SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: CONVERGENCE OR COMPETITION?

Security and development are increasingly regarded as overlapping policy fields. While their goals may intersect in view of the links between poverty, violent conflict, weak states, and terrorist challenges, they are not always congruent. The political challenge is increasingly to coordinate strategies and measures of security policy and development policy, without placing the fight against poverty one-sidedly into the service of peacebuilding.

Encounter between Afghan boy and British soldier   *Reuters / Ahmad Masood*

The interactions of security and development are frequently encapsulated in the maxim "No security without development, no development without security". From the security policy point of view, there has in recent years been a realization that development cooperation is a contribution towards conflict prevention. Actors in the field of development policy have realized that security is a core requirement for sustainable development. A closer linkage between these two policy fields is indispensable in view of these interactions. But it also creates fields of tension that have in recent years given rise to intense political debates.

Post-Cold War demarcation
The relationship between security policy and development cooperation has changed re-

peatedly. During the Cold War, the development cooperation policies of the superpowers were strongly shaped by the geopolitical and ideological confrontation between the Western and Eastern blocs. From the Western point of view, development cooperation was a means of containing Communism. Expenditures constantly increased during this period, but never reached the level of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) to which the OECD countries had committed themselves in 1970.

After the Communist threat vanished in 1989/91, the political instrumentalization of development cooperation diminished considerably. Development policy could thus be pursued with a greater degree of autonomy. The core task of combating pov-

erty now came to the fore. But the diminished role of ideological considerations also resulted in shrinking budgets. Between 1992 and 1997, expenditures on Official Development Assistance (ODA) by the OECD countries were reduced by 22 per cent to approximately US$60 billion. Nevertheless, the tendency towards separation from security policy was largely regarded by the development aid sector as an opportunity. It was believed that development efforts could gain efficiency in a more peaceful and less ideological environment, thus compensating for a loss of resources.

Identifying interdependencies
The dominant view of today that development and security are interdependent can be traced to negative experiences made in the mid-1990s: The failures of UN missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia exposed the limitations of conventional military crisis management in a threat environment shaped by domestic conflicts and highlighted the necessity of a comprehensive approach to security. At the same time, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda debunked the illusion that development was inherently neutral or conducive to conflict prevention.

At the conceptual level, the first consequence of this insight was the integration of the security-development nexus into basic documents of security and development policy. Secondly, the "Do No Harm" approach sensitized development actors to the potential effects of development cooperation as a conflict catalyst. Third, the human security concept emerged to serve

Trends in Official Development Assistance 1975–2007 (in millions of US$)

Total official development assistance by OECD/DAC countries (bi- and multilateral)
Bilateral share of official development assistance

Constant prices in 2006 US$ Source: OECD/DAC

as a common point of reference for security and development efforts. At the structural level, a large number of development agencies ensured that awareness of the security aspect of development policy activities was institutionalized through the creation of specific organizational units. The heightened awareness of the interdependencies between security and development as well as the fact that poverty reduction had proven an intractable problem, e.g. in Sub-Saharan Africa, resulted in a new increase of ODA from 1998 onwards.

The aftermath of 11 September 2001

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the experiences gained since in the fight against terrorism have reinforced the security-development nexus. However, due to the campaign against terrorism, the logic of security policy today dominates within this nexus. This logic places a premium on the preventive character of development cooperation and demands that it be subordinated to security-relevant goals. The underlying rationale is that development aid should contribute to creating an environment devoid of breeding grounds for terrorism. Development cooperation is also seen as a key instrument in stabilizing fragile states.

In 2005, ODA reached a new record level of US$109 billion – not least due to debt reduction measures that also caused a subsequent decrease of ODA. Further budgetary increases were promised that would add up to around US$130 billion by the year 2010. This trend towards increasing development expenditures is partially linked to efforts by donor countries to reach, by the year 2015, the targets defined in the framework of the UN Millennium Development Goals.

The extent of this increase could not be explained, however, without the linkage of

development cooperation to security interests, particularly since the lack of efficiency of poverty reduction strategies is increasingly criticized. An analysis of ODA distribution confirms the impact of security-political considerations. Important states in the campaign against terrorism, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan, benefit quite disproportionally from the increase in aid. It is also remarkable that the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2004 declared, under pressure from donor countries, that a number of security-relevant measures could be offset against ODA expenditures. Thus, contributions to security-sector reform, control of small arms and light weapons, or civilian peace-building efforts are considered as development expenditures.

Many development actors today advocate a role for development cooperation in the context of issues such as terrorism prevention or stabilization of fragile states. The latter, for example, is in line with the logic of both security policy and development policy: On the one hand, stabilization even of geographically remote crisis hotspots is a core task of security policy due to the transnational character of numerous threats and their increasing de-territorialization. On the other hand, stabilization is also desirable in the context of development policy, since outbreaks of violence disrupt development and make the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals impossible. The goals of security and development agendas partially intersect, which implies positive effects for both policy fields. The close interlocking of development and security policy also produces tension fields, however.

Tension fields and open questions

These tension fields relate in particular to the danger of development cooperation

being politically instrumentalized, to direct competition for resources between development and security policy aims, and to matters of geographical prioritization. Part of the development community is concerned that there is a danger of development policy once again being instrumentalized by security policy. The main concern is that such a process will lead to the core development target of reducing poverty being neglected in favor of short-term security interests.

Closely linked to these considerations is the fear of acute competition for resources between development and security policy and of a redistribution in favor of security political considerations, at the expense of development cooperation. Evidence of such misappropriation of development resources is seen in the EU's African Peace Facility, founded in 2003 to support peacekeeping missions by the African Union. The necessary funds were taken from the European Development Fund and were thus no longer available for actual development activities. This move, originally declared to be an exceptional solution, has now been institutionalized in the renewal of funding for the African Peace Facility for the period 2008–10. The possibility of offsetting ODA against security-related expenditures is criticized in a similar vein. The charge is that this is merely a way of alleviating pressure on defense expenditures by cross-financing security efforts with funds from the development budget.

The geographic selection of ODA recipients may also give rise to disagreements. At the core of the matter is the question of whether the focus of such efforts should be determined primarily by considerations of security policy or of development policy. The associated dilemmas can be illustrated with two examples. Of the total ODA transferred to 38 fragile states in 2006, more than half was given to only five recipient countries. If, despite massive aid expenditures, the results are sobering, such as in the case of Afghanistan, one may ask how justified and sensible it is to treat with relative neglect other states that are not in the focus of current security policy attention, but also urgently require support.

Opinions also diverge as to contributions to states in post-conflict situations. About 40 per cent of terminated violent conflicts flare up again within five years. In terms of security policy, it makes sense to stabi-

Swiss development, peace, and security policy: Focal points

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lize such crisis regions through rapid and sustained development aid. From a purely developmental point of view, however, such funds could be used more efficiently and with less risk of loss in more stable regions, where more consideration may be given to the factor of good governance. At this point, there are limitations in the convergence of goals between development and security policy. Donor countries are required to set clear political priorities. Only then can the efficiency of expenditures be audited and false expectations be avoided.

These fields of tensions show clearly that the goals of security and development policy, though convergent, are not always congruent. Where they do intersect, however, they create an indispensable potential for synergies in dealing with challenges. This should be exploited through coherent coordination of strategies, instruments, and activities in the interests of both security policy and development policy.

The debate in Switzerland

In Switzerland, the linkage of the security and development agendas has resulted primarily in closer cooperation between development policy and civilian peacebuilding. The international debate on the political instrumentalization of development cooperation has not resonated strongly at the domestic level. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) counts the advancement of human security and reduction of security risks among its goals, together with poverty reduction and efforts to shape globalization in a way that promotes development. Similarly, the Swiss federal government in its 2007 Bill to Parliament on Civilian Peacebuilding emphasizes the importance of common strategic targeting in peace-

building and development cooperation. There is thus a strong consensus at the political level that cooperation between development policy and security policy must be intensified. At the same time, there is broad agreement that poverty reduction should not be unilaterally subordinated to security policy or aimed exclusively at crisis regions.

Neither is the question of resources discussed against the background of intense competition between development and security policy for scarce funding. The ongoing debates mainly deal with the questions of how high Swiss contributions to development should be, and whether and how quickly Switzerland should raise these from a share of 0.37 per cent of GNI (2007) to the UN target level of 0.7 per cent. The intersection of these two policy fields has, however, been reflected to some extent in the current credit lines budgeted for development policy and civilian peacebuilding. Thus, the SDC's CHF4.5 billion credit line for 2009–12 anticipates expenditures of about CHF300 million, or 6.6 percent of the total, on efforts to promote human security and reduce security risks. Out of the approximately CHF53 million that the Swiss federal government spends annually on civilian peacebuilding and human rights promotion, around 90 per cent qualify as ODA. This is the equivalent of around 2.4 per cent of Switzerland's overall development aid expenditures.

The core challenges in implementing a coordinated approach to development and peace promotion policies are ensuring coherence and optimal use of synergies. At the level of projects and programs, progress has been made. Within the SDC, great importance is attributed to the "Do

No Harm" approach. Joint bodies of the SDC and the Directorate of Political Affairs within the Swiss Foreign Ministry, especially the Political Affairs Division IV, work to ensure that such efforts are coordinated. One example of the coherent use of instruments to promote development and peacebuilding is the Swiss engagement in Nepal, where the SDC and the Political Affairs Division IV jointly elaborated a sustainable basis for the Swiss contribution to the formulation of the 2006 peace agreement. The activities in the fields of development cooperation and of peacebuilding were supplemented by a military component in 2007, when five military observers were deployed to the region. Thus, the Swiss activities in Nepal constitute a "strategic chain of value added", with instruments of development policy being combined with civilian and military components and aligned towards a common goal.

This concept of a chain of value added should be given increased consideration in future planning of development and peacebuilding efforts in order to increase strategic coherence and identify possible synergies. This applies in particular to regional prioritization. Taking into account the different targets independently pursued by Swiss development and peacebuilding activities, it is not unreasonable if, following the geographic concentration process that is frequently demanded, their respective country focuses are not completely congruent. However, it is difficult to understand the particular lack of overlap between the priorities of the SDC's special programs that are focused on security issues and the topics emphasized in civilian peacebuilding and military peacekeeping. In this respect, some margin for future optimization remains if Switzerland's contributions to peace and development are to be conducted in the most efficient and comprehensive manner possible.