REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Medvedev and the Governors

By Darrell Slider, Tampa

Abstract

Medvedev's removal of important governors, culminating with Moscow's Yuri Luzhkov, marks a departure from the more incumbent-friendly policies of Putin. This new cadre policy suggests a confidence that Moscow can pick regional leaders that will be just as effective as their predecessors. However, the new leaders are managers rather than politicians and it remains unclear that they will have the necessary skills to deal with the challenges they face.

A Turning Point in Center–Periphery Relations

The replacement of Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov with Sergei Sobianin marks a watershed in Russian politics. While it was unlikely that Luzhkov would have been reappointed when his term expired in July 2011, his early departure changes much in the political dynamics of the country. It sent a message that even the most powerful regional leader could be removed from power in short order, and Dmitry Medvedev made this point explicitly in Shanghai when answering questions about his decision.

The legal framework allowing the president to dismiss regional leaders dates back to the 2004 decision by Vladimir Putin to end popular elections to that post. Yet Putin was reluctant to exercise this power, preferring a Brezhnev-like principle of "stability in cadres," especially for the leaders of critical or problematic regions. In fact, it could be argued that the decision to eliminate elections of governors was in part designed to allow key regional leaders to remain in place in spite of approaching term limits. (Under those provisions, adopted in 1999, regional executives could serve only two terms in office, not counting terms served prior to the law being passed. Once the post became an appointed one, term limits were eliminated.)

Putin's much vaunted "vertical of authority" subjected regional leaders to increased controls over their activity from the center, especially in the financial/budgetary sphere. But the nature of the arrangement in fact granted significant freedom of action to at least some regional leaders. The ad hoc nature of the Kremlin's dealings with the regions, often described in positive terms as the application of "manual controls" (as in driving with a stick shift rather than an automatic transmission), was based on a bargain that gave the greatest privileges to the strongest regional leaders. For their part, powerful governors were expected to show political support and personal loyalty to Putin and the Kremlin. In federal and regional elections they delivered overwhelming majorities to United Russia. In return, they were allowed to preside over their well-entrenched networks of allies in key administrative and economic positions. Questions were rarely raised about corruption or violations of federal laws in these regions, which made a mockery of justifications sometimes given for the imposition of Putin's "vertical."

Medvedev's New Direction

What is new about the Medvedev presidency is that he has been willing to abrogate Putin's deals with regional "heavyweights". The new approach debuted in February 2009 with the forced resignation of Orel province's Yegor Stroev, the oldest and one of the most honored of Russia's regional leaders. He had been in charge of the oblast since 1985 when he became communist party first secretary, and he also served as speaker of the Federation Council prior to Putin's overhaul of that body in 2000. Stroev was replaced, not with a member of his team, but an outsider—Alexander Kozlov, a deputy minister of agriculture at the federal level who had no ties to the region. Several of Stroev's top associates were subsequently charged with abuse of office.

In the past year Medvedev demanded the resignation of several other, more powerful regional politicians who had been elected in the early or mid-1990s. These were Sverdlovsk's Eduard Rossel' (forced out in November 2009), Tatarstan's Mintimer Shaimiev (December 2009), and Bashkortostan's Murtaz Rakhimov (July 2010). Unlike Luzhkov, all of them accepted the "voluntary" path of resignation in exchange for modest symbolic compensation in the form of appointments to the Federation Council or other token positions. These decisions were often preceded by a brief campaign in the national media "exposing" corruption and shady deals in the target regions. Negotiations between regional leaders and the Kremlin may have included grants of immunity from prosecution (there were reports of this in Rakhimov's case).

Medvedev announced at the beginning of the year that he would, as a general rule, seek to replace any regional leader who had completed three or more terms in office. This pattern of forced retirement demonstrates that the Kremlin under Medvedev has much greater con-

fidence that it is capable of finding replacements who could manage the regions at least as well as the incumbents. The only leader of those mentioned above who was influential enough to dictate his successor was Shaimiev; he was able to get his right-hand man appointed, then Prime Minister Rustam Minnikhanov. In the other cases, the replacements were brought in from outside the entourage of the ex-leader. Rakhimov was replaced by Rustem Khamitov, a manager of RusHydro, the largest producer of hydroelectrical power in Russia. Alexander Misharin, successor to Eduard Rossel', had worked in as a railroad official in Sverdlovsk at various points in his career, but since 2004 had held transportation and infrastructure-related posts in the Russian government.

The Luzhkov Decision

The decision to fire Yuri Luzhkov is of a different order of magnitude, given the importance of Moscow in Russian political life. The city is home to over 10 million residents (that is the official tabulation, many more live there in reality), which constitutes a significant percentage of the total Russian electorate. Economically, Moscow contributes roughly 20% of the national GDP. It is second only to New York in having the largest concentration of billionaires—50 in 2010 according to the Forbes' list—and tens of thousands of millionaires. As the site for the headquarters of most of Russia's major companies, Moscow benefits from profits earned in other parts of the country where the mineral resources and factories are actually located. The prosperity of the city is reflected in the prices of housing and office space, which are among the highest in the world. In spite of the high cost of living, the city attracts countless young and ambitious migrants from all of Russia, creating an internal "brain drain" that hinders the development of other regions.

Much of the city's development can be credited to the energetic leadership of Yuri Luzhkov. He took over the city government in 1992 with the endorsement of President Boris Yeltsin, who, as first secretary of the Moscow party committee, had promoted Luzhkov to his first important post in the city administration in 1987. While Luzhkov's education and background were in the chemical and plastics industry, he quickly became known for his large-scale construction projects. Many of these were controversial: they were expensive, sometimes he destroyed historic buildings in the process, and the projects were often of questionable aesthetic value. He added to Moscow's transportation infrastructure through major new road construction, though even this was criticized since the city's traffic only got worse over time. Construction and development was controversial for another reason: the role of nepotism and corruption in the awarding of permits and construction contracts. It soon became known that one of the billionaires living in the city was none other than Luzhkov's wife, Yelena Baturina, who headed what came to be the largest construction company in Russia, Inteko. Her business benefited from favorable treatment from city officials supervising construction under the control of her husband. Meanwhile, other businesses, large and small and in all spheres of activity, suffered from oppressive bureaucratic obstacles and accompanying corruption that were among the worst in all of Russia.

Despite the controversies, Luzhkov was always in the national political limelight and made a serious run for the presidency in the closing months of the Yeltsin era. The party he organized in 1999 became one of the founding components of Putin's party, United Russia, and he served at least nominally as one of the triumvirate of party leaders until his resignation. Putin had a particular logic for retaining Luzhkov as mayor. Luzhkov remained popular with Muscovites, especially senior citizens for whom he created a series of material benefits including a "Moscow supplement" that was added to residents' pensions. With this reservoir of support behind him, Luzhkov has championed the cause of popular elections for regional leaders—even before he was dismissed. He was also adept at using his administrative levers to achieve victories for Putin's party, United Russia, that went far beyond the actual distribution of political preferences in the city. The culmination came in October 2009, when Luzhkov managed to achieve total dominance for United Russia in the city duma—32 of 35 seats. For Putin and his chief ideologue Vladislav Surkov, maintaining stability and control in the capital was an obsession; it was an essential component of a strategy to prevent a "colored revolution" in Russia. This also explains the zeal with which Luzhkov sought to prevent opposition demonstrations in the city and his willingness to call in OMON special forces on a massive scale to break up even small "unauthorized" rallies.

The extent of Moscow's "special status" was certainly known to federal authorities, but they spoke openly of it only when Luzhkov was gone. Russian Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin revealed that the Moscow leadership, in violation of Russian law, adopted one in four decisions in secret. It is estimated that between 1998 and 2009 Luzhkov's government illegally classified "for internal use only" over 14,000 decrees and resolutions. Moscow, like other "donor" regions such as Tatarstan and St. Petersburg, has had additional flexibility in the use of city revenues. Kudrin, again only after the resignation, revealed that Moscow had invested "billions of dollars" in private businesses such as an airline, banks, and construction companies—all the while claiming

that the city lacked the funds needed to deal with its transportation problems.

Ultimately it appears that it was not corruption, misspending, human rights abuses, destruction of Moscow's architectural legacy, traffic nightmares, etc. that led Medvedev to move against Luzhkov. It is also unlikely that charges will be brought against him or his wife, though the threat of such action could well be used to dissuade Luzhkov from attempting to resurrect his political career. The motive for the mayor's dismissal was the appearance of disloyalty caused by his public questioning of Medvedev's judgment in several recent appearances and newspaper articles. This turned Luzhkov's continuation in office into an embarrassing symbol of political impotence for Medvedev, and Medvedev succeeded in convincing Putin that this was an intolerable threat to the current system of political authority in Russia.

Managers Not Politicians

Sergei Sobianin, a deputy prime minister with a low public profile and close political ties to Vladimir Putin, was chosen to take on the Moscow portfolio. He differs from almost all of Medvedev's appointees in that he has successfully run for office three times: mayor of a small town, then deputy to the Khanty-Mansi regional assembly, and then governor of Tiumen' oblast. In other respects, though, the choice is typical. Usually the new governors represent a younger generation, born about 20 years later than their predecessors. Like other new governors, Sobianin has no reputation as a reformer or an anticorruption crusader, and even before taking office he announced that he would make no radical personnel changes in the Moscow city government. The main selection criterion for regional leaders appears to be experience in *gosupravlenie*—state management. This results in appointees who are often unknown to the region's population, but who demonstrate administrative skills and loyalty to the Kremlin.

Thus, newly named governors are bureaucrats rather than politicians. This would seem to be a perfect match for a political system in which governors are simply an intermediary link in a chain of decision-making. In fact, though, governors face political challenges and need to possess political skills, even if they don't need to run for reelection. Successful regional government still requires governors who can take the initiative, convince other officials and the public to support a political program, and reach an accommodation with opponents. Eliminating elections at such a high level of political responsibility invites a catastrophic mismatch between capabilities and job requirements.

About the Author
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ANALYSIS

State-Building and Political Integration in Ingushetia and Chechnya (1991–2009)

By Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Bremen

Abstract

In explaining the different state-building outcomes in Chechnya and Ingushetia, the author argues that clan (*teip*) ties do not play the defining role. Instead, state-building has an impact on factors which shape the composition of the elite by dictating criteria for their recruitment. It also has an impact on the system of checks and balances and the strength of the opposition. The factors influencing the nature of ties within government include five patterns of integration: descent (clanship), kinship, territory, religion, and ideology. Additionally, integrative patterns such as acquaintances, colleagues, friends and professionals are important. The prominence of each factor depends on elite choices and the demands of the state-building project.

Two Different Outcomes

The Northern Caucasus has become infamous as the most tumultuous area in the Russian Federation. The political and economic changes that took place in the late 1980s had extremely disruptive effects on this part of the country and the most recent decade has seen a

period of instability, conflict and war. Chechnya was among several regions which challenged Russia's state integrity in the early 1990s and in 1994 it became the only republic where a separatist movement engaged in a full-blown war. Ingushetia, like many national regions of the USSR, was caught up in an intense nationalist struggle for its own republican statehood, but it also slipped into ferocious armed conflict with North Ossetia in October 1992.

Between 1991 and 2009 the political elites in these two Vainakh regions (Vainakh is the common ethonym of the Chechens and Ingush) undertook several attempts to create unified, effective, well-ordered polities. The Ingush Republic in 1994–2001 achieved precarious political stability, weak economic recovery and remarkable regime consolidation while Chechnya's efforts at state-building failed, and Chechen militants provoked a second round of destructive military confrontation with Russia when they invaded neighboring Dagestan in August 1999.

Rejecting Clan-Based Explanations
Most observers explain the different outcomes in Chechnya and Ingushetia by the adversarial vs. accommodative patterns of their relations with the Russian federal government. A case in point is the conflict in Chechnya, which is predominantly analyzed as a continuous struggle among the Chechens and Russians over power and land. The fragmentation and social complexity of the Chechen and Ingush societies, as well as their late and uneven modernization are also included among the factors that destabilize politics in the two republics and impede effective state-building. The survival of primordial structures, such as *teips* (clans), is thought to account for government failures and impotent policy-making in the region. It is now conventional wisdom that clan structures play a pivotal role in the political process and that any effective policy-making dealing with Chechnya should take into account the clan factor.

My argument both supplements and opposes the literature on clan politics in the region. This school of thought claims that regime transition and state-building in Central Asia and the Caucasus is shaped by and organized around clans—pre-existing informal identity organizations based on kinship (Collins 1996: 24, Schatz 2005, Sultan 2003). Maria Sultan, for example, claims that Chechen society is tribal and its integration into a modern Russian nation-state is essentially impossible (Sultan 2003).

Although such explanations may sound convincing, little or no research has been offered so far on what these primordial social structures are, whether they have transformed over time, how they function and interact

with the state and which other formal/informal patterns of social interaction have played an important, if not a decisive, role in post-Soviet state-building in Ingushetia and Chechnya.

A New Research Agenda
The author's research into state-building in Chechnya and Ingushetia has two goals: to assess the relative role of kin-based, but also religious, ideological, territorial and political structures in projects aimed at establishing and consolidating indigenous political units in Ingushetia and Chechnya, and to identify the principal internal reasons for the relative success or failure of these projects. I contrast two models of state-building. One is based on trust networks and socially-heterogenous groups driven by modern ideologies, programs and/or economic and political interests. The other one regards as protagonists the pre-existing organic social groups based on primordial bonds of real or fictive kinship.

My initial hypothesis draws on the clan politics claim. I hypothesize that polity-building in Chechnya and Ingushetia was determined by interactions with clans. However, as a result of extensive fieldwork (5-year-long participant observation, interviews with experts, and an analysis of historical data and modern political processes), I gathered enough evidence to reject this hypothesis.

I argue that as a result of demographic growth and social change brought about by colonization, Soviet modernization, and forced resettlements, clans (*teips*) have ceased to function as patterns of political integration of any prominence. Already in the 18th century *teips*, as social organizations, were weakened due to population growth and migration from the mountains to the lowlands. In the 19th century *teips* were further dispersed as both Imam Shamil and the Imperial forces resettled large numbers of people. Moreover, the creation of the Imamate, a theocratic state in Chechnya, produced social differentiation and ideological divisions within *teips*. After the end of the Caucasian War in 1864 political power in the region belonged to the Russian administration, which diminished the role of the traditional Chechen and Ingush institutions and customary law in the public sphere.

The Bolsheviks set up the first state which aimed to penetrate the family structure, submerge all competing power centers and to establish a monopoly on rule-making. Collectivization destroyed the economic basis of Chechen and Ingush extended families. The Stalinist deportation of the Chechen and Ingush people, their dispersion across vast territories of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzia and the subsequent return from exile, during which settlement to certain areas was restricted, were further

blows to *teip*-structures. Ethnic competition, which resulted from the mass resettlement of Russian-speaking people in Chechnya-Ingushetia during the years of deportation institutionalized ethnicity, enhanced group cohesion among Chechen and Ingush communities and weakened the significance of sub-ethnic divisions.

My ethnographic findings confirm the conclusions of this historical analysis. Fieldwork was carried out between 2008–2009: I settled in the region, took up a position at a local NGO in Ingushetia and became a lecturer at the history department of Chechen State University with a local salary and lifestyle. I shared flats with refugees in Nazran or stayed with Chechen families in Grozny, commuted by public transport (a remarkable milieu for political debates), shopped in local markets and got hair-cuts at local salons. Everywhere I talked to people. My job at the Memorial human rights group involved working with victims of rights abuse in Chechnya, Ingushetia and the Prigorodny Region of North Ossetia and required a lot of travel, sometimes to distant high mountainous settlements. Moreover, it allowed me to observe specific families, villages, and individuals in different situations over extended periods of time. Based on my fieldwork, I came to the conclusion that *teip* is not a relevant social organization within contemporary Vainakh societies. Mechanisms for maintaining the cohesion of Vainakh *teip* have disappeared; instead it remains a loose identity, to which different people attach different significance. Daily routines of Chechen and Ingush individuals are to a greater extent shaped by close kin, religious groups, regional/village identities and ideological orientations. Coupled with personal networks of acquaintances, colleagues and friends, these may be constitutive of a person's "inner circle," which one uses when necessary for gaining employment or acquiring social goods.

State-Building

The third element of my study is a detailed top–down analysis of five state-building projects in Ingushetia and Chechnya. These are the nationalist project in Chechnya of 1991–1994, the Islamist state-building efforts in Chechnya between 1997 and 1999, democratic state-building in Ingushetia in 1992–2001, the predatory regime of Murat Zyazikov in Ingushetia (2002–2008), and the sultanistic regime in Chechnya of the Kadyrovs (2003–present).

The case studies illustrate that clans do not play any significant role in the process of state-building in Vainakh societies. Rather, the political process is shaped by agency, integrated on the basis of ideology, program, religion or economic and military interests. Moreover, the strength of ties among the elites does not covary with kinship despite the expectations to the contrary. The case studies show that institutional constraints and political contexts shape the relevance of strong ties among the governmental elites.

I argue that the model of elite composition and the nature of ties within the government is the following (See Figure 1 on p. 7): state-building has an impact on factors which shape the composition of the elite by dictating certain criteria for their recruitment. It also has an impact on the system of checks and balances (via constitutional design and law) and on opposition (sultanistic and predatory states do not leave room for opposition). The factors influencing the nature of these ties within government include five patterns of integration (descent [clanship], kinship, territory, religion, ideology) together with some other integrative patterns (acquaintances, colleagues, friends and professionals). The prominence of each factor depends on elite choices and the demands of the state-building project. The nature of the ties depends on systemic constraints such as checks and balances and the existence of opposition, as well as the political risk environment. High risk of physical elimination or prosecution for economic crimes tends to strengthen the ties within the government. Elites, in turn, can alter the systemic constraints and reduce or increase risks by their policies.

About the Author:
Ekaterina Sokirianskaia holds a Ph.D. in political science from Central European University in Budapest. She has worked with the Memorial human rights center in the North Caucasus since 2003. During 2003–2006, she was an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the History Department of the Chechen State University in Grozny. Currently she is a senior researcher working on the North Caucasus in Memorial, and a Gerda Henkel fellow at the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen, and continues to regularly carry out field missions to the North Caucasus.

Recommended Reading
- Collins, K. 2006. *Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schatz, E. 2004. *Modern Clan Politics. The Power of "Blood" in Kazakhstan and Beyond,* Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Sultan, M. 2003. "The quest for peace in Chechnya: the relevance of Pakistan's Tribal Areas experience," *Central Asian Survey,* December, 22(4), 437–457.

## Figure 1: Elite Composition and the Nature of Ties Within the Government

Diagram by Ekaterina Sokirianskaia

Political Parties in Dagestan and the October 2010 Local Elections

By Arbakhan Magomedov, Ulyanovsk

Abstract

Overall, United Russia dominated the local elections in Dagestan on 10 October 2010. However, since its leaders are typically the most important public officials at the local level, the party has also become a target for voter dissatisfaction.

Party-System Standout

The republics of the North Caucasus have much in common with regard to their political party systems and parliamentary representations. However, Dagestan differs from the other North Caucasus republics in the unprec-

edented number of parties that took part in the 10 October 2010 local elections. On that day a record 14,991 candidates participated in the elections for 7,055 executive and legislative branch positions at the raion, city, and village levels. The 10 October voting included 9 may-

oral elections, 36 elections to city and raion legislatures, 463 elections for village mayors and 583 elections for village councils. On a day when six other regions across Russia elected members to their regional legislatures, Dagestan boasted the most candidates even though it was not electing its republican legislature. Dagestan also had the most people participating in its electoral commissions, which run the voting process, according to Vladimir Churov, chairman of Russia's Central Electoral Commission.

Dagestan's party system has the most parties represented in its parliament, where five political parties hold seats. In the 2007 elections, Putin's party United Russia won 63.67% of the vote. Just Russia won 10.68%, the Agrarian Party of Russia 9.12%, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 13%, and the Patriots of Russia, 7.07%. Thus, of the 72 seats in Dagestan's legislature, United Russia holds 47, Just Russia 8, the Agrarian Party 7, and 5 seats each for the Communists and Patriots.

Weak Parties

In Dagestan a key feature of the party system is that there are only weak links between the regional branches of the Russian political parties and the candidates representing them. In a meeting with representatives of the political parties on 2 September 2010, republican electoral commission chairman Magomed Dibirov expressed concern about the situation and called on the parties to take greater responsibility for the actions of their candidates.

A second feature of the party system is that in the 10 October elections, members of United Russia preferred to participate as independent candidates. Initially, according to the republic's official newspapers, United Russia nominated 5,215 candidates (34.7%), Right Cause 1,112 (7.4%), Communists 819 (5.4%), Patriots 638 (4.2%), Just Russia 602 (4%), LDPR 471 (2.7%), and Yabloko 52 (0.3%). In addition, there were 6,132 (40.9%) independent candidates. Several days later, RIA Novosti reported a different set of statistics, this time claiming that United Russia made up 71.9% of the candidates, Right Cause 15.7%, Communists 11.6%, Just Russia 8.5%, Patriots 8.3%, LDPR 5.9%, and Yabloko 0.7%. This game with the statistics suggests that United Russia is losing authority in the republic, according to journalists at the independent newspaper *Novoe delo*.

One member of the regional legislature said, on condition of anonymity, "I know that many of the independent candidates are actually members of United Russia. They prefer to run as independents because many leaders of United Russia are mayors in their cities and villages and they run their offices like separate king-

doms. Neither the people nor other party members trust them." Likewise one of the independent candidates noted, also on condition of anonymity, that "In our raion, the United Russia party is not popular because its leader has been our mayor for a year – he is completely incompetent and is only able to embezzle from the local budget. Before the election, he single-handedly prepared the list of candidates, including only people who were personally loyal to him. However, there are numerous problems in our area that no one is trying to address and I decided to run as an independent. Several of my friends did the same. The head of the raion was very unhappy, but so far he has not said anything to us" (*Novoe delo*, Makhachkala, 2 September).

The campaign was unprecedented not only in its scale, but the extent of the security measures that the authorities took to prevent any disorder. In addition to installing video cameras in several raions, they placed metal detectors at the entrance to the voting halls. In Babayurtov Raion, they even placed tanks outside the polls. There were numerous public protests during the campaign and even three murders, including the mayor of the large village of Khadzhalmakhi in Levashin Raion, the head of the electoral commission in Novolak Raion, and a relative of a candidate running for a council seat in Babayurtov Raion.

As usually happens during electoral campaigns, all seven of Dagestan's political parties signed a declaration calling for honest elections on 6 August. But this declaration had little impact on the campaign. In fact, in order to deal with the difficult situation surrounding the voting, the republican government set up a special working group headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Rizvan Kurbanov and the presidential administration set up a separate group whose members included representatives of the procurator's office.

Predictable Results

The United Russia party won the October elections, considerably improving its representation in the republic's elected bodies and convincingly confirming its reputation as the leading political force. The party scored its best results in the big cities of Makhachkala and Derbent where its members Said Amirov and Imam Yaraliev, both incumbents, won.

On election day, Makhachkala's markets and streets were unusually quiet. Amirov gained 96% of the votes, a result that surprised no one, given his personal influence and extensive control over the city's administrative resources. The only thing that threatened him was voter apathy. In fact, only 105,000 out of 300,000 potential voters, approximately one third, bothered to turn out. And that is according to official data (*Chernovik*,

Makhachkala, 15 October). In Derbent about 96%, the same as in Makhachkala, voted for Yaraliev. Both Amirov and Yaraliev belong to the constellation of heavy weights in Dagestan who can win elections regardless of the party competition on the basis of their personal charisma alone. In addition to United Russia, following the elections four other parties will be represented in the Makhachkala and Derbent city councils: Just Russia, the Communists, Patriots of Russia, and Right Cause.

Electoral Surprises: Party Duels and United Russia Failures

United Russia faced its greatest troubles in southern Dagestan. There was a particularly intense battle between parties in Kaitag Raion, where the Patriots of Russia, headed by Alim Temurbulatov, edged United Russia 22.5% to 21.47%, even though United Russia had the open support of the republican presidential administration. In the up-coming battle for the mayor's post, the Patriots will have the support of the Communists, who trailed close behind United Russia for third place with 18.56% of the vote.

There was also an intense party battle in the city of Dagestanskie Ogni. There United Russia, led by Galim Galimov, lost the fight for leadership of the city council to Just Russia, whose list was led by Mayor Magomed Gafarov. Just Russia took 38.57% of the vote, while United Russia won 33.58%, giving Just Russia 7 seats and United Russia 6. The Patriots of Russia and Right Cause also won seats. Five days before the voting, United Russia's Galimov said that the republican president supported him. The results were so surprising for the republican authorities that on 12 October the deputy speaker of the republican parliament Nikolai Alchiev arrived with the goal of convincing the new members of the city council to support Galimov. However, the local Patriots had already thrown their two votes behind Just Russia's Gafarov.

Another dark, but typical, side of Dagestani politics is the use of violence. The most notable incident occurred just before election day in Levashin Raion. As noted above, it ended in the death of Khadzhalmakhi mayor Abdulmuslim Nurmagomedov. On the eve of the elections, some of the ballots went missing. On 10 October, during the delivery of new ballots, an argument took place between Nurmagomedov and opposition-supporters among the village's residents, leading to a massive riot with more than 500 participants. In the course of the fighting someone shot and mortally wounded Nurmagomedov. Two others were seriously wounded. To this list can be added the murder on 22 August of a relative of the Communist candidate in the Babayurtov Raion, after which the Communists refused to participate in the elections. Also on 27 August Suleiman Gadzhimuradov, the head of the Novolak Raion electoral commission was murdered.

Communists Reject Results

The Communist Party's republican committee refused to recognize the results of the 10 October elections, describing them as a "farce." According to the Communist Party, the elections were characterized by the criminal methods that had been common during the 1990s. They declared that the lawlessness in the republic deprived people of the possibility of influencing the situation through legal methods. This announcement was made in response to the conflict in the Babayurtov Raion, where the Communists did not have a chance to participate in the elections.

Overall, the republican authorities were satisfied with the results of the 10 October elections. But their worries are far from over. Dagestan will elect the members of its legislature in March 2011.

About the Author
Arbakhan Magomedov is the chairman of the Department of Public Relations at Ulyanovsk State University and a frequent visitor to Dagestan.

The Political Survivability of Selected Russian Governors

29 of the 83 Subjects of the Russian Federation were chosen for this rating. All governors with a low rating (2) were included, as well as a cross section of governors with higher ratings. Experts ranked the governors using a five-point scale ranging from 5 – strong position to 1 – weak position (theoretically; after the dismissal of Luzhkov, there is no head of a federal Subject with a rating of 1).

Region	Governor	Rating	Year of birth	In office since	End of term
Moscow Oblast	Boris Gromov	2	1943	1999	May 2012
Omsk Oblast	Leonid Polezhaev	2	1940	1991	May 2012
Tomsk Oblast	Viktor Kress	2	1948	1991	March 2012
Leningrad Oblast	Valery Serdyukov	3	1945	1999	July 2012
St. Petersburg	Valentina Matviyenko	3	1949	2003	December 2011
Republic of Dagestan	Magomedsalam Magomedov	4	1964	2010	February 2014
Republic of Ingushetia	Yunus-bek Yevkurov	4	1963	2008	October 2013
Karachay-Cherkess Republic	Boris Ebseev	4	1950	2008	September 2013
Krasnodar Krai	Alexander Tkachyov	4	1960	2000	April 2012
Oryol Oblast	Alexander Kozlov	4	1949	2009	February 2014
Primorsky Krai	Sergey Darkin	4	1963	2001	January 2015
Volgograd Oblast	Anatoly Brovko	4	1966	2010	January 2015
Kemerovo Oblast	Aman Tuleev	4	1944	1997	April 2015
Kirov Oblast	Nikita Belykh	4	1975	2008	January 2014
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	Valery Shantsev	4	1947	2005	August 2015
Novgorod Oblast	Sergey Mitin	4	1951	2007	August 2012
Sverdlovsk Oblast	Alexander Misharin	4	1959	2009	November 2013
Tyumen Oblast	Vladimir Yakushev	4	1968	2005	November 2010
Ulyanovsk Oblast	Sergey Morozov	4	1959	2004	April 2011
Yaroslavl Oblast	Sergey Vakhrukov	4	1958	2007	December 2011

Rating of the Political Survivability of Selected Russian Governors (continued from previous page)

| Region	Governor	Rating	Year of birth	In office since	End of term
Chukotka Autonomous Oblast	Roman Kopin	4	1974	2008	July 2013
Republic of Bashkortostan	Rustem Khamitov	5	1954	2010	July 2015
Republic of Kalmykia	Alexey Orlov	5	1961	2010	October 2015
Sakha Republic	Yegor Borisov	5	1954	2010	December 2011
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania	Taymuraz Mamsurov	5	1954	2005	June 2015
Republic of Tatarstan	Rustam Minnikhanov	5	1957	2010	February 2015
Republic of Chechnya	Ramzan Kadyrov	5	1976	2007	March 2011
Krasnoyarsk Krai	Lev Kuznetsov	5	1965	2010	February 2015
Kaliningrad Oblast	Nikolai Tsukanov	5	1965	2010	September 2015

Source: Fund "Peterburgskaya politika" ("Petersburg politics") and Communications Holding "Minchenko Consulting"; International Institute for Political Expertise, http://www.stratagema.org/public/custom/file_br24l0909137959.xls

OPINION POLL

The Mayor of Moscow: the Man and the Office in Russian Public Opinion

Figure 1: Which Government Do You Trust More: the Moscow Government or the Federal Government? (April 2007–July 2009, Levada)

Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 2–13 July 2009 http://www.levada.ru./press/2009072101.html

Figure 2: Who Is Primarily Responsible for Solving Fundamental Problems of the City of Moscow? (August 2008–July 2009, Levada)


Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 2–13 July 2009 http://www.levada.ru./press/2009072101.html

Table 1: How Should the Mayor of a City Such as Moscow Be Appointed? (October 2010, Levada)

|	Russia	Moscow
The mayor should be elected directly by the citizens, the way it used to be	47%	46%
The mayor should be appointed by the [Russian] President in agreement with the leadership of the party that has a majority in the Moscow City Duma	14%	14%
The mayor should be proposed by the Moscow City Duma and confirmed by the President, as stipulated by the present law	10%	8%
The deputies of the Moscow City Duma should elect a fellow deputy to the office of mayor	6%	3%
The mayor should be appointed solely according to the decision of the President	4%	5%
I don't care, I am not interested	12%	11%
No answer	7%	12%

Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 8–11 October 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010101402.html

Figure 3: How Do You Rate the Work of the Mayor of Moscow Yuri Lushkov? (April 2001–January 2010, Levada)

Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 26–31 January 2010 http://www.levada.ru./press/2010020302.html

Figure 4: How Do You Rate the Work of the Mayor of Moscow Yuri Lushkov?
(September 2010, VTsIOM)

	Luzhkov is an effective manager.*	No answer	Luzhkov is an ineffective manager.**
All respondents	33%	34%	34%
KPRF	39%	23%	38%
LDPR	32%	22%	46%
Just Russia***	39%	31%	30%
United Russia	34%	34%	31%
other parties	30%	37%	33%
non-voters	29%	35%	36%
Moscow	65%	14%	21%
500,000 and over	36%	30%	34%
100,000-500,000	31%	25%	45%
less than 100,000	28%	40%	32%
village	27%	42%	31%

Electoral preference of respondents: KPRF, LDPR, Just Russia***, United Russia, other parties, non-voters

Population of respondents' place of residence: Moscow, 500,000 and over, 100,000-500,000, less than 100,000, village

*   Full answer: Luzhkov is an example of an effective manager who cares about the citizens of Moscow. Moscow's leading role and the
     high standard of living in the capital are to a large extent his achievements.
**   Full answer: Luzhkov is an example of an ineffective manager. In eighteen years in office he could not solve the city's problems and
     even aggravated some of them. All the successes of Moscow are due to its status as a capital and not to Luzhkov's work.
*** Full name: "Just Russia – Motherland – Pensioners – Life"

Source: representative opinion polls, VTsIOM, 18–19 September 2010
http://old.wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/13842.html

Figure 5: Do You Trust the Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov?
(Levada, January 1999 and September 2010)

	I trust him completely	I trust him more or less
	No answer	On the whole, I do not trust him
	I do not trust him at all	

September 2010	3%	17%	27%	27%	27%
Januar 1999	14%	38%	17%	17%	15%

Source: representative opinion polls, Levada Center, 17–21 September 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010092402.html

Figure 6: Lately, There Has Been A Lot of Talk That Yuri Luzhkov Is Corrupt and That His Wife Yelena Baturina Is Receiving Unfounded Advantages in Business. Do You Think This Is True? (Levada, September 2010)


Definitely 28%

More or less 39%

No answer 23%

Definitely not 3%

On the whole not 8%

Source: representative opinion polls, Levada Center, 17–21 September 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010092402.html

Figure 7: What Did You Feel When You Heard That Yuri Luzhkov Was Dismissed From the Office of Mayor? (Levada, October 2010)

■ satisfaction   ■ approval   ☐ interest   ☐ no particular emotions   ☐ no answer   ■ anxiety   ■ indignation

Moscow: 4%, 25%, 20%, 21%, 28%, less than 1%

Russia: 15%, 24%, 16%, 35%, 6%, 2%

Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 8–11 October 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010101402.html

Figure 8: Did Yuri Luzhkov Do More Good or More Bad Things for Moscow? (Levada, October 2010)

■ more bad things   ☐ no answer   ■ more good things

Moscow: 17%, 24%, 59%

Russia: 24%, 41%, 35%

Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 8–11 October 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010101402.html

Figure 9: How Do You Rate the Decision of the President to Dismiss Yuri Luzhkkov? (VTsIOM, October 2010)

	On the whole positive	no answer	On the whole negative
All respondents	66%	21%	13%
18-24 years	61%	27%	13%
25-34 years	61%	25%	14%
35-44 years	69%	19%	12%
45-59 years	68%	17%	15%
60 years and over	69%	21%	11%

Source: representative opinion polls, VTsIOM, 2–3 October 2010 http://old.wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/13875.html

Figure 10: In Your Opinion, What Are the Real Reasons for the Dismissal of Luzhkov? (VTsIOM, October 2010)

corruption, theft, abuse of power	30%
political intrigues, power struggle	11%
disagreements with the President, loss of the President's confidence in him	8%
bad performance of duties of mayor	6%
age, long term in office	5%
Yelena Baturina's dishonest business strategies	4%
other	2%
no answer	40%

Source: representative opinion polls, VTsIOM, 2–3 October 2010 http://old.wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/13875.html

Figure 11: Will the Situation In Moscow Improve With the New Mayor, Deteriorate or Remain the Same? (Levada, October 2010)

Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 8–11 October 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010101402.html

Figure 12: Will Corruption And Abuse of Power by Moscow Civil Servants Increase, Decrease Or Remain the Same With the New Mayor? (Levada, October 2010)

Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 8–11 October 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010101402.html

Figure 13: How Will the Dismissal of Yuri Luzhkov Affect the Political Situation in Russia? (Levada, October 2010)

Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 8–11 October 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010101402.html

ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST

Editors: Stephen Aris, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder, Aglaya Snetkov

The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), the Resource Security Institute and the Institute of History at the University of Basel (http://histsem.unibas.ch/seminar/). It is supported by the German Association for East European Studies (DGO). The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russland-Analysen (www.laender-analysen.de/russland), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (www.res.ethz.ch), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia's role in international relations.

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With a collection of publications on Eastern Europe unique in Germany, the Research Centre is also a contact point for researchers as well as the interested public. The Research Centre has approximately 300 periodicals from Russia alone, which are available in the institute's library. News reports as well as academic literature is systematically processed and analyzed in data bases.

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The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Crisis and Risk Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

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The Institute of History at the University of Basel was founded in 1887. It now consists of ten professors and employs some 80 researchers, teaching assistants and administrative staff. Research and teaching relate to the period from late antiquity to contemporary history. The Institute offers its 800 students a Bachelor's and Master's Degree in general history and various specialized subjects, including a comprehensive Master's Program in Eastern European History (http://histsem.unibas.ch/bereiche/osteuropaeische-geschichte/).

Resource Security Institute
The Resource Security Institute (RSI) is a non-profit organization devoted to improving understanding about global energy security, particularly as it relates to Eurasia. We do this through collaborating on the publication of electronic newsletters, articles, books and public presentations.