



THE WEST AND RUSSIA'S WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

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Ukraine Will Not Prevail If the West Negates Itself

James Sherr (International Centre for Defence & Security, Tallinn)

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Like a fish, an alliance rots from the head. In 2023, the United States lost much of its self-confidence. As presidential elections approach, the first danger is that a second Trump administration might resurrect this self-confidence on a malign, nativist basis at odds with the core interests of the West as a whole and the United States itself. The second danger is that this loss of confidence—and faith—will spread to Ukraine, the center of gravity in what Dmitry Trenin (2022) refers to as a “total war (so far hybrid)” against the West.

The roots of this loss of confidence are neither military nor material, but moral, psychological, and intellectual. In 2019, Putin’s counsellor Vladislav Surkov stated that Russia is doing something more serious than interfering with the West’s elections: it is “messing with its head.” But the still-underestimated ambit of Russia’s hybrid war is not the only source of Western disorientation. Memory of protracted, high-intensity war at industrial scales has all but vanished in most of the West, and that is also true of its surprises, its hardships, and its reverses. Moreover, under the impact of today’s imperatives and pre-occupations—migration, climate change, etc.—knowledge of the twentieth century, the century of great wars, has receded to alarming levels. Thus, we should not be astounded that disappointment with the meager results of Ukraine’s summer 2003 counteroffensive has unleashed a stream of doom-laden prognostications, including ahistorical warnings about the impossibility of defeating Russia.

The beginning of wisdom is to dispose of falsehoods. Static analysis cannot provide a basis for long-term prognoses. Yet with flimsy justification, many are drawing ultimate conclusions from the current positional phase of the war. It is true that Russia has formidable strengths and, despite the expectations of many, has amended and adapted in response to failure. Today, it is evident that the differential in respect to several key capabilities lies in Russia’s favor, and this discrepancy might worsen even further this year even if U.S. funds are unblocked.

Set against this are serious deficiencies. Russia has lost half the territory it acquired in 2022, and despite its replacement and augmentation of forces, and the imposition of wartime norms on the economy, it recovered very little of it by spring 2024. Its winter 2022–23 aerial offensive, designed to destroy Ukraine’s strategic infrastructure as well as its resilience, failed, and the only reason its current aerial offensive is succeeding is because US weapons deliveries are blocked. Without external support, Russia’s

vaunted advantage in artillery would be insufficient to maintain the current level of operations, which continue to draw down pre-2022 stocks. Although 38 percent of budgetary expenditure is now devoted to defense and security, a weighty proportion of it is dissipated by inflation, waste, and accounting tricks (Luzin 2023). In the Black Sea, Ukraine has partially turned the tables and might do so completely, despite the fact that it has no navy to speak of.

What changes the equation is the external factor: the Shahed drones of Iran, the missiles, military-industrial assistance from China, over 3 million artillery shells of North Korea (*The Moscow Times* 2024), as well as the Gaza war, which affords Russia a “strategic diversion” of U.S. resources and effort—effort already hobbled by the Biden administration’s self-imposed constraints. In 2022, the United States had the means to put Russia’s armed forces on the back foot and keep them there, and the enterprise enjoyed bipartisan support. Instead, the Biden administration’s fear of Russian escalation stifled strategic thinking, weakened deterrence, and allowed Russia to set the rules of the conflict. This moral hesitancy gave Putin the respite he needed and Trumpian nihilists a convenient target to attack.

Despite these factors—and perhaps because of them—Europe is no longer the soft spot of the Alliance. Clarity about the stakes in Ukraine is no longer confined to NATO’s eastern flank. But clarity does not alter the fact that Europe’s capability will prove insufficient to substitute for the capability and commitment of the United States, at least until the latter part of this decade. If that commitment is not reinvigorated, the result is less likely to be negotiation and compromise than the mutation of war into a partisan war at untold levels of ugliness. By then, there might be nothing left to decide.

So far, Ukraine’s will has been unquestionable. Despite the rationing and economization of its dwindling stocks of weapons, its battered army has inflicted 30,000 casualties on Russia in January–February 2024 alone. But like weapons and manpower, willpower has limits. Not only are discord and indecision in the West testing those limits, they are putting Ukraine in peril.

Russia has denied agency to Ukraine, and it comes as no shock to Ukrainians that it still does so. But what if the West denies agency to itself? That is a question Ukrainians never expected to face. But it is the question we all face now.

Please find information about the author and further reading overleaf.

About the Author

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COMMENT

Promoting "America First," U.S. Anti-Intervention Republicans Fail To Block More Aid to Ukraine

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Abstract:

Further U.S. backing for Ukraine's war effort against Russia is set to continue, following an April 20 vote in the House of Representatives. Republicans in Congress had blocked the approval of additional aid for many months. The final outcome was hard fought and required Speaker Mike Johnson to allow a vote that a majority of his own party opposed. The driving force behind Republicans' reluctance to continue assisting Ukraine is the party base's support for an America First policy and former President Donald Trump's antipathy toward Ukraine.

Republican Radicalism

The decision of many leaders and rank-and-file members of the Republican Party to oppose additional aid to Ukraine is deeply rooted in America First, the guiding philosophy of the party.

While many observers like to describe current American politics as "polarized," that is not really the most helpful description. Although the Democratic Party has evolved away from its focus on the working class to become a party that more comfortably represents the urban and suburban middle class, it is still recognizable as a mainstream political party. The Republicans, however, have become radicalized under the leadership of Donald Trump, attacking American political institutions and democratic practices, overturning long-standing policies, and resorting to racist and personal insults that run counter to the public standards upheld in recent decades.

Trump claims to be an outsider whose extraordinary wealth makes him independent, unlike ordinary politi-

cians who depend on fundraising to support their careers. Trump's fans appreciate his outsider status and the fact that liberals loathe him and the political agenda he represents. Furthermore, Trump's base is highly energized and motivated to vote, giving him a credible shot at a second term, particularly since traditionally Democratic voters have yet to rally around Joe Biden.

America First

While the term "America First" has roots in isolationist efforts of the 1930s to keep the US out of the Second World War, Trump mainly uses the term to promote the narrow idea that the US should behave in a way that maximizes immediate economic returns for itself.

In support of this argument, the Republicans point out that the US is presently facing numerous problems and that many people in this country are hurting economically. As such, they claim, the top priority should be a domestic policy that sends American dollars to American citizens. The corollary foreign policy is that the US

and its government should not waste any resources on foreigners, who should be made responsible for their own problems.

The general feeling among Americans paying attention is that if Trump is reelected in November 2024, his second presidential term will be much more extreme than his first. In 2016, Trump was likely surprised that he beat Hilary Clinton and was not prepared to govern. The people around him also appear to have tried to moderate his most incendiary tendencies. Today, he is much angrier and—given his approximately 90 criminal indictments—much more in need of the protections provided by the presidency to keep the court system at bay.

While his predecessor, Barack Obama, also complained that many NATO members were not “paying their fair share” to maintain the alliance, Trump was much more direct in his attacks and more demanding that European allies contribute more to the trans-Atlantic alliance. In a second term, observers like Anne Applebaum predict that Trump would simply abandon NATO. A taste of this came when he said in February 2024 that he would encourage Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO members that did not pay.

Republicans’ Ukraine Policy

When Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there was a fundamental bipartisan consensus that the US needed to act to support Ukraine. Since then, the Biden administration and Congress have provided about \$75 billion worth of aid to the country. Although many had predicted that Ukraine would quickly fall to the Russian onslaught, the Ukrainians have held the invaders off and even launched a counter-offensive. Americans, of all parties, love a scrappy underdog who successfully stands up to a bullying aggressor.

But as the war has dragged on and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has continued to ask for money, Republicans have begun to balk. The Republicans control the House of Representatives by only a handful of votes. Bitter divisions between institutionally minded Republicans and the far right make it difficult for anyone to govern the party. The fall of the previous Speaker of the House and an interregnum in which several other leaders failed to win a majority of Republican votes propelled the weak and inexperienced Mike Johnson to the status of top Republican in the lower house. Since taking up his leadership position, he lacked the ability to enact any of his policy priorities, frequently having to rely on Democrats just to pass the legislation needed to keep the government functioning. However, he was able to block any additional aid to Ukraine before eventually conceding to pressure to support it and allowing the April 20, 2024, vote that made fur-

ther aid possible. That vote was 311–112, with all Democrats voting yes and a majority of the Republican representatives voting no.

The Republicans’ aversion to providing more money to bolster the Ukrainian military seems to come from the grassroots. About half of Republicans say that the US is giving too much aid to Ukraine, according to a poll conducted at the end of 2023. Along these lines, the Washington Post reported an Alabama man yelling at a woman activist gathering funds for Ukraine: “Have n’t we given you enough money?”

Not only are such feelings widespread among Trump’s base, but the former president has also made clear that he is not interested in supporting the Ukrainian effort. Trump has personal reasons for not liking Ukraine. Trump’s first impeachment resulted from the Democrats’ charges that Trump had withheld military aid from Ukraine and sought to get Zelensky to open an investigation into alleged wrongdoing by Joe Biden and his son Hunter, who had served on the board of a Ukrainian energy company. Trump is also nursing a grudge because his opponents claimed that Russia had intervened in the 2016 election in his favor; he countered by claiming (without evidence) that Ukraine was the country that had intervened. Despite the formal vote against Trump in the House of Representatives, the Senate ultimately refused to convict Trump and declined to remove him from office.

Republicans’ Russia Policy

During Trump’s presidency, the US seemed to have two Russia policies that played out simultaneously despite being contradictory. Trump’s own Russia policy was an effort to curry favor with Putin and seemed to reach its peak at his July 2018 press conference in Helsinki, where he took Putin’s word that Russia had not intervened in the 2016 election over the evidence presented by the FBI. Trump believed then—and continues to believe now—his own myth that he is great at making deals and that his personal relations with other national leaders make this possible. Yet his efforts to establish a personal rapport with the leaders of Russia, North Korea, and other countries were generally not successful because they undermined the strategic interests of the US and the broader Western coalition.

At the same time, there were enough foreign policy hawks remaining in the Republican congressional delegation that they were able to vote with Democrats to maintain a strong commitment to countering Russian aggression. Such efforts had been underway since 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine. Following Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution, Russia had seized Crimea and eastern Ukraine, leading the western alliance, with Republican support, to take action, though not nearly

enough to prevent Putin from launching his full-scale invasion in 2022.

Both Trump and many of his supporters now seem to have genuine respect for Putin's apparent strongman style of leadership. Most recently, former Fox News star Tucker Carlson went to Russia and scored a rare one-on-one interview with Putin. The Russian president used the occasion to lecture his guest about his fantastical version of history. After this humiliation, Carlson toured war-time Moscow and found much to his liking, including in well-stocked grocery stores. Carlson's fawning reportage from Russia reversed the Soviet-era trope of former comrades defecting to the West when they discovered shelves full of breakfast cereal choices.

Putin connects with the American right by stressing an anti-LGBTQ agenda, promoting traditional views of women's role in society and the family, and backing a form of Christianity that in turn bolsters right-wing power. Putin and the Republicans also have a similar set of perceived enemies: climate activists who want to eliminate the use of fossil fuels, liberal intellectuals who promote independent thinking, and the free media/entertainment complex, which is frequently critical of their policies, often in mocking tones.

The Republicans, once known for promoting democracy at home (Lincoln) and abroad (Reagan, Bush Sr., Bush Jr.), are no longer interested in popular rights. Trump continues to argue that the 2020 election was rigged, inspired an insurrection against the peaceful transfer of presidential power on January 6, 2021, and persistently undermines the rule of law in the US by vilifying every court action against him.

What's Next

Americans will elect a new president on November 5, 2024. Current polling suggests that the race is a tossup. Even if Biden wins a majority of the popular vote, Trump could gain the White House with a victory in the Electoral College. The American Founders did not trust direct democracy and set up the Electoral College as a buffer

between the popular will and the presidency. There have been five presidential elections in which the winner did not have the most votes, including Trump's 2016 victory.

The choice in 2024 is stark. In marked contrast to Trump, Biden supports a robust NATO alliance and strong relations with the EU. While the Europeans are providing aid to Ukraine, the outcome of the conflict still hinges on whether the US delivers military support to help Ukraine counter the better-resourced and more populous Russia. Even if Biden wins a second term, further support for the NATO alliance would depend on whether he is able to secure a majority in both houses of Congress. A Republican victory in either house would seriously undermine the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Democrats therefore see the 2024 election as existential for the country and hope that fears about the consequences of a second Trump victory will maintain the integrity of their electoral coalition.

If they come to power, the Republicans will withdraw U.S. support for Ukraine and seek to extract as much wealth from the Europeans as possible. Trump has said that aid to Ukraine should only be in the form of loans which the impoverished country would have to repay. The Republicans will also continue to build ties with authoritarian leaders like Putin and Hungary's Viktor Orbán.

While the outcome of the election is hard to predict, the world is changing rapidly. Dramatic social transformations as wrenching as the arrival of the railroad in mid-nineteenth century rural England, as depicted in George Eliot's *Middlemarch*, are roiling American society and politics. Given the rise of AI, the transforming workplace, and the erosion of once-sacred social mores, it is not surprising that the forces of reaction are seeking to hold back the onslaught of new ideas. While the Republicans may not be able to install the kind of social system they prefer, they can do considerable damage in trying to shore up a status quo that is quickly slipping away. Additional U.S. support for Ukraine eventually may be a casualty of these efforts.

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Germany and Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine: The Third Year

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Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 came as a real shock to German elites and society alike. Although Russia has been behaving aggressively toward its neighbors since the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea—part of Ukraine's internationally recognized territory—in 2014, it was only with this most recent military attack that the German leadership came to understand Russia's behavior as a threat to German and European security.

In response, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (2022) gave his famous *Zeitenwende* speech, in which he acknowledged the full-scale invasion as a watershed moment for European security and announced a special fund of 100 billion Euro for defense and the modernization of the German army. The country also quickly decoupled from Russian gas and oil—a very costly decision, given that Germany received nearly 60 percent of its gas (which plays an important role in the German energy mix) from Russia prior to the war. As of February 2024, Germany had further supported thirteen comprehensive packages of EU sanctions against Russia. All in all, within a couple of months, the nature of German–Russian relations changed fundamentally: Germany decoupled from structural energy dependencies, cut off most of its economy from the Russian market, and has become—after two years of war—the second largest supporter of Ukraine (behind the US) in terms of the quantity of weapons supplied.

After Two Years of War: Germany as Ukraine's Main European Partner

In the first months of the war, the federal government, and particularly Chancellor Scholz, were careful to avoid provoking Russia by providing too much military support for Ukraine. Accordingly, Berlin took quite an incremental approach to supplying weapons. In light of the upcoming U.S. election in November 2024 and the risk that U.S. support for Ukraine will decline or be cut off—and even that the US will withdraw the security guarantees it has made to Europe—Scholz adapted his policy and Germany became one of the crucial supporters for Ukraine. Having welcomed 1.14 million Ukrainian refugees as of February 2024, according to UNHCR, Germany has been the leading European recipient of displaced Ukrainians, followed by Poland, which has taken in nearly 957,000 refugees. This openness to Ukrainian refugees is the result of a consensus policy among the ruling “traffic light” coal-

ition that also enjoys the support of the largest opposition party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Similarly, despite running a budget deficit in 2024, the German defense budget was not cut, and the ruling coalition agreed to provide Ukraine with an additional 8 billion Euro of support.

Yet the main criticism of the government's policy—leveled by members of the CDU and security experts—is not that Berlin has gone too far in its support for Ukraine, but rather that the Chancellor and parts of his Social Democratic party (SPD) have been too cautious. The discussion about (not supplying) Taurus missiles to Ukraine reflects this tension: parts of the German elite, especially within Scholz's SPD, are afraid that such a move would escalate the war and risk dragging Germany into direct military conflict with Russia. The whole Taurus discussion took so much energy that it distracted for some time from the main short-term challenges for Ukraine, which is the lack of ammunition and air defense.

Despite big shifts in Germany's policy toward Russia and Ukraine in the last two years, parts of the German elite still seem not to understand how Putin's Russia functions and appear to have failed to learn their lesson from past failures of German *Ostpolitik* (Meister and Jilge 2023). Specifically, they do not seem to recognize that Russia's ruling elites see compromise as weakness: the Kremlin does not believe in “win-win” international relations and thinks it can only win if the other party loses. The Russian leadership wants to bring Ukraine under its control in the classical imperial tradition; they demand the recognition of “spheres of influence” in Europe and buffer zones between Russia and NATO countries. As long as Russia is capable, it will attack Ukraine. Therefore, any ceasefire in the current difficult situation for Ukraine—or a “Minsk 3” accord, as proposed by head of the Munich Security Conference and former policy advisor to Chancellor Angela Merkel Christopher Heusgen (*Das Erste* 2024)—would invite Russia to regroup for a renewed attack on Ukraine and to keep the country in a “gray zone.”

German elites have also long underestimated the authoritarian, repressive, and deadly nature of the Putin system. The death of Alexei Navalny confirms that this regime kills internally and externally. Yet while Russia has a broad strategic framework for keeping the empire together, it does not have a strategy for achieving this except through military blackmail. Moscow reacts to

the West's action and inaction and uses the West's weaknesses to undermine unity and support for Ukraine. Russian disinformation plays on narratives and threat perceptions that already exist within European societies, from possible nuclear war to a protracted war in Ukraine and even a direct confrontation with Russia.

Dealing with an assertive actor like Russia will require European leadership and the political will to transform the pacifist culture prevalent in Germany and across Europe in line with the realities of ensuring European security. Self-defense and deterrence capabilities are crucial for a country like Germany. Communication and political ownership are integral to the pursuit of this goal. Despite longstanding high societal support for Ukraine, this is exactly what the current German leadership is not providing. The hesitance of the German Chancellor is in part a reaction to the (changing) mood in German society, which is growing tired of the war and fears escalation and growing economic costs. While there is still substantial support for Ukraine, there are clear limits to any support that imposes costs on Germans themselves. According to ARD-DeutschlandTrend (2024), as of January 2024, 43 percent of Germans say that the current sanctions are not sufficient, while 19 percent feel that they have gone too far. Although over half (51 percent) of respondents indicated that Germany's current diplomatic efforts were not sufficient, fully 41 percent of respondents said that Germany was providing too much military support to Ukraine (compared to just 21 percent who said that this support was insufficient). Similarly, 41 percent felt that Germany's financial support for Ukraine had gone too far, whereas only 12 percent indicated that it had not gone far enough. Support for Ukrainian refugees has also declined sharply over the past two years: according to a 2024 Munich Security Index report, whereas in May 2022 46 percent of respondents supported Germany welcoming more Ukrainian refugees, by early 2024 only 25 percent were in favor of this.

In sum, while German policy toward Russia and Ukraine has undergone a fundamental shift in the past two years and now emphasizes the need for Ukraine to win the war, German society is ever less comfortable with the war and the economic costs it imposes. A growing majority does not see an end to the war in sight and would prefer a diplomatic solution. Despite huge solidarity with Ukrainian refugees, the financial costs are increasingly seen as a burden, especially if the war will be a protracted one. The right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the new leftwing-populist Party of Sarah Wagenknecht (Bündnis Sarah Wagenknecht) are the main political forces trying to capitalize on this societal mood; they seek to benefit politically from making demands for peace without providing a

roadmap for achieving peace that would avoid sacrificing support for Ukraine. In this framework we have to understand the hesitant policy of Scholz.

NATO and EU Integration of Ukraine

Germany's decision to sign an agreement (Bundesregierung 2024) on security cooperation and long-term support with Ukraine neither represents an alternative to security guarantees nor provides any security guarantees. What the agreement does is to support the long-term development of Ukraine's security sector, arms supply and production, and demining efforts, as well as providing for cybersecurity and intelligence cooperation and promising long-term financial support. Parts of the agreement also discuss economic cooperation and the reconstruction of Ukraine. Besides German support for rebuilding infrastructure and supporting the rule of law and institutional reforms, there are several sectors where Germany has an interest in investment and economic cooperation. These include the IT sector and cybersecurity, agriculture, and energy (including areas like green hydrogen and renewable energy).

Such security agreements, which Ukraine has also signed with the UK and France, to some degree substitute for EU and NATO integration, which are impossible in the short-term. Nevertheless, without NATO integration there will be no security for Ukraine. And they do not address any short term needs of Ukraine to continue the defending itself against Russia's war of aggression which are crucial before discussing reconstruction and long-term cooperation.

While Germany supports Ukraine's integration into the EU, Berlin is at pains to emphasize that there will be no softening of the conditions for accession because of the war. Berlin understands integration as a long-term process and stresses, in parallel to Ukraine's candidacy, the need for internal EU reforms to the voting system, decision-making, and the distribution of funds. Germany will support Ukraine in its efforts to strengthen the rule of law, fight corruption, and carry out economic and decentralization reforms with a view to EU accession. But Berlin is not a leader when it comes to EU enlargement or EU internal reforms.

In his military support for Ukraine, Scholz's main partner is U.S. President Joe Biden. Many of Berlin's decisions regarding supplying weapons have been coordinated first with Washington and then with Germany's European partners. While the German government does not support the French approach of European strategic autonomy, there is a growing understanding that the European wing of NATO must be strengthened. The main goal of this policy is not to become more independent from the U.S. security guarantees, but rather to keep the US engaged in Europe by increasing spending on security and defense.

The Changing European Security Order and Regional Orders

The German government is aware that Europe is facing growing security and geopolitical challenges, due not only to Russia's large-scale war, but also to other conflicts in the Middle East (including the one between Israel and Hamas), in Central Africa, and in North Africa. This war marks the end of the post-Cold War European security order and represents the greatest threat to European security since the end of the Second World War. The fundamental shift in relations with Russia has necessitated a rethink of this relationship and the role Germany wants to play in European and trans-Atlantic relations. The German business model, based on cheap Russian pipeline gas, is history. Except the demand for more deterrence, there is no discussion of a new German or EU Russia strategy, no long-term prospects for relations with Russia, nor any other strategic approach. The current German government is in crisis management mode, without a vision for its own role in Europe and the world in the new geopolitical and security environment. If this continues, Germany might further lose its role as the main negotiator with Russia and Europe's key crisis manager, which it has played for the past decades.

This war is a stress test for German politics, which needs a more comprehensive and visionary approach to European security and the European project. The post-Second World War multilateral order guaranteed by the US is coming to an end and institutions traditionally supported by Germany—like the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe—are under pressure or becoming dysfunctional. Germany's growing focus on the Global South as we have seen it at the last two MSC's is not underpinned by a strategic approach or sufficient resources; as a result, it looks rather instrumental. In the post-Soviet region, we observe the end of Russian hegemony, driven by the huge amount of resources the country is spending in its brutal war in Ukraine, Western

sanctions, and the growing interest of the countries of Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Eastern Europe in counterbalancing Russia's influence. As a result, we will likely witness the emergence of new regional orders in which third powers like China, Turkey, Iran, or Arab countries will play an increasing role and also challenge Russia. At the same time, Russia can no longer guarantee stability to these post-Soviet regions and the war has changed its interests. Moscow is now reliant on cooperation with post-Soviet countries to circumvent sanctions, develop alternative trade and transit routes, and enlarge markets. Therefore, transactionalism will play a larger role and the security situation in the regions will become more volatile, depending on other intra-regional or external actors bargaining.

For the EU, this means that its policy of enlargement is now in competition with the transactional offers of other players. Since there are no longer any Russian security guarantees and multilateral institutions are eroding, it would be in the interests of the EU to play a greater role in the regional conflicts in its Eastern neighborhood. But this would require leadership and engagement from the EU's (big) member states, which is largely lacking. In the South Caucasus, for instance, a new regional security order is in making. Countries like Azerbaijan and Turkey aim to be the key players here, whereas Germany and the EU are confined to facilitating negotiations and have no real ownership of the peace process. Here again, the lack of a vision or strategy has led to a weakened role for the EU and Germany in this region. Despite growing interests in the Caspian region, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus when it comes to transit, connectivity, resources, and energy, German engagement with these parts of the world is rather limited. Therefore, the outcome of the Russian war against Ukraine will ultimately determine where the new European security order develops. Germany and the EU are currently reacting to developments rather than shaping them.

About the Author

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
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Election Poll For the Bundestag Election (RTL/ntv Trend Barometer by Forsa)


Figure 1: Question: Who Would You Vote For If the Bundestag Elections Were Next Sunday?



Source: survey: 20 – 26 February 2024, method: by telephone, no. of respondents: 2,503 <https://www.n-tv.de/politik/AfD-stoppt-Abwaertstrend-Gruene-ueberholen-SPD-article24766807.html>, published on 27 February 2024.

Survey on German Policy Towards Ukraine (Part of the ARD-DeutschlandTREND January 2024 by infratest dimap)


Figure 2: Question: Germany Reacted To the Russian Invasion Of Ukraine With Various Steps. Please Indicate Below Whether These Steps Are Appropriate, Go Too Far Or Do Not Go Far Enough



Note: missing values at 100 percent: Don't know / no answer

Source: survey period: 2 – 3 January 2024, method: random-based telephone and online survey, no. of respondents: 1,321 (787 telephone interviews and 534 online interviews), <https://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2024/januar/>, published on 4 January 2024.

Figure 3: Question: The Following Section Continues With Ukraine. Please Indicate Whether You Agree Or Disagree With Each Of the Following Statements.




Note: missing values at 100 percent: Don't know / no answer

Source: survey period: 2 – 3 January 2024, method: random-based telephone and online survey, no. of respondents: 1,321 (787 telephone interviews and 534 online interviews), <https://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2024/januar/>, published on 4 January 2024.

STATISTICS

Total Bilateral Aid Allocations to Ukraine by Country

Figure 1: Ukraine Support Tracker: Total Bilateral Aid Allocations by Country (Billion Euros)




Allocated aid includes bilateral allocations of aid to Ukraine. An allocation is the designation of committed funds for a specific purpose. Does not include private donations, support for refugees outside of Ukraine, and aid by international organisations. [...] For information on data quality and transparency please see our data transparency index.

Data: Ukraine Support Tracker (most recent data): Figure 5 Ranking Allocated from Excel file from following URL: <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/ukraine-support-tracker-data-20758/>

OPINION POLL

EU Citizens' Attitude Towards Their Governments' Response To Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine

Figure 1: Public Opinion in the EU: How Satisfied Are You With the Response By Your Government To Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine? (Oct./Nov. 2023)



| | Total Satisfied | Total Not Satisfied | Don't Know |
|-------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------|
| Bulgaria | 32% | 56% | 12% |
| Czech Republic | 45% | 53% | 2% |
| Italy | 49% | 48% | 3% |
| Germany | 49% | 47% | 4% |
| France | 49% | 39% | 12% |
| Austria | 49% | 46% | 5% |
| Romania | 54% | 42% | 4% |
| EU average | 54% | 41% | 5% |
| Latvia | 56% | 32% | 12% |
| Estonia | 56% | 36% | 8% |
| Hungary | 57% | 40% | 3% |
| Poland | 70% | 27% | 3% |
| Lithuania | 72% | 23% | 5% |
| Sweden | 78% | 19% | 3% |
| Netherlands | 78% | 20% | 2% |
| Denmark | 84% | 14% | 2% |
| Finland | 88% | 9% | 3% |

Source: Eurobarometer, question QD1.1 (<https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3053>)

ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST

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