

— ZÜRCHER BEITRÄGE —

zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung

Heft Nr. 24

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Namibia Becomes Independent

The U.S. contribution to regional peace

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ISBN 3-905641-24-0

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Preface

Successes in conflict resolution are not very numerous. Namibia is one of the few cases where quiet, steadfast and patient diplomacy produced such a success. The author of the following study tells the story of American diplomacy towards the resolution of the Namibia conflict, such as it became visible from the documents and audible from many conversations with personalities involved.

The story of the resolution of the Namibia conflict not only tells us something about difficulties in Southern Africa, but about the importance of patient diplomats and diplomacy, the importance of personalities in history in general.

The author gives a short narrative of the events as well as an analysis of the American policy, goals and achievements. In addition, the most important documents of the development are given in appendices. It is very useful to have this kind of summary description at hand, long before extensive history can be written on the basis of exhaustive archival studies.

Zurich, March 16th, 1992

Kurt R. Spillmann

1. Introduction

On March 21, 1990, the wish of many generations of Namibians came true; Africa's last colony declared its independence after having been first a German and then a South African territory for one hundred years.¹ The end of South African rule in the territory rewarded the Namibians who fought and suffered for the independence of their country. However, the last African colony's independence was also important for the whole southern African region. Having found a solution for Namibia made the chances for peaceful change in Angola, South Africa, and the whole troubled region of southern Africa more likely.

March 21 was also a success for U.S. diplomacy as the United States had played a leading role in the negotiations on Namibia's² independence. Washington's engagement in this African question is remarkable, because the U.S. traditionally devoted little attention to Africa. In the first years following World War II, Europe and the East-West conflict were at Washington's center of attention, while Africa was treated as a "back-burner item" in the United States.³ Until the late 1950s, Washington considered Africa to be in the European sphere of influence. Therefore, the U.S. policy toward the African states needed to be in accordance with the policy toward the European colonial powers. A new situation in Africa was created in the late 1950s. With Ghana's independence in 1957 a wave of decolonization in Africa started, resulting in the emergence of new and independent states.⁴ The new nation states were not aligned, neither with the Eastern nor the Western bloc. Facing the threat of the possible expansion of the Cold War to Africa, the changes in the political landscape forced the U.S. to reconsider its policy toward Africa.⁵

1 Appendix A: Information on Namibia's heritage.

Appendix B: Information on Namibia as an international issue.

2 In this paper only "Namibia", the name of the newly independent state will be used. The Germans and South Africans called Namibia "South West Africa". In 1968 the U.N. General Assembly adopted "Namibia" as the name for the territory. Pretoria, however, called the territory "South West Africa" up to independence in 1990.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), Nation Building: The U.N. and Namibia, Washington D.C. 1990, p.viii.

3 In a letter, Lucius Battle, the special assistant of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, wrote, *"Little room was left for an emphasis on areas that have since attracted major attention. Not much attention was paid to the Middle East, almost none to Africa and only symbolic lip service was given to Latin America..."*

Personal letter to Helen Kitchen, January 19, 1988, cit., Brown, Carl L., Centerstage: American Diplomacy since World War II, New York 1990, p.177.

4 Carter, Gwendolen M., O'Meara, Patrick, Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis, London 1979, p.320.

5 Note, Executive Secretary to the National Security Council (NSC), Subject: U.S Policy toward Africa, South of the Sahara prior to Calendar Year 1960, NSC 5719/1, August 23, 1957, p.2,3, National Archives and Record Service, Washington D.C., USA (NARS).

In the 1960s, the U.S. began to pay special attention to southern Africa. The engagement still remained minimal, but Washington paid lip service to the independence struggle of the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies and gave some aid to the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA).⁶ It was expected that the white governments would continue to dictate the regional politics in the 1960s and 1970s, despite the insurgency efforts of different movements.⁷ South Africa was particularly interesting because of its strategic minerals⁸, the geographic location between the south Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, and the control of air and sea communication⁹ in the area.¹⁰ The spread of communism in the region was seen as a potential threat to Washington's strategic and economic interests in South Africa and resulted in the increase of the U.S. engagement in southern Africa.

In 1974 a military coup in Lisbon against Marcello Caetano's government took place. The Portuguese military overthrew Caetano because it was discontented with the colonial policy and weary of fighting stalemated wars in Africa for fifteen years.¹¹ Therefore the new military leadership in Lisbon gave the colonies their independence. In Angola and Mozambique Marxist governments came to power. These events caused a drastic change in the U.S. policy toward the region. Henry Kissinger, who was Secretary of State at the time, began a shuttle diplomacy, aimed at Namibia, Zimbabwe¹² and South Africa.¹³ The goal of the new U.S. policy was to prevent any further African states from being taken over by Marxist regimes.

When the Carter administration came into office in 1977 the U.S. intensified its engagement in the region. During the first two years of Carter's term, the southern Africa agenda had a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy than ever before. The goals to be achieved were still the same as in the last year of the Ford administration: Namibia and Zimbabwe had to be given independence and Pretoria had to give up

6 U.S. Congress, Senate, Angola, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, January 29, February 3,4,6, 1976, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, p.16,17.

7 Revised Draft, Problems of Southern Africa: Background, October 4, 1962, p.16,25,26, (no additional information on origin given), NARS.

8 Appendix C: Information on strategic mineral debate.

9 Appendix D: Information on the sea lane debate

10 Note, Executive Secretary to the NSC, NSC 5719/1, August 23, 1957, p.3,4, NARS.

11 Ottaway, David B., The Washington Post, April 26, 1974, "Revolt Triggered by Book: War Hero Attack use of Forces in Colonies".

12 "Zimbabwe" was called "Rhodesia" (Southern Rhodesia) until independence in 1980. Here the name "Zimbabwe" will be used for the country also when referred to in the time before 1980.

13 Brown, Carl L., Centerstage, p.180,181.

its policy of apartheid. A change occurred, however, in the new administration's approach and motivated an increase in Washington's engagement in the region. The new administration desired better relations with black African states, and it championed a foreign policy on the basis of moral principles and human rights. Little attention was given to the issue of the Cold War spreading in the southern Africa region. Instead, African nationalism was believed to be the key force in the region and not communist expansion.

In the last two years of the Carter administration the U.S. reduced its engagement in southern Africa again. Political events in other parts of the world, such as the Islamic revolution in Iran drew U.S. attention away from Africa. The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the Soviet-sponsored Cuban invasion in Somalia, Vietnam's invasion in Cambodia, and South Yemen's attack on North Yemen seemed to heat up the Cold War anew. In addition, the Carter team's efforts on the Namibian question had reached an impasse, because of South Africa's intransigence on the question.¹⁴

In 1981 the Reagan administration came into office. A new approach was taken toward the southern African problem and the efforts to find a peaceful settlement for Namibia were intensified again. The new policy was unusual in many respects: it was formulated, adopted, and implemented by one person, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker.¹⁵ Crocker linked the Namibian issue with the Cuban presence in Angola, thereby making the East-West conflict an issue in the problem solving process. This move was precisely what the Carter administration had carefully avoided. The Carter team had wanted to keep Africa outside of the East-West competition. In the last months of the Reagan administration, the U.S. engagement was rewarded when in December, 1988, with the signing of the Brazzaville Protocol, an agreement was found for Namibia and the Cuban Troop Withdrawal (CTW) from Angola. This agreement was the prerequisite for Namibia's independence.

In the following study Namibia's case, which troubled the international community for forty years, will be examined from the U.S. viewpoint. The brief effort of the

14 U.S. News & World Report, January 28, 1980, "Carter's U-Turn in Foreign Policy".

15 Brown, Carl L., Centerstage, p.186.

Ford administration, the Carter administration's work that provided the framework for the settlement, and finally the Reagan administration's concept of regional peace that ended in Namibia's independence and the CTW will be examined.

The study focuses on the question, to what extent the U.S. engagement in southern Africa contributed to Namibia's independence. In order to answer the question three subordinated questions need to be worked on: Which policies were pursued within the studied timeframe of 1974 to 1988, which procedures and means were chosen to implement those policies, and what did the U.S. achieve.

The study is divided into four chapters, which are chronologically organized. The main emphasis is put on three issues. First, the finding of a framework for a Namibian settlement during the Carter administration. Secondly, Crocker's work in the 1980s, and thirdly, the final negotiations.

The first chapter looks at the Ford Administration with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as the key person for foreign policy. The administration's policy before and after the Lisbon coup is discussed.

Chapter two studies the four years under President Carter. Good U.S. relations with the Third World were a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Carter administration. An active team in the State Department and at the United States U.N. mission in New York worked hard on the problems in southern Africa. South Africa with its apartheid regime and Namibia were issues that demanded attention from an administration which declared human rights to be a leading theme of its foreign policy. The work performed on the Namibian question did not lead to the colony's independence, but the Carter administration set the stage for a solution.

Chapter three examines the eight years of the Reagan administration. The U.S. initiatives to find a settlement for Namibia are studied here. In addition the domestic debate on the U.S. policy toward southern Africa will be discussed. In the 1980s the public started to take interest in the events in southern Africa, and in particular in South Africa. Especially during President Reagan's second term Secretary Crocker's regional policy known as "constructive engagement" was passionately debated. The administration was sharply criticized and accused of being too friendly toward Pretoria. The problem of Namibia's independence and South Africa's domestic policy were interwoven and, therefore, the efforts by the U.S. in the Namibian question were often overshadowed by debates on the U.S. relationship with the Cape Republic.

Lastly, chapter four gives an overview of the implementation process of the United Nations Resolution (Res) 435 and the elections of the Constituent Assembly in Namibia.

The research for this study was conducted in two phases. In the first phase a considerable amount of secondary sources was found in libraries in Zürich, Switzerland, and the University Library of Constance, Germany. To ensure an in-depth study, however, a sojourn in the United States was necessary in the second phase.

Material was found in the National Archives and Record Service, the National Security Archives, the Library of Congress in Washington D.C., and in presidential libraries in different states of the Union. The usual historical methodology was then supplemented by interviewing officials of the Carter and Reagan administrations involved in the Namibian negotiations. In addition, Africanists, as well as some representatives of anti-apartheid organizations were interviewed.

The National Archives and Record Service provided very little material¹⁶ because very few State Department documents have been declassified for the period of 1974 to 1988. These documents will remain closed to the public for another thirty to fifty years, thereby limiting research. Except for some State Department leaks to the press, the information on U.S. government activities in Namibia is largely confined to prepared statements by the State Department and the White House. Only the "official" policy is made available to the public, while information on the decision-making process and the internal debates of the administration are not accessible.

The National Security Archives, a non-profit research institute and library facility in Washington D.C., had some cables and memos from the three administrations.

In the Library of Congress additional secondary sources, American newspapers and the Congressional hearings were found. The Johnson Library provided interesting information for the historical background. The Kennedy, the Carter and the Ford Libraries had little material on Namibia. The same can be said of the Nixon Presidential Materials Project where few worthwhile documents were found.

16 There were some useful declassified documents from the 1950s and 1960s which serve as a historical background.

Conducting interviews was an important factor for the completion of this study in two respects. On the one hand, talking to some of the key players in the Namibia negotiations provided first-hand information on U.S. efforts. In Washington D.C. the opinions on the U.S. policy toward southern Africa are still polarized. Generally speaking, there were two groups in the debate in the 1980s. One group supported the approach the Carter administration had taken and demanded the political and economical isolation of South Africa. The other group primarily feared communist expansion and tended therefore to support the Reagan administration's policy. The latter group strongly opposed measures to isolate South Africa.

Oral history is a valuable source of information but it is also a methodical challenge. The information gained in the interviews needed to be analyzed carefully, while considering the interviewed person's political views, his involvement in the Namibian question, the person's present position, and the time that has lapsed since the occurrence of the events being discussed.

The published materials on Namibia also need mentioning.

A number of *books* have been written in recent years on the U.S. policy toward the African continent.¹⁷ Namibia is usually mentioned in these publications, but only as a minor issue, summarized on one or two pages. There are, however, a few books that include a more detailed study of the Namibian question. In "African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy"¹⁸ Robert I. Rotberg focused on the Reagan administration's achievements in Namibia from 1981 to 1984. He concluded that the concept of linkage mainly served to buy time for South Africa and made Luanda and Havana look like the intransigent parties. According to him the U.S. should have used more sticks toward South Africa instead of only carrots. I. William Zartmann reached a similar conclusion in 1985 in his book "Ripe for Resolution"¹⁹. In the chapters five and six he analyzes the Namibian conflict up to 1984. He gave the historical background of the territory and discussed common patterns in conflicts. Helen Kitchen wrote an essay on U.S. policy toward Africa since World War

17 An overview of U.S. interests in Africa can be found in Helen Kitchen's short and concise study on Africa. She writes on the policy-making in Washington, the East-West competition in Africa and the U.S. economic interests in Africa.
Kitchen, Helen, U.S. Interests in Africa, The Washington Papers/98 Vol.XI, Washington D.C. 1983.

18 Bender, Gerald J., Coleman, James S., Sklar, Richard L. (Eds), African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, Berkeley 1985, p.95-109.

19 Zartmann, I. William, Ripe for Resolution, New York 1985, p.152-251.

II in the book "Centerstage".²⁰ She gave a brief summary of each administration's involvement in Africa since President Truman and came to the conclusion that the Ford, the Carter, and the Reagan administrations followed the same basic guidelines on Namibia, with different tactics, styles and priorities. James Vincent D'Amato developed an interesting theory in his dissertation²¹ about the failure of constructive engagement. The dissertation was ended before the settlement for the territory was reached, and, therefore, the final conclusion of the dissertation lacks a cornerstone. In addition two other books need mentioning: First, the book by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance: "Hard Choices". It provides valuable information on the Carter administration's efforts on Namibia.²² Secondly, an article by Chester Crocker in "The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990" is of interest.²³ Here he gave an account of his eight years of work on the Namibian question.²⁴ Finally, the study by the National Democratic Institute²⁵ (NDI) includes information on Namibia's history, the international dispute since 1946, and the transition period up to the election in November 1989. The NDI study and the publication of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs²⁶ contain the important documents that enabled the Namibian settlement.

A considerable amount of *articles* on southern Africa have been published in political periodicals since the mid 1970s. However, there are few publications which focus on Namibia. During the Ford and Carter administrations the articles published mainly discuss Angola and South Africa, while Namibia finds only brief mention. In the 1980s a number of articles on Namibia were written because events in southern Africa, and especially in South Africa, received increasing attention in the United States. The policy of constructive engagement and the linkage of the Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW) with the South African withdrawal from Namibia became

20 Brown, L. Carl (Ed), *Centerstage: American Diplomacy since World War II*, New York 1990, p.171-191.

21 D'Amato, James Vincent, *Constructive Engagement: The Rise and Fall of an American Foreign Policy*, Dissertation 1988, UMI, Order Number 8828016, p.91-100,155-229.

22 Vance, Cyrus, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*, New York 1983, p.85-119,256-313.

23 Newsom, David D. (Ed), *The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990*, Boulder 1991, p.9-35.

24 Chester Crocker also made an advanced draft available to the author of this study. The draft contains some additional information that does not appear in David Newsom's book.

25 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, *Nation Building: The U.N. and Namibia*, Washington D.C. 1990.
The NDI was one of the observer groups in Namibia during the transition to independence.

26 *Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop Withdrawal*, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria 1989.

an issue in the U.S. public debate. Central are the articles by Chester Crocker written in 1980²⁷ in which he summarized the previous U.S. policy toward southern Africa and made suggestions for a future course. These articles laid out the basic ideas of the U.S. policy of the Reagan administration. Two articles by the same author²⁸ were written after Namibia's independence. They looked back at the key events in the negotiations and gave an outlook of the work that still needed to be done. In the "CSIS²⁹ Significant Issues Series", Helen Kitchen and Michael Clough published a thoughtful study on the policy of constructive engagement.³⁰ They examined the debate in the U.S. and gave an outlook for the second half of the 1980s. Of further interest are articles by Robert I. Rotberg and I. William Zartmann³¹ published in the CSIS Africa Notes series. They discussed the U.S. diplomatic efforts and problems delaying the Namibian independence in the mid 1980s. The decisive phase of the negotiations was discussed in two articles by Gillian Gunn and Robert I. Rotberg.³²

The *hearings* on southern Africa and Namibia are an important source for this study as well. They provided information on the developments in Namibia and on the actions taken by the administrations. In addition they reflect the domestic debate and the willingness of the administrations to provide Congress and the public with information. During the Ford administration, Secretary Kissinger made key statements on southern Africa and Angola.³³ During the Carter presidency two

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- 27 Crocker, Chester, South Africa: Strategy for Change, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol.59 No.2, (Winter 1980/81), p.323-351.
Crocker, Chester, African Policy in the 1980s, in: The Washington Quarterly, Vol.3 No.3, (Summer 1980), p.72-86.
- 28 Crocker, Chester, Southern Africa, in: Foreign Affairs, (Fall 1989), p.144-164.
Crocker, Chester, Southern African Peace-Making, in: Survival, Vol.XXXII No.3, (May/June 1990), p.221-232.
- 29 CSIS is an acronym for Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- 30 Kitchen, Helen, Clough, Michael, The United States and South Africa: Realities and Red Herrings, in: CSIS Significant Issues Series, Vol.VI No.6, Washington D.C. 1984.
- 31 Rotberg, Robert I., Namibia's Independence: A Political and Diplomatic Impasse?, in: CSIS Africa Notes, No.13 (May 5, 1983).
Zartmann, I. William, Why Africa Matters, in: CSIS Africa Notes, No.86 (June 30, 1988).
- 32 Gunn, Gillian, A Guide to the Intricacies of the Angola-Namibia Negotiations, in: CSIS Africa Notes, No.90 (September 8, 1988).
Rotberg, Robert I. Namibia becomes a Nation: Could it be a Model?, in: CSIS Africa Notes, No.110 (March 20, 1990).
- 33 U.S. Congress, Senate, Angola, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, January 29, February 3,4 and 6, 1976, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, p.6-23.
U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Policy toward Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs and the Subcommittee Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements of the Committee on Foreign Relations, March 5,8,15,19, and May 12,13,21,26,27,1976, 94th Cong. 2nd sess.,1976, p.181-197.

important statements on Namibia were made by Ambassador Donald McHenry. On those occasions he provided information on the progress made by the Carter team.³⁴ During the Reagan administration Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker testified on a number of occasions before Congress.³⁵ The hearings during the Reagan presidency reflect the strained relationship between Congress and the State Department very well.³⁶

34 U.S. Congress, House, The Current Situation in Namibia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 7, 1979, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p.3-36. U.S. Congress, Senate, Namibia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 25, 1979, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p.2-21.

35 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa: Focus on Namibia and Angola, and South Africa, Hearing and Markup before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 16, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p.10-53. U.S. Congress, House, Namibia and Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 15, 1983, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, p.10-54. U.S. Congress, House, Namibia: Internal Repression and United States Diplomacy, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 21, 1985, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, p.6-35. U.S. Congress, Senate, Angola: Options for American Foreign Policy, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, February 18, 1986, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, p.3-26.

36 Crocker felt that information given to Congress might as well be published in the newspapers. The unwillingness to communicate the details of the State Department's efforts can be explained with the fear of damaging the quiet diplomacy and difficult negotiations. Interview with Chester Crocker in Washington D.C., October 9, 1990.

Acknowledgements

This thesis was made possible by many people. In the United States I would like to express my sincere thanks to former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose, Ambassador Donald McHenry, Brian Urquhart, Helen Kitchen, Elizabeth Landis, Michael Clough, a South African diplomat, and State Department and Pentagon officials for their willingness to talk to me and answer all my questions.

In Zürich I would like to thank Professor Kurt R. Spillmann who supported my project all the way. Thomas Peter's critical reading of the thesis, and the ensuing discussions were a wonderful help. Jürg Dedial's interest in my work and our discussions were helpful and encouraging.

Very special thanks goes to my family. My brother Michael's suggestions for improvements of the text were an invaluable help. My parents, Norma E. and Peter U. Fischer-James enabled my stay in Washington D.C., encouraged and supported me at all times and were a great help in reviewing the paper.

2. The Ford Administration

Namibia was always one problem among several in southern Africa that needed to be worked on, if a peaceful, stable southern Africa was ever to become a reality. However, achieving independence for Namibia never was an end in itself for the United States. Therefore, Africa's last colony cannot be studied as an isolated issue but always has to be seen in the overall U.S. strategy toward the region. Since the 1960s the U.S. was in a dilemma with their southern Africa policy. It wanted the elimination of colonial and racial government systems in southern Africa and supported the nationalist movements that strove for independence. But at the same time, Washington also wanted to protect their friendship with South Africa and the Portuguese.³⁷

In 1962, the U.S. predicted that the white rulers in southern Africa could hold on for at least another five years. However, nationalist groups were expected to increase sabotage, disobedience, and guerrilla actions in the Portuguese colonies, South Africa, and Namibia. The Kennedy administration concluded that an early decolonization and black majority rule for the countries would prevent an escalation of the conflicts. The finding of peaceful solutions would also reduce the danger of communist penetration of the continent.³⁸

Since the bureau of African Affairs in the State Department was established in 1958, the heads of the bureau have had a hard time keeping African issues on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Interest in the problems of Africa traditionally was only shown when an element of the East-West conflict was included. This holds also true in the case of southern Africa. U.S. policy-makers started to show interest in the region when they feared growing communist influence. Much has been written and said on the Soviet Union trying to win influence in the region. For a long time the South Africans claimed that Moscow planned a "total onslaught" on their country. This theory, however, found little support outside of South Africa. The Soviet Union was known to grab opportunities in the region to establish contacts with different

37 Revised Draft, October 1, 1962, Problems of Southern Africa: Background, p.18, NARS. Memorandum: Bill Brubeck to Mr. Bundy, Subject: Southern Africa, October 29, 1963, p.1, NARS.

Washington was interested in keeping good relations with South Africa. Depending on the administration, the U.S. policy has oscillated. But the general trend in the past twenty years has been away from South Africa.

Crocker, Chester, South Africa: Strategy for Change, p.326.

38 Revised Draft, October 4, 1962, p.6,8,13, NARS.

movements, but in general southern Africa's importance to the Soviet Union, especially strategically speaking, was regarded as quite small. In addition, the means of Moscow to influence the region have always been limited. Arms and military training were all the Kremlin could offer to Africans. Economic help, education, and agricultural development projects - things these countries needed desperately - only the West was able to offer. It is a generally held opinion that African states take help where they can get it, independently of the donor's ideology. Nevertheless, the U.S. policy toward southern Africa has been dictated by the fear of the Soviet Union dominating the area.³⁹

After 1974 the U.S. policy toward southern Africa of the late 1960s and early 1970s could no longer be pursued. The developments in southern Africa in the mid 1970s forced the Ford administration to reconsider the traditionally passive U.S. policy toward the region. The Nixon and the Ford administrations had a globalist⁴⁰ view of the world.⁴¹ Communist expansion was the top foreign policy concern. Therefore, southern Africa never had been their top priority. No serious communist threat was felt in the region as long as the white governments and the Portuguese were in power. In addition, the Vietnam War was Washington's main concern at the time, and no major changes were anticipated in southern Africa. The foreign policy-makers were wrong on this point. Drastic changes were to occur after April 25, 1974, when the military in Lisbon overthrew the government of Marcello Caetano. The drastic changes in 1975 in the Portuguese colonies and especially in Angola had a great impact on the region and the future U.S. policy. The new situation in the region also affected Namibia and its efforts to become an independent state. Because

39 Kitchen, Helen, U.S. Interests in Africa, p.14-17,30-32.

40 During the cold war two approaches could be found in the U.S. foreign policy toward Third World conflicts: the globalist and the regional approach. Globalists looked at Third World problem spots in the context of the overall East-West relationship. If communists, mainly Soviets, were pursuing an unpopular policy, globalists suggested to either support the competing side or react asymmetrically. This could be done by blocking U.S. cooperation with Moscow where it hurt most for the Soviet Union. The regionalists or area specialists considered local circumstances such as ethnic, racial and national issues. They did not support U.S. involvement in local conflicts for the sole reason that the Soviets were in it. Only when major U.S. interests were at stake they considered U.S. involvement. The Vietnam War is the prime example of U.S. involvement in a local conflict with the only objective to stop communist spread. The price paid in Vietnam was much too high for an area which is not of vital interest to the United States. The globalist view had a strong following in the Ford administration as the Angola conflict showed.

Bender, Gerald J., Angola, the Cubans and American Anxieties, in: Foreign Policy, No.31 (Summer 1978), p.4,5.

41 Bender, Gerald J., Angola, the Cubans and American Anxieties, p.3,4,5.

Angola was going to play an important role in the future settlement of Namibia a summary of the events in Angola in the mid 1970s will be given at the beginning of this chapter.

The Portuguese military was unhappy with Caetano's colonial policy and weary of fighting stalemated wars in Africa for fifteen years.⁴² In 1961 war erupted in Angola after the "Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola" (FNLA) and the "Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola" (MPLA) had launched individual struggles against the Portuguese colonial rule. In 1965 Jonas Savimbi split with the FNLA and started his own liberation movement known as "União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola" (UNITA).⁴³ The guerilla war lasted until 1974 when the situation in Angola changed through the coup in Lisbon. In the Alvor Accord⁴⁴ a transitional government was created to secure a smooth change to independent rule. The collapse of this government in 1975, however, triggered a civil war among the three liberation movements.⁴⁵ The MPLA was being supported by the Soviet Union while the FNLA and later UNITA received covert aid from the United States, South Africa and Zaire. The war escalated until 1976 and then culminated in the intervention of Cuban troops on the MPLA's side which led to Zairian forces aiding FNLA and South African support for UNITA. With Cuban help the MPLA became Angola's government, recognized by most states, but not by the United States.⁴⁶

42 Ottaway, David B., *The Washington Post*, April 26, 1974, "Revolt Triggered by Book: War Hero Attacked Use of Forces in Colonies".

43 The Kennedy administration supported self-determination in the Portuguese colonies and gave FNLA financial aid. The succeeding administration of President Johnson, withdrew the U.S. support for the FNLA. President Nixon in turn backed the Portuguese and tried to avoid any involvement in southern Africa. Under President Ford covert aid was given to the FNLA again but not to UNITA.

Martin, David, *The Observer*, August 24, 1975, "The Fight for Angola"

Marcum, John A., *Lessons of Angola*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54 No. 3, (April 1976), p. 414, 415. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Angola, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., January 29, February 3, 4, 6, 1976*, p. 16.

44 In January, 1975, the Alvor Accord was worked out. African states managed to bring the three rival groups together with the Portuguese. It was agreed to establish a transitional coalition government to prepare a peaceful transition of power. During the planned transition to independence on November 11, 1975, the three movements were to integrate their military forces, a constitution was to be written and elections were to be held. However, by July, 1975, the transitional government had collapsed.

Marcum, John A. *Lessons of Angola*, p. 414, 415.

45 U.S. Congress, Senate, *Angola*, 1976, p. 9.

46 McFaul, Michael, *Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola*, in: *International Security*, Vol. 14 No. 3 (Winter 1989/90), p. 100, 101.

The events in Angola and the U.S. covert aid to the FNLA provoked fears in Washington that the U.S. could be dragged into another conflict similar to Vietnam. As a result, in December 1975, Congress voted for the Clark Amendment,⁴⁷ thereby stopping the military assistance program and ending the U.S. military involvement against the MPLA. The unrest in Angola kept on after 1976. The FNLA was dissolved but UNITA fought on against the new government in Luanda. UNITA found support in Pretoria because South Africa had its own reasons to oppose the Angolan government: Luanda let SWAPO and the ANC have bases in Angola from where they could strike out against South Africa and Namibia. In addition, Pretoria was unhappy to have a communist government and Cuban troops just north of Namibia.⁴⁸

2.1. Policy Evaluation: National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39)

The U.S. policy for southern Africa of the Nixon and part of the Ford administrations was laid out in the NSSM 39 of 1969 which was leaked to the Press in October 1974. Journalists, diplomats, Congressmen and academics came to the conclusion that the U.S. policy toward the region was based on NSSM 39 up to 1974. It was widely believed that from the five options offered in NSSM 39, option 2⁴⁹ had been decided on by the policy-makers.⁵⁰ Government officials, however, declared that none of the

47 In Kissinger's and others' views the Clark Amendment deprived the president of flexibility in foreign policy and reduced the Executive's authority. Senator McGovern felt, as did many of his colleagues on Capitol Hill, that too much flexibility left to the Executive resulted with disastrous consequences as Indochina taught. U.S. Congress, Senate, Angola, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., January 29, February 3,4,6,1976, p.33,34.

48 McFaul, Michael, Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine", p.100.101.

49 The policy formulated in option 2 was called "tar baby" by White House and State Department officials. The policy of the Ford administration is often referred to by that name. Lewis Jr., John W., The Washington Afro-American, October 15, 1974, "U.S. 'tar bab' policy on Africa now exposed".

Appendix E: Option 2 in NSSM 39

50 Anderson, Jack, The Washington Post, October 11, 1974, "Henry Kissinger's First Big Tilt". El-Khawas, Mohamed, Cohen, Barry (Eds), The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, National Security Memorandum 39, Westport 1976, p.19.

five options offered in NSSM 39 were ever chosen as policy toward southern Africa. They claimed that few decisions had been based on NSSM 39. And the few that were taken were in agreement with the former policy of the Nixon administration.⁵¹

The policy as stated in NSSM 39 was written under National Security Adviser Kissinger's⁵² guidance and laid out the policy toward all countries in the region. If option 2 was the administration's choice, the bottom line of the U.S. policy was based on the assumption that the whites in southern Africa were there to stay.⁵³ Because no further documents are declassified it cannot be determined if the government chose an option or not and to what extent NSSM 39 influenced U.S. policy-making. But the U.S. government did believe the white regimes would most likely stay in power in the near future. The following two passages express this view.

*"The white governments are tough, determined and increasingly self confident...There is no likelihood in the foreseeable future that liberation movements could overthrow or seriously threaten the existing white government. Rebel activity may expand and contract from time to time, but there will be no definitive victory or defeat from the guerilla activities."*⁵⁴

A military victory of the guerilla groups seemed unlikely. The white governments were technically advanced and possessed an efficient security apparatus in the region.⁵⁵ The liberation movements were mainly supplied with arms, training, and funds from the Soviet Union and China, even though southern Africa was not a priority on the political agenda of either of the two countries.⁵⁶

51 U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 11,13,16, July 9,10,14,23,24,28,29, 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p.347.

52 The NSSM 39 was written under Kissinger's guidance and the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group of Africa. This group consisted of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as of the Department of State and Defense. El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p.21,22.

Henry Kissinger was President Nixon's National Security Adviser and president Ford's Secretary of State. Both presidents relied almost entirely on him in their foreign policy.

53 Option 2 starts with the following words:
"The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists."
El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p.105,117.

54 El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p. 117,136.

55 El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p.117.

56 El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p.82,136.

The U.S. interests in the region as stated in NSSM 39 were believed to be important but not vital. The geographical importance was due to the overflight and landing facilities for military aircrafts in South African and the Portuguese territories. There were logistic and well equipped ship repair facilities in South Africa. The U.S. also had a missile tracking station in South Africa. Of further importance was the NASA spacetracking facility in the Cape Republic. In addition, the U.S. had investments in the region (mainly in South Africa) and trade was yielding a highly favorable balance of payments advantage.⁵⁷ In order to safeguard its interests the following objectives for the regions were formulated by the United States.

- 1) The protection of economic, scientific and strategic interests.
- 2) Better U.S. relations with black African states.
- 3) Minimizing the spread of Chinese and Soviet influence.
- 4) Improving the situation in the white-led countries by moderating the rigid government systems.⁵⁸

President Nixon stated on different occasions that his administration was opposed to the racial policies in southern Africa. However, he emphasized that he did not support violent change to majority rule.⁵⁹ It was expected that changes would occur in the region but that it would be done by the white regimes at a given time.⁶⁰ Therefore, Washington chose a middle way in southern Africa between showing sympathy with the goals of the black Africans and keeping up the friendship with the white regimes.⁶¹

Within the U.S. government there were disagreements on the future developments in the southern African nations. One group predicted that there would be "...a) black guerilla and terrorist activity on a growing scale within these countries until change occur[red], and b) because of their support of the blacks, the Soviets and Chinese

57 El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p. 81.

58 El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p.82.

59 Brown, Carl L. (Ed), Centerstage, New York 1990, p.181.

60 Anderson, Jack, The Washington Post, October 11, 1974, "Henry Kissinger's First Big "Tilt".

61 Chester Crocker called the Nixon-Ford policy toward Southern Africa, a two track policy: Publicly the administrations condemned racial discrimination and privately they had good working relations with the Portuguese, Zimbabwe and South African governments. Crocker, Chester, South Africa: Strategy for Change, p.345.

[would] become major beneficiaries of the conflict."⁶² The other group believed that a peaceful evolution would take place because "...a) *black violence only produce[d] internal reaction, and b) military realities rule[d] out a black victory at any stage.*"⁶³

In the early 1970s it was generally believed in Washington that no major changes would occur in southern Africa in the near future. Nevertheless, the Portuguese rule in southern Africa ended after a coup in Lisbon in 1974. This development took the U.S. by surprise and proved the theory wrong that the white regimes could hold on indefinitely. The end of the Portuguese colonialism was not due to a liberation group's military victory, though. The military take-over in Lisbon was a domestic Portuguese affair, which resulted in Angola's and Mozambique's independence. But there was a link to the wars in the colonies. One of the reasons for the toppling of the government was the Portuguese military's war weariness in the colonies.

In NSSM 39 Namibia's case also finds mention. No solution for the problem was in sight at the time because South Africa was not willing to give up its occupation. In addition, it was believed that the South African military and police forces would be able to easily crush any infiltration or dissident activities in the territory.⁶⁴ The U.S. regarded the South African occupation of Namibia as illegal and showed concern about South African repressive policies and discrimination. But the U.S. was not willing to take the initiative and actively work on Namibian independence. In NSSM 39 the use of force or imposing mandatory economic sanctions was rejected as means to pressure South Africa into leaving Namibia.⁶⁵ In NSSM 39 no concrete proposal was made in regard to South Africa's continued occupation. Therefore, the U.S. went along with the steps taken by the international community. Washington supported

62 El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p.90.

63 El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p.90.

In previous administrations the situation in the region had been studied as well. In 1967, in a NSC meeting the statement was made that the Portuguese could not hang on forever to their African colonies. Unrest in the Portuguese colonies in Africa was also predicted as early as December 1959 and continually in the 1960s. At all times the situation in the region was believed to be fertile for communist penetration. In spite of the problems in the region, no measures were taken by the U.S. to try to achieve a peaceful settlement before 1974. The most likely explanation for Washington's passivity lies in the region's marginal importance to the United States.

National Security Meeting 572, Notes of the President's meeting with the NSC staff, Subject: Africa, July 13, 1967, p.2, NARS.

Draft, Prepared by NSC planning board sent to NSC, Subject: U.S. Policy toward South, Central, and East Africa, NSC 5920, December 31, 1959, p.1,2, NARS.

Revised Draft: Problems in southern Africa, Background, October 4, 1962, NARS.

64 El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p.123,124.

65 El-Khawas, Mohamed A., Cohen, Barry, p.94,95.

the U.N. resolutions on ending South Africa's mandate and the International Court of Justice ruling of 1971.⁶⁶ The U.S. also encouraged South Africa to consult with the U.N. Security Council in 1974 on achieving fast self-determination in Namibia. Washington was disappointed that hardly any progress was made.⁶⁷ Namibia's independence was an important objective but the U.S. was not willing to pay a high price for it.⁶⁸ This lukewarm interest can be explained by Namibia's minor importance to the United States. Good relations with South Africa were of far greater interest to the Ford administration and to the world.

2.2. Policy Change: The Lusaka Speech

The end of the Portuguese rule brought Marxist governments to Angola and Mozambique. After independence in Angola a civil war erupted and Cuban troops were sent to Angola to help the MPLA to stay in power. Thereby, the region became an element in the Cold War.⁶⁹

The drastic change in 1974/75 in southern Africa made the area into another issue in the East-West conflict, forcing the U.S. to reevaluate their policy. Instead of friendly white regimes, Washington was faced with black African rebel groups in

66 Since May, 1970, private U.S. involvements in Namibia were officially discouraged and Export-Import Banking credit guarantees were no longer made available for trade with Namibia. Washington advised U.S. firms with investments in Namibia to have employment rules conform to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 11,13,16, and July 9,10,14,23,24,28,29, 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p.335,336.

67 U.S. Congress, House, Resources in Namibia: Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the Committee on International Relations, June 10,1975, May 13,1976, 94th Cong., 1976, p.5-7.

68 U.S. Congress, House, Review of State Department Trip through Southern and Central Africa, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 12, 1975, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1975, p.44.

69 In a statement in Congress, Kissinger made clear that the U.S. intervention in Angola was to demonstrate to the Soviet Union and Cuba that they could not expect to intervene in countries without provoking a U.S. response. Kissinger rejected the opinion that Washington should not have got involved in Angola because nationalism was the driving force and not an ideology, and therefore, the Africans would get rid of communist influences on their own. He did not agree that nationalism would take care of communism as he made clear in a Congressional hearing. *"We are told that we need not concern ourselves because in the final analysis and at some indefinite time in the future, African nationalism will assert itself and drive out foreign influence. Even if this were true it still ignores the fact that governments under pressure will be forced to yield whenever a threat develops. Those who are threatened cannot afford to wait for history."*

U.S. Congress, Senate, Angola, January 29, February 3,4,6, 1976, p.12.

Angola and in Mozambique who were largely supported by the Soviet Union and China. In the famous Lusaka speech, Henry Kissinger formulated the new U.S. policy toward the region. The speech was made by the Secretary on a trip to six black African nations in April, 1976. Three points were at the center of the U.S. policy. First, the U.S. was hoping to increase its influence in southern Africa after it had lost ground to China and the Soviet Union when the Portuguese colonies became independent. The main goals of the U.S. was to prevent any additional nations in the region from falling under communist influence.⁷⁰ Secondly, Kissinger wanted to win the confidence of the moderate black African states and promised them more financial aid. Finally, the Secretary declared that his country desired to see majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia.⁷¹

In the Lusaka speech, Henry Kissinger intimated that Africa had been neglected by the United States. He declared that Washington recognized the necessity of a policy change. He described the purpose of his journey to Africa as to "*usher in a new era in American policy*".

In his speech⁷² the Secretary of State declared that "*We [The U.S.] support self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa - in the name of moral principle, international law and world peace.*" He compared the American Declaration of Independence and the Lusaka manifesto of 1969 which both stress the equality of men and equal rights. In terms of direct help the U.S. was willing to triple the support for development programs in southern and central Africa. Mainly training of manpower, rural development, advanced technology and modern transportation were needed in southern Africa. Concluding his speech he approached the subject of superpower rivalry in Africa. He encouraged African nations to stand firm on their independence and not to let them be split into "competing blocs". He declared that the U.S. was opposed to bloc policy, but left no doubt that his government would take measures against the communist bloc, should it pursue an aggressive policy in Africa. In his speech, Kissinger also talked about the three closely linked problems in southern Africa, that is, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia. And he made the following suggestions for actions to be taken on these issues.

70 Bender Gerald J., *Angola, the Cubans and American Anxieties*, p.3,4,5.

71 *Business Week*, May 10, 1976, "International Outlook", p.61.

72 The following section (p.19,20) is based on the Lusaka speech, given on April 27, 1976, printed in *The New York Times*, April 28, 1976, "Text of Kissinger's Address in Zambia on U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa".

For Zimbabwe he presented a ten point plan which emphasized Washington's opposition to the white minority regime of Ian Smith. Kissinger also reconfirmed the United States' commitment to the U.N. Security Council decision of 1966 and 1968 imposing mandatory sanctions on Zimbabwe.

His statements on the situation in South Africa were surprisingly critical. He called the situation unique because racial discrimination was part of the law and institutionalized in the Cape Republic. He urged Pretoria to change the unjust policy as long as there still was time. As he put it, time for peaceful change and "*reconciliation of South Africa's people*" was limited.

In his speech he also mentioned Namibia: He made clear that Washington regarded the South African occupation of Namibia as illegal and stressed five points.

- 1) South Africa was to let all Namibians express their views freely on the political future and constitutional structure under U.N. supervision and control.
- 2) South Africa was also called upon to announce a definite timetable for self-determination which would be acceptable to the world community.
- 3) The U.S. announced its readiness to work with the international community and African leaders on the Namibian issue as well as to give economic and technical assistance to the country.
- 4) Kissinger reminded his audience that the U.S. adopted Res 385 on January 30, 1976, and that the U.S. gave financial support to education and training programs through the United Nations.
- 5) Finally, he stated that Washington maintained contact with all nationalist movements including the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and did not favor any particular group.

The rhetoric of Kissinger's speech in Zambia sounded promising. The prospect of a policy change was welcomed by allies and black African states after the U.S. passivity in previous years on the Namibian issue and its debated role in Angola. Especially, African leaders, however, were skeptical toward Kissinger's new initiative and doubted that the U.S. had the leverage to force South Africa's cooperation on the Namibian question. Generally, it was believed that the new U.S. effort was

only being taken out of self-interest rather than out of a sincere commitment to majority rule. It was argued that the primary goal of Washington was to contain Soviet influence.⁷³

2.3. Achievements of the Ford Administration

In the months following the Lusaka speech, Kissinger lived up to his words and devoted more of his attention to southern Africa. He once again took up shuttle diplomacy for which he had become known in the Middle East conflict.⁷⁴

For Namibia Kissinger worked out a seven point proposal which he discussed with Pretoria. The plan was to hold a conference in Geneva where:

- 1) A constitution would be worked out.
- 2) The U.N. would be an observer.
- 3) South Africa would discuss relationships with Namibia after independence.
- 4) Arrangements for elections would be negotiated.
- 5) Any issue could be raised at the conference.
- 6) South Africa would accept a constitution negotiated by various internal and external Namibian parties.

73 Darnton, John, The New York Times, September 17, 1976, "Challenge to the Shuttle".

74 There were three closely connected issues that he worked on in southern Africa: Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Zimbabwe and Namibia were largely regarded as colonial type problems. In the case of Zimbabwe it was the British who took the lead role in trying to find a solution. South Africa was to be treated differently because of the long settlement history of the whites. In addition all parties acknowledged that Pretoria had to be approached carefully because South Africa could play a crucial role in finding peaceful solutions in Namibia and Zimbabwe. In Namibia, South Africa was directly involved through their occupation of the territory. The decolonization of Namibia was unusual because the colonial ruler was a neighbor and not half a world away. Therefore, the consequences of Namibia's independence and its impact on the region was of considerable concern to South Africa. In Zimbabwe's case, Pretoria had the means to pressure Ian Smith's white government into making concessions by cutting off economic and military support.

Zartmann, I. William, Ripe for Resolution, Conflict and Intervention in Africa, New York 1985, p.153.

Bloom, Bridget, The Financial Times, September 2, 1976, "Southern Africa - a formidable task for the flying diplomat"

7) The goal was to make Namibia independent by December 31, 1978.⁷⁵

Pretoria gave the U.S. a private commitment to the seven points and released a number of political prisoners as a sign of good faith, but SWAPO rejected the seven point plan.

Kissinger's work on Namibia was made more difficult because South Africa was following two tracks on the question. Parallel to Washington's efforts, South Africa was organizing the "Turnhalle conference"⁷⁶. The goal of this conference was to establish a black and white coalition in Namibia opposed to Sam Nujoma's SWAPO. A number of blacks participated in the "Democratic Turnhalle Alliance" (DTA) out of tribal fear of the Ovambo who dominated SWAPO. Nujoma's organization could not participate in the DTA because it is a political party. The DTA was made up exclusively of ethnic groups. Pretoria hoped it could strengthen the DTA so much that it could beat SWAPO in free and fair elections.⁷⁷

As mentioned before, Kissinger worked in parallel on bringing peaceful change to Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa since he viewed the issues as closely linked. Namibia was considered to be the most promising case since the South African Prime Minister Vorster had shown some signs of flexibility on the subject.⁷⁸ In Namibia's case the implementation of U.N. Res 385 of January 30, 1976, was pursued.⁷⁹ The Ford administration had welcomed the initiative taken by the DTA as a step in the right direction but regretted SWAPO's exclusion. Washington believed that without SWAPO no lasting settlement could be worked out for Namibia. Therefore, the main goal of the shuttle mission was to bring SWAPO and South African leaders together around one table. All along Kissinger had been vague on concrete steps to resolve the Namibian question. He only went as far as saying in May, 1976, that the U.S. would start serious discussions with South Africa on Namibia. He emphasized that the finding of solutions for the problems of the region was as much in the interest of South Africa as of any other country in the

75 Vance, Cyrus, *Hard Choices*, New York 1983, p.273.

76 The Turnhalle conference was named after its meeting place in the local gym. "Turnhalle" is a German word and means gym.

77 This ruling to exclude political parties enabled the South Africans to keep SWAPO out of the talks.
Vance, Cyrus, *Hard Choices*, p.273.

78 Brandon, Henry, *The Sunday Times*, September 12, 1976, "Why Kissinger feels shuttling round Africa is worth a try".

79 Appendix F: U.N. Res 385

region.⁸⁰ In the end Kissinger did not get a chance to implement the seven point plan. He only started his shuttle diplomacy in the last months of the Ford presidency, and therefore, time ran out.⁸¹

In terms of actual progress on Namibia the Ford administration has little to show for: First, Kissinger had very little time for his shuttle diplomacy because President Ford was not re-elected. Secondly, he had only paid serious attention to Namibia and the linked problems for a little over a year. However, he managed to make the issue of southern Africa a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy. But he did not manage to implement his seven point plan or achieve Namibia's independence.⁸² Also after the Lusaka speech the feeling remained that the Ford administration did not really care about the region and a peaceful settlement for the different conflicts. The motivation for the sudden U.S. interest was clearly the communist influence in the region. The striving for independence of African movements and racial problems were secondary issues for the Ford administration.⁸³

80 Bloom, Bridget, *The Financial Times*, September 2, 1976, "Southern Africa - a formidable task for the flying diplomat".
U.S. Congress, Senate, *U.S. Policy toward Africa*, 1976, p. 212.

81 Wright, Robin, *The Washington Post*, September 17, 1976, "Breakthrough seen in Namibia".

82 Bloom, Bridget, *The Financial Times*, September 2, 1976, "Southern Africa - a formidable task for the flying diplomat".

83 Bender, Gerald J., *Angola, the Cubans and American Anxieties*, p.3,4,5.

3. The Carter Administration

The approach to foreign policy changed drastically when President Carter came into office in 1977. In the first two years the new administration pursued a very different policy toward the Third World. Instead of viewing the whole world through the prism of the East-West conflict, Carter thought primarily in regional terms and wanted to separate Third World problems from superpower relations.⁸⁴ It was argued that conflicts in Africa, Asia and Latin America were largely local affairs and were of little importance to big power competition. Promoting human rights, moral principles and peaceful instead of military solutions in developing countries were the main goals of the Carter administration. Therefore, a big effort was made to insulate bilateral talks between Moscow and Washington, such as the new strategic-arms-limitation treaty (SALT II), from other world events.⁸⁵

In the second half of the Carter presidency, outside events forced the administration to reconsider its initial approach to foreign policy. The political events with the greatest impact on the U.S. policy were the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the Soviet sponsored Cuban invasion in Somalia, Vietnam's invasion in Cambodia and South Yemen's attack on North Yemen. U.S. policy-makers felt that the invasion of Afghanistan left Washington no choice but to turn back to older patterns of superpower rivalry also in Third World areas. Consequently the U.S. downgraded the arms-control agreement talks with Moscow. A linkage was made between U.S.-Soviet talks and the Soviet Union's actions in the world which had been avoided for so long.⁸⁶ The southern African policy of the Carter administration also was increasingly influenced by the other events in the world. However, in the first two years nothing indicated that set-backs were to be expected. Therefore, the administration formulated a new policy toward southern Africa which was quite different from Kissinger's approach.

84 Robert Price characterizes the first phase in the Carter administration as the "non-interventionist" perspective and the second one as the "neo-containment" orientation. He writes that from the outset it was likely that the "neo-containment" approach was going to dominate. Especially when the Soviet Union and Cuba became more involved in southern Africa, it seemed to be the logical consequence for the U.S. to make the Communist powers its main concern in the region. He also believed that "neo-containment" had more of a tradition in the U.S. policy in the twentieth century, than "non-intervention".

"It [neo-containment] is, after all, supported by the assumptions of twentieth-century American political culture, and has well-entrenched constituencies in the Executive bureaucracy, the Congress, the defense and intelligence communities, and the public."

Price, Robert M., U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, Berkely 1978, p.4,5.

85 U.S. News & World Report, January 28, 1980, "Carter's U-Turn In Foreign Policy".

86 U.S. News & World Report, January 28, 1980, "Carter's U-Turn In Foreign Policy".

President Carter brought a new set of people to the State Department's African bureau. They had new ideas on southern Africa and were knowledgeable on African issues. This had not always been the case in previous administrations.⁸⁷ The Carter administration did not pay much attention to the discussion about strategically important areas in Africa and increasing communist influence on the continent. The primary emphasis was put on human rights and on winning the friendship and trust of African states. Carter believed that African problems needed to be looked at from an African perspective. The U.S. sought to identify itself with African nationalism and did not regard Africa as another battleground of the cold war.⁸⁸ In an interview before the presidential elections, Jimmy Carter said that in the future Africa would play a far larger role in U.S. foreign policy. As he put it, Africa and the U.S. needed each other: Africa needed U.S. development assistance and technological know-how and the U.S. needed resources and the markets of emerging African nations.⁸⁹

In fact, southern Africa and in particular the three problem spots Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa received a great deal of attention from Washington. Carter acknowledged that up to 1975/76 the U.S. had hardly had any involvement in the region. This only changed with Secretary Kissinger's trip to Africa. Carter thought the Kissinger proposals for the region were good but, unfortunately, they had not worked.⁹⁰ A key difference between the Carter and Ford administrations was the motivation for having an active policy toward the region. As seen earlier, the fear of communist expansion was at the heart of the Ford administration's efforts. At least in the first two years the Carter team working on the southern Africa issue paid little attention to communism. According to Carter, Angola and the Cuban and Soviet presence in 1976 did not constitute a threat to the American interests, although he called their presence regrettable. He reasoned that the communist states provided military assistance but that they would not be able to hold on in the African states after independence. He reasoned that African liberation

87 U.S. News & World Report, January 28, 1980, "Carter's U-Turn In Foreign Policy".

88 Nickel, Herman, Fortune, August 14, 1978, "A sharper Focus for U.S Policy in Africa".
Gorman, Robert F., The Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1979, "Carter's Preventive African Policy".

89 Interview with Jimmy Carter, Africa Report, May-June 1976, "Jimmy Carter on Africa".

90 Public Papers of the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, 1977 Book II, June 25 to December 31, 1977, Washington 1978, p.2011.

movements were motivated by nationalism, not by ideologies.⁹¹ In Carter's Africa team all the members felt that Africans accepted military aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union because no one else gave it to them. The majority of the Africans never identified themselves with the communist ideology. Nationalism not ideology was the issue.⁹²

Within the policy toward southern Africa, Namibia received special attention from the African team in the State Department. The whole team and the U.N. delegates in New York worked together on the problem and everyone basically agreed on the approach that needed to be taken. Differences only arose on questions of tactics. It was a team effort but Andrew Young's deputy, Ambassador McHenry⁹³, mainly conducted the negotiations.⁹⁴

In January, 1977, the prospects were grim for a peaceful settlement in Namibia. There were more urgent problems in the region such as the escalating war in Zimbabwe. In spite of these facts, the U.S. believed an effort had to be made in Namibia. A solution in the territory was expected to have positive effects on talks

91 The African specialists in the State Department argued all along that communism did not threaten U.S. interest in the region. Carter agreed during the first two years. However, in the second half of his term with increasing communist activities in the world he became more concerned with Moscow and Havana's activities and increasingly followed the reasoning of his National Security adviser, Brzezinski, who believed all Soviet ambitions in any part of the world needed to be confronted. To Brzezinski, the Soviet and Cuban presence in Africa was another provocation.

Ungar, Sanford J., The Washington Post, June 18, 1978, "The Real Reasons for our Africa Role".

Africa Report, May-June 1976.

92 Interviews with Ambassador McHenry, October 30, 1990, Richard Moose, November 11, 1990, Cyrus Vance, December 3, 1990.

93 Ambassador McHenry became U.N. ambassador in New York after Andrew Young resigned. Young took this step because of the furor his unauthorized meetings with P.L.O. representatives caused.

Teltsch, Kathleen, The New York Times, September 1, 1979, "McHenry is named to succeed Young at the U.N."

94 Interview with Ambassador Donald McHenry, October 30, 1990.

in Zimbabwe and South Africa and encourage Pretoria to pursue domestic changes.⁹⁵ The Carter team was ready to make a clear break with the Kissinger policy on the Namibian question. However, there was some support to at least try the path that Kissinger had opened only months before he left office. Mainly Secretary Vance favoured this approach for the sake of continuity and, therefore, the seven point proposal was kept on the table.⁹⁶ However, this approach was not pursued any further after SWAPO and the Front Line States refused the plan and South Africa broke the commitment to the plan it had made earlier.

The Carter administration was not sorry about Pretoria's rejection of the Kissinger plan as it gave the State Department the chance to work out a new proposal. All along the new team in the African Bureau had regarded Kissinger's proposal as a lost cause.⁹⁷ It felt that a new approach to Namibia was necessary to let South Africa know, that there was an alternative to the Turnhalle conference. A negotiable proposal also had to be presented to keep African states from demanding sanctions on South Africa and thereby complicating the negotiations. The Carter administration wanted to work out a proposition which would be acceptable to all parties. Therefore, the U.S. worked with the Front Line States and South Africa and met with SWAPO leaders.⁹⁸

3.1. Different Players

The Carter team consciously chose a multilateral approach on Namibia to ensure that the settlement would be acceptable to the international community. Therefore,

95 Vance, Cyrus, *Hard Choices*, p.274.

The Carter team's approach to Namibia differed from Kissinger's in a basic question. Carter believed there was still time to find a solution for the territory to prevent a violent escalation. As a Canadian representative of the Contact Group once said, "*We are in this to avoid a bloodbath in southern Africa.*" And that is what the U.S. wanted, a peaceful transition. The Ford administration did not believe in taking any measures, such as establishing a peace-keeping force for Namibia as long as there was no violent situation. As Secretary Easum said: "*You don't keep the peace until there is a sufficient violent situation to require that need.*" The idea of trying to prevent the outbreak of violence and achieving a peaceful transition, for Namibia did not seem to be part of the Ford administration's thinking.

Zartmann, I. William, *Ripe for Resolution*, p.169.

U.S. Congress, House, Review of State Department Trip through Southern and Central Africa, Hearing before The Subcommittee on Africa, December 12, 1974, 93th Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p.19.

96 Interview with Ambassador Donald McHenry, October 30, 1990.

97 Interview with Ambassador Donald McHenry, October 30, 1990.

98 Vance, Cyrus, *Hard Choices*, p.275,276.

a new strategy to achieve independence for Namibia was needed. The U.S. wanted to get away from Kissinger's bilateral approach and work closely with the U.N. following the lines of U.N. Res 385. In addition cooperation with the African states and the Western allies was desired.

Ambassador Young suggested in January, 1977, that the five Western members of the Security Council should meet regularly and work together on the Namibian problem. This led to the formation of the Contact Group, consisting of the five Security Council members Great Britain, France, West Germany, Canada and the United States. Ambassador Donald McHenry became chairman of the Contact Group and started work on Namibia within weeks of taking office.⁹⁹ The establishing of the Contact Group had been an American idea but the other four nations were enthusiastic so that the Namibia problem became a joint effort. The U.S. played the leading role in the group of five, because being a superpower, its diplomatic corp and field operations were larger and better staffed.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the other four nations also encouraged the U.S. to play a major role because they had confidence in Donald McHenry who led the negotiations for the United States.¹⁰¹

South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)

The armed struggle for Namibia's independence was led by SWAPO against South Africa. The origins of the guerilla organization lie in the "Ovambo People's Organization" (OPO) that was founded in 1957 in Cape Town and renamed SWAPO in 1961. Different ethnic groups participated in SWAPO but it stayed a predominantly Ovambo organization. In the 1960s the organization became more radical and militant in their fight against South Africa. Triggering events for this development were the International Court of Justice's refusal to take a decision on the Namibian question and the removal of non-whites to a township (Katatura) outside of Windhoek by the South Africans.¹⁰² At this early stage SWAPO was a nationalist movement looking for assistance from the outside. The West was not

99 Vance, Cyrus, *Hard Choices*, p. 275, 276.

100 Interview with Ambassador McHenry, October 30, 1990.

101 Interview with Cyrus Vance, December 3, 1990.

102 Mühlemann, Christoph, *Namibia und der Westen*, in: *Europa Archiv*, Folge 1/1980, p.23.

very interested in supporting militant organizations in southern Africa.¹⁰³ Therefore, SWAPO had to seek help from other countries. Early on, SWAPO was trained by China in Zambia and Tanzania and worked with UNITA which was regarded as pro-Western. The big change came only in 1975/76 when Aghostino Neto came to power in Luanda with the help of Cuba and the Soviet Union. SWAPO, led by Sam Nujoma, then started accepting help from Moscow. And UNITA turned to South Africa for protection, for its military was crumbling. As a result the cooperation between SWAPO and UNITA ended. After this change SWAPO was considered a pro-Soviet organization. However, these ties to the Kremlin should be looked at in practical rather than in ideological terms. SWAPO was mainly interested in the equipment and training the Soviets could provide.¹⁰⁴ SWAPO was never looked upon favorably by most Western countries because of its links to communist countries. The U.N. General Assembly, under the influence of many Third World countries took a different stand. In 1973 the Assembly recognized SWAPO as the "sole authentic" representative of Namibia.¹⁰⁵

The U.S. feelings toward SWAPO were mixed. The Carter administration did not seem to have a problem with SWAPO and the possibility of its governing the country once independence was achieved. However, dealing with SWAPO was not very easy since it was not always helpful in the process of trying to find an internationally acceptable agreement.¹⁰⁶

103 There is one exception to be mentioned: the Kennedy administration gave support to the FNLA a group fighting the Portuguese in Angola.

104 Mühlemann, Christoph, *Namibia und der Westen*, p.22,23,24.
Jaster, Robert S., *The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of Southwestern Africa*, in: *Adelphi Paper 253*, (Fall 1990), p.9,10.

105 Eriksen, Tore Linné, *Namibia; South African Withdrawals and Preparations for Destabilization*, in: *Bulletin of Peace Proposal*, Vol.20 No.3 (September 1989), p.296.

This decision of the General Assembly was widely criticized. Many felt it was not up to the U.N. or any one else to decide who was to represent Namibia. Only the Namibians had the right to do that.

Crocker, Chester, *South Africa: Strategy for Change*, p.348.

106 Interview with Cyrus Vance, December 3, 1990.

The Front Line States¹⁰⁷

The cooperation between the Contact Group and SWAPO was not always easy because the guerilla group distrusted the Western nations. Therefore, it often took the intervention of the Front Line States and their pressure on the leaders of SWAPO to keep the negotiations from bogging down. Especially the Carter administration worked closely and very well with the Front Line States.¹⁰⁸ The most valuable contribution of the African Group to the work being done on Namibia, was their good contact to SWAPO. The African states had leverage over the guerilla group which the countries of the Contact Group did not have. Sam Nujoma's organization trusted the black Africans more than the Western Five. In addition, Angola and Zambia let SWAPO have bases on their territory and therefore had good contacts to Sam Nujoma and his organization.

South Africa

By 1977 the world community agreed that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and that the policy of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia was unacceptable. The U.S. policy toward South Africa was clearly formulated during Vice-President Mondale's stay in Vienna, where he met with the South African Prime Minister John Vorster. The two problems concerning South Africa were the apartheid system and the occupation of Namibia. At the meeting Walter Mondale stated that the U.S. could not accept the "*discrimination and absence of full political participation rights available to all their citizens.*" He actually said that one-man

107 The Front Line States consist of five states: Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.

For a long time South Africa did not use the name "Front Line States" because they felt there was hostility toward South Africa in the name. As a South African diplomat put it, "*a front line against what? - Obviously against South Africa.*"
Interview with a South African diplomat, October 16, 1990.

108 The cooperation with the Reagan team was by no means as good. The Crocker team in general did not consider the Front Line States very helpful.
Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

one-vote was the system needed in South Africa.¹⁰⁹ He accused South Africa's unjust system of giving Moscow incentive to increase its influence in the region and he emphasized that the U.S. would not intervene on Pretoria's behalf and support the unjust system. He stressed that Pretoria could not buy time for domestic problems in South Africa by showing diplomatic cooperation on Zimbabwe and Namibia. Finally, Mondale intimated his administration's willingness to let South Africa be isolated by a U.N. quarantine, should Pretoria continue on its course of apartheid.¹¹⁰ The basic differences between the U.S. and South Africa were clear. Solutions, however, were very hard to find. Washington condemned apartheid and wanted a political change in the Cape Republic. At the same time the U.S. had to admit its dependence on Pretoria's cooperation on Zimbabwe and Namibia. Therefore, the U.S. could not take drastic measures to try to pressure South Africa into changing its domestic policy and move out of Namibia.¹¹¹ The differences between the two governments were growing and the chances of bridging the gap more remote. Consequently, it is not surprising that the relationship between the countries became increasingly strained.

The Soviet Union and Cuba

The Carter team working on Namibia regarded the Soviet Union as a trouble-maker in the region, and no positive contributions were expected from the Kremlin. The Contact Group kept Moscow informed on the action taken with respect to Namibia. Keeping them informed was at that time regarded as a bold step and criticized by many in Washington. The leading U.S. diplomat, Ambassador McHenry, however, felt that by keeping the Kremlin informed, Moscow could be kept from making mischief in the area. For the same reason the U.S. wanted to have good relations with the African states to prevent them from turning to Moscow and causing

109 Statement and Replies by the Vice President (Mondale) to questions asked at a News Conference, Vienna, May 20, 1977, in: American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977-1980, Washington 1983, Document 618, p.1170-1174.

At the time asking for one-man one-vote was heresy in South Africa and Mondale's direct way of asking for it was surprising.

Mohr, Charles, The New York Times, May 29, 1977, "U.S. Policy in Africa is Broadly Advanced".

110 Mohr, Charles, The New York Times, May 29, 1977, "U.S. Policy in Africa is Broadly Advanced".

111 U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Policy toward Africa, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, May 12, 1978, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1978, p.5.

difficulties. Washington believed the Kremlin would not act contrary to African wishes unless vital Soviet interests were at stake.¹¹² According to Leonid L. Fituni, the Soviet Union had no vital economic or political interests in Africa. The Soviet activities in Africa seemed mainly to have been ideologically motivated. The independent African nations appeared to be likely allies of the Soviet Union, because of their dislike of Western imperialism.¹¹³ The economic realities, however, encouraged the African nations to foster good relations with Western countries. Many African nations depended on the economic cooperation and aid from the West.¹¹⁴

The Cuban presence in Angola¹¹⁵ was not only an East-West issue for Washington, it also was a domestic issue. Cuba has been a neuralgic problem in the U.S. for the past three decades.¹¹⁶ The Carter administration was divided on the issue of how to treat the Soviet-Cuban involvement in southern Africa. The National Security adviser and Soviet specialist Brzezinski wanted the African policy subordinated to the overall policy of the U.S. toward the Soviet Union, similar to Henry Kissinger's approach. The main opponent of this policy was U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young. Young stressed that Africa, especially black Africa, needed to be treated separately and kept out of the East-West competition. Young wanted to find solutions for Africa without the additional problem of the East-West conflict. Communism in the region did not seem a real threat to him because he believed, as did the others on the African team, the driving force in Africa was nationalism, not a foreign ideology.¹¹⁷ In regard to the Cuban presence in Angola Young went as far as to say that Castro's troops brought "*a certain stability and order*" to Angola.¹¹⁸ Quite surprisingly President Carter agreed with this provocative statement of his U.N. ambassador. A number of people shared the view with the president and Young, that the Cubans actually had some positive influence on Angola.¹¹⁹

112 Interview with Ambassador Donald McHenry, October 30, 1990.

113 Fituni, Leonid L., *New Soviet Priorities in Africa*, in: CSIS Africa Notes, No. 123 (April 29, 1991) p.1.

114 Hamann, Rudolf (Ed), *Die "Süddimension" des Ost-West Konfliktes: Das Engagement der Supermächte in Krisen und Kriegen der Dritten Welt*, Baden-Baden 1986, p.106.

115 The Cubans were also present in other parts of Africa as in the Horn of Africa.

116 Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

117 Ottaway, David, *The Washington Post*, February 4, 1978, "Struggle over U.S. Africa Policy Pits Young against Brzezinski"

118 Scott, Austin, *The Washington Post*, April 17, 1977, "Cuba Called Stabilizer in Angola"

119 Cuban teachers were all over Angola, Cuban troops were protecting the vulnerable Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda and had saved the MPLA government from being overthrown by a more radical leftist movement.
Bender, Gerald J., *The New York Times*, June 5, 1978, "U.S. Policy on Cubans in Africa".

Many academics, journalists, Congressional staff members and State Department officials believed the U.S. should recognize Angola diplomatically despite the presence of non-African troops there. Secretary Vance also believed that the diplomatic recognition by the U.S. could have sped up the process of the Cuban withdrawal. These people generally held the view that the Cuban presence was not welcome but understandable since the MPLA government felt threatened. It was believed that Luanda would send the foreign troops home as soon as it had no more reason to fear South Africa and UNITA. A peaceful settlement in Namibia and the withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola would have been one more reason for Luanda to end the Cuban stay.¹²⁰ These views were held by the key State Department officials during all of the Carter presidency. In the last two years, however, President Carter's views and rhetoric changed in regard to the Cuban and Soviet influence in Africa. The revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the doubling of the Soviet-Cuban forces present in Africa were some of the reasons for the president's change of course.¹²¹ In addition, Carter's NSC adviser Brzezinski increasingly gained influence on the president's decision-making. His globalist and cold warrior views started to dominate the foreign policy decisions and to a large extent replaced the regionalist approach of the State Department's African bureau.¹²²

3.2. Promise for a Settlement

Ambassador McHenry, as chairman of the Contact Group, started work on a peaceful settlement for Namibia within weeks of the Carter Administration taking office. He spent sixteen months travelling around the world working out a plan that provided for a U.N. supervised independence. The plan had to please SWAPO, South Africa the five Contact Group nations and the five Front Line States. A plan was devised that all parties supported including South Africa and SWAPO. The path was long and full of obstacles and set-backs. South Africa and SWAPO repeatedly

120 Interview with Cyrus Vance, December 3, 1990.

121 Kaiser, Robert G., *The Washington Post*, June 4, 1978, "Concern Over Soviets, Cubans Transforms U.S. Africa Policy".

122 Bender, Gerald J., *The New York Times*, June 5, 1978, "U.S. Policy on Cubans in Africa".

threatened to pull out of the negotiations.¹²³ The basic problem in getting a settlement for Namibia was the lack of trust between the two main players South Africa and SWAPO. Pretoria feared that SWAPO would not abide by the outcome of the elections because it basically believed that SWAPO was more interested in a military solution than a negotiated settlement. SWAPO, on the other hand, was suspicious of the Western nations, especially of the NATO countries, because South Africa's economic dominance in the region was based on Western support. SWAPO also was concerned about South Africa's seriousness in finding an acceptable international solution. It believed Pretoria preferred an internal solution and kept working toward that goal. However, one thing the two protagonists had in common: They both did not want to look like the intransigent party since they both needed international support.¹²⁴

Because of the lack of trust, it took a while until the Contact Group proposal was accepted by the South Africans and SWAPO. But by July 1978, both parties had agreed that the Secretary-General should draw up a plan on how the proposal would be implemented.¹²⁵ Pretoria saw in this plan the best possibility to have a stable neighbor and win some international credit for helping Namibia to become independent.¹²⁶ Once South Africa had accepted the proposal, the pressure on SWAPO to accept grew as well. Since SWAPO was not in a strong position it did not have much of a choice but to go along. In addition, the African states encouraged SWAPO to give the plan a chance.¹²⁷ The agreement was fragile, but at the time everyone still believed that it was a success and a diplomatic triumph for the United States.¹²⁸ Washington was also satisfied because the accord was a blow to the Soviet Union and its efforts to win more influence in the region by supporting guerilla groups.¹²⁹

123 Wright, Robin, *The Washington Post*, April 30, 1978, "Breakthrough in Namibia".

124 U.S. Congress, House, *The Current Situation in Namibia*, 1979, p.5.

125 U.S. Congress, House, *The Current Situation in Namibia*, 1979, p.7,8.

126 Wright, Robin, *The Washington Post*, April 30, 1978, "Breakthrough in Namibia".
Ambassador McHenry believed that South Africa agreed to the proposal because they never expected SWAPO to accept the plan.
Interview with Ambassador McHenry, October 30, 1990.

127 Pressure was put on SWAPO also by the U.N. Special Representative for Namibia, Marti Ahtisaari, who advised SWAPO to take up the proposal for it might be the best offer they would get since the world had other problems beside Namibia.
Interview with Elizabeth Landis, October 26, 1990.

128 Goshko, John M., *The Washington Post*, July 30, 1978, "The Man Behind Namibia Success".

129 Ottaway, David B., *The Washington Post*, July 14, 1978, "Namibia Accord Kindles Hope for Rest of Southern Africa".

The Contact Group's Proposal¹³⁰

On April 10, 1978, the Contact Group submitted a proposal to the U.N. Security Council suggesting Namibia's independence for December 1978. The Contact Group proposal was meant to be a method of implementing Res 385¹³¹. It aimed at achieving free and fair elections in Namibia. The five Western countries emphasized that they would accept whatever the outcome of the elections was as long as they were free and fair.

The five recommended to the Security Council that the Secretary-General should determine a Special Representative to ensure the conditions¹³² for free and fair elections. For his support the U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was to be established. The Special Representative would work with the South African Administrator-General in the transition process. Law and order during the transition would be guaranteed by the existing South West African police (SWA-POL). To ensure good conduct of these forces would also be part of the Special Representative's job.¹³³ The cessation of hostile acts was a main concern. The Contact Group proposed for South Africa to withdraw all troops except for 1,500 men within twelve weeks. The remaining South African forces and the SWAPO armed personnel would then be restricted to bases. The ultimate goal of the elections was to bring into life a Constituent Assembly which then would draw up and adopt a constitution for the emerging independent Namibia. And in the final paragraph,

130 The following chapter is based on the Contact Group proposal.
Appendix G: Proposal for a settlement of the Namibia situation.

131 RESOLUTION 385

This resolution of January 30, 1976, was the starting point for creating an acceptable plan for a peaceful settlement in Namibia. The resolution concerning Namibia contains demands on South Africa to end their illegal occupation, their discriminatory and repressive practices, their policy of Bantustans and homelands, the military build-up in Namibia and the use of the territory as a base to attack neighbors. The Security Council declared that free elections in the territory had to be held in Namibia as a whole political entity under supervision and control of the United Nations. South Africa was urged to comply with the U.N. resolutions and the decision of the ICJ of 1971. The withdrawal of the illegal South African administration was demanded in order to make possible the transfer of power to the Namibian people with help from the United Nations. South Africa was also told to release all Namibian political prisoners, to comply with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to abolish racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws, and to let Namibian refugees return to their country without threat of arrest, intimidation and imprisonment.
Appendix F: U.N. Res 385.

132 Conditions: release of all political prisoners, repeal of discriminatory and restrictive laws, the return of the refugees, the cessation of all hostilities.

133 It is spelled out clearly that the cooperation with the South Africans did not mean that South African presence in the territory was by any means legal.

the Contact Group called upon neighboring countries of Namibia to offer their assistance when needed during the transition and provide necessary facilities to the U.N. Special Representative and U.N. personnel and ensure tranquility along the borders.

A few months later, on July 27, 1978, the Security Council assembled to pass a resolution regarding the Contact Group's proposal. In Res 431¹³⁴ the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative and asked the Secretary-General to submit a recommendation for the implementation of the proposal as early as possible. The Secretary-General nominated Martti Ahtisaari as Special Representative. Finally, on September 29, 1978, the Security Council passed Res 435¹³⁵ which was to be the framework for Namibia's independence. The acceptance of the Contact Group's plan in the U.N. proceeded smoothly and hopes were high.

Implementation of the Contact Group Plan

In the meantime, however, changes occurred in South Africa. The ailing Prime Minister Vorster announced his resignation in September 1978 and also made public that Pretoria was rejecting the U.N. plan for Namibia's independence, even though earlier it had accepted its main provisions. Instead he announced that South Africa would move ahead unilaterally on Namibia's independence. Vorster explained his change of mind with his discontent with the implementation plans.¹³⁶ Pretoria objected to the proposed 7,500-man U.N. military presence and to holding the

134 Appendix H: U.N. Res 431.

135 RESOLUTION 435

In Res 435 the Security Council approved the proposal of the Contact Group and reiterated that its objectives were the end of the administration of Namibia through South Africa and the transfer of power to Namibia's people. It was decided to establish the UNTAG to help the Special Representative in his task to bring independence to Namibia through free and fair elections. Included was further a welcoming of SWAPO's willingness to cooperate with the U.N. plan and to observe the planned ceasefire. The South Africans are called upon to also cooperate on the implementation of Res 435. Finally, any unilateral measure taken by South Africa, such as transfer of power or registration of voters that were in violation of Res 385 were invalid. Appendix I: U.N. Res 435.

136 Goshko, John M., The Washington Post, September 21, 1978, "Ailing Vorster Quits; Namibia Plan Rejected".

elections after December 1978. South Africa, therefore, took another step toward an internal settlement and held unilateral elections in December, 1978, after which a constitutional assembly was established.¹³⁷

In the beginning of 1979 the Secretary-General continued his work anyway and tried to make a final implementation plan that South Africa and SWAPO would accept. The Secretary-General wanted to identify and restrict SWAPO military personnel in order to facilitate their monitoring. Both parties, however, had objections to the new proposals. South Africa insisted on UNTAG monitoring SWAPO bases in neighboring countries and objected to the monitoring plan of armed SWAPO personnel inside Namibia at the start of the ceasefire. On the other hand SWAPO asked for five bases to be established where 2,500 SWAPO personnel would be moved to after the ceasefire. The two parties found the conditions of the other party unacceptable. To avoid a breakdown, talks were held on minister level in March, 1979, in New York.

Secretary Vance and his colleagues met with the South African delegation and tried to convince them that the implementation plan of the Secretary-General was consistent with the proposal that Pretoria had earlier agreed to. After these talks SWAPO accepted the implementation plan¹³⁸ of the Secretary-General. During the same talks in New York, the Front Line States committed themselves to make sure that the ceasefire agreement would be observed. Therefore, in spring 1979, SWAPO, the Contact Group, the U.N. Security Council, and the international community in general were ready to proceed with the settlement. It was only South Africa who was not ready to support the agreement at this time.¹³⁹

The involved parties were concerned about South Africa's blocking of the progress. In spring 1979, the chances for a negotiated solution were still good but it was generally believed that with time negotiations would become more difficult and the parties would more likely resort to violent means to achieve their objectives.¹⁴⁰ The

137 The elections held by South Africa were boycotted by several groups so the assembly consisted mainly of members of the DTA.

U.S. Congress, House, *The Current Situation in Namibia, 1979*, p.7,8.

138 By accepting the implementation plan SWAPO accepted the following rules:

1) Restriction of SWAPO forces outside of Namibia to a base outside of Namibia.

2) Restricting and monitoring of armed SWAPO personnel at two locations in Namibia after the start of the ceasefire.

3) No SWAPO infiltration into Namibia after the begin of the ceasefire.

U.S. Congress, House, *The Current Situation in Namibia, 1979*, p.8,9.

139 U.S. Congress, House, *The Current Situation in Namibia, 1979*, p.7,8,9,10.

140 U.S. Congress, House, *The Current Situation in Namibia, 1979*, p.11.

U.S. administration believed that the proposal was in the South African interest and encouraged Pretoria to comply, especially since the U.N. was likely to put sanctions on South Africa if no progress was made on Namibia.¹⁴¹

As mentioned above, South Africa raised two objections to the U.N. plan as presented. First of all it wanted SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia to be monitored by the United Nations. Such a measure was not believed to be necessary by the Contact Group because the Front Line States had committed themselves to ensure the observance of the ceasefire. The Contact Group saw no reason to distrust this commitment. Secondly, Pretoria objected to the establishing of bases in Namibia where armed SWAPO personnel was to be taken to and monitored after the start of a ceasefire. For both issues solutions were found. The Front Line States managed to persuade SWAPO not to insist on having bases in Namibia. Instead it was agreed that when the ceasefire started, armed SWAPO personnel would be given two choices: they could either hand over their weapons to the U.N. forces and participate peacefully in the elections or they would be granted safe passage out of the territory.¹⁴² To overcome the second objection the late Angolan president Aghostino Neto proposed a compromise. He suggested to create a fifty kilometer demilitarized zone (DMZ) on each side of Namibia's northern boarder. The U.N. forces would monitor not only the Namibian territory but also the 50 kilometer zone in Angola and Zambia. South Africa, Angola and Zambia would be allowed to retain forces within the zone, however, restricted to designated locations. In this proposal SWAPO was not allowed to keep forces in the area. After the beginning of the ceasefire, South Africa would still have to withdraw their forces from the DMZ within twelve weeks.¹⁴³ The South Africans studied this proposal and demanded to be allowed to have twenty locations for their troops in the zone and that Zambia and Angola would only have seven on their territory. Again the Front Line States and SWAPO agreed to the South African conditions. In a letter to the Secretary-General, Pretoria communicated that they would agree to proceed with the discussions on the implementation of the plan if their interpretations and assumptions in regard to the settlement proposal and demilitarized zone concept were accepted.¹⁴⁴

141 U.S. Congress, House, The Current Situation in Namibia, 1979, p.22.

142 U.S. Congress, House, Namibia Update, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 9, 1980, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, p.4,5.

143 U.S. Congress, House, Namibia Update, 1980, p.5.

144 U.S. Congress, House, Namibia Update, 1980, p.5,6.

Regarding South Africa's interpretations and assumptions, two issues should be mentioned. South Africa brought up the problem of the U.N.'s impartiality. Because the General Assembly had declared SWAPO the "*sole and authentic representative*"¹⁴⁵, South Africans were sceptical of the United Nations. The U.S. and other involved parties repeatedly assured Pretoria by saying that the General Assembly, which was not involved in the implementation process, had taken that decision. The Security Council was the responsible body and had never sided with any party in the conflict.¹⁴⁶ The second point was the funds that SWAPO was receiving from the U.N.¹⁴⁷ Other issues were also raised by South Africa but none seemed to pose an insurmountable problem.

Toward the end of the Carter administration the U.S. team which had spent lots of time working on the Namibian settlement came to the conclusion that South Africa had not taken the basic decision of giving Namibia independence by way of free and fair elections. To the U.S. all of Pretoria's objections seemed to have one goal only, to delay action on Namibia. From reports in the New York Times, this suspicion was unofficially confirmed by South African officials.¹⁴⁸ Though, the implementation of Res 435 would have brought international acceptance of the settlement, it also would have been risky. The outcome of free and fair elections was not clear and there was a good possibility of SWAPO winning. It was this risk that many people involved in the negotiations thought South Africa was not willing to take.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, South Africa was believed to be following a two-track strategy. For some time the South Africans believed that the DTA, which they supported, could win free and fair elections. However, as they realized that SWAPO most likely would be victorious, they started to stall the negotiations.¹⁵⁰

145 NDI, Nation Building, p.ix.

146 U.S. Congress, House, Namibia Update, 1980, p.6.

147 Nossiter, Bernhard D., The New York Times, May 14, 1980, "U.N. Puzzled by Reply on Namibia".

148 Nossiter, Bernhard D., The New York Times, May 14, 1980, "U.N. Puzzled by Reply on Namibia".

149 U.S. Congress, Senate, Namibia, 1979, p.13,14.

150 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. Policy toward Namibia: Spring 1981, 1981, p.23.

3.3. Achievements of the Carter Administration

In cooperation with the Contact Group, the U.N. and the Front Line States, the Carter administration managed to create a framework for Namibia's independence that was acceptable to the international community with exception of South Africa. Because of the Cape Republic's intransigent attitude to make the final step and agree to the implementation of the plan, President Carter left office with the Namibian question unsettled.

Several reasons can be listed why the Carter administration did not achieve implementation of Res 435. First, Pretoria did not believe Res 435 was the final and best deal they would get on Namibia as long as an internal settlement looked better to them. Second, the relationship between Washington and Pretoria was cool to a point where cooperation became difficult. The situation did not improve when Prime Minister Botha came into office in 1978. His predecessor Vorster came from the Foreign Ministry and had been willing to consider Res 435. Botha, the former Secretary of Defense, however, was opposed to Res 435 from the beginning.

The lowest point in bilateral relations was reached when South Africa accused Washington of using the U.S. Embassy plane for spying missions. As a result three U.S. diplomats were asked to leave South Africa. Washington responded by ousting two South African diplomats from the U.S.¹⁵¹ In addition, South Africa attacked the leading U.S. diplomat on the Namibian negotiations, Ambassador McHenry. They accused him of having ties to a South African opposition leader and of being an unfair negotiator.¹⁵² South Africa's lashing out at the U.S. was considered by some diplomats as a sign that South Africa was not ready to accept the U.N. plan. The widening of the conflict in Namibia and a military escalation were feared. By April, 1979, prospects of making any further progress on Namibia were increasingly gloomy.¹⁵³ At the time the Carter administration was weakened and its attention was drawn to other trouble spots such as Afghanistan, Iran, and the United States'

151 Southerland, Daniel, *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 16, 1979, "U.S. Diplomacy under fire in Southern Africa".
Tyler, Humphrey, *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 16, 1979, "South Africa - U.S. relations at lowest ebb".

152 Southerland, Daniel, *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 16, 1979, "U.S. diplomacy under fire in southern Africa".

153 Teltsch, Kathleen, *The New York Times*, April 13, 1979, "U.S. and U.N. renew Efforts for Namibian Elections".

troubled economy.¹⁵⁴ Further circumstances in the last years of Carter made things worse. South Africa was taken by surprise by Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe in 1980. Pretoria considered his election as the worst possible outcome. In addition, South Africa was hoping that the elections in different Western countries in 1979 and 1980, such as Canada, France and Great Britain would bring conservative and friendlier governments to power. In Great Britain Pretoria hoped that Mrs Thatcher would win. The South Africans expected her to follow a more favourable course toward them. Their main interest was to have a friendly government that would veto punitive U.N. sanctions against the Cape Republic.¹⁵⁵

South Africa was the intransigent party because it blocked the implementation of Res 435. In the late 1970s, success and failure of the Namibian negotiations lay in the hands of the South Africans. The Contact Group and the Front Line States did not have the means to pressure South Africa or to entice them through offers to comply with Res 435. Neither sticks nor carrots were available to obtain South Africa's cooperation. The threat of sanctions put on South Africa was not a credible stick because the West feared sanctions more than South Africa. And there was no carrot for South Africa that made Res 435 more interesting than an internal settlement.¹⁵⁶ In spite of the great efforts of the Carter team, the Contact Group, the U.N and the Front Line States no solution could be found. The circumstances were not right: The moment was not "*ripe for resolution*"¹⁵⁷.

154 Interview with Ambassador McHenry, October 30, 1990.

155 Teltsch, Kathleen, The New York Times, April 13, 1979, "U.S. and U.N. renew Efforts for Namibian Elections".
Tyler, Humphrey, The Christian Science Monitor, September 4, 1980, "South African church deeply split over whether to drop racial barriers".

156 Zartmann, I. William, Ripe for Resolution, New York 1985, p.180,181.

157 Expression used by I. William Zartmann as the title of his book: Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention, New York 1985.

4. The Reagan Administration

In 1981 a Republican president came into the White House again. As in 1977, administrations were succeeding each other that had little in common with regard to their foreign policy. In the African Bureau of the State Department there was no real transition period in 1981 between the incoming and outgoing teams. On the questions on the southern African issues the cooperation between the two was not necessary because the Namibian negotiations were "dead in the water" when the Reagan administration came into office.¹⁵⁸

A new period of U.S. involvement in southern Africa began in 1981. The Reagan administration's policy toward the region showed an unprecedented continuity. This was mainly due to the fact that Chester Crocker¹⁵⁹ was the head of the State Department's African Bureau during the two terms of President Reagan. Chester Crocker is an Africanist by training with sophisticated views of the U.S. interest in Africa. His policy toward southern Africa became known under the name of "constructive engagement". The negotiations being conducted on Namibia's independence were one element in this regional policy.

Chester Crocker believed that the U.S. policy toward Africa in general had to change because the U.S. interest in Africa was growing faster than U.S. influence.¹⁶⁰ In order to make a sound policy several facts had to be considered. First of all, problem solving on this continent was not a short term engagement. Secondly, getting involved or disengaged in the area was not difficult. However, staying in Africa for a long time was. Only those who stay in Africa and work with the Africans on a daily basis could achieve a certain amount of influence. Thirdly, stopping the spread

158 Interview with a State Department official, October 3, 1990.

159 Crocker received his B.A. in 1963 at Ohio State University in history and political science. He got his M.A. and Ph.D. in international relations in 1965 and 1969 respectively, at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Crocker focused on African politics and wrote his dissertation on "The Military Transfer of Power in Africa: A Comparative Study of Change in British and French Systems of Order". During graduate school, Crocker worked for the news journal *Africa Report* where he was edition assistant and then news editor. After he left Johns Hopkins he taught at American University in Washington D.C. and then took a position in the Nixon administration as staff officer of the Planning and Coordination group of the National Security Council. In 1972 he left the NSC staff and took an administrative and teaching assignment at Georgetown University where he remained until 1981. During these nine years he was a consultant on Africa and southern Africa to the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Army War College, the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Navy, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Nomination of Chester Crocker, Report together with Additional Views of the Committee on Foreign Relations, May 4, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 4,5,6.

160 Crocker, Chester, *Africa Policy in the 1980s*, p.73.

of communism and limiting the Soviet influence in Africa was one of Washington's goals in Africa. But Crocker refused to look at the continent in strictly Cold War terms. He recognized that the U.S. did not have to shun the countries which were known as Marxist. Crocker felt that business could be conducted very well with countries led by so-called Marxist governments.¹⁶¹ Finally, the U.S. also had an advantage over the communist countries seeking influence in Africa: Washington had the means to provide economic assistance, whereas the Soviet Union could provide primarily arms and military training. According to Crocker, the U.S., however, traditionally made little use of this advantage. Instead of developing comprehensive programs for the economic development of Africa and incorporating the U.S. private sector, the U.S. spent their aid in an uncoordinated manner, spreading it thinly and achieving very little.¹⁶²

For Crocker one of the main flaws of Carter's Africa policy was the neglect of U.S. interests. He strongly opposed the Carter administration's view of Africa being a special part of the world that needed to be treated outside of the East-West arena. In Crocker's eyes Africa was no different from other areas of the world where the U.S. had interests. The Assistant Secretary explained U.S. economic interest in Africa with a major share of Western energy and mineral supplies coming from Africa and that half of the U.S. trade deficit was in Africa.¹⁶³ He demanded a new African policy considering the African realities as well as the U.S. interests. He rejected the action of the Carter administration which in his words ran a "*popularity contest from the highest moral ground available.*"¹⁶⁴

Southern Africa received a lot of attention from Crocker even though the region has never had great strategic importance to the United States and possible war or unrest in the region could not threaten the world as could a war in the Middle East. However, as observers have said, "*...whatever southern Africa lacks in strategic*

161 As mentioned earlier, conservative groups in the U.S. feared the U.S. could be cut off from the market of strategic minerals. It was widely believed, however, that such fears were unrealistic, because the African states needed the income they could make from selling their minerals. The Africans were as dependent on the Western buyers as the buyers on the Africans, because the West was the only market for the minerals.
Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

162 Crocker wrote in the Washington Quarterly "*Washington needs to stop thinking of Africa as a philanthropic venture and start defining U.S. interest in the economic relationship with Africa. Instead of trying to run rural welfare programs that by-pass sovereign governments, the United States should lay aside such echoes of the white man's burden and press ahead with more mundane tasks.*"
Crocker, Chester, African Policy in the 1980s, p.80.

163 Crocker, Chester, Africa Policy in the 1980s, p.73,74,80.

164 Crocker, Chester, Africa Policy in the 1980s, p.74.

importance, it makes up for in moral relevance..."¹⁶⁵ Because of the racial issue, South Africa could not be ignored by the Reagan administration, even though the area was strategically of little importance. In regard to Namibia the Reagan administration believed the territory's independence would easily be achieved and would likely be one of the first foreign policy successes for the new administration.¹⁶⁶

The basic ideas of the Reagan administration's policy toward southern Africa are laid out in two articles¹⁶⁷ written by Chester Crocker before he became Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. They both call for a change of policy toward the region. Crocker disagreed with the approach of the Nixon-Ford as well as the Carter administrations. He deplored the oscillating policy of the Nixon-Ford era that changed between "*reactive spasms of interest*" and neglect.¹⁶⁸ He was not fond of the Carter administration's policy, either, which struck harsh tones against South Africa. Crocker regarded this policy as unrealistic and saw his convictions confirmed when the Carter administration ran into problems with their southern Africa policy.¹⁶⁹

To Crocker, U.S. interests in the region were the main justification for making southern Africa a higher priority on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. He did not justify U.S. involvement in the area exclusively with the threat of spreading communism or the disregard of human rights, as the previous administrations had done.¹⁷⁰ Southern Africa received the Assistant Secretary's special attention because he regarded it as the key region in Sub-Saharan Africa with a large potential. The area's mineral wealth and the relatively well-developed economies made the regions economically significant. In addition, Crocker argued that southern Africa had strategic importance because of its position along the Cape sea routes.¹⁷¹ Economic

165 van Slambrouck, Paul, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1984, "Southern Africa: Can U.S. Policies influence Change?"

166 Winder, David, The Christian Science Monitor, May 14, 1984, "Africa offers Foreign Policy Pluses for Reagan despite elusive Namibia settlement".

167 Crocker, Chester, South Africa: Strategy for Change, in: Foreign Affairs (Winter 1980/81), p.323-352.

Crocker, Chester, African Policy in the 1980s, in: The Washington Quarterly, Vol.3 No.3, (Summer 1980), p.72-86.

168 Crocker regarded the U.S. covert action in Angola as ill-fated, because Washington lacked the "*domestic base for an interventionist policy, but also because there was no diplomatic base in Africa for one.*"

Crocker, Chester, African Policy in the 1980s, p.75.

169 Crocker, Chester, South Africa: Strategy for change, p.326.

170 Interview with a State Department official, December 7, 1990.

171 Appendix C and D: Discussion on Strategic Minerals and the Cape sea lanes

development and the peaceful solution of regional conflicts were desired by the head of the African bureau. The increasing East-West competition was considered a serious threat to the region's stability and therefore, the U.S. interests. Crocker regarded it as one of Washington's main goals to counter the expansion of Soviet influence in the region and to keep violence from dictating the regional politics. The threat of escalating violence in southern Africa was very real to him. The apartheid system in South Africa, the civil war in Angola, and the low-level guerilla war in Namibia were problems demanding attention. In Crocker's view the developments in the region were by no means clear and still could be influenced. As he put it in his Honolulu speech: "*...the future of southern Africa has not yet been written.*" He propagated an active U.S. diplomacy toward the region to prevent the further escalation of war and increasing influence of Moscow. He recommended that the U.S. strengthen its ties to countries in the region, urge South Africa to relinquish its apartheid policy and to make diplomatic efforts to resolve the Angola and Namibia conflicts.¹⁷² He shared the view point of Helen Kitchen that "*...there are no quick fixes for Africa's instability.*"¹⁷³ Southern Africa, was in a transition phase from colonialism to a new form. Crocker proceeded from the assumption that southern Africa's transition to a stable region would be a long haul because of the region's complexity.¹⁷⁴

4.1. Constructive Engagement

Constructive engagement was a policy directed toward the whole region of southern Africa. The complex political constellations in the region needed a complex and differentiated U.S. policy. Crocker believed Carter's approach and strong rhetoric against South Africa had backlashed.¹⁷⁵ He wanted the U.S. to play an "honest-broker" role in the region and he believed that the U.S. could play such a role as it could talk to all involved parties. He was not willing to alienate South Africa, because

172 Speech by Chester Crocker in Honolulu, August 29, 1981, printed in appendix of U.S. Congress, House, United States Policy Toward Southern Africa: Focus on Namibia, Angola, and South Africa, Hearing and Markup before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 16, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st sess., p.57-60.

173 Kitchen, Helen, Eighteen African Guideposts, in: Foreign Policy, No.37 (Winter 1979/80), p.86.

174 Crocker, Chester, Africa Policy in the 1980s, p.82.

175 D'Amato, James V., Constructive Engagement: The Rise and Fall of an American Foreign Policy, Dissertation 1988, UNI, No 8828016, p.32.

of Pretoria's key role to peace in the region.¹⁷⁶ Crocker felt that acceptable changes in southern Africa would only be achieved by dealing with realities. To him a key reality in the region was South Africa's position as the regional superpower.¹⁷⁷

Crocker saw South Africa as the regional military power with a strong and largely self-sufficient economy.¹⁷⁸ He also recognized the close-knit economies in southern Africa and the great dependence of neighboring countries on the Cape Republic.¹⁷⁹ When trying to find ways to change the unacceptable apartheid system, these realities needed consideration. Change in South Africa will need "*Hundreds of decisions, drawn-out negotiations, and quite probably a combination of violence and politics...*". He also wrote that one of the problems of U.S. considerations on South Africa was that the ultimate goal was focused on instead of the path to reach it.¹⁸⁰

Crocker believed it was in the United States' interest to have friendly relations with South Africa. However, as long as Pretoria kept up the apartheid policy and its repressive measures against the majority, friendship with the Cape Republic would only bring "*...constraint, embarrassment or political damage...*" to the United States. It was impossible for Washington to endorse such a political system.¹⁸¹ Crocker suggested that the U.S. help South Africa to achieve change through evolution. The last thing the U.S. wanted was a revolution in the Cape Republic. A step-by-step change was needed to guarantee a peaceful transition. The U.S. was to pressure Pretoria to move on with reforms but at the same time also to recognize and support moves in the right direction. According to Crocker the problem of the previous U.S. policies toward South Africa was the unorganized manner in which the U.S. used pressure and recognition toward Pretoria, resulting in very mixed signals reaching the Cape Republic.¹⁸²

When Crocker writes about putting on pressure, he did not mean economic sanctions. There are several reasons why he disapproved of sanctions: First, he argued that comprehensive sanctions would not produce the desired results, which was peaceful

176 D'Amato, James V., *Constructive Engagement*, p. 151.

177 Lewis, Neil, *The New York Times*, June 9, 1987, "Chester Crocker: Inside Making Policy on Africa", p.26.

178 Crocker, Chester, *South Africa: Strategy for Change*, p.59.

179 Documentation, in: *Survival* Vol.XXVIII No.6 (November/December 1986), p.548.

180 Crocker, Chester, *South Africa: Strategy for Change*, p.327.

181 Crocker, Chester, *South Africa: Strategy for Change*, p.324.

182 Crocker, Chester, *South Africa: Strategy for Change*, p.324,325.

change in South Africa.¹⁸³ Punitive sanctions by the international community, such as mandatory U.N. sanctions were counterproductive. For they were "...in practice irreversible and tended to erode rather than strengthen future influence and flexibility."¹⁸⁴ Secondly, Crocker opposed sanctions because he did not believe they would bring any advantages. To make sanctions work "very draconian and costly measures" would have to be taken by the U.S. and the international community. Such measures, however, were in no one's interest, according to Crocker. They would damage U.S. economic interest and make all neighboring states of South Africa suffer greatly. Off record, these states had made it sufficiently clear to Crocker that they did not wish economic sanctions to be put on South Africa.¹⁸⁵

Instead of putting on sanctions, Crocker recommended a course toward South Africa that neither rejected nor embraced the Republic. The main U.S. concern was the orderly transition to a new South Africa. Crocker formulated five points which could enable peaceful change in South Africa:

- 1) *Measures to improve the living conditions and opportunities of the black communities.*
- 2) *Steps to increase black bargaining power by strengthening the capacity to organize and articulate common interests.*
- 3) *Developing forms and procedures that expand the potential for intergroup bargaining and accommodation.*
- 4) *political-constitutional reform toward power-sharing.*
- 5) *dismantling statutory social barriers and discriminatory access to public services and facilities.*¹⁸⁶

183 Quite on the contrary comprehensive sanctions could damage South Africa in a way that would produce unforeseeable consequences. Uprisings, decline of white lifestyle and white emigration might be achieved. But presumably, "full political participation" was the goal and not hurting the whites.

Crocker, Chester, South Africa: Strategy for Change, p.327.

184 Crocker, Chester, South Africa: Strategy for Change, p.351.

Among analysts there was a discussion on the wisdom of the Reagan administration to take the threat of sanctions off the table. It was argued that sanctions should not have been excluded as a bargaining chip, because they had a certain psychological impact and gave additional leverage.

Kitchen, Helen, Clough, Michael, The United States and South Africa: Realities and Red Herrings, p.40,41.

185 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. Policy toward Namibia: Spring 1981, 1981, p.16.

186 Crocker, Chester, South Africa: Strategy for Change, p.347.

Crocker considered the U.N. arms embargo and Washington's refusal to use South African military facilities as good measures to be kept up in the absence of political change. Economic sanctions, i.e. economic warfare, against South Africa, however, were rejected by Crocker for the reasons discussed above. On the other hand he encouraged U.S.-European cooperation on the South African question. He wanted the dialog between South African and U.S. leaders to be kept alive.¹⁸⁷ According to Crocker, making scapegoats of one another was easy and often done in the U.S.-South Africa relationship. But such actions had negative effects and made helpful communication impossible. Exchange of ideas, warnings and encouragement with Pretoria were necessary to promote peaceful change in the Cape Republic and the southern Africa region.¹⁸⁸

The policy of constructive engagement was strongly criticized in the United States. Critics believed this new U.S. policy could have terrible consequences. For the liberals this policy signaled to South Africa that the U.S. would not take any measures against the Republic even if it kept up its aggressive politics toward neighbors and internal repression.¹⁸⁹ Already in 1981 the new policy led opponents to talk about the Reagan administration's "tilt" toward South Africa, as had been done in the Ford administration.¹⁹⁰ Some liberal critics of the administrations policy compared constructive engagement to the "tar baby" option of Henry Kissinger. They felt that the Reagan administration was giving Pretoria lots of carrots but no sticks and that this policy was not yielding any positive results.¹⁹¹ The liberals suggested to give South Africa the choice of immediately changing their racial political system or being forced to do it by sanctions.¹⁹² On the other hand a small and very conservative group of politicians who wanted to have closer ties to South Africa, opposed constructive engagement. They disliked the policy because it included criticism for South Africa.

187 Crocker, Chester, *South Africa: Strategy for Change*, p.346.

188 Crocker, Chester, *South Africa: Strategy for Change*, p.350,351.

189 U.S. Congress, House, *Namibia and Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa*, 1983, p.2.

190 When the U.S. vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning South Africa for invading Angola, there was talk about the tilting toward the Cape Republic. Southerland, Daniel, *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 21, 1981, "U.S. tilt to South Africa is costly: gains unknown".

191 Ambassador McHenry put his beliefs into strong words in one of his Congressional hearings in 1981: "*What they [South Africa] are likely to do is to gulp up all carrots that you have tossed them and ask for more.*"
U.S. Congress, House, *U.S. Policy toward Namibia: Spring 1981*, 1981, p.27,28.

192 D'Amato, James V., *Constructive Engagement*, p.270, 271.

In Congress, especially in the House, the debate about constructive engagements already started in 1981. A broader congressional and public debate, however, started only in 1984 when intenser violent unrest broke out in South Africa. The extensive media coverage of these events in the U.S. created a public outcry. The demand for action to be taken against the repressive government in Pretoria grew.¹⁹³ With this background of rising public pressure, Congress passed sanctions against South Africa. The bill was vetoed by the White House whereupon Capitol Hill overrode the veto and passed the bill¹⁹⁴ on October 3, 1986, by a landslide vote. The vote gave a wrong picture of the situation in Congress. There was by no means a consensus on what the U.S. policy should look like toward South Africa. The motives for a large majority of Congressmen and Senators to support the legislation were quite varied.¹⁹⁵ Some Congressmen voted for the act because they wanted to send Pretoria a strong message, others viewed the sanctions as a punishment for the Cape Republic. A third group supported the legislation primarily for domestic reasons. The developments in South Africa and the media coverage of the events triggered strong sentiments in the United States. Therefore, some Congressmen felt they had to take some kind of action in response to their constituents' demands. And finally, a fourth group regarded the sanctions as a chance to damage President Reagan's foreign policy.¹⁹⁶

On the effect and usefulness of the sanctions implemented in 1986, views differ. In Crocker's eyes the sanctions drove South Africa off and made working with the Republic more difficult. Pretoria let the Reagan administration know that they thought the administration did not have its foreign policy under control and therefore was not a credible negotiating partner.¹⁹⁷ The fact that it was Congress

193 D'Amato, James V., *Constructive Engagement*, p.341,342.

194 Appendix J: *The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986*

195 Clough, Michael, *Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.66 No.5 (Summer 1988), p.1068-1072.

196 Baker, Pauline H., *South Africa: Time Running Out. The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years*, *The South Africa UPDATE Series* 1989, p.46.

197 Interview with Chester Crocker, October 9, 1990.

and not the administration who imposed the sanctions made the sanctions less credible as a bargaining chip with South Africa. For only Congress could end the sanctions again.¹⁹⁸

4.2. Namibia: A new Strategy

The policy of constructive engagement was a policy directed toward the whole region and not only toward South Africa. Therefore, Namibia's independence was also included in the strategy of constructive engagement. Namibia's case cannot be studied isolated from the events in the region, and the U.S. efforts in the Namibian negotiations cannot be separated from the U.S. actions toward South Africa and Angola. In spite of Namibia being an element of constructive engagement, the term will not be used in this study of the Reagan administration's efforts for a Namibian settlement. Chester Crocker's policy has been studied, discussed and interpreted in different ways and criticized for numerous reasons. Behind the name "constructive engagement" different individuals see a variety of different issues.¹⁹⁹ The name has too many connotations and it is too heavily burdened in the United States. Here, the main interest lies in the concrete initiatives taken by the Crocker team and in other events that made the Namibian settlement possible.

The Namibian negotiations were stalled when the Reagan administration came into office so that the new administration had to decide what approach they would choose for Namibia. Three options were considered by the new team:

- 1) The "Namibia-only" approach could be chosen continuing the Carter administration's work and accepting the limited hope for success.

198 Interview with Michael Clough, October 17, 1990.

The passing of sanctions in Congress was one of the most important defeats for Reagan's foreign policy. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 did not only include the sanctions. The legislation was designed to give a new framework for the future U.S. policy toward South Africa. The act was supposed to help create a new, non-racial and democratic South Africa. The legislation, however, played a minor role in the U.S. policy because the provisions were contradictory and confusing as to what strategy was to be followed. Baker, Pauline H., *South Africa: Time Running Out*, p.44-47.

199 Some disliked the policy because it criticized South Africa, others felt the U.S. was too soft on South Africa and that the administration was "going to bed with South Africa". A staunch opponent of Crocker's was Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina). He disliked Crocker from the beginning and held up the Assistant Secretary's confirmation in Congress for several months. Bender, Gerald J., *The New York Times*, June 10, 1981, "Secretary of State Helms".

- 2) The Namibia issue and the whole region could be down-graded and the regional dynamics would take care of the development.
- 3) A new approach could be worked out.²⁰⁰

The third option was chosen, which led to the restructuring of the negotiations. The Reagan administration introduced three issues to break the deadlock on the Namibian negotiations which were carrots for South Africa.²⁰¹ It proposed the improvement of U.S.-South African relations, constitutional guarantees, and the concept of linkage.

First, military attachés, defense-usable licenses and material, and nuclear and intelligence cooperation were restored in order to reestablish good relations between Pretoria and the United States. These measures were criticized in the U.S because they made the U.S. look as if they supported the apartheid regime. The Reagan administration always emphasized their abhorrence of the racial system. But they also recognized that there would be no settlement in Namibia without South Africa's cooperation. The working relation between the Carter administration and South Africa had been frigid and unproductive. The new team wanted to change this in order to have more leverage over South Africa and improve the chances of a peaceful transition in Namibia. Secondly, constitutional guarantees were worked out. They were part of Crocker's plan to reassure the whites in Namibia and South Africa that the minorities would be protected in the independent Namibia. Crocker originally wanted the whole constitution written before the elections. This had already been done in Zimbabwe to protect the whites. The African states and the Contact Group, however, opposed this plan and, therefore, nine constitutional principles²⁰² were agreed on in 1982, instead of a whole constitution.²⁰³ The three most important principles demanded that:

- 1) The constitution be adopted by two-thirds of the total membership of the Constituent Assembly.

200 Newsom, David, *The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990*, Boulder 1991, p.12.

201 When it came to the sticks for South Africa, the U.S. had fewer and less convincing means to pressure South Africa into cooperation. Putting sanctions on South Africa was one possible stick, but Crocker had shown little inclination to put sanctions on South Africa, thereby taking this bargaining chip off the table. He did, however, let South Africa and the other parties know that the U.S. would pull out of the negotiations if its efforts were useless. Oberdorfer, Don, *The Washington Post*, May 1, 1981, "Crocker Warning on Namibia Talks".

202 Appendix K: Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an Independent Namibia

203 Zartmann, I. William, "Ripe for Resolution", New York 1985, p.187,188.

- 2) The government be made up of three branches;
 - a) An elected legislature,
 - b) An elected executive responsible to the legislature.
 - c) An independent judiciary.
- 3) A declaration of fundamental rights enforced by the courts.²⁰⁴

Finally, the most controversial measure proposed by Crocker was the concept of linkage which included the Cuban presence in Angola into the negotiations on Namibia. The Cuban presence in Angola had not been dealt with previously by the U.S. in order to avoid accusations of only being interested in the Cuban troop presence and not in the occupation of Namibia. To Crocker this way of thinking of many Western nations can be considered sound diplomatic reasoning, but bad strategy. According to him, Angolan leaders had already made the connection between events in Angola and Namibia before 1981, when in the late 1970s they had announced that Cuban troops would withdraw when Namibia became independent.²⁰⁵ In the following, the Reagan administration's policy toward Namibia, the reason for introducing the linkage, and the concept's domestic and international acceptance will be discussed.

204 Namibia Independence and Cuban Troop Withdrawal, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria 1989, p.7.

Opponents of Crocker's approach criticized the discussion about the Constitutional Principles. They considered this new element, brought in by the U.S., as a means to stall the process. The Center Magazine, Vol.XVI No.2 (March/April 1983), p.53,54.

205 Newsom, David, The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990, p.12.13.

It is hard to keep the Angola and Namibia issues separated because there are several linkages of the conflicts. Already in the early 1970s UNITA and SWAPO started working together. UNITA gave SWAPO safe passage through southern Angola, enabling them to attack Namibia from Angola. SWAPO on the other hand made sure that Chinese weapons arriving in Zambia found their way to UNITA. After the Lisbon coup the collaboration of UNITA and SWAPO intensified. SWAPO moved its bases to southern Angola because South Africa had been raiding Zambia after SWAPO attacks on Namibia. UNITA was under pressure from the MPLA and needed weapon supplies. The situation changed with the spreading of the Angolan civil war. Fighting went on just north of the Namibian border, and Angolan refugees were coming into Namibia. South Africa moved into Angola in July, 1975, attacking SWAPO bases, disarming FNLA and UNITA fighters, and capturing MPLA troops. With this South African move the Namibian and Angolan issue became closely linked. Pretoria started to support UNITA after Savimbi rejected to work together with the MPLA. At the time UNITA was weak and dependent on South African protection. In return, Savimbi gave South Africa intelligence on SWAPO camps and movements. In parallel, the MPLA government found an ally in SWAPO. The Angolan president Neto wanted an ally in the southern part of his country. Therefore, he allowed Nujoma's organization to establish bases inside of Angola. This allowed SWAPO to infiltrate Namibia which resulted in an increase of South African troops in Namibia. Jaster, Robert S., The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of Southwestern Africa, in: Adelphi Papers 253 (Fall 1990), p.9,10.

The Concept of Linkage

By linking the South African withdrawal from Namibia and the Cuban Troop Withdrawal (CTW) from Angola, Crocker hoped to break the stalemate on Namibia. He believed that South Africa considered the Cuban presence north of Namibia as a serious threat. Therefore, Pretoria was reluctant to commit itself to withdraw from the territory which, among other things, had a buffer function. The MPLA government in Luanda, on the other hand, felt threatened by UNITA which was backed by South Africa and by the South African incursions into southern Angola. With Namibia independent, Crocker felt Luanda would be less threatened, thus making the Cuban presence no longer necessary. The CTW also would make a settlement between UNITA and MPLA more likely thereby making a coalition government possible.²⁰⁶

The new U.S. strategy was ambitious and to a certain extent also a gamble. The complex situation in southern Africa needed consideration, making the cooperation of the Front Line States, South Africa, the Contact Group, Cuba as well as UNITA and SWAPO necessary.²⁰⁷ The chances of success in 1981 were not very good, as Crocker admits when writing, "*A skeptic would have to be forgiven for wondering, in 1981, why and how all this would work.*"²⁰⁸ The chances of success for Crocker's policy in 1981 were estimated at about one out of ten.²⁰⁹

206 Crocker's ideas on what the U.S. should do in southern Africa were very clear. Not just any settlement was desired for the region but the settlement suggested by the United States. Newsom, David, *The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990*, p. 13,14.

207 Newsom, David, *The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990*, p.13
Interview with Chester Crocker, October 9, 1990.

208 Newsom, David, *The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990*, p.14.

209 Interview with Chester Crocker, October 9, 1990.

Domestic Situation

During eight years Crocker and his team led the negotiations on Namibia and enjoyed great autonomy because Africa was no priority in U.S. foreign policy.²¹⁰ He had to keep his superiors informed and comfortable with his decision, but there was little interference.²¹¹

The regional conditions were decisive for the policy toward Namibia and the introduction of the linkage concept. But there also were some domestic reasons why linkage made sense. Crocker needed the support of his superiors for his new strategy toward Namibia and the upgrading of southern Africa on the foreign policy agenda. Namibia was not any special concern to Secretary of State Haig, his successor Secretary Shultz or the White House. However, by bringing in the Cuban elements and the possibility to "roll-back"²¹² Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa, Crocker won the interest and support of key administration officials.²¹³ As Crocker saw it, linkage made a logical package in domestic politics: the liberals wanted South Africa to leave Namibia while the conservatives were unhappy about the Cuban presence in southern Africa. Therefore, linkage included the concerns of both ends of the

210 The Pentagon showed very little interest in the Namibian negotiations. There was one Pentagon official on the Crocker team, though. Africa, and especially southern Africa was of little interest to the Department of Defense. Until 1982 Africa was treated together with the Middle East and South Asia. Then a special African region was created within the Bureau of International Security Affairs. Finally, in 1986 the position of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa was established, slightly upgrading the region in the Pentagon. The Navy did not regard the communist threat in southern Africa as very serious. Therefore, the policy of the Pentagon was to support broader national objectives: In Namibia's case, meaning the negotiations of the State Department.
Interview with a Pentagon official, November 5, 1990

211 Interview with Chester Crocker, October 9, 1990.
Lewis, Neil A., The New York Times, June 9, 1987, "Chester Crocker: Inside Making Policy on Africa"

212 The origins of the "roll-back" strategy go back to the early 1950s. Truman already regarded the rolling back of the Kremlin's influence as a long-term objective as is seen in NSC-68, "At any rate, it is clear that a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950, Vol.I, S. 283-284.

John Foster Dulles was a strong proponent of the "roll-back" strategy. He felt that only containing the spread of communism was not enough. He wanted to see Moscow's influence in the world reduced and the people behind the iron curtain freed.

Peter, Thomas, Abschrecken und Ueberleben im Nuklearzeitalter, Grösch 1990, p.48.

213 Kitchen, Helen, Clough, Michael, Realities and Red Herrings, p.4.

political spectrum.²¹⁴ However, not everyone in the U.S. viewed the problem as Crocker did. Many people saw linkage as a hindrance to a Namibian settlement and opposed the new concept.

Foreign Acceptance of Linkage

Outside of the U.S. the linkage issue found few friends as well. Angola rejected the linkage at first, arguing it needed the Cuban presence as protection against the South African-backed UNITA. Among the Contact Group members, linkage was unpopular because it became the main obstacle to a settlement.²¹⁵ They did not believe the Angolans could or should send the Cuban troops home before Namibia's independence was achieved.²¹⁶ The Front Line States opposed the linkage as well because they thought it was very unlikely to be successful. South Africa was apt to have agreed with the Front Line States on the unlikelihood of the linkage proposal's success. This, however, made the U.S. idea attractive to Pretoria. Linkage took pressure off South Africa and the Cuban presence became a hindrance in the implementation of Res 435.²¹⁷

South Africa did not believe the U.S. could get Angola and Cuba to agree to such an agreement. The Reagan administration believed linkage was feasible and a good way to lock South Africa into an agreement on Namibia that Pretoria would be likely to live up to.²¹⁸ The parties involved also found linkage distasteful because it encouraged cooperation with South Africa and bought time for Pretoria. The Crocker team was aware that linkage gave South Africa or, as others would put it, "bought" time for South Africa. Buying time for the Cape Republic was an element the Crocker team consciously chose. For if South Africa was not ready to move out of Namibia nothing would happen anyway.²¹⁹

214 Interview with Chester Crocker, October 9, 1990.

215 Newsweek, November 12, 1982, "The Namibia Conundrum".

216 Bender, Gerald J., The New York Times, January 8, 1982, "Why Optimism About a Namibia Settlement".

217 Interview with Ambassador Donald McHenry, October 30, 1990.

218 Interview with Chester Crocker, October 9, 1990

219 Interview with Chester Crocker, October 9, 1990.

4.3. Steps toward a Settlement: 1981-1988

The strategy for Namibia was clear early on in the Reagan administration. The implementation, however, took a long time. The eight years of work until a settlement was found for Namibia and the CTW will be discussed on the following pages. In David Newsom's book, Chester Crocker divided the eight years he was head of the African Bureau into six phases. The same division of time will be used here to give an overview of the events and the work performed by the Reagan administration.

Phase I (April-October 1981)

In the first phase the new U.S. team held consultations with the Contact Group on the implementation of Res 435. Talks were also held between the Contact Group, the Front Line States, and SWAPO. The Western Five worked out proposals for the new round of negotiations. Internally, however, there was a debate about the CTW link. France, West Germany, Canada, and Britain were skeptical about including the Cuban problem and left it up to Washington to work on the issue, not wanting to be associated with this new element.²²⁰

Phase II (November 1981-September 1982)

Intense diplomacy in this phase resulted in the formulation of the nine constitutional principles mentioned earlier.²²¹ The Front Line States, SWAPO and South Africa accepted these principles. In addition, the parties agreed on UNTAG monitoring

220 Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, "Peace-Making in Southern Africa: The Namibia-Angola settlement of 1988", p.11.

According to Ambassador McHenry, France, West Germany and Canada repudiated linkage and even Britain did so privately.
Interview with Ambassador Donald McHenry, October 30, 1990.

221 Appendix K: Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an Independent Namibia

SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia as well as the South African forces in Namibia.²²² Another important problem was solved in this second phase which made the implementation of Res 435 acceptable to Pretoria. The financial aid and other support to SWAPO from the U.N. was suspended and the U.N.'s official position that SWAPO was the only authentic representative of the territory relinquished. These steps encouraged South Africa to allow UNTAG to help decolonize Namibia.²²³ By September 1982 all details were in place for a Namibian settlement.²²⁴ Only the CTW was still unresolved.²²⁵

Phase III (January 1982-March 1985)

Already during phase II bilateral talks between Washington and Luanda took place. The U.S. was trying to establish itself as credible mediator between Pretoria and Luanda. The linkage concept was introduced to Angola as a package in the interest of all parties and as the only alternative to prevent an escalating conflict in the region. In 1983 Angola started to signal its acceptance of the concept.²²⁶ Therefore, the U.S. engaged in intensive diplomacy from December, 1983, to January 1984.

222 This agreement made the DMZ unnecessary, which had been worked out during the Carter administration.

223 Jaster, Robert S., *The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future Southwestern Africa*, p.33,34.

224 There were two more issues that had not been settled but were no major problems and, therefore, did not hinder the process of further negotiations. The status-of-force of the UNTAG still had to be agreed on and South Africa had to decide on a electoral system for the Namibia election of a Constituent Assembly. The former was decided on in 1985 and the latter in 1988. Crocker, Chester, *Advanced Draft*, p.11,12.

225 Zartmann, I. William, *Ripe for Resolution*, p.191.

226 Luanda and Pretoria led bilateral talks without a mediator from late 1982 until early 1984 to see if a deal could be made without Res 435. These talks, however, led to no results. Crocker, Chester, *Advanced Draft*, p.12.

The effort resulted in the Lusaka agreement and the Nkomati accord.²²⁷ The U.S. efforts toward disengagement were aimed at creating an atmosphere of confidence and security for the future negotiations. In this phase Angola accepted linkage officially for the first time by making a proposal for the CTW. Parallel to the diplomatic efforts the military conflict, however, continued. Several SWAPO incursions were stopped by South Africa and Pretoria made pre-emptive strikes into Angola triggering reactions of the Cubans and Angolans. These activities ended in a costly stalemate in 1984. In addition, UNITA was intensifying its pressure on the MPLA government. Because of the mounting pressure on Luanda, Havana sent another 10,000 Cuban troops into Angola, raising the number of Cuban forces to 35,000. In spite of these negative developments the third phase ended with Washington presenting the first negotiating document, suggesting the CTW to start at the same time as the implementation of Res 435.²²⁸

Phase IV (April 1985-April 1987)

The fourth phase lasting two years was a difficult period. Many earlier achievements were destroyed. The Lusaka agreement broke up because both parties did not fulfil their commitments. The South African withdrawal from southern Angola fell behind schedule and was completed a year late. The accord did not hold, however. South Africa re-entered Angola making pre-emptive strikes against SWAPO. In September the MPLA launched an offensive against UNITA which again brought in South African forces to reenforce the guerilla group.²²⁹ The escalating internal

227 In 1984 the Nkomati accord and the Lusaka agreement were signed.

Lusaka Agreement: This agreement between Angola and South Africa was aimed at the conflict between SWAPO and South Africa in Namibia. South Africa and Angola agreed that Luanda would not let SWAPO use Angolan territory as a base to attack Namibia. In return South Africa would withdraw its troops from southern Angola. It did not, however, limit or prohibit the signing parties from supporting domestic opposition groups, meaning Angola's support for the ANC and South Africa's aid to UNITA.

Nkomati Accord: This accord was made between Mozambique and South Africa. Maputo agreed to expel the ANC from its territory and in return Pretoria promised to stop supporting the Mozambique National Resistance which was fighting the Mozambique government. The Nkomati accord was farther reaching than the Lusaka agreement for it actually called itself "agreement of non-aggression and good neighborliness".

Price, Robert M., Southern Africa Regional Security: Pax or Pox Pretoria?, in: World Policy Journal (Summer 1985), p.534.

228 Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.13.

229 Strategic Survey, 1985-1986, p.188,189.

unrest in South Africa and the government's repression brought the world's criticism on the Republic. As a result, Pretoria increased its military strikes against neighbors accused of tolerating ANC bases on their territory. These South African actions were regarded as acts of regional destabilization and condemned by the international community.²³⁰ On the other hand Angola started a Soviet-backed offensive against UNITA, that was successfully countered by South Africa and UNITA. The South Africans, as well as the Angolans seemed to have decided to try to find a solution by military means.²³¹

With these events in southern Africa, the Clark Amendment of 1976 was repealed and in early 1986 the Reagan administration decided to give aid to UNITA.²³² This decision was heatedly debated in Washington. Savimbi, UNITA's leader, was regarded by the liberals as "South Africa's stooge" and the conservative Republicans believed he was "Angola's liberator". Chester Crocker and some of his advisers regarded aid to UNITA as one of their bargaining chips to pressure the MPLA into negotiations. The decision to give UNITA aid was not meant as a declaration of war against Luanda.²³³ The Crocker team never believed the U.S. aid could turn the course of the war or enable UNITA to win. Angola was being supported with US\$ 1 billion by the Soviet Union. Therefore, giving aid to UNITA was meant to be a psychological card to pressure Luanda.

The fear of causing an escalation of the civil war in Angola was negated by the Crocker team. According to a State Department official, the war had been heating up already before the decision to give aid to UNITA was taken. The massive Soviet

230 South Africa did not accept the term "destabilization". It regarded these strikes as a necessity for self-protection and not as action directed against the host country of SWAPO. According to a South African diplomat, Pretoria used diplomatic channels to communicate that it could not accept ANC camps in these countries that were used as spring boards to attack South Africa. Pretoria asked these countries to take action and eject the ANC cells. If there were no reactions to the diplomatic efforts and the guerilla activity continued, then South Africa struck at the bases. Pretoria maintains that the attacks were very well targeted and not directed at the general public.

Interview with a South African diplomat, October 16, 1990.

231 Jaster, Robert S., *The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of Southwestern Africa*, p.15.

232 In 1981 the Reagan administration had decided to recommend the repeal of several legislative provisions that limited the President's flexibility in conducting foreign policy. Among the provisions was also the Clark Amendment. In a cable Secretary of State Haig declared that the repeal of the Clark Amendment did not mean any actions would be taken and aid given to any party in Angola. According to Haig the U.S. policy was still under review at the given time. He emphasized that the aim of the administration was to find diplomatic solutions for the region.

Cable, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Subject: Angola Repeal of the Clark Amendment, March 19, 1981, p.3, National Security Archives, Washington D.C., USA, (NSA).

233 McFaul, Michael, *Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine in Angola*, p.108,109.

aid to Angola suggested that Moscow was pushing a military solution. The negative effect of the aid to UNITA was, that Angola cut communication with the U.S. which in turn caused the negotiations on Namibia and the CTW to come to a standstill. Because of this, fourteen months were wasted and the Namibian independence was drawn out. The only contact during this time between Washington and Luanda was over African, European and U.N. intermediaries. This move of Luanda's was considered short-sighted because it did not improve Angola's later position in the negotiation, but stalled the efforts.²³⁴

Shortly after the aid to UNITA was approved, Congress passed sanctions on South Africa because of Pretoria's internal politics. Sanctions were also put on Front Line States²³⁵ and Namibia. As Crocker put it, the situation was gloomy and it seemed like "*constructive problem solving would be replaced by a left-wing-right-wing alliance favouring destructive disengagement.*" Despite these disheartening events the administration decided to stick to the basic concept for Namibia, even though, many observers said, with the passing of the sanctions, the administration's efforts were ended. While the conflict in the region was escalating, different parties beside the U.S. continued to call for a negotiated settlement.²³⁶ The one positive event in this phase was South Africa's carefully conditioned acceptance in the fall of 1985 of the U.S. proposal on the CTW. This did not help much at the time because the parties were trying out military solutions. But it gave Washington leverage over Luanda in the future.

Phase V (April 1987-April 1988)

In spring 1987, Angola showed willingness to resume talks with the U.S. after more than a year. The first meeting of a U.S. and Angolan delegation took place in Brazzaville, Congo, in April 1987. At the meeting the U.S. pressed Luanda to partially accept the U.S. proposal of March 1985 as South Africa had done in fall 1985. The Angolans on the other hand demanded carrots from the U.S. for a new

234 Interviews with a State Department Official, October 2, December 7, 1990.

235 Sanctions were put on these states because they supported the ANC and the practice of "necklacing".
Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.14.

236 Crocker, Chester, Advance Draft, p.13-15.

Angolan proposal. By carrots they mainly meant stopping the aid to UNITA. The discussions during the summer of 1987 were called "*a waste of time*" by Chester Crocker.²³⁷

In July, 1987, things started to move on the Cuban-Angolan front. Castro let Washington know indirectly that he wanted to participate in the negotiations as co-member of Angola. In September the terms of Cuba's participation in the negotiations were worked out. As a result of the talks going on between the U.S. and Angola, South Africa again started to show interest in negotiations. Still during the summer Luanda and Havana made a new proposal for the CTW, shortening the withdrawal time period of the Cuban troops in the southern part of Angola from three to two years. The troops in the northern region, however, were to stay indefinitely.

In spite of the diplomatic efforts, military plans were being made. The Soviets and the MPLA started an offensive against UNITA which ended in a disaster for the two initiators.²³⁸ Toward the end of the offensive in November, 1987, Castro decided his troops who had kept out of the offensive would take part in the dispute but on his own terms.²³⁹ He, therefore, brought in 15,000 additional troops (raising the number of Cuban troops in Angola to 50'000) for a flanking maneuver and then headed toward the Namibian border. The Cuban plan clearly had the long term objective of achieving an honourable exit for Cuban troops out of Angola. The Cuban maneuver was aimed at bringing Havana into a strong military position that would let it cut a profitable political deal.²⁴⁰

On the diplomatic scene the first negotiations took place in January, 1988, between Cuba, Angola, and the United States. The big step forward made in this meeting was that Havana and Luanda both accepted the principle of Total Cuban Troop

237 Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.16.

According to a State Department official it bothered the MPLA government that the U.S. regarded the talks as a waste of time. U.S. officials involved in the negotiations felt that this publicly stated displeasure of the U.S. mediator had an effect on Luanda to change its course. Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

238 Cuba kept out of this offensive, it had advised against the Soviet-Angolan plans which resulted in a military debacle. By November the offensive was defeated by UNITA and South African troops.

Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.15,16.

239 Jaster, Robert S., The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future Southwestern Africa, p.21,22.

240 Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.16.

For a more detailed description of the Angolan-Soviet offensive in 1987 and the battle around Cuito Guanavale, read Jaster, Robert S., The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of Southwestern Africa, p.17-23.

withdrawal (TCTW)²⁴¹. By March, 1988, South Africa was also back on the diplomatic track. In April, 1988, Washington decided that direct face-to-face talks between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa could be initiated. The indirect method with the U.S. being a mediator and communicator was very time-consuming and prone to cause misunderstandings. It was time that the parties faced each other and reality.²⁴² According to a member of the Crocker team the parties often lived in a dream world and had a very unrealistic picture of their own potential and that of their adversaries. These wrong perceptions led them to draw erroneous conclusions. For example the U.S. realized early on that no party could force a military decision. South Africa and UNITA did not have the means to push out the Cubans or to overthrow the MPLA government. And SWAPO could not win against the South African forces.²⁴³

During this fifth phase important changes occurred in the Soviet Union. Since 1986 Moscow was trying to pull out of financially burdensome commitments abroad. The Kremlin intimated its willingness to cooperate with the West and try to find peaceful solutions for conflicts in the Middle East, Central America, and southern Africa. In southern Africa, and in particular Angola's case, the Soviet Union believed that there was no military solution for the region. The need for a political settlement was emphasized after the disastrous offensive in 1987, which had been directed by the Soviet Union. Moscow did not want to abandon Angola at once, and it kept pouring arms into Angola. On the diplomatic front, however, the Kremlin was looking for a settlement to pull out of the region. In 1987, the Soviets were sceptical of Crocker's linkage plan. By spring 1988, however, Moscow recognized that linkage might work after all. During the 1988 peace talks the Soviet Union was not an active party in the negotiations. But it was present at most of the meetings and helpful in explaining to the Cubans and Angolans why certain agreements made sense and encouraged the parties to make concessions. The Soviet Union kept a low profile during all of the talks while playing a constructive role. It supported the U.S. efforts and convincingly showed its interests in a peaceful settlement for the region.²⁴⁴

241 Until January 1988, Angola and Cuba had insisted on keeping troops stationed in northern Angola.

242 Crocker, Chester, *Advanced Draft*, p.16,17.

243 Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

244 Jaster, Robert S., *The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future Southwestern Africa*, p.28, 29.

Phase VI (May 1988-December 1988)

The last phase started with the first face-to-face talks between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the U.S. mediator. There were twelve such meetings, taking the negotiating parties five times to Brazzaville, twice to New York and Geneva, and once to Luanda, Cape Verde and Cairo.

Despite the diplomatic efforts, the military actions had not ceased. Around Cuito Cuanavale skirmishes continued from December, 1987, through March, 1988. By March the front was stabilized through the additional Cuban troops sent in to help the heavily weakened MPLA. South Africa decided it would withdraw as announced earlier, instead of suffering more casualties. Therefore, only about 1,500 men were left of the South African forces in Angola while Castro's troops pushed further south toward Namibia. Havana declared that South Africa had suffered heavy casualties in the three months of fighting at Cuito Cuanavale. It also announced that Pretoria was now willing to negotiate because of the new Cuban position of strength in Angola. The rhetoric used by Castro was part of the scheme to have a good bargaining position, allowing for a negotiated exit out of Angola.²⁴⁵ The statement that South Africa had suffered heavy losses was not quite true. It was the MPLA and UNITA who had suffered the most in the military actions in late 1987 and early 1988. Cuba and South Africa had few losses to deplore. There was one serious clash between South African and Cuban troops on June 27, 1988, near the Calueque Dam. It was the first and last encounter of the two armies since 1975. A South African unit seemingly surprised Cuban troops north of the Calueque Dam and attacked them, killing some Cuban soldiers.²⁴⁶ The same day the Cubans retaliated with an air strike against the dam killing twelve South Africans.²⁴⁷ The numbers given for suffered casualties vary: officially twelve South Africans and ten Cubans died.²⁴⁸

245 After Castro's speech South Africa feared the worst and called up reservists. The additional troops were not needed because Havana had no intention of invading Namibia. Havana's military action and rhetoric were the last move before the final withdrawal. Invading Namibia would have been very foolish: Crocker wrote, "...it would have been lunacy for the Cubans to cross the Namibia border, especially if their objective was a graceful exit." Crocker, Chester Advanced Draft, p.17,18.

246 The South Africans talked about hundred-fifty Cubans killed, the Cubans gave the number of ten.

247 Jaster, Robert S., The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of Southwestern Africa, p.22.

248 Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.17,18.

After the fighting in June, serious diplomatic efforts were made by all three parties. The first document containing the basic deal of TCTW and the implementation of Res 435 was agreed on in New York. In July military commanders of the three parties met in New York and Cape Verde with the difficult objective of finding a way to disentangle the armed forces. Decisive progress was made in early August in Geneva.²⁴⁹ Here the details of the tripartite agreement were worked out. It also was agreed to create a bilateral Angolan-Cuban agreement containing specifics of the TCTW and its linkage to the Namibian independence process. The parties agreed to the bilateral agreement on the same day as the tripartite one. In Geneva a document was drafted and named "Geneva Protocol".²⁵⁰ It described the South African withdrawal and committed Cuban forces not to attack UNITA forces anymore and determined SWAPO's deployment.

The South African withdrawal was scheduled for September 1, and on November 1, Res 435 was to be implemented. The outstanding issue was the timetable for the TCTW. On this issue the gap between the proposals was very large.²⁵¹ Another three months with five more negotiation rounds were needed to find an agreement on the TCTW, even though, the implementation date of Res 435 had easily been found and set for November 1, 1988. This deadline, however, lapsed because no decision could be taken on the Cuban issue.²⁵² Finally, in November 1988 a twenty-seven months

249 The Soviets sent a senior observer to Geneva after having missed the meetings at New York and Cape Verde.
Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.19.

At these meetings the South African General Geldenhuys and his Cuban counterpart, General Rosales worked together well and were optimistic about finding a settlement for the military problems. According to Jaster, at the meeting in Cape Verde General Geldenhuys warned the Cubans not to boast publicly about the South African withdrawal because that could cause domestic difficulties in South Africa. There were conservative forces in the Cape Republic that were not in favor of the negotiations. And it was likely that they would demand the end of the negotiations if South Africa was humiliated publicly.
Jaster, Robert S., The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of Southwestern Africa, p.24,57.

250 Appendix L: Protocol of Geneva

251 Cuba and Angola suggested a four-year time period for the TCTW while Pretoria wanted the Cuban forces sent back home within seven months. This time period was equivalent to the transition period from implementation of Res 435 to the Namibian elections. Within this seven months timeframe all South African troops had to be withdrawn from the territory as well.
Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.19,20.

252 In the weeks around the U.S. presidential elections no decisions were made. The parties seemed to want to wait and see what was to be expected from the future U.S. policy. When George Bush was elected, it was clear that no major policy changes would occur. This persuaded Angola and Cuba to cut a deal since no better one was to be expected from the next administration.
Wren, Christopher S., The New York Times, December 18, 1988, "The Crocker Formula for African Diplomacy".

timetable was decided on in Geneva.²⁵³ In the following five weeks the penultimate Brazzaville Protocol was outlined, the U.N. verification plan negotiated, the U.S. proposal to establish a joint commission²⁵⁴ was agreed on, and consultation with the U.N. Secretary-General took place to set a new date for the implementation of Res 435. The date was set for April 1, 1989. Two more sets of meetings in the Congo brought the process to a close, producing the "Brazzaville Protocol" of December 13.²⁵⁵ Finally, on December 22, 1988, the parties signed the tripartite agreement in New York.²⁵⁶

4.4. Namibia's Independence and Tripartite Agreement

Why were the negotiations for Namibia's independence successful in 1988? Did South Africa decide Namibia was an unprofitable territory to have? Did the sanctions weaken South Africa and force the Cape Republic to cooperate? Were the changes in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and the new Soviet approach to southern Africa the reasons? Did Crocker's effort of almost eight years pay off, was his policy toward the region successful after all?

In articles and in the conducted interviews many reasons were given why a solution was found for Namibia in 1988. The views can be roughly put into two groups: Liberal groups and supporters of sanctions who had opposed constructive engagement and the concept of linkage all along, believed that a settlement was found because South Africa was under pressure from the sanctions and because of its domestic opposition to the war in Namibia. According to this group the changes

253 Appendix M: Schedule of the Peace Process

254 The U.S. and the Soviet Union acted as observers on the commission.

255 Appendix N: Protocol of Brazzaville

256 Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.19-21.

At the same time as the tripartite agreement was signed, Cuba and Angola also signed a bilateral agreement, providing the timetable for the TCTW over twenty-seven months. On December 20, 1988, the Security Council passed Res 626 thereby establishing the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). Already on January 3, 1989, the first UNAVEM members arrived in Angola to monitor the withdrawal of the first 3,000 Cuban troops. At full strength UNAVEM was to consist of twenty civilian support personnel and seventy military observers. The observers will stay in Angola until July 1991, when the TCTW will have been completed. U.N. Chronicle, March 1989, p.36,37.

Appendix O: Tripartite Agreement signed by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa

Appendix P: Bilateral Agreement signed by Angola and Cuba

in the Soviet foreign policy since Mikhail Gorbachev took over in the Kremlin were an important reason as well. At any rate the work of the Reagan administration in Namibia was not estimated as an important factor. They believed the policy of linkage delayed the settlement and that Crocker's plan for Namibia worked only because the circumstances were right and no other proposal was on the table.²⁵⁷ In opposition to the opinion above, some give Crocker's work a great deal of credit for bringing about the implementation of Res 435 after ten years. They agree that the circumstances were right and that Crocker's plan made the best of the situation. But they acknowledge Crocker's persistence and strong commitment to finding a solution.

To understand how the settlement finally came about, a look should be taken at the elements that had the greatest influence on the decision making process of the involved governments in the 1980s. On the following pages, the interests in seeing a Namibian settlement and the CTW happen in 1988 will be studied.

The United States of America

As Assistant Secretary, Crocker came into office with a well thought through concept for the region. He used these ideas for the development of the strategy that determined the U.S. policy toward southern Africa for eight years. A leading element in Crocker's policy toward southern Africa was "self-interest". Governments usually do not adjust their policy just because other people, groups or governments consider such actions as being nice or preferable to them. Crocker made clear that the engagement of the U.S. in the region was motivated by self-interest. U.S. interest in the region was clear, they wanted the region to be economically prosperous, friendly to the U.S., and politically stable in the long-run. To create such a situation in the 1980s three problems needed to be solved:

- 1) Apartheid had to be dismantled in South Africa.
- 2) Namibia needed to become independent.
- 3) Angola had to send the Cubans home and achieve national reconciliation.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Pauline H. Baker, October 18, 1990.

The historical development of these problem spots were diverse but the issues and their resolutions were closely related in the 1980s. Crocker argued that also all other parties involved in the region only would agree to a settlement if their interest were respected.²⁵⁸

The U.S. suggested a parallel withdrawal of Cuban troops out of Angola and South African forces out of Namibia.²⁵⁹ With the Cubans gone there would be no reason for South Africa to feel threatened by communism any longer. And the MPLA would feel safe with South Africa out of southern Angola and out of Namibia. The so-called Marxist governments in the region posed no serious threat to South Africa's sophisticated army. The South Africans grabbed up the proposal according to Crocker. The State Department team suspected that Pretoria accepted linkage thinking the U.S. could never deliver the Cuban side. The South Africans were hoping that linkage would take pressure off of them and make the negotiations more complex. At the time South Africa had not made the decision to give up Namibia. The linkage proposal was criticized by many out of fear that the Cuban presence would become a hindrance to the implementation of Res 435. It was believed that the Angolans and Cubans would not accept the conditions of linkage.²⁶⁰

The Crocker team was accused of buying time for South Africa and dragging out Namibia's independence. Whether or not Namibia could have become independent faster, will always remain speculation. No other plan was on the table that might have sped up the process. When judging the effectiveness of the linkage concept, two important factors need to be kept in mind:

- 1) Before linkage was suggested no progress was being made. South Africa saw no incentive to approve the implementation of Res 435. It believed a better deal could be found, through an internal settlement or new developments coming from the new governments in Europe and North America. In the early 1980s Pretoria did not seem to see any substantial gains in letting Namibia go. At the time Namibia was not yet the financial burden it was to become in the late 1980s.

258 Zartmann, I. William, *Ripe for Resolution*, p.237.

259 There is a debate on the origin of the linkage idea. Some say it was originally a South African idea, others say it was Crocker's or maybe National Security adviser Clark's idea.

260 Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

- 2) Not only South Africa had to be "caught", it also was a U.S. domestic problem. Crocker's superiors had hardly any interest in Namibia or even the region. Had it not been for Crocker's personal interest in the region, a low-profile policy would most likely have been chosen, thereby, keeping the regional problems a low-key issue. With the Cuban link, however, Crocker won the support of conservatives and his superiors who regarded the area almost exclusively in East-West terms.

The opposition to Crocker's policy in the U.S. demanded pressure to be put on South Africa to force its compliance with Res 435. They called for the dropping of the linkage concept and sanctions on South Africa. The decision whether to put on sanctions or not was heatedly debated. The argumentation that Namibia would have been independent earlier, had sanctions been imposed, cannot be proven. In the early 1980s there is, however, reason to doubt the effectiveness of sanctions. The world had talked about sanctions for many years and South Africa had enough time to develop a largely self-sustaining economy. The sanctions called for would have been directed at the apartheid system and not only at the occupation of Namibia.²⁶¹ On the domestic question South Africa felt strongly that internal affairs were none of the world's business. In 1986 as Congress finally passed sanctions their effect was limited and can hardly be called the decisive factor in the final settlement of Namibia or the internal changes occurring in South Africa.

South Africa

At the end of the Carter administration many involved U.S. officials concluded that South Africa had not taken the basic decision to give Namibia independence. At the time Res 435 was not interesting enough for South Africa to compensate for its economic interest in Namibia and for the loss of the buffer to Angola. By 1988 the situation was quite different. Namibia had become a financial burden for South Africa. Internationally, South Africa was isolated because of its apartheid policy and its intransigent position on Namibia's independence. Internally, it became increasingly difficult for Pretoria to justify the war in Namibia and Southern Angola

²⁶¹ The opponents of Crocker's policy never offered a better alternative strategy. They criticized the administration's policy and proposed to "drop linkage" and "impose sanctions". These suggestions can be discussed as possible tactics, but not as an overall strategy.

which was claiming South African lives and consumed huge amounts of money. Especially as the loss of lives among white conscripts increased, Pretoria's policy was criticized strongly in the Cape Republic. The white South Africans saw little sense in watching their sons die fighting in Angola for UNITA.²⁶²

By the mid 1980s Pretoria had recognized that its effort to find an internal solution in Namibia had failed. For many years South Africa did not want free and fair elections because SWAPO was bound to be victorious. In the meantime Pretoria recognized that it could live with a SWAPO government, because any government in Windhoek would have to cooperate to a certain extent with South Africa in order to avoid an economic disaster. Namibia, like the other countries in the region, depends economically on the Cape Republic. Therefore, SWAPO would have to mellow, if it got into power, and would not be a threat to South Africa.

Another factor often mentioned is the weakened South African economy. In the U.S. the sanctions imposed in 1986 by Congress are cited often as one reason for South Africa's economic troubles.²⁶³ The opinions differ greatly on this issue. Other people feel that the sanctions hardly had any effect. And if at all, the sanctions had a psychological or political but not an economic effect because the measures emphasized the South African position as an outcast of the international community.²⁶⁴ A number of people felt the sanctions only drove Pretoria off and made negotiations harder, especially because Congress controlled the implementation, not the administration.²⁶⁵

A number of people attribute a greater effect on the South African economic situation to the action of foreign banks rather than to sanctions. The refusal of the Chase Manhattan Bank on July 31, 1985, to roll over loans and the decision of other foreign banks on September 4, 1985,²⁶⁶ not to extend credit, had a far greater impact on the South African economy than the U.S. sanctions. Chase Manhattan took the unexpected step because it had grown tired of the difficult working conditions in the

262 Wren, Christopher S., *The New York Times*, December 18, 1988, "What South Africa Gets for the Continent's Last Colony".

263 Interview with a staff member of the U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Africa, November 27, 1990.
Interview with Ambassador McHenry, October 30, 1990.

264 Interview with a Pentagon official, November 15, 1990.

265 Interview with a State Department official, December 7, 1990.

266 Baker, Pauline H., *The U.S. and South Africa*, p.94.

Cape Republic.²⁶⁷ All these internal and external pressures on South Africa added up and persuaded South Africa that giving Namibia independence and pulling out of southern Angola was in their own interest. Therefore, in 1988 Pretoria finally made up its mind to leave Namibia. This basic decision was crucial for the implementation of Res 435 because it had been missing in all previous negotiations.

Finally, the relationship between the U.S. and South Africa needs to be examined. The Reagan administration was accused of tilting toward South Africa and of not being tough enough on the apartheid regime. According to the Crocker team which led all the negotiations with South Africa, the relationship with Pretoria was never good and at times it was bad.²⁶⁸ Prime Minister Botha already expressed reservations toward Chester Crocker in 1981. He did not like Crocker's refusal to brand SWAPO a surrogate of the Soviet Union. For most South Africans, SWAPO was a communist controlled organization. Crocker was not willing to categorize SWAPO so easily. The Assistant Secretary of State did not believe SWAPO's future action could be deduced from its present communist backing. Prime Minister Botha said that the climate between the two states would not improve as long as the outspoken U.S. criticism of apartheid lasted. He regarded the condemnation of the South African political system as interference in the domestic affairs of the Cape Republic.²⁶⁹

Angola

As seen earlier, Angola played a constructive role in the Carter administration. It pressured SWAPO into cooperating with the Contact Group on implementation of Res 435. Luanda also made proposals to bridge the stalled talks on Res 435. During the Reagan administration, Angola's position was different. Because of the concept of linkage it became one of the three parties in the negotiations instead of just being one of the Front Line States. Only in October 1984, Angola officially accepted linkage, when it made a proposal for CTW parallel to South African withdrawal

267 Interview with a State Department official, December 7, 1990.

268 Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

269 Cable, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassies, Africa Region, Subject: Crocker Mission: U.S. Media Reaction, April 17, 1981, p.10,11, NSA.

from southern Angola and Namibia.²⁷⁰ There were several reasons for Luanda's decision to agree to the Cuban troop withdrawal which made Crocker's linkage concept workable. For a long time Luanda wanted the Cubans to stay because they feared renewed South African invasions in support of UNITA and continuing Western aid to Savimbi's guerilla group.²⁷¹ However, already during the Carter administration Luanda hinted that they would be willing to send the Cuban troops home if the external threat and foreign aid to UNITA would cease.²⁷² The Angolans recognized that having Cubans in their country and having to fight a civil war was a financial burden. Luanda had to pay for the Cuban soldiers and the Soviet arms in hard currencies which added to the desperate economic situation.²⁷³ The MPLA government realized that its Soviet and Cuban allies were not capable of helping to develop a strong economy in the long run. All they could give were troops, arms, and military know-how. Economically Angola depended on trade, and only the West could provide the necessary market. The Soviet Union hardly bought any African products and therefore, did not help the Angolan economy. Luanda was aware that improved relations with the West were necessary in order to ameliorate its economic situation.²⁷⁴ By agreeing to a negotiated settlement Luanda hoped to end the South African incursions and foreign aid to UNITA as well as assuring U.S. support.

In the U.S.-Angolan relation there is a certain irony. Since the MPLA came to power with Cuban help, Angola was a sensitive spot for Washington. Up to the present day Angola has not been recognized diplomatically by the United States. In spite of these facts the U.S. is Angola's main trade partner. Because Luanda has a very liberal investor regulation, big U.S. companies are in Angola and actually have been protected by Cuban troops.²⁷⁵ All along there were discussions about including an internal Angolan settlement into the linkage package because all involved parties wanted a settlement between MPLA and UNITA that would end the civil war.

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- 270 van Slambrouk, Paul, *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 27, 1984, "Angola makes move in Namibia talks".
- 271 U.S. Congress, Senate, *U.S. Interest in Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa*, October 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 29, November 13, 14, 1979, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p.37.
- 272 Rotberg, Robert I., *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 9, 1982, "Namibia and the Cuban connection".
- 273 Lewis, Anthony, *The New York Times*, November 19, 1984, "Fragile Truce over Namibia could Grow to Wider Peace".
- 274 U.S. Congress, House, *U.S. Interest in Africa*, 1979, p.49,50.
- 275 Interview with Helen Kitchen, October 12, 1990.

Whether to include the Angolan conciliation or not was also debated within the Crocker team. There were officials who wanted it included.²⁷⁶ Crocker, however, felt the negotiations would not work with this additional difficult linkage.²⁷⁷

Cubans

For the last three decades Cuba has been a touchy subject in the United States. Accordingly, the Cuban presence in Angola was a delicate point for Washington. In spite of this, the U.S. cooperation with Cuban delegations of the TCTW was reasonably good. In the final year the Cubans played an important role in the negotiations for the tripartite agreement. Havana wanted a deal in 1988 which would allow the Cuban troops to return home. The Cubans were anxious to pull out of Angola. Since 1979 the maintaining of the troops in Angola had been a burden for Cuba's economy which depended heavily on Soviet subsidies. Therefore, the Cubans persuaded the Angolans to accept a timetable for the withdrawal which was very similar to the U.S. proposal of March, 1985.²⁷⁸ Their presence in southern Africa since 1975 had developed into an expensive excursion. With the changes in the Soviet policy under Gorbachev, it became even bigger. Moscow stopped financing foreign adventures abroad and also cut aid to Cuba and other countries. The reduction of aid let Havana feel the financial burden of Angola even stronger.²⁷⁹ In 1987 Castro brought in more troops to help Luanda after the disastrous joint offensive of the Soviet Union and the MPLA. One U.S. official felt that Castro made this move with the objective in mind to leave Angola. He brought in troops to change the military situation in southern Angola which put him into a strong military position from which he could negotiate and arrange an honourable Cuban exit out

276 Interview with a Pentagon official, November 15, 1990.

277 Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.24.

278 Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.35.

279 Wren, Christopher S., The New York Times, December 18, 1988, "The Crocker formula for African Diplomacy".

of Angola.²⁸⁰ In addition, Cuba and Angola could not hope for a better deal in the next years. With George Bush's victory in the presidential election, a similar U.S. policy was to be expected.²⁸¹

Soviet Union

Up to 1986 the Soviets tended to impede the Western efforts in southern Africa. In this point the Carter and the Reagan administration made the same experiences. Moscow had opposed Res 435 until 1982. Then it started to support the resolution but opposed any changes and criticized the U.S. suggestion of linkage.²⁸² The change came with Gorbachev. He called for political instead of military solutions for regional conflicts. He decided to reduce the aid to Angola because of the strained Soviet budget. This move was part of the new Soviet leader's strategy to give up financially draining commitments abroad and use the means for domestic reforms instead.²⁸³ Moscow played an important role in 1988 in keeping the negotiations on track. As Chester Crocker put it in a speech given on December 13, 1988 in Brazzaville:

*"As mediator, we have developed a pattern of close, practical and effective cooperation with our Soviet counterparts. Despite some differences in perspective and different roles in the negotiating process, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have been able to work cooperatively to move the process forward. It has been a case study of superpower effort to support the resolution of regional conflicts. So, I would like to salute the hard work and professional dedication of the Soviet officials who have been involved in this intensive effort over the past months."*²⁸⁴

280 Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

281 Wren, Christopher S., The New York Times, December 18, 1988, "The Crocker Formula for African Diplomacy".
The Bush administration stayed strongly involved in the southern African region. With Portugal and the Soviet Union, the U.S. helped mediate a ceasefire and a peace treaty in 1991, between UNITA and the MPLA government.
dpa, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), June 1, 2, 1991, "Unterzeichnung des Angola-Friedensabkommens".

282 Crocker, Chester, Advanced Draft, p.31.

283 McFaul, Michael, Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola, p.116-118.

284 Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Crocker, Brazzaville, December 13, 1988, in American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988, p.640.

Already before the changes occurred in the Soviet Union, U.S. officials had discussed the problems of southern Africa with their Soviet counterparts. In a meeting between President Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, southern Africa in general was discussed. According to Secretary Vance, he tried to urge the Soviet Union to cooperate with the U.S. in finding peaceful solutions for the region. Washington believed that it was in the Soviet, African and U.S. interest not to let the conflicts in southern Africa escalate and turn into a Cold War battleground.²⁸⁵ Cyrus Vance's successor in the Reagan administration, George Shultz, also met with Andrei Gromyko in 1982 at the U.N. where they determined two issues they would jointly work on. One was nuclear non-proliferation and the other one was to be southern Africa, in particular Namibia. On the first issue good progress was made, on the second one not much happened for a long time. It was not until 1985 that the discussion on the region gained a little momentum. Secretary Shultz described the series of talks as being in an *"arms-length, suspicious fashion"* which then developed from a *"damage control effect to firm exchanges of factual material and to a stage where there was some collaboration"*. There were U.S.-Soviet exchanges on the issue between Reagan and Gorbachev and between Shevardnaze and Shultz. The importance of the southern Africa issue is also demonstrated by the fact that Chester Crocker was the only assistant secretary to take part in the Moscow summit. According to Shultz, objectives for the region were set in the bilateral talks. These were not reached in terms of time but the exchange pushed the whole process ahead.²⁸⁶

It is generally accepted that the changes in the Kremlin under Gorbachev resulted in better U.S.-Soviet relations which had a positive effect on the Namibia negotiations. However, according to Ambassador McHenry the Soviet influence on the course of the negotiations is overrated. The improved relations helped but were by

285 Interview with Cyrus Vance, December 3, 1990.

286 An interview by Amy Biehl with George Shultz, March 14, 1989, in: Stanford University, Honors Thesis for the Program of International Relations, May 1989, Biehl, Amy, Chester Crocker and the Negotiations for Namibian Independence: The Role of the Individual in Recent American Foreign Policy, p.123.

no means decisive.²⁸⁷ The important steps were taken in Havana, Luanda and Pretoria.²⁸⁸ Moscow, however, supported the efforts to bring peaceful change to Namibia and the region and received lots of credit for it.

*"Moscow at one level achieved a visible role and confirmed global status by 'free-riding' on an American effort. By placing their imprimatur on a regional settlement whose time had arrived, the Soviets earned some international credit and acted in accordance with the new spirit of U.S.-Soviet relations. At another level, Soviet advice and tactical thinking were at times extremely helpful to harried U.S. diplomats who had to cope day and night with the antics and idiosyncrasies of three unusual negotiating parties...In the final analysis, the Soviet record in Southern Africa will be judged both by their readiness to share such burdens and to shed burdens - like the one in Angola that reflected 'old thinking'."*²⁸⁹

There seems to be a tendency to give Moscow a great deal of credit for the coming about of the Namibian settlement; even though it came in very late and only when the greatest hurdles had already been taken.

African States

In the Carter years the Front Line States had an important role in the efforts to negotiate and to implement Res 435. They had good relations with SWAPO and managed to persuade the guerilla organization to go along with the Contact Group's ideas. In the first two years of the Reagan administration the five African states continued to be helpful negotiating partners with continuing influence over SWAPO. After 1982 the good working relation between the Front Line States and Washington ceased, however, because the African states were opposed to the concept of linkage. There were three exceptions, though:

287 Interview with Ambassador McHenry, October 30, 1990.

288 Crocker writes in an essay: "There is no evidence of Soviet arm twisting of their Marxist allies, though Moscow certainly made clear its general support for a 'political solution' and its desire to be perceived as contributing toward one."
Newsom, David, The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990, p.32.

289 Newsom, David, The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990, p.33.

- 1) Angola stayed involved and was one of the signatures of the tripartite agreement which made linkage a reality.
- 2) Mozambique helped U.S. diplomats on different occasions after 1983. At times the communication between South Africa, Angola and the U.S. was conducted through Maputo.
- 3) Zambia worked within the regional context to promote reconciliation in Angola.²⁹⁰

Another African state, the Congo, which was no Front Line State, played a very important role in the last eighteen months. It had good relations to the MPLA and encouraged it to return to the negotiating table in 1987. The Congo also hosted five tripartite meetings during 1988.²⁹¹

Western Nations

The Contact Group functioned well until 1982 and got a lot of work done on Res 435. But when it came to the linkage issue the views differed and the Contact Group left it up to Washington to try to implement the concept. In spite of the differences the group worked on until 1984.

Except for the U.S., all the Western allies had diplomatic relations with Angola. They used their diplomatic channels to Luanda to persuade the Angolans to move along on the U.S. proposals. By doing this they helped Washington make up for their missing diplomatic relations with Angola. As the most important working relation, Crocker names the cooperation between Great Britain and the United States. London did not endorse the linkage concept but was willing to help the U.S. in their goal to bring peaceful change to the region. Great Britain's well-developed

290 In addition the following states were helpful in the negotiations: Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Gabon, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Cape Verde.

291 Newsom, David, *The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990*, p.26,27.

diplomatic channels in Europe, Africa and Asia were very helpful and provided information for the mediator. Especially valuable were London's good relations with Luanda and Pretoria.²⁹²

SWAPO

The independence of Namibia was the main U.S. objective beside getting Cuba out of Angola. Up to now the focus has mainly been on the interest of countries from three different continents in getting South Africa out of Namibia. Hardly anything has been said about the Namibian people's role and in particular SWAPO's role in the negotiations. The reason for the neglect of the local force can be explained quite simply. In the late 1980s SWAPO hardly played a role in the negotiations. After SWAPO had given its consent to Res 435, its role became negligible. For the realization of the linkage concept, South Africa, Cuba and Angola made the basic decisions. And in 1988 the U.S. mainly negotiated with the Cubans, and some with the Angolans.²⁹³ Nujoma's group had very little influence on the events because they were weak both militarily and politically, and constituted no serious threat to South Africa. Consequently, SWAPO was talked about very little and played a minimal role in the negotiations.²⁹⁴ In Washington SWAPO was regarded as badly organized and not very helpful; some U.S. officials felt they were achieving independence for Namibia despite SWAPO and not with or because of it.²⁹⁵

After looking at the situation of the parties involved, an attempt can be made to answer the questions asked at the beginning of this section. In late 1987 and early 1988 the process had reached a stage where all parties involved recognized that a negotiated settlement was in their own interest. The heating up of the situation in 1986 and 1987 brought losses to all parties and the military situation was stalemated. It became clear to all involved parties that the further regional development could not be decided by military force. SWAPO could not force South Africa into

292 Having good relations with both of these parties was unusual. Most countries had ties to one or the other country, but not both. London's good relation to Pretoria became very important in the end phase because there were increasing strains between Washington and Pretoria. Newsom, David, *The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990*, p.28.

293 Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

294 Interview with Helen Kitchen, October 12, 1990.

295 Interview with a State Department official, October 2, 1990.

leaving Namibia. South Africa and UNITA could not push the Cubans out. And as long as Cuban troops were in Angola the MPLA could hold on to power. The regional situation entered a stage that could be called "*ripe for resolution*". I. William Zartmann describes a "*ripe moment*" as a point in time when mediation is most likely to bear fruit. Such a moment develops, according to him, "*...either when the parties are locked in a mutual, hurting stalemate marked by a recent or impending catastrophe; when unilateral solutions are blocked and joint solutions become conceivable; or when the "ups" and "downs" start to shift their relative power position. Parties can come to perceive these moments themselves, to be sure, but they frequently need the help of conciliators. Once the moment has come, parties and mediator can turn to the more creative way out of the conflict.*"²⁹⁶ The situation in southern Africa in the late 1980s matched this description quite well. Unilateral solutions were not possible, continuing military actions had no prospect of bringing a final solution and the stalemated situation was hurting all the involved parties.

The signatories of the tripartite agreement were all suffering from the conflict in the region. The financial burden was great and in addition the rising number of casualties among white South African soldiers provoked domestic opposition to Pretoria's policy. At the point when the situation in Angola and Namibia had heated up but no decisive developments could be made, the time for diplomatic solutions had come. For seven years Crocker had tried to mediate in the region but not until the last year of the Reagan term were all parties ready for a mediated solution.

From the developments in 1988 it is clear that even when a conflict reaches a "ripe moment" the negotiations are very tough and the mediator cannot suddenly produce an easy solution. Zartmann describes the mediator and his job in a way that also fits the U.S. efforts in Southern Africa.

"Mediators are not magicians, pulling solutions out of hats. They are patient, persistent, dogged workers, gradually pressing to change perceptions and behaviours. Their leverage comes primarily from their ability to construct a perception of a better outcome for both parties than the one at the end of the plateau"²⁹⁷ or the first track,

296 Zartmann, I. William, *Ripe for Resolution*, p.236.

297 Plateau: Zartmann describes a "plateau" in a conflict as a ripe moment for resolution. A plateau is reached when the parties involved are not able to resolve the problems by themselves. The situation is perceived as a dead-end and a hurting stalemate.

First track: Zartmann defines a "first track" as a unilateral solution and consequently, a "second track" would be bilateral solutions.

not from any dominant relationship that allows *them to pull strings on puppets.*²⁹⁸ In theory it sounds nice and easy that conflicts reach a ripe moment and then can be solved. In reality, however, it is not always obvious when such a moment approaches and the moment is rarely totally ripe. A lot of skill is needed to make use of such a moment and the finding of a solution is by no means guaranteed.²⁹⁹ The U.S. mediation in Southern Africa ended successfully. But as all interviewed officials engaged in the negotiations stressed, the process was difficult and the outcome uncertain, virtually to the last minute. In New York on December 22, 1988, U.S. officials feared the parties would walk out without signing the final agreement since harsh words and accusations were exchanged.³⁰⁰ Secretary of State Shultz, who was at the signing ceremony together with U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, said it was "*miraculous that this agreement was consummated at all*". Cuba, Angola and South Africa had angry exchanges. The differences among the signing parties were obvious. The main disagreement centered around the continuing U.S. and South African aid to UNITA and Luanda's unwillingness to make peace with Savimbi enabling an Angolan reconciliation.³⁰¹

298 Zartmann, I. William, *Ripe for Resolution*, p.237.

299 Zartmann, I. William, *Ripe for Resolution*, p.237.

300 Interview with a Pentagon official, November 15, 1990.

301 Lewis, Paul, *The New York Times*, "Angola and Namibia Accords signed", December 23, 1988.

5. Implementing Resolution 435 and the Elections

In the late 1970s and 1980s the U.N. had hardly played a role in the Namibia negotiations. During the Carter administration, the U.S. and the Contact Group took the lead on the territory's question. In the Reagan years primarily the United States worked on the issue. The U.N. supported the Contact Group's work, and the cooperation between the two was good. After Res 435 was adopted by the U.N., the Contact Group also worked within the U.N. framework. The new administration in Washington continued to brief the U.N. on the work being done but the exchange with the U.N. became minimal. Not until the signing of the tripartite agreement in New York the U.N. became more active again. After the signing the Security Council started to work out the procedures for the implementation of Res 435. In this phase the U.N. began to play an important role in leading Namibia into independence.³⁰² In January, 1989, Res 628 and 629³⁰³ were adopted in the Security Council setting the implementation of Res 435 for April 1, 1989. In February 1989, the Security Council agreed on the size of the UNTAG³⁰⁴ force and authorized implementation in Res 632.³⁰⁵ Another month later the UNTAG budget was approved by the General Assembly. Everything was set for the Namibian independence process to begin on April 1, 1989.³⁰⁶

302 Interview with Brian Urquhart, December 4, 1990.

303 Appendix Q: U.N. Res 628/629/632

304 The UNTAG operation was unusual because it was designed to resolve an old conflict. It had to help guarantee free and fair elections but also had a more traditional peacekeeping role which was to keep apart fighting groups and secure peace. The composition of the UNTAG was debated for a long time and especially the decision on the size of the military contingent required much time. In fact the debate on the military force was one reason why only a small number of military forces were in Namibia on April 1. In the end UNTAG consisted of about 8000 people from 110 countries. A hundred participants were in the civilian UNTAG from the U.N. Secretariat and in addition 1500 civilian police officers, over 1500 election supervisors and more than 4500 military personnel participated in the operation. The UNTAG personnel arrived in three phases in Namibia. Around April 1, some civilian and military groups arrived. A second group arrived in summer for the registration process and finally the election supervisors arrived before the elections. The cost for the operation was projected to be US\$ 416 million. The General Assembly accepted this budget in March 1989. It was worked out that US\$ 240 million were to be paid by the five permanent members, US\$ 155 million from economically developed countries, US\$ 11 million by less developed nations and US\$ 2 million by the forty-seven least developed countries. In November 1989 there were still US\$ 95 million missing. Germany, Switzerland, Greece and the U.S. contributed US\$ 10 million and Japan US\$ 13 million. The U.S. is responsible for over thirty percent of the costs of peacekeeping operations. This kind of U.N. action is a heavy burden for the five permanent members. NDI, Nation Building, p.65-73.

305 Appendix Q: U.N. Res 628/629/632

306 NDI, Nation Building, p.x.xi.

The implementation of Res 435 got off to a bad start on April 1, 1989. In the last days of March South Africa announced that SWAPO was pulling together troops near the Namibian-Angolan border. South Africa discussed the issue with the Joint Military Monitoring Committee but no one expected a large SWAPO incursion, and therefore, no measures were taken. Shortly after implementation started, there were clashes between infiltrating SWAPO fighters and the South West African Police (SWAPOL). At the time only one hundred U.N. military personnel were in northern Namibia. They were powerless against the fighting. The debate on the size of the military component had delayed the deployment of UNTAG personnel³⁰⁷ But even if the full contingent of U.N. troops had been there, more than likely they could not have stopped the SWAPO penetration. Because of SWAPO's action Pretoria asked for permission to let South African troops out of the bases to which they were confined before April 1. Special Representative Ahtisaari felt that the whole process was threatened. Since the U.N. forces were powerless, he agreed to the South African wish.³⁰⁸

The fighting between SWAPO and South Africa forces worried the international community and it was feared the implementation of Res 435 could be called off.³⁰⁹ Seven days later the Joint Commission held an emergency meeting in northern Namibia to try to end the hostilities. During the meeting at Mount Etjo, Angola, South Africa and Cuba also met privately and to everyone's surprise Cuba proposed that all SWAPO fighters in Namibia and in Angola south of the 16 parallel should be transported to Angolan bases north of the 16 parallel. Cuba also agreed with the South African version that the SWAPO fighters had infiltrated the territory and had not been there all along. SWAPO had claimed that its forces had been in Namibia before April 1 and at the time when the fighting broke out, were in search of U.N. forces in order to hand over their weapons. SWAPO had believed that it first had to deliver the weapons before being confined to a base in Namibia.³¹⁰ SWAPO claimed that negotiations in the early 1980s on Res 435 had provided SWAPO with the right

307 Jaster, Robert S., *The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of Southwestern Africa*, p.36.

308 NDI, *Nation Building*, p.75.

309 Ahtisaari was criticized for his decision to let South African troops out of their bases and many lost faith in the Special Representative, the UNTAG, and the settlement plan. The trust lost in UNTAG right at the beginning never could quite be recovered again. NDI, *Nation Building*, p.75,76.

310 Gunn, Gillian, *Keeping Namibian Independence on Track: The Cuban Factor*, in: CSIS Africa Notes, No.23, (October 23, 1989), p.3.

to have bases in Namibia. The U.S., South Africa and also Cuba³¹¹ disagreed with SWAPO referring to the agreement of 1982 and the Geneva Protocol of August 5, 1988. In 1982 the agreement called for U.N. monitoring of SWAPO bases outside of Namibia and in the Geneva Protocol it is formulated clearly that SWAPO forces had to be deployed north of the 16 parallel in Angola. SWAPO had committed itself to this peace process through a letter to the Secretary-General on August 12, 1988.³¹² The meeting at Mount Etjo was ended with the agreement to transport all SWAPO fighters beyond the 16 parallel in Angola and confine them to bases there.³¹³

After the rough start in April, things calmed down and the implementation process continued more or less as scheduled. In negotiations between the U.N. Special Representative and the South African Administrator-General, the necessary decisions were made to enable free and fair elections to take place:

- 1) Discriminatory laws were repealed.
- 2) Political prisoners released.
- 3) An electoral system was adopted.
- 4) Namibian exiles were repatriated.
- 5) Voters were registered.
- 6) The UNTAG handled the intimidation going on among the parties.

After the seven months that were planned for the implementation of Res 435, the elections could be held.

The elections in Namibia started on November 7, 1989, and lasted for five days. There were 633 candidates from ten parties running for the Constituent Assembly, made up of seventy-two members.³¹⁴ As was expected, SWAPO won the election but did not achieve its goal of winning a two-thirds majority. With fifty-seven percent (350,000 votes), SWAPO secured forty-one out of seventy-two seats in the Constituent Assembly. The DTA had the second best result with twenty-eight percent and twenty-one seats.³¹⁵ It was Special Representative Ahtisaari's responsibility to make sure the elections were free and fair. On November 14 he announced that the

311 Cuba's attitude was surprising but easily explicable. Havana wanted to pull out of Angola and SWAPO's action threatened the whole process of Res 435 and the TCTW. A breakdown in the process was by no means in Cuba's interest.

312 Legal Analysis of the SWAPO incursion by U.S. State Department. South Africa Foreign Ministry, Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop Withdrawal, p.72,73.

313 Gunn, Gillian, Keeping Namibian Independence on Track, p.4.

314 sdl, NZZ, November 4,5, 1989, "Namibia vor einer entscheidenden Wahl", p.4.

315 Appendix R: Namibian Election Results

elections had been free and fair without any serious incidents. Out of the 701,483 registered voters 690,000 Namibians cast their votes, achieving a ninety-seven percent turn out.³¹⁶ Ten days after the end of the elections, on November 21, 1989, the Constituent Assembly met for the first time in Windhoek. A permanent chairman was elected and the Assembly agreed to follow the Constitutional Principles which the Contact Group had worked out in 1982.³¹⁷ Within three months a constitution was adopted. SWAPO showed itself ready for compromise, enabling a rapid agreement on the constitution. The Namibian constitution was based on the republican model.³¹⁸ On February 16, 1990, the Constituent Assembly elected Sam Nujoma unanimously as President of the Republic of Namibia. He was sworn in as the first Namibian president, on March 21, 1990, the date set for Namibia's independence.³¹⁹

316 sdl, NZZ, November 15, 1989, "Wahlsieg der SWAPO in Namibia".

317 sdl, NZZ, November 22, 1989, "Erste Sitzung der Konstituante in Windhoek".

318 sdl, NZZ, March 22, 1989, "Günstige Startbedingungen für Namibia".

319 sdl, NZZ, March 21, 1990, "Unabhängigkeitsfeier in Windhoek".

6. Conclusion

On March 21, 1990, the Namibian part of the tripartite agreement was fulfilled. Africa's last colony was finally independent. A vast number of people contributed over many years to this peaceful solution. After the signing of the treaty in New York on December 22, 1988, there was a consensus, however, that especially the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, deserved praise. The participants signing thanked Crocker for staying in the negotiations for so long and for mediating between Cuba, Angola and South Africa.³²⁰ Also the media gave credit to Crocker for the success of the agreement. In this concluding chapter the U.S. role in the Namibian settlement will be assessed, considering Crocker's policy toward the region as well as the policy of the two preceding administrations.

The three administrations in office from 1974 to 1989 had basically the same objectives in southern Africa. They wanted the region to be peaceful and stable.³²¹ Since the 1960s the U.S. has been following four principles in their African policy:

- 1) Contain the spread of communism.
- 2) Promote human rights and democratic governments.
- 3) Open Africa to the Western markets and guarantee access to minerals.
- 4) Work toward the abolition of apartheid in South Africa.³²²

The Ford, the Carter, and the Reagan administrations worked basically toward the same goals in southern Africa, but the approach and the motivation for their efforts were different.

The Ford administration only spent one year of serious work on southern Africa. No progress was made in bringing about peaceful solutions but Washington and the international community started to pay more attention to the developments at the southern tip of Africa. The Cuban troop presence in Angola and the fear of communism spreading in the region attracted the Republican administration's attention. Kissinger recognized the need for a new policy toward the whole region.

320 Transcript of an interview by Amy Biehl with George Shultz, in: Stanford University, Honors thesis, Biehl, Amy, Chester Crocker and the Negotiations for Namibian Independence, p.122.

321 Brown, Carl L.(Ed), Centerstage, p.181.

322 Legum, Colin, Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey of Documents 1983-1984, p.A284.

Other problems beside Angola, such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa also received attention from the policy-makers and resulted in a new U.S. policy toward southern Africa.

The Carter administration introduced a new approach to the region by looking for individual solutions for South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Mainly the rampant disregard for human rights and the need for economic development drew the Carter administration's attention to the region.³²³ In Namibia's case it created the frame-work for a settlement but the plan could not be implemented. Carter's policy toward Namibia was based on the following assumptions:

- 1) South African withdrawal from Namibia and internal reforms in the Cape Republic were the keys to a settlement in the region. It was assumed that South Africa's occupation of Namibia, its incursions into Angola and the aid given to UNITA were the main reasons for Cuba's presence.
- 2) Nationalism was the driving force in the region and not a foreign ideology.
- 3) The Cuban presence was no real problem and little attention had to be paid to the Cuban-Angolan issue. The Cuban presence was not so much an East-West problem indicating communist expansion but a security guarantee for the MPLA, which felt threatened by South Africa and UNITA. Castro would call back his troops as soon as South Africa pulled out of southern Angola and Namibia.

By the time the Reagan administration came into office, Zimbabwe was independent, and therefore, South Africa, Namibia, and the civil war in Angola were the main problems to be solved in the 1980s. The Reagan administration again changed the U.S. policy toward the region after having recognized strong interdependences among the Namibian, South African and Angolan issues. A settlement could only be found by considering the three together and finding solutions that included all parties. Crocker proceeded from the following three assumptions:

- 1) The Cuban presence in Angola and the South African presence in Namibia and its incursions into southern Angola were stumbling blocks to a regional settlement.

323 Price, Robert M., U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.35.

- 2) Cuban presence in Angola made reconciliation unlikely and encouraged South Africa to keep Namibia as a buffer.
- 3) Because of its aid to UNITA and invasions into southern Angola, South Africa's continuing presence in Namibia threatened the MPLA.

In addition it may not be forgotten that the Cuban presence was a sore point in the United States. The Reagan administration was very keen on getting the Cubans out of the southern African region.

Which administration had the right picture of the situation? The Ford administration spent one year working on the region and there was little hope of its efforts succeeding. The Ford approach also was very narrow because it looked at the region only in East-West terms. More can be said about the work of the other two administrations. Both approaches had their strengths and weaknesses. The Carter administration's argumentation that the Cubans would return home, once the threat to Luanda ceased is credible. Already in the 1970s it was known that the foreign troops were not very popular among Africans. The problem with this approach was that South Africa had been singled out as an intransigent party that had to be forced out of Namibia. A key to Namibia's independence was Pretoria's decision to let go of the territory. By alienating South Africa and making it pay a price for Namibia, the chances of Pretoria leaving were slim. There was nothing in such a deal for the Cape Republic. Pretoria's long-standing fear of expanding communism was not taken into consideration at all. Admittedly, the communist threat to South Africa was exaggerated by Pretoria, but the spreading communism was a real concern to the Cape Republic.³²⁴

The Reagan administration, on the other hand, considered the South African side. It recognized that South Africa was not willing to move out of Namibia just because the international community or the U.S. told it to. South African national interests had to be considered. The conservatives in the Reagan administration tended to emphasize the communist threat and saw the main problem in the Cuban presence. Crocker assumed that the interest of all players, including South Africa, had to be respected in order to find a settlement. To him it was a necessity that all participants

³²⁴ It is believed that the Soviet Union and Cuba never were a threat militarily to South Africa. A Cuban attack on South Africa was estimated to be very unlikely at any time in the fifteen years of Cuban presence in Angola. Politically, however, the ANC and the Cubans could make trouble for Pretoria. Still, the South Africans felt threatened by the Cuban troops as well as the growing number of Soviet and Cuban backed governments and guerilla groups in the region.
Interview with a State Department official, December 7, 1990.

gained from an agreement. He wanted the solution to be a "positive-sum game" instead of a "zero-sum game".³²⁵ The proposal to work with South Africa and to consider Pretoria's interest was unpopular in the U.S., in Africa, and in Europe. Preferably one would not want to work with a racist regime or even provide it with gains. Unfortunately, then, the finding of solutions, as in Namibia's case, becomes almost impossible. Therefore, Crocker's proposal to give South Africa an incentive to give up Namibia might not have appeared to be as ethical as the Carter administration's harsh rhetoric condemning apartheid. But this new approach was based on political realities: without Pretoria's consent Namibia would not have become independent, unless an international military intervention would have taken place to push out South African forces. This option was no real possibility even though some people demanded it in the Council of Namibia.

As mentioned earlier the tripartite agreement was a success for Chester Crocker. But conservatives in the U.S. also tried to credit the Brazzaville agreement to the Reagan Doctrine. They argued that the Reagan administration's decision to give UNITA aid in 1986 had forced the MPLA and the Cubans to accept a negotiated settlement. This explanation of the successful negotiations has flaws. The MPLA and Cuba already had shown interest in negotiations in 1983 and 1984³²⁶ and with the tripartite agreement important goals of the Reagan Doctrine in southern Africa were not fulfilled:

- 1) The Reagan Doctrine's aim to overthrow the Angolan government failed.
- 2) The doctrine's objective to "roll-back communism" in southern Africa can by no means be regarded as achieved. With the tripartite agreement the conditions were created for free and fair elections in Namibia. In these elections the majority of the Namibians gave their vote to a "Marxist terrorist band" as Ronald Reagan once called SWAPO.

The guerilla group's victory can hardly be called a "roll back of communism" as the supporters of the Reagan Doctrine would have wished to see it.³²⁷ The Reagan

325 In a "zero-sum game" the gain of one party automatically means the loss of the other side. In the "positive-sum game" all parties make gains.
Crocker, Chester, Southern Africa in Global Perspective, in: CSIS Africa Notes, November 30, 1989, No 105, p.4.

326 Smith, Wayne A., The Christian Science Monitor, December 19, 1988, "A Diplomatic Success in Africa".

327 McFaul, Michael, "Rethinking the Reagan Doctrine in Angola", p.13.

Doctrine at best was a hindrance to the regional settlement. The aid given to UNITA caused a breakdown in the U.S. negotiations with the Angolans. Therefore, it is justified to give Crocker and his team credit for its successful mediator role. However, to list the Reagan Doctrine as a reason for the successful outcome is not justified.

The tripartite agreement did not achieve the Reagan Doctrine's objectives, but what were the results of the agreement? The implementation of Res 435 was made possible after ten years, enabling free and fair elections to take place in the last African colony. With Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 and Namibia's ten years later, two countries were ridden of their colonial heritage. Once the Namibian question was settled, the interest in the territory deteriorated. It became clear that all along Namibia had been a tag-a-long and stepping stone for other problems in the region. The end of apartheid and Angola's reconciliation were far more important to the U.S. and the rest of the world than the Namibian independence. Namibia got a lot of attention from Washington because it provided a way to get at the problems in Angola and South Africa. The U.S. had hoped that a peaceful transition to independence in Namibia would have a positive spill-over effect on its neighbors. Both issues, being domestic issues, limited the international community's capability to exert influence on the involved parties.

Already in the year of Namibia's independence it was clear that the territory's independence had a positive impact on its neighbors. In September, 1989, W.F. de Klerk became the new South African Prime Minister succeeding P.W. Botha. De Klerk was a "*late blooming reformer*" who had supported the policy of separate development. Only when it became clear that apartheid was leading nowhere, did he deviate from the traditional National Party line.³²⁸ In the first eight months of de Klerk's term, important steps were taken on the path toward a new South Africa. In February, 1990, Nelson Mandela was released after over twenty-seven years in prison. The national state of emergency was lifted after four years and blacks were allowed to become members of the National Party. The ANC suspended its armed struggle and finally the ANC became a legal party.³²⁹ De Klerk was optimistic about finding a new political system for South Africa. With the rapid changes in the Soviet

328 Stengel, Richard, Time Magazine, February 5, 1990, "Cautious Architect of a Cloudy Future".

329 Mufson, Steven, South Africa 1990, in: Foreign Affairs, America and the World (Winter 1990/1991), p.120.

Union and Eastern Europe the pressure on the ANC grew from its foreign supporters. They wanted the ANC to compromise and negotiate with the white government. Several meetings between Prime Minister de Klerk and Nelson Mandela took place. One of the biggest problems was and is the violence among blacks in the townships. Mandela and the president of Inkatha, Buthelezi, have called for an end to violence but there has been no end to the killing.³³⁰

In Angola the sixteen year old civil war has taken a heavy toll. Beside the thousands of dead soldiers the civilian population is suffering greatly as well. Thousands have died of starvation. The lack of medication has caused anaemia, diarrhoea and cholera epidemics. In addition, the southern and central parts of the country have been suffering from a drought which is threatening the lives of one million people.³³¹ Since the first talks started in April, 1990, with Portuguese, Soviet and U.S. mediation, there have been positive developments which give reason to hope that Angola's future will be peaceful. On May 31, 1991, in Lisbon, Portugal, the Angolan president, Eduardo dos Santos, and UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, signed a peace treaty. Already on May 15, the fighting had ceased. The agreement signed in Lisbon confirmed the ceasefire and the parties agreed that free elections should be held in the fall of 1992. The signing was witnessed by Secretary of State Baker, Foreign Minister Bessmertnych, the Portuguese President Cavaco Silva, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar and the OAU-President Museveni. The signing of the peace treaty is a promising break-through in the sixteen year old civil war. It gives the Angolans a chance to rebuild their potentially wealthy country.³³²

The U.S. engagement in the Namibian question has certainly paid off. The United States' mediating role was appreciated by the Africans and the U.S.-Soviet competition in southern Africa has developed into cooperation. Helping the last African colony to become independent ended a long international dispute and triggered further change in the region. Most important are the changes in Angola and South Africa, the two nations in the region which are at the center of attention of the United States. Therefore, Namibia played a useful role in regional politics

330 Mufson, Steven, South Africa 1990, p.133,134.

331 Baumgartner, Jacques, NZZ, July 7,8, 1990, "Angolas Regime immer mehr in Bedrängnis".

332 dpa, NZZ, June, 1,2, 1991, "Unterzeichnung des Ango la-Friedensabkommens".

Four days before the Angolan peace treaty was signed in Lisbon, the TCTW was ended more than four weeks ahead of schedule. With the withdrawal of the last Cuban troops from Angola, the tripartite agreement of 1988 has been fulfilled.
dpa/afp, NZZ, May, 27, 1991, "Die letzten Kubaner aus Angola abgezogen".

and turned out to be the stepping stone Washington had hoped it would be. However, after the independence celebration, Namibia vanished from the headlines. Talking about this fact, people involved in the negotiations like to say: "*Namibia is now moving into the obscurity it deserves*". This comment illustrates Namibia's role in U.S. policy. The settlement for Namibia was the means to advance peaceful changes in southern Africa.

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8. Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies

CTW Cuban Troop Withdrawal

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DTA Democratic Turnhalle Alliance

FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola

ICJ International Court of Justice

MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola

NDI National Democratic Institute

NSC National Security Council

NSSM National Security Study Memorandum

Res Resolution

SALT Strategic-arms-limitation treaty

SWAPO South West Africa People's Organization

SWAPOL South West Africa Police

TCTW Total Cuban Troop Withdrawal

U.N. United Nations


U.S.A. United States of America

UNITA Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola

UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group

9 APPENDICES

Map of Southern Africa



Hammond, Superior Map of Africa, Hammond & Co, New York

Appendix A: Heritage

Located in the southwestern part of Africa, on the Atlantic coast, Namibia shares borders with South Africa in the South, Botswana (the former Protectorate Bechuanaland) in the East and Angola and Zambia (the former Northern Rhodesia) in the North. Its territory stretches over 318,261³³³ square miles and is one of the least populated countries in the world. The official number for Namibia's population is 1.5 million.³³⁴ Large portions of the country are desert or semi-desert with only the North receiving a fair amount of rain. The Namib Desert along the Atlantic coast and the Kalahari Desert in the southeastern region constitute a large part of the territory. Several rivers form the borders of Namibia: the Orange river in the south, the Kunene, Kavango, Zambezi and the Kwando-Linyanti rivers in the north.³³⁵

Namibia's economy is based on mining, agriculture, fishing, and a subsistence pastoral economy. The natural resources are made up of mineral deposits including diamonds, copper, uranium, zinc and manganese. The Atlantic coast offers vast fishing resources, and cattle and karakul sheep are raised in the arid areas. In the North where over 24 inches of rain fall agriculture can be sustained.³³⁶

The native African population is made up of Ovambos, Kavangos, Hereros, Damara, Nama, Caprivi, Rehoboth Basters, San (Bushmen) and Tswana. Approximately seven percent of the population is white. Half of them are Afrikaners and the rest are of English, German or Portuguese descent.³³⁷

The northern part of Namibia is inhabited by about 800,000 Ovambo and 110,000 Kavango. Also in the North, in the eastern edge of the Caprivi strip 47,000 Caprivian

333 Namibia's size equals about the size of France and lies between the 18th and 28th parallels.

334 Other sources estimate the Namibian population to be between 1.2 million and 1.3 million. NDI, Nation Building, p.96.

335 Information leaflet published by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Namibia to the United Nations in New York, Summer 1990, p.1.

336 NDI, Nation Building, p.9.

337 NDI, Nation Building, p.10.

live. Farther south 80,000 Herero, 90,000 Damara, 9,000 Tswana and 35,000 San inhabit the same area as the whites do. The deep south is the home of 45,000 Nama and 29,000 Rehoboth Basters.³³⁸

338 Rotberg, Robert I., *Namibia Becomes a Nation: Could it be a Model?* in: *CSIS Africa Notes*, No.110 (March 20), 1990, p.2.

Appendix B: Namibia: An International Issue

At different times in history Namibia was entered by European explorers and traders. The first recorded arrival of a European in Namibia dates back to 1485 when a Portuguese sailor, Diogo Cao, landed at Cape Cross. White settlements, however, were not established until the late 18th century, when Cape-based Dutch moved into Namibia. At approximately the same time the first European traders came to the territory. Missionary activities started around 1800 when the London Missionary Society established itself in Namibia. After 1840 German and Finnish Lutheran missionaries followed. The territory started to be claimed by the Europeans beginning with the annexation of the area around Walvis Bay by the British in 1876. German rule was established with the declaration of a protectorate around Lüderitz Bay in 1884. A German businessman, Adolf Lüderitz, had settled there and opened Namibia to Germany's economic interest.³³⁹ In the following years the Germans and Portuguese negotiated borders for Namibia in the north, toward Angola. With the British the boundary was set between Namibia and Botswana.³⁴⁰

The German rule lasted from 1884 until 1915 when Namibia fell to South African forces during World War I. After the war, in 1920, the League of Nations assigned the territory to South Africa as a "Class C mandate" to be administered as an integral part of South Africa. It was Pretoria's duty to see to the well-being of the Namibian inhabitants and to protect their interests. After World War II South Africa refused to submit Namibia under the new international trusteeship system when the League of Nations was succeeded by the United Nations. At the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, South Africa unsuccessfully tried to incorporate Namibia as its fifth province³⁴¹. A year later Pretoria informed the U.N. that it would not continue to pursue the incorporation for the time being. Instead it wanted to keep administering the territory as a mandate. In 1949, however, South Africa decided to cease sending the U.N. Trusteeship Council reports on Namibia, arguing that the obligation to write reports on mandates lapsed when the League of Nations was dissolved.³⁴² In 1950 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Pretoria did not have to conclude a trusteeship agreement but that the mandate remained in

339 Katjavivi, Peter H., *A History of Resistance in Namibia*, London 1988, p.5-7.

340 NDI, *Nation Building*, p.10.11.

341 NDI, *Nation Building*, p.viii,11.

342 FRUS 1951, Vol.V, p.1433,1436.

effect and that South Africa could not alter Namibia's international status unilaterally. Pretoria's unwillingness to cooperate with the U.N. on the Namibia question started a long dispute over the control of Namibia.³⁴³ During the 1950s and 1960s many petitions were handed in at the U.N. from Namibians protesting against the continuing South African occupation. The political situation in the territory became aggravated because the South Africans were repressing opposition activities and drove a great number of Namibians into exile.³⁴⁴ Because of the deteriorating situation in Namibia, Liberia and Ethiopia instituted proceedings before the ICJ concerning Namibia on November 4, 1960. They alleged that South Africa was not complying with the Mandate agreement, the covenant of the League of Nations and the UN Charter. The international community encouraged this procedure believing that South Africa would more likely follow a ICJ decision than a U.N. General Assembly resolution. The U.S. in particular tried to prevent the U.N. or South Africa from taking any measures on Namibia's case which would complicate the judicial proceedings while the case was at the ICJ.³⁴⁵ On July 18, 1966, after five and a half years of litigation the long awaited judgement of the ICJ was handed down. The decision was quite unexpected for it declared that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked sufficient legal interest and therefore the case was dismissed.³⁴⁶ The Africans were angered and pressure grew for the U.N. to act on Namibia. Under this pressure the 21st General Assembly adopted Resolution 2145 (XXI) on October 27, 1966, declaring South Africa's mandate over Namibia legally terminated. The following year, in 1967, the Council for Namibia was established with the instructions to facilitate the transfer from South Africa's administration to the United Nations. The Council was supposed to administer the territory and guarantee a peaceful

343 NDI, Nation Building, p.viii, 11.

344 Katjavivi, Peter, A History of Resistance in Namibia, p.38-41.

345 South Africa challenged the U.S. position in 1964 by implementing the Odendaal plan that aimed at developing Namibia along segregationist lines. The National Security Council (NSC) thereupon instructed the State Department to continue the U.S. arms embargo on South Africa (ammunition, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for their manufacture and maintenance were affected), the suspension of action on applications for loans or investment guarantees involving South Africa and the authorization to constrict stand-by space-tracking facilities outside of South Africa. By April, 1964, South Africa announced the deferral of the Odendaal plan. Administrative History: Department of State, The South West Africa Question, (no date given, approximately 1968) p.2,3,4,5, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, USA, (LBJL).

346 It was not until June 21, 1971, that the ICJ took a decision stating it was the U.N.'s right to declare South Africa's mandate over Namibia as terminated and acknowledged thereby that South Africa was illegally occupying Namibia. Cooper, Allan D. (Ed) Allies in Namibia: Western Capitalism in Occupied Namibia, New York 1988, p.2.

transition to independence. The U.S., other Western countries, and the communist bloc abstained on this issue and declined a membership on the Council because they did not believe the Council could achieve anything in Namibia.³⁴⁷

347 Administrative History: Department of State, p.17. (LBJL).
The Council of Namibia received little attention and hardly played a role in the Namibia negotiations. The Council was regarded as difficult to deal with and as having unrealistic demands.
Interview with Sir Brian Urquhart, December 4, 1990.

Appendix C: Strategic Minerals

Southern Africa possesses a vast store of minerals on which the U.S. relies heavily. Four minerals among them (chromium, manganese, vanadium, and platinum) are regarded as strategically important. A large part of the known reserves of these minerals in the non-communist world are found in South Africa. Because the Soviet Union is the other large storehouse for the mentioned minerals, having access to South African resources during the Cold War was of some importance to the U.S. and other Western nations. Parallel to the sea lane debate, heated discussions were conducted about possible interruptions of the mineral supply from southern Africa. Again two lines of argumentation can be identified.³⁴⁸

One group feared that should southern Africa fall under communist influence, the U.S. would be cut off from strategic minerals. In this context a theory was developed stating that there was a communist masterplan to try to win influence over southern African and its resources in order to have a monopoly for the world's strategic minerals. The realization of such a plan would have put the West at the Soviet Union's mercy and put Moscow in the position to ask any price for the minerals.³⁴⁹

The other, more moderate group agreed that the southern African minerals were of some interest to Washington. But the idea of Moscow having a masterplan to control all of mineral-rich southern Africa in order to pressure the West seemed far-fetched.³⁵⁰ As it turned out this communist masterplan idea originated in South Africa and in American circles which had close ties to the Cape Republic. It was South Africa's scheme to play up the regions importance to the U.S. and its allies.³⁵¹ It was argued (and new authoritative studies confirm) that minerals could be substituted at a higher price even if a supply interruption from South Africa should ever occur. In addition, stockpiles could help bridge the time until other supplies would be established.³⁵² Many believed that were more countries in southern Africa to become communist, these would still sell their resources to the U.S. for one simple reason: no one else could buy them and these countries needed the income.³⁵³

348 Kitchen, Helen, U.S. Interests in Africa, p.39-41.

349 Interview with a Pentagon official, November 15, 1990.

350 Interview with a State Department official, November 9, 1990.

351 Interview with a South African Diplomat, October 16, 1990.
Crocker, Chester, South Africa: Strategy for Change, p.324.

352 Kitchen, Helen, U.S. Interests in Africa, p.40.

353 Interview with a State Department official, November 9, 1990.

The debates on the sea lanes and strategic minerals³⁵⁴ and their role in the decision-making process toward the region were continued and kept going during the whole time period that is being considered here. However, the moderate views were increasingly supported by a large group of people with liberal and conservative backgrounds. Especially after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power the fear of communism expanding in the region diminished.

354 In 1987 a study was made that talks about the possible denial of strategic minerals to the U.S. from South Africa. In such a case there would be inconveniences for the U.S. but the potential impact would not be big enough to determine U.S. policy toward South Africa. The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, U.S. Department of State, (April 1987), p.3.

Appendix D: The Cape Route

The sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope connect the southern Atlantic and the Indian Ocean and are an important alternative to the Suez Canal. The supertankers transporting mostly oil must go around the Cape because they are too large to pass through the Suez Canal. From 1967-1975 the Suez Canal was closed and forced all the ships to go around Africa. Were the Suez Canal and the Cape sea routes ever to be closed, the West would be in a tough spot because its major supply routes would be cut off. In the past and present public debate, two views can be ascertained on the strategic importance of the Cape route to the United States:

On the one hand, those who saw a serious communist threat in southern Africa argued that one fifth of the United States' supply of oil and over one half of Western Europe's was shipped around the Cape. Therefore, a cut-off of these supplies would have a severe impact on the West.³⁵⁵ They argued that hostile governments in southern Africa, and in South Africa in particular, could intercept ships sailing around the Cape quite easily because the ships have to sail within forty miles of the South African coast. To take a route farther south would be hazardous because of rough weather and dangerous currents. This argumentation was often heard when Angola and Mozambique were taken over by leftist regimes. The supporters of this argumentation feared that all of southern Africa could fall like dominoes under communist influence and threaten the international shipping route.³⁵⁶

On the other hand more liberal groups argued that if the Soviet Union or Moscow-friendly governments in the region would impede Western shipments of oil around the Cape, they would more than likely trigger a war with the West. It was regarded as very far-fetched and unlikely that the Soviet Union would start the Third World War in the waters of southern Africa. The reasoning was that firstly, the Soviet Union could stop the transport of oil to the West at many other more convenient spots, for example in the Persian Gulf. Secondly, The Soviets did not need port facilities to stop the flow of goods around the Cape because their sub-

355 Kitchen, Helen, U.S. Interests in Africa, p.60,61.

356 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. Interests in Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, October 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 29, and November 13, 14, 1979, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p.139-149.

marines could do the job at any chosen place.³⁵⁷ The advocates of this more liberal view agreed that the Cape sea lanes were important for the U.S. and the West in general but did not believe the Soviet Union was likely to threaten these interests.

357 U.S Congress, House, U.S. Interests in Africa, p.139-149.



(SECRET)

Premise:

The Whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the black states (a total of about \$5 million annually in technical assistance to the black states) help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change. Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable political cost.

General Posture:

We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible - albeit small and gradual - moderation of white policies. Without openly taking a position undermining the UK and the UN on Rhodesia, we would be more flexible in our attitude toward the Smith regime. We would take present Portuguese policies as suggesting further changes in the Portuguese territories. At the same time we would take diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and majority rule aspirations in the south are not attainable by violence and that their only hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with white-dominated states. We would emphasize our belief that closer relations will help to bring

change in the white states. We would give increased and more flexible economic aid to black states of the area to focus their attention on their internal development and to give them a motive to cooperate in reducing tensions. We would encourage economic assistance from South Africa to the developing black nations.

This option accepts, at least over a 3 to 5 year period, the prospect of unrequited US initiatives toward the whites and some opposition from the blacks in order to develop an atmosphere conducive to change in white attitudes through persuasion and erosion. To encourage this change in white attitudes, we would indicate our willingness to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule, provided that they assure broadened political participation in some form by the whole population.

The various elements of the option would stand as a whole and approval of the option would not constitute approval of individual elements out of this context.

Operational Examples:

- Enforce arms embargo against South Africa but with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes.
- Permit US naval calls in South Africa with arrangements for non-discrimination toward US personnel in organized activity ashore; authorize routine use of airfields.
- Retain tracking stations in South Africa as long as required.
- Remove constraints on EXIM Bank facilities for South Africa; actively encourage US exports and facilitate US investment consistent with the Foreign Direct Investment Program.
- Conduct selected exchange programs with South Africa in all categories, including military.
- Without changing the US legal position that South African occupancy of South West Africa is illegal, we would play down the issue and encourage accommodation between South Africa and the UN.



- On Rhodesia, retain consulate; gradually relax sanctions (e.g. hardship exceptions for chrome) and consider eventual recognition.
- Continue arms embargo on Portuguese territories, but give more liberal treatment to exports of dual purpose equipment.
- Encourage trade and investment in Portuguese territories; full EXIM Bank facilities.
- Establish flexible aid programs in the black states of the region; respond to reasonable requests for purchase of non-sophisticated arms but seek no change in Conte amendment.
- Toward African insurgent movements take public position that US opposes use of force in racial confrontation. Continue humanitarian assistance to refugees.
- Increase information and exchange activities in both white and black states.

PROS:

1. Encourages existing tendencies to broaden relations between black states and white and thus reduce tensions - South Africa's new outward policy, Zambia's trade and sub rosa political contacts with South Africa and Portugal.
2. Preserves US economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states and would expand opportunities for profitable trade and investment.
3. Relaxation of the US attitude toward the whites could help lift their present siege mentality; and it would encourage elements among the whites seeking to extend South African relationships with black Africa.
4. US diplomatic support and economic aid offer the black states an alternative to the recognized risks of mounting communist influence.
5. Increased aid would also give us greater influence to caution the black states against violent confrontation and give them a tangible stake in accepting the prospects of gradual change.
6. Would reduce a major irritant in our relations with Portugal, and afford the Caetano government opportunity for liberalization.

CONS:

1. Relaxation of US stance towards white states could be taken by the whites as a vindication of their policies. Many black states, led by Zambia and Tanzania, probably would charge us with subordinating our professed ideals to material interests and tolerating white-regime policies.
2. There is a serious question whether pro-Western leaders of the black states could continue to justify their stance to their populations if the US officially declared its opposition to current liberation efforts. Radical and communist states would be the beneficiaries.
3. Unilateral US relaxation of sanctions against Rhodesia would be a highly visible violation of our international obligations and would be damaging both to the US and to the UN.
4. The current thrust of South African domestic policy does not involve any basic change in the racial segregation system, which is anathema to the black states. There is virtually no evidence that changes might be forthcoming in these South African policies as a result of any approach on our part.
5. Requires extensive diplomatic and economic involvement in a situation in which the solution is extremely long-range and the outcome doubtful at best.
6. It is doubtful that the additional aid contemplated would be sufficiently great to influence the black states in the direction indicated.



Appendix F: U.N. Res 385

S



S/RES/385 (1976)
30 January 1976

RESOLUTION 385 (1976)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1885th meeting, on 30 January 1976

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Having considered the statement by Mr Moses M Goroeb, Administrative Secretary of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 21 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 15 May 1967, which established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular, resolution 3255 (XXX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 262 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,


Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its aggressive military build-up in the area,

Strongly deploring the militarization of Namibia by the illegal occupation régime of South Africa,

1. *Condemns the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;*
2. *Condemns the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;*
3. *Condemns the South African military build-up in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries;*
4. *Demands that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;*
5. *Further condemns South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of Security Council resolution 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974;*
6. *Further condemns all attempts by South Africa calculated to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia;*
7. *Declares that in order that the people of Namibia be enabled to freely determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;*
8. *Further declares that in determining the date, timetable and modalities for the elections in accordance with paragraph 7 above, there shall be adequate time to be decided upon by the Security Council for the purposes of enabling the United Nations to establish the necessary machinery within Namibia to supervise and control such elections, as well as to enable the people of Namibia to organize politically for the purpose of such elections;*
9. *Demands that South Africa urgently make a solemn declaration accepting the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertaking to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and recognizing the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;*
10. *Reiterates its demand that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 366 (1974), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;*
11. *Demands again that South Africa, pending the transfer of powers provided for in the preceding paragraph:*
 - (a) *Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;*
 - (b) *Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connection with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;*
 - (c) *Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands;*
 - (d) *Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;*
12. *Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 31 August 1976 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of this resolution and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter.*





S/12636
10 April 1978

LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1978 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from our Governments we have the honour to transmit to you a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian situation and to request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

The objective of our proposal is the independence of Namibia in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976. We are continuing to work towards the implementation of the proposal.

(Signed) William H BARTON
Permanent Representative of Canada to the
United Nations

M Jacques LEPRETTE
Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations

Rüdiger von WECHMAR
Permanent Representative of the Federal
Republic of Germany to the United Nations

James MURRAY
Deputy Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations,
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Andrew YOUNG
Permanent Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations

Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation

I. Introduction

1. Bearing in mind their responsibilities as members of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have consulted with the various parties involved with the Namibian situation with a view to encouraging agreement on the transfer of authority in Namibia to an independent government in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976.
2. To this end, our Governments have drawn up a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian question designed to bring about a transition to independence during 1978 within a framework acceptable to the people of Namibia and thus to the international community. While the proposal addresses itself to all elements of resolution 385 (1976), the key to an internationally acceptable transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity with an appropriate United Nations role in accordance with resolution 385 (1976). A resolution will be required in the Security Council requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations Special Representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations Transition Assistance Group.
3. The purpose of the electoral process is to elect representatives to a Namibian Constituent Assembly which will draw up and adopt the Constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia. Authority would then be assumed during 1978 by the Government of Namibia.
4. A more detailed description of the proposal is contained below. Our Governments believe that this proposal provides an effective basis for implementing resolution 385 (1976) while taking adequate account of the interests of all parties involved. In carrying out his responsibilities the Special Representative will work together with the official appointed by South Africa (the Administrator-General) to ensure the orderly transition to independence. This working arrangement shall in no way constitute recognition of the legality of the South African presence in and administration of Namibia.

II. The electoral process

5. In accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976), free elections will be held, for the whole of Namibia as one political entity, to enable the people of Namibia to freely and fairly determine their own future. The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves, and the certification of their results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect. Moreover the Special Representative may himself make proposals in regard to any aspect of the political process. He will have at his disposal a substantial civilian section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, sufficient to carry out his duties satisfactorily. He will report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, keeping him informed and making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council informed.
6. Elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls, and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to



organize and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed. The official electoral campaign shall commence only after the United Nations Special Representative has satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures. The implementation of the electoral process, including the proper registration of voters and the proper and timely tabulation and publication of voting results will also have to be conducted to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.

7. The following requirements will be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative in order to meet the objective of free and fair elections:
 - A. Prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, the Administrator-General will repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations, or administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit that objective.
 - B. The Administrator-General shall make arrangements for the release, prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, of all Namibian political prisoners or political detainees held by the South African authorities so that they can participate fully and freely in that process, without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Any disputes concerning the release of political prisoners or political detainees shall be resolved to the satisfaction of the Special Representative acting on the independent advice of a jurist of international standing who shall be designated by the Secretary-General to be legal adviser to the Special Representative.
 - C. All Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the territory of Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Suitable entry points will be designated for these purposes.
 - D. The Special Representative with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other appropriate international bodies will ensure that Namibians remaining outside of Namibia are given a free and voluntary choice whether to return. Provision will be made to attest to the voluntary nature of decisions made by Namibians who elect not to return to Namibia.
8. A comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts shall be observed by all parties in order to ensure that the electoral process will be free from interference and intimidation. The annex describes provisions for the implementation of the cessation of all hostile acts, military arrangements concerning the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, the withdrawal of South African forces, and arrangements with respect to other organized forces in Namibia, and with respect to the forces of SWAPO. These provisions call for:
 - A. A cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base.
 - B. Thereafter a phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1 500 South African troops within 12 weeks and prior to the official start of the political campaign. The remaining South African force would be restricted to Grootfontein or Oshivello or both and would be withdrawn after the certification of the election.
 - C. The demobilization of the citizen forces, commandos, and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structures.
 - D. Provision will be made for SWAPO personnel outside of the territory to return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points to participate freely in the political process.
 - E. A military section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group to make sure that the provisions of the agreed solution will be observed by all parties. In establishing the military section of UNTAG, the Secretary-General will keep in mind functional and logistical requirements. The Five Governments, as members of the Security Council, will support the Secretary-General's judgement in his discharge of this responsibility. The Secretary-General will, in the normal manner, include in his consultations all those concerned with the implementation of the agreement. The Special Representative will be required to satisfy himself as to the implementation of all these arrangements and will keep the Secretary-General informed of developments in this regard.
9. Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator-General in the

satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative shall ensure the good conduct of the police forces and shall take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period. The Special Representative shall make arrangements when appropriate for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. The police forces would be limited to the carrying of small arms in the normal performance of their duties.

10. The United Nations Special Representative will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter.
11. Immediately after the certification of election results, the Constituent Assembly will meet to draw up and adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. It will conclude its work as soon as possible so as to permit whatever additional steps may be necessary prior to the installation of an independent Government of Namibia during 1978.
12. Neighbouring countries shall be requested to ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the transitional arrangements, and the outcome of the election, are respected. They shall also be requested to afford the necessary facilities to the United Nations Special Representative and all United Nations personnel to carry out their assigned functions and to facilitate such measures as may be desirable for ensuring tranquillity in the border areas.



Appendix G: Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian Situation

ANNEX

Timing	SAG	SWAPO	UN	Other action
(1) At date unspecified			UNSC passes resolution authorizing SYG to appoint UNSR and requesting him to submit plan for UN involvement. SYG appoints UNSR and dispatches UN contingency planning group to Namibia. SYG begins consultations with potential participants in UNTAG.	
(2) As soon as possible, preferably within one week of Security Council action.			SYG reports back to UNSC. UNSC passes further resolution adopting plan for UN involvement. Provision is made for financing.	
(3) Transitional period formally begins on date of UNSC passage of resolution adopting SYG's plan.	General cessation of hostile acts comes under UN supervision. Restriction to base of all South African forces including ethnic forces.	General cessation of hostile acts comes under UN supervision. Restriction to base.	As soon as possible, UNSR and staff (UNTAG) arrive in Namibia to assume duties. UN military personnel commence monitoring of cessation of hostile acts and commence monitoring of both South African and SWAPO troop restrictions. Begin infiltration prevention and border surveillance. Begin monitoring of police forces, ethnic forces and military personnel performing civilian functions. UNSR makes necessary arrangements for co-ordination with neighbouring countries concerning the provisions of the transitional arrangements.	Release of political prisoners. Detainees wherever held become and to be completed as soon as possible.
(4) Within six weeks	Restriction to base continues. Force levels reduced to 12 000 men.	Restriction to base continues.	Appropriate action by UN High Commissioner for Refugees outside Namibia to assist in return of exiles. All UN activity continues.	Establishment in Namibia of provisions to facilitate return of exiles. Establishment and publication of general rules for elections. Completion of repeal of discriminatory laws and restrictive legislation. Dismantlement of command structures of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, including the withdrawal of all South African soldiers attached to these units. All arms, military equipment, and ammunition of citizen forces and commandos confined to drill halls under UN supervision. AG to ensure that none of these forces will drill or constitute an organized force during the transitional period except under order of the AG with the concurrence of UNSR. AG with concurrence of UNSR determines whether and under what circumstances those military personnel performing civilian functions will continue those functions.
(5) Within nine weeks	Restriction to base continues. Force levels reduced to 8 000 men.	Restriction to base continues. Peace. All repatriation under UN supervision starts for return through designated entry points.	All UN activity continues.	Completion of release of political prisoners/detainees wherever held.
(6) Within 12 weeks.	Force levels reduced to 1 500 men, restricted at Groenfontein or Caluevello or both. All military installations along southern border would by now either be deactivated or put under civilian control under UN supervision. Facilities which depend on them (e.g. hospital, power stations) would be protected where necessary by the UN.	Restriction to base continues.	All UN activity continues. Military Section of UNTAG at maximum deployment.	
(7) Start of thirteenth week.				Official start of election campaign of about four months duration.
(8) On date established by AG to satisfaction of UNSR.				Election to Constituent Assembly.
(9) One week after date of certification of election.	Completion of withdrawal.	Closure of all bases.		Convening of Constituent Assembly.
(10) At date unspecified.				Conclusion of Constituent Assembly and whatever additional steps may be necessary prior to installation of new government.
(11) By 31 December 1978 at latest.				Independence.

AG = Administrator-General; SAG = South African Government; SWAPO = South West Africa People's Organization; SYG = Secretary-General of the United Nations; UN = United Nations; UNSR = United Nations Special Representative; UNSC = United Nations Security Council; UNTAG = United Nations Transition Assistance Group

South African Department of Foreign Affairs,
 Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop
 Withdrawal, Pretoria 1989, p.19-25.



Appendix H: U.N. Res 431

Namibia: Resolution 431



Security Council Resolution 431(1978) of 27 July 1978


The Security Council:

Recalling its resolution 385(1976) of 30 January 1976,

Taking note of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in document S/12636 of 10 April 1978,

1. *Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Namibia in order to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;*
2. *Further requests the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing his recommendations for the implementation of the proposal in accordance with Security Council resolution 385(1976);*
1. *Urges all concerned to exert their best efforts towards the achievement of independence by Namibia at the earliest possible date.*

NDI, Nation Building, p.94.



Appendix I: U.N. Res 435

S



S/RES/435 (1978)*
30 September 1978

RESOLUTION 435 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2087th meeting on 29 September 1978

The Security Council

Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) and 431 (1978), and 432 (1978),

Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) (S/12827) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),

Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12841),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia:

1. *Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/12827) for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and his explanatory statement (S/12869);*
2. *Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 (1976);*
3. *Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;*
4. *Welcomes SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of SWAPO dated 8 September 1978 (S/12841);*
5. *Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;*
6. *Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and this resolution are null and void;*
7. *Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council no later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.*

South African Department of Foreign Affairs,
Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop
Withdrawal, Pretoria 1989, p.18.



S.2701 The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986

Importation into the United States of the following South African goods/commodities prohibited:

- (1) Krugerrands and any other South African gold coins;
- (2) Military articles;
- (3) Articles 'grown, produced, manufactured, marketed or exported' by South African parastatal organizations, defined as 'a corporation or partnership owned or controlled by the Government of South Africa'. Exception: essential strategic minerals;
- (4) Uranium ore and uranium oxide;
- (5) Coal;
- (6) Textiles;
- (7) Agricultural commodities, products and by-products or derivatives and articles suitable for human consumption;
- (8) Iron;
- (9) Steel.

Export of the following goods/commodities to South Africa prohibited:

- (1) Computers and computer-related technology to certain South African government agencies (e.g. military, police, national security agencies);
- (2) Nuclear-related goods and technology;
- (3) Items contained in the US munitions control list;
- (4) Crude oil or refined petroleum products.

Activities by US nationals in South Africa prohibited:

- (1) Loans to the South African Government and entities owned or controlled by it, with certain limited exceptions;
- (2) New investment in South Africa, except for investment in companies owned by black South Africans.

US Government activities prohibited:

- (1) Procurement of South African goods and services, except those necessary for diplomatic and consular purposes;
- (2) Promotion of tourism to South Africa;
- (3) Promotion of trade with South Africa;
- (4) Military cooperation with South Africa.

Bilateral agreements in force terminated:

- (1) Air agreement, effective 10 days after enactment of the Bill into law;
- (2) Tax treaty and protocol, effective immediately upon enactment of the Bill into law.

Activities in the United States by the South African Government and entities owned/controlled by it:

- (1) Bank accounts, except accounts maintained for diplomatic and consular purposes.

Possible additional future punitive sanctions:

The Bill contains a provision with respect to 'additional measures' that might be imposed in the future.

That provision requires the President to report every 12 months to the Congress with respect to progress in South Africa on ending apartheid.

If the President determines that 'significant progress has not been made by the Government of South Africa in ending the system of apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy', he must include in his report to Congress 'a recommendation on which of the following additional measures should be imposed':

- (1) A prohibition on US military assistance to countries that continue to circumvent the international embargo on arms and military technology to South Africa;
- (2) A prohibition against the importation into the US of diamonds from South Africa;
- (3) A prohibition against South African nationals having US bank accounts; and
- (4) A prohibition on the importations into the US of strategic minerals from South Africa.

Namibia: S/15287



United Nations

Letter (S/15287) dated 12 July 1982 from the Representatives of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the Secretary-General

On instructions from our Governments we have the honour to transmit to you the text of Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia put forward by our Governments to the parties concerned in the negotiations for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) in accordance with Security Council resolution 435(1978).

We have pleasure in informing you that all parties to the negotiation now accept these Principles. Our Governments believe that a decision on the method to be employed to elect the Constituent Assembly should be made in accordance with the provision of Council resolution 435(1978). All parties are agreed that this issue must be settled in accordance with the terms of resolution 435(1978) and that the issue must not cause delay in the implementation of that resolution. In this regard, our Governments are in consultation with all parties...

Annex

Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an Independent Namibia

A. Constituent Assembly

1. In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 435(1978), elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government.

■ Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly.

■ Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write.

■ The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process.

■ Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed.

■ The electoral system will seek to ensure fair representation in the Constituent Assembly to different political parties which gain substantial support in the elections.

2. The Constituent Assembly will formulate the Constitution for an independent Namibia in accordance with the principles in part B below and will adopt the Constitution as a whole by a two-thirds majority of its total membership.

B. Principles for a Constitution for an Independent Namibia

1. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic State.

2. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the State. It may be amended only by a designated process involving the legislature or votes cast in a popular referendum, or both.

3. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. It will provide for a system of government with three branches: an elected executive branch which will be responsible to the legislative branch; a legislative branch to be elected by universal and equal suffrage which will be responsible for the passage of all laws; and an independent judicial branch which will be responsible for the interpretation

of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the law. The executive and legislative branches will be constituted by periodic and genuine elections which will be held by secret vote.

4. The electoral system will be consistent with the principles in A.1 above.

5. There will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life, personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property or deprivation of private property without just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination.

The declaration of rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.

6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to provide for increased penalties with retrospective effect.

7. Provision will be made for the balanced structuring of the public service, the police service and the defence services and for equal access by all to recruitment of these services. The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies.

8. Provision will be made for the establishment of elected councils for local or regional administration, or both.

Appendix L: Protocol of Geneva

PROTOCOL OF GENEVA

Delegations representing the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola/Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, 2-5 August 1988, with the mediation of Dr Chester A Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, United States of America, have agreed as follows:

1. Each side agrees to recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that 1 November 1988 be established as the date for implementation of UNSCR 435/78.
2. Each side agrees to the establishment of a target date for signature of the tripartite agreement among Angola, South Africa, and Cuba not later than 10 September 1988.
3. Each side agrees that a schedule acceptable to all parties for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola must be established by Angola and Cuba, who will request on-site verification by the Security Council of the United Nations. The parties accept 1 September 1988 as the target date for reaching agreement on that schedule and all related matters.
4. The complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola shall begin not later than 10 August 1988 and be completed not later than 1 September 1988.
5. The parties undertake to adopt the necessary measures of restraint in order to maintain the existing *de facto* cessation of hostilities. South Africa stated its willingness to convey this commitment in writing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Angola and Cuba shall urge SWAPO to proceed likewise as a step prior to the ceasefire contemplated in resolution 435/78 which will be established prior to 1 November 1988. Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that, once the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola is completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO's forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel. The parties deemed it appropriate that, during the period before 1 November 1988, a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General be present in Luanda to take cognizance of any disputes relative to the cessation of hostilities and agreed that the combined military committee contemplated in paragraph 9 can be an appropriate venue for reviewing complaints of this nature that may arise.
6. As of 10 August 1988, no Cuban troops will deploy or be south of the line Chitido-Ruacana-Cahueque-Naulila-Cuamato-NGiva. Cuba furthermore stated that upon completion of the withdrawal of the South African troops from Angola not later than 1 September 1988 and the restoration by the People's Republic of Angola of its sovereignty over its international boundaries, the Cuban troops will not take part in offensive operations in the territory that lies east of meridian 17 and south of parallel 15 degrees, 30 minutes, provided that they are not subject to harassment.
7. Following the complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, the Government of Angola shall guarantee measures for the provision of water and power supply to Namibia.
8. With a view toward minimizing the risk of battlefield incidents and facilitating exchange of technical information related to implementation of the agreements reached, direct communications shall be established not later than 20 August 1988 between the respective military commanders at appropriate headquarters along the Angola/Namibia border.
9. Each side recognizes that the period from 1 September 1988, by which time South African forces will have completed their withdrawal from Angola, and the date established for implementation of UNSCR 435, is a period of particular sensitivity, for which specific guidelines for military activities are presently lacking. In the interest of maintaining the ceasefire and maximizing the conditions for the orderly introduction of UNTAG, the sides agree to establish a combined military committee to develop additional practical measures to build confidence and reduce the risk of unintended incidents. They invite United States membership on the committee.
10. Each side will act in accordance with the Governors Island principles, including paragraph E (non-interference in the internal affairs of states) and paragraph G (the acceptance of the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other states).


FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF ANGOLA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CUBA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA:

Geneva, 5 August 1988

South African Department of Foreign Affairs,
Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop
Withdrawal, Pretoria 1989, p.30,31.



Appendix M: Schedule of the Peace Process

DATE	NAMIBIA	ANGOLA
1 April 1989	Commencement of implementation of UNSCR 435/78, the reduction of South African forces and confinement to their bases in Namibia. Release of prisoners/detainees.	Completion of the withdrawal of 3 000 of the estimated 50 000 Cuban troops from Angola. Commencement of the step-by-step withdrawal of the remaining 47 000 troops and their simultaneous and gradual redeployment to the north. Commencement of the confinement of SWAPO combatants to their bases in Angola and Zambia.
14 May 1989	South African forces reduced to 12 000 men and commencement of return of exiles and publication of election rules. Completion of the repeal of discriminatory legislation. Dismantling of command structures of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces and confinement of their military equipment under UN supervision.	
11 June 1989	South African forces reduced to 8 000 men and repatriation of refugees completed.	
1 July 1989	South African forces reduced to 1 500 men confined to base and election campaign begins.	
1 August 1989		All the remaining Cuban troops in Angola will have been withdrawn to the north of the 15th parallel.
31 October 1989		All the remaining Cuban troops in Angola will have been withdrawn to the north of the 13th parallel.
1 November 1989	Election for Constituent Assembly.	25 000 of the 50 000 Cuban troops (50%) will have been withdrawn from Angola.
1 week after the certification of the election	All the South African forces will have been withdrawn.	
1 April 1990		33 000 Cuban troops (66%) will have been withdrawn from Angola with the remainder deployed north of the 13th parallel.
1 October 1990		38 000 Cuban troops (76%) will have been withdrawn from Angola.
1 July 1991		All Cuban troops will have been withdrawn from Angola.

South African Department of Foreign Affairs,
Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop Withdrawal,
Pretoria, 1989, p.68.

Appendix N: Protocol of Brazzaville

PROTOCOL OF BRAZZAVILLE

Delegations representing the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa,

Meeting in Brazzaville with the mediation of the Government of the United States of America,

Expressing their deep appreciation to the President of the People's Republic of the Congo, Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, for his indispensable contribution to the cause of peace in southwestern Africa and for the hospitality extended to the delegations by the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo,

Confirming their commitment to act in accordance with the Principles for a peaceful settlement in southwestern Africa, initialled at New York on 13 July 1988 and approved by their respective Governments on 20 July 1988, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement; with the understandings reached at Geneva on 5 August 1988 that are not superseded by this document and with the agreement reached at Geneva on 15 November 1988 for the redeployment to the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola,

Urging the international community to provide economic and financial support for the implementation of all aspects of this settlement,

Agree as follows:

1. The parties agree to recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that 1 April 1989 be established as the date for implementation of UNSCR 435/78.
2. The parties agree to meet on 22 December 1988 in New York for signature of the tripartite agreement and for signature by Angola and Cuba of their bilateral agreement. By the date of signature, Angola and Cuba shall have reached agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on verification arrangements to be approved by the Security Council.
3. The parties agree to exchange the prisoners of war upon signature of the tripartite agreement.
4. The parties agree to establish a Joint Commission in accordance with the annex attached to this protocol.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC
OF ANGOLA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CUBA:


FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA:



Brazzaville, 13 December 1988

ANNEX ON THE JOINT COMMISSION

1. With the objective of facilitating the resolution of any dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation of the tripartite agreement, the parties hereby establish a Joint Commission, which shall begin its work upon signature of the tripartite agreement.
2. The Joint Commission shall serve as a forum for discussion and resolution of issues regarding the interpretation and implementation of the tripartite agreement, and for such other purposes as the parties in the future may mutually agree.
3. The parties invite the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to participate as observers in the work of the Commission. Furthermore, the parties agree that, upon the independence of Namibia, the Namibian Government should be included as a full member of the Joint Commission. To that end, the parties will extend a formal invitation to the Namibian Government to join the Joint Commission on the date of Namibian independence.
4. The Joint Commission shall be constituted within thirty days of the signing of the tripartite agreement. The Joint Commission shall establish its own regulations and rules of procedure for regular meetings and for special meetings which may be requested by any party.
5. The decision by a party to discuss or seek the resolution of an issue in the Joint Commission shall not prejudice the right of that party to raise the issue, as it deems appropriate, before the Security Council of the United Nations or to pursue such other means of dispute resolution as are available under international law.
6. The Joint Commission shall in no way function as a substitute for UNTAG (including the monitoring role of UNTAG outside Namibia) or for the UN entity performing verification in Angola.



Appendix O: Tripartite Agreement signed by Angola, Cuba and South Africa

AGREEMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter designated as "the Parties",

Taking into account the "Principles for a peaceful settlement in southwestern Africa", approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988, and the subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these Principles, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.

Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September 1978, hereinafter designated as "UNSCR 435/78".

Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola.

Recognizing the role of the United Nations Security Council in implementing UNSCR 435/78 and in supporting the implementation of the present agreement.

Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of all states of southwestern Africa.

Affirming the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states.

Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights, and of the states of southwestern Africa to peace, development, and social progress.

Urging African and international co-operation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa.

Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America.

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in southwestern Africa.

Agree to the provisions set forth below.



- (1) The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council to commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989.
- (2) All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435/78.
- (3) Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435/78, the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Angola shall co-operate with the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with acts of war, aggression, or violence against the territorial integrity or inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other action which could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78.
- (4) The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the Security Council of the United Nations for the on-site verification of that withdrawal.
- (5) Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression, or violence, against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, or independence of any state of southwestern Africa.
- (6) The Parties shall respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa.
- (7) The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations undertaken in this agreement and shall resolve through negotiation and in a spirit of co-operation any disputes with respect to the interpretation or implementation thereof.
- (8) This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Signed at New York in triplicate in the Portuguese, Spanish and English languages, each language being equally authentic, this 22nd day of December 1988.

FOR THE PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA:

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF
CUBA:

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA:



South African Department of Foreign Affairs,
Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop
Withdrawal, Pretoria 1989, p.16,17,



S



S/20345
22 December 1988

LETTER DATED 22 DECEMBER 1988 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CUBA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the bilateral Agreement signed today between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba.

I request you to have this Agreement circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Oscar ORAMAS OLIVA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA FOR THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONALIST MISSION OF THE CUBAN MILITARY CONTINGENT

The Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, hereinafter referred to as 'the Parties',

Considering

That on 1 April the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978) on the independence of Namibia will commence,

That the question of the independence of Namibia and the safeguarding of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola are closely interlinked and closely linked to peace and security in the southwestern region of Africa,

That, on the same date as the present Agreement, a tripartite agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba, the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, containing the essential elements for the achievement of peace in the southwestern region of Africa, is to be signed,

That, with the acceptance of and strict compliance with the aforementioned, the causes that gave rise to the request made by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, in legitimate exercise of its right under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, for the dispatch to Angolan territory of a Cuban internationalist military contingent to ensure, together with FAPLA, its territorial integrity and its sovereignty in the face of the invasion and occupation of a part of its territory.

Taking into account

The agreements signed between the Governments of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Republic of Angola on 4 February 1982 and 19 March 1984, the platform of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola approved in November 1984 and the Brazzaville Protocol signed by the Governments of the Republic of Cuba, the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of South Africa on 13 December 1988,

Now therefore hold it to be established

That the conditions have been created which permit the commencement of the return to its

ARTICLE 1

The redeployment to the fifteenth and thirteenth parallels and the phased and total withdrawal to Cuba of the 50 000-man contingent of Cuban troops dispatched to the People's Republic of Angola shall commence, in accordance with the pace and time-limits established in the annexed timetable, which shall form an integral part of this Agreement. The total withdrawal shall be concluded on 1 July 1991.

ARTICLE 2

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba reserve the right to modify or alter their obligations arising out of article 1 of this Agreement in the event that flagrant violations of the tripartite agreement are verified.

ARTICLE 3

Both Parties, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, request the Security Council to carry out verification of the redeployment and the phased and total withdrawal of the Cuban

troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and to that end the corresponding protocol shall be agreed upon.

ARTICLE 4

This Agreement shall enter into force upon the signature of the tripartite agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Cuba, the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of South Africa.

DONE on 22 December 1988 at United Nations Headquarters, in duplicate in the Spanish and Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the Republic of Cuba For the Government of the People's Republic of Angola

(Signed) Isidoro MALMERCA PEOLI (Signed) Alfonso VAN DUNEM (MBINDA)

Appendix

TIMETABLE ANNEXED TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERNATIONALIST MISSION OF THE CUBAN MILITARY CONTINGENT

In compliance with article 1 of the Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Republic of Angola on the conclusion of the internationalist mission of the Cuban military contingent now present in Angolan territory, both Parties establish the following timetable for withdrawal:

TIME-LIMITS	
By 1 April 1989	3 000 troops
(day of the commencement of the implementation of resolution 435(1978))	
Total duration of the timetable starting from 1 April 1989	27 months
Redeployment northwards:	
To the 15th parallel	1 August 1989
To the 13th parallel	31 October 1989
Total troops to be withdrawn:	
By 1 November 1989	25 000 (50 per cent)
By 1 April 1990	33 000 (66 per cent)
By 1 October 1990	38 000 (76 per cent)
By 1 July 1991	50 000 (100 per cent)

South African Department of Foreign Affairs,
Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop
Withdrawal, Pretoria 1989, p.26-28.

Appendix P: Bilateral Agreement signed by Angola and Cuba

Appendix Q: U.N. Res 628/629/632

Décision

A sa 2842^e séance, le 16 janvier 1989, le Conseil a examiné la question intitulée "La situation en Namibie".

Résolution 628 (1989) du 16 janvier 1989

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Rappelant sa résolution 626 (1988) du 20 décembre 1988,

Prenant acte de l'accord entre la République populaire d'Angola, la République de Cuba et la République sud-africaine, signé le 22 décembre 1988⁸,

Prenant également acte de l'accord entre la République populaire d'Angola et la République de Cuba, signé le 22 décembre 1988⁹,

Soulignant l'importance de ces deux accords pour le renforcement de la paix et de la sécurité internationales,

1. Se félicite de la signature de l'accord entre la République populaire d'Angola, la République de Cuba et la République sud-africaine, d'une part, et de l'accord entre la République populaire d'Angola et la République de Cuba, d'autre part;
2. Appuie sans réserve ces accords, et, dans cet esprit, décide d'en suivre de près l'application;
3. Demande à toutes les parties intéressées, ainsi qu'à tous les Etats Membres, de coopérer à l'application de ces accords;
4. Prie le Secrétaire général de tenir le Conseil de sécurité pleinement informé de l'application de la présente résolution.

Adoptée à l'unanimité à la 2842^e séance.

⁸ Question ayant fait l'objet de résolutions ou de décisions du Conseil en 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987 et 1988.

⁹ Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, quarante-troisième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre et décembre 1988, document S/20346, annexe.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, document S/20345, annexe.

Résolution 629 (1989) du 16 janvier 1989

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Réaffirmant ses résolutions pertinentes, en particulier les résolutions 431 (1978) du 27 juillet 1978 et 435 (1978) du 29 septembre 1978,

Tenant compte de sa résolution 628 (1989) du 16 janvier 1989,

Notant que les parties au Protocole de Brazzaville¹¹ sont convenues de recommander au Secrétaire général de fixer au 1^{er} avril 1989 la date à laquelle doit commencer l'application de la résolution 435 (1978),

Considérant les progrès du processus de paix dans le sud-ouest de l'Afrique,

Préoccupé par le renforcement des forces de police et des forces paramilitaires et par la création de la force territoriale du Sud-Ouest africain dès 1978 et soulignant la nécessité de garantir des conditions dans lesquelles le peuple namibien puisse participer à des élections libres et régulières sous la supervision et le contrôle de l'Organisation des Nations Unies,

Notant aussi que cette évolution justifie un réexamen des moyens dont a besoin le Groupe d'assistance des Nations Unies pour la période de transition pour s'acquitter efficacement de sa mission et qui ont été prévus pour lui permettre notamment de surveiller les frontières, d'empêcher les infiltrations, de prévenir les mesures d'intimidation et de veiller à ce que les réfugiés puissent regagner leurs foyers en toute sécurité et participer librement aux élections,

Rappelant qu'il a approuvé la déclaration faite devant lui par le Secrétaire général le 29 septembre 1989¹²,

Soulignant qu'il est résolu à assurer rapidement l'indépendance de la Namibie au moyen d'élections libres et régulières sous la supervision et le contrôle de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, conformément à sa résolution 435 (1978),

Réaffirmant la responsabilité juridique de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à l'égard de la Namibie,

1. Décide que l'application de la résolution 435 (1978) commencera le 1^{er} avril 1989;
2. Prie le Secrétaire général de prendre les dispositions nécessaires à la réalisation d'un cessez-le-feu officiel entre la South West Africa People's Organization et l'Afrique du Sud;
3. Demande à l'Afrique du Sud de procéder immédiatement à une réduction substantielle de ses forces de police stationnées en Namibie en vue de réaliser un équilibre satisfaisant entre l'effectif de ces forces et celui du Groupe d'assistance des Nations Unies pour la période de transition, et de permettre ainsi à celui-ci d'exercer un contrôle efficace;

¹¹ *Ibid.*, document S/20325, annexe.

¹² Document S/12869; pour le texte, voir Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, trente-troisième année, 2087^e séance, par. 11 à 22.



Appendix Q: U.N. Res 628/629/632

4. Réaffirme qu'il incombe à tous les intéressés de coopérer pour garantir l'application impartiale du plan de règlement conformément à la résolution 435 (1978);

5. Prie le Secrétaire général d'établir le plus tôt possible à son intention un rapport sur l'application de la résolution 435 (1978), en tenant compte de tous les événements pertinents survenus depuis l'adoption de cette résolution;

6. Prie aussi le Secrétaire général, lorsqu'il établira ce rapport, de réexaminer les besoins du Groupe afin de définir toutes les mesures tangibles de compression des dépenses qu'il serait possible de prendre sans compromettre la capacité du Groupe de s'acquitter pleinement de la mission qui lui a été assignée en 1978, à savoir assurer rapidement l'indépendance de la Namibie au moyen d'élections libres et régulières sous la supervision et le contrôle de l'Organisation des Nations Unies;

7. Demande aux Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies d'étudier, en coordination avec le Secrétaire général, comment ils pourraient apporter au peuple namibien une aide économique et financière, tant pendant la période de transition qu'après l'indépendance.

Adoptée à l'unanimité à la 2842^e séance.

Décision

A la 2848^e séance, le 16 février 1989, le Conseil a examiné la question intitulée :

"La situation en Namibie :

- "a) Nouveau rapport du Secrétaire général concernant l'application des résolutions 435 (1978) et 439 (1978) du Conseil de sécurité relatives à la question de Namibie (S/20412¹³);
- "b) Déclaration explicative du Secrétaire général visant son nouveau rapport concernant l'application des résolutions 435 (1978) et 439 (1978) du Conseil de sécurité relatives à la question de Namibie (S/20457¹⁴)".

Résolution 632 (1989)

du 16 février 1989

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Réaffirmant ses résolutions pertinentes, en particulier les résolutions 431 (1978) du 27 juillet 1978, 435 (1978) du 29 septembre 1978 et aussi 629 (1989) du 16 janvier 1989,

Réaffirmant aussi que le plan des Nations Unies contenu dans la résolution 435 (1978) reste la seule base de règlement pacifique de la question namibienne qui soit acceptée à l'échelle internationale,

Confirmant la décision énoncée au paragraphe 1 de sa résolution 629 (1989), en vertu de laquelle l'application de la résolution 435 (1978) commencera le 1^{er} avril 1989,

Ayant examiné le rapport, en date du 23 janvier 1989, présenté par le Secrétaire général¹⁴, ainsi que sa déclaration explicative du 9 février 1989¹⁵,

Tenant compte des assurances qui ont été données au Secrétaire général par tous les membres du Conseil et qui sont énoncées au paragraphe 5 de sa déclaration explicative,

Réaffirmant la responsabilité juridique de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à l'égard de la Namibie jusqu'à l'indépendance,

1. Approuve le rapport du Secrétaire général ainsi que sa déclaration explicative concernant l'application du plan des Nations Unies pour la Namibie;

2. Décide d'appliquer sa résolution 435 (1978) sous sa forme originale et définitive afin de garantir en Namibie les conditions voulues pour permettre au peuple namibien de participer librement et sans intimidation au processus électoral sous la supervision et le contrôle de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en vue de l'accès rapide du Territoire à l'indépendance;

3. Assure le Secrétaire général de son appui et de sa coopération sans réserve dans l'exécution du mandat qu'il lui a confié aux termes de la résolution 435 (1978);

4. Demande à toutes les parties intéressées d'honorer les engagements qu'elles ont pris en ce qui concerne le plan des Nations Unies et de coopérer sans réserve avec le Secrétaire général à l'application de la présente résolution;

5. Prie le Secrétaire général de tenir le Conseil de sécurité pleinement informé de l'application de la présente résolution.

Adoptée à l'unanimité à la 2848^e séance.

¹³ Voir Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, quarante-quatrième année, Supplément de janvier, février et mars 1989.

¹⁴ Ibid., document S/20412.

¹⁵ Ibid., document S/20457.



Appendix Q: U.N. Res 628/629/632

Décisions

Dans une lettre, en date du 21 février 1989¹⁶, le Secrétaire général s'est référé au paragraphe 59 du nouveau rapport, en date du 23 janvier 1989, qu'il avait présenté concernant l'application des résolutions 435 (1978) et 439 (1978) du Conseil de sécurité relatives à la question de Namibie¹⁴ et a proposé au Conseil de sécurité que les diverses unités de l'élément militaire du Groupe d'assistance des Nations Unies pour la période de transition soient composées de contingents fournis par les pays suivants : a) bataillons d'infanterie : Bangladesh, Finlande, Kenya, Malaisie, Togo, Venezuela et Yougoslavie; b) observateurs militaires : Bangladesh, Finlande, Inde, Irlande, Kenya, Malaisie, Pakistan, Panama, Pérou, Pologne, Soudan, Tchécoslovaquie, Togo et Yougoslavie; c) unités de soutien logistique : Australie, Canada, Danemark, Espagne, Italie, Pologne et Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord. Les unités de soutien logistique devraient aussi comprendre des éléments civils envoyés par la République fédérale d'Allemagne et la Suisse. Le 23 février 1989, le Président du Conseil a adressé au Secrétaire général une lettre¹⁷ dont la teneur était la suivante :

"J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que j'ai porté votre lettre, en date du 21 février 1989, concernant la composition de l'élément militaire du Groupe d'assistance des Nations Unies pour la période de transition¹⁶ à l'attention des membres du Conseil de sécurité. Ils ont examiné la question au cours de consultations officielles tenues les 22 et 23 février et ont approuvé les propositions contenues dans votre lettre."

Dans une lettre, en date du 24 mai 1989¹⁸, le Secrétaire général s'est référé à l'intervention qu'il avait faite devant le Conseil à l'occasion de consultations tenues le 11 mai 1989 au sujet de la situation en Namibie. Il avait alors informé le Conseil que son représentant spécial en Namibie avait recommandé de porter à 1 000 au total le nombre de policiers de métier affectés au Groupe d'assistance des Nations Unies pour la période de transition et que, une fois achevés les préparatifs techniques voulus, il saisirait de nouveau le Conseil. Il a alors confirmé qu'il entreprendrait d'urgence des consultations à ce sujet et informerait notamment le Comité consultatif pour les questions administratives et budgétaires du coût de l'opération, après quoi il se proposait d'envoyer en Namibie, à compter de la mi-juin, les 500 nouveaux policiers requis. Le 26 mai 1989, le Président du Conseil a adressé au Secrétaire général une lettre¹⁹ dont la teneur était la suivante :

"J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que j'ai porté votre lettre, en date du 24 mai 1989, concernant l'accroissement du nombre de policiers de métier affectés au Groupe d'assistance des Nations Unies pour la période de transition¹⁸ à l'attention des membres du Conseil de sécurité. Ils ont examiné la question et approuvé la proposition contenue dans votre lettre."

A sa 2876^e séance, le 16 août 1989, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants de l'Afrique du Sud, de l'Angola, du Cameroun, de Cuba, de l'Égypte, du Ghana, du Mali, du Nigéria, de la République-Unie de Tanzanie et de la Zambie à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question intitulée :

"La situation en Namibie :

"Lettre, en date du 10 août 1989, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le Représentant permanent du Ghana auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (S/20779²⁰);

"Lettre, en date du 10 août 1989, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le Représentant permanent du Zimbabwe auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (S/20782²¹)".

A sa 2877^e séance, le 17 août 1989, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants du Burundi, du Guatemala, de l'Inde et de l'Indonésie à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question.

A sa 2878^e séance, le 18 août 1989, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants du Bangladesh, du Nicaragua, de l'Ouganda et du Pakistan à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question.

A sa 2879^e séance, le 21 août 1989, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants du Congo, de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne, de la Mauritanie et de la République fédérale d'Allemagne à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question.

A sa 2880^e séance, le 21 août 1989, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants de l'Afghanistan et du Zimbabwe à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question.

¹⁶ S/20479.

¹⁷ S/20480.

¹⁸ S/20657.

¹⁹ S/20658.



Appendix R: Namibian Election Results

Namibian Election: Summary Results by Electoral District

Electoral district number	Name of district	ACN	CDA	DTA	FCN	NNDP	NNF	NPF	SWAPO-D	SWAPO	UDF	Reject	Total votes cast	Total valid votes
01	Bethanie	301	32	1,314	35	4	8	15	16	461	87	44	2,337	2,291
02	Damaraland	175	28	2,579	34	9	109	62	25	4,204	1,838	152	15,215	15,063
03	Gobabis	1,940	158	11,684	173	50	391	377	59	2,458	442	379	18,111	17,732
04	Grootfontein	1,606	115	8,818	236	32	66	376	51	6,417	1,319	566	19,602	19,036
05	Hereroland	68	89	9,880	193	33	705	1,935	40	2,353	100	209	15,605	15,396
06	Kaokoland	64	91	8,180	120	70	48	2,480	24	1,330	71	316	12,794	12,478
07	Karasburg	4,820	54	10,068	367	30	40	152	39	2,378	739	126	18,813	18,687
08	Karibib	406	24	1,989	67	2	56	161	14	2,244	1,533	86	6,382	6,496
09	Kavango	527	449	24,817	401	179	151	497	319	30,755	1,336	1,995	81,426	59,431
10	Ketmanshoop	1,438	100	9,249	335	38	432	209	113	5,496	1,518	301	19,269	18,968
11	Lüderitz	521	17	2,138	89	14	218	67	26	7,753	390	45	11,278	11,233
12	Malahóho	388	15	668	161	13	8	14	9	848	383	71	2,578	2,507
13	Mariental	1,467	85	7,665	403	26	77	101	29	3,024	1,036	169	14,082	13,913
14	Okahandja	672	42	4,273	56	9	81	334	23	3,718	1,142	30	10,380	10,350
15	Oranien	213	40	2,959	48	5	206	318	24	1,281	589	89	5,772	5,683
16	Oos-Caprivi	104	168	13,786	436	44	44	687	93	10,415	556	673	27,006	26,333
17	Otjiwarongo	699	49	5,213	81	12	134	134	19	4,020	1,835	142	12,318	12,176
18	Outjo	765	37	3,072	88	3	31	52	13	1,197	1,483	163	6,904	6,741
19	Ovambo	465	489	10,745	150	214	95	505	1,706	225,621	5,167	3,014	248,171	245,157
20	Rehoboth	127	66	7,746	5,010	84	304	243	48	3,015	462	251	17,356	17,105
21	Swakopmund	1,271	32	5,931	395	5	241	145	64	14,123	1,736	140	24,083	23,943
22	Tsumeb	922	36	4,028	96	11	46	72	57	7,254	1,202	148	13,872	13,724
23	Windhoek	4,749	279	34,730	1,458	77	1,853	1,777	350	44,202	6,910	749	97,134	96,385
Grand totals:		23,728	2,495	191,532	10,452	984	5,344	10,693	3,161	384,567	37,874	9,858	690,688	670,830

1989 Namibian Election Results

Party Affiliation	Seats Won	Total Votes	Pct. of Vote
Aksis Christelik Nasionaal (ACN)	3	23,728	3.537
Christian Democratic Action for Social Justice (CDA)	0	2,495	0.372
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)	21	191,532	28.551
Van Namibia	1	10,452	1.558
Federal Convention of Namibia (FCN)	0	984	0.147
Namibia National Democratic Party (NNDP)	1	5,344	0.797
Namibia National Front (NNF)	1	10,693	1.594
National Patriotic Front of Namibia (NPF)	0	3,161	0.472
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)—Democrats (SWAPO-D)	41	384,567	57.327
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	4	37,874	5.646
United Democratic Front of Namibia (UDF)			
TOTAL	72	670,830	100.00



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