

that the city lacked the funds needed to deal with its transportation problems.

Ultimately it appears that it was not corruption, mis-spending, human rights abuses, destruction of Moscow's architectural legacy, traffic nightmares, etc. that led Medvedev to move against Luzhkov. It is also unlikely that charges will be brought against him or his wife, though the threat of such action could well be used to dissuade Luzhkov from attempting to resurrect his political career. The motive for the mayor's dismissal was the appearance of disloyalty caused by his public questioning of Medvedev's judgment in several recent appearances and newspaper articles. This turned Luzhkov's continuation in office into an embarrassing symbol of political impotence for Medvedev, and Medvedev succeeded in convincing Putin that this was an intolerable threat to the current system of political authority in Russia.

Managers Not Politicians

Sergei Sobianin, a deputy prime minister with a low public profile and close political ties to Vladimir Putin, was chosen to take on the Moscow portfolio. He differs from almost all of Medvedev's appointees in that he has successfully run for office three times: mayor of a small town, then deputy to the Khanty-Mansi regional

assembly, and then governor of Tiumen' oblast. In other respects, though, the choice is typical. Usually the new governors represent a younger generation, born about 20 years later than their predecessors. Like other new governors, Sobianin has no reputation as a reformer or an anticorruption crusader, and even before taking office he announced that he would make no radical personnel changes in the Moscow city government. The main selection criterion for regional leaders appears to be experience in *gospravlenie*—state management. This results in appointees who are often unknown to the region's population, but who demonstrate administrative skills and loyalty to the Kremlin.

Thus, newly named governors are bureaucrats rather than politicians. This would seem to be a perfect match for a political system in which governors are simply an intermediary link in a chain of decision-making. In fact, though, governors face political challenges and need to possess political skills, even if they don't need to run for reelection. Successful regional government still requires governors who can take the initiative, convince other officials and the public to support a political program, and reach an accommodation with opponents. Eliminating elections at such a high level of political responsibility invites a catastrophic mismatch between capabilities and job requirements.

About the Author

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ANALYSIS

State-Building and Political Integration in Ingushetia and Chechnya (1991–2009)

By Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Bremen

Abstract

In explaining the different state-building outcomes in Chechnya and Ingushetia, the author argues that clan (*teip*) ties do not play the defining role. Instead, state-building has an impact on factors which shape the composition of the elite by dictating criteria for their recruitment. It also has an impact on the system of checks and balances and the strength of the opposition. The factors influencing the nature of ties within government include five patterns of integration: descent (clanship), kinship, territory, religion, and ideology. Additionally, integrative patterns such as acquaintances, colleagues, friends and professionals are important. The prominence of each factor depends on elite choices and the demands of the state-building project.

Two Different Outcomes

The Northern Caucasus has become infamous as the most tumultuous area in the Russian Federation. The

political and economic changes that took place in the late 1980s had extremely disruptive effects on this part of the country and the most recent decade has seen a

period of instability, conflict and war. Chechnya was among several regions which challenged Russia's state integrity in the early 1990s and in 1994 it became the only republic where a separatist movement engaged in a full-blown war. Ingushetia, like many national regions of the USSR, was caught up in an intense nationalist struggle for its own republican statehood, but it also slipped into ferocious armed conflict with North Ossetia in October 1992.

Between 1991 and 2009 the political elites in these two Vainakh regions (Vainakh is the common ethonym of the Chechens and Ingush) undertook several attempts to create unified, effective, well-ordered polities. The Ingush Republic in 1994–2001 achieved precarious political stability, weak economic recovery and remarkable regime consolidation while Chechnya's efforts at state-building failed, and Chechen militants provoked a second round of destructive military confrontation with Russia when they invaded neighboring Dagestan in August 1999.

Rejecting Clan-Based Explanations

Most observers explain the different outcomes in Chechnya and Ingushetia by the adversarial vs. accommodative patterns of their relations with the Russian federal government. A case in point is the conflict in Chechnya, which is predominantly analyzed as a continuous struggle among the Chechens and Russians over power and land. The fragmentation and social complexity of the Chechen and Ingush societies, as well as their late and uneven modernization are also included among the factors that destabilize politics in the two republics and impede effective state-building. The survival of primordial structures, such as *teips* (clans), is thought to account for government failures and impotent policy-making in the region. It is now conventional wisdom that clan structures play a pivotal role in the political process and that any effective policy-making dealing with Chechnya should take into account the clan factor.

My argument both supplements and opposes the literature on clan politics in the region. This school of thought claims that regime transition and state-building in Central Asia and the Caucasus is shaped by and organized around clans—pre-existing informal identity organizations based on kinship (Collins 1996: 24, Schatz 2005, Sultan 2003). Maria Sultan, for example, claims that Chechen society is tribal and its integration into a modern Russian nation-state is essentially impossible (Sultan 2003).

Although such explanations may sound convincing, little or no research has been offered so far on what these primordial social structures are, whether they have transformed over time, how they function and interact

with the state and which other formal/informal patterns of social interaction have played an important, if not a decisive, role in post-Soviet state-building in Ingushetia and Chechnya.

A New Research Agenda

The author's research into state-building in Chechnya and Ingushetia has two goals: to assess the relative role of kin-based, but also religious, ideological, territorial and political structures in projects aimed at establishing and consolidating indigenous political units in Ingushetia and Chechnya, and to identify the principal internal reasons for the relative success or failure of these projects. I contrast two models of state-building. One is based on trust networks and socially-heterogenous groups driven by modern ideologies, programs and/or economic and political interests. The other one regards as protagonists the pre-existing organic social groups based on primordial bonds of real or fictive kinship.

My initial hypothesis draws on the clan politics claim. I hypothesize that polity-building in Chechnya and Ingushetia was determined by interactions with clans. However, as a result of extensive fieldwork (5-year-long participant observation, interviews with experts, and an analysis of historical data and modern political processes), I gathered enough evidence to reject this hypothesis.

I argue that as a result of demographic growth and social change brought about by colonization, Soviet modernization, and forced resettlements, clans (*teips*) have ceased to function as patterns of political integration of any prominence. Already in the 18th century *teips*, as social organizations, were weakened due to population growth and migration from the mountains to the lowlands. In the 19th century *teips* were further dispersed as both Imam Shamil and the Imperial forces resettled large numbers of people. Moreover, the creation of the Imamate, a theocratic state in Chechnya, produced social differentiation and ideological divisions within *teips*. After the end of the Caucasian War in 1864 political power in the region belonged to the Russian administration, which diminished the role of the traditional Chechen and Ingush institutions and customary law in the public sphere.

The Bolsheviks set up the first state which aimed to penetrate the family structure, submerge all competing power centers and to establish a monopoly on rule-making. Collectivization destroyed the economic basis of Chechen and Ingush extended families. The Stalinist deportation of the Chechen and Ingush people, their dispersion across vast territories of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzia and the subsequent return from exile, during which settlement to certain areas was restricted, were further

blows to *teip*-structures. Ethnic competition, which resulted from the mass resettlement of Russian-speaking people in Chechnya-Ingushetia during the years of deportation institutionalized ethnicity, enhanced group cohesion among Chechen and Ingush communities and weakened the significance of sub-ethnic divisions.

My ethnographic findings confirm the conclusions of this historical analysis. Fieldwork was carried out between 2008–2009: I settled in the region, took up a position at a local NGO in Ingushetia and became a lecturer at the history department of Chechen State University with a local salary and lifestyle. I shared flats with refugees in Nazran or stayed with Chechen families in Grozny, commuted by public transport (a remarkable milieu for political debates), shopped in local markets and got hair-cuts at local salons. Everywhere I talked to people. My job at the Memorial human rights group involved working with victims of rights abuse in Chechnya, Ingushetia and the Prigorodny Region of North Ossetia and required a lot of travel, sometimes to distant high mountainous settlements. Moreover, it allowed me to observe specific families, villages, and individuals in different situations over extended periods of time. Based on my fieldwork, I came to the conclusion that *teip* is not a relevant social organization within contemporary Vainakh societies. Mechanisms for maintaining the cohesion of Vainakh *teip* have disappeared; instead it remains a loose identity, to which different people attach different significance. Daily routines of Chechen and Ingush individuals are to a greater extent shaped by close kin, religious groups, regional/village identities and ideological orientations. Coupled with personal networks of acquaintances, colleagues and friends, these may be constitutive of a person's "inner circle," which one uses when necessary for gaining employment or acquiring social goods.

State-Building

The third element of my study is a detailed top-down analysis of five state-building projects in Ingushetia and

Chechnya. These are the nationalist project in Chechnya of 1991–1994, the Islamist state-building efforts in Chechnya between 1997 and 1999, democratic state-building in Ingushetia in 1992–2001, the predatory regime of Murat Zyazikov in Ingushetia (2002–2008), and the sultanistic regime in Chechnya of the Kadyrovs (2003–present).

The case studies illustrate that clans do not play any significant role in the process of state-building in Vainakh societies. Rather, the political process is shaped by agency, integrated on the basis of ideology, program, religion or economic and military interests. Moreover, the strength of ties among the elites does not covary with kinship despite the expectations to the contrary. The case studies show that institutional constraints and political contexts shape the relevance of strong ties among the governmental elites.

I argue that the model of elite composition and the nature of ties within the government is the following (See Figure 1 on p. 7): state-building has an impact on factors which shape the composition of the elite by dictating certain criteria for their recruitment. It also has an impact on the system of checks and balances (via constitutional design and law) and on opposition (sultanistic and predatory states do not leave room for opposition). The factors influencing the nature of these ties within government include five patterns of integration (descent [clanship], kinship, territory, religion, ideology) together with some other integrative patterns (acquaintances, colleagues, friends and professionals). The prominence of each factor depends on elite choices and the demands of the state-building project. The nature of the ties depends on systemic constraints such as checks and balances and the existence of opposition, as well as the political risk environment. High risk of physical elimination or prosecution for economic crimes tends to strengthen the ties within the government. Elites, in turn, can alter the systemic constraints and reduce or increase risks by their policies.

About the Author:

Ekaterina Sokirianskaia holds a Ph.D. in political science from Central European University in Budapest. She has worked with the Memorial human rights center in the North Caucasus since 2003. During 2003–2006, she was an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the History Department of the Chechen State University in Grozny. Currently she is a senior researcher working on the North Caucasus in Memorial, and a Gerda Henkel fellow at the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen, and continues to regularly carry out field missions to the North Caucasus.

Recommended Reading

- Collins, K. 2006. *Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schatz, E. 2004. *Modern Clan Politics. The Power of "Blood" in Kazakhstan and Beyond*, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Sultan, M. 2003. "The quest for peace in Chechnya: the relevance of Pakistan's Tribal Areas experience," *Central Asian Survey*, December, 22(4), 437–457.

Figure 1: Elite Composition and the Nature of Ties Within the Government




Diagram by Ekaterina Sokirianskaia

ANALYSIS

Political Parties in Dagestan and the October 2010 Local Elections

By Arbakhan Magomedov, Ulyanovsk

Abstract

Overall, United Russia dominated the local elections in Dagestan on 10 October 2010. However, since its leaders are typically the most important public officials at the local level, the party has also become a target for voter dissatisfaction.

Party-System Standout

The republics of the North Caucasus have much in common with regard to their political party systems and parliamentary representations. However, Dagestan differs from the other North Caucasus republics in the unprec-

edented number of parties that took part in the 10 October 2010 local elections. On that day a record 14,991 candidates participated in the elections for 7,055 executive and legislative branch positions at the raion, city, and village levels. The 10 October voting included 9 may-