

Foreign and Security Policy Implications of Russia's Demographic Crisis

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Foreword

Russia is currently facing a potential demographic disaster. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of the Russian Federation has been steadily declining. This paper, written by Graeme P. Herd, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Aberdeen and Deputy Director of the Scottish Center for International Security (SCIS), examines the security implications of Russia's demographic crisis. It identifies current predictions of the population decline, evaluates explanations of its causes and explores the geographically uneven nature of Russia's shrinking population. The paper then discusses the likely impact of the population decrease upon each of Russia's security sectors, exploring potential security dilemmas and paradoxes for Russia's regions and their (international) security environment.

The author argues that Russia's demographic challenges and the central state's responses to them are likely to expose the strengths and weaknesses of federal power under President Vladimir Putin. While Moscow has developed migration and immigration policies and a "demographic blueprint" aimed at stimulating the birth rate and lowering the death rate, there is little evidence that these initiatives form part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy designed to address the underlying causes of Russia's dwindling population.

The study also illustrates the potential consequences of Russia's demographic problems on the center's foreign and security policies. Issues associated with Russian population decline, such as inward migration and the role of Russian diaspora in neighboring states, are likely to play an ever more important role in shaping Russia's relations with its "Near Abroad." In addition, outward migration and emigration of Russian citizens to CEE and Western European states are also likely to have a greater influence on the Russian Federation's relations with its "Far Abroad." As will be the case for many states in the globalizing post-sovereign security order, contested identi-

ties are therefore likely to influence the character of Russian foreign and security policies for some time to come.

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Introduction:

A threat to the survival of the nation*

Russia is undergoing a demographic crisis that is unprecedented in peace time: the population of Russia declined at comparable rates only when experiencing world wars, repression or the famine of the 1930s.¹ The dynamics of Russian demography, their causes and the consequences of changing settlement and migration patterns will have both domestic policy-making and international security implications for the Federation well into the foreseeable future. Indeed, in the Russian State Duma elections of December 1999, the newly-created Unity Party, which supported Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, stated: "Unity's main goal is to extricate Russia "from the fatal logic of the development of events." The Unity Party elaborated a proposed blueprint for resolving the "problem of the year 2003," when a peak in foreign debt payments will be accompanied by the "obsolescence of fixed productive capital and demographic decline."² Once elected president in 2000, Putin again raised the profile of this issue in his first address to Federal Assembly in 2000:

Before talking about priorities and setting tasks, let me list for you the most acute problems facing our country. Population decline threatens the survival of the nation. We have come to regard Russia as a system of bodies of authority or as an economic mechanism. But Russia is first and foremost people. People who look on it as their home.

* My sincere thanks to Jeronim Perovic for inviting me to present a draft version of this paper at a stimulating conference held in July 2001 in Zurich on the topic of Russian regionalism. Without his encouragement this paper would not have been written. Unfortunately, he cannot be equally credited for the errors in fact and interpretation which litter the text – they remain, alas, mine alone.

1 *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, Moscow, 29 November 2000.

2 *Segodnia*, Moscow, 7 September 2000.

Their welfare and a worthy life for them are the main task facing the powers that be – whoever these may be. But the fact is that our home today is far from being a comfortable one. For very many people it is still difficult to bring up children, to ensure a fitting old age for their parents – life is difficult. As each year goes by there are fewer and fewer of us citizens of Russia. For several years past the population of the country has been diminishing on average by 750'000 a year. And if we are to believe the forecasts – which are based on realistic work by people who are experts in such matters, who have devoted their entire lives to this – then in 15 years from now there may be 22 million fewer Russians. I ask you to ponder this figure – one seventh of the country's population. If the present tendency continues there will be a threat to the survival of the nation. We are under a real threat of becoming a drifting nation. Our demographic situation today is an alarming one.³

The government duly responded and in September 2000 a decision to set up a special working commission for solving the so-called 2003 problem was reached during Putin's meeting with the leaders of State Duma factions and deputy groups at the Kremlin. The Fatherland – All Russia [faction] leader Yevgenii Primakov reported that the *ad hoc* commission will comprise representatives of the Russian parliament's lower chamber, the government, and the presidential administration. "This commission will address the strategic problems that could threaten Russia's existence as a state" and would focus on the problems of demography and the erosion of basic funds in Russia.⁴ Moreover, in February 2001 Prime Minister Mikhail Kas'ianov called for the creation of a draft concept for Russia's demographic policy in the period up to 2015 and for proposals that concentrate on combating infant deaths and accidents at work.⁵ He also resolved to give assistance to Russian-speaking citizens outside of Russia to return to Russia, particularly those qualified workers and experts from CIS states, and expressed the need to create a new migration policy.

However, these governmental initiatives and remedies appear to have a limited potential impact on the implosion of the Russian population. Short of an economic catastrophe in Belarus or civil wars in Ukraine or Kazakhstan and consequent mass immigration to Russia, it appears that the demographic decline will progressively worsen, by some estimates, through to 2050 and 2075. Should the decline continue unabated, the very concept "population" could become a virtual one, but the raft of security issues that such declines raises very real. Specialists within the Goskomstat have analyzed the link between power and population size and argued that, "the problem is not what place the Russian Federation will be in population-wise, but what place it holds in terms of general demographic dynamics, its strategic consequences."⁶

Demography consists of the study of *population composition* and *population dynamics*. That is, it examines both the characteristics of a given population (size, gender/ethnic/age balance, geographical distribution etc.) and the changes through

3 *Russia TV*, Moscow, 8 July 2000.

4 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 13 September 2000.

5 *Center TV*, Moscow, 15 February 2001.

6 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 5 January 2001.

time in the population composition, caused by fertility, mortality and immigration/emigration.⁷ Population size and density has traditionally been used as one of the factors within the “bucket of capabilities” that determines potential state power and influence in the international system.⁸ Recent scholarship has stressed the dynamic, rather than static, impact of population upon potential state power.⁹ This “dynamic” paradigm argues that it is not merely population size, but rather “the interactions between population pressures and environmental degradation, mass migrations, resource depletion, forced refugee flows, ethnic conflict, hypernationalism, and urbanization” that better determines state power and stability.¹⁰

This Working Paper aims to provide an initial survey and analysis of some of the most pressing strategic security implications arising from Russia's demographic decline. This paper analyses the emergent security implications of Russia's demographic crisis. It identifies current predictions of population decline that are based on the sustainability of current demographic dynamics. It then proceeds to evaluate the various explanations given for the decline, and the geography of uneven or “variable geometry” demographic decline. Utilizing the extended concept of security, it then analyses the likely impact and implications of such decline upon each of the security sectors, exploring potential security dilemmas and paradoxes for Russia's regions and their (international) security environment. It argues that two linkages become apparent. Firstly, there is a connection between the reasons for the decline in Russia's population and the likely success of policies put in place to arrest the decline. Secondly, a link can be established between the impact of the causes of decline and the domestic and foreign policy consequences for the Russian State. The long-term systemic impact of population decline will prove critical to characterizing and determining Russia's foreign and security policy over the medium- and long-term.

7 Nichiporuk, Brian. *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1088, 2000, p. 3. See <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1088/>. See also: Andreev, Evgeni, Sergei Scherbov and Frans Willekens. “Population of Russia: What Can We Expect in the Future?” *World Development*, vol. 26, no. 11 (1998), pp. 1939–1955.

8 Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*, 4th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967; Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979.

9 Tuchman Mathews, Jessica. “Redefining Security.” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 2 (1989); Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict.” *International Security*, vol. 16, no. 2 (1991), pp. 76–116.

10 Nichiporuk, *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, p. 6.

The dynamics of Russian demographic decline

When in 1995–1996 the average life expectancy of the Russian male fell to below 58 years, the demographic issue received widespread coverage within the Russian press, by Russian government officials and international academic journals, as well as registering a Russian public reaction.¹¹ However, after this brief period of exposure, subsequent debates and analysis of the phenomena continued in specialist journals. The issue of demographic change within the Russian Federation is a difficult topic to analyze. This is not because of the degree of speculation involved in forecasting – demographic forecasts are one of the most precise ones and their margin of error is usually below 5% – but because of the lack of accurate data that the forecasts are based on. Russia's demographic decline needs to be treated with care due to the general unreliability of sources and statistics in Russia.

Demographic data is particularly poorly served, in this respect, by the failure by the Russian State to hold a census in 1999 – ten years following the last Soviet census. This data provided a composition of the Russian population: “by age, sex, nationality, place of birth, length of residency, branch of the economy, level of education and settlement size.”¹² Although the data represented a benchmark in assessing subsequent

11 Zakharov, Sergei and Elena Ivanova. “Fertility Decline and Recent Changes in Russia: On the Threshold of the Second Demographic Transition.” In *Russia's Demographic “Crisis,”* ed. Julie DaVanzo. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, CF-124, 1996. See <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF124/CF124.chap2.html>.

12 Heleniak, Timothy. “Out-Migration and Depopulation of the Russian North during the 1990s.” *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, vol. 40, no. 3 (1999), pp. 155–205, see p. 159.

changes in population composition, Goskomstat territorial agencies and appropriate departments are only now taking the first preparatory steps towards carrying out the all-Russia population census in October 2002.¹³ Goskomstat is working with the Justice Ministry to formulate “an acceptable legal formulation enabling it to submit a draft census law to the Duma, stipulating that it is permissible to gather information on individuals for abstract, or statistical, rather than personal purposes.”¹⁴

Moreover, official information is controlled by state structures, some of which have been condemned by the Criminal Code for corruption – not least, key officials from the Goskomstat in 1999. The overlapping jurisdictions between different parts of the state bureaucracy involved in the analysis and management of this issue are also a cause of confusion as numerous interpretations of sometimes-contradictory demographic data proliferate. The Presidency and the Government of Russia are involved in the analysis and management of this issue. In particular, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Federative Affairs, National and Migration Policy, Ministry of Labor and Social Development and the population Census and Demographic Statistics Department of Russia’s State Committee of Statistics (Goskomstat) have direct roles in this respect. There are also many state and private research institutes that are concerned with demographic issues. The most prominent are the Center for Human Demography and Ecology, the Institute of Gynaecology, Perinatology and Maternity, the Institute for Social and Economic Problems of the Russian Population and Semashko Institute of the Russian Medical Sciences Academy.

Table 1: Russia’s current population

Resident Population (as of 1 January; mln. persons)		
	2000	2001
Total population	145.6	144.8
Urban	106.1	105.6
Rural	39.5	39.2

Despite these limitations, demographers have reported an observable tendency towards population decrease in Russia since 1992. In 1992, the country’s population first decreased by 219’700 people, according to the State Statistics Committee. Thus, demographers can show that since the collapse of the Soviet Union the population of the Russian Federation has declined as follows: 148.3m in 1992; 145.8m in 1998;

13 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 3 January 2001.

14 DaVanzo, Julia and Clifford Grammich. *Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1273, 2001, pp. 101, see p. 3. See <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1273/>.

and 144.5m in May 2001.¹⁵ On the basis of the trajectory established between 1992–2001, demographers generally agree that over the next fifteen years Russia's population profile will fall as follows: 142m in 2005; 138m in 2010; and between 132–4m in 2015/16. Forecasts made by the State Statistics Committee, for example, report that by the year 2016 the population in Russia will drop by 10.4m people against the beginning of 2001, and is expected to total 134.4m.¹⁶

According to the UN forecast the number of people in Russia in 2050 will be little more than 121m, moving Russia from 7th to 14th among the world's most populated countries.¹⁷ Some assessments are even more pessimistic than this. Murray Feshbach, a leading US demographer, calculates that as socioeconomic conditions in Russia will continue to decline, the Russian population will be 80m by 2050. Unless demographic trends improve, a leading demographic expert Nataliia Rimashevskaya, director of the Institute of Socio-economic Problems of the Population at the Russian Academy of Sciences, has argued that Russia's population could shrink by approximately 60% over the next half-century: 87m in 2025 and 55m in 2050.¹⁸

Whilst it is certain that by 2015 the decline in population numbers will take the Russian population into the mid-130 millions based on the known current population size of child bearing age and the fertility rate which can be calculated against the current death rate. However, as it shall be argued below, the longer-term forecasts for 2050 and especially 2075 are too distant in time to make an accurate prediction. These forecasts are based on a number of factors, not least the assumption that the current dynamics of decline will be sustained and this is open to question over the long-term. The long-range forecasts also fail to take into account the possibility of contingency or the impact of any future state policy or initiative that encourages a stabilization or even growth in the population of the state.

15 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 22 June 2001.

16 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 7 August 2001.

17 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 2 January 2001.

18 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 29 May 2001.

1.1 *The Soviet legacy: Marx and mortality?*

There are a number of reasons given for the startlingly dramatic decline of Russia's population in the post-Soviet period. Many of the explanations for this decline are located in the experience of the Soviet era. Putin, for example, in an address to the nation on the 60th anniversary of Germany's invasion of the USSR, noted that: "Even Russia's current demographic problems are largely a consequence of the war."¹⁹ Russian population growth and ageing have both been affected by the Great Patriotic War, the Civil War and the famine, producing a marked imbalance in the age-sex structure of the population.²⁰

Demographers have argued that fertility, family planning, health status, health care and population ageing largely determine the current size, composition, health needs, and growth rate of the Russian population. Thus an understanding of the Soviet modernization paradigm, particularly when related to the family and society, provides the context within which contemporary demographic decline can be placed.²¹ Here, a financial incentive structure within hospitals based in part on the number of occupied beds promoted a state-led "abortion culture."²² After the Second World War, it is argued, the Soviet emphasis on economic modernization reduced the birth rate as more women entered the workforce. Moreover, Soviet economic development stressed the importance of through heavy industrialization over consumer goods: "that helped families in other nations to manage the demands of work and home."²³ Thus, in sparsely populated Siberia, the Far East and the North life expectancies are lower and infant mortality higher – reflecting the problems the Russian health care system faces in these remote areas, whilst they are higher in the Caucasus, Volga and Black Soil regions. Working-age mortality amongst males in the North and North West is higher, reflecting the prevalence of "civilizational ills," such as cardiovascular diseases.

In the Southern Federal District, Chechnya, unsurprisingly, has suffered the worst decline in population. The Russian State Statistics Committee released figures showing that the population of Chechnya has declined by almost 50%, or 505'000 people, in the period 1994–1999. The population of Chechnya declined by 211'000 people, or over 25%, in 1999 – the year in which the Second Chechen Campaign

19 *Russia TV*, Moscow, 22 June 2001.

20 Vassin, Sergei. "The Determinants and Implications of an Aging Population in Russia." In *Russia's Demographic "Crisis"*, ed. Julie DaVanzo. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, CF-124, 1996. See <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF124/CF124.chap6.html>.

21 Vishnevsky, Anatoliy. "Family, Fertility, and Demographic Dynamics in Russia: Analysis and Forecast." In *Russia's Demographic "Crisis"*, ed. Julie DaVanzo. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, CF-124, 1996. See <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF124/CF124.chap1.html>.

22 Rozenfeld, Boris A. "The Crisis of Russian Health Care and Attempts at Reform." In *Russia's Demographic "Crisis"*, ed. Julie DaVanzo. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, CF-124, 1996. See <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF124/chap5.html>.

23 DaVanzo/Grammich, *Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation*, p 21.

began and in which the republic's population decline was the greatest.²⁴ Chechnya, though, is exceptional and its population decline is clearly linked to warfare.

1.2 *The post-Soviet context: is transition a killer?*

However, although some of the population decline can be attributed to the changing age structure of the population, falling age-specific birth rates suggest that Russia's post-Soviet economic and social difficulties are the primary causes. The loss of the Cold War and the post-war structural reform, systemic change and breakdown of functional security and geopolitical space is "reflected in the pauperization, demoralization of the population, accompanied by the deterioration of health and demographic indices that this entails."²⁵ The mortality increase in particular has been attributed to a host of factors associated with the political and economic changes following the Soviet collapse.²⁶ Economic and social distress, the deterioration of the health care system (the free health care guaranteed by Article 41 of the constitution has effectively died a death), and growing homicide and industrial accident rates account for mortality increases. Moreover, as the retired population grows the state lacks the necessary financial resources to meet their needs.

Here it can be argued that there is a relationship between economic reform and health status, particularly when the economic reform takes the form of shock therapy through price liberalization, privatization and rapid political transformation. The Institute for Social and Economic Problems of the Russian Population calculates, for example, that approximately one-third of the Russian population (50m people) live below the poverty line. Nataliia Rimashevskaya reported that more than half of Russia's children were growing up in poor families and as a consequence beggars, tramps and homeless children make up about 10% of the population in Russian cities. The number of Russians who considered themselves poor was 1.5 times [50%] higher than official indices showed, indicating that up to 60% of Russian citizens had incomes lower than their idea of what was decent.²⁷

These dramatic socioeconomic changes occurred ahead of the development of a sustainable social protection network and have led to increased social polarization within Russia.²⁸ Social capital – "the stock of networks that are used to produce goods

24 NTV, Moscow, 2 July 2000.

25 Field, Mark. "The Health Crisis in the Former Soviet Union: A Report from the 'Post-War' Zone." *Social Sciences & Medicine*, vol. 41, no. 11 (1995), pp. 1469–1478; Shlapentok, Vladimir. "Russia: Privatization and Illegalization of Social and Political Life." *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1996), pp. 65–85; Brainerd, Elizabeth. "Market Reform and Mortality in Transition Economies." *World Development*, vol. 26, no. 11 (1998), pp. 2013–2027.

26 Rozenfeld, "The Crisis of Russian Health Care and Attempts at Reform."

27 ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, 17 October 2000.

28 Yuanli Liu, Keqin Rao and John Fei. "Economic Transition and Health Transition: Comparing China and Russia." *Health Policy* 44 (1998), pp. 103–122.

and services in society of which health is one example” – has also dwindled in the post-Soviet period, reinforcing a breakdown in social cohesion and impacting negatively on health.²⁹ Urban regions in European Russia, in other words those that were most economically developed, were most affected. The prerequisites for stress related mortality were in evidence: “high rates of labor turnover, large increases in reported crime, and more unequal distribution of household income.”³⁰ There is also a correlation to be made between environmental degradation – 40% of Russians live in “environmentally dangerous conditions” and the population decline. Mikko Vieonen, a WHO representative in Moscow, has also drawn the link between Russia’s tax regime and population decline: “As long as a bottle of vodka costs the same as a kilo of apples, milk is more expensive than beer, and a packet of cigarettes is cheaper than chewing gum, you ought not to worry about a demographic crisis. Under such circumstances, any country would have a demographic crisis.”³¹

A better guide to explaining the prevalence of population decline is to analyze the three major positive and negative factors that influence population size and growth: births and deaths, immigration and emigration, acquisition and loss of territory and its peoples.³² One recent study undertaken has analyzed the nature of the birth and death rate in Russia as a core explanation to account for decline.³³ Let us take each of these dynamic factors in turn and identify the main characteristics and trends at play.

1.3 *Falling fertility*

According to Kas’ianov, to maintain the population at its present levels every family in Russia needs to have 2.3 children.³⁴ In 1987, Russian maternity clinics registered 2.5m new born, by 1999 1.2m and by 2010 it is calculated it will be as low as 600’000.³⁵ The number of children under 16 has decreased by three million or by 10% and the number of children less than six years old has decreased by four million or 35%. There are 33 million children in Russia, according to the press service of the

29 Rose, Richard. “How Much Does Social Capital Add to Individual Health? A Survey Study of Russians.” *Social Science & Medicine*, 51 (2000), p. 1422.

30 DaVanzo/Grammich, *Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation*, p. 43.

31 Gentleman, Amelia. “Wanted: More Russian Babies to Rescue a Fast Dying Nation,” *The Observer*, 31 December 2000, p. 19.

32 Field, “The Health Crisis in the Former Soviet Union: A Report from the ‘Post-War’ Zone,” p. 1471.

33 Notzon, Francis C., Yuri M. Komarov, Sergei P. Ermakov, James S. Marks, Christopher T. Sempos and Elena Sempos. “Causes of Declining Life Expectancy in Russia.” *Journal of the American Medical Association* 279, 11 March 1998, pp. 739–800; Grebe, Theodore. “Russia’s Population Crisis: The Migration Dimension.” Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) *Policy Memo Series*, no. 118, May 2000. Available at http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0118.pdf.

34 *Russia TV*, Moscow, 9 July 2000.

35 *Moskovskii komsomolets*, Moscow, 29 November 2000.

Russian Children's Foundation, 600'000 of these youngsters are disabled, and 30'000 have no families and are being raised in orphanages. Statistics note that nearly 700'000 orphans are brought up in boarding schools and children's care centers and at least one tenth of them have no parents.³⁶ The Institute of Gynaecology, Perinatology and Maternity reports that 2.3m abortions are registered in Russia every year and 10% of women are left infertile by abortion. There are only 12 specialized centers in the Russian Federation where female infertility can be cured and as in-vitro fertilization can cost up to \$5'000 this option is open to only a few.³⁷ In twenty-seven regions of Russia death rates exceed birth rates by 2–3 times, although a slight increase in birth rates from 8.3 to 8.7 per every 100'000 people was reported in 2000 against the 1999 birth statistics.³⁸

Table 2: Vital statistics (per 1'000 population)

	1999	2000
Births	8.4	8.7
Deaths	14.7	15.3
Natural increase, decrease (–)	–6.3	–6.6
Infant mortality (infant deaths under 1 year per 1000 births)	16.5	15.3
Marriages	6.3	6.2
Divorces	3.7	4.3

1.4 Increasing mortality

The overall death rate grew steadily from 1991 until peaking in 1994, then gradually abating. This reflects the well publicized increase in male (and, less markedly, female) mortality during the first half of the 1990s. The male death rate jumped from 11.6 per thousand in 1990 to 17.8 per thousand in 1994, then declined to 15.0 per thousand in 1997 and is registered at 14.7 per 1'000 in 1999 and 15.3 per 1'000 in 2000. In a health statistics report released by Academician Oleg Shenin at a meeting of the board of the Russian Health Ministry in August 2001, it was noted that particularly high death rates have been registered among the economically active population.³⁹

36 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 21 May 2001.

37 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 29 October 2000.

38 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 7 August 2001.

39 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 7 August 2001. See also, Field, Mark G. "The Health and Demographic Crisis in Post-Soviet Russia." In *Russia's Torn Safety Nets: Health and Social Welfare during the Transition*, eds. Mark G. Field and Judyth L. Twigg, pp. 11–42. New York: St Martin's Press, 2000.

A pressing demographic problem is thus the high premature death rate – in 1999, 27% (500'000) of all deaths consisted of able-bodied Russians of working age.⁴⁰ Russian renowned haematologist Andrei Vorobeev, Fellow of the Medical Science Academy, argues that widespread alcoholism and smoking have lead to a rise in cancer and heart disease.⁴¹ The survival rates of the 400'000 Russians who contract cancer each year, for example, is 30–40% (compared to 60% in the US), mainly due to late diagnosis.⁴²

This has resulted in a negative natural increase. In 1997, the mortality rate was higher than the birth rate by 1.6 times within the Russian Federation. By 1998, in Moscow alone the mortality rate was almost two times higher than the birth rate: 129'000 death certificates were issued as opposed to only 68'000 birth certificates. In 2000, 23m babies were born – but to maintain normal reproduction of the population Russia needs another 750'00 babies over and above that every year. The combination of the two preceding developments has produced annual natural decreases in Russia's population. In 2000, the population grew only in 15 regions (mainly through immigration – see below). Russia has the lowest life expectancy among males for a developed country in peacetime and the largest gap between male and female life expectancy in the world.⁴³ Life expectancy is currently 65 years, 72.4 years for women and 58.9 years for men.⁴⁴ As women live on average 12 years and 6 months more than men (in developed countries the average gap is within the 6–8 years range) a gender imbalance is becoming more marked.⁴⁵ Moreover, according to the State Statistic's Committee, in 2000 the in-migration surplus only offset 6.3% of the natural decrease in the population.⁴⁶

40 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 7 March 2000.

41 *RIA news agency*, Moscow, 24 October 2000.

42 *RIA news agency*, Moscow, 21 November 2000.




43 Shkolnikov, Vladimir and France Mesle. "The Russian Epidemiological Crisis as Mirrored by Mortality Trends." In *Russia's Demographic "Crisis"*, ed. Julie DaVanzo. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, CF-124, 1996. See <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF124/chap4.html>.

44 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 6 June 2001.

45 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 7 March 2001.

46 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 22 June 2001.

Table 3: Russia's gender imbalance⁴⁷



47 U.S. Census Bureau, Population Pyramid Summary for Russia, available at <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbpys.pl?cty=RS&out=s&ymin=250>.

The variable geography of demographic decline

Broadly speaking, in rural regions the number of old people is more than the number of young and the population decline registered in European Russia (the west and the south) is less relative to the population of the northern and eastern territories of the Russian Federation. Between 1992 and 1999 demographic decline was highest in the regions of the Russian Far East, an area that covers 36% of Russia's territory but holds only 5% of its population, suffered a 10.9% decline in population. This decline was registered in each of the constituent parts of this Federal District: – 48% in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug; – 5% in Magadan Oblast; – 18.5% in the Koryak Autonomous Okrug; and – 16.8% – Sakhalin Oblast. The bulk of the population will continue to live in the four territories that constitute the South – Amur and Khabarovsk oblasts, Jewish Autonomous Okrug and Primorskii Krai – and share a 3'000km border with China. By 2016, it is calculated that the population of the Russian Far East, which currently stands at 7.168m, will continue its fall to 6.284m, representing a 12% drop.⁴⁸ Relative to the eastern territories, the decline of Russia's northern population between 1989–1998, was less, at approximately 7% and this progressive decline is set to continue.⁴⁹ According to First Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Development Galina Karelova, the population of the northern territories is also expected to fall by 12% by 2016.⁵⁰ Of the 16 federal constituent parts that comprise the Russian North, 11 of them are ethnic homelands of indigenous peoples, although the non-indigenous population comprises the majority.

48 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 2 January 2001.

49 Heleniak, "Out-Migration and Depopulation of the Russian North during the 1990s," p. 195.

50 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 16 March 2001.

This depopulation during a turbulent post-Soviet transition reverses the historical (Tsarist and Soviet) trend of migrants relocating from the European core to the north and east as labor/production/transport costs have risen, incentives and subsidies were reduced or abolished and living conditions have deteriorated.⁵¹ Studies of migration patterns in Russia have also revealed that certain groups have a higher degree of “migratability” – that is: “the propensity to use migration as a strategy of adaptation” is higher in some groups than others.⁵² Educated ethnic Russian migrants of working age lead the net out-migration towards the European core. Semi-Sovietized indigenous people, pensioners, unskilled workers and invalids who cannot effectively exploit the natural resource potential of these territories are left behind to languish within a poverty trap. In the North for example, between 1989 and 1998, 72% of out-migrants were Russians, 77% were Slavs whilst most indigenous peoples remained.⁵³ This promotes the effective de-Russification of the north and east.

In the European core, the majority of illegal migrants (that are not resident in the Russian Far East) and intra-Russia migrants are to be found in large urban centers, such as Rostov-na-Donu, Volgograd, St Petersburg and especially Moscow. Moscow Oblast external economic affairs minister, Mikhail Amirbegishvili, quoting the Moscow Oblast Statistics Committee’s data at a Moscow Oblast Duma session argued half of migrants in Russia settle in Moscow and Moscow Oblast.⁵⁴ The capital appears to be the only region where the death rate is not much higher than the birth rate.⁵⁵

However, the demographic picture is not uniformly healthy within European Russia. According to the governor of Tula Oblast, Vasilii Starodubtsev, the number of those who died in 1999 exceeded the number of births by three times while the average life expectancy in the region was 66.4 compared with 67.1 in Russia generally. The region is one of the “oldest” in the country, as the average age of its inhabitants is 40.5. The number of children in the region is half the number of people of pensionable age and there are 1’000 men compared to 1’196 women. In Moscow, St Petersburg, Ivanovo and Tver oblasts, the ratio of men and women is more disturbing than elsewhere. The governor particularly stressed the destructive effect on demography in the areas affected by the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. As a result of that accident, 1’299 villages with the 714’000 population, that is, almost half Tula Oblast’s inhabitants have found themselves living in the polluted areas.⁵⁶

Russia’s infant mortality rate varies considerably depending on the Federal District: in the Northwestern District it is lower than the average rate in Russia (12.8 babies

51 Kontorovich, Vladimir. “Can Russia Resettle the Far East?” *Post-Communist Economies*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2000), pp. 365–384, see pp. 370–371.

52 Heleniak, “Out-Migration and Depopulation of the Russian North during the 1990s,” p. 190.

53 *Ibid.*, p. 190.

54 *RIA news agency*, Moscow, 20 June 2001.

55 *Russia Center TV*, Moscow, 20 October 2000.

56 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 3 November 1999.

per 1'000 live births), while in the Far Eastern District the infant mortality rate is higher than the average in Russia and now is 18.6 babies per 1'000 live births. Childbirth death rate steadily tends to decrease. The average childbirth death rate in Russia now has gone down 7.8%. In the Northwestern Federal District, the childbirth death rate has now reached the lowest level over the past ten years (41.2 deaths per 100'000 mothers). In Pskov Oblast, it is 17.8 and in Kaliningrad Oblast – 28.2. In the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, no childbirth deaths have been registered for the past three years, according to the Russian Health Ministry.⁵⁷

2.1 HIV/AIDS factor

Socially significant infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and hepatitis are spreading rapidly and are developing a region-specific impact. HIV prevalence levels can be used to project the number future illnesses, deaths and orphans – deaths due to AIDS follows the HIV infection curve by several years – and it is therefore critical for accurately assessing the rise of HIV in Russia.

In the first half of 2000 the number of people infected with HIV in Russia rose by over 50% against last year and according to Nikolai Mashkilleyson, HIV/AIDS coordinator with the World Health Organization: “The HIV epidemic is developing progressively” in Russia. As of 2 July 2000, 129'261 HIV cases were registered in Russia, Mashkilleyson reported, citing the Russian Health Ministry. At the end of 2000, there were 85'820 people infected with HIV. According to various sources, the actual number of people infected with HIV in Russia is between 250'000 and 700'000.⁵⁸ By 31 August 2001, Vadim Pokrovskii, head of the Russian federal AIDS prevention center, reported that 144'233 people infected with HIV were registered in Russia. “If officially there are almost 150'000 people infected with HIV, their actual number, according to the calculations that are generally accepted in the world, is ten times more, and maybe even twenty times more,” he said. If the current infection rate persists, and Pokrovskii stated that, “it will persist,” one million Russians will be infected with HIV by the end of 2001.⁵⁹ Representatives of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have said they are concerned about the HIV-infection rate among children. They have reported that more than 800 children contracted the HIV virus in Russia in 2001, which exceeds the overall rate of HIV-infected children in the ten previous years combined.⁶⁰ As a result Russia has become an “Aids epicenter” in which Ministry of Health officials predict that 10% of the entire Russian population could have HIV by 2005.⁶¹

57 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 11 August 2001.

58 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 9 July 2001.

59 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 1 September 2001.

60 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 11 October 2001.

61 *Segodnia*, Moscow, 22 November 2000.

Approximately 17'000 drug addicts are registered by Moscow's medical services, according to Moscow's senior drug specialist Yevgenii Briun: "To obtain the real picture, we have to multiply it by seven. "According to this method, he estimates there could be 120'000 drug addicts in Moscow at present. With that, he pointed out, by the method of the World Health Organization, to assess the real number of drug addicts, it is necessary to multiply those formally registered by 50, which would come to 850'000 people, approximately one-tenth of the population of Moscow.⁶² On the basis of this calculation, experts believe that there are 3m drug addicts in Russia. As Internal Affairs Minister Boris Gryzlov told a conference of law enforcement agencies in Maritime Territory, reiterating the warning of Yevgenii Briun: "While just 451'000 addicts are officially registered, the actual number must be six to seven times that," on 28 July 2001. What is important is that most addicts are young people aged 15 to 25, Gryzlov said. "This implies that every fifth young man in Russia is an addict."⁶³

As the majority of new cases of HIV contraction (90–95%) continue to be among drug users, HIV victims reside in cities where drug use is highest. Thus Moscow, Moscow Oblast and Irkutsk Oblast account for 70% of all new cases and the Ministry of Health expect an upsurge in cities such as Samara, Ulyanovsk and Orenburg, which straddle the main drug route from Central Asia to Moscow.⁶⁴ The majority of those infected with HIV were registered in Moscow Oblast (15'595) and Moscow (12'995), then Sverdlovsk Oblast (10'500 people), Samara Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast and St Petersburg (over 8'000).⁶⁵

However, regions with related socio-economic and political problems are also witnessing a rapid upsurge in instances of AIDS/HIV. Dagestani medical doctors believe that the situation with HIV in the republic is so serious that it can be described as an epidemic. The number of cases registered in January–March 2001 was more than in the whole of 1997.⁶⁶ By August 2001, a second wave of HIV-infection had started in Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast, with rural areas becoming increasingly affected, according to Grigorii Moshkovich (the oblast's chief specialist in this area) at a meeting of the regional anti-epidemic commission. A total of 54 people have died of AIDS in the Oblast since January 2001 and 541 new cases of HIV have been registered, representing a 9.5-fold increase on the same period in 2000. A total of 1'580 HIV-infected people were registered in the Oblast before 1 August.⁶⁷ It is further reported that Kostroma Oblast is facing an HIV and AIDS epidemic associated with intravenous drug taking.⁶⁸ An HIV epidemic has also been reported in Mari El, centered on the

⁶² *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 19 July 2001.

⁶³ *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 28 July 2001.

⁶⁴ *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 27 November 2000.

⁶⁵ *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 1 September 2001.

⁶⁶ *NTV*, Moscow, 09 April 2001.

⁶⁷ *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 16 August 2001.

⁶⁸ *Ren TV*, Moscow, 16 August 2001.

industrial town of Volzhsk. Here the number of HIV patients has doubled since May 2001 and the major cause is drug addiction.⁶⁹

The battle with AIDS is also becoming the top priority for healthcare officials in Maritime Territory, according to Nikolai Berezkin, chief doctor of the Maritime Territory AIDS center. The center's data, as of 1 September 2001, reported that 2'633 people were registered as HIV-positive in a region with a population of 2.3m. As Berezkin noted, the growth statistic for the number of AIDS sufferers in Maritime Territory is as follows: in 1999, 93 people were registered as infected, while the figure for 2000 was 1'500. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the real number of infected persons is higher by several times. Berezkin says that at this rate (50–60 new cases of infection are registered in the Territory weekly), in four to five year's time about 30% of the population will be infected. This could entirely annul the birth rate and cause a demographic catastrophe in the Territory.⁷⁰ The rise in HIV cases in Tatarstan is also said to follow Russian trend and are centered on Kazan.⁷¹

The number of hepatitis A cases in the Novosibirsk Oblast of central Siberia has increased seven-fold in the course of a year, occurring in six in 100'000 head of population in the first half of 2000, and soaring to 40 in 100'000 in the first six months of this year. By October 2001 it was calculated that the number of HIV-carriers in the Siberian Federal District exceeded 20'000 and that the HIV rate in the District is 1.5-fold higher than Russia's average. The Novosibirsk medical information agency Med-Info reported that 8'776 new HIV cases were registered in the Siberian Federal District in the first nine month of 2001. Compared with the same period last year, HIV growth rate has increased 12-fold in Chita Oblast and 10-fold in Altay Territory and Krasnoyarsk Territory. About 85 HIV-carriers are under 29 years old.⁷² This increase was attributed to the "crumbling" water-supply infrastructure and the "cyclical pattern of the natural occurrence of the virus causing hepatitis A." In 1998, hepatitis A cases peaked at 300 per 100'000 people, but they are not expected to reach that level in 2001.⁷³ A Cholera epidemic was reported in Russian Volga region in Kazan (capital of Tatarstan), infecting 167 people who have been hospitalized, two-thirds of whom are children.⁷⁴

2.2 Ethno-religious factor

Mortality and fertility rates in Russia can also be differentiated according to ethnicity and religion. This ethno-religious dimension is most striking in the differing fertility rates between ethnic Slav Orthodox and Islamic (ethnic Slav or otherwise) popula-

69 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 25 August 2001.

70 *RIA news agency*, Moscow, 20 September 2001.

71 *Tatar-Infom news agency*, Kazan, 25 September 2001.

72 *RIA news agency*, Moscow, 11 October 2001.

73 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 24 July 2001.

74 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 30 July 2001.

tions on Russian territory. It is notable that: "Those areas with the highest concentrations of Islamic religious communities have crude birth rates (rates of birth per 1'000 population) about a fourth higher than those for other areas of Russia.⁷⁵ Moreover, the mortality rates in the areas of highest Islamic community concentrations in Russia are lower than elsewhere within the Federation.⁷⁶

75 DaVanzo/Grammich, *Diré Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation*, p. 43.

76 Pashinteva, N. I., I. V. Voronina and L. A. Kazachenko. *The Demographic Yearbook of Russia, Statistical Handbook*. Moscow: State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics, 1998.

Demographic blueprint and migration concept: Russian policy responses

Russia can maintain population stability by increasing fertility, reducing mortality and promoting immigration. Due to the weakness of the Russian economy and deteriorating health care system (exacerbated by a growing ageing population), immigration is perceived to offer the best opportunity to achieve stability. Aleksandr Blokhin, the Russian minister for federal affairs, nationalities and migration and specialists from the Russian State Council's working group on migration policy have argued that the influx of immigrants, especially from the CIS and the Baltic states, can improve the demographic situation in Russia in the next 20 years.⁷⁷ Migration patterns have important consequences for Russia's demographic profile. According to Theodore Gerbe, three distinct patterns have emerged following the end of the Soviet Union. Firstly, high levels of immigration to the Russian Federation from other countries, particularly CIS states. Secondly, the rapid emigration from Russia's northern and eastern regions to its western, southern, and central regions. Thirdly, the response of net regional migration rates to increasingly varied regional labor market conditions.

Gerbe's analysis argued that positive immigration rates have offset the natural population decline slightly, but not enough to prevent Russia from becoming one of the few countries with a shrinking population.⁷⁸ In 1994, with 2.3m deaths and 1.4 m births, Russia suffered a population loss of 900'000. However, in that year net immigration to Russia peaked at 1.15m immigrants whilst emigration was less than 340'000. This resulted in a net population loss of 100'000.⁷⁹ For this reason net immi-

⁷⁷ *RIA news agency*, Moscow, 8 June 2001.

⁷⁸ Gerbe, "Russia's Population Crisis: The Migration Dimension."

⁷⁹ DaVanzo/Grammich, *Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation*, p. 13.

gration is perceived as the best means of reducing population loss and has received much official attention in 2000–2001, although Goskomstat population projections predict a drastic decline in net immigration of ethnic Russians from the “Near Abroad” by 2010.⁸⁰

A further solution of the demographic problem is the so-called labor migration, involving attracting specialists from abroad, mainly compatriots from the CIS countries. It is here that incentives are needed: particularly housing subsidies paid out on a selective basis, that take into account the domestic labor market.⁸¹ In 2000, such a suggestion met with some reservations and resistance from within the government. Aleksandr Blokhin, at a “Migration Policy in Contemporary Russia” conference in the Russian State Duma, he noted that up to 500’000 “illegal” migrants were living in Russia. As a consequence, he called for the creation of a new state concept for migration policy to reflect the demographic situation in the country and workforce shortages in some regions.⁸² He proposed introducing immigration quotas in Russia, creating an immigration inspectorate controlling illegal immigrants when they cross the border and monitoring them when within the Federation.

By 2001, the accent was more on the positive. As a result of the 15 February meeting, the federal and ethnic policy ministry developed a program for 2001 by April 1, and a larger group of agencies to draw up a new migration policy for 2002–2005 by 15 May. A session of the presidium of the State Council on 26 June 2001 and it addressed a wide range of issues, including how to turn migration policy into an effective lever of national economic development through assisted resettlement and incentives. By 19 July the Russian government approved at the draft conception of immigration policy and a program for its realization in 2001–2002 and beyond. The Minister of Federation Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy Aleksandr Blokhin named encouraging immigration as one of the conception’s priorities, above all of Russian-speaking people, from the CIS and Baltic countries. Russia has, he explained, “a most unfavorable demographic situation” – an annual population decrease of 700’000. “If that depopulation rate continues, by 2050 Russia will have just a little over 85 million people,” he observed. Thus to maintain a stable population immigration should equal 700’000 annually. If mortality and birth rates remain at present levels, that figure should be at least 1 million. However, the conception of immigration policy also includes tougher immigration control, he noted. Russia now has about a million illegal immigrants who live underground: “Immigration control will be exercised not only on the borders, as happens now, but throughout the country’s territory.”⁸³

However, immigration into Russia is drying up. The State Statistic’s Committee reported that Russia’s population decreased by 458’400 or 0.3% in the first half of

80 Vishnevsky, Anatoliy. “The Demographic Potential of Russia.” Translated by Robert Valliere. *Russian Social Science Review*, vol. 40, no. 4 (1999), pp. 4–29.

81 *Russian Public TV (ORT)*, Moscow, 15 February 2001.

82 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 4 December 2000.

83 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 19 July 2001.

2001 to 144.4m. In the first six months of 2000, the country's population shrank by 425'400. Immigration provided only a limited relief: "The increase of the population due to migration for the first half of 2001 compensated for only 5.5% of the natural decrease. "This represented the "lowest indicator for the entire period of population decrease from 1992 to 2000. Despite the reduction of the natural decrease," the ratio is "the result of a considerable reduction (from the first half of 2000) in the migration increase." Migration-caused population increase was 79% lower in the first half of 2001 than in the first half of 2000. In 2001, 21'600 more people arrived in Russia than left the country while in 2000 there were 100'700 more arrivals than departures. Altogether 81'100 people moved to Russia and 59'500 emigrated from it in the first half of 2001, compared with 173'000 and 72'300 respectively in the same period in 2000. Thus, "the number of migrants within Russia is also continuing the decrease: it diminished by 72'700 people in the first half of 2001, or 7%, from the first half of 2000."⁸⁴

Table 4: International migration (per 1'000 population)

	1999	2000
Arrived in the Russian Federation, total	367'105	350'874
Among them from the countries of:		
<i>CIS and Baltic region</i>	366'655	350'288
<i>Other regions</i> ¹⁾	450	586
Emigrated from the Russian Federation, total	214'963	161'178
Among them to the countries of:		
<i>CIS and Baltic region</i>	129'704	83'438
<i>Other regions</i> ¹⁾	85'259	77'740
Migration increase, decrease (-), total	152'142	189'696
Including the result of migration exchange with the countries of:		
<i>CIS and Baltic region</i>	236'951	266'850
<i>Other regions</i>	-84'809	-77'154

¹⁾ Data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation

The Russian government at the 15 February session examined a migration policy and demographic policy blueprint. It approved as a whole the blueprint for a demographic policy aimed at stimulating the birth rate and lowering the death rate. The demographic blueprint is designed for a period of 15 years, with immediate measures to be implemented in the next five years, to avoid a shortage of personnel in Russia. Given the forecast economic growth, there will simply not be enough specialists at an able-bodied age. According to Kas'ianov: "The problem of the decline of the able-bodied population in the Russian Federation is not simply a social problem. It is a problem,

to all intents and purposes, of either a successful or an unfavorable development of our state as a whole.”⁸⁵

In order to stimulate the birth rate the Labor Ministry insists on increasing the payments when a baby is born and on adopting a housing program for young families. Nikolai Gerasimenko, chairman of the State Duma Committee for Health Care and Sport and a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, has promoted one such potential initiative. He has argued that falling fertility rates can be reversed if the example of Penza Oblast is reproduced. Over the last 20 years young couples have received housing on credit: if one child is born in the family, then 25% of the credit is written off; if two children, then 50%; if three, then the entire credit is forgiven.⁸⁶ This initiative was adopted nation-wide. A program devoted to preventing diseases that shorten the life span: 50% of able-bodied men currently die of heart diseases and another half die of accidents and alcoholism. According to Aleksandr Pochinok, labor and social development minister: “We are not calling for the repetition of the anti-alcohol campaign of the Eighties with its defects. We simply draw attention to the fact that people are dying mainly of synthetic spirit, of substitutes, of surrogates.”⁸⁷

However, as one analyst has argued, there is a gulf between the rhetoric and reality of government policy on migration as a panacea for population decrease: “strictly speaking, Putin’s team still has no strategy as such. The officially approved program put forward by German Gref, minister of trade and economic development, is called a strategy, but though it is a sensible program for ongoing social and economic reform, it is more about the means of economic policy than the aims. And a strategy is primarily about aims. Encouraging immigration to Russia could be a strategic aim, not the only one but one of the main aims. But so far, to all appearances, the president hasn’t ordered any program to be drawn up on this issue.”⁸⁸ Whilst Russia appears to be developing a Migration Policy, Immigration Policy and a Demographic Blueprint, it is not clear the extent to which these initiatives are to be co-ordinated and, in reality, whether they all address the same problem and or even contradict each other. “Muddle through” appears to be the watchword.

85 *Russian Public TV (ORT)*, Moscow, 15 February 2001.

86 *Moskovskii komsomolets*, Moscow, 29 November 2000.

87 *Russian Public TV (ORT)*, Moscow, 15 February 2001.

88 Latsis, Otto. “Strategy and Demography.” *The Russia Journal*, 14 August 2001. Available at <http://www.russiamjournal.com/weekly/article.shtml?ad=3955>.

Russian foreign and security policy: implications of demographic decline

It has been argued that demographic change “can cause conflict in two major ways: by directly causing increased tensions between states in a region, or by altering the domestic politics of a given state so that it becomes a security problem for its neighbors.”⁸⁹ Adopting a broader concept of security to embrace economic, political and societal security issues, it is clear that demographic change can also cause conflict in a third way, through increasing tensions and generating tensions within a state. Multi-national Federations, such as Brazil, Nigeria, India, Indonesia, China and the Russian Federation are particularly prone, it will be argued below, to these non-traditional sources of insecurity. It has also been noted that: “Demographic shifts can affect domestic politics in four ways: the creation of revolutionary states, the creation of failed states, the outbreak of ethnic warfare, and the ecological marginalization of poorer socio-economic groups.”⁹⁰ However, it should be noted that within multi-national federal entities, such as the Russian Federation, demographic dynamics have the ability to create all four scenarios simultaneously within one state.

4.1 Possible foreign and security policy implications

Russia is not alone amongst Eurasian states in suffering a population decline and for this reason it is very likely that demography will become a key issue in bilateral and multilateral relations within Eurasia in the 21st century. Within the former Soviet space issues associated with Russian demographic decline – such as migration and the

89 Nichiporuk, *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, p. 29.

90 *Ibid.*, p. 39.

role of the diaspora in the “Near Abroad” – have received widespread coverage and will continue to do so as demographic dynamics play an increasingly prominent role in shaping Russian relations with the former Soviet republics. Ethnic diasporas, for example, have been perceived to play an increasingly important role in the foreign policy implementation of home states. They represent a potential strategic asset that could be drawn upon to secure regional politico-military objectives.⁹¹ Thus migration of workforce and labor reserves, both legal and illegal, is an issue of rising importance within the CIS and as the multi-level consultations held between CIS member states in Almaty, February 2001 indicates, it has already established itself on the CIS agenda.⁹²

However, the number of Russians throughout the former Soviet Union, as well as the Russian Federation, has declined in the last ten years. In real terms the number has fallen from approximately 24.8 million in 1989 to 19 million by 2001. The absolute number and the percentage of Russians in the population are declining in every former Soviet republic.⁹³

Table 5: Number of Russians in the former USSR (in thousands)⁹⁴

Country	January 1989	January 1999
Azerbaijan	392.3	148
Armenia	51.6	8
Belorussia	1'342.1	1'141.7
Georgia	341.2	140
Kazakhstan	6'062.0	4'479.6
Kyrgyzstan	916.6	603.2
Moldova	562.1	501
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	119'865.9	117'883.5
Tajikistan	388.5	80
Turkmenistan	333.9	240
Uzbekistan	1'653.5	1'150
Ukraine	11'355.6	9'100
Estonia	474.8	353
Latvia	905.5	710
Lithuania	344.5	280
All countries former USSR	144'990.1	136'818.0

Population declines are registered in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan amongst the CIS states. Kazakhstan's population has decreased from 16m people in 1995 to 14.9m

91 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

92 *Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency*, Almaty, 12 February 2001.

93 Goble, Paul. “Russian Presence in Former Republics Declines.” *RFE/RL Newslines*, vol. 5, no. 149, Part I, 8 August 2001.

94 Source: Tul'skii, Mikhail. “The True Face of the Demographic Catastrophe.” *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, No. 130, 19 July 2001, p. 5.

people in 2000; Russia's population currently totals 144.8m people, compared with 148.3m people in 1995; Ukraine's population has decreased by more than 2m people since 1995.⁹⁵ Consequently, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are likely to compete hard with Russia to attract from amongst the remaining pool of migrants. As Ukraine has traditionally been the main migration destination for Russians, the migration of Russians to Ukraine is very likely to grow after that country copes with the crisis. Competition between Russia, Ukraine and North Kazakhstan for migrants may both destabilizes foreign policy relations between these states and exacerbate societal security problems within sub-regions on their territories.

According to Blokhin the majority of Russians currently living in Central Asia (4m) wish to emigrate to Russia. It is here that the issue of population migration from Central Asia is increasingly becoming an issue in inter-state and bilateral relations. The Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Russia to Kyrgyzstan Georgii Rudov, for example, has noted that the two countries have good prospects for the development of bilateral relations, expressed concern about the continuing emigration of the Russian-speaking population. He observed that the main reason is economic instability in Kyrgyzstan, which does not allow the Russian-speaking population of Kyrgyzstan to fully apply its knowledge and experience because industrial enterprises are not functioning. However, he also pointed to the efforts of the Kyrgyz president, all the country's leadership and the Russian embassy to restrain this process.⁹⁶

In Kazakhstan, 5m ethnic Russians make up a third of Kazakhstan's population, but find their hopes of emigration to Russia are hindered by bureaucratic red tape, poverty and unemployment and overt discrimination. The status of the Russian language in Kazakhstan is cited as one push-factor for mass migration. While Kazakh is preserved as the state language, there is no law granting Russian any official status. According to ethnographer V. A. Tishkov, in his report, "Russians in Central Asia and Kazakhstan," published in the Moscow journal *Studies on Applied and Urgent Ethnology*, another obstacle for Russians in Kazakhstan is the rebirth of conservative Islam there, particularly for Russian women. He argued that "strengthening the Muslim traditions in some Central Asian countries (...) will hamper the activity of Russian teachers and artistic intelligentsia (...). The spread of Islam might reflect on the population's attitude toward women's labor. Russian women who live in other ethnic environments are the most vulnerable."⁹⁷

In the Baltic states, Russia's instrumental use of the diaspora is a well-documented foreign policy ploy. The citizenship policies adopted by Estonia and Latvia can be partly explained with reference to the emergent foreign policies of the Russian Federation.

95 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 10 March 2001.

96 *Kabar news agency*, Bishkek, 14 September 2001.

97 Chernyakova, Nonna and Russell Working. "Bureaucracy Creates Obstacles to Emigration of Russian's from Kazakhstan." *RFE/RL Newslines*, vol. 5, no. 187, Part I, 3 October 2001.

On re-gaining independence in 1991, the main danger to Baltic sovereignty and territorial integrity was perceived to arise from the danger of an ill-defined post-Soviet re-integrationist impulse, generated by a vaguely defined combination of Russian nationalist chauvinism, Soviet nostalgia and imperial patriotism. The high water mark of this policy is best expressed in the *Long Term Policy Guidelines towards the Baltic States* published in February 1997 by Yeltsin's Presidential Office. The policy document outlined six inter-linked issues that were central to Russo-Baltic relations. It began by reiterating Russian opposition to Baltic inclusion into NATO, a carte blanche condemnation of the primary foreign policy objective of all three Baltic states. It then stated that until the protection of "compatriot rights" was guaranteed in Estonia and Latvia, border ratification between Russia and these two Baltic states would be delayed.⁹⁸ The document emphasized the necessity of Russia maintaining profitable economic ties to the Kaliningrad Oblast, whilst calling for Russo-Baltic co-operation to combat the threats posed by organized crime. Lastly, increased bi-lateral cultural co-operation between Russia and the Baltic states was encouraged. Clearly, the highlighting by Russia of societal security concerns amongst its "persecuted" compatriot minorities in Estonia and Latvia provided the motor that drove Russian policy.⁹⁹

It might be argued that this tactic – instrumental use of the diaspora – would no longer prove such an effective option if Russian citizens and ethnic-Russian or Russian-speaking residents return to Russia in increasing numbers. However, one should note the demographic dynamics within the Baltic states. The Latvian national statistics office has reported that the Latvian population was reduced by 8'800 people from 2'366'400 at the beginning of the year to 2'357'600 in early August. The downward trend continued as the expected year-on-year growth of the birth rate in six months of this year never took place. In the first half of 2001 there were 10'100 births and 16'700 deaths registered in Latvia as compared to 10'300 and 16'900 respectively in six months of 2000. Thus, birth and death rates calculated per 1'000 of population remained unchanged year-on-year at 4.3 births and 7.1 deaths per 1'000 of population.¹⁰⁰ These statistics do not indicate decline by ethnicity. However, it is likely that fertility and mortality rates amongst ethnic Russians in Latvia – the poorest and most marginalized elements of society – reflect more the Russian Federation trends than ethnic Latvian. For this reason, given the competition for population, the diaspora change function in Russian foreign policy, moving from a means to an end to an end in itself. As the utility of the diaspora declines, so other factors – such as energy, peacekeeping troops and Islamic fundamentalism are likely to rise in importance as potential levers of influence and control through the "Near Abroad."

98 Cichock, M. "Interdependence and Manipulation in the Russian-Baltic Relationship: 1993–1997." *Journal of Baltic Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1999), pp. 89–117.

99 Herd, Graeme P. "Russia's Baltic Policy after the Meltdown." *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1999), pp. 197–212.

100 *BNS news agency*, Tallinn, 28 August 2001.

Whilst the issue of immigration from former Soviet states to the Russian Federation impacts on Russia's relationship to the "Near Abroad," emigration of Russian citizens from the Federation will have a greater influence over Russia's "Far Abroad" policy than ever before. Both CEE and Western European states are becoming more interested in attracting skilled migrants and this creates competition for Russia amongst white-collar migrants leaving the CIS who will seek higher wages in the West rather than Russia. It also constitutes a pull factor for Russia's remaining population, particularly those in the European core: "migration aspirations of Russians now and in the foreseeable future will be mainly orientated westwards, towards developed countries."¹⁰¹

However, given that many of the migrants are illegal temporary workers, this could have a serious impact on Russia's relations with the evolving European security order particularly the EU. Whether Russia remains a source of cheap labor and a market for secondary products or a fully integrated part of the EU will all depend on border regimes – their location and their nature. The Schengen agreement, for example, has important consequences for the EU's relationship with the East. Polish-Ukrainian relations are a case in point as 2m people (shuttle-traders) travel across this border every month. If the Ukrainian economy is strengthened, the role of organized crime diminishes, and unemployment is reduced, then it is highly likely that a semi-transparent border will emerge. However, if prostitution, drug transit and other criminal activity prevail and predominate, then the EU's eastern frontiers will be "hard" and impermeable. Russia's human rights commissioner, Oleg Mironov, reports of a catastrophic rise in the export and trade of Russian citizens in the West, with over 500'000 women, children and young men from the FSU living illegally in Western Europe. They are subjected to sexual abuse and contribute to the trade in human organs, rendering Russia "a reception, transit and dispatch country for the export of human commodities."¹⁰² Illegal migration and associated criminality will have a profound impact on the ability of former Soviet territories to integrate into "Fortress Europe" and on the perception in Western capitals and public opinion over the desirability of further enlargement.

In Latvia and Lithuania, for example, all these process are currently emergent and need to be managed. EU enlargement and the issue of the Russian diaspora can be seen to impact on both Russian-EU relations and Russian-Baltic security policy, crossing from the societal into the political and economic security sectors. The issue of transit fees for Russians travelling in transit trains to Kaliningrad is set to focus attention on the societal sector once more. In 2001, the Latvia Foreign Minister, Indulis Berzins, stated that Latvia abrogated a 1993 agreement with Russia under which Russians could travel without a visa in transit, because: "we are obliged to comply with the rules that operate in EU countries."¹⁰³ Under the Latvian plan for negotiating accession to the EU in accordance

101 Kontorovich, Vladimir. "Can Russia Resettle the Far East?" *Post-Communist Economies*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2000), p. 375.

102 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 21 July 2000.

103 *ITAR-TASS*, Moscow, 27 March 2001.

with Schengen visa rules, a rule will be in effect before 30 June 2002 by which all passengers on trains in transit will need visas as they are in effect crossing what will constitute the EU's external border.

However, the traffic is not all one-way. The labor market in Kaliningrad Oblast is saturated with foreign workers, according to Yevgenii Kuldyshev, head of the Kaliningrad Oblast department of the Ministry of Federations Affairs and Ethnic and Migration Policy in a meeting with the committee for social policy of the Oblast Duma. Kuldyshev reported that most of these workers entered the region illegally. The specific geography of the region means that Kaliningraders hardly ever travel to other Russian regions to earn their living. But the simplified entry procedures for citizens from the neighboring countries of Lithuania and Poland means they can get tourist vouchers and come to work and earn illegal income. Kuldyshev argued that the law enforcement agencies every year catch up to 1'000 illegal workers, with much more escaping detection of the authorities. There are also up to 1'500 foreigners in the region who are legally entitled to work. The Kaliningrad Oblast Duma in 1998 passed a law on rules for importing foreign labor, but that law does not solve the main problem of protecting the labor market from illegals. Kuldyshev has therefore introduced proposed amendments to the existing law, including the increase of penalties for employers offering work to foreigners not entitled to such work, while at the same time protecting employment rights. One proposal is to create an immigration inspectorate, which would combat illegals. In the Soviet period approximately 70 to 86% of foreign workers in the region were Lithuanians or Poles working in the construction industry or transport sector. Since the year 2000, Ukrainians – mostly shipbuilders and welders – have taken second place in the numerical stakes.¹⁰⁴

4.2 Possible domestic political security implications

Although Kontorovich has noted that “the political implications of uneven population distribution are not well understood”¹⁰⁵ – it can be argued that there is a correlation between voting behavior and socioeconomic and demographic indices of different regions. As the process of economic transformation in Russia has proved highly uneven, rich and poor within the Federation are geographically spread through richer and poorer regions. Some studies have analyzed the spatial voting patterns of different elections by reference to underlying socioeconomic traits apparent in the 89 constituent parts of the Russian Federation and uncovered important spatial variations in the regional distribution of the electorate. Clem and Craumer, for example, have argued that: “certain characteristics of the electorate in the different regions have very consistent statistical relationship with voting preference.”¹⁰⁶ Their study of the March 2000

104 *BNS news agency*, Kaliningrad, 10 September 2001.

105 Kontorovich, “Can Russia Resettle the Far East?,” p. 380.

106 Clem, Ralph S. and Peter Craumer. “Spatial Patterns of Political Choice in the Post-Yeltsin Era: The Geography of Russia's 2000 Presidential Election.” *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, vol. 41, no. 7 (2000), pp. 465–482, see p. 478.

Presidential election indicates that agricultural workers and pensioners who have suffered most from shock therapy privatization and transition to the market economy tend to vote for parties of the left, nationalist and anti-reform parties. Younger, white-collar and urbanized citizens more generally tend to vote for change and reform parties.

As well over 50% of the registered voters that comprise the total electorate reside in 20 of the most populous regions, the political security implications of demographic change are not as important as one might at first suppose. Elections tend to be won or lost according to the voter preference in the 10 most populous regions and therefore the voting preference of the sparsely inhabited regions of the east and north are marginal to the result. The 10 largest regional electorates in 1996 and 2000 were as follows: Moscow City, Moscow Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, the St Petersburg, Sverdlovsk and Rostov oblasts, the Republic of Bashkortostan, Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast, the Republic of Tatarstan and Chelyabinsk Oblast.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, a general pattern emerges in which there is higher turnout in the west and south, lower in the north and east, so compounding this differential in regional voting power. Thus, continued population decline in the north and east will not be a determining factor in Russian elections, particularly as the out-migrants will gravitate towards urban centers in the European core.

However, demographic decline, whilst not impacting radically upon election results, does increase the politico-military security importance of sparsely populated border regions to the center. In November 2000, the Security Council held a key conference on the defense of Russia's national interest on the state border and within border regions. The role and significance of the state border increases in significance in the overall system of ensuring Russia's security, the conference argued, as global stocks of raw hydrocarbons, drinking water and agricultural land diminishes and the world's population grows.¹⁰⁸ Implicit within the discussion was the realization that as Russia suffers from population decline it is clear that it faces security problems of a different order, magnitude and dynamic than other states.

Moreover, demographic decline could lead to the gradual process of re-centralization of state power – “the politics of Putinism” – becoming associated with Russian ethno-centrism. Russia is a multi-ethnic state with 128 “nationalities” (ethnic groups) which constitute 18% of the total population, ethnic Russians (*russkii*) the other 82%. All are citizens of Russia (*Rossiianin*). However, the advent of the second Chechen campaign, the perceived threat of “Islamic terrorism,” the reduction of the sovereignty of Russia's ethnic republics have all helped re-centralize state power. Moreover, the creation of the Federal District structure, the association of state and Orthodox Church and Putin's calls for a national idea based on “traditional values” of Russians – patriotism,

107 Clem/Craumer, “Spatial Patterns of Political Choice in the Post-Yeltsin Era: The Geography of Russia's 2000 Presidential Election,” p. 469.

108 *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, Moscow, 30 November 2000.

gostudarstvennichestvo, and social solidarity – allow Putinism to become associated with Russian ethno-centrism.¹⁰⁹

Indeed, in August 2001 Aleksandr Blokhin argued that no ethnic group that does not form a majority in a compact territory should have territorial autonomy, but rather these groups should enjoy extraterritorial cultural autonomy. Under this proposed system, they “would be candidates for dissolution and inclusion in larger, non-ethnically based federal units.”¹¹⁰ This would mean that only six of the 22 ethnically based federal units would survive the cull and it would increase tension between Russian and non-Russian constituent parts of the Federation. If this phenomena is emergent, then the variable geometry of demographic decline (migration from ethnic republics on the periphery to the European core and differential Slav/non-Slav birth and death rates) will exacerbate such initiatives. This in turn will further promote political tensions, grievances and insecurity.

This risk is particularly relevant in view of Russia’s Muslim minority status, an extremely controversial topic of debate in Russia. In the late Soviet period Muslims constituted 40% of the total population of the USSR and were projected to cross the 50% threshold by 2005. A more accurate figure for the number of Russian Muslims will be revealed by the 2002 census, but it is currently estimated that their number is between 20–30 million, approximately 15–20% of the total population of the Russian Federation. Dmitrii Glinski-Vassiliev has argued that the state imposition of Orthodoxy and political uniformity from above, an increasing assertiveness in Islamic society from below, will exacerbate the current political asymmetry between the size of Russia’s Muslim minority and its representation in the national elite.”¹¹¹ This in turn could encourage “radicalism and the use of undemocratic means in political struggle on the part of Russia’s Muslims.” In the current context of a war against Chechnya and Russia’s part in an international coalition against Afghanistan, this would have international repercussions.¹¹²

109 Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. “Putin’s Leadership Style: Ethnocentric Patriotism.” *Security Dialogue*, vol. 31, no. 3 (2000), pp. 377–380, see p. 378.

110 Goble, Paul. “An End to Russia’s Ethnic Federalism?” *RFE/RL Newsline*, vol. 5, no. 165, Part I, 30 August 2001.

111 Glinski-Vassiliev, Dmitrii. “Islam in Russian Society and Politics: Survival and Expansion.” Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) *Policy Memo Series*, no. 198. Available at http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0198.pdf.

112 Smith, Mark. *Russia and Islam*. Conflict Studies Research Center, Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Camberley, Surrey, August 201, F73, pp. 1–12.

4.3 Possible domestic military security implications

The Russian military has been in contradiction since the early 1990s. The number of men aged 17–19 will reduce from 3.46m in 2000 to 1.99m in 2016. On 9 November 2000 the Security Council reduced the Russian military establishment by 600'000, and it now comprises of 365'000 MoD servicemen, 105'000 paramilitary servicemen and 130'000 civil servants. Currently, Russia should be conscripting around 350'000 18-year old men for military service, around 30% of the available pool. However, one third are deferred for health reasons (ill-health/body weight deficiency), one-third are alcoholics or drug addicts, 15% have criminal records and 50% have failed to complete secondary education. For these reasons the Russian military only conscripts around 15% of the available pool. By 2016, annual conscription requirements will be reduced to around 300'000, representing nearly half the available 18-year old men. Given socio-economic and health indicators are falling, it is likely that Russia will struggle to conscript 15% of this number.¹¹³

In 2000, for example, up to 200'000 conscripts are expected to join the army. However, Anatolii Baturin, Sverdlovsk Oblast's military commissar is forecasting a sharp fall in the number of conscripts healthy enough to serve in the army, and expect that the region will supply almost 1'000 conscripts less than last autumn, due to demographic and health factors. Because of the poor health of the youth, Sverdlovsk authorities are suggesting that the Defense Ministry change the call-up age be changed from 18 to 19. Whereas in the late 1980s 90% were deemed fit, the figure is now around 60%, with military enlistment offices reporting a sharp increase (90%) in the number of drug abusers. Thus, whereas in the early 1990s the Sverdlovsk Oblast could supply up to 20'000 conscripts, in 2001 the figure is slightly above 10'000.¹¹⁴

Thus demographic factors will largely shape the nature, pace and direction of military reform in conventional forces. Demographic change will force the Russian military to accept a radical downsizing of the Russian armed forces. Marshal Igor Sergeev has stated that, "the demographic slump will probably meet its peak in 2015," implying that Russia would effectively end mass conscription and move by default to the creation of a professional army.¹¹⁵

That the Russian population is declining is not in itself a direct cause of concern for Russian military planners in that the force structure and composition can be adapted to meet the new demographic dynamics, even if this adaptation occurs through default rather than design. Indeed, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) embraces low-number, high-capital expenditure armies: "The enormous investments required to equip and train first-class units will make it very difficult for even populous states to maintain large force structures."¹¹⁶ However, as the projected "dependency

113 "Russian Demography: Apocalypse Tomorrow." NATO Unclassified, DPA (2000) 1505.

114 *Russian Public TV (ORT)*, Moscow, 2 April 2001.

115 *Russia TV*, Moscow, 22 February 2001.

116 Nichiporuk, *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, p. 32.

ratio” between able body and the ageing population increases after 2006–2010 there are clear resource and finance implications for future levels of GDP and affordable military spending for the Russian Federation. In short, the greater state resources directed towards Russian pensioners the less state revenue available for RMA expenditure.

Moreover, the downsizing of Russia’s armed forces has the unintended consequence of reinforcing internal migration patterns. For many communities the presence of large armed formations acts as a magnetic center for other networks and industries. The reduction in military forces, a feature of the last 10 years, has been particularly acute, for example, in the Far Eastern military District and has contributed to the reduction in the population as employment opportunities related to the military diminished. Between 1989 and 1997, ground forces shrank from 24 to 10 armored and motorized divisions, 120–43 submarines and 77–45 surface ships.¹¹⁷

On the basis of this example, it could be hypothesized that military reductions might in turn reduce populations in peripheral regions below recoverable levels. As the armed forces reduce their size the likelihood that populations in peripheral communities will migrate to European Russia increases. This in turn increases the necessity for the state to deploy troops to defend these peripheral and further depopulated regions whilst at the same time renders this task more difficult. One analyst, aware of the population differentials on the Russo-Chinese border (1:15–20) has even suggested: “Perceptions of low Russian population densities in the Russian Far East could lead to low-level Chinese probes and low intensity conflict in the next 10–20 years, but the continued existence of a substantial Russian nuclear arsenal will probably prevent the Chinese from seriously considering the option of launching a conventional military campaign to seize large parts of Russian territory as a result of demographic factors.”¹¹⁸

4.4 Possible domestic economic security implications

The economic consequences of population decline are critical to the ability of Russia to modernize through the twenty-first century. That the population is declining is predicted and to an extent can be factored into long-term economic planning, but the nature of the decline – who dies and when – is more unpredictable and non-linear and this has economic costs. Demographic decline impacts on “capacity deepening” amongst the labor force (building on existing skills in order to increase productivity) and the reduction in savings, rates of investment reinforces the decline in economic growth.¹¹⁹

117 Kontorovich, Vladimir. “Can Russia Resettle the Far East?” *Post-Communist Economies*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2000), pp. 365–384, see p. 368.

118 Nichiporuk, *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, p. 34.

119 Bloom, David E. “Macroeconomic Consequences of the Russian Mortality Crisis.” *World Development*, vol. 26, no. 11, 1998, pp. 2013–2027; Buckley, Cynthia and Donahue, Denis. “Promises to Keep: Pension Provision in the Russian Federation.” In *Russia’s Torn Safety Nets: Health and Social Welfare During the Transition*, eds. Mark G. Field and Judyth L. Twigg, pp. 251–270. New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000.

Russia faces the problem of widespread elderly poverty, as the social safety net does not receive the financial resources to keep it viable, despite the fact that some men relieve the state of the necessity of paying pensions with life expectancy at 58 years old on average. Russia's government plans to launch a 50-year pension reform were announced by Kas'ianov. He noted that planned reform should take account of the country's current and expected future demographic situation and also its economic situation.¹²⁰ Kas'ianov was responding to the inadequacy of a Russian pension system: "designed for an age structure of a population of a nation that no longer exists, where population pressures would not have been great, but whose pension mandates cannot now be easily changed."¹²¹

As the average annual population of Russia will decrease by 1.5m in the period between 2002 and 2004 (142.2m) this will impact on the economic growth of Russia. The First Deputy Economic Development and Trade Minister Ivan Materov, has argued that the development of the demographic situation is "an important component of the forecast" of Russia's socio-economic development in the period between 2002 and 2004. He stated that as the age structure of the Russian population is characterized by the continuing growth of the number of able-bodied people the average annual able-bodied population will increase from 87.9m in 2002 to 89.3m in 2004 (i.e., by 1.4m). As a result: "The anticipated rates of economic growth in 2002–2004 will not cause an adequate increase of the people employed in the [Russian] economy."¹²² Thus, in the short-term – 2002–2004 – the workforce supply will continue to exceed the demand for it and the dependency ratio – the ratio of persons not of working age ("dependants") to those of working age – will actually decrease from 42% to 36% of the population. This creates a small window of opportunity for the Russian government to reform the pensions system.

However, in the longer-term, the dependency ratio will swing in the other direction by 2006–2010 resulting in the diversion of greater state finance towards the elderly and less upon the economy or military. According to Anatolii Sudoplatov of the demographics faculty at Moscow State University: "These demographic trends block any attempts to raise the standard of living in Russia, because the government has to allocate such large sums of money to look after the ageing and sick population."¹²³ In other words: "Russia may face particularly acute problems in supporting its elderly when the large number of persons born in the 1950s leaves the workforce and is replaced by a much smaller number of persons born in the 1990s. Such problems may be overcome by increasing capital, and thereby productivity per worker, but contraction of the Russian economy may prevent this option."¹²⁴

120 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 19 March 2001.

121 DaVanzo/Grammich, *Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation*, p. 67.

122 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 19 April 2001.

123 Gentleman, "Wanted; More Russian Babies to Rescue a Fast Dying Nation."

124 DaVanzo/Grammich, *Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation*, p. 67.

Moreover, as well as facing a shortfall in the labor-reserves, Russia faces an economic security dilemma in some parts of the Federation. If moderate economic growth is recorded in the Russian Far East, for example, then it is calculated that this will increase the mobility of the population and allow the current deferred migrants to leave for European Russia. It is economic stagnation that keeps the emigration at current levels and only a massive economic resurgence would return incentives, subsidies and benefits to workers in these peripheral regions, thus increasing immigration.

Table 6: Economically active population (thou. persons):

	1999	2000
Economically active population,¹⁾ total	72'431	71'732
Males	37'649	37'159
Females	34'782	34'572
Including:		
Employed in the economy,²⁾ total	63'337	64'732
Males	32'848	33'379
Females	30'490	31'354
Unemployed, total	9'094	6'999
Males	4'801	3'781
Females	4'293	3'219
Unemployed officially registered by state employment services, ³⁾ total	1'263	1'037
Males	383	322
Females	880	715
Of them those receiving unemployment benefits, total	1'090	909
Males	334	285
Females	756	624

1) In accordance with the Sample employment surveys at the end of November.

2) Including employed at private household plots producing goods for sale.

3) In accordance with the data of the Ministry of Labor and Social Development of the Russian Federation; the end of the year.

By 2050, the proportion of immigrants in the labor reserves will rise at least to 20%, while 10m–20m Chinese will live in the Russian Federation. According to sociologists' forecasts the bulk of the population in border regions in the Far East will be Chinese illegal immigrants. Zhanna Zaionchkovskaia, head of the population migration laboratory at the Russian Science Academy's Institute of Economic Forecasting by 2050, the Chinese in Russia may become the second largest ethnic group within the Federation after ethnic Russians. They will constitute an inalienable component of the Russian

work force, capable of reviving the national sector of services, construction, municipal transport, and agriculture.¹²⁵

For this reason it has been argued that flexible legislation, rigid control, and educational activities ought to be the three pillars of Russia's immigration policy.¹²⁶ The adoption of a number of laws – “On Immigrants,” “On Displaced Persons” – are a necessary response to this dynamic. Aleksandr Blokhin, Minister for Federal affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy noted the failure of the draft law “On the legal position of foreign citizens” to progress through the Duma after its first reading in 1999 and that at present about 180 legal normative acts deemed by the Federation Ministry's experts to be either antiquated or mutually incompatible are in force in Russia. He argued: “Laws in this sphere are closely interconnected, and if one link disappears from the chain, we will be unable to make further progress.”¹²⁷ The minister said: “We will have to admit precisely the number of people which we can afford to provide for financially.” Economic levers, such as a graded scale of loans for resettlement, are to be used to ensure an influx of immigrants to the regions most affected by lack of labor.¹²⁸ Vladimir Kulakov, an expert from the Ministry for Federation Affairs, Ethnic and Migration Policy, has called for the approval of a federal migration program and the restart of the governmental commission for migration policy, noting 800'000 migrants entered Russia in 2000.¹²⁹

A further security dilemma for the Russian Federation emerges. Immigration from FSU states will provide a (partial) solution to Russia's economic insecurities, namely the projected shortfall in labor reserves and thus inability to economically rejuvenate. Partial, because it is calculated that potential immigrants from the former USSR will not be able to compensate for a more than 40% manpower shortage.¹³⁰ Thus Russia is reliant upon in-migration from China, Korea, Vietnam and Central Asian CIS states, which raises the question of societal security within the Russian Federation. As Alexseev noted: “On the one hand, cross border exchanges improved the supply of food and consumer goods, provided jobs, increased local tax revenues, and generated investment. On the other hand, the cross-border flow of Chinese migrants and business people gave rise to concerns about national identity and sovereignty amongst local Russians.”¹³¹

126 *Izvestiia*, Moscow, 23 June 2001.

127 *Segodnia*, Moscow, 14 March 2001.

128 *RIA news agency*, Moscow, 20 June 2001.

129 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 29 June 2001.

130 *Izvestiia*, Moscow, 23 June 2001.

131 Alexseev, Mikhail A. “Identity, Interests and Security: Cross Border Migration and Policy Preferences Vis-à-Vis China and Chinese Nationals in the Russian Far East.” Paper presented at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 21 February 2001.

4.5 Possible domestic societal security implications

There are an estimated 5–7m immigrants in Russia from 70 countries, 700'000–1.5m of which are illegal. Ukraine, China and Moldova top the list, but there are also an estimated 1.5m from Afghanistan, Somalia and Angola in Russia.¹³² Although it can be argued that Chinese immigration will be vital for Russian economic revival and security – just as Turks in Germany or Arabs in France in the 1950s – they also raise the issue of societal security within the Federation. Immigrants from Asia (Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese) and from the CIS, particularly Central Asia (Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Uzbeks) – grew up in societies, which were completely different in ethnic and cultural terms. Indeed, Olga Semionova, chief for demographic policy at the State Statistic's Committee has stated that Russia is interested in “desirable migrants,” who share Russian education and mentality, strongly expressing an implicit preference for migrants from the former Soviet republics.¹³³

This general bias is supported by opinion polls that indicate the overwhelming majority (79%) support the development of the CIS, while only 10% do not. Even within the CIS there is a bias towards Slavic Republics, with respondents saying that Russia should first of all develop co-operation with Belarus (53%), Ukraine (49%), Kazakhstan (24%), Moldova (17%), Georgia (9%), Armenia (7%) and Azerbaijan (5%).¹³⁴ However, as Konorovich observed: “Immigrants from ex-republics will constitute, at best, a marginal addition to the population of the Russian Far East, too small to compensate from intra-Russian out-migration and the natural decline.”¹³⁵ Indeed, in order to maintain a constant total population over the next 50 years Russia would have to admit over 500'000 migrants every year until 2050. As a result, approximately 25% “of the Russian population would comprise of migrants of the first half of the 21st century or their descendants.”¹³⁶ Thus the questions that arise are: will the arrival of large scale Chinese immigrants cause societal insecurity within the Federation and why might this occur?

Government policies can control migration flows, usually in an effort to preserve cultural homogeneity, reduce the political weight of antithetical groups or to project pressure and influence onto neighboring states.¹³⁷ Were China to adopt such a policy towards the Russian Far East, then “societal security” would become the key security determinant of Russian territorial integrity and sovereignty. “Societal security”

132 *Ren TV*, Moscow, 15 March 2001.

133 *ITAR-TASS news agency*, Moscow, 20 October 2000.

134 *Interfax news agency*, Moscow, 31 May 2001; Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (VCIOM) and University of Strathclyde Center for the Study of Public Policy, *Russia Votes*, 2000. Available at <http://www.russiavotes.org>.

135 Kontorovich, “Can Russia Resettle the Far East?,” p. 375.

136 DaVanzo/Grammich, *Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation*, p. 82.

137 Weiner, Myron. “Security, Stability, and International Migration.” *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3, (1992/93), pp. 91–126.

concerns “identity, the self conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community.” It refers to “identity based communities” and can be understood as “identity security.”¹³⁸ A society gains its core identity through the shared ethnic, religious or national identities of social groups living in communities. This shared identity can transcend international state borders, which are fixed to particular state territories. The survival of these communities in the face of perceived (“constructed”) potential threats is paramount. The greater the threat to the identity, the stronger the identity becomes and the determination to preserve the identity: societal security ultimately concerns the survival of a society. Communities construct threats to their identities in a number of different ways.

Buzan, *et al.* focus on three key factors that prompt the construction of a threat to the identity and survival of these societies, namely, migration; horizontal competition, and vertical competition. All three factors can be “placed on a spectrum running from intentional, programmatic, and political at one end to unintended and structural at the other.”¹³⁹ Migration undermines the unifying effect of strong societal identity as host societies are “overrun or diluted” by the influx of the migrants who cause a “shift in the composition of the population.” This is particularly so if migration is used instrumentally to homogenize minority societies – the Sinofication of Tibet provides a worrying example of this process for the Russian Far East. Horizontal competition entails a transformation in the identity of a society due to “the overriding cultural and linguistic influence from a neighboring culture.” This process can reflect the unintended impact of a myriad of interactions between large, vital, expanding cultures upon those that are geographically proximate, smaller, more conservative and introspective in nature. Vertical competition acknowledges the impact of an “intended” integration process that pulls a culture into a wider definition, such as the European Union, or a secessionist project that focuses on a narrower definition of identity. Thus, there is a danger that ethnic Russians will “securitize” what they perceive to be a threat to their identity following the collapse of the Soviet Union, namely the influx of non-ethnic Russian migrants to the Russian Far East and Siberia. Such an influx will also threaten the dominant position of the titular nationalities within these regions and republic, and so the societal sector quickly becomes securitized and a classic societal security dilemma emerges.

A societal security dilemma can occur during independence when political and economic disenfranchisement of new minorities takes place.¹⁴⁰ This can be accompanied by an upsurge of nationalism amongst the majority society and the passing of legislation, which legitimizes the downgrading of their political and economic rights. Within the hypothetical context of mass Chinese migration to the Russian Far East,

138 Buzan, B., O. Wæver and J. de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, pp. 119–120.

139 *Ibid.*, p. 121.

140 Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” pp. 27–47; Roe, “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as ‘Tragedy.’” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 2 (1993), pp. 183–202.

the majority Slav and indigenous societies might perceive a potential threat to their identity through the domination of the political community by “colonial” minorities, and so adopt extreme legislation. The reinforcement of the identity of the majority society’s identity would be perceived as the weakening of the minority Chinese society’s identity, and this would generate inter-ethnic and inter-state (Russo-Chinese) tension, resulting in a spiral of instability within the Russian Federation.

Thus, although migration could be a panacea, Anatolii Vishnevskii, the director of Moscow’s Center for Demography and Human Ecology, has argued that Russia “is not ready for that, either economically or even psychologically.”¹⁴¹ Migration as a Russian State policy to rectify population decline runs the high risk of exacerbating the problem it attempts to resolve. Societal security dilemmas and societal conflict could easily emerge, as the preconditions for frustrations are present: Russia has a constricted housing market, negative growth, and decaying infrastructure, inter-societal tensions. Migrants will become associated with high crime rates, unemployment, housing shortages, and epidemics. Against the backdrop of the Chechen War, in-migration from Central Asia and China, Russia’s border regions will receive a disproportionate share of migrants despite having a higher-than-average unemployment and lower-than-average wages and housing availability. This raises the possibility of an increase of the importance of the societal security sector.

Moreover, given the fact that the ethnic Russian Slav populations are declining within the Federation but that some minority peoples and nationalities – particularly in the Southern Federal District are increasing – there is also scope for growing ethnic cleavages within the Federation arising from reasons other than in-migration. Paradoxically, such conflict may even arise over different strategies for population revival adopted by separate nationalities and ethnic groups within the Federation. The Council of Muftis of Russia supports the right to polygamy. They argue that compulsory monogamy, as an institution of external pressure, cannot lead to love or harmony in a marriage, but simply facilitates unofficial polygamy, allowing many social ills to flourish and women’s rights to be unprotected. Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia Ravil Gaynutdin argued polygamy could resolve Russia’s demographic problems and argued: “Russia’s Muslims are citizens of a secular state. They obey secular laws but in their daily lives, their lives on Earth, they also obey the laws of the Almighty and the teachings of the religion sacred to them and that religion allows Muslims to take a second wife with the consent of the first and a third with the consent of the first and second. I think that some areas of the Russian Federation, given their specific features and the tradition and religion of the people, could combine Shari’ah law and secular legislation as was the case, for example, at the beginning of Soviet power when Muslims and the peoples of the North Caucasus were permitted to live according to Shari’ah law in combination with the authorities’ secular laws. This did the state system and the country’s legislation no harm whatsoever.”¹⁴² Such a proposal has received

141 Goble, “A Demographic Threat to Russian Security.”

142 *Ekho Moskvy radio*, Moscow, 25 May 2001.

limited analysis in Russia and it is unlikely that it will do so under Putin's re-centralization drive.¹⁴³ President Putin has declared his intention to secure a unified legal space and standardized juridical, constitutional and political differences between the center and periphery and the nature of this process is hotly contested. However, there has been little work on its implications for Russian demography. It is unlikely, within the context of a re-centralizing state.

It is also argued that societal identity within Russia is increasingly becoming defined by economic wealth. At a session of the special scientific council of the Russian Security Council, Nataliia Rimashevskaya, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences [RAS] and director of the RAS Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the Population, recently delivered a report entitled "Analysis of Threats to the Security of Standards of Living and Provision of Social Guarantees for Russian Citizens." She depicted the implementation of the social aspect of Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref's economic program as a direct threat to the state's main resource – its human potential. The recent report on obstetrical care, for example, indicated that the cost of a pregnant woman's stay in a high-comfort ward would be \$10'000 for the whole observation period, including midwifery, whereas in an ordinary ward the cost would be \$2'000–3'000. She argued that the measures envisioned by the program will escalate the polarization and impoverishment of a major part of the population; the nation's genetic pool will be weakened; social tensions will increase. The country will be thrown back into the past to the period of the Civil War:

For a long time now we have not had one country for all. There is Russia of the rich and Russia of the poor, which differ greatly not only in terms of their income levels (the incomes differ by a factor of 100 or more), but also in terms of their behavior, values and preferences. Often they know very little about each other, just as the person who never uses the subway does not know what is happening underground: What the routes, stations and passengers look like. One gets the impression the authors of the social aspect of the program belong to the elite minority and simply do not know the country about which they write their works. Otherwise it would be hard to interpret the fact that the main object of the future reform is some kind of average statistical citizen. This category does not exist in nature; society is layered (....) The program does not say a word about any specific measures regarding any particular sections of society, although those kinds of measures should have been developed long ago; the only exception is the group of people with above-average incomes which, in the opinion of the authors of the program, should be offered an infrastructure meeting its demands (casinos, restaurants, holiday centers and the like). Analysis of the socioeconomic situation demonstrates that shock therapy is absolutely unacceptable to Russia for many reasons, including the population's mentality; absolutely different measures are required.

Scientists from the RAS Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the Population suggested the following measures might effectively combat the greater degree of social polarization and impoverishment: the reduction in the difference between employees'

143 Antonov, "It Would Be Not Bad at All to Have Three Wives: Can Legalized Polygamy Prevent a Demographic Catastrophe," pp. 79–85

compensation levels; the raising of the minimum wage based on subsistence level indicators; the reform of the social sphere, particularly the improvement of children's and young people's health, protection of the state's intellectual potential.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, Moscow, 5 August 2000.

Conclusion: Demography as destiny?

Within a global perspective it is clear that developing countries are characterized by population growth (China, India, Indonesia), whilst developed European states are experiencing different degrees of population decline. Just as in the case of Russia, it is calculated that the G7 countries will spend 12% of their states' total GDP on pensions by 2040.¹⁴⁵ In this respect, Russia can be viewed as pre-eminently European and developed state. However, an analysis of the reasons of Russia's population decline paradoxically places Russia on all available indices on the verge of developing-state status. Decline is not a consequence of economic strength and stability, as in developed states, but rather socioeconomic degradation and stalled transition – the imprimatur of developing states. The uneven rate of decline, particularly as it reflects out-migration patterns and in-migration from the Russian diaspora and its changing geographical distribution within the Russian Federation also points to the role of globalization and its impact on the Russian foreign and domestic environment. Emigration and immigration are dynamic motors of globalization within the Federation, but also instruments of localization. They most graphically illustrate causes and symptoms of the phenomena of “framigration” – that is, fragmentation and integration.

For the Russian Federation the demographic decline both reflects and reinforces other structural, systemic and functional transformations that occurred at the end of the Cold War. For this reason analysts of Russian regional development should be encouraged to study the emergent implications of Russia's demographic transformation.

¹⁴⁵ Nichiporuk, *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, p. 27.

It represents a threat that cuts across each of the security sectors and the hard/soft security divide and it demands a coherent, consistently applied strategic plan to contain then reverse its trajectory.¹⁴⁶ This can be illustrated by reference to just one aspect of the population decline – HIV/AIDS. Russia is in danger of being perceived of as an “epidemiological pump,” with the ability to spread the HIV and AIDS disease globally.¹⁴⁷ Such a perception – driven by the rapid growth of the infection within the Federation – will have profound foreign policy implications. It will directly and indirectly shape the way in which foreign states and international organizations view Russia and the extent to which they are prepared to integrate Russia into their networks.

Moreover, if population size has traditionally been used as one of the determinants of state power then the protection and sustainability of the population is a litmus test for the effectiveness of a state. Realist interpretations of international relations argue that the larger a population, the larger the territory, the stronger the economy and the more effective its military power. It is clear that Russia will have to adjust its “Great Power” foreign and security policy ambitions and refocus upon domestic policy and the attendant consequences of population implosion – not least health care reform, pensions, internal migration and the expected internal backlash from ethnic, religious and societal security dilemmas.

Thus, Russia’s demographic challenges and state responses both mirror and reflect the exercise and effectiveness of power in contemporary Russia. Demographic decline has promoted responses from the center in terms of policy initiatives designed to reverse or manage the current decline and manage the re-distribution of the population. The demographic concept and migration policy, once formulated and implemented, will reveal the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of federal power under Putin. Will Russian demographic decline elicit more rhetorical than practical responses from the state? It is possible that policies might only emerge in a piecemeal fashion, be applied in an *ad hoc* manner and be driven by default rather than design. Any response by the center will shed light on the nature of state power in the new century.

In contemporary Europe it appears that as the linkages between security, integration and identity are growing, the relationship between society, nation and state weaken. As the strength of a sovereign state identity is downgraded and diminished, so societal identities will be placed under increased stress, creating the danger of a self-reinforcing spiral of instability becoming institutionalized. In this sense, Russia could become the pre-eminent European State. The prospect of Russian demographic decline sparking further ethnic unrest within the Federation cannot be discounted.

146 One notable weakness of this paper is its failure to explore the relationship between the Russian environmental security sector and demographic decline.

147 DaVanzo/Grammich, *Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation*, p 55; See also Mendelson, Sarah E., Julie Sawyer and Celeste A. Wallander. “The Security Implications of HIV/AIDS in Russia.” PONARS *Policy Memo Series*, no. 245. Available at http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0245.pdf.

Contested identities will continue to remain the lynchpin and leitmotif of Russian security, reflecting and in turn shaping military, political and economic security within Russia, placing it firmly within a globalizing post-sovereign security order.

Appendix A

Federal district population/employment distribution

According to Goskomstat Rossii (<http://www.gks.ru/eng/bd.asp>) the demographic and socio-economic variation within the newly-created Federal districts at the end of 2000 was as follows:

Central Federal District comprises the Belgorod, Bryansk, Vladimir, Voronezh, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Kursk, Lipetzk, Moscow, Orel, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tambov, Tver, Tula and Yaroslavl oblasts, and the city of Moscow. It covers the territory of 650.7 thou.sq.km. At the end of 2000, the **population of the district amounted to 36.7m**, 78.9% are urban residents. 58.9% of the population is of working age. Employment in 1999 was 17.4m persons, of whom 21% were engaged in industry, 11 % in agriculture, 32 % in the non-production sphere

North West Federal District comprises the Republic of Karelia, the Republic of Komi, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod and Pskov oblasts, the city of St Petersburg, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. It covers the territory of 1'677.9 thou.sq.km. At the end of 2000, the **population of the district amounted to 14.4m persons**, 81.1% are urban residents, 62.0% of population is of working age. Employment in 1999 was 6.5m persons, of whom 23% were engaged in industry, 6% in agriculture, 33 % in the non-production sphere.

Southern Federal District comprises the Republic of Adygeya, the Republic of Dagestan, the Republic of Ingushetia, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, the Republic of Kalmykia, the Karachaevo-Cherkess Republic, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, the Chechen Republic (Ichkeria), the Krasnodar and Stavropol krais, Astrakhan, Volgograd and Rostov oblasts. It covers the territory of 589.2 thou.sq.km. At the end of 2000, the **population of the district amounted to 21.5m persons**, 57.4% are urban residents, 57.8% of the population is of working age. Employment in 1999 was 8.2m persons, of whom 18% were engaged in industry, 22% in agriculture, 30 % in the non-production sphere.

Privolzhskii (Volga) Federal District comprises the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Marii El, the Republic of Mordovia, the Republic of Tatarstan, the Udmurt Republic, the Chuvash Republic, Kirov, Nizhnii Novgorod, Orenburg, Penza, Perm, Samara, Saratov and Ulyanovsk oblasts, and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug. It covers the territory of 1'038.0 thou.sq.km. At the end of 2000, the **population of the district amounted to 31.8m persons**, 70.7% are urban residents. 59.6% of the population is of working age. Employment in 1999 was 14.2m persons, of whom 25% were engaged in industry, 16% in agriculture, 30% in the non-production sphere.

Ural Federal District comprises the Kurgan, Sverdlovsk, Tyumen and Chelyabinsk oblasts, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. It covers the territory of 1'788.9 thou.sq.km. At the end of 2000, the **population of the district amounted to 12.6m persons**, 80.0% are urban residents. 62% of the pop-

ulation is of working age. Employment in 1999 was 5.8m persons, of whom 26% were engaged in industry, 9% in agriculture, 30% in non-production sphere. Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs. It covers the territory of 1'788.9 thou.sq.km.

Siberian Federal District comprises the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Buryatia, the Republic of Tuva, the Republic of Khakassia, Altai and Krasnoyarsk Krai, the Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk and Chita oblasts, the Aga-Buryat, the Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets), the Ust-Orda Buryat, and the Evenk autonomous okrugs. It covers the territory of 5'114.8 thou.sq.km. At the end of 2000, the **population of the district amounted to 20.7m persons**, 70.4% are urban residents, 61.5% of the population is of working age. Employment in 1999 was 8.7m persons, of whom 22% were engaged in industry, 14% in agriculture, 32% in the non-production sphere.

The Far East Federal District comprises the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the Primorskii and Khabarovsk krais, the Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan and Sakhalin oblasts, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. It covers the territory of 6'215.9 thou.sq.km. At the end of 2000, the **population of the district amounted to 7.1m persons**, 75.9% are urban residents, 64.8% of the population is of working age. Employment in 1999 was 3.2m persons, of whom 20% were engaged in industry, 8% in agriculture, 35 % in the non-production sphere.

Appendix B

Estimation of number de-facto and de-jure population of the subjects of Russian Federation

According to Goskomstat Rossii, the *de facto* and *de jure* population of the subjects of Russian Federation as of January 1, 2000 (thousand people) was as follows:¹⁴⁸

	De-facto population			De-jure population		
	total	urban	rural	total	urban	rural
Russian Federation	145184.8	106023.0	39161.8	144819.1	105599.6	39219.5
Central Federal District	36925.1	29192.3	7732.8	36738.1	28986.1	7752.0
Belgorod Oblast	1501.3	992.0	509.3	1498.8	985.9	512.9
Bryansk Oblast	1429.2	987.3	441.9	1424.5	980.5	444.0
Vladimir Oblast	1594.2	1285.6	308.6	1589.1	1277.8	311.3
Voronezh Oblast	2440.7	1522.6	918.1	2437.6	1513.5	924.1
Ivanovo Oblast	1208.7	997.5	211.2	1'205.1	993.5	211.6
Kaluga Oblast	1071.4	797.5	273.9	1'068.8	793.7	275.1
Kostroma Oblast	780.1	515.6	264.5	774.5	512.3	262.2
Kursk Oblast	1302.9	806.6	496.3	1'298.9	800.3	498.6
Lipetsk Oblast	1235.0	800.8	434.2	1'235.0	795.9	439.1
Moscow Oblast	6482.7	5174.0	1308.7	6435.8	5158.6	1277.2
Orel Oblast	892.3	564.2	328.1	890.7	559.8	330.9
Ryazan Oblast	1269.2	879.4	389.8	1271.0	870.8	400.2
Smolensk Oblast	1118.5	792.1	326.4	1113.7	785.4	328.3
Tambov Oblast	1255.0	733.7	521.3	1256.6	728.5	528.1
Tver Oblast	1582.0	1169.8	412.2	1575.0	1159.0	416.0
Tula Oblast	1721.8	1404.8	317.0	1716.2	1398.3	317.9
Yaroslavl Oblast	1402.0	1130.7	271.3	1400.7	1126.2	274.5
Moscow	8638.1	8638.1	-	8546.1	8546.1	-
North-Western Federal District	14401.2	11792.7	2608.5	14371.7	11756.0	2615.7
Republic of Karelia	761.8	565.7	196.1	760.6	562.9	197.7
Republic of Komi	1123.9	831.1	292.8	1126.1	835.9	290.2
Arkhangelsk Oblast	1443.3	1076.3	367.0	1442.7	1075.3	367.4
including the Nenets Autonomous Okrug	45.9	27.2	18.7	45.0	27.2	17.8
Vologda Oblast	1316.1	900.3	415.8	1311.3	895.5	415.8
Kaliningrad Oblast	946.8	728.3	218.5	946.7	726.0	220.7
Leningrad Oblast	1666.6	1100.0	566.6	1659.1	1094.5	564.6
Murmansk Oblast	970.6	891.5	79.1	988.5	906.0	82.5
Novgorod Oblast	720.9	510.8	210.1	719.4	507.6	211.8
Pskov Oblast	790.6	528.1	262.5	789.5	524.5	265.0
St Petersburg	4660.6	4660.6	-	4627.8	4627.8	-

¹⁴⁸ Internet source: <http://www.gks.ru/scripts/free/1c.exe?XXXX25F.1.4.1.1/000070R>.

Southern Federal District	21652.4	12446.0	9206.4	21523.1	12339.1	9184.0
Republic of Adygeya	446.5	240.8	205.7	446.0	240.7	205.3
Republic of Dagestan	2166.4	870.4	1296.0	2160.3	861.1	1299.2
Republic of Ingushetia	460.8	194.4	266.4	460.1	194.3	265.8
Kabardino-Balkar Republic	790.0	450.9	339.1	783.9	446.5	337.4
Republic of Kalmykia	314.3	133.2	181.1	314.3	133.1	181.2
Karachaevo-Cherkess Republic	433.3	191.4	241.9	430.7	189.9	240.8
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania	678.6	456.9	221.7	677.0	454.5	222.5
Chechen Republic	608.3	141.8	466.5	609.5	158.7	450.8
Krasnodar Krai	5058.4	2698.8	2359.6	4998.7	2648.7	2350.0
Stavropol Krai	2683.4	1491.6	1191.8	2654.2	1463.0	1191.2
Astrakhan Oblast	1019.4	675.6	343.8	1012.8	670.3	342.5
Volgograd Oblast	2659.3	1972.1	687.2	2658.2	1965.2	693.0
Rostov Oblast	4333.7	2928.1	1405.6	4317.4	2913.1	1404.3
 Volga Federal District	 31860.2	 22563.6	 9296.6	 31839.5	 22508.7	 9330.8
Republic of Bashkortostan	4109.0	2680.7	1428.3	4101.7	2676.7	1425.0
Republic of Marii El	755.3	466.5	288.8	755.2	465.4	289.8
Republic of Mordovia	920.3	553.9	366.4	919.7	549.9	369.8
Republic of Tatarstan	3772.8	2792.0	980.8	3776.8	2790.3	986.5
Republic of Udmurtia	1627.2	1129.4	497.8	1623.8	1127.0	496.8
Chuvash Republic	1351.4	830.0	521.4	1353.4	827.9	525.5
Kirov Oblast	1575.0	1120.8	454.2	1576.0	1118.2	457.8
Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast	3627.1	2848.4	778.7	3632.9	2839.6	793.3
Orenburg Oblast	2216.8	1263.2	953.6	2212.7	1257.0	955.7
Penza Oblast	1517.4	982.2	535.2	1517.6	977.9	539.7
Perm Oblast	2949.6	2213.4	736.2	2940.7	2209.6	731.1
including the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug	150.3	38.9	111.4	149.1	38.9	110.2
Samara Oblast	3282.0	2640.1	641.9	3279.3	2638.3	641.0
Saratov Oblast	2698.3	1974.5	723.8	2696.3	1967.4	728.9
Ulyanovsk Oblast	1458.0	1068.5	389.5	1453.4	1063.5	389.9
 Ural Federal District	 12563.7	 10062.5	 2501.2	 12564.6	 10062.7	 2501.9
Kurgan Oblast	1088.3	604.1	484.2	1087.1	601.6	485.5
Sverdlovsk Oblast	4582.4	4010.8	571.6	4572.8	4000.5	572.3
Tyumen Oblast	3236.6	2473.3	763.3	3253.7	2491.1	762.6
including the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	1387.9	1267.1	120.8	1401.9	1280.5	121.4
Chelyabinsk Oblast	496.7	410.4	86.3	505.4	417.4	88.0
	3656.4	2974.3	682.1	3651.0	2969.5	681.5
 Siberian Federal District	 20684.0	 14576.6	 6107.4	 20675.1	 14550.3	 6124.8
Republic of Altai	205.6	53.1	152.5	204.8	52.7	152.1
Republic of Buryatia	1029.2	614.2	415.0	1026.3	614.5	411.8
Republic of Tuva	311.2	151.6	159.6	310.7	150.3	160.4
Republic of Khakassia	580.1	412.8	167.3	578.3	410.6	167.7
Altai Krai	2642.0	1386.0	1256.0	2642.6	1380.8	1261.8

Krasnoyarsk Krai	3019.7	2250.8	768.9	3032.0	2261.1	770.9
including the						
Taimyr Autonomous Okrug	43.0	27.9	15.1	43.7	27.8	15.9
and the						
Evenk Autonomous Okrug	18.1	5.1	13.0	18.5	5.3	13.2
Irkutsk Oblast	2734.7	2170.8	563.9	2728.8	2164.6	564.2
including the Ust-Orda Buryat	143.4	-	143.4	143.0	-	143.0
Autonomous Okrug						
Kemerovo Oblast	2967.7	2575.2	392.5	2962.1	2567.9	394.2
Novosibirsk Oblast	2734.0	2023.8	710.2	2730.5	2016.6	713.9
Omsk Oblast	2146.0	1445.2	700.8	2147.5	1442.1	705.4
Tomsk Oblast	1064.4	715.0	349.4	1064.8	715.3	349.5
Chita Oblast	1249.4	778.1	471.3	1246.7	773.8	472.9
including the Aga-Buryat	79.1	25.7	53.4	79.3	25.6	53.7
Autonomous Okrug						
Far East Federal District	7098.2	5389.3	1708.9	7107.0	5396.7	1710.3
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	973.8	624.1	349.7	986.0	634.2	351.8
Primorskii Krai	2157.7	1690.1	467.6	2155.4	1684.1	471.3
Khabarovsk Krai	1506.7	1213.3	293.4	1495.9	1208.0	287.9
Amur Oblast	997.5	652.2	345.3	989.9	650.7	339.2
Kamchatka Oblast	378.3	306.2	72.1	384.2	311.5	72.7
including the Koryak	28.5	7.5	21.0	29.1	7.5	21.6
Autonomous Okrug						
Magadan Oblast	227.2	210.4	16.8	233.5	212.8	20.7
Sakhalin Oblast	590.6	513.0	77.6	591.2	512.7	78.5
Jewish Autonomous Oblast	197.5	133.4	64.1	195.6	131.3	64.3
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	68.9	46.6	22.3	75.3	51.4	23.9

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