


ISSN 2238-6262 / e-ISSN 2238-6912

AUSTRAL

Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais



Porto Alegre, v.5, n.10 | Jul./Dec. 2016



Austral	Porto Alegre	v.5, n.10	p. 1-276	Jul./Dec. 2016
---------	--------------	-----------	----------	----------------

About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations was the first Brazilian journal in the area of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) and the Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world.

The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. *AUSTRAL* is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations.

The content of the journal consists of in-depth analytical articles written by experts (Professors and Doctors), focusing on each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to *AUSTRAL* are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

Indexes

LivRe! | Latindex | ISN-ETH | Journal TOCs | Sumário de Revistas Brasileiras
Beardsley Library Journals | Directory of Open Access Journals | Scopus
Columbia International Affairs Online | EZB - Social Science Research
Center Berlin | ROAD - Directory of Open Access scholarly Resources

This work was supported by the
Journal Edition Supportive Program (PAEP) - UFRGS



**Programa de apoio à
Edição de Periódicos**

Editorial Team | *Equipe Editorial*

Editor | *Editor*

Paulo Visentini (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Deputy Editor | *Editor Adjunto*

Marco Cepik (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Editorial Board | *Conselho Editorial*

Celso Amorim (Ministério das Relações Exteriores / NERINT, Brazil)

Carlos Arturi (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Chris Landsberg (University of Johannesburg, South Africa)

Eduardo Mígon (Escola de Comando e Estado-maior do Exército, Brazil)

Érico Esteves Duarte (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Fábio Morosini (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Gladys Lechini (Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina)

Immanuel Wallerstein (Yale University, United States of America)

Marcelo Milan (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Ruchita Beri (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India)

Edition Assistants | *Assistentes de Edição*

Guilherme Thudium (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

João Vitor Corrêa (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Vitória Gonzalez Rodriguez (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Consultative Board | *Conselho Consultivo*

Adam Habib (University of Johannesburg, South Africa)

Amado Luiz Cervo (Universidade de Brasília, Brazil)

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

André Luiz Reis da Silva (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Antônio Carlos Lessa (Universidade de Brasília, Brazil)

Antonio Jorge Ramalho (Universidade de Brasília, Brazil)

Beatriz Bissio (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)

Bertrand Badie (Sciences Po, France)

Boris F. Martynov (Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia)

Carlos Aurélio Pimenta de Faria (Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Brazil)

Cristina Pecequillo (Universidade Federal de São Paulo, Brazil)

Diego Pautasso (ESPM-Sul / Unisinos, Brazil)

Henry Kam Kah (University of Buea, Cameroon)

Ilter Turan (Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey)

José Ariosa Pérez (Universidad de la Habana, Cuba)

José Miguel Quedi Martins (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

Liu Youfa (China Institute of International Studies, China)

Lotfi Kaabi (Institut Tunisien des Études Stratégiques, Tunisia)

Lucas Kerr de Oliveira (Universidade Federal da Integração Latino-Americana, Brazil)

Luiz Rogério Goldoni (Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Brazil)

Mamoudou Gazibo (Université de Montréal, Canada)

Marcos Costa Lima (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Brazil)

Maria Regina Soares de Lima (IESP, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)

Mehdi Parvizi Amineh (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Monica Hirst (Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Argentina)

Nikolai Mikhailov (Russkiy Mir Foundation, Russia)

Sean W. Burges (Australian National Centre for Latin American Studies, Australia)



©Núcleo Brasileiro de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais - UFRGS

Cover and Layout: Tiago Oliveira Baldasso

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations is available online in English and Portuguese at www.seer.ufrgs.br/austral

Contact

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas
Av. João Pessoa, 52, sala 18E - CEP 90040-000 - Centro
Porto Alegre/RS - Brazil
Phone: +55 51 3308.3963 | Fax: +55 51 3308.3963
E-mail: austral@ufrgs.br

www.seer.ufrgs.br/Austral

Cataloging-in-Publication (CIP)

Austral : Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações
Internacionais = Brazilian Journal of Strategy &
International Relations / Universidade Federal do Rio
Grande do Sul, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas.
- v. 5, n. 10 (J./Dec. 2016). - Porto Alegre:
NERINT/PPGEEI/FCE/UFRGS, 2012-
Semestral.
ISSN 2238-6262. e-ISSN 2238-6912
1. Political Science. 2. International Relations.
3. International Politics. 4. Diplomacy. 5. Developing
Countries.

CDU 327

Biblioteca Gládis Wiebbelling do Amaral, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da UFRGS.

Contents

Editor's Note	7
<i>Paulo Fagundes Visentini</i>	
Framing Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation: perspectives from China	9
<i>Cui Shoujun, Otávio Costa Miranda</i>	
Interactions between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the United Nations and its repercussion to Japan's national security	32
<i>Aline Chianca Dantas, Alexandre Cesar Cunha Leite</i>	
The consolidation of North Korea as a nuclear power through the leadership of Kim Jong Un	48
<i>David Morales Martinez, Cristian Pires Coelho Martins</i>	
Civil Society and Regional Powers in a Changing World: the cases of Brazil and India	71
<i>Daniela Vieira Secches, Maria Cristina Andrade Aires</i>	
Maritime geopolitics as a strategic factor for regional integration in South America	90
<i>Fernanda Pacheco De Campos Brozoski, Raphael Padula</i>	
South Africa and regional stability in the Mbeki era: the nexus between personality and geo-political and economic concerns in foreign policy making	108
<i>Olajide Olayemi Akanji</i>	
The evolution of Peacekeeping: Suez, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of the Congo	122
<i>Maria Fernanda Affonso Leal, Rafael Santin, David Almstadter de Magalhães</i>	
From "Failed State" to exporter of security? Colombia and the diplomacy of security	148
<i>Esteban Arratia Sandoval</i>	
National defense policy and the protection of the critical energy infrastructure in Brazil	173
<i>Iure Paiva</i>	

Current overview and future perspectives on integrated defense logistics in South America: opportunities for the regional defence industry <i>Edson Aita, Álvaro Vasconcelos Studart, Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira</i>	199
UNASUR in a comparative light: the relations with Venezuela and Colombia <i>Fabio Luis Barbosa Dos Santos</i>	229
Bolivarian foreign policy: Venezuela´s international insertion during Hugo Chávez Frías first-two mandates (1999-2007) <i>Pedro Henrique de Moraes Cicero</i>	252
Partners	271
Submission Standards / Previous Issues	274

*The responsibility for the content of the articles is of their respective authors.
A responsabilidade do conteúdo dos artigos é de seus respectivos autores.*

Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
e-ISSN 2238-6912 | ISSN 2238-6262 | v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016

EDITOR'S NOTE

Paulo Visentini¹

With its 10th edition, AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, completes 5 years of existence. Since its inception, it has been publishing dense and prospective analytical articles, written by Professors and Doctors, renowned experts in their fields of research. The idea was initially to draw attention to a global crisis (both geographical and thematic) in progress. Then, we addressed the acceleration of the political and economic processes of International Relations. Finally, in 2016 we can speak of a real earthquake shaking the already fragile world order.

The crisis in the Middle East has undergone a remarkable evolution and transformation, particularly when it comes to the role of Turkey (with its failed coup attempt) and the Russian protagonism in Syria. NATO's strength seems shaken, while Moscow affirms its presence with the recent retake of Aleppo by the Syrian government forces. Europe is experimenting the worsening of the migratory issue, the crisis of the integration and the Brexit vote, which for the first time will make a country leave the successful supranational union in almost 60 years.

Germany seems to be in an uncomfortable position, while xenophobia and the advancement of right-wing populism, as well as financial and social instability, continue to rise. The answers seem contradictory, with attempts to return to the foundations of the integration process, while, at the same time, recent NATO maneuvers point to the opposite direction. South America has undergone a near-complete political change, with the impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and the defeat of the center-left across the subcontinent, in a context of permanent instability and international realignments that are still not very clear.

But nothing was more shocking than Donald Trump's election to the American presidency. This a complex and deep rooted phenomenon that,

¹ Editor, Full Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and Coordinator of the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT). E-mail: paulovi@ufrgs.br

instead of being analyzed, is currently being caricatured. More than an approach to Vladimir Putin's Russia, as was advocated by Henry Kissinger in his latest book 'World Order', the rejection of several free trade agreements in the Pacific and the Atlantic signals a significant change in the international arena, reinforced by Trump's propositions to reduce American engagement in NATO. Finally, in the last days of the year, the unthinkable happened: the UN Security Council condemned Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which was only possible with the American abstention, one of the last provisions of the Barack Obama era.

In this half-decade edition, the journal focuses mainly on matters of Defense, particularly in Asia and South America, as well as other regions.

We thank the Support Program for Journal Editing (PAEP) of the Office of Research of the Deanship at UFRGS for the support with the translation, editing and printing of the Journal, as well as the whole team that worked on the editing and translation, in particular the Assistant Editors Guilherme Thudium, João Vitor Corrêa and Vitória Gonzalez Rodriguez, as well as the designer Tiago Oliveira Baldasso. We are also grateful to Professor Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo for the revision of the English versions.

FRAMING SINO-BRAZILIAN ENERGY COOPERATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM CHINA

Cui Shoujun¹
Otávio Costa Miranda²

The vast resources demand driven by China's fast urbanization and economic growth and the abundant resource reserves coupled with efficient exploration capacity consolidate a solid foundation for vigorous increase in bilateral trade. In the meantime, the improving political synergy in bilateral ties reinforced by the mutual interests and common views of both countries' political elites, pundits and entrepreneurs, highlights the complementarity of their economies development and political aspirations. Following the natural incentives listed above, the Chinese FDI in Brazil flows into a wide array of sectors that range from mining and infrastructure to telecommunications and services (Fritschak, Soares and O'Connor), but among all of them energy represents the most substantial investment. According to China Global Investment Tracker, from 2005 to 2016 the Chinese FDI in Brazil represented US\$ 45 billion dollars, in which energy ranked first, receiving more than US\$ 30 billion dollars. (AEI, 2016)

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC), as the largest energy consumer and the second largest economy in the world, has seen remarkable economic growth sustained by a growing dependency on the importation of energy resources, oil and gas in particular. Consequently, energy supplies are becoming one of its pressing concerns for energy security. Brazil, on the other hand, is the largest developing economy of the western hemisphere, endowed with abundant reservoirs of oil and natural gas in deep offshore waters as well as plenty of new oil fields. Furthermore, Brazil holds huge hydroelectric poten-

¹ Associate Professor and Assistant Dean of the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China (RUC). E-mail: cuishoujun@ruc.edu.cn

² Research Assistant of International Studies at Renmin University of China. E-mail: otaviolcmiranda@gmail.com

tial, biofuels production, and significant investment in solar and wind energy farms that is transforming Brazil into energy superpower.

China and Brazil are the biggest developing nations of the Eastern and Western Hemisphere respectively, and the nature of their energy cooperation evidently complements one another, and carries strategic importance, highlighting enormous potential for future growth in the coming decades. The implications of the Sino-Brazilian cooperation are not only restricted to both countries, but have far-reaching intra-regional and global impacts. The cooperation, also aiming to continuously improve the China-Latin America integration mechanisms, with energy as a key area for cooperation. Thus, the examination of the present situation and future challenges of the Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation, as well as the discussion of actions to better advance the ongoing momentum are pertinent in this context.

Recent Developments in Sino-Brazilian Energy Cooperation

Currently, Brazil is the world's 7th largest economy and is the most prosperous economy in South America. (World Bank 2014) According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Brazil is the 8th largest consumer of energy and the 10th biggest energy producer. Due to the rapid increase in the oil demand, Brazil's oil consumption reached 3 million b/d in 2014. (EIA 2014) In the last decade, because of the fast growth of its economy, the national energy demand increased by a third. In 2014, the oil and petroleum liquids production capacity reached at 2.8 million b/d, with off-shore deep water oil accounted for more than 91 percent of the national production. (EIA 2014) According to the data released by Brazil's National Agency of Petroleum (ANP 2014), in 2014 the crude oil exploited from the Pre-salt oil reserve reached at 300 thousand b/d, representing 15 percent of the overall oil production, while in 2008 during the beginning of the exploitation of the Pre-salt oilfields the production only represented 0.4 percent of the annual production of crude oil. (ANP 2014)

The discoveries of off shore oil reserves have enabled Brazil to become an important oil producer. In 2007, Petrobras announced the offshore oil discovery with estimated oil reserves up to 5 to 8 billion barrels in the Santos basin, later named as Lula oil field. According to the BP's estimates, the total reserves may stand at 12 to 13 billion barrels, one of the biggest oil field discoveries of the past decade. (Cui 2012)

It is estimated that the current oil production lifted Brazil to the rank of second biggest South American oil reservoir, second to Venezuela. (Jia 2009) According to estimate of the International Energy Agency (IEA 2014),

by 2035 the global offshore oil supply will increase by 13 percent, in which the Brazilian production alone shall account for a third of the new supply. (IEA 2013) The IEA also predicts that by 2035 the Brazilian production of oil may double its current figure, making it the 6th largest world oil producer. (IEA 2013) Indeed, the great potential for oil exploration, together with the advanced exploitation technology know-how in deep waters, will transform Brazil into a major oil producing country in the coming decades.

Brazil is not only an advanced country in conventional energy, but also is a global leader in the development and utilization of new energy sources. The vast national hydropower potential and great investments backed and even stimulated by the government in other fields of clean and renewable energy, brings Brazil as a valuable set of energy resources and one of the biggest world investors, along with China, India and South Africa ranking at the top 10. Being guided by its own robust and diverse energy strategy, Brazil was the first country to harness biofuels. Being one of the world's largest producers and consumers of ethanol, the country has attained a remarkable progress in bioenergy production, accounting for 35 percent of global production and 13.6 percent of global consumption. (Xinhua 2015) Moreover, Brazil also has a vast hydropower industry, with hydropower generation representing approximately 80 percent of total national electricity supply. (IEA 2013)

In contrast, facing a harsh energy security situation, China has prioritized the advancement of energy partnerships, including with Brazil. The general status of Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation has unfolded in two parallel but complementary hierarchies, which can be proposed as *government-to-government* level and *business-to-business* level.

Government-to-Government Level Cooperation

From the *government-to-government* perspective, since the beginning of the 21st century the high level dynamics between two governments have achieved numerous breakthroughs in energy cooperation practices. China and Brazil have already established a inter-governmental cooperation platform through the creation of a high level joint committee. Inspired by innovative ideas, new cooperation frameworks and a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements have been established. In 2006, the PRC's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the China-Brazil Commission of High Level of Agreement and Cooperation (COSBAN). Pursuit to that, the Subcommittee of Energy and Mining was soon established in order to accelerate the cooperation in the various energy

fields, deepen the mutual understanding of each other's energy policies, and facilitate the dispute resolution arises in bilateral energy cooperation. Furthermore, the Chinese government has been attempting to apply new energy cooperation models with Brazil, in which the most known model is referred to as *loan-for-oil*.³ Distinct from directly purchasing oil from international market, or acquiring a certain percentage of equity by direct oversea investment, China extends a loan to a certain oil exporting country and expects loan repayments in the form of oil shipments at market prices. The *oil-backed loan* is usually granted to an oil-rich developing country with a reasonably stable political environment but short for foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2009, China and Brazil negotiated and signed a US\$ 10 billion deal in oil-backed loans granted by the China Development Bank (CDB), to be paid with the supply of 100 to 160 thousand b/d by following the market price of the commodity.

Since the *loan-for-oil* cooperation model has been regarded as a beneficial and profitable means by the Brazilian government, on the one hand this has allowed China to maintain stable imports of crude oil and increase its energy security, while on the other hand, Brazil has been bankrolled by the Chinese fund, a key aspect for driving its economic growth. Although for the time being Petrobras languishes in debt crisis, the *loan-for-oil* cooperation will not be affected, as the Chinese government prefers to take a long-term view for the investment rather than a short-sighted approach. The CDB and Petrobras signed a US\$ 5 billion agreement in 2015, which assured Brazil that China will continuously strengthen the strategic financial and energy cooperation with its Brazilian counterparts. (Petrobras 2015) The China Development Bank's (CDB) investments will partially soothe the debt and credibility crisis faced by Petrobras and set the skeptical minds at ease.

In addition to creating the high level committee and adopting a new cooperation model, China and Brazil also signed a series of agreements seeking to further promote the bilateral energy cooperation (Table 1). In April 2011, China and Brazil released the "Joint Communiqué between the People's Republic of China and The Federative Republic of Brazil", which covered various fields of cooperation, energy in particular. Both sides demonstrated the willingness to deepen oil trade, financing, upstream oil exploration and production (E&P), electricity, energy equipment, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, biofuels and new energy sources. In February 2012, a "Joint Action

3 Resource-backed structured financing is provided to an overseas borrower based on the long term resource product purchase and sale contract signed between the borrower and domestic enterprise, with the borrower's future sales income under the purchase and sale contract as a main source of repayment.

Plan” was also signed to formalize a decade of cooperation. During the BRICS 2014 summit, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin proposed the initiative of creating the BRICS Energy Coalition, together with a Fuel Reserve Bank and the BRICS Energy Policy Institute to promote the energy cooperation and integration among the member countries, due to the lack of coordination mechanisms inside the group, which was agreed with high enthusiasm from all the members.

The Sino-Brazilian inter-governmental energy cooperation not only enhanced the mutual political trust between both countries, but also set a solid cooperative foundation for *business-to-business* level cooperation, driven by both countries’ companies.

Table 1 - Table of Successful Sino-Brazilian Government Negotiations on Energy Cooperation

Time Period	Agreement
10/1984	Intergovernmental Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
11/1985	Government Protocol on the Steel Industry Cooperation
7/1985	Agreement on the Technical Cooperation on the Exploitation of Petroleum in the Sea signed between the PRC’s Ministry of Mining and Brazil’s Ministry of Mining and Energy
7/1988	Agreement on Scientific and Technologic Cooperation in Electricity (including hydroelectricity)
6/2006	Memorandum of Understanding of the COSBAN’s Subcommittee of Energy and Mining
2/2009	Government Protocol on the Energy and Mining Cooperation
5/2009	Memorandum of Government Understanding on Oil, Equipment and Financing
11/2009	US\$ 10 billion in oil-backed loans funding agreement signed by Petrobras and the CDB

4/2011	Memorandum of Understanding signed between the PRC's Minister of Water Resources and the Brazil's Ministry of Environment on Water Resources
6/2012	Memorandum of Understanding between Brazil's and the PRC's Ministries of Science and Technology on the Formation of a Sino-Brazilian Center of Biotechnology
4/2015	US\$ 5 billion in oil-backed loans funding agreement signed by Petrobras and the CDB

Source: RPC's and Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Business-to-Business Level Cooperation

From the *business-to-business* point of view, the potential development of Brazilian natural resources are the main incentive that drives the oil-thirsty Chinese companies to explore commercial opportunities. In *business-to-business* level, the energy cooperation between China and Brazil is mainly concentrated in four fields: crude oil trading, market access, technology absorption, and bioenergy cooperation.

The first cooperation field is bilateral oil trading. In the past few years Brazil has had a significant increase in its energy supplying role to China. Between 2003 and 2014 the Brazilian crude oil exportation to China went from less than 200 thousand tons to more than 7 million tons of equivalent oil and became China's the 10th biggest oil suppliers. (Pang 2014) If the current oil trade momentum continues, China, the world's largest oil importer, may surpass the United States and become Brazil's largest crude oil buyer. To date, the Chinese dependency on overseas oil imports has already drawn near 60 percent, half of which comes from the Middle East. In this context, the strengthening of the energy partnership between Brazil and China is more than a business opportunity, but also has a central role in the diversifying of oil import sources, relieving China of its over-dependency on the increasingly chaotic Middle East countries.

China's access to Brazilian energy market is the second. The late discoveries of offshore oil fields have provided investment opportunities for Chinese companies. Besides that, the adjustments in the Brazilian energy policy had ushered in a more favorable and attractive investment environment for Chinese energy companies to invest in Brazil, which is manifested in the fact that Chinese companies acquired equities in electric transmission

companies and constructed power transmission lines. Petrobras, as Brazil's most important and valuable public company, has been in partnership with the Chinese energy giants Sinopec, CNPC, SinoChem and CNOOC in the areas of crude oil trading, deep waters exploitation, shipbuilding industry, and marine equipment manufacturing. As a result, all the above areas have developed significantly. The fruitful and mutual beneficial cooperation has enabled the Chinese companies to be more incentivized in acquiring local assets, attending public biddings, and participating in transnational operations. In addition to the tangible commercial profits, the competitiveness and the internationalization of Chinese enterprises have also been substantially enhanced. (Table 2). (Gu 2014)

Third is technology know-how. With the fast technological development in the deep waters oil E&P, there is an increasing consensus that the gravity center of world oil production is shifting from conventional to unconventional, such as offshore reserves. In recent years, China has adapted foreign technology to improve its shallow water E&P technology, however, deep offshore exploration requires improvements. Currently, the Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) own technology for offshore oil exploration in approximately 1,500 meters deep, but is still lacking the independent R&D capabilities. However, Brazil has grasped far more sophisticated technology know-how in deep and ultra-deep water oil exploration, having successfully drilled oil in depths that exceeds 3,000 meters. Furthermore, Brazil is the first country in the world that applies remotely operated vehicles (ROV) into the installation of Wet Christmas Trees in wellheads, and also the first to use steel catenary risers in semi-submersible platforms, now having 48 floating platforms, 56 ships of different classes and more than 30 thousand kilometers of undersea pipelines. Brazil also holds the world's largest amount of offshore production platforms, and her model of installation, floating production, storage and off-loading summed along with her subsea storage and disposing systems form the Petrobras' "Early Floating Production Systems", or the "Brazil model". (Li 2014) In this area, Chinese NOCs should take a pragmatic approach to learn from Brazilian counterparts in order to fulfil its goal of becoming a leading county in marine equipment manufacturing as indicated in China's 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020).

Last but not least is biofuels cooperation. Biofuels, after coal, oil and natural gas, is the most disseminated form of energy form in the earth. Brazil has been a leader in utilizing biofuels in the world. In contrast to the relatively fast development in oil and gas cooperation, as well as the recent hydropower and transmission lines investments, the cooperation in biofuels fields is still in an early stage. Brazil has been a pioneer in the development of liquid bio-

fuels industry, solving a series of key technology obstacles and industrialization barriers. The development of biofuels has not only significantly increased Brazil's overall energy security, but contribute to the sustainable growth of national economy. With the increasing depletion of conventional energy, the lower greenhouse gas emissions and the high efficiency characteristics of biofuels make it more popular among the international community. It is thus undeniable that a well-planned and consistent cooperation with Brazil in this field would enrich the strategic partnership.

Table 2: Main agreements and facts of the Sino-Brazilian Energy Cooperation (2004-2015)

Year	Agreement Content	Companies	Model
2004	Strategic cooperation agreement on oil exploration, prospection, pipelines, engineering and technical services	Sinopec and Petrobras	Agreement
2004	GASENE pipelines building	Sinopec and Petrobras	Infrastructure construction
2006	Oil export agreement	Sinopec and Petrobras	Negotiation
2006	Joint construction of the Vitória-Cabiúnas pipeline	Sinopec and Petrobras	Infrastructure construction
2009	US\$ 10 billion Oil-backed loans	CDB and Petrobras	Oil-Backed Loans
2010	Sinopec acquires for US\$ 7,1 billion 40% of Repsol Brazil's shares	Sinopec and Repsol Brasil	Equity acquisition
2010	Sinochem Purchases for US\$ 3 billion 40% of Statoil's shares at the Peregrino oilfield	Sinochem and Statoil	Equity acquisition
2010	Joint purchase of 25% of the exploration rights at two oilfields in the Northeast	Sinopec and Petrobras	Equity acquisition
2010	State Grid acquires seven electric transmission companies and sets up a subsidiary in Brazil for R\$ 3 billion	State Grid and Spain's Elecnor, Isolux Corsan and Cobra	Equity acquisition

2011	Agreement to rise the Natural Gas offer to Rio de Janeiro	Sinopec and Petrobras	Agreement
2011	US\$ 3,9 billion agreement for the increase of Galp Energia's Brazilian subsidiary	Sinopec and Galp Energia	Financing
2012	State Grid acquires for € 751.7 million 7 power transmission lines	State Grid and ACS	Equity acquisition
2013	CTG buys 50% of 2 hydropower plants for R\$ 900 million	CTG and EDP Energias do Brasil	Equity acquisition
2013	Sinopec purchases for US\$ 15 billion deep water oilfields projects	Sinopec, Petrobras, Shell and Total	Stock Purchase
2013	Joint venture for exploration projects at the Santos basin and Libra oilfield	CNPC, CNOOC, Petrobras, Shell and Total	Joint Venture
2014	CTG purchases for R\$ 364.8 million 49% of EDP's participation in 11 wind farms	CTG and EDP Renováveis Brasil	Stock Purchase
2014	State Grid owns 49% of the joint venture to build and operate the transmission line from Belo Monte to the Southeast	State Grid and Eletrobras	Joint Venture
2014	CNPC purchases for US\$ 2.6 billion all the shares of Petrobras Energía Perú	CNPC, Petrobras and Petrobras Energía Perú S.A.	Stock Purchase
2015	CTG purchased TPI's assets for R\$ 970 million	CTG and Triunfo Participações e Investimentos	Stock Purchase
2015	State Grid won the auction for the building and operation of Belo Monte's 2nd energy transmission system	State Grid	Hired Project

2015	US\$ 5 billion credit provided to Petrobras	CDB and Petrobras	Oil-Backed Loans
2015	CTG purchases the integrity of the Jupiá and Ilha Solteira hydropower plants for US\$ 3.7 billion	CTG	Stock Purchase

Source: Authors' compilations

Challenges to the Bilateral Energy Cooperation

Even though the Sino-Brazilian bilateral energy cooperation has vast potentials and embraces diverse fields, there are still unavoidable constraints that engender barriers to a further development of the cooperation. In a nutshell, momentary and chronic challenges may affect the cooperation. This paper analyses mainly the chronic ones, which can be defined as resource nationalism, cultural and legal differences, laws and regulations constraints and the US relations with its closest neighborhood.

The first challenge is the sentiment of resource nationalism. Resource nationalism is the tendency of a government to assert control or seek revenue stakes over natural resources located on their territory for strategic and economic reasons, by setting or changing contractual terms for foreign resource extraction companies. These terms constrain the operation or profit-earnings of foreign entities, which is particularly embodied in the control of the hydrocarbon industry, thus resource nationalism conflicts with the interests of multinational corporations. (Mares 2010) Latin America often regarded as the historic origin of the resource nationalism, being one of the regions where some countries strengthen the sovereign control over oil and gas resources, restricting the participation of transnational corporations in their oil and gas sectors.

There is strong evidence that the nationalist waves in some Latin American countries remount to the economic sphere rather than ideology, and the resources nationalism follows the same historical course. (Berrios, Marak and Morgenstern 2010) As the new left arose in Latin America, Venezuela was the first country to implement nationalist policies over oil resource. In 1999 and 2001, the new Venezuelan constitution and laws granted the state full ownership of PDVSA's shares, consequently the Hugo Chavez administration adopted nationalization policies toward foreign enterprises by demanding the Venezuelan NOCs to hold no less than 60-80 percent of stakes, (Sidney 2007) substantially raising the taxation on private and foreign

capital invested in hydrocarbons, changing the status of previous contracts and agreements signed between PDVSA and foreign investors and reducing the profit margin of national private and international companies. In 2008, Bolivia and Ecuador also pursued similar policies towards international oil companies, which particularly put European, American and Brazilian companies in a tough situation.

The Brazilian energy policies are also worth noting. Since the discovery of massive deep waters oil reservoirs is a recent phenomenon, Brazil haven't historically enjoyed the same benefits of 'oil dividends' as other Latin American countries did. Therefore, the Brazilian resources nationalism sentiments are relatively mild compared with countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, or Ecuador. However, Brazil is not apathetic to the regional tendency towards resources nationalism. During the Lula administration the government introduced regulations and reforms with a strong nationalist characteristic towards the Pre-salt oil reserve, establishing the Petrobras' obligation to hold at least 30 percent of stakes in their reservoirs exploration. (Viscidi 2015) Moreover, in order to guarantee its global leadership in deep water drilling, the Brazilian government has adopted special protection measures on its advanced technologies, preventing foreign companies from obtaining access to the offshore oil drilling technology know-how, indirectly raising the exploitation costs for partner countries.

The second challenge comes from cultural and legal differences. One could argue, China's international system approach and social structure originates from Confucianist cultural traditions, while the Brazilian culture, institutions and international insertion are based on western values, highlighting the differences between the two emerging countries. In the legal aspect, Brazil's legal institutions derive from the civil law system. However, the unique combination of the civil law and the American common law makes the understanding of the Brazilian legal system more complex for foreign investors. Brazil does not have a singular comprehensive energy law encompassing various energy fields, but it has specific regulations in different energy fields, which are composed of the overall energy regulatory system. The current Constitution is clear in maintaining the Brazilian government's monopoly on the exploration and production (E&P) of important fields and resources. Prior to 1997, the Brazilian oil industry was monopolized by Petrobras, the only public company in the country, not only participating in the formulation and implementation of national energy policies, but also being responsible for administrating and overseeing the domestic oil exploration, production, refinement and transportation industry. After approximately 40 years of monopoly, in the 1990s Brazil implemented a market-oriented reform in the en-

ergy fields, as in 1997, the law 9.478, popularly known as the “New Oil Law”, allowed foreign companies to attend public biddings to explore the nation’s oilfields, liberalizing the oil and gas sectors.

Following the new law, a new legal framework was also established to uphold it, resulting in the creation of the National Council of Energy Policy (CNPE) and the National Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANP), seeking to draw out policies for various energy sectors and to define guidelines for the participation of domestic and international companies. (Gomes 2014) The National Agency of Electrical Energy (ANEEL) was also founded, being mainly responsible for the management of hydropower. The Ministry of Mines and Energy was appointed as the coordinator of all of the new agencies. Besides the new law, other regulations have also been issued, like the “Conservation and Rational Use of Energy Law”, the “New Oil Regulatory Framework”, the Inter-ministerial Ordinance 553, which deals with the national energy efficiency, as well as others laws also compose the Brazilian system of energy regulation. (Yang 2013)

The Brazilian energy regulatory system is very broad, covering from hydrocarbon extraction rights to the taxation, licensing and energy-saving systems, all of them having specific legal regulations that if added to the cultural and linguistic barriers creates major market access restrictions for Chinese and foreign companies, necessitating a meticulous study on the whole legal system. The Brazilian legislation and law enforcement processes have been complained as lacking of transparency, with a relatively high degree of arbitrariness. As an example, shortly after the deep waters oil discovery, in 2008 the Brazilian government decreed that Petrobras must hold at least 30 percent of stakes in every new project in the Pre-salt oilfields. However, the Brazilian government unexpectedly suspended the bidding process already underway for the exploration of the pre-salt blocks, in order to wait until the decree being formally legislated as law. The public biddings were resumed only after the new law was passed in 2013; however, this move discouraged foreign companies from investing in the oilfields. However, since the discovery of the Pre-salt oil the Brazilian government has introduced preferential policies intended to protect the national control over the oil reservoirs, which indirectly again raised legal obstacles for international investors. The harsh regulations, the high taxes on foreign companies, and the complex financial system, will potentially increase investment costs. (EIA 2014) Besides having a deep understanding on the energy law and regulation, Chinese companies should also be acquainted with Brazil’s labour standards and environmental law in order to perform well in the Brazilian energy market.

The US influence is the last challenge from the Chinese perspective.

From the mainstream Chinese point of view, Latin America is historically perceived as Washington's geopolitical influence sphere and the triangular relations between China, the U.S. and Brazil should not be neglected. However, since the consecutive rise of nationalist-leftist governments in many Latin American countries, the pursuit of independent foreign policies became more evident if compared to the political momentum that preluded the trend. (Hirst 2013) Seeking to reduce the American dependency on Venezuelan oil, the U.S. government viewed in the Brazilian energy market an important alternative supply source. Especially after the 'Shale Revolution', adjustments in the US energy cooperation priorities can be easily perceived and the US has a very strong interest in cooperating with Brazil particularly in the sustainable energy sectors. (Stevens 2012) Since the beginning of the last Bush administration, this tendency has been noted and several memorandums of understanding for cooperation in energy projects have been signed. The increasing engagement between Latin American countries and China coincides with some leftist governments distancing themselves from the U.S. influence, thus the Chinese inroad naturally raises the Washington's concerns in the West Hemisphere, where China's intense commercial activities, investments and political dynamics are gradually contesting the American influence and threatening their hegemony in the region. (Johnson 2005)

Despite the recent achievements and progress, the Brazil-China relation is remarkable, and the Chinese presence in Latin America is a recent phenomenon. Latin America historically and geographically is viewed as an US geopolitical sphere of influence, of whose investments and trade volume in the region are still far larger than the China's, therefore, the US factors in the region whether direct or not, should not be ignored.

Suggestions for Promoting Sino-Brazilian Energy Cooperation

In January 2015, the first Ministerial Meeting of the CELAC-China Forum was successfully held in Beijing, obtaining a historical breakthrough and rushing in a new chapter in the development of the relations between China and Latin America. During the summit Beijing proposed the 'China-CELAC Cooperation Plan 2015-2019', and announced six priority key cooperation fields, in which energy ranked as the first and foremost priority for industrial capacity cooperation. In this respect, the Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation will further deepen and develop the China-Latin America holistic relations, whereas the advance of China-Latin America relations will in turn accelerate the Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation.

Despite the problems and challenges in the bilateral cooperation, the Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation is facing a historic opportunity in the coming decades. Looking into the future, China should adopt proactive energy diplomacy towards Brazil in order to strengthen long term cooperation, enhancing its understanding on the local energy market. Furthermore China should seek to understand the Japanese and South Korean engagement approaches, and how to understand the triangular relations between China, Brazil and the US

Primarily, China should enhance its understanding on the Brazilian energy market, reducing legal, social, environmental and commercial risks. Undoubtedly, a thorough and comprehensive knowledge is the most basic prerequisite for Chinese energy companies to engage and expand its role in the Brazilian energy market. This knowledge is not only restricted to energy resources but also to complex Brazilian energy policies, different culture, distinct institutions, among others. When compared with Latin America, the Brazilian energy policy may seem to be favorable but when compared with other countries globally, it seems to be rather restrictive, particularly regarding the hydrocarbon industry.

While Brazil has been consistently reducing the barriers for foreign investments, nevertheless, its legal and administrative measures still restrict the participation of foreign companies, such as the Law 12.351, that stipulates technical parameters for oil companies and service providers that precisely intend to protect and raise the market share of domestic companies. (Macedo 2013) Following those requirements, a significant share of the oil companies operating in Brazil have to purchase products and services from Brazilian domestic ship builders or oil service providers, with a low degree of market competition. According to the Brazilian Institute of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (IBP), the government monitoring policies and mechanisms lack of flexibility, which block the development of domestic oil industry. The low administrative efficiency of the Brazilian government is not only due to the complicated legal system, but also to the lack of transparency and over-inspection towards foreign investors.

The opacity and abrupt suspension of bids due to adjustments of several administrative orders in the standards of the processes are the main complaints of international oil companies, since it compromises the attendance of foreign oil companies for the lack of procedural justice and bad planning, also harming the Brazilian interests by lacking of market competition. The current economic recession may lead Brazil to a more flexible energy policy, which can be observed by the deregulations of the domestic oil and natural gas market as well as statements of the Petrobras' president and the Minister

of Mining and Energy indicating the necessity of a suitable policy for attracting more foreign investments. (Globo 2015)

Second, the Chinese companies' intents to expand their investments to Brazil must be well aware of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of their operations and should also develop a much closer tie with the local communities and civil society. It is noted that an important resistance factor to the Chinese engagements in many projects is caused by a devoid of understanding to Brazilian domestic civil societies, which have a much deeper embeddedness in the social life of the country. In comparison with China, Brazilian civil society is much more embedded, autonomous and active because of the intensive participation and mobilization in various social strata during the process of democratization, nowadays being a fundamental part of the Brazilian democracy, represented by many diverse and active groups with a high degree of participation in economic, political and social affairs. (Avritzer 2012)

Regarding energy resources, the Brazilian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are fairly playing an important role in shaping projects implementation, more specifically the indigenous people, the environmental groups, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and labor unions. Mega-infrastructure projects like the Belo Monte dam had been protested by neighboring indigenous people and NGOs because of the adverse social-environmental impacts and lack of involvement of the local representatives in the social-environmental assessment process. Despite the indigenous peoples being very diverse and having different histories, Latin America is currently experiencing an indigenous resurgence. From Mexico to the Andes, indigenous peoples have stepped forward to demand their long-denied cultural, political, and economic rights. (Cleary and Steigenga 2004) In Brazil the claims of participation as stakeholders in the political and economic systems seems to be following the same tendency. In addition to that, international NGOs such as Amazon Watch, the Conservation International, the Earth Rights International and the Amazon Conservation Association have a great influence over political representation, opinion articulation, and social mobilization. Brazil's labor rights are also fairly protected and in daily matters labor unions play an important and impacting role as well. For example, despite the US \$200 billion investment in the oil industry after the discovery of Libra oilfields, numerous strikes halted the production capacity, which brought up great concerns among foreign investors. (Li 2014)

It is well known that energy infrastructure and oil exploration projects have high socio-environmental risks if handled improperly, thus potential environmental and social conflicts arise in the due course may damage

the governmental legitimacy, simultaneously being one of the main concerns in Brazilian society. Demonstrations, strikes and other forms of pressure are constantly triggered against the government and energy companies, which definitely raise the investment cost and risk for the reasons exposed above. For Chinese energy companies, they should bear this in mind when engaging with Brazilian energy market.

Thirdly, Chinese companies must improve corporate social responsibility (CSR), which is very likely to create a positive corporate image by reducing conflicts over environmental and social issues. Environmental protection and social responsibility are two important indicators to evaluate the performance of foreign companies in Brazil. Historically, before Chinese companies began investing in Brazil, some western companies did not conduct due diligence in mitigating the environmental impacts in energy E&P. The environmental and social problems left behind increased anti-development sentiments and concerns among the local society, which came as one of the main basis of resources nationalism.

It is widely admitted that the environmental impacts of oil and gas exploitation is relatively high, since the ecological system is both vulnerable and sensitive to human activities. In the early stage of China's engagement with Africa, negative episodes of damaging the local environment occurred in some infrastructure and natural resources exploitation projects due to the lack of appropriate environmental mitigation measures. Such irresponsible and short-sighted commercial behaviors in Africa were put into spotlight by international media, which not only substantially damaged China's image but also even gave rise to local violent conflicts. (Wu 2013) Regarding the increasing momentum of China's presence in Latin America, Chinese companies should increase greater community investment initiatives to change the profit-oriented and environmental indifferent approach by adopting a strong sense of 'global responsibility', being able to meet the expectations and requirements from the Brazilian general public and comply with the international commitments made by the Chinese government.

Fourth, the PRC must learn from the Japanese and South Korean companies in the way of accessing the Brazilian market. South Korea and Japan were pioneers in establishing a fruitful energy cooperation with Brazil and their experience deserves meticulous studies. From the cultural perspective, they all have an Asian cultural background and their accumulated knowledge facilitates the Chinese companies' understanding and inspiration for the development of a favorable framework. With the advantage of an early developed shipbuilding industry, both made their headway into the Brazilian market earlier than many other Asian countries. Japan and South Korea de-

veloped their shipbuilding industry earlier than China and despite the notable Chinese improvements in heavy industry and manufacturing, the formers had an important role in the Brazilian market since the early 1990's, when the Brazilian shipbuilding industry was on the verge of bankruptcy due to the debt crisis.

To date, the Brazilian shipbuilding is quite sophisticated in manufacturing engineering and technology, but somehow the industrial capacity still cannot meet the increasing demand arise from the deep water oil and gas exploitation. The high pre-salt demand of ships, platforms and marine equipment has created enormous investment opportunities for foreign companies. Although the Chinese companies are intensively interested and involved in Brazilian shipbuilding and deep water drilling platform, the bilateral cooperation mainly is restricted to areas just as equipment purchasing and capital injection, focused on the Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and Banks, while Japan and South Korea focus on their national giants, prioritizing the private sector. (Myers and Viscidi 2014) In the meantime, Japanese and Korean companies became more involved in industrial chain integration.

Japan, more specifically, has been seeking for partnerships eagerly in the both upstream and downstream industrial chain collaboration, incorporating marine equipment construction, operation, management, shipbuilding technology, human resources, technology transfer and so on. In 2014 Shinzo Abe and the Brazilian government signed the "Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Shipbuilding to Facilitate the Development of Offshore Resources between Brazil and Japan", seeking the enhancement of the marine cooperation between both countries in all directions. Despite the Petrobras' ongoing crisis and disinvestment plans, Japan still has two important joint ventures in Brazilian shipyards: the Kawasaki-Estaleiro Enseada do Paraguaçu (EEP) and the Japan EAS Investimentos e Participações (JEI), between Ishika-Wajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI), JGC Corporation, Japan Marine Unites and Estaleiro Atlântico Sul.

Last, China must find a delicate way to pursuit equilibrated triangular relations between Brazil, the US and China. Latin America has traditionally been under the US sphere of influence, and the rise of the Sino-Latin American relations naturally raises precautions on the US side. Besides the economic partnership, Latin America is also a vital area for the US regional security and stability. The US is part of several regional associations, banks and forums; however China is growing its ties with Latin America by joining existing associations such the Organization of American States (OAS) as an observing member and supporting the advancement of Latin American regional integration mechanism known as CELAC. More specifically, China is

viewed by the US as fairly aggressive in creating the China-CELAC Forum from the geopolitical lens, as the CELAC intentionally excluded the U.S. and Canada. (Ellis 2015)

In terms of energy cooperation, the links between Brazil and the US are still close, even though a recent relative decline in their cooperation can be noted. In 2013 Brazil exported 110 thousand barrels per day to the U.S., a 30 percent decrease over 2012, because of the shale revolution in the U.S. that significantly increased their energy autonomy. (EIA 2014) Concurrently, the Sino-Brazilian relations have a strong strategic feature, and has been developing quickly, as the Chinese participation in the energy fields have been rather successful in multiple areas, being a key investor for various important projects. Despite the relative slowing down of the Chinese economic growth in last year, China is the most robust economy in the world and is the world's largest importer and consumer of crude oil, tending to keep increasing its imports, bringing Brazil into the spotlight of Chinese investments in the effort to diversify oil importation sources, to internationalize her energy and infrastructure companies and to strengthen the complementarity of the energy cooperation.

Since the beginning of the 21st century the bilateral trade has grown more than thirteen times. In 2009, China overtook the US as the largest trade partner, and since 2010 became Brazil's largest foreign investor. Brazil's strategic importance and its enormous economic potential determines that China will keep upscaling its investment in the country, encompassing mega-infrastructure projects as the the Trans-Oceanic railway between Brazil and Peru to the building of clean energy power plants.

Brazil and China, both emerging economies and developing countries, share the same goals and aspirations towards the world. Brazil was the first country that established a strategic partnership with China, and the two countries share similar points of view on many contemporary international matters. Both countries have been supporting each other in the multilateral organizations such as the G20, BRICS, BASIC, among others, coordinating in the most urgent global issues such as reforming the international financial system, climate change, the Doha Round negotiations, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and so on, defending the common interests of developing countries by steadily advancing and promoting a more reasonable international order.

Brazil and China have different political and economic development models and being so their positive partnership creates a new paradigm and a positive demonstration effect to other countries. Energy has a political and global character and the balance of the China-US relations as well as the Bra-

zile-US relations are vital for a stable progress of the Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation.

Conclusion

The increasingly harsh situation of the Chinese energy security reinforces the strategic importance of the Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation, reducing the Chinese dependence on the Middle East oil imports and diversifying her energy supplying sources. Brazil is the largest and most populous Latin American country with abundant natural resources and advanced offshore drilling technology, and China is the second largest economy with an increasing consumption of energy. Both countries' determination on enhancing the bilateral energy cooperation, where the benefits are not restricted to the local economy, will also serve as a new South-South cooperation model between China and Latin American countries.

In the recent decades, the international energy landscape has undergone a dramatic change and the Brazilian discovery of the pre-salt oil has raised the world's attention and created a historical opportunity for the advancing China-Brazil cooperation. Even though, the energy cooperation is led by the oil industry, big investments in electricity, hydropower and clean sources of energy has been growing quickly in recent years, while natural gas, coal and nuclear energy remain as areas with a high potential. Besides that, the comprehensive industrial chains cooperation between the two countries' oil industry has created a good prospect for a continuous future expansion, from the exploration to refinement, from the financing to technology transfer, from equipment manufacturing to infrastructure building, encompassing upstream, midstream and downstream of the oil production chains.

REFERENCES

- AIE and Heritage Foundation. China Global Investment Tracker. 2016. <https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>
- ANP. 2008. Oil, Natural Gas, and Biofuels Statistical Yearbook 2014: Agencia Nacional de Petroleo, Gas Natural e Biocombustiveis, 2008. <http://www.anp.gov.br/SITE/acao/download/?id=73192>
- Avritzer, Leonardo. 2012. Sociedade civil e Estado no Brasil: da autonomia à interdependência política. OPINIÃO PÚBLICA, vol. 18, nº 2, No-

- vember 2012, 383-398.
- Berrios, Ruben , Marak, Andrae and Morgenstern, Scott. 2010. 'Explaining hydrocarbon nationalization in Latin America: Economics and political ideology', *Review of International Political Economy*, First published on: October 19, 2010 (iFirst) DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2010.493733
- Cui, Shoujun. 2012. *nengyuan dawaijiao: zhongguo jueqi de zhanlve zhihou* [Energy Diplomacy: the rise of China's strategic support shaft]. Beijing: Petroleum Industry Press, 224.
- Cleary, Edward L., and Steigenga, Timothy J.. 2004. Resurgent Voices: Indians, Politics, and Religion in Latin America, P1, in Edward L. Cleary and Timothy J. Steigenga edited *Resurgent Voices in Latin America: Indigenous Peoples, Political Mobilization, and Religious Change*, 1.
- Ellis, R. Evan. 2015. "Testimony to the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Foreign Affairs Committee", The U.S. House of Representatives, February 3, 2015, .2-3. <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20150203/102885/HHRG-114-FA07-Wstate-EllisE-20150203.pdf>.
- Estrella, Guilherme. 2011. Pre-salt Production development in Brazil, Qatar : WPC, 2011. World Petroleum Conference. 96-99.
- Fariello, Danilo. 2015. "Ministro Quer Mais Estrangeiros No Setor de Transmissão de Energia", *O Globo*, September 2, 2015. <http://oglobo.globo.com/economia/ministro-quer-mais-estrangeiros-no-setor-de-transmissao-de-energia-17384078#ixzz3qAWZSZ1D>
- Fritschak, Claudio; Soares, André and O'Connor, Tania. Chinese Investments in Brazil from 2007-2012: A review of recent trends. China-Brazil Business Council. June 2013.
- Gomes, Ieda. 2014. Brazil: Country of the Future or Has its Time Come for Natural Gas?, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, June, 2014, 10-11. <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/NG-88.pdf>
- Gu AnPing. 2014. *zhongshiyou shugou baxi nengyuan bilu gongsi* [Petrochina Acquisition of a Brazilian Energy Company in Peru]. *renmin ribao haiwai ban* [People's Daily Overseas Edition] November 8, 2014.
- Hirst, Monica. 2013. Understanding Brazil-United States relations : contemporary history, current complexities and prospects for the 21st century, Brasília : FUNAG, 2013, 54-62 and 197-227
- Ibope Inteligencia. 2015. "Hoje 70% dos brasileiros consideram governo Dilma ruim ou péssimo". Ibope, December 15. <http://www.ibopeinteli->

- gencia.com/noticias-e-pesquisas/hoje-70-dos-brasileiros-consideram-governo-dilma-ruim-ou-pessimo/
- IMF. 2016. World Economic Outlook Update, International Monetary Fund, January 19, 2016 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/update/01/pdf/0116.pdf>
- International Energy Agency (IEA). 2013. *World Energy Outlook 2013*, London, November 12, 2013, 55.
- International Energy Agency (IEA). 2013. *World Energy Outlook 2013*, London, November 12, 2013, 23.
- International Energy Agency (IEA). 2013. *World Energy Outlook 2013*, London, November 12, 2013, 303.
- JIA, Lu. 2009. baxi shiyou ziyuan xianzhuangyu touzi jihui [Petrobras resources and investment opportunities]. *Petroleum & Petrochemical Today*, (6): 39-40.
- Johnson, Chalmers. 2005. The Real China Threat, in *Asia Times*, March 19, 2005. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC19Ad05.html>
- Li, HuaiYin and Li, HongWei. 2014. zhongguo yu baxi haishang youqi fazhan bijiao yanjiu [A Comparative Study of China and Brazil's offshore oil and gas development]. *zhongguo gongcheng kexue* [China Engineering Science]. (3): 23-24.
- Li, Hui. 2014. baxi shiyou zhengce baobian buyi [Brazil's mixed oil policy]. *zhongguo nengyuan bao* [China Energy Journal]. 7th edition, September 22, 2014.
- Macedo, Marcelo Mafra Borges de. 2013. *Análise das Rodadas de Licitação até 2013 e perspectivas para a exploração de petróleo no horizonte 2020*. Rio de Janeiro, Agência Nacional do Petróleo, 10th Encontro Nacional do Prominp.
- Mares, David R.. 2010. Resource Nationalism and Energy Security in Latin America: Implications for Global Oil Supplies, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Working Paper, January 2010. <http://baker-institute.org/publications/EF-pub-MaresResourceNationalismWork-Paper-012010.pdf>.
- MME. 2014. Boletim Mensal de Acompanhamento da Indústria do Gas Natural. Brasília : Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2014.
- MRE. 2009. Plano de Ação Conjunta entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República Popular da China, 2010-2014, Ministério de Relações Exteriores, May, 2009. http://pequim.itamaraty.gov.br/zh/2010_rr2014_rrrrrr.xml

- Myers, Margaret and Viscidi, Lisa Viscidi. 2014. "Navigating Risk in Brazil's Energy Sector: The Chinese Approach", The Inter-America Dialogue, October 2014, 2-3. <http://www.io.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2014/14838.pdf>
- Pang, MingLi. 2014. 2014 nian zhongguo yuanyou jin chukou da pandian [2014 China's oil import and export report]. caixin wang [Caixin Media], February 24, 2015. <http://www.wusuobuneng.com/archives/16440>
- Petrobras. 2015. "We have signed a US\$5 billion funding agreement with China Development Bank", Petrobras, May 20, 2015. <http://www.petrobras.com.br/en/news/we-have-signed-a-us-5-billion-funding-agreement-with-china-development-bank.htm>
- Stevens, Paul. 2012. The 'Shale Gas Revolution': Developments and Changes. EERG BP 2012/04, Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), August 2012.
- US Energy Information Administration. 2014. International Energy Data and Analysis of Brazil. Washington DC : EIA, 2014, 1. http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Brazil/brazil.pdf.
- U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2014. "International Energy Data and Analysis of Brazil", December 29, 2014. 3.
- US Energy Information Administration. 2014. International Energy Data and Analysis of Brazil. Washington DC : EIA, 2014, 6-7.
- Viscidi, Lisa. Energy and Politics in Brazil: A Retreat from Oil Nationalism, in *Harvard Review of Latin America*, Fall 2015. <http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/energy-and-politics-brazil>.
- WB. 2014. Data of Brazil, the World Bank, 2014. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/brazil>
- Weintraub, Sidney (ed.). 2007. Energy Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Benefits and Impediments, The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Press, 170-175.
- Wu, Baiyi. 2013. zhong la nengyuan hezuo: Jingyan, wenti yu weilai xuanze [China-Latin America Energy Cooperation: experience, problems and future options]. dangdai shijie [Contemporary World], (4): 29.
- Xinhua Guoji. 2015. baxi huo jiang tigao putong qiyou zhong shengwu jiujiing de hanliang zhi 27% [Brazil will increase the content of bioethanol on regular gasoline to 27%] Xinhua News, 4 de Fevereiro, 2015.
- Yang, JieJun. 2013. meizhou guojia nengyuanfa gailun [Introduction to the American Countries' Energy Law]. Guangzhou, shijie tushuguan

chuban guangdong youxian gongsi, [Guangdong World Publishing Co.], 2013, 134-136.

Zhang, Fan. 2013. baxi gongmin shehui tanxi [Civil Society of Brazil]. lading meizhou yanjiu [Latin American Studies]. (5): 45-46.

ABSTRACT

With the booming of Brazil's off-shore oil drilling, the Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation is facing historical opportunities, manifested in the fields of oil trade, market access, technology transfer and bioenergy exploration. To achieve a steady and robust development in bilateral cooperation, China should take a proactive energy diplomacy approach to overcome challenges arise from its increasing engagement.

KEY WORDS

Energy Diplomacy; Cooperation fields; Challenges.

Received on November 11, 2016.

Approved on December 1, 2016.

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES AND THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS REPERCUSSION TO JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY

Aline Chianca Dantas¹

Alexandre Cesar Cunha Leite²

Introduction

In the most recent years -usually at the same time of Japan's mandate as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)- the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have been acting in joint peacekeeping actions of the United Nations (UN). However, JSDF's participation in these joint operations has been altering its character, as determined by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The article makes clear that the JSDF must work in the realms of internal and civil security, and should not become an intervention mechanism outside Japanese borders.

It is worth mentioning that a constitutional amendment was approved in September 2015, granting the possibility for the JSDF to act in military operations abroad—even though there is a lot of argument (domestic and foreign) regarding this change³. Anyway, this transformation reinforced the role played by the JSDF and shows the interest in strengthening the Japanese national security.

Considering these previous issues, the current work aims at analyzing the relations between the JSDF and the United Nations, through Japan's

¹ Postgraduate Student in International Relations at Universidade Estadual da Paraíba (UEPB). E-mail: alinechiancadantas@gmail.com

² Professor of International Relations at Universidade Estadual da Paraíba (UEPB). E-mail: alexccleite@gmail.com

³ Available at: < <http://www.aereo.jor.br/2015/09/19/forcas-de-autodefesa-do-japao-agora-podem-realizar-operacoes-militares-no-exterior/>>. Accessed October 22, 2015.

participation in UN peace missions. In this sense, the consequences of this interaction to the Japanese national security can be seen.

Initially, the paper will analyze the JSDF by its structure, characteristics, action constraints, and relations with the Japanese society and the country's national security. Moreover, starting from a debate regarding the realist and liberal International Relations theories, it will discuss the shades of the defensive role of the JSDF, of the institutions background and of the Japanese national security concept.

In a second moment, JSDF's participation in UN peace missions will be considered, outlaying the models of participation, the general results of these operations, the hardships perceived, and the changes noted in the JSDF. At the same time, realist and liberal theoretical arguments will be used in this discussion.

Following, the text will study JSDF–UN relations, trying to understand whether the UN poses as a limit to the action of the JSDF, or if the UN is a goal in itself for the JSDF, or if this organization legitimizes the JSDF and, last, but not least, if the JSDF are limited by its own characteristics. These debates enable us to envision the consequences of the interactions between the two aforementioned organizations for Japan's national security, regarding the possible re-militarization of the country and the concern regarding the image of the Japanese state.

This discussion is also characterized by realist and liberal approaches. For example, it considers, from the liberal standpoint UN's role focusing on peace promotion. And, for instance, from the neorealist perspective, it sees state interests as inherent to institutions, allowing us to see the UN as an instrument for the international strengthening of actors.

Finally, facing the debate developed throughout the text, one might consider the JSDF as responsible for its own limitations, due to the incorporation of the impositions of the Japanese society and state that determined its defensive character (Kurashina 2005). Nonetheless, examining this new behavior of the JSDF in the international realm, through UN peacekeeping operations, it is possible to notice a new momentum in the Japanese national security, encompassing a greater concern regarding the image of the Japanese state abroad. In this sense, the UN would be working as an instrument for the strengthening and legitimization of the JSDF in the internal and international realms. Thus, the relations between the JSDF and the UN may be framed as a first step towards a change regarding national and foreign perceptions of the JSDF, towards broader goals in the future. Moreover, recent changes in the Japanese Constitution enhance the role of the JSDF and reveal the path followed by Japan in terms of its national security.

Contextualizing Japan Self-Defense Forces

According to Kurashina (2005), Japan Self-Defense Forces emerged between 1945 and 1960 and were related to the limitations posed by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution⁴, such as self-defense, its police character and its lack of legitimacy. This author denies that the JSDF survives as an organization of “dirty work”, aiming at the maintenance of the population’s purity, amidst the memory of war crimes. For this reason and due to the burden they carry, the JSDF faces a vicious process of in search of its legitimacy (Kurashina 2005).

However, when one considers the pacifist character attributed to the Japanese state and the constitutional constraints regarding the use of force, it comes to mind that the JSDF emerged to attend the immediate necessities of Japan’s domestic security situation. One should bear in mind the United States occupation (and influence) of the Japanese territory. Summing up, following Kurashina’s (2005), argument the JSDF end up working as a police force.

During the process of formalization of the JSDF, the US pushed for its consolidation in order to fight against direct or indirect invasions of the Japanese territory. In this sense, in 1953, the JSDF and the Defense Agency frameworks were defined by laws. As early as in 1954, a reform enabled the existence of three spheres within the JSDF: land, sea, and air. Later, still according to Kurashina (2005), a reinterpretation of the Article 9 of the Constitution allowed the possibility of creating the power of military defense for the JSDF.

Considering the organization and constitution of the JSDF, it is relevant to point out the following tenants that sustain it: (i) an exclusively defense-oriented policy; (ii) not becoming a military power; and (iii) the observation of the three principles of non-proliferation and civil security control (Kurashina 2005).

Focusing on the guidelines mentioned above for JSDF activities, and the characteristics of the Japanese national security, the understanding regarding the impossibility of the deployment of Japanese troops to UN peace operations becomes clear. Thus, Japan always kept its relationship with the

4 Art. 9 of the Japanese Constitution: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” Available at: <<http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>> Accessed June 12, 2011.

international environment and with the UN through “paycheck diplomacy” (Segura 2006/2007), which consisted in the donation of monetary values to operations.

The great debate regarding the JSDF deployment in UN peace operations revolves around the main JSDF characteristic—namely, self-defense. In relation to this issue, it is useful to outline a theoretical discussion regarding what is defense and which are its limits, aiming at a better assessment of the internal concerns with respect to the eventual participation of Japanese troops in international actions.

Problematizing the discussion, whereas establishing an interconnection between defense and aggression from a liberal standpoint, Norman Angell (2002, 268) points out that: “The necessity of defense comes from the existence of a reason for the attack. Rivalries that are ignored by all. Mitigating the reason for aggression equals to fostering the work of the defense”. Thus, even though the referred author recognizes the necessity of defense—especially at the time when he wrote his book, bearing in mind the concern with regards to World War I—it implies a reason for aggression, considering the belief (which was, at time, universal) in the social and economic benefits of conquest.

On that account, an actor in the international arena defends itself because the other does so as well and, in this way, it enhances the possibility of mutual aggression. Precisely at this point resides the “great illusion”, as claimed by the mentioned author. In this sense, Angell (2002, 269) makes clear that: “What determines a man’s behavior are not the facts, but the idea they make out of these facts”. Facing this, ideas lead to politics and these to militarization, reinforcing the defense sphere and raising the odds for a future aggression.

Under this perspective, the threshold between defense and aggression is extremely complex, and defense is thought in terms of animosities, ground for an attack and as a means for reducing the reason for aggression. Therefore, analyzing the Japanese case, affirming that Japan prioritizes self-defense is simply to state the country uses a strategy of lessening the motivations for an attack. In this sense, as Japanese forces leave the country to take part in peace operations, relations between defense and aggression become even more fragile. Moreover, it can be said that the very concept of “self-defense”, incorporated by the JSDF, is flawed, considering that there is no way of thinking of a defense that ignores the other, as already discussed under the perspective of Norman Angell.

Despite the internal dispute regarding the JSDF participation in peace operations, as it can be seen, for example, in the discussions regarding the al-

ready mentioned shades of the term “(self-) defense”. The Gulf War marked a watershed to Japanese national security and, consequently, to the JSDF. The absence of the participation of Japanese troops in the conflict produced a negative international perception towards Japan's foreign policy and, hence, its paycheck diplomacy. In this sense, Japan decided to more actively engage in the UN and, from the 1990s on, to act in peace operations of the organization (Segura, 2006/2007).

In relation to this point, the Japanese participation in UN peace operations was marked by external pressure, especially from the United States; still, we cannot refrain from pointing that, simultaneously, there were important internal forces that supported this Japanese engagement abroad through peace operations (George 1993).

Therefore, a transitional phase on the Japanese diplomacy stands out, providing a new role to Japan and its JSDF, which started to act in issues related to regional security, peace operations and civil security. However, Japan's domestic constitutionalism exercised a direct influence on the country's foreign policy, perpetuating the inflexibility of its security policy, even facing the changes in the international system. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is directly connected with the democratic endurance and cultural influence (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993).

In spite of the strength of the perspective presented by Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) in Japan, one cannot ignore the changes within the framework of the Japanese national security structure due to the New National Defense Program Guidelines, which aims to invigorate Japanese defense forces in order to make them more effectively in answering security challenges. Thus, the main objectives of the JSDF as pointed out by Joshy M. Paul (2011) are: (i) to become more dynamic; (ii) to protect the sovereign rights of Japan; (iii) to act properly in the promotion of stability in Asia; and (iv) to play a more active role in the global security environment.

The Japanese National Defense Program Guidelines⁵ lay out the importance of a proactive stance based on the contribution to peace, on the built of a comprehensive defense framework, on the reinforcement of the alliance with the US, and on the effectiveness of its defense forces—without turning them into a military force that would arouse fear among other countries. Attention is paid to the structure of the JSDF, seeking to prioritize its maritime and aerial capabilities; strengthen the intelligence and transport system; enhance its command, control, information, and communication faculties; im-

5 Ministry of Defense. Available at: <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf>. Accessed October 20, 2015.

prove its response to attacks to remote islands and to ballistic missiles; among other aspects.

Chart 1 highlights the interest in strengthening logistic-related aerial and maritime capabilities of the JSDF.

Chart 1 - The JSDF and the New National Defense Program Guidelines

Category			Present (as of the end of FY2013)	Future
Ground Self-Defense Force	Authorized Number of Personnel		approx. 159,000	159,000
	Active-Duty Personnel		approx. 151,000	151,000
	Reserve-Ready Personnel		approx. 8,000	8,000
	Major Units	Rapid Deployment Units	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Regional deployment Units	8 divisions 6 brigades	5 divisions 2 brigades
		Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Destroyer Units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions
		Submarine Units	5 divisions	6 divisions
		Minesweeper Units	1 flotilla	1 flotilla
		Patrol aircraft Units	9 squadrons	9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Destroyers	47	54
		(Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)	(6)	(8)
		Submarines	16	22
Combat Aircraft	approx. 170	approx. 170		
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning & Control Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units	12 squadrons	13 squadrons
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	-
		Aerial Refueling/Transport Units	1 squadron	2 squadrons
		Air Transport Units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	6 groups	6 groups
	Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft	approx. 340	approx. 360
Fighters	approx. 260	approx. 280		

Source: Japan Ministry of Defense. National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, 2013, 31.

According to Berkofsky (2011), the adoption of the new Japanese defense program, in December 2010, produced several transformations in Japanese security and defense policy. Among these transformations, Japan's defense expenditures is no longer limited to 1% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), being allowed, thus, to increase its military and defense capabilities in case there are changes in the security environment that demand new stances and actions. Nonetheless, the author stresses that this does not mean that Japan will immediately surpass the 1% limit; but, it is allowed from now on to do so, in case China or North Korea (for example) threaten the Japanese national sovereignty. Moreover, in this new scenario, the valorization of the JSDF, the strengthening of Japan's Coast Guard, a growing concern with the implementation of a joint missile-defense system with the United States, and the modernization of Japanese military equipment, are all noticeable features.

However, as Berkofsky (2011) presents, this militarist stance on Japan's part is not widely announced, since officially it remains a pacifist country as defined by its Constitution. However, it should be stressed that some changes regarding Article 9 that, allow JSDF's deployment abroad, show a more active stance from Japan in the security realm and corroborates the guidelines of the new national defense program.

Despite the changes noted in Japanese national security, which impacts are reflected in the JSDF, Berkofsky (2011) makes it clear that Japan's defensive character remains. Hence, through a realist International Relations analysis, it is conceivable that Japan is guided by a realist perspective of structural defensive character (Walt in Elman 2008), as it does not act in a manner perceptively preemptive and seeks the maintenance of the regional *status quo*—even though the Japanese strategy may change following the growth and weight of the Chinese presence and of nuclearized North Korea.

Facing the situation presented above, one may perceive in the Japanese national security and in the JSDF a concealed effort towards the discussions developed through the next sections. In particular, this is linked in the debate regarding the relations between the JSDF and the UN and its impacts on Japanese national security. Henceforth, the next topic seeks to understand how the JSDF takes part in UN peace operations.

The Relations between Japan Self-Defense Forces and Peace Operations

Since the approval of the Peacekeeping Operations Law, in 1992, Japan was allowed to deploy JSDF troops abroad. Its first action had the objec-

tive of taking part of peace missions in Cambodia. Therefore, 1300 Japanese participated in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAD), a peacekeeping operation- among which were engineers responsible for monitoring the ceasefire, police officers and supervisors to the local elections (Guimarães 2005).

It is relevant to mention that the justification for the JSDF participation in peacekeeping missions lies on the argument that this kind of action consists on collective self-defense (Berkofsky 2011); still, if the term “self-defense” is already troublesome, as previously discussed, the concept of “collective self-defense” is something even harder to sustain⁶.

Although peacekeeping operations law authorized the JSDF’s participation in peace operations, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution remained unchanged, prompting intense and heated debates regarding this law’s unconstitutionality and the violation of the referred article (George 1993). As stated by Uehara (2003), some analysts believe the JSDF could undertake unarmed joint actions; others, such as Wilborn (1994) see the JSDF as possible instruments for future aggressions, accordingly to the debate regarding defense and aggression developed above. Alarmists, as notes George (1993), said the Japanese participation in peace operations could be an attempt to conceal the intention of bearing a military international role, or even to revive Japanese militarism⁷.

Nonetheless, despite all this foreign and national discussion about the JSDF’s participation in peace operations, the truth is that they have been acting at the international level and should, still, follow some rules, such as: (i) a ceasefire between the conflict sides must be reached before the entrance of the JSDF; (ii) the host countries, as well as the conflict sides, must consent with the conduction of UN peace operations; (iii) missions should keep impartiality, refraining from favoring one part or the other of the conflict; and (iv) the use of arms must be kept at the minimum necessary for the protection of people’s lives. Thus, all requisites listed must be followed, if not, the Japanese govern may withdraw the JSDF, ending the action and its participation in the operation (Kurashina 2005).

Considering its mandate, after the performance in Cambodia, the JSDF took part in operations in Mozambique in 1993, in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNUMOZ), to which 160 specialists were deployed. In Rwanda too, 1994, Japan sent 400 specialists to, substantially,

6 It is not the objective of the current work to undertake a conceptual discussion regarding the term “self-defense”.

7 One may recall the change in 2015 towards enabling foreign activities of these forces.

support refugees. Since 1996, approximately 800 Japanese were sent to the Golan Heights. As early as 1999, 2300 individuals were deployed to East Timor for the participation in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). In 2001, Japan sent ships for acting in the Indic Ocean, aiming at fighting terrorism within a strategy proposed by the United States (Guimarães 2005).

In the period between 2003 and 2003, Japan acted in Iraq and the JSDF started, in 2004, to include support for the process of reconstructing the country (Kawahara in Guimarães 2005). According to Fouse (2007), this was the first time (after World War II) that Japanese soldiers were allowed to carry weapons and, as stated by Pilling (2004), it was the first action of the JSDF without a UN mandate for it. Therefore, this last piece of information shows that the UN does not present a limitation for JSDF activities, but rather it works as a supporter and as a means to promote its strengthening.

In this sense, one can notice that all the JSDF actions cited above are related to peacekeeping operations, which are, in other words, interventions that use military presence as an instrument for operationalization (Kurashina 2005)—even though there are other roles that keep this non-military feature, such as disaster-relief, humanitarian aid, and anti-piracy operations (White Paper 2009, 2010). Moreover, all cited JSDF performances were linked to a UN mandate (which is a reflection of Japan's necessity of acting as a non-permanent member of the UNSC), except for the operation in Iraq, as described above.

Taking this into account, it would be relevant to think of the implications of these operations to the Japanese national security. In this sense, JSDF's action in the international realm may be working as a soft power instrument, promoting the image of the Japanese state in a peaceful way; but, at the same time, as a means for training and enhancement of these forces that, in the domestic realm, are more safeguarded and prevented from using certain equipment, something that could give the opportunity for Japan's remilitarization. Kurashina (2005), on the other hand, does not agree with this possibility of Japan's remilitarization through JSDF foreign actions: interviews with JSDF members show that, through time, the limitation regarding the defense-oriented character of the forces was incorporated by its soldiers, preventing the development of a military/offensive trait among them.

Hence, as some authors note (Kurashina 2005, Fouse 2007), Japanese participation in UN peace operations can be seen as a positive experience. Accordingly, this involvement reflected in the very figure of the "Japanese soldier", and in changes about the perception regarding the JSDF as an organization, and in the wider acceptance of its members within society. Regarding this new perception of the JSDF, others factors beyond peace oper-

ations should be considered, such as media, attempts of authority-breaching in order to favor social rapprochement, wider gender inclusion, among others (Kurashina 2005). However, the contribution of peace operations seems to be fundamental to the new face of the JSDF and to its greater popularity among nationals and foreigners.

Difficulties found by the JSDF in peace operations raise doubts regarding its fundamental characteristics. Internally, people question the role played by them in these operations bearing in mind the obstacles to their actions, and see them as highly costly, whereas undertaking tasks that could be done by civilians. Moreover, the members of the JSDF feel some differences facing other countries' troops, many of which are better technically organized (Kurashina 2005).

From another perspective, nevertheless, these peace operations enhance the JSDF members' self-esteem, which feel more useful to their society, strengthening the bonds between military and civilians—groups which are historically apart (Kurashina 2005). This may give Japan a more proactive role abroad, through so-called pacific instruments.

Making an analogy with Aragusuku's (2011) approach regarding Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA)—the official name for the country's foreign aid—Japanese performance in peace operations could be labeled as a symbolic domination strategy, through which the altruist collective self-defense would provide, “softly”, the broadening of Japan's power abroad combined with a high prestige for the state.

Aurelia George (1993) corroborates this line of argument, as she believes making contributions to the international community is not itself a priority of the Japanese government, but rather the enhancement and mobility of the JSDF abroad, changing the perception regarding the Japanese stance in the international arena. Bearing this in mind, the next topic will analyze the relations between the JSDF and the UN as well as its consequences to national security.

Japan Self-Defense Forces, their relations with the UN, and the impacts on Japanese national security

Following the previous discussion it is interesting to debate UN's role in face of state interests by taking into account Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Japanese national security.

According to Kant (2008), the league of peoples—analogous to UN's role nowadays—should be a moral community whose value surpassed the

one of national communities, seeking common good; on the other hand, the state, that may linger on the use of its wisdom, would be led by prudence, which would be responsible for putting its actions in harmony with moral values. Therefore, sustained by these principles, eternal peace would be possible.

Nevertheless, the case study that we are presenting shows that the interests of the state are not always altruist. On the contrary, countries act, most of time, selfishly, but prudence follows state rationality. Analyzing the Japanese case, one may notice that JSDF participation in UN peacekeeping do not aim for the common good only, since the inherent competition in an anarchic international system, in accordance with the realist view, demands that states think in terms of power and survival. For example, an interest that would be behind the Japanese actions would be the pursuit of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, as pointed Pilling (2004).

On that account UN peace operations can be conceived in liberal republicanism terms (Baldwin 1993), by considering the valorization of peace and democracy for the attainment of the common good. Also, they can be interpreted by a neo-realist approach, highlighting states' role as the control managers of international organization, as well put by Mearsheimer (1995).

Thus, when Mitrany (1948) develops the thesis, within the functionalist approach, that international organizations only act as responsible for a technical role promoting cooperation, the distance from reality is clear. In practice, states are the main constituents of international organizations and, as becomes perceptible in the case of the UN, its actions are bind to states, through the General Assembly as well as the Security Council. Even simple actions of the UN regarding peace operations take into consideration the host-state and state-provided troops (e.g. Japanese) to act in the place. That being so, the spillover process, through which Haas (1956) believe cooperation in one area leads to the a similar trend in the other, is only true when states have the interest to establish other kinds of cooperation, since—as Haas himself points in his works—the political element also matters to institutions.

Regarding this aspect, as put by Keohane and Nye (2000) in their discussion on complex interdependence, international organizations are instruments for negotiation and cooperation; still, power and interest cannot be left aside. They state, nonetheless, that institutions are capable of solving problems in which states are interested in solving, since asymmetrical interdependence prevails in reality. However, Mearsheimer (1995) is even more straightforward when he says that relative gains are inherent to choices posed to states; thus, thinking of the Japanese focus on peace operations, would imply in picturing the Japanese cooperation as oriented to obtain gains for itself while taking into account the other countries' gains in doing the same.

Bearing in mind the theoretical discussion developed above, relations between the UN and the JSDF, as well as their consequences to the Japanese national security, are now concretely analyzed. The first question to be posed in discussing this relation is if the UN is a limit for the action of the JSDF abroad, keeping this organization attached bilaterally to the UN and preserving the defensive character of the Japanese national security. As evident throughout the work, this is not what is happening in fact, as the JSDF acted independently from the UN in Iraq, an engagement related to the alliance with the United States. Moreover, as pointed by Kurashina (2005), the UN have no clear definition of peace operation, which could allow for the use of any military activity to solve armed conflicts.

In being so, UN centrality to Japanese national security may be conceived much more as a strategy from the government to retain the pacific character of the country rather than the result of Japan's lack of options in the international realm.

As a second question in this issue, one may ask: is the UN an objective of the JSDF? Its answer would be complementary to the former one, as it is perceivable the UN position as a focus of the Japanese national security, in virtue of the connection of the UN's and of in reality prevails the Japanese state peaceful policies. Once we go further on the perception of the JSDF, it can be noticed that its members see the UN as one of its action goals, since they feel more useful and able to act in the country's name.

A third question would be if the JSDF are the responsible for their own limits. As put by Kurashina (2005), it is perceivable that anti-militarism within Japan—a consequence of wars—influenced the organization and its self-defensive role, which indeed provokes a self-limitation of the JSDF. Nonetheless, as this limitation is a consequence of the structural constraints of the Japanese state and not of the organization itself, it is possible that, in the future, through the participation in international operations, there may be a change in JSDF members' mentality that lead them to seek a more active role abroad, partially renouncing their strictly self-defense character. Moreover, the very Japanese security strategy may change, which would produce a transformation of the JSDF.

The following inquiry can still be raised: does the UN legitimize the JSDF? This is the core point of this work, as it takes into consideration that JSDF actions in UN peace operations would be strengthening the JSDF as well as the image of the Japanese state abroad. It seems this is precisely what is going on, as the participation of the JSDF in UN peace operations is enabling deeper relations of the institution with the Japanese people in general, breaking to some extent the social separation between the two spheres

(Kurashina 2005). This strengthens these forces' role and may give space for a possible and implicit change in Japanese national security.

Added to this fact is that participation in peacekeeping missions is good training for defense actions, making possible for the JSDF to learn relevant techniques that may help strategy in case of invasion to the national territory, as well as enemy reconnaissance (Kawano in Kurashina 2005).

Therefore, the contribution to world peace provided by the JSDF follows a broader plan that encompasses promoting Japan's image, strengthening the country's security, concern with regional integration, the elevation of the country's political profile in the international scenario, enhancing respect for Japan, among other points (George 1993).

In that sense, the double perception one may have of the UN—on the one hand, as an institution for the promotion of international peace, and on the other, as an instrument of states action seeking their own interests—goes against the utopic thought of Kant (2008), according to which it is possible the existence of a moral institution that, looking for the common good, would not be bound by states interests.

Henceforth, this work provokes greater discussions regarding the Japanese military revival with the strengthening of the JSDF. Contributing to this debate are authors that believe in the normalization of the Japanese state, such as Pyle (2007), which points to the reforms developed in Japan since the 1990's and to the consequences of the international environment on Japanese national security, leading to its opening in military aspects—especially when it comes to mind the complexities of the Asian regional scope.

Final considerations

Bearing in mind everything developed above, the JSDF is seen to be holding a growing role and, even if there are restrictions to these forces, obstacles are gradually being removed, enabling discussions about the real defensive character of the JSDF and the Japanese national security.

In analyzing relations between the JSDF and the UN, the growth of the JSDF becomes clearer—considering that these forces are not restricted to the bilateral relation with UN, as the Japanese participation in peace operations in Iraq was not linked to a UN mandate. Hence, the UN would be an objective for the JSDF as a means for maintaining the argument of the United Nations centrality to the Japanese national politics. On the other hand, the UN would be much more of a legitimizing tool for the JSDF operation abroad.

Regarding JSDF's self-limitations, they indeed exist, but they are not

a product of the organization itself, being rather a consequence of the internalization of its defensive character and of the other restrictions imposed to these forces. That being so, with changes in Japanese popular perception of the JSDF and the lessening of restrictions within the country for the JSDF—enabled by domestic politics—a more open path shows itself to the ascension of these forces, both internally and externally, which allows them to act not only seeking Japan's defense, but international security in a broader sense (George 1993).

The growth of the JSDF, it is relevant to say, represents not only a change in the organization and in Japanese national security, but also has implications to Japan–US bilateral relations, considering that this new developments could mean greater Japanese autonomy in relation to the United States.

In that sense, the JSDF may be the instrument found by Japan to promote the country's normalization in a soft manner, clearly maintaining the pacifist character and the country's positive international image. Implicitly, it also allows the growth and development of an important security institution of Japan. Thus, it comes to mind the adoption by Japan of the "active pacifism" philosophy, through which military might would be a necessary instrument to reach peace.

Indeed, it seems that there is an ongoing process of the opening of Japanese national security, through the JSDF participation in peace operations abroad, even though this is still a shy process. If these operations continue, the trend for the future is that a more active Japan could be seen in the international scenario.

REFERENCES

- Angell, Norman. 2002. *A Grande Ilusão*. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 261-289.
- Aragusuku, Juliano Akira de Souza. 2011 "A assistência oficial para o desenvolvimento na política externa japonesa.". Available at: <http://www.santiagodantassp.locaweb.com.br/br/arquivos/defesas/aragusuku_dissertacao_mestrado.pdf> Accessed on June 02, 2013.
- Baldwin, David A. 1993. "Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics". In: *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Berkofsky, Axel. 2011 *Japanese Security and Defense Policies: Trends, Threat Perceptions and Prospects*. In: *Asian Paper*.
- Constitution of Japan. 2012 Available at: <<http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>> Accessed on February 12, 2012.
- Elman, Colin. Realism. 2008 In: *Security Studies: An Introduction*. Ed. Paul D. Williams. London and New York: Routledge, 15-28.
- Fouse, David. 2007. *Japan's Dispatch of the Ground Self Defense Force to Iraq: Lessons Learned*. Available at: <<http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Japan's%20Dispatch%20of%20the%20GSDf%20to%20Iraq.Fouse.doc.pdf>> Accessed on January 15, 2012.
- George, Aurelia. 1993. "Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response?" *Asian Survey* 33(6.): 560-575.
- Guimarães, Lytton L. 2005 *A inserção político diplomática do Japão no cenário internacional*. Available at <http://vsites.unb.br/ceam/neasia/boletins/artigo_lytton20406.pdf> Accessed on June 8, 2012.
- Haas, Ernst. 1956. *Regionalism, Funtionalism and the Universal International Organization*. *World Politics*, 8(2).
- JAPAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE –MOD. 2013. *National Defense Program Guidelines*. Available at: <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf> Accessed on October 20, 2015.
- Kant, Immanuel. 2008. *A paz perpétua*. Porto Alegre: L&PM.
- Katzenstein, Peter J., e OKAWARA, Nobuo. 1993. "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies". *International Security*. 17(4): 84-118.
- Keohane, Robert e NYE, Joseph. 2000. "Realism and Complex Interdependence." In: LINKLATER, Andrew (Ed.). *International Relations*. Vol. II. Florence: Routledge, 718-731.
- Kurashina, Yuko. 2005. *Peacekeeping participation and identity changes in the Japan Self Defense Forces: Military Service as "Dirty Work"*. Available at <<http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/2967/1/umi-umd-2760.pdf>> Accessed on June 1, 2012.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/1995. "The false promise of International Institutions." *International Security*. 19(3): 5-49.
- Mitrany, David. 1948. The functional approach in International Organization. In: *International Affairs*.
- Paul, Joshy M. 2011. *China and Japan: Scrambling for Regional Space*. Available

- at: <<http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary023.pdf>> Accessed on January 25, 2012.
- Pilling, David. 2004. *The role of Tokyo's Self Defense Forces is increasingly beset by contradictions*. In: *Financial Times*.
- PODER AÉREO. 2015. Available at < <http://www.aereo.jor.br/2015/09/19/forças-de-autodefesa-do-japão-agora-podem-realizar-operações-militares-no-exterior/> > Accessed on October 22, 2015.
- Pyle, Kenneth B. 2007. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Segura, Caterina Garcia. 2006/2007. *Seguridad humana: conceptos, experiencias e propuestas*. In: Revista CIDOB D'AFERS INTERNACIONALS, 76: 79-95.
- Uehara, Alexandre Ratsuo. 2003. *A política externa do Japão no século XX: o que faltou?* São Paulo: Annablume: Fundação Japão.
- White Paper, 2009. Available at: <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2009.html> Accessed on March 13, 2013.
- White Paper, 2012. Available at: <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2012.html> Accessed on March 13, 2013.
- Wilborn, Thomas L. 1994. *Japan's Self Defense Forces: What Dangers to North-east Asia?*. Available at: <<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub102.pdf>> Accessed on January 15, 2015

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the relationship between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the United Nations, through the participation of the first institution in peacekeeping operations led by the second. Thereafter, the effects of this interaction for Japanese national security are observed, in view of a possible remilitarization of the country and the maintenance of a good image of the Japanese state in the international arena.

KEYWORDS

Japanese Self-defense forces; UN; Japanese National Security.

Received on May 18, 2015.

Approved on November 25, 2016.

Translated by Bruno Palombini Gastal

THE CONSOLIDATION OF NORTH KOREA AS A NUCLEAR POWER THROUGH THE LEADERSHIP OF KIM JONG UN¹

David Morales Martinez²
Cristian Pires Coelho Martins³

Introduction

With the death of Kim Jong-il, on December 17, 2011, there has been a significant increase in the debate about the future of North Korea, specially related to its political system and the future of its nuclear program. The process of replacing the leader was fast and, his son Kim Jong Un immediately took over the power. The sudden death of Kim Jong Il wasn't expected, since it was caused by a myocardial infarction and there was no process of leadership succession consolidated. Therefore, Kim Jong Un, considered young for the position (28 years), rose in December 30 to the position of Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and was officially installed as the supreme leader of the regime in April of 2012 (Kim 2012).

During the Fourth Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), on April 11, 2012, Kim Jong Un was nominated First Secretary, therefore controlling all the hierarchical apparatus of the WPK. Two days later he was announced as the president of the National Defence Commission (NDC), supreme organ in North Korea, becoming the official successor of his father and leading the main positions in the party (Kim 2012).

This article aims to approach the implications of Kim Jong-Un consolidation of power for North Korea nuclear question, running through the

¹ This research had the support of CAPES/CNPq

² Adjunct Professor of International Relations at Universidade Federal do ABC. Professor of the Post-Graduate Program in Human and Social Sciences at Universidade Federal do ABC. E-mail: david.morales@ufabc.edu.br

³ Graduate in Humanities and Science at Universidade Federal do ABC. E-mail: cristian_pir-ess@hotmail.com

North Korean internal politics based on the Juche philosophy and the governance of the current leader. The North Korean foreign policy will be analyzed from the standpoint of its nuclear program, which has acquired relevance in the studies of international relations focused on this country. The motivations for this program will be analyzed through the isolation of North Korea in the international system and through the approach of Jacques Hymans (2006; 2008), Pinacho (2014), Brites (2016) about the nationalist identity of the opposition till the motivations exercised by the internal and external environments or levels.

***Juche* philosophy and *Songun* politics**

The *Juche* philosophy, characterized as a monolithic ideological system, was created by Kim Il Sung, leader of North Korea from its foundation (1948) until his death (1994) when his son, Kim Jong Il, took on the leadership after he passed away. The *Juche* philosophy became the official political foundation of the country by the end of 1960 and rose to the level of “guiding principle of the national policy” in 1972 (Lee 2003; Person 2013; Armstrong 2008).

In this sense, the *Juche* philosophy encompasses a complex ideological system which forms the political foundation of North Korea, being, therefore, a guiding principle of the domestic and foreign policy of the country. This philosophy was crafted through the concepts of self-reliance and independence, especially amid the *modus operandi* of three state actors rivals of North Korea: the renaissance of the Japanese imperialism, the establishment of the South Korean regime and, the economical recovery of US imperialism in the post war period (Armstrong 2008).

After the Meiji Revolution, the Japanese imperialism has consolidated itself in the Asian region through a significant industrial modernization which allowed to establish a expansionist political model and to strengthen its regional hegemony. During Japan militarization and imperialism, North Korea existed as a Japanese colony, between 1910 and 1945, after the victory in the war against Russia.

It's worth remembering that South Korea has been strongly supported, politically and militarily, by the USA, which realized the need to defend its geopolitical interests in the region through a generous economic aid by means of financial policies aiming to raise the growth and to develop the industry in South Korea.

In this sense, the *Juche* philosophy acted as a mean or answer to la-

tent threats, in order to ensure security in North Korea. On the other hand, the Juche philosophy was a way to guarantee loyalty to the only leader, using ten points of the ideological system that made the sovereign's word absolute (Person 2013 (a); Person 2013 (b)).

We emphasize three points that represent clearly the power granted to the leader of North Korea:

[...] 1. We shall give our best in the quest to unify all the society with the revolutionary ideology of the great leader Kim Il-Sung; [...] 3. We shall make absolute the authority of the great leader Kim Il-Sung; [...] 5. We shall strictly join the principle of unconditional obedience in the compliance of the instructions of the great leader Kim Il-Sung.”

Therefore, we can show that the North Korean regime that was being established, during all the 20th century and specially during the Cold War, always looked for ways to guarantee its autonomy and safety against explicit threats of external nature, what meant strengthening the local power and establishing a mechanism of internal loyalty to the regime.

The philosophical principle of Juche is the fact that men have control over the world and his own destiny, since he has consciousness. This philosophy was established by Kim Il Sung as a pillar of the country's revolution and reconstruction, which means rejecting the dependence of others and using their own strength to determine the revolutionary spirit of self-sufficiency in the regime (Lee 2003).

Kim Il-Sung worked the Juche philosophy through three principles of independence:

- Political (Chaju), with the idea of mutual equality between the nations, in which each state would have the right to self determination in order to guarantee happiness and prosperity to its people;
- Economical (Charip), in which the economic dependency of external help would make the State a political satellite of other countries, it's worth noticing that, for the leader, the economic self-sufficiency wouldn't be the same as building an isolate economy;
- Militar (Chawi), regarded as essential to the philosophy of a independent and sovereign state, contrarily to any “imperialists movements of aggression and war” with violence, making this the best way to defend the national independency and the revolutionary cause (Lee 2003, 106-107).

The Juche philosophy is going to be enhanced in the institutional scenery of North Korea, especially due to the fact that it is based on the Songun policy. The origins of this policy date to the Kalun Conference, in 1930, when the president Kim Il Sung proclaimed a new strategy of armed struggle to confront the Japanese troops in the process of liberation (Zerpa 2011).

The Songun policy is based in two strands. One, in the priority the State gives to the military apparatus as a way to propel the revolutionary war in the process of socialist construction. The other is based on the relevance of the military system as a primary job of the State in order to defend the homeland, the revolution and socialism, considering the revolutionary army as the main force (Bulling 2009; Zerpa 2011).

It is interesting to observe the Juche philosophy and the Songun policy, existing together as strong mechanisms in the construction of national strategy in great scale, have allowed at least two dimensions of the political action of the State in the international scenery and equally favorable to the national needs. Firstly, North Korea was able to maintain national sovereignty and dignity while confronting and containing the assault of the North American army in the 1950 war. Therefore, according to Vizentini and Pereira (2014, 176) the Songun policy was implemented with the aim to become a military strategy of survival.

Secondly, precisely since the Korean Peninsula War in 1950, the country has showed a strong urge to improve its military forces, making them powerful and ready to repel any external threat. Bulling (2009, 47) states that since the 1970s national defense has been the target of great national investments to the appropriation of heavy weaponry, then becoming one of the biggest armies in the world.

Therefore we are able to verify that the maintenance of the Songun policy and the Juche philosophy have a strong and prevailing justification to North Korea, especially in the implementation of its foreign policy. The Songun was effective during the process of liberation of the Japanese empire and afterwards, along with Juche, has worked as strategic policy of defense against the threats coming from the USA during the Post Cold War period.

Governance and the Consolidation of Kim Jong Un

Kim Jong Un replaced his father amid several doubts about his ability to take the power, in a way where he had to generate his own legitimacy, what included the promotion of his parent image (Frank 2012). So, in the same

way that Kim Il Sung was promoted by the end of his “physical life” due to the eternity of his “political life”, Kim Jong Il was worshiped in such way that North Korea began to have two ex-leaders, each one with “eternal political bodies” (Kwon 2013).

Kim Jong Un assumed his father’s legacy of a government based on “military policy in the first place”, which left some economic issues behind, producing serious crises that were exacerbated by Russia’s post-Cold War recession (Kim 2012; Kwon 2013; Lodgaard 2011). In this way, Kim decides to work with the legacy of the former leaders in parallel, presented as an organic whole, giving new guidelines for the Party and for the economy, maintaining the military legacy of his father (Kwon 2013; Avery e Rinehart 2014).

In 2012 Kim Jong Un brought new economic guidelines, with benefits to workers and peasants as well as more permits for entrepreneurship (Kim 2012), but not joining the Chinese reform, as it could lead to a significant social opening (Magalhães 2012a).

The strengthening of the military and nuclear programs consolidated internal power and showed strong foreign policy momentum through provocations with satellite launches, nuclear tests and missile launches that have occurred most frequently since 2006 (Magalhães 2012b; Avery e Rinehart 2014).

International Insulation and Opposition Government

The country joined the socialist bloc during the Cold War, with the United States, South Korea and Japan as its opposition. In addition, the fall of the former USSR and improved relations between China and South Korea further forced its isolation (Lodgaard 2011). The United States was seen as an enemy by the ideological opposition, which was allied to its participation in the Korean War and its support for the South Korean government. South Korea, since the same war, is constantly embroiled in frequent tensions and threats with the neighbors of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the official name of North Korea). Japan was considered as one of the greatest enemies of the North Koreans, mainly by the violent colonization suffered until the end of World War II.

The isolation also came from the former Cold War allies, because Russia was based on a Western economic model policy and moved away from the North Korean regime. China, despite maintaining the communist regime and not completely parting with North Korea, entered into a process of economic renewal, which brought it closer to some of the enemies of the

North Korean regime, such as South Korea.

This history merges with its opposition to other countries, which has strong relation with the national identity, the Juche philosophy and the Songun policy. The self-differentiation of the enemy and the need for independence in the face of their isolation and perceived threats, since the Japanese imperialism and the Korean War have helped to form the North Korean identity (Armstrong 2008; Lee 2003).

The concept of opposition nationalism is constructed by Jacques Hymans (2006) through the conception of the national identity of the leader, characterized by the belief that the interests and fundamental values of his nation are naturally opposed to the main countries in comparison. The core values and interests of the North Korean nation would be, in this case, opposed to the values and interests of other comparable nations such as the United States, South Korea, and Japan. In addition, there's also the belief in nationalism as a Duty to keep their heads up in relation to other countries (Hymans 2008).

The decision to acquire nuclear weapons is seen in this case as a choice, not as a result (Busch 2008), which reflects deep national conceptions of national identity (Hymans 2008), serving as a product of the country's nationalism and of its opposition to others. In this case, the opposition nationalism of the Kim dynasty is at the heart of the Juche ideology (Hymans 2008). Jacques Hymans describes the relationship between fear, pride, and opposition nationalism and how they interact to build the decision to be a nuclear country:

The leader who reaches for the bomb, as for any protective amulet, is doing so at least as much to control fears as to decrease actual dangers. Second, pride produces a desire for markers of autonomy and power—and of these, nuclear weapons are the gold standard. The bomb is a symbol of the nation's unlimited potential, of its scientific, technical, and organizational prowess, and also of its tenacity in the face of strong international condemnation. (Hymans 2008, 263).

We see, therefore, that the decision to become a nuclear country on the part of North Korea is directly related to its nationalism and its opposition to other countries, providing security to deal, on the one hand, with fears and threats, and on the other, with pride in its representation of strength and technological capacity.

The Development of the North Korean Nuclear Program

This analysis contemplates the North Korean nuclear program as a result of domestic and external factors. The desire to have nuclear weapons has been present in North Korea since the 1960s (Hymans 2008), while the Juche doctrine and the Songun policy were being implemented. Alongside this will, there was also the consolidation of the political system of the party, and the gradual recognition of countries that are still seen as a threat.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union facilitated the development of the North Korean nuclear program (Hymans 2008; Lodgaard 2011), to the point of making it a self-sustaining short-term program (Lodgaard 2011). In foreign policy, the Cold War concomitantly ended with the declaration of the United States, South Korea, and Japan as official enemies of the North Korean regime (Lodgaard 2011).

Thus, the historical development of North Korea's nuclear program is linked to internal and external factors, followed by the military's first policy in the 1990s, with the departure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10/01/2003 and with the beginning of its nuclear tests in 2006. North Korea's exit from the NPT gains importance when we look at its nuclear program and its foreign policy. We have such action as a response to the threat brought by the United States, which included it in the Axis of Evil in 2002, so that North Korea goes on to demonstrate its concrete claims to become a warlike nuclear country. Subsequently in a period of 10 years, since the first in 2006, North Korea has performed 5 nuclear tests, the last in 2016 being the most powerful so far.

In Brites' analysis (2016, 17) we find three structural and historical factors that, since Kim Jong Un's rise to power, that can be considered central in the analysis of the current situation of the country and that motivated the development of a nuclear program for military purposes : 1 - the unresolved issues of the Korean War; 2. The Juche doctrine and the development of the nuclear program; and 3. The current characteristic features of North Korea's modernization process and the doctrine of "strategic patience" implemented by the US government during Barack Obama's presidency.

First, we have the consequences that the Korean War (1950-1953) brought to the current political and strategic developments in the Peninsula. Korea has traditionally been a connecting corridor linking China with Japan, which historically has always been regarded as a geopolitical space of enormous interest to both empires. The Japanese colonization and division of the peninsula into two parts due to occupations by the Soviet and North American troops represented, what we understand as a historical defect, a rupture

with the ethnic and cultural reality of the region, in which the Cold War still exerts a dissuasive and restraining force.

The Korean War has brought about a deepening of the split between the two States. From the economic point of view, there was already a distinction between the north and the south, and from the Japanese colonization onwards, an industrial infrastructure apparatus was established in the north and there was a predominance of agriculture in the south (Vizentini and Pereira 2014; Brites 2016).

This war has made the peninsula essential, acquiring geopolitical relevance in northeastern Asia with enormous impacts to the world. According to Brites (2016: 17):

“With the outbreak of the conflagration, one of the bloodiest of the Cold War, Korea became the geopolitical epicenter of East Asia. The US invasion, the Chinese reaction and the Soviet support left deep marks for inter-Korean relations and, to a large extent, still condition the insertion of both countries to date.”

The impact of the war was not limited to the countries that were initially involved. The advance of US troops over Kim Il-Sung’s army extrapolated the UN mandate and ended up encouraging China’s entry into the conflict and the US withdrawal to the south, specifically to Seoul. China’s entry came with the purpose of alienating the US from its currency. However, in the withdrawal exercise, troops destroyed much of the country’s industrial infrastructure, as well as any undertaking that could aid in the reorganization of North Korean forces. Hydropower plants, military and civilian logistical support facilities were bombed. In this destructive step of the American troops, more explosives were used than those used against Japan during the Second World War (Cumings 2016, Brites 2016).

In this process of advancement, setbacks and destruction of the country by the invading troops, North Korea was constantly threatened with nuclear weapons. In the development of this troubled litigation that caught a war of extermination against the North Korean population, in addition to humiliation, a feeling of extreme vulnerability was generated in relation to their own security. Therefore, perhaps this is the crucial element in understanding the country’s most recent developments concerning the option for the development of nuclear weapons for war purposes (Cumings 2010; Vizentini and Pereira 2014; Brites 2016).

Currently the problem is even greater because the Korean War has not officially ended yet, as in 1953 only an armistice was established in which

the parties agreed to stop fighting without officially declaring the end of the war. It was only a cease-fire which lasted for several decades without a peace treaty being drafted. The absence of a commitment made through the formalization of diplomatic normality through a peace treaty with binding effect in the light of international law is one of the determining factors in the insertion of North Korea to this day.

For Brites (2016, 18), the normalization of the country with the international community passes by the end embargoes promoted by the United States, the United Nations and the West as a bloc. In this sense, the search for deterrence capacity is linked to the goal of establishing direct negotiations with the US.

Continuing with the analysis of the structural and historical factors that led the country to the development of a nuclear program, we have in the second place the successful implementation of the Juche doctrine. As discussed earlier, in the immediate aftermath of the beginning of the armistice, North Korea adopted the Juche philosophy as the official doctrine of the state, which sought to establish a mechanism for social cohesion in the country based on the idea of self-confidence and self-reliance.

In Brites' view (2016, 18), the Juche doctrine made the North Korean people lord of their own destiny by laying the foundations for North Korean nationalism and the prospect of non-submission to external interests as it was subjected to during the long period of Japanese and Chinese colonization and during the war in the peninsula. Thus it was the Juche doctrine that brought the perception of economic self-sufficiency and the ability to guarantee its external security in an autonomous way.

In the context of post-war on the peninsula, North Korea begins its intentions to carry out a nuclear program autonomously and for military purposes to ensure its stability and security in the region. The US indirectly encouraged this intention since it established in South Korea nuclear artifacts under the claim that they would be to maintain regional stability in a balance of power.

The establishment of an autonomous nuclear program by North Korea addressed, in addition to strategic objectives, an unresolved security issue, as well as the satisfaction of an energy demand in which the country would be in a position to supply the uranium mines of high quality it possessed. The implementation of the North Korean nuclear program is only able as long as an approximation is established between the country and the former Soviet Union. Through a cooperation agreement, in 1965 the first reactor was installed in the city of Yongyon and would later start the missile program in partnership (Brites 2016, 18).

Here it is necessary to discuss a little the influence that the former Soviet Union and China had on the initial development of the North Korean nuclear program. The scientific and technological assistance provided by these countries has materialized in the adoption of double-use infrastructure needed to process plutonium and uranium in the Yongyon reactor (Petrovic 2010). This encouraged the country to develop a small arsenal of atomic bombs for its missiles, but perceived some technical and political obstacles to carry out its policy of autonomy based on the Juche philosophy.

In this sense, King Il Sung had to make practical decisions in order to materialize the intentions that led him to the decision to undertake a nuclear war program. Thus, Pinacho (2014, 3) argues that:

At that time, the small group of physicists and nuclear engineers in North Korea was aware that the uranium bombs were bulkier than the plutonium ones and that, while the fabrication of uranium bombs was available to any country that detained a medium level technology, the plutonium ones required a significant number of high qualified physicists and nuclear engineers, and that the technology of these bombs was extremely complex. Nevertheless, the North Korea government had decided that its atomic bombs were small enough that they could fit the warhead of its missiles. It considered as its first option the development of plutonium atomic bombs and, as a second option, the uranium ones.

Once the option for plutonium bombs was decided, it was necessary to maintain technological cooperation with its partners and to find new sources of technological support for its purposes to be materialized. The question that remained on the air was, of course, the extent to which the support given by the ex-Soviet Socialist regime would go so that North Korea would be able to follow up its nuclear research for purposes other than the peaceful ones. In 1985 Pyongyang adhered to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which enabled it to continue acquiring nuclear technology on the international stage. The signature of the NPT was a demonstration that the country renounced the development of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, hundreds of physicists and engineers were sent to study nuclear technology in the specialized centers of the former USSR, China and Europe (Pinacho 2014, 3).

However, the country had to develop strategies to deal with its population while meeting the basic needs and, at the same time, to invest heavily in high-performance nuclear technology as a State policy, and in this way guarantee a place in the international scenario by prioritizing its Military and strategic objectives. Therefore,

Since the beginning the North Korean government faced serious problems. The first one was that due to the deficient agricultural development and the shortage of electrical energy, famines were produced periodically and the North American aid was needed to for oil supply and agricultural surplus. On the other hand, they had to develop an ingenious policy of confusion and fatigue, mainly towards the US, signing and denouncing agreements in order to make the necessary time to build their nuclear weapons. All of this, without reaching extreme situations that could lead to definitive ruptures in the talks with the North American government. (Pinacho 2014, 4).

The end of the Cold War and the decline of the USSR in the late 1980s meant for North Korea the loss or alienation of its main ally and partner. This represented a drastic reduction in the supply of food and fuel subsidized by the former USSR (Brites 2016, 19). In its quest to ensure its survival in the new international context, the Government decided to move closer to the sister republic, South Korea, in order to normalize relations with the United States. The result was the establishment of the “Accord for Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Cooperation and Exchange between North and South” signed in 1992 and focused on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula (Brites 2016). That same year the Supreme People’s Assembly ratified the NPT which had been signed 7 years ago and the inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began.

As we can see, the steps taken showed that the North Korean nuclear program was moving toward a peaceful resolution. In the international context characteristic of the early 1990s, nuclear disarmament became a priority, as the classic Cold War rivalries between the major hegemonic blocs were being disbanded and overcome. In this sense, a process of greater control of nuclear weapons was initiated, which focused on regional powers that had advanced nuclear technology. North Korea is at the heart of this new reality because it has demonstrated the technological capacity to enrich uranium since the cooperation agreements with the former USSR and China were implemented.

Efforts to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-weapon-free region were shaken for at least two facts that history still had to hold for the nuclear movement to become even stronger. On the one hand, Kim Il-Sung’s death in July 1994 and the delayed fuel delivery promised by the US through President Bill Clinton’s administration led to discouragement in negotiations (Brites 2016, 19).

Kim Jong-Il’s rise to power was interpreted as a sign of transformation in North Korean politics and in the midst of an uncertain landscape, the new leader implemented the Songun doctrine. As explained earlier, this new

policy leaves behind the foundation-based government of the institutions and the preponderant role of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) to focus on the politics of military primacy and to establish a state of war bases.

The Iranian nuclear program enters an upward spiral phase under Kim Jong-il's rule based on Songun policy. However, there is a fact that gave a new political direction for the North Korean nuclear program. In 2002, the United States accused North Korea of developing a clandestine nuclear uranium enrichment program for the purpose of obtaining fissile material for bomb making. The charges were substantiated by statements by Pakistani scientist Abdul Khan who acknowledged having provided Libya, Iran and North Korea with technology for the enrichment of uranium and other nuclear secrets. Khan made at least 13 trips to North Korea during the 1990s, having the opportunity to visit underground facilities containing nuclear warheads (Petrovich 2011).

In fact, relations with the United States had become much more difficult since the United States pronounced the Bush "Axis of Evil" doctrine in which Korea was included and which brought much instability to the peninsula and widened the perception of threats and of extreme insecurity on the part of the North Koreans. In this context, negotiations to continue the nuclear disarmament of the peninsula began to falter as the proposed freeze reward program was not materialized while the US stated that they would not negotiate again until the dismantling of the nuclear program actually took place (Brites 2016, 19).

In this sense, since there were no significant advances in terms of appeasement and approximation, but rather a profound paralysis of the negotiations, North Korea adopted a strategy of an offensive nature withdrawing from the NPT in 2013 and, as of 2005, the country started to use all its nuclear policy as an element of deterrence giving free way to the development of war-like artifacts.

It was in this context that the first nuclear tests took place in 2006, which continued with the unfolding of a new policy based on the rise of Kim Jong-Un, focusing on the process of modernization through the Juche doctrine which was explained earlier. In Brites' view (2016 20):

The arrival of Kim Jong-Un to power brought a series of questions about the regime's resilience to the process of political transition. In general terms, the Western perspective has been centered, since the end of the Cold War, on the belief of the imminent collapse. However, the new leader took over the country reaffirming the speech of autonomy and sought to demonstrate strength. In this context, the country has begun a new round of threats and provocations.

As we can see the development of the North Korean nuclear program was always marked by external influence as well as the extreme perception of insecurity on all sides (West, regional neighbors and South Korea). More than that, the incessant government investment to improve technology, even though the country is practically isolated from the world, what in principle would hamper such technological development, surprised even more the international community because the country is increasingly sophisticated in terms of nuclear technology for war purposes.

Within all these events, the internal characteristics defined by the Juche philosophy were strongly linked to external factors, such as international isolation, combined with the composition of a nationalist opposition government. In addition, given the centralization of power, the choice to be a nuclear country is defined mainly by its government, which in turn is characterized by opposition nationalism, Juche philosophy and its conflictive isolation in foreign policy.

To the extent that the ten points of the Juche system have been updated by Kim Jong Un, his government consolidates and he continues to be the supreme leader in the country. They maintained the militarized politics, the hostility against their enemies and against demonstrations of force. In the same sense, North Korea remains like a nuclear country.

In this way, it is not possible to see changes in the results of this connection between the internal (Philosophy Juche) and the external (Isolation and Opposition before the international community), as it is not possible to have perspectives of a denuclearization in the country through the 2005 Joint Declaration (US-Department of State 2005), raising doubts about the errors of the international approach to this problem and how best to approach it.

The Joint Declaration made it possible to establish an agreement reached during the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks (Hexapartite) in which, among other points, North Korea accepted to abandon its nuclear program and both the United States and South Korea were committed not to implement Weapons in the region. The document was considered one of the most important of the Six-Party Talks, held between the United States, Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea and Japan, which since 2003 has been aiming for peace and stability in the Korean peninsula through its denuclearization .

Criticism Against Counter-Proliferation

We know that North Korea is already a country with nuclear capability, and this stems from the fact that the international community has not been

able to prevent this nuclear proliferation of horizontal feature, adding that the policies adopted by countries to prevent the nuclear program, such as the Six-Party Talks in 2005 and the application of sanctions in 2006 and 2009 were flawed (US Department of State 2005, Kimball 2014).

First of all, we have the NPT as a regime of nuclear control and non-proliferation that has been controversially grounded from the start. Its creation, through the nuclear powers legitimized by the same treaty (USA, former USSR, United Kingdom, France and China), had as its initial focus the maintenance of the hierarchy generated by the possession of nuclear weapons under the veil of the ideal of pacifying relations and avoiding a global collapse arising from nuclear proliferation. Consisting of multilateral and bilateral initiatives, the NPT is based on three parts: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Lodgaard 2011; Willis 2013). What troubled the vast majority of countries was the way in which the pose of nuclear weapons by countries that had conducted successful tests until 1964 became legal. Many claimed that the select club of countries that could develop nuclear warfare technology was legitimized while most countries would undergo periodic revisions to control the advancement of technology.

Abstinence and deterrence systems emerged during the Cold War, so that, even if antagonistic, they would work together to form a global nuclear order. The abstinence system would be related to non-nuclear countries, who make a choice to see nuclear weapons as a source of insecurity. On the other hand, the deterrent system corresponds to countries that choose to be nuclearized because they see such possession as a source of security through containment, this system is considered as defensive and used through deterrence rules (Walker 2000). In these two systems, for example, we can frame the NPT, as an abstinence system, through nuclear non-proliferation, and we can frame North Korea in a deterrent system, but taking into account that the country is not aligned to any rules related to the possession of nuclear weapons.

Related to the deterrent system, we have Waltz's (1981) analysis of "optimistic proliferation," which suggests the possibility of pacifying the system in the sense that equilibrium would create stability and prevent conflicts. With this reasoning, we can reinforce Willis's (2013) idea that nonproliferation actually seeks to maintain domination while proliferation is not threatening, but rather the intentions behind this proliferation along with perceptions of threat.

The way in which the countries involved in the Korean case intend to contain their program end up reinforcing the motivations for pursuing it. The sanctions applied often increase the isolation of the country and do not have

a positive effect, as the country does not change its policy of self-sufficiency. In addition to this, we see North Korea demonstrating that it will not relinquish its autonomy in security and economy, finding escape from sanctions through its relationship with China, which does not intend to create tensions with the country for the costs that they would bring to stability in the region (Bishop 2005). Alongside this, sanctions diminish the very scope of China's diplomatic power over Korea.

On the other hand, we consider important to understand the process by which the country has become nuclear in view of the political and economic developments both internally and externally. The economic sanctions that the United States and the UN have implemented to stop North Korea's nuclear program since the 1980s have not yielded effective results. The interesting thing about this game established among the different actors is that the same policy implemented had two totally different directions and with divergent strategic utility for each side. In this way:

[...] the United States imposed to North Korea a series of economic and commercial sanctions. Since then, both the North Korean and the North American governments established a policy of *squeezing but not choking*, with different goals. North Korea gained time to build its first plutonium bomb. The United States to undermine the communist regime. (Pinacho 2014, 8-9).

We can define the beginning of North Korea's last and current proliferation momentum when the Jan Network in 2003 was dismantled, a network that provided the country with sensitive materials on the black market. The Jan Network started in 1976 when Abd al-Qadir Jan and several Pakistani engineers who worked for the Dutch FDO company on ultracentrifuges to the URENCO, which supplied 3 and 4% enriched uranium to European nuclear reactors returned to Pakistan with a huge amount of technical documentation and sophisticated plans. The key issue is that President Ali Bhutto has named Abd Qadir Jan as director and coordinator of the enriched uranium procurement subprogram of the Pakistani nuclear program (Pinacho 2014, 5).

For more than two decades Jan has used this experience to his advantage by establishing an extensive network for the supply of ultracentrifuge plants. For this, he built a clandestine factory in Malaysia for the development of high-level nuclear technology, which would later be exported and marketed through Dubai. However, in 2003, the BBC China ship which transported ultracentrifuges from Malaysia to Libya was intercepted at the time it crossed the Suez Canal. This was possible thanks to the Proliferation Security Initia-

tive's policy that had been proposed by the United States and aimed at intercepting materials related to the manufacture of illegally transported nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons, as well as the launching systems for such weapons (Pinacho 2014, 5).

The main issue in this matter is that, with the dismantling of the Jan Network, it became evident that in 2000 the network was able to supply North Korea with centrifuges of the most diverse models, as well as the technology developed by URENCO. Therefore, evidence that North Korea had built an underground plant to enrich uranium at high levels in order to obtain sufficient plutonium to build military armaments was proven once again.

Thus, in view of the new international reality of the war against terrorism, the Evil Axis doctrine, the dismantling of the Jan Network, the exit from the NPT, and the scarcity of food, electricity and oil, imminent financial and the commercial punishments led the government to develop an intimidating policy using the discreet nuclear technology that until then the country possessed. Thus, on October 6 2006, the country carried out its first nuclear test at the Hwaderi test site, being strongly condemned by the international community.

In 2009, the country performed launch tests on *Taepo Dong II* missiles and then did the second nuclear test on May 25. Although considered a test of limited force, the energy of the explosion was estimated at 4.7 kilotons by the US Geological Survey (Pinacho 2014, 10). This raised the level of concern as the punitive measures imposed were not working to curb North Korea's technological development. On the other hand, the country was gradually profiting from the manifestation of strength projected on the international scene, which gave it even more obstacles in obtaining materials essential for the accelerated development of this technology.

Such counter-proliferation measures adopted after the second nuclear test were not enough since on February 12, 2013, North Korea had its third nuclear test. This time, according to data provided by the same agency, the test reached 12 kilotons of force. The message was that the technical problems caused by the shortage of barred materials as a result of the punitive sanctions imposed had been internally overcome and the program continued in an accelerated fashion (Pinacho 2014, 10).

Kim Jong Un, in fact, has been the leader who gave more impetus to the North Korean nuclear program. The project to develop nuclear weapons has been accelerating in recent years. The fundamental question is that, in an exponential way, the most recent developments show that there is in fact an interest that is not only to demonstrate dissuasive nuclear capacity, but rather to position itself as a relevant actor at the regional level to demand the satis-

faction of its strategic interests more immediately

In that sense, in January 2016, North Korea held its fourth nuclear test, being considered the strangest of all performed. It was no coincidence that it was held two days before the birthday of the national leader. The government of Kim Jong Un assured that it had successfully detonated a hydrogen bomb, which many scientists in the international community doubted, but in the official communiqué of the State it was evident that the country already had the capacity to arm nuclear warheads in ballistic missiles. Thus, the hydrogen bomb ends up being 50 times more powerful than the nuclear bomb. However, the doubts remained because to a certain extent, the possession of a hydrogen weapon requires much more logistic sophistication which meant that North Korea still did not have all the infrastructure for handling and displacing such weapons. What the analysts point out is that even if there is doubt, North Korea may have tested a miniature unconventional hydrogen artefact and another technology that does not correspond to what traditionally refers to hydrogen bombs.

Also in 2016, on September 10, the country held the fifth nuclear test in 10 years. This latest test was considered the most powerful of all it has done in the history of North Korea's nuclear program. The explosion had a force of 10 kilotons and caused an earthquake to the north, in the border with China being perceived by the international scientific agencies. One of the most relevant purposes the country has sought with this test was to demonstrate to the world that it already has enough power to implement preemptive attacks if external threats are imminently materialized. The test was one in response to tensions experienced on the Korean peninsula since the US and South Korea agreed to implement the advanced THAAD anti-missile system to confront the challenges imposed by the North Korean nuclear program on the whole region (Fontdegloria 2016).

This new scenario establishes a gradual shift in the balance of power and threats among state actors. Another point that we cannot rule out is that there is a need to highlight North Korea's ability to intimidate not only South Korea but also Japan and thus challenge the alliances established between these countries and the western powers. North Korea's position is to make clear that there are defense strategies and mechanisms in the face of aggression against the country and the political regime. The fundamental question is that there is still disbelief and lack of international respectability, and the country would thus be seeking to strengthen its position to face future scenarios in which it may find itself much weaker towards the identified enemies (Azambuja 2016).

In this process of expressive and ostensible increase of the North Ko-

rean nuclear program with warlike aims during the last 10 years, it is interesting to note that in parallel with the emergence of Kim Jong Un, we have on the other side the implementation of a very particular US foreign policy led by the president Obama. Diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries are not straightforward and have remained at a distance since the Armistice was proclaimed to halt the Korean War. But what is worth noticing is the intention that Kim Jong Un has manifested in several opportunities to participate inside the APEC - Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; Of the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB); and to approach the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), but in order to participate in all these variable-geometry coalitions of economic orientation it is necessary to normalize relations with the US (Brites 2016, 21).

In Brites view (2016), in this geopolitical scenario, the Obama administration has adopted the so-called strategic patience policy based on the perception that the North Korean regime would tend to collapse sooner or later, and in that sense, it would be extremely useful to implement non-military measures to promote and encourage regime change in the country and thus lay the foundations for solid negotiations:

[...] the US strategic definitions for the peninsula remain focused on damage control in the event of regime collapse. And from a political standpoint, the Obama administration takes the position of only accepting negotiations in the event of more evident demonstrations by North Korea that it intends to abandon its nuclear program (Brites 2016, 21).

The issue that has unfolded in recent years is that the hegemonic powers' practice of implementing mechanisms to initiate transitions of political regimes in countries that were considered alien to Western values has not been peaceful, let alone the results successful. The cases of Iraq, Libya and Syria reinforce North Korea's understanding that the fall of the political regime and the renunciation of the nuclear program would make the country extremely vulnerable to the interests of Western countries that would step in to change the geopolitical landscape of northeastern Asia.

This scenario, in fact, is already changing with the alliance between the US and South Korea in the installation of the THAAD-Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system near the border of North Korea. Both Russia and China expressed concern, considering the presence of US troops and armament in the area very risky and provocative which, in fact, would alter the regional balance of power. Both regional powers (China and Russia) in a possible geopolitical transformation of the Korean peninsula, would have much to lose with a collapse of the Kim Jong Un regime as this would mean

a greater presence of the US and Western powers in the region.

In this sense, it is understandable the interest of maintaining this regional establishment on the part of the great neighbors of North Korea, since it is more likely to initiate dialogues of greater economic cooperation between China, Russia, including with Japan and South Korea, than a drastic Western intervention that would convulse the region to the heights of the 1950 war, which has not yet been resolved. For these reasons, the policy adopted by Kim Jong Un demonstrates that the West still has to deal with the unpredictable in what concerns the nuclear program while looking for ways to reduce war deterrence through trade contacts and keep the region away from the armed conflict.

Final considerations

This analysis sought to analyze the motivations for the development of the North Korean nuclear program, through the leadership of Kim Jong Un. For that, the nuclear program was justified by the country's internal and external policies, in which the consolidation of its regime takes place through the Juche philosophy and the Songun policy in the context of a scenario of international isolation and the perception of constant threats. In this way, North Korea would also fit as a nationalist opposition government, a condition exposed by Hymans (2006) to justify the decision of some countries to be nuclear.

To develop the country's economy, Kim Jong-Un found an outlet to demonstrate its strength by consolidating the nuclear program, which brings a sense of security through its consolidation as the sole leader of the North Korean regime (reinforcing the Juche philosophy and acting according to the Songun policy), demonstrated through the death of Jang ThaeK, and giving continuity to the revolution instituted by his grandfather. In other words, North Korea's nuclear program is consolidated through the leadership of Kim Jong Un, as the leadership of Kim Jong Un uses the strengthening of its nuclear program to consolidate itself.

Another relevant issue is related to the debate that urges as international crises emerge from the country's nuclear program. Both the fact that the implementation of sanctions in North Korea does not contain the advances of its nuclear program and the maintenance of the hierarchy established by the nuclear powers through the NPT are factors that gain importance in discussions that seek stability in the country, in northeast Asia and in the international system.

It is important to emphasize that the development of North Korean nuclear war technology means the materialization of two strategic dimensions. At first, we realize that through the nuclear program the country has developed a greater deterrence capacity vis-à-vis its closest enemies, mainly South Korea and Japan. On the other hand, the program is designed as a synonym for modernization of the country and patriotic grandeur, which gives the government greater popular legitimacy and a positive return of measures adopted for the development of technology at advanced levels.

Thus, North Korea's implementation of the Juche philosophy and Songun policy increasingly challenges the major powers as the threats of using nuclear weapons by the Pyongyang regime may be no longer customary to become gradually war rhetoric, which leaves a scenario of complete uncertainty as to whether Kim Jong Un could lead the country to a peaceful and harmonious transition with the West, or on the contrary, will lead the country to a war against the powers that defend interests in the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian.

REFERENCES:

- Armstrong, Charles. 2008. *Necessary Enemies: Anti-Americanism, Juche Ideology, and the Torturous Path to Normalization*. Washington: U.S.-Korea Institute -Working Paper Series.
- Avery, Emma; RINEHART, Ian (2014). "North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation". *Congressional Research Service*. April 5, 2013. Accessed on 20 October, 2014 <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=734743>.
- Azambuja, Marco. 2016. "Coreia do Norte e a busca pelos holofotes". CE-BRI-Textos. Accessed on 24 November, 2016 http://midias.cebri.org/arquivo/Coreia_do_Norte_e_a_busca_pelos_holofotes.pdf
- Bishop, David. 2005. "Dismantling North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Programs." Publicado em: Strategic Studies Institute. United States Army War College. Accessed on 20 November, 2014 <http://library.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/nkornuke.pdf>.
- Brites, Pedro. 2016. "A Questão Nuclear na Península Coreana: as Reformas Internas na Coreia do Norte e os Desafios Regionais". *Boletim de Conjuntura NERINT*. Porto Alegre, 1(1): 15-24. Accessed on 14 November, 2016 <https://www.ufrgs.br/nerint/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Boletim-vini-questaanuclearcoreia.pdf>.

- Bulling, Agustin. 2009. Un Estado “En Guerra”: Corea del Norte y el Mundo. *Revista Diplomacia*. No. 119, Abril-Junio. Accessed on 24 November, 2015 Disponível em: https://www.csbsju.edu/Documents/Asian%20Studies/Revista%20Diplomatica%20no%20119_rev.pdf
- Busch, Michael. 2008. “Identity and the Bomb.” *The Whithbead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. Summer/Fall, 9(2): 165-171.
- Cumings, Bruce. 2016. “The North Korea that Can Say No”. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Accessed on 14 November, 2016: [<http://thebulletin.org/north-korea-can-say-no9048>].
- Fontdegloria, Xavier. 2016. Corea del Norte realiza el ensayo nuclear más potente de su historia. Accessed on 20 November, 2016 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/09/09/actualidad/1473384714_686411.html
- Frank, Ruediger. 2012. *North Korea’s Ideology after April 2012: Continuity or Disruption?* Publicado em 38north.org. Accessed on 20 November, 2013 <http://38north.org/2012/05/rfrank050912/>.
- Hymans, Jacques. 2006. *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press..
- Hymans, Jacques. 2008. Assessing North Korean Nuclear Intentions and Capacities: A New Approach. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 8, (2008) 259-292.
- Kim, Hong. 2012. The Kim Jong-Un Regimes’s Survival Strategy and Prospects for the Future of North Korea. *International Journal of Korean Studies*, Fall/Winter, 2012, 16(2): 81-106.
- Kimball, Daryl. 2014. *Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy*, publicado em armcontrol.org. Accessed on 1 April, 2014 <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>
- Kwon, Heonik. 2013. *North Korea’s New Legacy Politics*, publicado em E-International Relations: e-ir.info. Accessed on 5 December, 2013 <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/16/north-koreas-new-legacy-politics/>.
- Lee, Grace. 2003. The Political Philosophy of Juche. *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 3(1): 105-112.
- Lodgaard, Sverre. 2011. *Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Towards a nuclear – weapon – free world?* London/New York: Routledge.
- Magalhães, Nuno. 2012a. *A Liderança de Kim Jong-un*, publicado em Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais: www.ipri.pt Accessed on 17 January, 2014. http://195.23.110.38/publicacoes/working_paper/working_paper.php?idp=730 .

- Magalhães, Nuno. 2012b. *Depois de Kim Jong-il*, publicado em Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais. Accessed on 14 January, 2014. http://www.ipri.pt/publicacoes/working_paper/working_paper.php?idp=727.
- Person, James. 2013a. *North Korea's Purges Past*, publicado em: nationalinterest.org Accessed on 5 January, 2014. <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/north-koreas-purges-past-9628>
- Person, James. 2013b. "The 1967 Purge of the Gapsan Faction and Establishment of the Monolithic Ideological System," publicado em wilsoncenter.org Accessed on 10 January, 2014. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-purge-the-gapsan-faction-and-establishment-the-monolithic-ideological-system>
- Petrovic, Milutin. "El Programa Nuclear de Corea del Norte." *Análisis Internacional El País*. Accessed on 15 November, 2016. http://internacional.el-pais.com/internacional/2011/12/20/actualidad/1324375721_863970.html.
- Pinacho, Guillermo. 2014. "Desarrollo del Armamento Nuclear de Corea del Norte." *Documentos de Opinión*. No. 78. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos – IEEE.ES. Accessed on 28 November, 2016 http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2014/DIEEO78-2014_DesarmeNuclear_CoreaNorte_GD.Velarde.pdf.
- US–Department of State. 2005. "Six-Party Talks, Beijing, China", Accessed on 5 January, 2014. <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm>.
- Vizentini, Paulo; Pereira, Analúcia. 2014. "A Discreta Transição da Coreia do Norte: Diplomacia de Risco e Modernização sem Reforma". *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*. 57(2). Accessed on 22 November, 2015. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201400310>.
- Walker, William (2000). "Nuclear Order and Disorder". *International Affairs*. 76(4): 703-724.
- Waltz, Kenneth. (1981). "The spread of nuclear weapons: more may better". *International Institute for Strategic Studies*. London: Adelphi Papers.
- Willis, Bem (2013). "Nuclear Proliferation Through Critical Security Studies", Accessed on 5 February, 2014 <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/02/nuclear-proliferation-through-critical-security-studies/>.
- Zerpa, Ramon (2011). *La Política de Songun*. Accessed on 20 November, 2015. www.aporrea.org/internacionales/a115577.html.

ABSTRACT

With the death of Kim Jong Il 2011, the uncertainty regarding North Korea future increased in its internal political system and in relation to its insertion in the international system. This article aims to approach the implications of Kim Jong Un's power by the *Juche* philosophy and *Songun* policy as guiding principles of the nuclear foreign policy of this country. The main focus of this paper is the emergence of the accelerated nuclear program that, in recent years, Kim Jong Un has used as a bargaining strategy and as a demonstration of regional and technological power that modify the regional geopolitical scenario. The motivations for the implementation of this program will be analyzed through the approaches of Hymans (2006-2008), Pinacho (2014) and Brites (2016) about the nationalist identity of the opposition as well as about the motivations exerted by the internal and external levels. This analysis points out that the confluence of interests and strategies implemented by the various actors about North Korea's nuclear program has favored North Korea huge bargaining power that defies the punishments imposed by the West overcoming obstacles and testing more sophisticated artifacts every time.

KEYWORDS

North Korea; Nuclear Proliferation; Kim Jong Un.

Received on December 6, 2015.

Accepted on August 1, 2016.

Translated by Gabriela Freitas

CIVIL SOCIETY AND REGIONAL POWERS IN A CHANGING WORLD: THE CASES OF BRAZIL AND INDIA¹

Daniela Vieira Secches²
Maria Cristina Andrade Aires³

International governance in a changing world: new interactions and old actors

International governance can be comprehended as a continuous process from which interest harmonization is sought between actors within the international environment in order to avoid conflict and promote cooperation (Commission On Global Governance 1995). The European Concert created in Vienna Congress in 1815 is an important historical landmark for understanding this concept as a route where the state was the protagonist. Nevertheless, state prominence did not mean that all negotiations within this normative framework had not been opened to public scrutiny (Krasner 2009).

During the 20th century, interstate relations were formulated through a diplomacy centered in the leader of the executive power. Despite the liberal revolutions from the previous centuries, plenipotentiaries kept clothed with a legitimacy that still lacked institutional solidity in order to be truly transferred to the people. Foreign policy, understood as the state domestic demands projected towards the international environment, was drawn based on a univocal national interest (Hudson 2006).

¹ A draft on the topic was presented and discussed during the International Studies Association – FLACSO Convention in Buenos Aires, 2014.

² Coordinator and professor of the International Relations undergraduate course at Centro Universitário UniBH. PhD candidate at Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais. E-mail: drvieira@gmail.com

³ Professor of International Relations at Centro Universitário UniBH. Director of SERVAS - Voluntary Social Service Assistance. E-mail: crisaires@gmail.com

Within this scenario, a clear line between high and low politics⁴ was defined (Bustamante 2000). Hence, diplomacy had the noble mission to ensure the integrity of state sovereignty and, therefore, its own survival in the international environment. Foreign policy was seen exclusively as a matter of high politics – it was not open for citizen debate, and it should not be, in order to avoid risking the entire national society. It was based on this that secrecy and decision-making centralization on the executive power were justified.

Over the years, state and transnational flows have become more and more intense, and the frontier between high and low politics is not that obvious anymore. The last two centuries have testified an increasingly interdependent world concerning relationships with all its actors (Keohane; Nye 2011). More heterogeneous players important for domestic decision-making process on public policies find more channels to voice their interests inside more mature democratic societies (Lima 2000).

Global capital, advocacy transnational networks and international organizations are examples of actors that gained increasingly power within international governance, especially after the Cold War (Keck; Sikkink 1998). These new players and their new interactions promote great chances within state foreign policy construction from defining national interest up to plenipotentiary final decision-making.⁵

As shown by Robert Putnam (1988),⁶ foreign policy decision-making level II has growing power in this process. As state institutions solidify their democratic regime, accountability control channels and social scrutiny over government actions may also fortify and tend to become more frequent and available. Therefore, the group of agreements that are possible for the plenipotentiary to get them approved at home – the win-set, is reduced, because

4 On this distinction, Maria Regina Lima (2000, 273, 274) states that “*Nessa concepção, a política internacional está acima da política doméstica porque é voltada para a defesa dos interesses nacionais e por tratar de questões afetas à segurança e à sobrevivência do Estado, em um contexto em que tanto uma quanto outra não estão garantidas por qualquer instituição ou norma, mas apenas pelo próprio poder de cada Estado*”.

5 Hermann and Hermann (1989) discuss multiple autonomous actors influences. They are individuals or groups that are outside a decision-making structure, but they are capable of constraining, even though not determining, a decision on foreign policy. See Hermann, M.; Heremann, C. Who makes foreign policy decisions and how: an empirical inquiry. *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(4), (Dec. 1989), 361-387.

6 Robert Putnam proposes to analyze foreign policy decision-making based on a dynamics between the level I (international) and the level II (domestic environment). In this sense, the chief negotiator behavior in the international arena is constrained by the necessity of reelection and power maintenance in the domestic field. See Putnam, R. (1988): Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level game. *International Organization*, 42(3).

the chief negotiator will be subject to increasingly strong pressures at home. National civil society becomes then an important player, able to impose constraints and to demand results concerning state foreign actions.

On one hand, national civil society increases its space for action through a foreign policy that is more accountable in front of its state institutions. On the other hand, the increasing number of transnational interactions within a hegemonic order under transformation can contribute to modify the society own social behavior. In this highly dynamic scenario, the state and its challenge for defining national interest react and interact with international environment structure side by side with the internal debate on democracy as a value defended by the international society built upon a western liberal structure.⁷

Brazil and India are states whose economic growth and global relations are growing considerably in the last decade, specially considering the years after 2008 financial turmoil. In an international order where traditional powers as United States of America (U.S) and Europe are found more fragile, there is space to reconfigure international governance, as it can be noticed with G20 increasing influence (Ramos 2013). These changes bring about some questions.

To think about how Brazilian and Indian states place themselves in contemporary international environment, unitary actor models do not suffice. Some questions arise that go beyond these prototypes. In which way democratic regime institutions are influencing foreign policy decision-making? What is the place of civil society in these countries concerning foreign policy decision-making? In order to comprehend foreign policy decision-making in a world under change, this paper aims to think of how Brazil and India decide foreign policy matters domestically, and if there is any social participation within this process. More than arriving at empirical findings, it is sought to ramble theoretically over these challenges as an initial provocative effort about this relevant topic.

Within modern political dynamics, civil society is responsible for producing inputs that shall be addressed to the state, that then respond with public policies – the outputs. In spite of tensions on how to pose these demands and the difficulties for establishing a limit about when civil society must produce outputs for its own necessities, a very important task for this social force understood as an arena for demand construction is to verify state

7 Currently, it can be noted a predominant trend to use democracy as an instrumental element – democracy of low-level intensity. For a more classical definition in this sense, see Robert Dahl and its concept of polyarchy. In Dahl, R. (1972): *Polyarchy: participation and opposition*. New Haven.

actions accountability (Bobbio 1999).

The Democratic State of Law expects a state action that is juridical within a hierarchical subjection and a material qualification made through law. A legal democracy is legitimated, thus, by the necessity for the state to absorb socioeconomic diversities in its public policies, using law as an instrument for transformation and solidarity. In this sense, social restructuring and state control happen through education and popular participation. Civil society then plays the role of controlling state behavior and matching its demands with public policies built as answers to them (Wolkmer 1995).

If civil society arena within a Democratic State of Law relay mainly on accountability, from the moment that output construction is transnationalized through international agreements and organizations, questions on its legitimacy rise, since public policies are planned and/or constructed outside domestic democratic institutions and have a direct effect over citizens life and the own definition of common good. As a consequence, it is quite important to discuss where civil society stands not only inside the state, but also within a broader transnational horizon.

With this in mind, the next sections presents two cases – Brazil and India. This discussion aims on shed some light over (1) the general lines upon which Brazilian and Indian foreign policy decision-making occur; and (2) these processes openness for social participation. Finally, some considerations will be brought about concerning Brazil and India current challenges under a changing world order, and how social participation within foreign policy decision-making is related to these states capacity to project themselves internationally as emerging powers.

The Brazilian case

Brazilian foreign policy decision-making has been traditionally pointed as an insulated process that does not establish a clear connection with public debate, and with low participation level of legislative power. Throughout Brazilian history, some relevant changes have occurred within this realm, since a formal increasing on legislative participation until a better coordination between new domestic actors in an attempt to democratize foreign policy construction. Nevertheless, academia still describes the executive power as a consecrated actor within foreign policy decision-making in Brazil.

Aimed on better comprehending this framework and on evaluating possible changes, a brief historical discussion on legislative role within Brazilian diplomacy will be initially done, followed by presenting its current partic-

ipation on foreign policy. This involvement played essentially a residual role during the Empire. This state building moment promoted complete power centralization on the executive based on the defense of national interest and survival. This background is relatively reversed with republic revolution in 1889. As Alexandre (2006:49) points out, “for the first time in Brazilian constitutional history, it was stated the congress privative ability to ‘decide definitively concerning treaties and conventions with foreign nations’ – a text that is kept almost without changes until nowadays”.⁸

Despite this new constitutional landmark, Brazilian diplomacy during the Old Republic keeps tied to territorial configuration efforts. During this period, the Baron of Rio Branco gets prominence, and foreign policy is still full of his influence. He is a crucial and symbolic character for the Foreign Affairs Ministry institutionalization, and clearly defended a diplomacy separated from domestic policies. State matters would be then autonomous and independent from internal social groups cleavages and conflicts. This conception contributed to reinforce the already ongoing process of Brazilian foreign policy insulation, which is now also part of Itamaraty (Alexandre 2006; Lima 2000; Ramos 2012).

From 1946 on, Brazil enters a period of import substitution model consolidation. According to Lima (2000), this economic agenda made multilateral negotiations play the role of a collective good, since it was desired to protect national industry. Once more, the Foreign Affairs Ministry had its autonomy pattern reinforced in front of domestic political and social forces. It is important to highlight that legislative powers concerning foreign policy (and all other matters) were suspended during *Estado Novo* period (1937 – 1945), as the Congress was kept dissolved. In 1968, the Congress is again put aside during military dictatorship, and the executive power assumed integrally foreign policy decision-making, including treaties approval. Therefore, it seems that, during history, there was a fluctuation between a strong and complete executive autonomy for foreign policy decision-making.

With political democratization and the introduction in the new constitution of a wide set of social rights, it was expected that there would be changes concerning democratization and decentralization of foreign policy decision-making. Nevertheless, the final version of constitutional text kept executive powers concerning international relations and reinforced its ability to decide over it before congress, even after it has given the congress more

8 Freely translated by the authors from the original text: “*Pela primeira vez na história constitucional brasileira, previu-se a competência privativa do Congresso em ‘resolver definitivamente sobre tratados e convenções com as nações estrangeiras’ – redação que é mantida quase sem alteração até os dias de hoje*”.

exclusive powers over treaties celebration⁹ (Lima; Santos 2001). Alexandre (2006:60) states that “in 1998 constitutional regime, legislative fundamental participation in foreign policy kept laid down on its competence to approve international agreements *ex post*”.¹⁰ It seems clear that the congress is quite limited to act, as its costs for rejecting a convention already celebrated by the executive would bring high costs and possible sanctions for the country. Therefore, legislative can only play the part of accepting the agreement already defined by the president and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The power concentration over executive hands must be stressed, that end up with unilateral power for defining the country foreign agenda (Lima; Santos 2001).

The new constitution also brought about some degree of confusion concerning executive and legislative roles: the articles that dealt with foreign policy used different terms to define each power competence for celebrating international treaties. The obscurity and the absence of further regulation have been utilized, thus, as mechanisms to enhance legislative powers. Capacity to make amendments, safeguards and interpretative marks to international conventions enabled the broadening of legislative participation. While analyzing agreements made by Brazil, Alexandre (2005; 2006) points a still enduring trend by which the congress usually participates within foreign policy decision-making by inserting amendments during approval of certain international acts.¹¹

So it can be noted that legislative has resorted to this legal void, and the increasing of its participation within foreign policy decision-making has not been definitively solved. Nevertheless, it would not be reasonable to suppose that this participation would happen in all treaties. Alexandre (2006) states that this control has been made in situations in which there was more public opinion sensitiveness concerning a given agreement. That is, the congress claims for more powers when it sees a social mobilization concerning certain international negotiation. Legislative interest seems to be produced

9 The 1988 Constitution states the exclusive competence of the congress to “*resolver definitivamente sobre tratados, acordos ou atos que acarretem encargos ou compromissos gravosos ao patrimônio nacional*”. In the article 84, nevertheless, it treats as an exclusive competence of the president, as a power to “*celebrar tratados, convenções e atos internacionais, sujeitos a referendo do Congresso Nacional*” (Alexandre 2006).

10 Freely translated by the authors from the original text: “*no regime constitucional de 1988, a participação fundamental do Legislativo em questões de política externa continuou assentada em sua competência para a aprovação ex post de acordos internacionais*”.

11 There is an important debate concerning Brazilian foreign policy and the relation between the executive and the legislative powers (Alexandre 2006; Cesar 2002). This discussion is set around delegation and abdication power theories that go, however, beyond the purpose of this paper.

through some social sectors domestic activation (Alexandre 2005; 2006).

This legislative participation over legal voids reveals that foreign policy decision-making process can be enlarged and less insulated. It seems a possible way out for thinking foreign policy democratization, since congressmen, the people representatives, have fired this prerogative precisely when they see civil society mobilization and consequent public opinion impact. In this perspective, a quite frequent argument in the academia shows up: globalization and certain topics transnationalization promote the domestic component within foreign policy formulation (Lima 2000).

However, this paper is not that optimistic concerning foreign policy democratization through legislative powers enhancement. It seems crucial and urgent to establish democratization and decentralization tools within Brazilian foreign policy decision-making. To fortify internal democracy also means making foreign actions accountable, and, with a more careful analysis, it is possible to find some problems that rise from congress action in this realm. Classical studies on political participation (Verba, Scholzman & Brady 1995; Milbrath 1965) and a number of current researches show that sociodemographic variables as income, schooling, race and gender can predict political participation. Generally, these variables indicate that political activity is skewed in favor of higher income and higher schooling level groups (Aires 2010).

It is possible to note that individuals with more resources for political participation, according also to this sociodemographic differentiation, are the ones usually heard by the government. That is, they can voice their preferences more efficiently and make them hit the political system (AIRES 2010). This social hierarchy constrain different social groups participation and influence capacity, and it is not, as pointed by Fábio Wanderley Reis (2010:56), “incompatible with a thoughtful public opinion concerning international problems and foreign policy that is able to exert influence over decisions on these matters”.¹²

As shown above, it is this same public opinion that has pushed for more congress participation within Brazilian foreign policy. The problem is how this public opinion is skewed by socioeconomic and schooling levels, and, hence, not able to completely fulfill democracy requirements. Given political participation pattern found in Brazil, it can be noted that public opinion is generally a small socioeconomic elite ideas, perceptions and desires. That

12 Freely translated by the authors from the original text: “incompatível com a existência de uma opinião pública atenta aos problemas internacionais e de política externa e capaz de exercer influência sobre as decisões a esse respeito”.

is, the public opinion of a minority.¹³

Here, a contradiction concerning current Brazilian congress enhanced participation on foreign policy following national public opinion mobilization as a democratizing mechanism can be found. What can be, at a first sight, perceived as a possibility for enlarging social participation within foreign policy formulation through its elected congressmen, reducing then the Ministry insulation and contributing for democratization, must be reevaluated more cautiously. It must be highlighted that actors with unequal resources for participation present themselves in an unequal position within a democratic regime, since not everyone can effectively have the chance for being heard by the political system.

Since public opinion reflects individual and groups positioned more favorable in the socioeconomic strata, the government listens and answers to these groups mobilization when it behaves according to public opinion. There is a clear risk to the equal interest protection democratic principle (Verba; Schlozman; Brady 1995). It can be noted that to homogenize public opinion is to make its emancipatory character null. Society is composed of a number of interests and those associated to dominant groups have prevailed, not otherwise.

However, public opinion has been activated by foreign policy formulators, as an expression of a univocal national common will. Therefore, it is supposed that there is something collectively shared by all population, and it is possible to comprehend and express this national will by the way elite interests constrain policies concerning Brazil international standing. Once more, the government reinforces foreign policy insulation, this time protected by the reference to public opinion, in spite of the fact this is skewed. That is, as this will can be comprehended and expressed through the Foreign Affairs Ministry highly qualified bureaucracy; there is no longer the need for defining this will through electoral race or democratic deliberation (Reis 2010). Once again, the democratic ideal is disrupted.

This means then that it is impossible to combine foreign policy formulation with democratic practices? Not at all. A democratic regime legitimacy and strength relay over the connection between multiple demands from a number of socioeconomic and demographic strata and the public policy construction, and the foreign policy is indeed a public policy.¹⁴ This mech-

¹³ Fábio Wanderley Reis (2010) still points out, with his usual precision, the role of media for public opinion, and notes that the journalist position, in general, has no correspondence with Brazilian population.

¹⁴ In the last years, Brazil assisted to a significant enlargement of its popular participation mechanisms, as participative budget, management councils, special commission and the cre-

anism ensures state action as a transformative agent and as a social justice promoter. As we note, in Brazil, the absence of such a correspondence, there is a need to evaluate alternatives for legislative action, as an instance of democratic representation that effectively reflects societal demand more broadly. In order to do so, it is of utmost importance to establish civil society empowering mechanisms through all its strata beyond institutional channels and constitutional arrangements. The search for voicing less favored groups, traditionally excluded from formal political power, as a way to effectively guide public policies formulation can create a more democratic foreign policy management.

This democratization process in Brazil needs, therefore, to have a desire for constructing “broad democratic consensus, creating conditions in which the general public perceives the relevance of foreign policy initiatives and approves them, and do so precisely through values and institutional mechanisms consecrated by democracy” (Reis 2010:66).¹⁵

The democratic institutions existence is a landmark that differentiates also India from other emerging countries, in the same line shown in Brazilian case. A brief historical of its construction and functioning, and its fragilities concerning foreign policy decision-making will be debated following. Finally, these observations will be compared to the current challenges these countries face for their projection in the international system.

The Indian case

India is one of the oldest political societies in human history (Karim 2013). Hindu civilization dates back five thousand years ago, of social acquaintanceship that endures until nowadays. Nevertheless, it is only possible to think about India as a modern Westphalia state with a democratic regime after its independence from British rule, in 1947, after almost one century of foreign domination.

Since then, India can be described as a federative republic with a democratic political regime and a parliamentary government system. Republic was a natural choice after the colonizing monarchical submission of the

ation of a number of civil society organizations dealing with environment and human rights, among other topics. However, these efforts have not been translated into a significantly increased participation on foreign policy decision-making.

15 Freely translated by the authors from the original text: “*amplos consensos democráticos, de criar condições em que o público em geral perceba a relevância de iniciativas de política externa e as aprove -, e de fazê-lo justamente pelo apelo a valores e mecanismos institucionais que a democracia consagra*”.

Viceroy and after previous territorially destabilizing nobility experiences. Federalism adoption had a similar logic due to the multireligious, multiethnic and multilinguistic character of Indian people (Lijphart 1996).

Remembering John Stuart Mill (1958), Karim (2013) discusses how Indian democracy survived despite Mill indication that it would be impossible to adopt a democratic regime in such linguistically divided society.¹⁶ In this sense, *panchayat* tradition, colonialism, charismatic leaderships, federalism, elections, constitution, military and civil sector relationship, and the role of the Supreme Court were fundamental to ensure the relative success of the nowadays most diverse democracy.

The *panchayat* is an Indian millenary tradition from which social groups used to organize themselves politically in the local realm (Johnson 2003). It is a council composed for, generally, five elected members that seek consensus concerning disputes related to a number of issues. Originally, it was believed that they had divine legitimacy, but today their temporal representativeness is stronger. Currently, these councils still are the primary political unit of rule in India, and it is believed that they collaborated to create a culture of elective relation between the representatives and the *demos*.

Despite attempts to dissociate ideally from British rule during the independence process, the metropolis legacy for democratic institutions in India is still quite relevant. In 1885, United Kingdom authorized the creation of a proto-party, the Indian National Congress, as a mean to voice Indian preferences to the British Crown. It ended up in the future as basis for the independence movement. From 1895 on, local governments were elicited, and they too contributed to shape a more professionalized group of individuals that eventually entered for independent Indian politics (Karim 2013).

Charismatic leaderships also played a central role for Indian state creation, and largely dominated its decision-making, specially concerning foreign policy. From Mahatma Gandhi legacy, to Nehru and its family – Indira, Rajiv and Sonia Gandhi, strong leaders and prime ministers are a significant part of the country history. In spite of Karim (2013) consideration that these leaderships helped state democratic consolidation and the diversity conformation in India, its personalistic actions also marked their rule not solely in a positive way, as posed by Ganguly (2010).

The federalist choice obviously contributed as well to conform the

¹⁶ Currently, there are two official languages in India – Hindi and English, and other twenty-one recognized national languages. For having an idea on Indian linguistic complexity, its constitution, in its Part VII, sets a tangle of rules for adopting a number of different languages in the official instruments. See INDIA. Constitution of India. http://india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf. Accessed on July 1st, 2014.

high ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, as did the creation of many regional parties, especially from the 1960 on (Narang; Staniland 2012). Furthermore, Indian electoral practice is surprisingly uninterrupted. With a brief suspension in the 1970s for only two years, all other governments came to rule with an increasing voters turnout that reached 66,4% in 2014, according to India Electoral Commission.¹⁷

Elections regulation, federalism, and an independent Supreme Court are among other information on fundamental rights and state organization in a written constitution that came into force in 1950. Finally, it is important to stress the separation between military and civil sectors, a legacy from British Crown own organization (Karim 2013). With a military subservient to the civil, a decision-making process centralized in a civil bureaucracy largely controls even matters related to security and defense (Narang; Staniland 2012).

Indian decision-making on foreign policy happens within this federalist, parliamentary, democratic and highly social diverse environment. Nehru created Indian Foreign Affairs Service in the 1940s. Its diplomatic action, however, has always been closely tied to the Prime Minister, as during Nehru, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi rules, or to the governing coalition, as can be observed in the last two decades (Narang; Staniland 2012).

Markey (2009) lists a series of difficulties for a successful Indian diplomacy action abroad aimed on placing India within current global challenges and on promoting the country regional leadership. The author points the small size of Indian diplomatic network, with about seven hundred officials; the lack of information on governmental actions to be analyzed by independent and well equipped universities and think tanks; and the lack of interest of the mídia and the private sector to truly engage in the debates on foreign policy.¹⁸

This structure is mostly insulated and dependent on a small elite centralized in the federal government (Fair 2012). The basic political framework in India lays down over multiple-oriented coalitions, built upon ethnic, regional, religious, casts, among other factors (Narang; Staniland 2012). A resource that is greatly used in the relationship between the state and its *demos* is patronage, defined as a clientelistic exchange of provisions in the public realm based on private relationships and on future compromises made by the political actor involved in the negotiation (Nunes 2003).

17 Election Commission Of India. Turnout trends over the years. http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/GE2014/line.htm. Accessed on July 1st, 2014.

18 Routray (2013) makes an interesting literature revision about critics that have been made to Indian diplomacy. See Routray, B. *National Security Decision Making in India*. Singapura: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013.

Nevertheless, in spite of an increasing popular participation during the elections, there are no great incentives for the politics to use foreign policy matters as platforms for the electoral race. It can be observed that the average citizen guides its vote on short-term domestic issues, like welfare policies, and on the many internal cleavages and its patronage system. Eventually, it has been tried to mobilize international issues for electoral race, but they were not as successful for granting votes as, for example, coalition dynamics (Narang; Staniland 2012).¹⁹

The low level of social mobilization on foreign policy collaborates for its insulation and its ideologization. Generally, these two characteristics constancy was marked by foreign policy guidelines fragmentation during different governments, showing that India lacks a solid strategy for its insertion in the international environment (Routray 2013; Tharoor 2012; Mohan 2010; Markey 2009). However, Narang and Staniland (2012) indicate it is possible to note an emphasis on autonomy search based on domestic self-reliance and aversion to alliance during the three main periods about the Indian foreign policy – Nehru Era (1947 – 1965), Gandhi Era (1965 – 1988) and Post-Cold War Era (1989 – today).

Jawaharlal Nehru based Indian foreign policy first guidelines on non-alignment (Ganguly 2010). Fearing that a close relationship with one of the superpowers in the international bipolar system would bring about a colonial dependency revival, Indian strategy was funded in the defense of de-colonization, of disarmament, of equitable international resources sharing, and of participation on multilateral forums.

Indira Gandhi e her son, Rajiv Gandhi,²⁰ did not present such a coherent vision for the Indian foreign policy as their ancestor did with non-alignment. More ferociously opposed to United States, Indira Gandhi ended up getting closer to Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), like the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation signed in 1971. Rajiv Gandhi, despite having rhetorically proposed changes, largely did not modify his mother legacy (Routray 2013).

Narang and Staniland (2012) state that it is possible to note a strategic

19 It can be noted a small sensitiveness concerning tensions with Pakistan, Muslim population in India, Sri Lanka situation and terrorism. On this discussion, see ROUTRAY, B. *National Security Decision Making in India*. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013; e Sahni, A.; Mohan, R. India's security challenges at home and abroad, *National Bureau of Asian Research*, Special Report 39, May 2012.

20 Indira Gandhi (1966 – 1977, 1980 – 1984) and Rajiv Gandhi (1984 – 1989) rules in this era are not continuous, and were interrupted by a short authoritarian interregnum and by some coalition governments.

center that persists after Cold War, even though some domestic and structural changes have taken place. Coalition governments that came about followed a tendency to privilege autonomy, flexibility and a desire to avoid dependency on stronger powers, as elements that trace back to Nehru Era, no matter were they from Hindu right²¹ or from left orientation.²² Coalition dynamics that are predominant currently tend to modify state apparatus in order to give voice to more multiple interests. According to Muni (2009), centrality around party leadership tends to give space to a consensus necessity through coalition, what could open more space for social mobilization, historically important for *demos* manifestation since Indian independence.

Pachayat and civil disobey legacy bring about civil society importance for India. Some resist to discuss social groups in India following what they consider to be a western concept, and most of readings are focus on more strict interpretation based on rural, labor, and anticolonial movements from the beginning of state history, following the liberal benchmark of three sectors (Mcduie-Ra 2009). Nevertheless, it can be noted the relevance of civil society groups in India for constituting the *demos* build up discourse. As Katzenstein *et al* (2001) highlights, many political groups, specially regional ones, have gained prominence firstly linked to social and political movements before become elected. During the 1940s and the 1950s, these movements happened as social fights mainly connected to imperialism and anticolonialism, and took Nehru political party to federal government after independence.

Specially after the Cold War, with a profound economic crisis and state liberalization, social and political movements start to address resources management in India, assuming sometimes the role of providers within the liberal context (Gupta 2003). It can be perceived a ruling elite consolidation in New Delhi, increasingly influenced by regional parties, and a social mobilization more concentrated on local specific issues, as, for example, some environmental movements.²³ As previously discussed, civil society domestic proactivity in India was not translated into great mobilizations on foreign policy issues. The independence movement adopted a non-aligned position of rejection towards international alliances, what was also adopted domestically by the average cit-

21 *Bharatiya Janata Party*, specially. It is currently in the government, with Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi.

22 The strongest party in this spectrum, nationally speaking, is the Indian National Congress, a center-left party that occupied Indian cabinet up to the recent elections in 2014.

23 Examples are the fight against a dam construction in the River Narmada and movements against deforestation in Uttaranchal. See Mcduie-Ra, D. *Civil society, democratization, and the search for human security: the politics of environment, gender, and identity in Northeast India*. Nova York: Nova Science Publishers, 2009.

izen. In this sense, during the first five decades of Indian state, there was little room for transnational fight channels, or even for domestic problems connection to the international realm.

It is expected that economic liberalization and a more profound insertion of Indian market in international trade after Cold War could contribute for addressing civil society demands to foreign policy decision-making. However, it can be still noted a significant apathy within the average voters, that largely have few information and knowledge on international relations (Kapur 2009). Narang and Staniland (2012) think that a tendency to a greater foreign policy elitization can occur due to business sector participation on it. Trade groups have contributed for effectively enhancing some institutional flaws within Indian diplomacy, specially the *Confederation of Indian Industry* (CII) and the *Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry* (FICCI). Some strategic dialogues have been kept between Indian industry and central figures in United States, Japan and Singapore, and commercial visits were arranged. Moreover, some authors remember the importance of Indian diaspora and the media as voicing vehicles for society interests concerning foreign policy, even though they are restrained to a privileged elite and distant from the majority.

It is expected that this business sector will increasingly act closer to foreign policy decision-making in India, since the state is inefficient for correcting diplomacy institutional flaws. They will have, however, some challenges ahead, according to Ganguly (2010). Firstly, there is no truly articulated alternative for non-alignment, and the decisions are made more based on stakeholders expectations than on a rational long term calculus (Routray 2013). Lasting issues, as Pakistan tensions, bilateral relations with US and China rise seem to lack good analysis and planning. There are still serious institutional deficiencies in the Foreign Affairs Service, what makes the task of finding this new axis even harder. In this scenario, India would have fewer chances for successfully acting within contemporary relevant international regimes like non-proliferation, climate change and international trade.

While comparing Brazilian and Indian cases, it is possible to note some differences concerning their foreign policy decision-making. Nevertheless, it is possible to also note many similitudes when it comes to deal with civil society involvement in this realm. Considering the current challenges Brazil and India face for global insertion, these points shall be following debated.

Brazil and India: old and new challenges in the changing world

Brazil and India are emerging powers in contemporary international system, especially after 2008 crisis. Their territorial and population continental

dimensions and their sharp economic growing have contributed to put these countries diplomacies to more than ever search the consolidation of a more privileged position in international relations and in the regional realm.

Considerable natural resources richness²⁴ and diverse cooperation initiatives with developing countries²⁵ are elements that mark Brazilian insertion in the 20th century (Chun 2013). Nevertheless, a historical defender of non-intervention principle, the country lacks hard power capacity, and its consolidation as a global power largely depends on larger investments in the military sector. For doing so, the greatest Brazilian challenge is to reverse its current economic growing retraction in order to generate capital for solidifying not only its economic and financial leadership, but also its power in other realms.

The fact that it is the largest non-western democracy in the world grants India an important role as strategic western powers ally, what can generate capital for a better regional and global insertion. Its current investments in the military, its nuclear power and its economic growth also collaborate as positive factors for enhancing Indian role. Chun (2013) also remembers that for a sustainable enlargement of its capacities, Indian diplomacy must rectify its institutional flaws, consolidate its rapprochement with South East Asia, and solidify its recent closer bilateral relations with US and other states as BRICS alliance.

Brazilian diplomacy professionalization took a leap in quality with the Baron of Rio Branco leadership in the beginning of the last century, leaving as legacy a Ministry with solid formation and well prepared diplomats. A number of personal leadership that has been played by Brazil in many international forums can be perceived as an indication of such preparation. On the other hand, in the Indian case, it can be noted a lack of larger investment in their bureaucrats preparation and even in hiring such personnel.

Itamaraty more solid institutionalization may have elicited more concise rapprochement initiatives with public opinion. Since last two governments, public dialogues with civil society multiplied and information and transparency channels have been created. The same impetus cannot be so strongly perceived in Indian diplomacy that has promoted a more structured proximity with the business sector, which has played for many times the role of diplomat advisors.

The business sector also plays a role side by side with Brazilian diplomacy, and this tradition is older than Indian one. Brazilian economic liberaliza-

24 Brazil has the largest biological diversity in the world, and almost a tenth of global fresh water (Chun, 2013).

25 An example is the country recent enlargement of African policy, with direct actions in many African states as medicaments and agriculture cooperation and investments on infrastructure. See SARAIVA, J. A política exterior do governo Lula: o desafio africano. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 45 (2), 2002, 5-25.

tion traces back to foreign investment openness during the 1940s, expanding considerably when Juscelino Kubistchek ruled the country some years later. On the other side, Indian market opening got stronger only after the Cold War, when the socialist center-left party – the Indian National Party, lost elections for a right-wing coalition. In this sense, the diplomatic proximity with business sector only happened in a denser way more recently, and this is a crucial challenge for India projection and the sustainability of its considerable last years economic growth.

If Brazilian and Indian diplomacy proximity to businessmen is almost an inevitable move due to the growth and openness of these states economies, to promote a democratic consensus around other issues as security and defense is a much more complex task. Some problems of this nature have been capable of mobilizing Indian public opinion and promoting interfaces with its foreign policy, especially when it comes to deal with border tensions and terrorism. It can be perceived a trend for these channels to become more frequent due to regional parties increasingly important participation in national politics. On the other hand, in Brazil there are no such challenges more directly noticed by the population, and enlarging investments in military and the country participation in international activities such as United Nations peacekeeping operations are not that well comprehended and accepted by the citizens.

While evaluating this brief history concerning Brazil and India foreign policy decision-making, institutional mechanisms that try to democratize this process and its relation with civil society and its demands face quite similar challenges in both countries. Firstly, and mainly, it is clear that there is an insulation of the actors dedicated to negotiate and decide on these policies when it comes to deal with international issues. As pointed out above, both states present a history of few and small exemptions, and largely denote a considerable centralization in a diplomatic bureaucracy linked to an individual or a coalition government.

This insulation consecration as basis for foreign policy formulation and negotiation seems in both cases to have been strengthened by a low level of social mobilization around international issues. Since there is no significant pressure made by the population for a more participative process, and as demands are not that clearly organized concerning foreign affairs, there is no systematic discussion about institutional mechanisms to democratize foreign policy decision-making. In spite of the recent civil society activation in both countries with organized movements increasing, this domestic dynamism was not translated into larger mobilizations on foreign policy.

Moreover, as already discussed here, due to socioeconomic, cultural and demographic cleavages, the participation tends to be highly skewed. The

trend is that more favored groups from higher socioeconomic strata are the only ones that can not only give voice to their demands, but also make them having an impact on the formal political system. It can be noted, then, a reversal in the democratization process: an elitization of Brazilian and Indian foreign policies, mainly concerning the business sector. This sector benefits from the institutional porosity for directing diplomacy closer to its interests.

On one hand, this can mean a seed for increased societal participation. Nevertheless, it still can risk democratic equality ideal. Therefore, it seems that both Brazil and India will have to deal with its society structural issues in order to initiate a democratization process for their foreign policies. Such a process, however, is essential for adapting their international projecting to their domestic democratic regime, making it more legitimated.

REFERENCES

- Alexandre, C. 2006. *O Congresso Brasileiro e a Política Externa (1985-2005)*. Dissertação de Mestrado. Programa de Pós- Graduação em Relações Internacionais da PUC-Rio.
- Alexandre, C. 2007. "O papel do Poder Legislativo na Política Externa Brasileira: o caso dos acordos referentes ao Centro de Lançamentos de Alcântara (CLA)." *I Encontro Nacional da ABRI*.
- Bustamante, J. F. C. 2010. "La diplomacia: de la Edad Moderna a nuestros días." *Revista de Economia & Relações Internacionais*, São Paulo, (8)16.
- Chun, K. 2013. *The BRICs Superpower Challenge: foreign and security policy analysis*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Comission On Global Governance 1999: *Our Global Neighbourhood*. Nova Iorque: Oxford University Press.
- Fair, C. 2012. "Prospects for effective internal security reforms in India". *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 50(2): 145 – 170.
- Fialho, F. 2008. *Participação e Desigualdade Política: Um Exercício em Teoria e Método*. Dissertação de mestrado apresentada ao Departamento de Ciência Política do Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.
- Gupta, D. 1999: "The "Civil and the "Political" in Civil Society." *Reprinted in C.M. Elliot (Ed.) Civil Society and Democracy: A Reader*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 211- 237.
- Hermann, M.; Heremann, C. (1989). "Who makes foreign policy decisions and

- how: an empirical inquiry." *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(4): 361-387.
- Hudson, V. 2006: *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Lahnam: Roman and Littlefield.
- Johnson, C. 2003.: *Decentralization in India: Poverty, Politics and Panchayati Raj*. Londres: Overseas Development Institute.
- Kapur, D. 2009. "Public opinion and Indian Foreign Policy." *India Review*, 8(3): 286-305.
- Katzenstein, M., Kothari, S., Mehta, U. 2001. "Social movement politics in India: institutions, interests, and identities." In A. Kothari (Ed.) *The Success of India's Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Keck, M.; Sikkink, K. 1998. *Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca: Cornell.
- Keohane, R; Nye, J. 2011. *Power and interdependence*. London: Pearson.
- Krasner, S. 2009. *Power, the State and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations*. London: Routledge.
- Lijphart, A. 1996. "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation." *American Political Science Review*, 90(2): 258 – 268.
- Lima, M. 2000. "Instituições Democráticas e Política Exterior." *Contexto Internacional*. Rio de Janeiro, 22(2).
- Lima, M.; SANTOS, F. 2001. "O Congresso e a Política de Comércio Exterior." *Lua Nova*, 52.
- Markey, D. 2009. "Developing India's Foreign Policy Software," *The National Bureau of Asian Research, Asia Policy*, 8: 73-96. Accessed on 9 June 2014. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=105157>.
- Mcduie-Ra, D. 2009. *Civil society, democratization, and the search for human security: the politics of environment, gender, and identity in Northeast India*. Nova Iorque: Nova Science Publishers.
- Milbrath, L. 1965. *Political participation: how and why do people get involved in politics?* Chicago: RandMcNally & Company, 1965.
- Mill, J. S. 1998. *Considerations on Representative Government*. Charlottesville: Liberal Arts Press.
- Mohan, C. 2010: "India's Strategic Future." *Foreign Policy*. Accessed on 3 July 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/04/indias_strategic_future?hidecomments=yes.
- Muni, S. (2009) *India's Foreign Policy: the democracy dimension*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Nunes, E. 2003.: *A gramática política do Brasil: clientelismo e insulamento burocrático*. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar.
- Putnam, R. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level game." *International Organization*, 42(3).
- Ramos, L. 2012. "Contra-hegemonia e política externa? A política externa brasileira no governo Lula." *Carta Internacional*, 7(1).
- Reis, F. 2010. "Política Externa Democracia e Relevância." *Política Externa*, 19(2).
- Routray, B. 2013. *National Security Decision Making in India*. Singapura: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
- Saraiva, J. "A política exterior do governo Lula: o desafio africano." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 45 (2): 5-25.
- Tharoor, S. 2012. *Pax Indica, India and the World of the Twenty first Century*. Nova Iorque: Penguin Global.
- Verba, Sidney; SCHLOZMAN, Kay Lehman; BRADY, Henry E. 1995. *Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press.

ABSTRACT

A changing world in which global and regional powers rethink their actions and preferences in the international arena is a world where domestic politics increasingly creates a more complex framework for foreign behavior. Many newly emerging powers have just recently adopted a democratic regime, while others are still governed by hard autocracies. Within this context, their civil societies have different channels to express their preferences towards the new world order under formation and their expectations concerning how their states plan to be part of it. This paper will discuss how emerging regional powers behave in this changing world, the possibilities and limits imposed by civil society pressure, or even inaction. The authors wish to address how these systemic changes impact on the channels through which civil society movements voice their platforms for their country international role, considering the degree of democratic institutional consolidation as an intervening variable. As case studies, this theoretical debate will be applied to contemporary Brazil and India.

KEYWORDS

Foreign Policy; Civil Society; Brazil.

*Received on May 30, 2016.
Accepted on December 7, 2016.*

MARITIME GEOPOLITICS AS A STRATEGIC FACTOR FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA

Fernanda Pacheco De Campos Brozoski¹
Raphael Padula²

Introduction

Initially, it should be pointed out that the present work does not seek to analyze the different conceptions and practices of integration in course in South America. In the last decade, this theme has been explored by academics in a very widespread and consistent way, and today we have a full range of studies on the subject – which, of course, is still far from being exhausted. However, our intention here is to contribute more promptly to the debate, highlighting aspects of the geopolitics of the South Atlantic and the oceans in general that reinforces the arguments of the so-called revisionist axis of integration.

To do so, we have organized this article in four topics. In the first one, we will explore some analyzes on the characteristics of the heterogeneity and the fragmentation of the South American integration process. Based on this, we will try to locate in which integration point of view are inserted the reflections that we raise here. In the second topic, we will discuss the most relevant phenomena in global geopolitics surrounding oceanic and energy resources and their effects on continental policies. In the third one, we will highlight the geopolitical factors present in the South Atlantic that impact on the progress of regional integration, and point out some potentialities not yet explored. And finally, in the fourth topic, we conclude with some reflections on the need for the strategic geopolitical element to become a more important variable in the

¹ PhD candidate and MSc in International Political Economy at Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). E-mail: brozoski@yahoo.com.br

² Adjunct Professor and Coordinator of the Postgraduate Program in International Political Economy at Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). E-mail: padula.rafael@gmail.com

regional agenda.

South American integration and global geopolitics

In order to be more objective in our purpose and not to extend ourselves in the controversial theme on the types of integration, in this work we will take as a basis, the classification suggested by the Venezuelan economist José Briceño Ruiz (2013). According to the author, since 2003, the new phase of Latin American regionalism is fundamentally characterized by heterogeneity and fragmentation. For the academic, there are now three axes of integration – the open regionalism, the anti-systemic and the revisionist. These axes adopt, to a greater or lesser extent, the guidelines of three economic models of integration: the neoliberal, the social and the productive. With a bias centered on free trade, the neoliberal model seeks to integrate the region into global markets through trade liberalization and the elimination of barriers to the free market. The social model seeks, through cooperation, to coordinate a regional social policy that fosters redistributive policies and diminishes the negative social effects produced by open regionalism. And the productive model sees integration as an instrument of regional development, which would materialize with industrialization, the connection of productive chains and economic complementarity.

Despite different views, the anti-systemic and revisionist projects do not oppose each other adversely in the process of South American integration. It is even possible to affirm that they exert mutually influences that diversify their agendas without overturning their central orientations: ALBA, for example, has brought into the Mercosur the social agenda, and has been reinforcing in a propositional way the need to seek mechanisms to reduce regional economic asymmetries. On the other hand, we clearly note the configuration of an antagonism in the relationship between the strategic and the revisionist axis, although the latter does not represent a complete break with the commercialist project. Briceño Ruiz (2013, 15), indirectly, also establishes this contrast by placing the Pacific Alliance as a project that opposes both ALBA and Mercosur:

The Pacific Alliance represents a political response from the Latin American governments that still support the open integration model. It is a reaction to the growing role of the ALBA axis and the government of Hugo Chávez in the scenario of economic integration in Latin America. The new block is also intended to be a factor of balance against the growing Brazilian leadership in South America, whether in its unilateral action or in the

framework of Mercosur.

At this point, it is interesting to bring to our study a broader view that locates South American integration within global geopolitical dynamics and does not restrict it to the regional context. The Pacific Alliance, rather than the expression of a local variant of integration, embodies the interests of external powers that are now at the center of the world power struggle. Although it does not represent an effective economic threat to the model of revisionist integration headed by Brazil, the liberal project of the Pacific divides the region and makes it more vulnerable to external pressures, thus reducing its degree of autonomy in the process of regionalization and international insertion. In other words,

The Pacific Alliance is an instrument of the expansionary struggle for political and economic influence of great powers and their large transnational corporations in the region, thus allowing greater influence of external powers, and greater political weakness and vulnerability to the countries of the region. Its weight in economic, population and market terms does not challenge Brazil or Mercosur, but the symbology and geopolitical repercussions of such an agreement tend to fracture the region and its possibilities of autonomous insertion (Padula 2013, 40).

We cannot disregard the fact that South America is a relevant area for external projection of powerful global actors, and that competition on the global geopolitical board inevitably resonates in the process of regional integration. In this light, we assume a critical position in relation to the visions that accentuate the autonomous character of the integration process and give little importance to the external factors. In other words, we oppose the perspective that raises internal factors – such as the lack of consensus among local interests, the inability to manage or lack of adequate institutionality – to be the sole determinants of regionalization. Without wishing to underestimate the relevance of these factors, in this article we will try to move the geopolitical element from the position of minor constraint to a prominent place in the direction of South American integration.

The external pressure that most strongly influences the integration process in South America are the projections of the United States and China on the subcontinent. The expansion policies of these powers, as we have argued previously, find in the commercial project, now represented by the Pacific Alliance, its promotional vehicle. For this reason, we will explore in more detail the recent impacts of the US and Chinese international strategies on the regional choices of insertion in the world system. Before that, however, it is necessary to address some phenomena that are part of the hard core of

the competition dynamics for global power hegemony.

Energy and the oceans at the heart of global geopolitics

The current conjuncture of geopolitical changes on the international scene indicates that in the coming decades one of the historical trends of the capitalist interstate system will become even more intense: the struggle for control of areas that are rich in strategic natural resources. According to some analysts³, it is now possible to identify two essential and determinant movements in the dynamics of global geopolitics. The first, which has been taking place since the second half of the twentieth century, is the adoption, by the central countries, of a foreign policy focused especially on the control of areas rich in strategic natural resources, making energy security policy the main policy determinant. The second movement corresponds to the recent action of major powers and some emerging countries to ensure the domination of oceanic mining areas. Strategic documents, such as the five-year plans of the Chinese State and the US Geological Survey, are important sources of the rise of a world deeply interested in seabed resources.

As the American political scientist Michael Klare (2008) points out, for more than half a century, the core of global oil production has been moving from the North to the South, from industrialized to underdeveloped countries. This change is due to the progressive reduction of energy resources in the central countries and to the new opportunities for exploration of offshore reserves that recent technological advances in deep water have provided. In the last decades, continuous evidence of offshore reserves has mitigated the rather negative prediction of the depletion of world oil reserves. However, much of the new findings are located in peripheral areas where there is some political instability. This fact has generated conflicts and transformations in the balance of power of the international system that have important implications for South America.

In this work, we assume that oil is not losing relevance in the world energy matrix. According to Klare (2008), since the 1970s, the United States, in parallel to the decline in its oil reserves, has substantially increased its military power. With the reduction of production and, at the same time, the increase of the demand for oil, the Americans became more dependent on the importation of this substance⁴. The immense US military apparatus, the only

3 Daniel Yergin, Michael Klare, Philippe Le Billon, Gal Luft, Donna J. Nincic, José Luis Fiori, Moniz Bandeira etc.

4 Although the dependency framework of oil imports decreased significantly with the explora-

truly global one, according to Klare, is practically all fueled by oil. Therefore, for the author, the dispute for sources that guarantee the abundant supply of this fuel will continue to be the focus of North American foreign policy.

We must also consider that the sharp increase in the demand for oil is not only the result of the depletion of reserves and the military strengthening of the developed countries. Countries with high economic and demographic growth, such as China and India, and countries historically dependent on oil imports, such as Japan and Korea, also play a significant role in the global competition for energy sources. In addition, Russia, with the recent discoveries of oil and gas in Siberia and the Caspian Sea, reappears as an important player in the geopolitical game of energy resources. According to British Petroleum (2014), the country maintained the position of the world's second largest oil and gas producer in 2013 (in the first case, slightly behind Saudi Arabia, and in the second behind the United States). For Klare (2014),

The continued availability of energy and mineral supplies is also essential for political and military survival. No nation can maintain a robust military defense without a wide array of modern weapon systems, and most such systems—from warships to fighter jets—are fueled by oil. The U.S. military, with multiple overseas commitments and a significant combat presence in Southwest Asia, is especially dependent on petroleum, consuming as much oil every day as the entire nation of Sweden. Other nations that seek to project military power beyond their immediate territory, such as Britain, China, France, and Russia, also require substantial petroleum supplies.

In addition to oil, there are other strategic natural resources of the seabed that have attracted the attention of several countries. Many states are currently making high investments in deepwater exploration technologies and exploration, and making great efforts to ensure the right mining of iron-manganese crusts (rock formations rich in cobalt and nickel); polymetallic nodules (rich in nickel, cobalt, copper, iron and manganese); and polymetallic sulphides (rich in iron, zinc, silver, copper and gold) present in the Area⁵. In the 1960s, interest began to grow in the exploitation of resources located in the seabed and in the subsoil of this zone. However, after the 1970s, due to the lack of adequate technology and the onshore mining activity still showing strong potential, interest in the mining of seabed resources has declined considerably. The ocean bottoms are considered the new frontier of

tion of huge reserves of shale gas that were discovered recently.

5 The Area corresponds to ocean bottoms that are beyond the limits of any national jurisdiction.

global mining (Becker 2005), facing a horizon of increasingly evident depletion of the mineral reserves on the mainland and the significant technological development in deep waters in several countries.

Minerals in this area have important significance in the development agenda of various powers – such as the United States, Germany, China, Russia and India. The metals found in these reserves can supply the demand of strategic industries of important world economies, remembering that this demand has been growing substantially due to the intense process of industrialization of countries such as China and India. Copper, cobalt, manganese and nickel, for example, are components of great application in various metallurgical operations, such as the production of different types of metal alloys used in the manufacture of aircraft turbines, marine engines and in the automobile and chemical industry. They are also valuable raw materials for the production of steel and iron and in manufacturing batteries. In addition, Klare (2014)⁶ emphasizes the importance of these resources for the arms industry and the war power of nations:

Any nation that seeks to sustain a significant arms-making capability, moreover, must possess ensured supplies of iron, cobalt, nickel, titanium, and various specialty metals. And, of course, any country seeking to join the “nuclear club”—whether for political or for military reasons, or a combination of both—must have a reliable supply of uranium .

The life expectancy of most of the world’s reserves of oil and ores is not very promising in the face of the rapid growth of global demand for these goods. Therefore, according to Klare (2014), we will see from now on an increasingly fierce dispute over the control of resources located in previously unexplored areas – such as some inhospitable African areas and the ocean floor:

Virtually all accessible resource zones are now in production; except for the extreme areas such as the Arctic, the Congo, the ocean bottom, and unyielding rock formations, there is nowhere else to go. For this reason, the invasion of the world’s final frontiers has unique significance. What we expropriate from these areas represents all that remains of the planet’s once abundant resource bounty. In all likelihood, we are looking at the last oil fields, the last uranium deposits, the last copper mines, and the last reserves of many other vital resources. These materials will not all disappear at once, of course, and some as-yet-undeveloped reserves may prove more prolific than expected. Gradually, though, we will see the complete disap-

6 Digital book without pagination.

pearance of many key resources upon which modern industrial civilization has long relied .

The search for new energy sources and minerals in remote areas is, according to Klare (2014), part of a larger phenomenon of the world geopolitical conjuncture. For the author, what we are witnessing today is a concerted maneuver between governments and large corporations to guarantee access and control over the remaining raw material reserves in the world.

Donna J. Nincic (2009) points out that most of the world's most promising oil and gas reserves are in maritime territories whose borders have not yet been defined. The dispute over control of these areas has inspired strong litigation with the relevant international organizations, and has been the source of a significant portion of the world's armed conflicts over energy resources:

With the future of energy exploration lying largely in the world's oceans, and with so many known and potential oil and natural gas reserves lying in areas with disputed maritime boundaries, conflict over access to these resources is bound to continue. The conflicts in the South China Sea and elsewhere, and the potential for conflict in the Arctic, show how willing nations are to take risks over access to energy resources (Nincic 2009, 41).

In this context, the mineral riches present in the South Atlantic have been promoting the region, both in economic and strategic terms, as an important zone for power projection mainly by great world powers.

The South Atlantic and its surroundings in the light of the Sino-American competition for natural resources

As we all know, the United States' ambition for supremacy in the American continent is a longstanding one. The intent to play the role of political arbiter in the region is already signaled in the Federalist Papers, and is clearly revealed in the Monroe Doctrine. During World War II, the formulations of Nicholas Spykman pointed to Latin America as an area of strategic interest for the United States, where its supremacy could not be questioned for security reasons. And, as another example, we can mention how during the Cold War, James Burnham extended this vision by leading the US containment policy for the region.

To this day, from the point of view of military power, there is no actor, internal or external, with enough force to challenge the superiority of the

United States' regional projection. However, in the economic sphere, in this new millennium, the American ascendancy over the South American countries begins to show signs of weakening with the notable Chinese expansion over the region. In this sense, the almost generalized reaction by South American governments to neoliberalism since the early 2000s has also made a significant impact.

During the 1990s, the incorporation of the South American countries into the neoliberal model took place through the implementation of the "Washington Consensus", a package of economic measures aimed at framing the Latin American countries in the process of globalization. The problems of the peripheral countries would supposedly be solved through the application of measures such as: economic opening, with a strong reduction of protectionist barriers; privatization of state-owned enterprises and public services; deregulation of finances, such as the elimination of limits on capital movements; and flexibilization of labor relations, among others. In South America, these measures have resulted in de-industrialization, rising unemployment and poverty, and deepening external vulnerability. As a result, a great wave of opposition to neoliberalism erupted in several countries, which led to the rise of new political forces in the continent. Several governments that settled at the beginning of the 21st century sought to rescue national projects that proposed measures contrary to Washington's guidelines. It is in this context, for example, that the US project to create the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) perished.

The loss of ideological influence over South American governments led the United States to adopt, in the 2000s, a generally passive military attitude towards regional issues. However, at the end of the decade, this stance began to change. Under the administration of Barack Obama, the US government signed a new agreement that gave access to seven air and naval bases in Colombian territory; reactivated its Fourth Fleet (U.S. South Atlantic Force); intensified naval operations and exercises in the South Atlantic⁷ etc. Certainly such an advantage in the military field is a factor of strong intimidation that puts in check the autonomy that the region has over its own destiny. In addition, it's important to note the insistent actions by the USA in spreading a security agenda based on drug trafficking, through bilateral and OAS actions.

7 The United States owns large military installations in Ascension Island and two military commands to operate in the region: USSOUTHCOM, created in 1963; and AFRICOM, established in 2007. The US military power is present in Latin America through the control of bases and centers of operations and training. In addition to having Ascension Island and the bases where NATO has access in the South Atlantic, they also have fixed supports in various regions of the American continent: Guantanamo (Cuba), Honduras, Aruba, Curaçao, El Salvador, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Guyana and Suriname.

In the economic area, however, the story is a different one. Today, South America is configured as an important area of contention, where the dominance of the United States begins to decline due to the rise of the Chinese presence. The confrontation between these two powers, already so evident in the countries bordering the Pacific, was not restricted to this side of the South Atlantic: Chinese and Americans have also been competing to expand their power of influence over African countries on the Atlantic coast.

Until the mid-twentieth century, the United States paid little attention to the African side of the South Atlantic. Throughout the century, this picture began to change because of Soviet intervention and the process of decolonization in Africa. But closer trade ties with the West African fraction are a more recent phenomenon. In recent decades, there has been a substantial increase in the share of energy minerals in the United States import tariff. Today, Angola and Nigeria appear in the analysis of the EIA (2014) in 5th and 10th place, respectively, as suppliers of crude oil to the United States.

In the last decade, similarly to what happened in South America, there has also been a significant increase in the Chinese presence in Africa, as evidenced by the dramatic increase in trade and investment figures on the continent. In the span of ten years, between 2002 and 2012, Chinese imports from Africa went from approximately \$ 500 million to \$ 14 billion; this means a gross increase of more than 2000%. In 2002, China, which accounted for only 1% of total African exports, came to represent 6.6% in 2012. Along with oil, mineral resources are the African products that occupy the most prominence in the Chinese import tariff. Recalling that, in addition to the gigantic land reserves, there are significant deposits of offshore minerals, not counting the resources of the Area⁸. It is worth remembering that China – along with Japan, the United States and Germany – is among the countries that have the most advanced technology for research and exploitation of these resources.

China's demand for base minerals has grown more than 10 percent a year since 1990. Today, China is the world's largest consumer of aluminum, iron ore, lead and zinc, as well as considerable stakes in the demand for other minerals. As a reflex, China's imports of non-combustible mineral resources from African countries off the Atlantic coast have increased significantly in the last decades. South Africa accounts for the largest share of Chinese imports (5.5%). More than 80% of the cobalt imported by China and

8 Considering that the extension of Africa's continental shelf is a narrow one – and therefore the abyssal regions are relatively close to the coast –, it is probable that the mineral riches of the Area are closer to the African Atlantic coast. In addition, the Meso-Atlantic Ridge – an underwater mountainous chain where polymetallic sulphides have already been found – is located in a shorter distance from the African coast when compared to the American coast.

40% of the manganese comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon, respectively. It is worth mentioning that China is the destination of about 62% of the export of minerals from South Africa and 95% from Nigeria (UN Comtrade). The increased intensity of recent flows illustrates the strong complementarity between African natural resources and the Chinese economy. As Fiori puts it (2014, 251), “Africa is today the great space of primitive Asian accumulation and one of the main frontiers of economic and political expansion for China and India.” It is worth noting that China has no military presence in the region, but only commercial relations of military assets.

Turning to the maritime landscape, the growing importance of oil and gas in the world economy gives special emphasis to the recent oil discoveries on the coast of the countries bathed by the South Atlantic. In Brazil, since 2001, the new reserves that were found, including pre-salt, increased national reserves by approximately 67% and enabled Brazil to increase its oil production by 60%. Today, Brazil holds the 13th position in the ranking of oil producing countries (BP 2014). On this side of the South Atlantic, aside from Brazil, new reserves were also found on the Argentine continental shelf, which cover the Malvinas Islands and the Antarctic zone in dispute with England.

Approximately 1.1% of the world’s proved oil reserves and 0.4% of the gas reserves are found in the South American Atlantic coast. These figures may not be very expressive in the world scenario, but it is necessary to consider the great unexplored potential of the enormous reserve of the “pre-salt”, and probably of the continental shelf. In addition, if we add to the Atlantic countries the oil and gas reserves of the other South American countries, the percentage of world reserves is close to 18% for oil and 3.5% for gas. On the African Atlantic coast, Angola and Nigeria stand out among the continent’s top five oil producers and account for more than half of African production (EIA 2011). It’s also in these countries where statistics indicate the largest growth of oil deposits in the last twenty years. Proven Angolan reserves increased by almost 5-fold from 2 billion barrels in 1990 to 9 billion in 2014. Meanwhile, Nigerian reserves more than doubled, rising from 16 billion to 37 billion barrels in the same years. Today, Angola occupies the 16th place in the world ranking of oil production, and Nigeria the 12th place (BP 2014). It is worth mentioning that recent significant offshore reserves have also been found in other countries of the Gulf of Guinea.

In addition to oil, the South Atlantic is endowed with mineral resources present in the area. Despite the scarcity of studies on the South Atlantic seabed, resources of high economic and strategic value such as iron-manganese crusts, nodules and polymetallic sulphides were found. The most prom-

ising deposits of the three mineral compounds mentioned are located in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This is mainly due to the existence of greater investments in research in this region. However, the research already carried out indicates the presence of polymetallic nodules in the ocean basins around Trindade Island; of iron-manganese crusts at the Rio Grande elevation; and of polymetallic sulphides near the São Pedro and São Paulo archipelago.

Inasmuch as the importance of the resources of the South Atlantic and its surrounding continental regions is underlined, we wish to highlight some specific aspects of the most recent external projections in South America, especially in China, which may be decisive in the course of regional integration.

The South Atlantic: development and regional integration

As is well known, for the Chinese, the continuity of the country's growth, the fulfillment of its development goals and the guarantee of the mobility of its military power depend, inexorably, on the guarantee of safe access to energy resources. China sees energy shortages as one of its greatest potential threats. The substantial increase in dependence on oil imports has demanded the Chinese government to restructure its energy security strategy. According to Klare (2008, 75), since China began to import oil, it is possible to perceive three priority orientations in its energy security policy: 1) to diversify sources of imported energy supply; (2) to expand supply possibilities by land and reduce reliance on oil transported by sea; 3) and to delegate the acquisition of foreign energy supplies to state-owned enterprises.

Regarding the economic intentions of the Chinese projection in South America, there are two main motivations: facilitated access to strategic natural resources, and market expansion for its higher added value products. According to Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2012),

China's foreign economic policy (like American policy) has as its main objective to ensure access to sources of mineral, energy and agricultural raw materials throughout the world, but, as it should be, especially in the peripheral world of Africa and Latin America. This demand, which will continue to exist in a large scale, even if there is a growing emphasis on the development of its domestic market, has a direct impact on the economy of Mercosur as a whole and for each state-party, especially for Brazil.

And, indeed, the numbers that attest to the extraordinary growth

of China's share of South American trade and investment⁹ are proof of the strength of its expansion in the subcontinent. However, it is also necessary to look at other possible effects of China's foreign policy and energy security and the global energy dispute. Considering that the majority of the investments destined to South America are related to the sector of energy and metals, without difficulty, we can locate the extension of the projection of Chinese capital in South America in the first guideline mentioned by Klare. However, we would like to draw attention to some possible effects of the Chinese actions dedicated to fulfilling its second orientation.

In order to extend its energy supply protection margin China has sought to reduce its dependence on energy supplies transported by sea. According to Comtrade (2013), more than 40% of Chinese oil imports come from the Middle East. This cargo crosses the Strait of Hormuz and passes through the Straits of Malacca, until reaching the eastern Chinese coast. This is one of the most important oil trade routes and is controlled by the Americans. As a safety measure, China has been pushing ahead with a number of projects with neighboring countries to build pipelines and gas pipelines that could divert part of the oil circulation to land routes and facilitate their access to the world's energy and mineral resources.

In our view, it is following the aforementioned strategic line that China has given special attention to the bi-oceanic corridor construction projects in South America. Such projects, as early as the 2000s, comprised the infrastructure portfolio of the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA). This body was created with the objective of promoting the expansion of a transport infrastructure that supported the formation of a regional free trade area. That is, the corridors were conceived within the logic of the neoliberal model of integration of open regionalism, which, as Padula (2014, 14) explains, proposes to be:

A model whereby, in a peaceful way through the opening of markets, the South American countries would facilitate access to the natural resources of the region to transnational corporations and their sponsoring mother states, through trade and investment flows, not only in productive exploratory activities, but also in the logistics construction of export corridors.

As already discussed in the beginning of this article, in the 2000s, the new elected governments in Latin America, refuting the neoliberal project, undertook a series of actions with the purpose of revising the model of open

9 In 2002, China accounted for only 4.3% of total South American exports; already in 2012, it now represents over 15% (Comtrade 2013).

regional integration. In this context, in 2008, UNASUR emerged, and, in 2009, subordinated to it, the Infrastructure and Planning Council (Cosiplan) was created, conceived to function as an executive body of IIRSA. This was to ensure that IIRSA followed the guidelines dictated by the UNASUR governments. These were aimed at building a regional physical integration structure that would foster internal development and enable the connection of productive chains with higher added value in the region. Thus, bi-oceanic corridors can make possible different integration plans, including antagonistic projects such as “open regionalism” and “revisionist”. According to consultants¹⁰ of the Center for Management and Strategic Studies (CGEE 2013, 66):

After all, what role can the construction of transport routes and bi-oceanic connections have in the process of regional integration? They can act as much in favor of the socioeconomic development, strategic autonomy and political dominion of the geographical spaces of the continent by the countries of the region, as well as efficiently articulate the strategic natural resources of the region to the international market, attending to the interests of internationalization of resources for powers and multinational companies. (...) Such corridors can act as corridors for the export of natural resources and low-value goods, and as corridors for the importation of industrial goods of higher added value and technological intensity of other countries and continents. Also, they can serve for the political penetration by actors outside the region, seeking to access, influence and control territories and strategic resources of the countries of the region.

China’s great interest in bi-oceanic corridors is not just a strategy to secure future energy and mineral supplies from South America.

There are those who argue that “bi-oceanic” is not the appropriate term for South American projects, since they do not have as main objective to use the subcontinent as an enabler of the continuity of a flow of commerce between two oceans¹¹. In fact, today, there is no such strong maritime trade in the southern hemisphere as to justify the need to deploy such transportation corridors. As we have already pointed out, such avenues of communication are designed to optimize the flow of production (mostly primary products) to international markets, especially to Asia¹² and the United States, which con-

10 Chapter written by José Luis Fiori, Maria Claudia Vater and Raphael Padula.

11 Authors from different areas (international law, engineering, military, etc.) that signal the lack of an adequate definition for these routes. Among them, the captain Dilermando Ribeiro Lima, Marianela Salazar Vega, among others.

12 This focus is made evident in documents and studies promoted by the governments of the region. To cite an example, the technical report “Evaluation of bioceanic corridors”, made by the BNDES, makes explicit that the estimation of the commercial flow potential that would

concentrate most of their activities in the Pacific coast.

However, the data presented in the previous topic provide us with indications that there may be a greater interest in the attraction of China by the future South American corridors than just facilitating access to commodities in the region. First, in addition to the natural resources of South America, the energy and mineral riches of Atlantic Africa and the South Atlantic have also taken a prominent place in the economic expansion projects of the United States and China. Thus, through bi-oceanic corridors, there would also be potential for the circulation of goods from these areas. Second, China's actions in the subcontinent may be part of a larger strategy, which involves other guidelines of its foreign policy. As we have already mentioned, the search for alternative routes for the movement of strategic goods is at the heart of China's energy security policy, and a land route connecting the South Atlantic and the Pacific can be very convenient.

That is, for China, besides the gains from trade, the increase of its presence in South America also involves a question of geostrategic order. In our view, this perception can broaden our prospect on the meanings of the regional integration process. Relations with China have been a way out for South American countries to bypass the effects of the 2008 crisis. However, as far as the regionalization progress is concerned, if we remain tied to a short-term perspective, we will not be able to see in China opportunities more advantageous compared to those we can get with the United States or other powers. Restricted to commercialism, few possibilities can be seen beyond expanding our condition as a primary exporting region. According to Fiori (2014, 259),

After the crisis of 2008, (...) South America briefly recovered from Chinese growth, but this short-term success has brought back, and deepened, some secular features of the South American economy that have almost always hindered and hampered the integration project, namely, the fact that it is a sum of primary-exporting economies oriented towards external markets.

Nevertheless, this is not a compulsory route. Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2012), analyzing the impacts of the Chinese factor in Mercosur, has argued that the scenario, commercially favorable to the countries of South America, should be exploited in favor of the industrial and technological development of the region.

pass through the corridors takes into account only the import and export data of the South American countries: "It should be noted that the approach taken to estimate the potential demand in the simulation model considers all flows with origin or destination in South America" (BNDES 2010, 220).

The crisis of the world economy, which will last for at least another decade, and the greater freedom of economic policies in the external area, due to the weakening of the neoliberal practices that provoked it, and the protectionist actions of the developed countries, enables the Mercosur countries to take advantage of this rare opportunity in the course of its history: to make use of the extraordinary Chinese demand for primary products in order to promote its development, that is, of its industrial development. Thus, together with a strategic transformation of Mercosur, it would be extremely important to conclude trade and industry agreements with China for the industrial processing of raw materials (...). This alternative would be in perfect harmony with the objective of the development of the economy, which is the capacity to transform its natural resources, to add value to production, to create better paid jobs, to raise its technological level, and to vertically integrate sectors of its economies.

In the following section, the economist Carlos Medeiros (2010) highlights some structural aspects of Mercosur that impede regional productive integration, among them, the concentration of trade in primary commodities and natural resources. The author points out that the effort dedicated to developing industry and infrastructure in the region would contribute to diversify the exports of the smaller economies, thus enabling a greater regional complementation:

The predominance of primary commodities and natural resource-intensive activities, deregulation and financial vulnerability, the backwardness of the electrical and electronic machinery industries, the lack of specialized OEM equipment, the predominance of subsidiaries of multinational companies based outside the region, the absence of a gradient of technological content coupled with the cost of labor between countries, and the high costs of transport are evident macro-structural explanations. However, in spite of these factors, there was in some industrial segments a growing intra-industry trade, signaling an important possibility of deepening productive integration and sector diversification. This geographic internalization of the benefits of integration depends, however, on the degree to which the expansion of the Brazilian economy's market allows a combination of industrial and infrastructure investment initiatives to favor the diversification of exports from the least developed countries, making the expansion of the regional bloc's trade flow a simultaneous way of achieving greater external sustainability for the economies (Medeiros 2010, 27).

Final considerations: South Atlantic as opportunities x risks

The economically viable natural resources and geostrategic potential of the South Atlantic can be important catalysts for industrialization and productive integration. There is a potential for exploiting such resources that involve more dynamic industrial sectors (of higher added-value products with high technological content) that could be included in the agenda of negotiations with China. In recent years, the Chinese have invested heavily in the development of technologies for offshore use and, like Brazil, are among the few countries qualified to conduct exploration activities in the area.

It may be pointed out that the energy and mineral wealth of the South Atlantic represents only a future opportunity to significantly increase the reserves of exportable primary goods. In this way, these resources would end up stimulating the region's primary-export specialization and thus would not contribute to industrialization, so necessary for the advancement of the productive integration process. Arguing in favor of the idea that we can extract other opportunities of the activities implied in the defense and exploitation of the resources of the South Atlantic, below we selected another fragment from a study realized by the Center of Management and Strategic Studies (2013, 129):

State commissions and support ensure that the defense sector can be a good business and generate its own (national) technologies and production in this sensitive and strategic sector. Amazônia Azul Defense Technologies (Amazul), created in 2012 and linked to the Ministry of Defense, and the South American Defense Council, can articulate, respectively, a Brazilian and South American defense industrial base. A policy of demanding a greater participation of national content, or of South American companies, in the orders contracted with foreign companies, can initially drive important changes (CGEE 2013, 129).

In 2014, Petrobras was awarded, for the third time¹³, for the development of offshore oil exploration technologies. Today, the company is an international reference in the area and considered the world leader in this sector. This segment is the main engine of the Brazilian naval industry, which has been gaining a strong boost in recent years.

The defense of the South Atlantic waters and the mining of offshore resources require intense efforts by the naval industry and require major investments in the development of technologies for deepwater exploration. In our view, the possible convergence between Brazil and China in relation to ocean resources should not be understood only as a beneficial opportunity

13 With the OTC Distinguished Achievement Award for Companies, Organizations, and Institutions.

for Brazilian growth. Industrial areas driven by possible cooperation in this segment with China should be seen by the South American countries as a whole, and especially by Brazil, as possibilities to strengthen the productive integration of the region.

In addition to different forms of economic exploitation, there is a political aspect of great importance that must be carefully considered: South Atlantic resources can also contribute to the promotion of a common security agenda for South America. With a focus on sovereignty over natural resources and in defense of external threats, this agenda would be an alternative to the US hemispheric agenda, disseminated through the OAS and bilateral agreements aimed at combating drug trafficking. In this sense, Brazil has been fomenting regional initiatives through the Defense Council of UNASUR.

The South Atlantic represents development opportunities for South America, but for this to become a reality, the states of the region, including Brazil, must partially abdicate the benefits that can be obtained in the short term with the expansion of trade, and highlight, in a more consistent way, a strategic geopolitical vision within the regional integration project.

REFERENCES

- BNDES. 2010. "Avaliação dos corredores bioceânicos". *Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social*. Accessed on: February 2, 2015. http://www.bndes.gov.br/arqs/corredor_bioceanico/Produto%202.pdf
- Becker, Bertha. 2005. "Geopolítica da Amazônia". *Estudos Avançados* 19 (53). <http://www.revistas.usp.br/eav/article/view/10047/11619>
- Briceño Ruiz, José. 2013. "Ejes y modelos en la etapa actual de la integración económica regional en América Latina". *Estudios Internacionales*, v. 45, n. 175, 9-39.
- British Petroleum. "Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014". *British Petroleum*. Accessed on: January 25, 2015. <http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-2014/BP-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2014-full-report.pdf>
- CGEE. 2013. "Dimensões estratégicas do desenvolvimento brasileiro: Brasil, América Latina e África: convergências geopolíticas e estratégias de integração". *Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos*, v.3. Accessed on: March 10, 2014. http://www.cgee.org.br/publicacoes/caeb_xxi.php

- Comtrade. 2013. "International Trade Statistics Database". *United Nations Statistics Division*. <https://comtrade.un.org/>
- Fiori, José Luis. 2014. *História, estratégia e desenvolvimento: para uma geopolítica do capitalismo*. São Paulo: Boitempo.
- Klare, Michael T. 2012. *The Race for What's Left The Global Scramble for the World's Last Resources*. Nova Iorque: Metropolitan Books.
- . 2008. *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: the new geopolitics of energy*. Nova Iorque: Henry Holt.
- Medeiros, Carlos. 2010. "Integração produtiva: a experiência asiática e algumas referências para o Mercosul". In: Alvarez, Renato; Baumann, Renato; Wohlers, Marcio (Org.). *Integração produtiva: caminhos para o Mercosul*. Brasília: ABDI.
- Nincic, Donna J. 2009. "Trouble Waters: Energy Security as Maritime Security". In: Luft, Gal; Korin, Anne (Org.). *Energy Security Challenges for the 21 st century*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
- Padula, Raphael. 2013. "Desafios para uma agenda de segurança na América do Sul: a disputa de poder global, o Brasil e o conselho de defesa da UNASUL". In: *Anais do IV Encontro Nacional da Associação Brasileira de Relações internacionais*, Belo Horizonte.
- . 2014. "Recursos naturais, geopolítica e desenvolvimento: os desafios da UNASUL e da Política Externa Brasileira na integração sul-americana". In: *Anais do 38º Encontro Anual da Anpocs*, Caxambu.
- Pinheiro Guimarães, Samuel. 2012. "O Mercosul e a China: alternativas". *Carta Maior*. <http://cartamaior.com.br/?/Editoria/Internacional/O-Mercosul-e-a-China-Alternativas/6/25925>

KEYWORDS

Regional Integration; Geopolitics; International Political Economy.

ABSTRACT

In light of the recent deceleration and disarticulation of the South American integration process, the objective of this paper is to highlight some geopolitical factors in the South Atlantic Ocean, which, in our view, should set and propel a strategy of rapprochement of the different interests in the subcontinent and contribute to greater convergence in the integration agenda.

Received on July 11, 2016.

Accepted on November 15, 2016.

Translated by Guilherme Thudium

SOUTH AFRICA AND REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE MBEKI ERA: THE NEXUS BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND GEO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

Olajide Olayemi Akanji¹

Introduction

Since joining the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1994, South Africa has been involved in a number of regional peace and security issues. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, for instance, South Africa played a leading role in the management of the crisis in Lesotho and Zimbabwe respectively, and has since been in the vanguard of international efforts to resolve the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The question this raises, however, and which this paper seeks to interrogate, is whether South Africa's role in SADC peace and security is given because of its economic and military leverage in the sub-region or whether it was due to the personalities of its political leaders? Another question is whether South Africa's role in the sub-region particularly between 1999 and 2008 was due to the particular situations it had to respond to? Also, have particular situations within South Africa aided or undermined its leadership role in the sub-region? The paper interrogates these questions using the Thabo Mbeki presidency (1999-2008). In specific terms, the paper highlights and examines the nature of South Africa's role in SADC peace and security during Mbeki's presidency, using as case studies the crises in Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo and the operation of the SADC, and examines whether the

¹ Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan; Senior Research Associate, African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg. E-mail: akanji-jide@yahoo.com

role was effective in maintaining South Africa's interest and regional stability.

Mbeki's administration and SADC peace and security

Thabo Mbeki was elected president of South Africa in 1999, and remained in power till 2008, during which period he assumed the chairmanship of SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government in 1999 and 2008 and deputy chair in 2007. During this period, South Africa's international relations was shaped and influenced by Mbeki's African renaissance vision, which centred on Africa's 'political and socio-economic renewal, and its reintegration into the global economy on its own self-determined terms.' (Landsberg 2010) To achieve this, Mbeki emphasised the link between growth, governance, democracy, peace and security, and cooperation at regional, sub-regional as well as international levels.

As a result, his administration's foreign relations officially centred on promoting democracy and good governance, accelerating growth and development, combating international and cross-border crimes, building the South African economy, and building a better Africa and a better world (DFA 2003). In line with this, Africa, and the developing countries, constituted the core of South Africa's foreign policy thrust during the Mbeki era. This however represented a continuation and an extension of the Mandela era's international relations, which 'stressed the importance of human rights, democratisation, and respect for international law,' and 'bridge-building between the developed north and developing south.' (Landsberg 2004).

Given his African renaissance vision, and headship of South Africa and of the SADC at different times and in different capacities, Mbeki was able to influence and initiate policies that impacted on peace and security challenges of the sub-region. Among the peace and security issues that South Africa under Mbeki tackled in the sub-region were the crisis over the status and operationalisation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) vis-à-vis the SADC Summit; the conflicts in the DRC, Angola and Burundi; and political crisis in Zimbabwe. In tackling these situations the Mbeki presidency adopted different approaches, some of which are discussed below alongside their implications for sub-regional peace, security and stability.

Crisis over OPDS

The crisis over OPDS was the first major test of the leadership ability and quality of Thabo Mbeki beyond the confines of South Africa. Though it

started before Mbeki assumed the chairmanship of SADC Summit in 1999, his headship of the organisation made efforts to address it. In the first place, the Mbeki leadership continued with the lobbying strategy of the Mandela government (1994-1998) to convince other SADC members to consider the restructuring of the OPDS. It also initiated the restructuring of the entire SADC system alongside the OPDS. At the 1999 Summit of Heads of State and Government, under the chairmanship of Mbeki, the summit proposed a review of 'all operations of SADC institutions.' (SADC 1999) The review was intended to 'increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its policies and programmes to implement a more coherent and better coordinated strategy to eliminate poverty in the region.' (DFA 2003) Achieving this objective was predicated on the centralisation of the operations of SADC institutions, as opposed to the sectoral and decentralised approach that operated in the past.

Part of the review, relating to the status and operationalisation of the OPDS, was completed in 2001, resulting in renaming OPDS as OPDSC (Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation) and its integration under the SADC Summit through article 3(1) of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). (SADC 2001). As a result, OPDSC became an organ of SADC. Also, article 4 of the Protocol on OPDSC placed the organ under a Troika arrangement (Organ Troika), comprising the chairperson of the Organ, the incoming/deputy chairperson and the outgoing chairperson. Members were elected on a yearly basis by, and accountable to, the SADC Summit. (SADC 2001). This totally removed the OPDSC from the control of its chairperson, contrary to the case under the OPDS in which the composition of the body was not specified and its chairmanship was never rotated, as stipulated to be on an annual and a Troika basis. Given the restructuring, Mbeki was appointed the deputy chair and chair of the Organ Troika in 2003 and 2004 respectively, which enabled him to further participate in other efforts to foster sub-regional peace.

The restructuring of the OPDS was significant in many ways. First, it demonstrated the considerable influence that post-apartheid South Africa had assumed in SADC, because the restructuring was orchestrated and initiated by South Africa's opposition to the independent status of the OPDS. Second, it points to the diplomatic astuteness of the South African political leadership, first under Mandela and later Mbeki, and their team of diplomats. Third, the review contributed to the emergence of robust sub-regional security architecture, evidenced by the creation of OPDSC and its ancillary structures, namely the Organ Troika, the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Organ Ministerial Committee. These structures complement other SADC security struc-

tures such as the sub-regional standby brigade (SADCBRIG), a peacekeeping brigade established in 2007, to create SADC security architecture.

The signing of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact in 2003 by states, including South Africa and Zimbabwe and the formulation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPD-SC, were the heights of the sub-regional security cooperation that followed the review of SADC. This also signified a *détente* in South Africa-Zimbabwe power tussle, which had brought about the OPDS crisis, as military relations between the two countries improved, culminating in the signing of the Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security in 2005 and an agreement that allowed Zimbabwean pilots to train South African pilots (Kagwanja and Rupiya 2008). The friendly relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe improved the perception of South Africa by SADC states, and enabled the Mbeki administration to later participate in SADC mediation in the crisis in Zimbabwe. On the whole, the review process contributed to the strengthening of SADC, because it also led to setting of clear roles and functions for its institutions.

Peace-building in DRC and Zimbabwe

Another area where Mbeki's leadership of South Africa facilitated the country's contribution to peace and security in SADC was in peace-building. Peace-building, described as a series of activities intended to help countries recover from violent conflict, and as 'nothing less than an enormous social engineering aimed at creating the domestic conditions for durable peace within countries just emerging from civil wars,' (Boutros-Ghali 1992) was South Africa's tool of international relations during Mbeki's presidency. This was due to a number of reasons (Paris 2004).

These include the recurring cases of violent conflicts and political instability in Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe during the period. Also, there was a general dislike for military intervention in the region, as demonstrated by public reactions to South Africa's intervention in Lesotho in 1998, and Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia's intervention in the DRC in the same year (Vale 2003). Similarly, South Africa's military and economic leverage as well as the geo-strategic and economic importance of the region made it imperative for the country to ensure the region's peace and stability, without alienating other regional powers by being misconstrued as a hegemon. The fact that South Africa is the military and economic powerhouse of the region makes it more likely for it to be interested in the region's stability, both for its own socio-political and

economic wellbeing and good public image.

However, the person and ideological disposition of Mbeki contributed to South Africa's embrace and use of peace-building as a tool of international relations. For, example, long before becoming the president of South Africa, he had demonstrated a firm belief in and commitment to pacific settlement of conflicts. This conviction was apparent in his commitment in the 1980s/early 1990s to a negotiated end to white minority rule in South Africa. Mbeki played a major role in bringing about a shift from violent confrontation to peaceful negotiations between ANC and the apartheid regimes (Mbeki 1998). To Peter Vale, 'Thabo Mbeki brought about a sophisticated and polished face to a liberation movement which had been demonised by the Cold War propaganda...'

Mbeki's conviction of the futility of all forms of domination, including military intervention and imposition of solutions on parties in conflict, was connected to his belief in African solutions to African problems; a belief that was part of his African renaissance vision. This conviction about African renaissance and the futility of violence and domination underpinned Mbeki's peace-building initiatives (the Mbeki peace-building model).

Both peacemaking, in the form of promotion of democracy, good governance, mediation and negotiation, and peacekeeping constitute the central elements of the Mbeki government's peace-building approach. This approach, like peace-building approach generally, was a form of preventive diplomacy, defined as diplomatic actions taken 'to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.' (Boutros-Ghali 2012) For the Mbeki approach however, the initiative for peace-building in Africa must come from within Africa, although such initiative and its execution could be in conjunction with non-African actors. This constitutes the strength and uniqueness of the Mbeki approach, because it emphasises the issue of ownership and responsibility that Africans have to bear in order to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, and earn respect internationally. The importance of, and commitment to, this approach underlined his government's establishment of the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) in 2000, increasing deployment of South African forces on peacekeeping missions, as well as efforts to strengthen and promote multilateral diplomacy. The ARF was established through the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund Act 2000 to,

'enhance cooperation between the Republic and other countries, in particular African countries, through the promotion of democracy, good gov-

ernance, the prevention and resolution of conflict, socio-economic development and integration, humanitarian assistance and human resource development.(RSA 2004)'

The ARF's focus on promotion of democracy and good governance was underpinned by the assumption of the democratic peace thesis that, 'democracies tend to be peaceful in both their domestic affairs and their relations with other states.'(Paris 2004) Guided by this assumption and the African renaissance vision, the Mbeki government, working with other SADC members, made efforts towards the building of stable democracies in the region through provision of material and financial support for the holding of elections and participation in election observer missions.

Through this, South Africa effectively became a donor country and was able to influence African politics in direct ways (Landsberg 2004). This view was true as ARF enabled South Africa to contribute to and shape the socio-economic and political wellbeing, and peace and security agenda, of many SADC states and non-member states. Between 2000 and 2008, for instance, a number of countries benefited from loans and other financial facilities of ARF. These include Liberia, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) or Western Sahara, Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Burundi, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea. The ARF's loans and grants to these beneficiaries were, in some instances, intended for post-conflict reconstruction programmes including holding of elections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. Within SADC region, some of the beneficiaries of ARF's assistance include Lesotho in 2000 and 2001 Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006, and Zimbabwe in 2008 (ARF 2008).

In 2008, the sum of R10 million (about \$634, 854) was granted under the ARF towards the funding of South African participation in SADC Election Observer Mission to Zimbabwe, during the conduct of its local, parliamentary and presidential elections in March 2008 (ARF 2008). Also, in 2006, South Africa granted the sum of R278million (about \$18, 220,315) under the ARF towards the conduct of elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (ARF 2007). This was intended to bring about a legitimate, democratically elected government in the country and an end to the conflict in the Great Lake region. South Africa's contribution to the elections in DRC was in three areas: procurement and printing of ballot papers, transportation of ballot papers to 14 election hubs, and deployment of election experts and South Africa's observer mission (ARF 2007). Similar financial assistance was rendered to the DRC in years before and after 2006 elections. But despite South Africa's huge financial investment, peace and stability has remained elusive in some of the beneficiaries, including the DRC, where the complexity and the interplay of

local and international interests in the issues involved in the conflict have wrecked all efforts at peace.

Similarly, as part of the peace-building approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution, the Mbeki government encouraged multilateral diplomacy by emphasising and encouraging closer relationship between SADC and other international organisations, particularly the AU, UN, and EU. The significance of multilateral cooperation to conflict management, as well as to SADC's socio-economic development, was highlighted during his leadership of the SADC Summit in 1999. At the summit, Mbeki stressed the importance of regional and continental cooperation and alluded to the 'interdependencies of SADC member states and the African continent as a whole.' (SADC 1999) This underpinned subsequent efforts by the Mbeki administration to integrate AU and NEPAD programmes into South Africa and into SADC. In South Africa, a series of workshops and meetings were organised by the Mbeki government among stakeholders to popularise AU and NEPAD programmes (DFA 2003). Beyond the national level, Mbeki's chairmanship of SADC in 1999, and of the AU in 2002/2003, encouraged regional economic communities (RECs), including SADC, to become the engines driving the implementation of AU and NEPAD ideas. The Mbeki effort to build closer AU-RECs relationship was attested to by SADC's hosting of AU summit in two consecutive years; first in Durban in 2002 and followed by Maputo, Mozambique in 2003.

In the area of peace and security, integration of RECs into AU was furthered through the Protocol that established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, adopted in 2002 during Mbeki's AU chairmanship. Article 16 of the Protocol recognised RECs as part of the continent's security framework, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The successful launching in 2007 of SADCBRIGS, the SADC regional peacekeeping brigade, as a component of the continental standby force, was one of the high-points of the closer AU-SADC relationship that Mbeki advocated. This notwithstanding, there was no formalised relationship between SADC's OPDSC and AU's PSC throughout Mbeki's nine year rule, and even up to 2010 This hampered multilateral efforts at conflict resolution on a number of occasions, including during the political crisis in Madagascar in 2008/2009, where both SADC and AU failed to cooperate on the best solution to the problem (AU 2010).

Furthermore, Mbeki's peace-building approach espoused the use of negotiation, mediation and peacekeeping over and above military intervention in conflict management. The use of mediation and negotiation by the Mbeki government focused on bringing disputants to the roundtable, for

them to deliberate and arrive at mutually acceptable political solutions in the form of peace agreements. Through this, the Mbeki government contributed to the negotiation of peace agreements, albeit fragile ones, in Cote d'Ivoire, Comoros, Sudan and Zimbabwe (Landsberg 2010). This approach was complemented with peacekeeping operations that were aimed at reducing and preventing civilian casualties in conflict situations through, 'monitoring and assisting with the implementation of agreements reached between belligerent parties' South Africa during the Mbeki presidency employed these strategies (negotiation, mediation and peacekeeping) at sub-regional, regional and global levels.

The use of the strategies by South Africa under Mbeki, stemmed partly from Mbeki's personal conviction of the futility of all forms of domination, including military intervention and imposition of solutions to parties in conflict. It also stemmed from the 1999 white paper on South African participation in international peace missions, which allows the country to provide civilian, military and police services for peace missions (DFA 1999). This explains why South Africa participated in numerous peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts under the auspices of the AU, UN and SADC, a further pointer to its commitment to multilateral diplomacy. South Africa contributed troops to peacekeeping operations in countries such as Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Cote d'Ivoire (Chikane 2012).

Test cases of Mbeki's peace-building approach

South Africa's involvement in the international efforts to resolve the crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe best illustrate the nature and effectiveness or otherwise of Mbeki's government peace-building approach.

Democratic Republic of Congo: a case study

A major test for Mbeki's peace-building initiative was the DRC, where civil war broke out in 1997 between forces loyal to President Mobutu sese Seko and rebel forces. After botched attempts by the Mandela administration to broker a truce, the rebel forces, led by Laurent Kabila overpowered the government forces and took over the reins of government in May 1997, and changed the name of the country from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).² But despite this, the civil war continued, because of the

2 See for example, Ajulu, 'South Africa and the Great Lake: a complex diplomacy'; Kagwanja

complicity of internal and external factors. These included the involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in the war and the emergence of a number of splinter rebel forces that challenged the Laurent Kabila-led government of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Zaire (ADLF)³. Among these forces were the Rwandan-backed rebels, the RCD-Goma, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and a number of unarmed opposition groups.

As a result of the grave situation in the DRC, and especially the threats it posed to the peace, security and stability of the sub-region, attempts to resolve the conflict featured prominently on SADC Summits and OPDSC's agendas, as well as on the agenda of the Mbeki-led South African government. For Mbeki and his government, the best solution to the escalating conflict in the DRC was only through an inclusive government, which would arise out of collective deliberations involving the key actors. Based on this, all through the Mbeki presidency (1999-2008), and his chairmanship of the SADC Summit in 1999 and 2008 and membership of the Organ Troika from 2003 to 2004, negotiations were encouraged among actors and factions in the conflict. In 1999 South Africa showed willingness to contribute troops for international peacekeeping in the DRC. By 2003, it had contributed more than 1000 troops at the cost of R819.6million (about \$5,199,458) (Landsberg 2004). This was followed by a series of quiet negotiations, brokered by Mbeki and his team and occasionally alongside some key actors in the SADC.

Most of the negotiations were held in South Africa, including at Sun City, Johannesburg in January 2002, Durban in July 2002, and Cape Town in April 2003. The negotiations and mediation yielded positive results, including the Lusaka peace agreement of July 1999, which was brokered by South African-backed Zambian government (Ajulu 2008). The agreement, among other things, called for the formation of a joint military commission comprising of foreign, Congolese and UN observers, and paved the way for the deployment of UN Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC), which South Africa contributed troops to (Ajulu 2008). This was followed by another peace deal brokered by South Africa between the DRC President, Joseph Kabila, who came to power after the assassination of his father Laurent Kabila, and the leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, Jean-Pierre Bemba in January 2002 (Landsberg, 2004). Also, international mediation and negotiations involving South Africa led to the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement between Presidents Joseph Kabila of DRC and Paul Kagame of Rwanda in July 2002 (Landsberg, 2004).

and Rupiya, 'Praetorian solidarity'

3 Ibid

By the 2002 peace deals, the parties agreed to the ‘withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC, the disbanding of the ex-FAR (Rwandan National Army) forces and the Interahamwe (Hutu militia)’ (Landsberg, 2004). The signing of the Memorandum of Agreement was preceded and facilitated by South Africa’s active participation in an Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which focused on an inclusive political arrangement and the formation of a government of national unity in the country (Ajulu 2008). The quest for an inclusive political arrangement was achieved with the formation of a transitional government that included all the warring parties. This paved the way for subsequent conduct of elections, which was won by the incumbent, Joseph Kabila.

But all this notwithstanding, the civil war continued and remained largely unresolved all through the Mbeki presidency of South Africa and headship of the SADC Summits and membership of the Organ Troika. Hostilities between Kabila’s forces and rebels continued and escalated even after the elections. This was partly because Kabila’s electoral victory was widely disputed by the opposition, creating tensions between them and government forces, leading to violence, which further dented and eroded the government’s political legitimacy that was needed to stabilise the country. This situation was also caused by the exclusive nature of the Kabila government, a government that was a product of winner-take-all presidential elections (Ajulu 2008). This heightened other issues which impacted on the country’s peace and stability. These included government’s lack of capacity to govern the whole country; absence of an apolitical and competent security forces; the predatory attitude of Congolese politicians and issues of citizenship and the debate around ‘true’ Congolese nationality (Ajulu 2008). What this points to is that Mbeki’s best efforts and peacebuilding strategies were not able to address the multiplicity of factors surrounding the hostilities between Kabila’s government and rebels.

The Zimbabwean case

The socio-economic and political crises that gripped Zimbabwe between 1998 and 2003 necessitated the involvement of South Africa. The crises ranged from ‘acute shortages of foreign exchange; high levels of inflation; ballooning unemployment and poverty levels’ to ‘sporadic acts of violence, land invasions dubbed by the Mugabe government as “fast track” land restitution, the eviction of farm worker’. The declining economic condition of Zimbabwe at the time stemmed partly from the government land reform programme, characterised by violence and human rights violations, which un-

derpinned 'the loss of revenue, foreign direct investment and donor support' (Lindsberg 2004).

The height of the crises was the presidential elections of 2002 and 2008, which were riddled with vote-buying and vote-rigging, making the results highly disputed. As a result, loyalists of the Mugabe-led Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) and the opposition Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) engaged in violent confrontations, in which there were various forms of human rights abuses. The violence, and government's role in it, attracted condemnations from a section of the international community, particularly Western powers. But, as opposed to open condemnation and criticisms of the Mugabe administration, the Mbeki-led South African government employed a policy of quiet diplomacy, 'a non-confrontational diplomacy aimed at nudging parties along the route of negotiated solutions, rather than imposing solutions from the outside.' (Landsberg 2010) Consequently, Mbeki's quiet diplomacy was geared towards persuading the Mugabe government into a negotiated settlement with the oppositions in and outside of the country.

This underlined Mbeki's facilitation of communication over the land issue between Mugabe's government and the UN at the Millennium summit in 2000, and between Zimbabwe and key member states of the donor community such as the European Union (EU), the US, and Britain (Landsberg 2004). Aside from South Africa's participation as election observers in the presidential elections in 2002 and 2008, and parliamentary elections in 2005, Mbeki was a member of SADC constituted task force on developments in Zimbabwe in 2001 and later SADC appointed mediator after the general elections in 2008. While as a mediator, Mbeki was meant to resolve the political impasse that followed the 2008 elections, the 2001 SADC task force, of which he was a member, sought to find solutions to Zimbabwe's economic and political problems, particularly the crisis surrounding the land reform (SADC 2008). Mbeki's mediation led to political dialogues between Zanu-PF and MDC, resulting in the formation of a government of national unity which brought about relative political stability in the country.

It is important to note that South Africa's choice of negotiation and political solution to the crises in Zimbabwe, instead of strong actions or punitive measures as the US, Britain and other Western powers had advocated, reflected Mbeki's belief in pacific settlement of conflicts, a cornerstone of his peace-building approach (Landsberg 2004). However, the choice of quiet diplomacy has also been predicated on a number of factors, including the historical ties between the ANC and Zanu-PF (Kagwanja e Rupiva 2009). Others are Zimbabwe's economic and geo-strategic importance to South Africa,

including being its eleventh largest trading partner; the politics of solidarity among southern African states and South Africa's limited leverage over Zimbabwe (Landsberg 2004). Nevertheless, South Africa's approach, which failed to show understanding with civil society's opposition to Mugabe's retention of power raised serious concerns about the genuineness of its efforts to promote and entrench democratic values in the SADC.

Conclusion

This paper has critically engaged the question of peace and security in the SADC with specific emphasis on the role of the Mbeki presidency in South Africa in the sub-region. From the preceding analysis, it has been made clear that the SADC was faced with a number of security threats to its peace, security and stability between 1999 and 2008. South Africa responded to the security challenges using different approaches. The South African responses were however dictated by three factors.

The first was the person of President Thabo Mbeki, whose his leadership of South Africa and policies towards the SADC reflected in non-violence, multilateral diplomacy, peacebuilding, and respect for historical ties with countries with revolutionary antecedence. These qualities were a function of his ideological, social and leadership orientations, shaped by his family and educational background and revolutionary experiences in the ANC during the struggle to end apartheid rule. The second was the domestic realities in South Africa particularly that the South African public was totally against military intervention in addressing security issues in neighbouring countries. The third was the strategic geo-political and economic interests of South Africa. These three factors combined together to influence and determine the foreign policy choices and actions of the Mbeki-led South African government towards the SADC. This underlined South Africa's use of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and promotion of elections through financial support and participation in election monitoring as foreign policy tools of engagement with SADC member states.

Though the three factors contributed to South Africa's foreign policy decisions on SADC, it was the leadership offered by Thabo Mbeki, as president of South Africa and at some points the head of the SADC, which was inextricably fused to his person that determined the choice of the instruments and the extent to which they impacted on the situations they were deployed to address. For instance, South Africa's preference for pacific settlement of disputes in the SADC between 1999 and 2008 was the continuation of Mbeki's apparent commitment in the 1980s/early 1990s to a negotiated end to white minority rule

in South Africa.

Also, South Africa's peacemaking efforts in the SADC reflected Mbeki's leadership from behind approach, which was his strategy against being mis-construed as pushing South African agenda over and above collective regional interest. This however compromised South Africa's ability to promote durable peace in the sub-region. In DRC and Zimbabwe, for instance, the Mbeki government played behind-the-scenes roles in the process of negotiating and mediating peace. This led to fragile peace in both countries, as exemplified by continued hostilities in the DRC and the weak nature of the government of national unity in Zimbabwe. This was in spite of South Africa's economic and military leverage in the sub-region, by which it could have taken a tougher and more robust approach to the situations in the two countries.

REFERENCES

- ARF (African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund), 'Annual Report for the Year ended 31 March 2008,' (2008); ARF, 'Annual Report for the Year ended 31 March 2007' (2007); ARF, 'Annual Report for the Year ended 31 March 2006' (2006); ARF, 'Annual Report for the Year ended 31 March 2005' (2005)
- AU, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)-2010 Assessment, (Addis Ababa: AU, 2010), p.24
- Boutros-Ghali, B. 1992. "An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping", Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council, S/24111, Accessed 02 January 2013 <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/at/cf/wpsS24111.pdf>.
- Chikane, F. 2012. *Eight days in September: the removal of Thabo Mbeki*, Johannesburg: Picador Africa.
- DFA, 1999. "White Paper on South Africa's Participation in International Peace Missions" *Department of Foreign Affairs*, Accessed 12 January 2013 www.gov.za/whitepaper/1999/peace_missions.pdf, 1999.
- DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs). 2003. Annual Report 2002/2003. Johannesburg: Department of Foreign Affairs.
- Kagwanja, P. and M. Rupiya, R. 2009. "Praetorian solidarity: the state of military relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe," in Kagwanja, P. and Kondlo, K. (eds.), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2008*. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council.

- Landsberg, C. 2004. *The quiet diplomacy of Liberation: International politics and South Africa's transition*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd.
- Landsberg, C. 2010. 'Thabo Mbeki's legacy of transformational diplomacy', in D. Glaser (ed.), *Mbeki and after: reflections on the legacy of Thabo Mbeki*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
- Mbeki, T. 1998. *Africa the Time has come: selected speeches of Thabo Mbeki*. Cape Town & Johannesburg: Tafelberg Publishers Ltd./Mafube Publishing (Pty) Ltd.
- Paris, R. 2004. *At War's End: Building Peace after civil conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SADC. 2008. *SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, Sandton-South Africa, 16-18 August 2008*. Gaborone: SADC Secretariat.
- SADC. 2001. *Communiqué of the Summit of the SADC Task Force on Developments in Zimbabwe, 10-11 September 2001* Gaborone: SADC.
- SADC. 1999. *SADC Heads of State and Government Summit Communiqué, Mozambique-Maputo, 17-19. August*, Gaborone: SADC Secretariat.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa Government Gazette), 2000. 'African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund Act 2000, Act No 51, No 21798'
- Vale, P. 2010. "Thabo Mbeki and the great foreign policy riddle", in D. Glaser (ed.), *Mbeki and after: reflections on the legacy of Thabo Mbeki*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the role that South Africa during Mbeki's presidency played in peace and security issues of Southern African Development Community (SADC). The paper infers that South Africa under Mbeki adopted a peace-building approach, comprising mediation, negotiation, peacekeeping, promotion of democracy and election monitoring, in addressing peace and security challenges in the SADC. It however argues that it was the person of Mbeki, shaped by his leadership and revolutionary experiences in the African National Congress (ANC) during apartheid era, alongside South Africa's economic strength that underlined and shaped its approach and contributions to SADC peace and security.

KEYWORDS

South Africa; Thabo Mbeki; Regional Stability.

Received on November 23, 2016.

Accepted on December 23, 2016.

THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING: SUEZ, RWANDA AND DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Maria Fernanda Affonso Leal ¹

Rafael Santin²

David Almstadter de Magalhães ³

Introduction

In March 28th, 2013, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2098, through which the Intervention Brigade was created in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, aiming to “neutralize and disarm” the rebel militias in the Congolese territory. This resolution has been considered a landmark in the history of UN’s peacekeeping operations that since its genesis have operated based on the principle of the minimum use of force necessary to achieve the desired effect.

The creation of the United Nations, following the Second World War, sought to avoid the outbreak of new conflict in the international system through cooperation among the member states. Peacekeeping operations were not mentioned in the founding Charter of the UN; however, Chapter VI of the document regards the peaceful settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII creates pacific and non-pacific mechanisms of collective security aiming to preserve international peace.

In the 1950s, during the Suez crisis, the first UN’s peacekeeping operation was created. With the purpose of stopping the conflict from escalating

¹ BA in International Relations from Anhembi Morumbi University. E-mail: fernandaaffonso.l@gmail.com

² BA in International Relations from Anhembi Morumbi University.

³ Professor of International Relations at Fundação Armando Alvares Penteado (FAAP) and Anhembi Morumbi University.. E-mail: david.dvdmg@gmail.com

uncontrollably, the General Assembly decided to send a military contingent to keep peace in the region. This first attempt was considered successful by the UN.

Since then, the UN has been involved in a number of conflicts around the world, mostly observing the basic premises of peacekeeping operations: minimal use of force, impartiality and consent. These features are considered the bedrock of this kind of operation, for without them the UN's interventions would be considered belligerent, and hence, an active party to the conflict. However, because of the end of the deadlocks among the member of the Security Council, in the post-Cold War there has been a change in the approach of the peacekeeping operations. The amount of missions increased vertiginously, mainly because of the many civil wars that proliferated during this time.

Following this greater participation of the UN in international conflicts, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General (SG) unveiled the Agenda for Peace in 1992, a document establishing the foundations of the peacebuilding operations⁴. These operations aimed to build long-lasting peace, through the development of the administrative capabilities of the warring states. This made the involvement of the UN in such states more complex and, thus, more expensive.

During the 1990s, when the UN faced serious issues regarding peace operations, its erratic and hesitant stance became a landmark in the history of the organization. Kofi Annan, who was ahead of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) at the time of the Rwanda mission, witnessed the difficulties faced by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) because of the restrictions imposed by the Security Council in regards to the *modus operandi* of the mission. Therefore, given his experience, when taking over as Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan convened the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping in order to evaluate the shortcomings of the peace operations system applied up until then.

The panel led to the Brahimi Report, establishing a new commitment from the member-states, besides significant institutional changes and the increase of the financial support to the peace operations, becoming a turning point in the UN's reinterpretation process in regards to its humanitarian intervention mechanisms.

The most significant change to the peacekeeping operations pro-

⁴ The document also defined the peace enforcement operations as units from the member-states made up of volunteer troops, using heavier weaponry than the peacekeeping operations. The creation of these troops is authorized by the Security Council and as in the case of peacekeeping operations, they are commanded by the Secretary-General (UN 1992).

cedures happened in 2013: the creation of the Intervention Brigade for the *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo* (MONUSCO), the UN's peace operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Intervention Brigade is also bound to the basic principles of the peacekeeping operations – consent, impartiality and minimal use of force. This obligation to keep following the principles came from the organisation's concern that the Brigade's new rule of engagement could delegitimize the foundations of the peace operations. Despite its close links to the peacekeeping operations, the Intervention Brigade is, according to the Secretary-General, the first offensive combat force created to control the violence waves in the DRC (Fett 2013).

Considering the legal issues and possible disputes caused by the creation of the Intervention Brigade, we can evaluate its emergence as a step towards a new way to understand peace operations. It becomes pertinent to inquire: are we facing a moment of change in the approach of the UN towards peace operations?

This article's hypothesis is developed from the principle that after a number of failures in its interventions, culminating, for instance, in the infamous genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the UN – and more specifically, its Security Council – began to implement a number of changes aiming to repair some mistakes experienced in the peacekeeping operations. By investigating the evolution of the peace operations and using as comparison parameters the UNEF I (Suez Canal), UNAMIR (Rwanda) and MONUSCO (DRC), the changes in the UN's *modus operandi* in dealing with humanitarian crisis will be analysed.

UNEF I: UN's first step

When peace operations were conceived by the UN in the end of the 1940s, their objective was to be a neutral force interposed between two warring states after a cease-fire was established. The first mission authorized by the Security Council (UNSC) was the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948 that established as its goal the monitoring of the Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries, and remains active to this day (UN, no date).

After the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by the Egyptian government, France and the United Kingdom requested a Security Council meeting to discuss the situation. Following the requisitions, the UNSC met

in September to decide on the actions that would be taken in regards to the received questions. The Resolution 118 (1956) was adopted by the UNSC, and the SG claimed it would do everything possible to reach an agreement based on the principles approved by the Council (*idem*).

However, in October, 1956, the situation between Israel and Egypt became critical when the General Armistice Agreement signed by the countries was voided because of the Israeli invasion – supported by British and French forces – to the Egyptian territory. Despite Lt. Gen E.L.M Burns, from Canada, – who led the UNTSO – attempts to reach a cease-fire agreement between the countries, Egypt was bombed by England and France (UN, no date).

In November 1st, 1956, the General Assembly had its first emergency session to deal with the situation in the Middle East, after the UNSC was unable to reach an agreement given the vetoes issued by France and the United Kingdom. The Assembly approved the resolution 997 (ES-I) asking for an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces and reopening of the Canal. Canada abstained from voting, and Lester Pearson⁵ justified his country's choice claiming that more drastic actions were necessary to aid the cease-fire in the region. Pearson suggested that a UN's police force able to assist in the solution of the crisis was installed; and in discussions with the Secretary General the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) emerged, the first armed peace operation of the UN (*ibid*).

Canada's suggestion was approved in the resolution 998 (ES-I) of November 4th, 1956, and in the same day the SG forwarded the first report with a plan to the UN's emergency force. In the second SG's report, of November 6th, he defined the concept of the new force and the principles that should guide it throughout its mandate, among them one that would be fundamental to future missions: the mission would not have rights beyond those necessary to the execution of its functions, it would be more than an observation mission, but wouldn't be, in any way, a military force controlling territory (UN, no date).

The General Assembly approved a total of seven resolutions during the special emergency session; these formed the UNEF I, and gave the SG the authority and support necessary to end the disputes between Egypt and Israel. The UNEF I marked the emergence of the UN's armed peace operations, which from that moment on would be crucial to the preservation of peace in the international system. However, in order to the Force to act in the Egyptian territory, the country's government consent was necessary; this was

5 Advisor of Canada's UN delegation, President of the General Assembly's 7th Session and Prime Minister of Canada.

a fundamental aspect of the implementation of the UNEF I and to this day it is a principle of the peace operations.

The negotiations regarding the cease-fire and the retreat of the armies from the borders were led by the SG himself, through resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and discussions with the governments of the involved countries. This eased the UNEF I's operations on the field that were only to support previously accepted decisions, and aid the peace process.

The mission was implemented in four phases: from November to December 1956 aiming to facilitate the retreat of British and French troops from the Port Said area; the second was from the end of December 1956 until March 1957 and observed the retreat of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula; the third phase of the UNEF I focused on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from both areas; and the last phase involved the distribution of UNEF I troops through the border between Egypt and Israel, and lasted for about 10 years, from March 1957 to May 1967. (UN, no date).

In 1967 the situation in the Israel-Egypt border was stable because of the performance of the peace operation in the region; however, the Israeli borders with Syria and Jordan presented continuous problems. When Syrian and Israeli forces exchanged fire across their border, the Egyptian government asked the UNEF I to exit its territory, claiming its functions in the region were completed. The Secretary-General accepted Egyptian demands given the necessary government consent to keep troops in the country had been withdrawn (ibid).

When the UNEF I emerged, the international system characteristics were well defined: the context was that of Cold War and prominently state-driven conflicts. This eased the implementation of a mission meant to be interposed between warring states, for the cease-fire and troop withdrawal negotiations happened within the UN, being mediated by the SG himself in talks among the representatives of the involved states. Once an agreement was reached, the FC of the UNEF I delivered the orders to the military commanders in the field, and there they organized how the withdrawal of troops would happen.

The UNEF I, being the first armed peace operation of the UN, set precedents to all others that followed; reason for which its foundations are used to this day; and its concepts are central to the establishment of every peace operation of the United Nations. This model has, however, undergone few changes aimed at adapting itself to a new international context. Such rigidity regarding the *modus operandi* eventually created complications to the UN, eventually faced with much different situations than those that originated the missions, and used the same model. Despite this, the UNEF I is

considered by the UN one of the most successful operations in the history of the organization, for it was able to end a war and bring 10 years of peace to an extremely unstable region.

UNAMIR: UN's mistakes in Rwanda

Between the 1980s and the 1990s it is possible to perceive the emergence of new kinds of conflicts, different than those that happened up until then. These disputes were named “new wars” by Mary Kaldor (1999), and differ from former wars under some crucial aspects. Marked mainly by civil conflicts, the new wars are a result of the Cold War and the “power vacuums” that typically appear during transition periods, and usually occur in countries suffering with government corruption and economic decline. Such elements create a suitable environment to the rising of paramilitary groups, organized crime and large scale human rights violations (KALDOR, *idem*).

Despite the appearance of this new kind of organized violence in the years following the Cold War, the author states that, the new wars did not supersede the interstate conflicts, in other words, what she calls “old wars”. The contemporary conflicts acquire more complexity, for there is coexistence, intensified by globalization, between state and non-state actors, between the governmental and the transnational.

New wars are concentrated mainly in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia, areas where the above-mentioned factors are clearly present. If we look into the Rwanda situation, we can notice that, besides being a socially unequal and corrupt country, enemy factions permeate its territory and, according to Kaldor (1999), have the common goal of spreading fear and hatred among the population, in order to achieve control over it and, consequently, more power. To Kaldor (*idem*), the new wars must be understood within a globalization context, that is, of intensification of the global connections. Among the consequences of this globalization process is the dissemination of ideals, as is, for instance, the democratization wave of the 1990s that followed the end of the Cold War.

This democratization process is pointed out by Filip Reyntjens (1996) as one of the crucial factors to the outbreak of violence in Rwanda in the beginning of the 1990s. Around this time, the president Juvénal Habyarimana sought to adapt to the international wave, and created in 1990 the “National Synthesis Commission on Political Reform”, aiming to democratize the country. Soon after the creation of the Commission, the Rwandese Patriotic Front

(RPF) invaded the country's capital and started a war against the central Hutu government. According to Reyntjens, this invasion was planned by the RPF as a way to further destabilize the country in a time the government sought to democratize. Thus, once Habyarimana was no longer considered a dictator, the RPF would lose one of its strongest arguments: the fight against a monolithic dictatorship (Prunier 1993, 30).

The violence wave that assailed Rwanda in 1994 began in 1991 under the form of planned, one-off attacks, perpetrated by "death squads" linked to the government – and the family – of Habyarimana. The attacks aimed at sabotaging the negotiations of the Arusha Accords and, also, the democratization process (Reyntjens 1994). In this turbulent context, the Accords were signed in August 4th, 1993, despite the sabotage attempts from the more radical wings of the Habyarimana regime.

The Arusha deal established an ample role to the then called Neutral International Force (NIF) – to be provided by the UN as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) – throughout the transition period after the treaty was signed, that should last for 22 months. During its mandate, the force would play a central role in the security of the country. Among its assignments were: to guarantee security in the country, maintaining law and order; to guarantee that humanitarian aid safely reached all and assisted in the protection of civilians. Besides, the force should help in locating weapons depots, neutralizing armed gangs and recovering weapons illegally distributed or acquired by civilians (UN 1999).

In August 1993, a reconnaissance mission was dispatched to Rwanda under Canadian Lt. Gen. Roméo A. Dallaire. Its job was to evaluate NIF's possible attributions and the resources necessary to the establishment of the peace operation. The Security Council unanimously approved UNAMIR's establishment, despite some reservations, most importantly omitting the suggestion that the mission helped in recovering illegally acquired weapons (UN 1999).

In October 1993, UNAMIR was established in Rwandan territory. The chosen Force Commander (FC) of the operation was Dallaire himself, who led the mission from October 1993 to August 1994. SG Boutros Boutros Ghali nominated Cameroon's foreign relations minister and his friend, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, who reached Kigali in November 1993 as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).

In November 1993, Dallaire sent a draft of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the UNAMIR to the UN headquarters in New York for the secretariat to approve. In that draft, he specifically required that the UNAMIR could act and use force in response to crimes against humanity and other abuses.

According to the 1999 UN report on Rwanda and Dallaire (2003) himself, this draft made by the FC never received a formal response from the headquarters⁶.

One of the most glaring examples of the UN's inflexibility regarding the established ROE was when Dallaire sent a telegram in January 11th requesting to the UN the extraction of an informant from Rwandan territory. This, an important member of the Interahamwe – the Rwandan extremist militia – reported evidences of the existence of weapon caches that could be used in a massacre.

Dellaire pointed out that his troops were ready to perform reconnaissance on the depots within the following 36 hours, and recommended protection for the informant and his withdrawal from the country. The headquarters denied authorization for the operation to be carried out, and instructed Dallaire and Booh Booh to request an urgent meeting with President Habyarimana to update him on the information received on the Interahamwe and how they could affect the establishment of peace (UN 1999).

This UN decision was based on the directives regarding Peace Missions on Chapter VI, requiring the state's consent for the UN's forces to act. However, as it was later proven, the president was involved with the massacre and had no intention to maintain peace; because of this, when the FC informed Habyarimana about the location of the weapons and requested that he took immediate effective action against the Interahamwe, what the head of state did was relocate the caches and allow the massacre to go on as planned.

In March 30th 1994, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, presented the Security Council with a report on UNAMIR's performance, and suggested that its mandate was extended by further six months. The CSNU showed incredible reluctance to accept the mission's extension, and so its mandate was extended by little more than four months when the UNSC approved it in April 5th. The resolution 909 (1994) also included the possibility for this period to be increased if the peace process showed no signs of progress during the established timeframe.

The wave of violence in Rwanda escalated vertiginously after president Habyarimana's assassination, when returning from a meeting on the Arusha agreements in Tanzania, along with Burundi's president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, in April 6th, 1994. The plane in which both were suffered an attack when approaching the Kigali's airport. Soon after the explosion, the Presidential Guard, supported by the Interahamwe, installed road blocks. The

6 The ROE anteceded changes later applied to the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

military quickly took command of the country, disregarding the authority of the Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana (UN 1999).

The FC sent a report to the headquarters informing that the UNAMIR might need to use force to rescue the Prime Minister, to which Iqbal Riza – from the DPKO – answered confirming the approved ROE: UNAMIR should only open fire if fired upon first (*idem*). Because of this, the Belgian soldiers stationed in front of the Prime Minister's house ended up surrendering their weapons to the Presidential Guard and being taken to Camp Kigali, where they suffered a number of abuses and were killed.

The FC made it clear that an operation to rescue the soldiers from Camp Kigali was not viable because of the risks the rescue team would be subjected to, and the high chance the mission would fail. He states that for not having the necessary firepower to attack the RGF troops, a rescue attempt would be irresponsible. Dallaire also understood that an attack on the RGF complex would make them legitimate targets and, consequently, a third party to the conflict.

In a report to the Belgian senate commission, Dallaire described UNAMIR's deficiencies and its lack of resources: "The UNAMIR mission was a peacekeeping operation. It was not equipped, trained or staffed to conduct intervention operations." (UN 1999). In the words of the FC we see the inadequacy of a classic peace mission to the situation in Rwanda, that dealt with belligerents within the same state and a civil war, no longer a war among states as was the case during the Cold War. The restrictions of this kind of mission and the ROE led to the unnecessary death of ten Belgian soldiers that would have been able to defend themselves if permission had been granted for them to open fire when threatened:

We were sending our soldiers, who were ready for classic chapter-six peace-keeping missions, into a world that seemed increasingly less amenable to such interventions. (Dallaire 2003, 40, 41).

Even before UNAMIR began its mandate, Roméo Dallaire already understood that the mission needed greater powers than the ones established, and that, without them, the chances of failure would be big. After the death of the Belgian soldiers, the mission suffered another hit from which it would not be able to recover: Belgium's Prime Minister, Willy Claes, requested to the Secretary-General that UNAMIR operations were suspended, as it had been unsuccessful in keeping the peace and avoiding the deaths that happened until then. The UNSC did not authorize the suspension of the mission,

which led to Belgium withdrawing its troops from Rwandan soil, depriving UNAMIR of its better equipped and trained soldiers.

The Belgian withdrawal led to a discussion within the UN regarding UNAMIR's mandate and if it should be kept with a much smaller contingent, or if it should be suspended. In April 21st, 1994, the UNSC approved the resolution 912 (1994) reducing the missions contingent to only 270 troops and changing its mandate. However, April was the month in which Rwanda experienced the worst wave of killings in its territory; until the end of the month approximately 200,000 Rwandans were killed. This situation changed the perspective for the Secretary-General, who requested to the UNSC that the decision to reduce UNAMIR's force was reversed. According to Boutros Ghali, the resolution 912 (1994) did not offered the mission capacity to take effective action against the ongoing massacre (UN 1999). The Secretary-General believed the UNSC had to consider what kind of actions could be taken to restore law and order. Such actions would demand material resources and contingents in a scale the Member States had until then been reluctant to contemplate (*ibid*).

This change of stance of the Secretary-General exemplifies the lack of direction and even interest the UN headquarters showed in regards to the situation in Rwanda. The decisions were taken based on the expenses the countries would have in order to support the mission, not on what would be the most effective way to avoid the massacre. One of the issues faced by UNAMIR in regards to its mandate was the contradictory orders from headquarters that often failed to send information.

In mid-May 1994, the Secretary-General sent to the UNSC a report describing the implementation of the "UNAMIR II" that would consist of a 5,500-strong force. The new UNAMIR mandate generated discussions within the UNSC, since there was a split among its members. Despite the divergences, in May 17th, 1994, resolution 918 (1994) was adopted by the UNSC.

Following the resolution, the Secretary-General sent Gen. Maurice Baril – chief of the DPKO's military division – and Iqbal Riza, also from the DPKO, to assess the situation in Rwanda and help the belligerent reach an agreement on the cease-fire. The report sent to the headquarters acknowledged that trying to establish a cease-fire without stopping the killings would not be advisable, for the continuation of the massacres could lead to a prolonged violence cycle, so the stopping of the killings should happen concomitantly with the cease-fire (Dallaire 2003).

From the information gathered by Baril and Riza, the Secretary-General formulated a report that was sent to the UNSC in May 31st. A retrospective of the information on the Rwanda situation that the Secretariat had had ac-

cess to from before the genocide was included in it, proving, in other words, that the UNSC had the knowledge and the capacity to avoid the massacres that followed, having failed to take the actions necessary to do so. The report also provided the guidelines to the implementation of the UNAMIR II, with a larger mandate than its predecessor that included providing safety to threatened civilians and humanitarian operations.

This report was of extreme importance to point out the problems inherent to the UN and the UNSC that for geopolitical and budgetary reasons, many times avoided adopting life-saving action. It was a first step towards a new way to deal with peace missions, as it began to be clear that the established mandates were inadequate to the presented situations and because of this, many times, the agents were bound to outdated rules that harmed both the operations and the civilians of the affected countries.

In an attempt to control the situation in Rwanda, the Secretary-General suggested to the UNSC the adoption of the “Opération Turquoise”, presented by France. The plan was to conduct a multinational peace enforcement operation based on the Chapter VII of the UN Charter – which provides for military interventions in other countries – to ensure the protection and safety of the refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda (UN 1999). In the end of June 1994, this operation was established to support the UNAMIR in controlling the situation.

UNAMIR’s FC was against the operation from the beginning for he knew the risks it could bring to the peace mission that was still under his mandate. One of the biggest concerns was with the UNAMIR troops with the same nationality as those partaking in the Opération Turquoise. This was fundamental, because the Opération Turquoise had authorization to use force, being considered a belligerent, as opposed to the UNAMIR.

Despite Dallaire’s contestation, the operation went ahead and was established mainly in the border between Rwanda and the former Zaire. In mid-July 1994, the refugee situation became an emergency, with more than a million Rwandans crossing the border between the countries. The refugee situation was of extreme importance because, the bigger the number of Rwandans entering Zaire, the more instable the situation became in the country. The French of the Opération Turquoise and the Zaireans were disarming the RGF that attempted to enter the country but, in the words of Dallaire “neither the Zaireans nor the French were taking any measures to separate the militia, gendarmes or soldiers from the civilians as they crossed the border” (2003, 471). This showed to be a fundamental mistake in the reception of the refugees, for it allowed for the Rwandan soldiers to gather their strength again inside the Zaire, leading the country to a political overturn that was, inevitably,

consequence of the situation in Rwanda⁷.

In July 18th, the RPF had already taken control of all Rwandan territory, except the zone controlled by the *Opération Turquoise*, and declared a unilateral cease-fire, ending the hundred-day massacre in Rwanda. The next day an interim government was established, with Pasteur Bizimungu⁸ as president and Paul Kagame⁹ as vice-president. With this new government came promises of a better country, but no talks yet of conciliation between Hutus and Tutsis.

The situation in Rwanda was the result of a series of factors, and among them we stressed UN's actions, that was unable to quickly act in order to avoid the massacres and now carries this stain in its history. The report made in 1999 by the Secretary-General raised fundamental questions for the understanding on how the UN's inaction affected Rwanda; in the end of the report, the SG points at both the mistakes made by the Organization as a whole, and the UNSC, being this essential so that the decisions taken in the future are more conscious of the possible outcomes, preventing this situation from happening again. In this way, we conclude that the Rwanda massacre was an important step in allowing changes to happen in the way peace missions are established, especially in countries that suffer with internal conflicts and are unable to receive a peace mission bound by the three basic principles: consent, minimal use of force and impartiality.

MONUSCO

The experience in Rwanda showed that the peace mission model used until then was inadequate for dealing with situations and conflicts of the so-called New World Order. Because of this, when the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo was implemented, the UNSC brought fundamental changes to the operation structures, starting a new stage in the UN's peace operations. The MONUSCO was an important turning point, mainly because the conflict outbreak in the DRC was a direct consequence of the situation in Rwanda.

7 Added to this flaw in the border control, the zone established by the *Opération Turquoise* proved to be propitious for the Interahamwe to carry on the massacres without the French soldiers' intervention. Furthermore, the *Opération* protected extremist members of the government against the RPF that would bring them to court, and helped them flee the country (THE GUARDIAN, 2007).

8 Senior political councillor for the RPF, RPF's Executive Committee member, Hutu.

9 Military commander of the Rwandese Patriotic Army, RPF's military wing, Tutsi.

After the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed, the UN authorized the establishment of a peace mission in the DRC, and in November 1999 the MONUC was created. The mission's original mandate included observation and assistance tasks, not involving the use of force, and the UNSC avoided, in the first moment, mentioning threats to the international security and peace (Janik 2014). However, in 2000, violence quickly escalated, prompting the UNSC to declare that the situation in the DRC threatened the international peace. The result of this understanding was the approval of the historical resolution 1291 that authorized MONUC to employ force when necessary to protect UN and Joint Military Commission (JMC)¹⁰ staff and civilians from attacks and imminent threats (Janik 2014).

The constant hostilities prevented the MONUC to exercise the observation and monitoring tasks. The many military groups present in the DRC led to a territorial fragmentation of the country, causing a noticeable decline in the humanitarian situation, with hundreds of thousands of victims and at least two million refugees (JANIK, *idem*). Responding to this situation, the UNSC approved in 2003, an intervention led by France, to control the wave of genocides in the northeast region of the country. The resolution also authorized MONUC to help the government in the militia disarmament efforts.

Resolution 1565 of 2004 authorized a multidimensional peace enforcement and peace building mission, in accord to the patterns established by the Brahimi Report of 2000 (*ibid*)¹¹. It is possible that the new MONUC mandate went too far by allowing such an active role for international forces, and consequently, questioning the DRC's central government capability to deal with the issue. This led to president Kabila's attempt to remove all international influence, publicly announcing the intention to see MONUC leave the country until the summer of 2011. Because of this, in July 2010, the resolution 1925 renamed the mission to MONUSCO, as a way to emphasize the important steps that were being taken towards peace (*ibid*).

The use of peace enforcement within a peacekeeping mission was not an innovation brought exclusively to the MONUC, given that other peace operations had already used Chapter VII for some or all aspects of its mission.

¹⁰ Composed by the belligerents and established through the Lusaka Agreements, with the goal of investigating cease-fire violations and disarming militias.

¹¹ The Report established new parameters, especially to the missions involving peace building and peace enforcement, among them: the inclusion of demobilizations and reintegration programs in the budget of the first phase of complex peace missions; the creation of a plan to strengthen UN's permanent capability to develop peace building strategies; besides emphasizing the importance of the peacekeepers being able to defend themselves, fulfilling their mandates in a professional and successful manner, using robust rules of engagement against those that deny the terms of the peace agreement (UN, 2000).

Already in the 1960s the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was authorized to use force, if necessary, to prevent the outbreak of a civil war in the country. Another example of the use of force in the mandate happened during the 1990s with the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) that had a peace enforcement mandate approved in order to establish safe zones for humanitarian aid inside the Somali territory (Boulden 2001). However, as is pointed out by Boulden (*idem*), though there had been attempts of peace enforcement before MONUC, they did not succeed. “Bound by the predominant optimism of the post-Cold War, the international community found horizons for new security arrangements” (Boulden, *idem*, 9-14).

In July 1st 2010, to mark the beginning of a new stage in the DRC, MONUC was renamed as MONUSCO (United Nations Organizations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) through the resolution 1925. By “new stage”, is understood a significant progress of the mission, with the consolidation of the government institutions, the holding of relatively free and transparent elections, the stabilization of the situation in most of the territory, though the conflict and the humanitarian crisis persisted in the east of the country (UN 2010).

Among the changes brought by the resolution, there are not only increases in the contingent of both military and civilians in the missions, but alterations in its directives as well. The one that can be considered the most striking to the mission, and clearly demonstrating the more offensive tendency of its *modus operandi*:

[...] the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources and authorizes MONUSCO to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection mandate [...] (UN 2010. Emphasis added).

Even though its predecessor MONUC already had great freedom to act and counted on a reasonable number of troops, by using again the phrase “*all necessary means*”, the UNSC makes clear its intention to turn MONUSCO into a “robust” mission since its creation, as opposed to MONUC, that began as a non-force using peace mission. With the usage of this term, parameters to the mission are practically eliminated when it relates to means to be employed in the defense of civilians, legitimating the use of force in every action taken under the aegis of the resolution.

In the resolution, the following item is among the mission priorities:

Develop and implement, in close consultation with the Congolese authorities and in accordance with the Congolese strategy for justice reform, a multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme in order to develop the criminal justice chain, the police, the judiciary and prisons in conflict-affected areas [...] (UN 2010.)

So, by putting among its priorities the rebuilding and development of institutions as the police, the judiciary and penitentiary system, the UNSC assumes the commitment of stabilizing the Congolese state not only through the fight against armed groups and human rights violations, but also through the rebuilding of a bureaucratic structure with mechanisms that allow the development of sustainable peace, in such a way that given time the country will acquire authority sufficient to control its own crisis.

In June 2011, a year after the resolution that implemented it, MONUSCO obtained, in a broad manner, significant results in relation to the peace and security in the DRC and the region of the Great Lakes as a whole (UN 2011). However, armed conflicts and grave violations of the human rights, including the recruitment of children by the armed groups, extrajudicial killings and mass rapes, still were frequent (especially in the east of the country) (ibid). Appealing to the relevant parties to cease all forms of violence and human rights violations, the UNSC extended MONUSCO for a further year through the resolution 1991 (Fett 2013).

Another important element in this last resolution relates to the renovation of the importance attributed to peacebuilding practices. The UNSC recognizes that, to guarantee the restoration of peace and consolidation of democracy, that in their turn generate socioeconomic development in the DRC, inclusive and transparent elections would need to be held. And so declares that MONUSCO would support the elections to be held in November that year through technical and logistical support (UN 2011).

Among accusations of irregularity in the elections by both national and international observers, Kabila was reelected president, and after three years of international pressure, in March 2012 finally ordered the prison of the commander of his armed forces, Bosco Ntaganda, accused of recruiting children for combat, rape, murder and ethnic persecution, and other crimes, having been indicted by the International Court in 2006 (ICG 2012). The general then organized a mutiny, and bringing with him part of the army formed the rebel group *Mouvement du 23-Mars* (M23), who took the city of Goma and engaged in direct combat against the FARDC and MONUSCO, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee the region (ibid).

Throughout 2012, three resolutions were approved by the UNSC,

with their main concerns being the regional flow of natural resources used by the rebel groups to maintain their arsenals, and the newest threat to the regional peace, the M23 (UN 2012). MONUSCO's mandate was then extended for a further year, and the UNSC announced it would reinforce the mission by applying new sanctions against countries in the region to curb the arms trafficking to rebel groups such as M23, as it was proven they were receiving support from Rwanda's government (BBC 2013).

After a period of intense battles and negotiation attempts between the Congolese government and the M23, in February 2013 a crisis broke out within the rebel group that led to a split and consequently a conflict among the two resulting factions – one side led by Bosco Ntaganda and the other by Col. Sultani Makenga (UN 2013). A few weeks later, the faction led by Ntaganda was defeated and he fled to Rwanda with about 600 of his fighters (ibid). Surprising everyone involved, in March 18th Ntaganda surrendered to the North American embassy in Kigali and requested transfer to the International Criminal Court (BBC 2015).

Finally, in March 28th, 2013, through the resolution 2098 the UNSC decided that in order to increase MONUSCO's efficiency and offer a definitive solution to the recurring conflict cycles and general violence caused by the armed groups in the DRC, there should first be created room to the stabilization process in the region (UN 2013). In other words, for the mission to be able to guarantee and keep peace in the region, this should first be acquired through strategic action to contain the violence outbreaks. MONUSCO was then not only extended for another year – until March 31st, 2014 – but also began to count with an Intervention Brigade (IB) among its instruments (idem).

Intervention Brigade

The Intervention Brigade's task was to neutralize and disarm armed groups so that the military operations in the mission context were facilitated and the country stabilization process enabled. Counting on 3,069 troops distributed among three infantry battalions, an artillery one, one of special forces and a reconnaissance company, the IB would support the DRC's authorities in their activities through offensive strategic operations "in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner" (UN 2013).

The Intervention Brigade was established because of a specific conflict context in the DRC, which for beginning in the 1960s, included both the Cold War and the post-war, allowing for applying Mary Kaldor's (1999) definition of "new war" and also the interpretation of it as an interstate war – given the constant influence of neighboring countries in the DRC. This unstable

environment of conflict between armed groups generated the need for a faction within MONUSCO able to curb the violence created by the rebel militias and having a specific mandate for the active use of force.

It is important to note that, as opposed to previous resolutions, in the first paragraphs the resolution 2098 brings a number of reservations about the concept of peacekeeping, aiming to secure the principles guiding such missions:

[...] Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned. (Resolution 2098 2013, 1.)

In this way, the UNSC tried to make it as clear as possible that it does not intend, through the introduction of the IB, to conduct a reform in the peacekeeping missions' structures, instead just adapting MONUSCO to the context it is inserted in. Despite this, it could be observed that exactly this repagination of the basic principles of peacekeeping is an indicative that the UNSC understands it is entering new waters, as affirmed by British ambassador Mark Lyall Grant when questioned about the introduction of the IB (Al Jazeera 2013). Whatever objective the UNSC had when creating the IB, it can be claimed to be the greatest innovation to the peacekeeping set of practices in the last years.

Another concern present in the resolution is the reinforcement of the respect for the non-intervention principle, in an attempt to dispel any fears that the IB could represent a threat to the DRC's or any other country's sovereignty in the region. (UN 2013): "reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC and emphasizing the need to fully respect the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation."

It is necessary to stress that another important consequence of the introduction of the IB, pointed out by Priscila Fett in her article on MONUSCO (Fett 2013), refers to the status of the peacekeeping forces among the armed conflicts. As explained by Fett (*idem*), UN determined through a bulletin¹² of the UNSG Kofi Annan (UN 1999) that despite its peacekeepers being

¹² The bulletin titled Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law discourses on the need for UN troops to follow rules of the International Law of Armed Conflicts (ILAC). (UN 1999).

obliged to respect the International Humanitarian Law (IHL)¹³ when using force in self-defense, that would not categorize them as combatants, and so they should have their status equated to that of civilians in armed conflicts along the lines of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC 1949). However, with the offensive actions now employed by the IB, it becomes pertinent to question if such troops could be considered legitimate targets as they are actively involved in the hostilities.

Furthermore, it is important to point out that, as opposed to the missions with an exclusive peace enforcement mandate, the Intervention Brigade acts completely under the consent of the DRC's government – the peace enforcement missions seek government's consent, if one exists, and are authorized to act without consent if necessary. And, as claims Fett (2013), it is not possible to draw parallels between the Intervention Brigade and UNOSOM II or the *Mission de Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti* (MINUSTAH), as the first did not have Somalia's government consent to use force, for it had a peace enforcement mandate, and the second did not foresee offensive actions in its mandate and was a stabilization mission in a country with much inferior levels of violence than those found in the DRC.

In November 2013, demonstrating the success in the containment of the crisis in the region, the FARDC – with the support of the IB – finally defeated the M23 rebels (UN 2013). Despite the persistence of violence in the region with the resistance of armed groups, mainly the FDLR and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the victory over the M23 was crucial, bringing other groups to surrender and to show interest in integrating the Congolese police and army (ibid). In December of the same year, to make the M23 end official, the negotiations in Kampala¹⁴ were concluded through the signing of the Nairobi Declarations (SADC 2013).

Aiming to prepare the FARDC to fight rebel groups without the need of the support of a foreign force, MONUSCO decided to invest even more in the capabilities of the Congolese army by training its troops and creating training teams so that the acquired knowledge and experience could be perpetuated (UN 2013). In this sense, and continuing with the mission's state building practices, MONUSCO helped the government develop and implement a programmatic law to the reform of the police between 2014 and 2017

13 International Humanitarian Law is a set of norms seeking to limit the effects of armed conflicts. It protects people that do not participate or stop participating in the hostilities, and restricts means and methods of combat. (ICRC 1998).

14 Beginning in December 2012, the Kampala Talks were negotiations that took place in the capital of Uganda and were facilitated by the president of that country, seeking a peace deal between the DRC and the M23 (SADC, 2013).

(UN 2013).

Throughout 2014, meaningful advances were not observed in the situation in the east of the DRC, and the Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UN 2015) recognized that the environment generated by the defeat of the M23 in November 2013 did not translate into gains in relation to the stability of the region. Congolese and foreign armed groups, such as the FDLR, the ADF, and others were weakened again, but none of them were defeated, with a number of new cases of abuses such as torture, sexual violence and massacres being registered. Because of this, the two resolutions passed in 2014 maintained the previous prerogatives, again extending MONUSCO's and its Intervention Brigade's mandate for a further year, without significant changes (ibid).

Up until the conclusion of this article, despite meaningful advances related both to the conflict in the east of the country and to the political situation of the DRC, reports of violence were still recurring. A number of new murder, sexual violence and kidnapping cases were reported, among these being the 2015 discovery of a mass grave containing 421 corpses in the region of the capital Kinshasa maybe the most tragic one (UN 2015). The main armed groups – FDLR, ADF and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – suffered a number of losses in attacks led by the FARDC with or without MONUSCO's assistance¹⁵, but they kept harassing the east of the country with attacks that left approximately 2.8 million people dislocated in all Congolese territory (ibid).

The last resolution passed for MONUSCO approved its extension for a year more, until March 2016, betting again in keeping the Intervention Brigade. This resolution also orders the withdrawal of 2,000 troops from the mission forces, because of the significant progress obtained in the priorities of the MONUSCO mandate, such as the crisis stabilization and the civilian protection (ibid).

Balance of the changes

In order to better understand the changes in peace missions and, mostly, the motivations that enticed them, we will use the parameters suggested by Duanne Bratt in his work *Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations* (1996). Bratt presents four criteria to the evaluation of the success of peace missions: mandate performance, facilitating conflict resolution, conflict containment and limiting casualties.

¹⁵ MONUSCO refused to support the FARDC in some campaigns because some of the Congolese generals were being accused of human rights violations (UN, 2015).

The first criterion, mandate performance, measures the degree of success of the mission by evaluating how effective it was when fulfilling the mandate established by the Security Council's resolutions. According to Bratt, this criterion is direct and relatively simple to be evaluated, though not exempt of flaws.

Facilitating conflict resolution is an indicator that measures if the mission was able to assist in solving the causes of the conflict. It is important to understand that this indicator brings into analysis events that are not under the mission's force control, for though the peacekeepers may aid in the resolution, this can only be achieved through the good-will of the combatants.

The third criterion is the mission's ability to contain the conflict, being determined by the mission's aptitude to avoid other potencies' or neighboring states' intervention in the conflict. Even if the intervention is promoted by the UN itself, the mission will be considered failed, at least under this aspect.

The last criterion considered by Bratt is the mission's ability to limit the number of deaths during its active period. In order to verify the success level of the mission under this indicator, it is necessary to compare the number of casualties – both military and civilian – before and after the mission's actions in the region.

The evaluation of the missions, based on the four criteria previously presented, allows them to be considered a success, a moderate success, or a failure. The following table fits the three missions presented in this article in all four categories, evaluating their degree of success.

MISSION	MANDATE PERFORMANCE	FACILITATING CONFLICT RESOLUTION	CONFLICT CONTAINMENT	LIMITING CASUALTIES	BALANCE
UNEF I	SUCCESS	FAILURE	SUCCESS	SUCCESS	SUCCESS
UNAMIR	FAILURE	FAILURE	FAILURE	FAILURE	FAILURE
MONUSCO	MODERATE SUCCESS	FAILURE	MODERATE SUCCESS	NOT ANALYSED*	MODERATE SUCCESS

* In this article, we considered the number of 5.4 million deaths, as it is the most usual, though there are controversies regarding this amount. In a report made by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in 2007, it was stated that approximately 5.4 million people died since 1998 in the DRC, but that number was contested in a 2010 report of the World Politics Review, affirming that about 200,000 died because of the war, and IRC's estimate included people who would have died even in times of peace, either because of disease or malnutrition.

The reviews of the missions show even clearer how the inadequacy of a *modus operandi* can negatively influence the outcome of a mission. UNEF I was a well succeeded mission because it was designed for a situation of

conflict between two states and was able to follow its mandate in an adequate manner. UNAMIR, unfortunately, still followed UNEF I's model, despite existing under a different set of circumstances, and this affected the result of the mission in Rwanda, that was unable to control the conflict as it was not free to act when necessary. In the MONUSCO case, we can already see attempts by the UN to adapt the *modus operandi* of the mission to the challenges that an intrastate conflict presents, and consequently a greater efficiency is perceived, especially when compared with UNAMIR.

Final Considerations

The history of the peace missions allows a deep analysis of their development throughout time. Since their beginning, the operations necessarily followed the three principles established by the United Nations: impartiality, minimal use of force and consent. This base was established as a way to control the troops' actions in the field and making sure that the mission stayed within the boundaries of the Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Throughout the Cold War this mission model showed to be efficient to interpose itself between belligerent states. This period's conflicts mainly occurred between two or more countries, facilitating the enforcement of the three principles in the operations. Another important factor related to international conflicts is that the negotiations regarding a cease-fire can occur within the UN, mediated by the Secretary-General. The fact that the UN did not adapt the missions' format proved harmful to the performance of the operations, especially in the beginning of the 1990s.

The greatest innovation in the post-Cold War peace missions was the creation of the Intervention Brigade for the MONUSCO. The IB is authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter to promote offensive operations to neutralize armed groups without the need of consent from the parts involved in the conflict (except from the Congolese government). That being said, we can consider it an enforcement element inside a peacekeeping operation, which alone exposes MONUSCO's peculiarity.

It is evident that international crises have their own characteristics and origins, and must receive special treatment, with peace missions and its mandates developed from an individual analysis. However, certain structural aspects are part of every mission, and even though the Brigade is an exclusive instrument of the MONUSCO, it is possible that it sets a precedent as it creates a new kind of mission, resulting from Chapter VI, but including certain aspects of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or "Chapter Six and a Half", as stated by SG Dag Hammarskjöld (UNIS, no date).

According to Kenkel (2013), during its progression, the peace mission evolved from their reactive positions of conflict palliatives, to proactive positions that sought to influence the result of the conflict. Because of this, in a broad manner, we can point to a series of transformations that are initially considered by the UN as specific uses in certain missions, but that, if analysed chronologically, as was done in this article, turn out to be big structural changes to the peace missions, reflexes of the relatively recent ingress of the organization in the post-Cold War world order and its continued adaptation to the new realities of intrastate wars.

REFERENCES

- Autesserre, S. 2010. *The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 142-143.
- Boulden, J. 2001. *Peace enforcement: the United Nations experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
- Bratt, D. 1996. "Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations." IN: *International Peacekeeping*, London: Routledge, 3(4): 64-81.
- Dallaire, R. A. 2003. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.
- Fett, P. 2013. "Tudo de novo no front: MONUSCO, uma nova era nas peacekeeping operations?" *Revista de Direito Internacional*, Brasília: UNICEUB. 10(2): 169-183.
- Henson, K. D. 2014. *Peacekeeping in the Congo, 1999-2001: Success or Failure?* Tese - School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
- Janik, R. 2014. "Putting Security Council Resolution 2098 on the Democratic Republic of Congo in Context: The Long Way of Peacekeeping." *10 Human Security Perspectives*, 142-185.
- Kaldor, M. 1999 *New and Old Wars : Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Kenkel, K.M. 2013. "Five generations of peace operations: from the "thin blue line" to "painting a country blue". *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Rio de Janeiro, 56 (1): 122-143.
- Prunier, G., «Elements pour une histotie du Front Patriotique Rwandais », *Politique Africaine*. 51: 121-138.

- Reyntjens, F. 1996. "Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond." *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 9(3): 240-251.
- Roberts, A. 1994. "The crisis in UN peacekeeping. IN: *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, London: Routledge, 36(3): 93-120.
- Sloan, J. 2011. *The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Waldorf, L. 2009. "Revisiting *Hotel Rwanda*: genocide ideology, reconciliation, and rescuers." *Journal of Genocide Research*, London: Routledge, 2009, 101-125.

WEBSITES:

- Al Jazeera America. 2013. *UN tests combat brigade in Democratic Republic of Congo*. >. Accessed on 10 October, 2015: <<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/5/un-tests-combat-brigade-indemocraticrepublicofcongo.html>>
- BBC News. 2015. *M23's decline raises hopes of DR Congo peace*. Accessed on 13 October, 2015 <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24802888>>
- BBC News. 2013 *Profile: Bosco Ntaganda the Congolese 'Terminator'*. Accessed on 13 October, 2015 <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17689131>>
- International Crisis Group. 2012, *Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed*. Accessed on 10 October, 2015 <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/b091-eastern-congo-why-stabilisation-failed.aspx>>.
- International Committee Of The Red Cross. 2015. *O que é o direito internacional humanitário?*. Accessed on: 10 October, 2015 <<https://www.icrc.org/por/resources/documents/misc/5tndf7.htm>>.
- International Rescue Committee. 2007. *IRC Study Shows Congo's Neglected Crisis Leaves 5.4 Million Dead; Peace Deal in N. Kivu, Increased Aid Critical to Reducing Death Toll*. Accessed on: 10 October, 2015 <<http://www.rescue.org/news/irc-study-shows-congos-neglected-crisis-leaves-54-million-dead-peace-deal-n-kivu-increased-aid--4331>>.
- ONU. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy and related matters*. 17 jun. 1992. Accessed on: 02 October, 2015 <<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r120.htm>>. ONU, *Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides* | ONU. Accessed on: 15 de novembro de 2015. <<http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>>.
- ONU, *Middle East – UNEF I* | ONU. Accessed on: 02 October, 2015. <<http://>>

- www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unefibackgr2.html>.
- ONU. 1999. *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*. Accessed on 14 August, 2015<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1257>.
- ONU. 2000. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*. Accessed on: 02 October, 2015 <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305>.
- ONU, 2013. *United Nation Operation in the Congo*. Accessed on: 13 December, 2016.: <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onuc.htm>>.
- ONU, 2011. *United Nations Operation in Somalia II*. Accessed on: 13 December, 2016.<<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/uno-som2.htm>>.
- The Guardian. 2007. *France's shame?*. Accessed on: 09 December, 2016. <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/11/rwanda.insideafrica>>
- UNIS Vienna, *Looking Back/Moving Forward*. Accessed on: 30 September, 2015 <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/60yearsPK>
- United Nations Security Council. 2004. *Resolution 1565 (2004)*. UN doc. S/RES/1565. 1 out. 2004. Accessed on: 20 September, 2015. <[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1565\(2004\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1565(2004))>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2010. *Resolution 1925 (2010)*. UN doc. S/RES/1925. 28 mai. 2010. Accessed on: 24 September, 2015 <[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010))>
- United Nations Security Council. 2011. *Resolution 1991 (2011)*. UN doc. S/RES/1991. 28 jun. 2011. Accessed on: 24 September, 2015. < [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1991\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1991(2011))>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2011. *Resolution 2021 (2011)*. UN doc. S/RES/2021. 29 nov. 2011. Accessed on: 30 September, 2015.< [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2021\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2021(2011))>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2012. *Resolution 2053 (2012)*. UN doc. S/RES/2053. 27 jun. 2012. Accessed on: 4 October, 2015. < [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2053\(2012\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2053(2012))>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2012. *Resolution 2076 (2012)*. UN doc. S/RES/2076. 20 nov. 2012. : Accessed on: 8 October, 2015. < http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/

- RES/2076+(2012)&Lang=E&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LatestUnDocuments-SecurityCouncilDocuments+(Latest+UN+documents++Security+Council+documents)>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2012. *Resolution 2078 (2012)*. UN doc. S/RES/2078. 28 nov. 2012. Accessed on: 8 October, 2015. < [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2078+\(2012\)&Lang=E&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LatestUnDocuments-SecurityCouncilDocuments+\(Latest+UN+documents++Security+Council+documents\)>](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2078+(2012)&Lang=E&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LatestUnDocuments-SecurityCouncilDocuments+(Latest+UN+documents++Security+Council+documents)>).
- United Nations Security Council. 2013. *Resolution 2098 (2013)*. UN doc. S/RES/2098. 28 mar. 2013. Accessed on: 20 October, 2015. < [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098\(2013\)>](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098(2013)>).
- United Nations Security Council. 2014. *Resolution 2136 (2014)*. UN doc. S/RES/2136. 30 jan. 2014. Accessed on: 20 October, 2015. < [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2136\(2014\)>](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2136(2014)>).
- United Nations Security Council. 2014. *Resolution 2147 (2014)*. UN doc. S/RES/2147. 28 mar. 2014. Accessed on: 20 October, 2015. < [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2147\(2014\)>](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2147(2014)>).
- United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 2211 (2015)*. UN doc. S/RES/2211. 26 mar. 2015. Accessed on: 20 October, 2015. < [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2211%20\(2015\)>](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2211%20(2015)>).
- United Nations Security Council. 2013. *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region*. UN doc. S/2013/757. 17 dez. 2013. Accessed on: 20 October, 2015. < http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/757>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2015. *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region*. UN doc. S/2015/172. Accessed on: 20 October, 2015. < http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/172>.
- United Nations Security Council. *Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region*. UN doc. S/2015/173. 13 mar. 2015. Accessed on: 20 October, 2015. <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/173>
- United Nations Security Council. 2015. *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region*. UN

doc. S/2015/486. Accessed on: 20 October, 2015. <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/486>.

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission In The Drc. *MONUSCO Background*. Accessed on: 20 out. 2015 <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/back-ground.shtml>>.

SADC. 2013. *Declaration of Commitments by the Movement of March 23 at the Conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue*. Accessed on: 17 nov. 2015. http://www.sadc.int/files/7013/8718/4213/M23_DECLARATION_ENGLSH0001.pdf

World Politics Review. 2010. *DRC Death Toll Debate Raises Questions*. Accessed on: 10 October, 2015 <<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5209/war-is-boring-drc-death-toll-debate-raises-questions>>.

ABSTRACT

Since the first peacekeeping operation was created until today, the UN has been trying to adapt them to the different contexts in which they are deployed. This paper analyses the possibility of a bigger shift happening in the way the United Nations, through the Security Council, operates their Peacekeeping Operations. The change here addressed includes, mainly, the constitution of more “robust” missions and the newly introduced Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo. By presenting three missions (UNEF I, UNAMIR and MONUSCO) deployed in different historic periods, we identified various elements in their mandates and in the way these were established which indicate a progressive transformation in the peacekeeping model since the Cold War - when conflicts were in their majority between States – until present days, when they occur mostly inside the States.

KEYWORDS

Peacekeeping in Africa; Intervention Brigade; RDC.

*Received on July 28, 2016.
Accepted on December 1, 2016 .*

Translated by Salvatore Gasparini Xerri

FROM “FAILED STATE” TO EXPORTER OF SECURITY? COLOMBIA AND THE DIPLOMACY OF SECURITY

Esteban Arratia Sandoval¹

Building a successful narrative

The Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) 2013 Posture Statement said: “Although once it was about to fall under the hands of a powerful insurgency, Colombia is now a leader in counter-insurgency tactics and provides training to its counterparts in Latin America “ (Isacson and Withers 2013,24). However, it should be asked: how was this drastic turn in the US perspective of the coffee exporting country achieved?

At the end of the 90s, the chronic weakness of the Colombian State had led the country into what many U.S. analysts feared to be the verge of collapse, even more so considering that it is not convenient to anyone having a nation in such situation only three hours away. That scenario “led to the talking in political, military and official circles in Washington about Colombia as a *failed State* in the making. In this specific case, it was also been created a *sui generis* epistemic community on the quasi failed condition of the State” (Tokatlian 2008,102).

Thus, former Presidents Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) and Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) courted through intense diplomatic efforts their American counterparts Bill Clinton (1993-2000) and George W. Bush (2001-2008) to overcome the narrow focus on the anti-narcotic struggle and to become more actively involved in the internal armed conflict. This strategy called *intervention by invitation* implied “accepting the United States anti-drug agenda, in exchange for the necessary socio-economic, technical and military support


¹ Analyst in Politics and International Affairs, with a focus in Security and Defense, at the University of Santiago. Master in International Studies at the University of Santiago. Research Associate at the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies of Chile. E-mail: jarratia@anepe.cl

from Washington. Foreign aid sought to expand, professionalize and modernize the armed forces, combat armed insurgents, increase territorial control, and later, during the consolidation phase of the Plan Colombia (2007-2013), extend the rule of law and pursue economic and social development” (Tickner 2014, 2).

Under this logic, it is possible to hold that the construction of that chaotic image accelerated the discussion and approval of the Plan Colombia. After 9/11 and the failure of the negotiations between the Pastrana government and the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia (FARC), “the ghost of an eventual failed State in the heart of the Andes strengthened the U.S. strategy so that, through the impetus of the Plan Colombia, the State regained capacity, legitimacy and sovereignty” (Tokatlian 2008, 94).


It cannot be denied that the security situation in Colombia experienced significant improvement under the second period of Uribe (2006-2010), and it has continued to do so during the administration of Juan Manuel Santos, being described as an extraordinary transformation. Indeed, during 2015 Colombia has lived the less violent seven months of the last 30 years (Wills 2015), to a large extent due to the demobilization process the paramilitaries entered, and to a series of successful military operations managed to weaken the FARC. Military offensives and counterinsurgency tactics seized its territories, reduced its capacity of coordination and of launching major offensives, and ultimately moved the conflict towards the borders and isolated rural areas (González Bustelo 2014). Similarly, some indicators of citizen security such as the rate of homicides and kidnappings have decreased in the last decade, as can be seen in **graphics 1 and 2**.

Graphic 1 - Rates of homicides per 100.000/pop Colombia (2004-2014)



Source: Developed by the author with the data of the Ministry of Defense of Colombia 2015.

Graphic 2 - Rate of kidnappings in Colombia (2004-2014)




Source: Developed by the author with the data of the Ministry of Defense of Colombia 2015.

The case is such that in September 2013, the former Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzón stated that “in almost 92% of the territory we can say that we are living in post-conflict conditions, and I immediately clarify what I mean by this: it is not so that there is no insecurity, that there is no violence, that there is no criminality.” “What happens is that the crime and the violence which happen are of a different type from those we had and very similar to which the greater part of the countries of medium income in the world with the countries of Latin America have” (Colprensa 2013).

On that line, the Colombian Defense Minister, Jorge Enrique Bodoya, assured during an interview with *El Espectador* that “at the present there are 1.030 municipalities (93% of the national territory) where there has not happened a single terrorist attack, along with noting that the FARC are already inactive in 82% of the country” (Gurney 2015). According to Bodoya, the Army of National Liberation (ANL), a subversive group of minor size, was operating in less than 4% of the national territory, while in 948 municipalities (which is equivalent to 86% of the total) it was allegedly eradicated the presence of neo paramilitary forces known as criminal bands or Bacrim (see **Graphic 3**).

Graphic 3 - Operation of non-state armed actors in Colombian territory (2014-2015)



Source: Developed by the author from a compilation from Gurney 2015.

Those statistics could suggest that the armed conflict of Colombia could be coming to its end while the peace talks between the national Government and the FARC advance because, despite the ups and downs they have presenting, until now it has been achieved agreements on agrarian reform, political participation, transitional justice and illegal drugs (Bosworth 2015). Good news arriving just when the Colombian armed forces have reached both capacity and size unprecedented (approximately more than 500,000 members), being currently listed as the second largest at the regional level (after Brazil), after more than one decade of strengthening through Plan Colombia.

According to Security Assistance Monitor data, much of the money committed has resulted in the strengthening of the Colombian armed forces because, of the almost \$10 billion that United States assigned to such initiative between fiscal years 2000 and 2015, nearly US\$ 7 billion were directed to train, assist, instruct and equip the army and police of the Andean country. In other words, approximately 70% of the funds of the referred program are destined to military purposes and 30% to social works (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015). Following that reasoning, it can serve as an example to mention that in 2002, the U.S. Congress authorized the use of the aid to combat terrorism, and in 2003, Álvaro Uribe launched the *Plan Patriota* (Patriotic Plan). From there, rather than responding to initiatives of the illegal armed groups, it began to grow the size and strength of the army and the police, enabling them to take the initiative with a more combative approach (González Bustelo 2014).

Noting the figures of the assistance, it is possible to determine that between 2000 and 2008, the United States economic and military aid to Colombia exceeded US \$6 billion, thus being the largest recipient of US aid in Latin America (Tickner 2014,3) and the third in the world (after Israel and Egypt) during the past 20 years. This support was vital in terms of training, and to achieve substantive increase in the capabilities of air mobility, intelligence, communications, coordination and organizational capacity. And while this initiative marked the beginning of an unconditional support to the strengthening of the Colombian armed forces, the former President Uribe also gave a strong boost to these operations. And this was how the defense spending has tripled from 4,000 to 12,000 million dollars, in part through a special tax on property of elites (González Bustelo 2014).

In the middle of the 2000s, United States had supported operations in numerous departments, and thousands of soldiers had been deployed. But these actions, that could remove the FARC of a determined area, could not avoid its return after the offensive was over. As affirmed by Mabel González-Bustelo (2014), the premise in which they based themselves was that his-

torically abandoned rural areas could recover only through the participation of the entire Government to regain and strengthen State presence. The doctrine was put up with a strategy in several phases based in military operations, socio-economic projects of fast impact (to win the minds and the hearts) and the establishment of civil institutions of Government. In other words: territorial control, stabilization and consolidation.

Subsequently, the Strategic Initiative for Development was launched in 2009 to support the effort and the consolidation model, trying to provide economic opportunities once the security and basic services had been established. It is an example of the US doctrine of stabilization that attracted important funds of Washington, provided within the framework of the Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance (with funds transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of State).

Therefore, Colombia was a pioneer in incorporating operations of stabilization and State construction in its military doctrine, reflecting the same trends in the American army. This confirms the thesis that Washington has sought models to reduce the burden on its armed forces in a frame of budgetary restrictions, while at the same time helping allied countries to face challenges of security that exceed widely the military answers. It is worth mentioning, that the United States to some extent has helped create its own reflection in the Colombian armed forces, appreciation that "agrees with the important privileges that the institution already has: coordination and control of the system of Defense by the own military; autonomy in the management and administration of their resources and income; high immunity and absence of control on the part of the legislative on military matters, among others aspects" (Gonzalez Bustelo 2014). By such reason; questions about the future of that relationship arise, and its implications in the role that the Colombian military forces would play in a post-conflict scenario.

From this perspective, it is possible to hold that Colombia has become a cornerstone for American security policies since after the Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2014) wars, adding the tail of the crisis sub-prime (2008) it has gained importance the approach of *moderate intervention* or *low impact*, consisting of special operations with limited direct presence, whose objective is "to teach others countries to fight against the threats for their own security, with armies that fight in the form of networks and in connection, against the transnational networks (terrorism, organized crime and others)" (Isacson and Withers 2013,12). In this order of ideas, this model of cooperation can be defined as *helping others help themselves* through human and institutional capacity building, and by means of constant security assistance and of long term. It is here where Colombia comes to play a key role, in both

symbolic and practical terms, essentially for the following reasons:

First, from the point of view of its current policy of security and defense, the U.S. Government has justified this strategy based on the widespread idea that the war on drugs it supported succeeded in the Andean country, exhibiting it to the international community as an emblematic case of *moderate intervention* or *low impact* given the prolonged duration of such support, the degree of maturity reached in the bilateral military cooperation and the volume of the budgetary releases, as well as the diversity of tasks of State construction undertaken. Robert D. Kaplan explains how Colombia has developed into a *laboratory* for the tactics that United States would employ to manage complex global problems in the following form: “you generate a product and then let it go” (2006,53). What happened in Colombia was exactly that, i.e., a model of cooperation in security designed not only to improve the internal safety of that country, but also applicable to changes in the security objectives of United States in the Western hemisphere and in other parts of the world. This new reading of the bilateral relationship reflects the philosophy that *as we help Colombia, Colombia will help us to help others*.

The maximum of working by, with and through the (a slogan frequently enunciated by U.S. officials), is the strategic axis of the model of *moderate intervention* or *low-impact* as it allows to obtain results at a lower material and political cost. On the other hand, the use of third actors generates a *plausible denial* or the denial of the knowledge or responsibility over unpopular or illegal activities. As so, “the cooperation through representatives is based on a spirit of body cultivated through a prolonged and repeated commitment with their foreigner counterparts; the existence of first name personal relations, the creation of bonding elements to ensure connectivity and support for the objectives of the host country in order to develop a common purpose” (Tickner 2014,4). Then, while the construction of capacity continues, the best of the local actors matures.

In second place, Colombia is assuming an important role when it comes to executing programs of American assistance in security, both in Latin America as in Western Africa due to the growing animosity of the US public opinion towards the expensive direct military participation in contexts that are not perceived as a direct threat to the national interests. Hence, United States also recognizes the political and strategic value of Colombia as a delegate that allows the Americans to remove themselves from the first rows and direct from the back with the eagerness of evading the political risks, allowing them to leave a less perceptible footprint in several countries, i.e., without the negative impression of a high military presence. And that without counting the financial costs associated with the direct participation, through a cheap

strategy that allows the missions to continue as, "it is a lot less expensive for the United States to pay the hosting, the feeding and the military equipment of an apprentice than to finance the travel of a squadron of instructors to a foreigner country. Indeed, the employment of Colombian dependencies and instructors can be up to four times cheaper than the use of American actives" (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015). Also, senior U.S. officials also see this strategy as a return on the investment made in the Plan Colombia. At a hearing of the Congress in 2013, William Brownfield, former Assistant of the Deputy Secretary of the International Office on Narcotics and Law Enforcement, said: "it is a dividend that we obtain by having invested more than US\$ 9,000 million in support to the Plan Colombia" (Alarcon 2013).

As Jim Thomas and Christopher Dougherty claim: "Colombia is an exporter of security nest, and therefore constitutes a key node of an emerging network global of forces of operations special" (2013,84). This opinion is shared by the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) David Petraeus, who conceives the Andean nation as one of the firmest allies of Washington in the world and with better willingness to help regions such as Latin America, the Middle East and West Africa. Accordingly, this Alliance seems to reflect "a new was of cooperation in matter of defense based on a conception common of the spectrum of challenges and interests relating to its security." In it, the institutional relations at the hemispheric level guarantee respect for sovereignty and international norms. "These rules and practices are evolving by the need of acting collectively to share the load" (Tickner 2014,5).

An exportable model of security?

From the mid of 2000, Colombia has received a growing number of requests of cooperation in security on the part of governments with different ideological trends in all Latin America, which have been treated in an ad-hoc and little systematic manner. However, during the last years of Uribe's administration, there has been a political will to intensively use the main exportable active of the country: the experience and accumulated knowledge by Colombian armed forces, openly considered as one of the most experienced of the world regarding counterinsurgency and the fight against drug trafficking. However, "few governments wanted to be seen working with the former Colombian leader, given his hard-line anti-terrorism speech" (Tickner 2014,6), following the logic of *tell me who your friends are and I'll tell you who you are*. For this reason, the arrival of Juan Manuel Santos to the Presidency in 2010 provided an opportunity to advance in this effort because the first represent-

ative resorted to the aforementioned improvements in security as a mean to change the predominant narrative on Colombia as a failed State, with a weak history of human rights and some poor democratic institutions. Consequently, a successful history began to be constructed which the Santos government has strategically used as an instrument of foreign policy with the purpose of helping to strengthen the reintegration of Colombia, both at regional and international levels, as an offeror country in themes of security and defense.

As a result of this new priority in the presidential agenda, the Colombian government has designed the International Cooperation Strategy on Integral Security, whose institutional structure is headed by the Ministry of Foreign Relations as civil spokesman responsible for interacting with the soliciting Governments and coordinate the specific efforts of cooperation with the Ministry of Defense and the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (henceforward, APCI), while the National Police of Colombia and the Military Forces are the institutions responsible for executing such strategy in their respective fields of action. Also, the strategy has been formulated in an international legal framework that comprises the following elements:

Table 1- Legal framework Colombia Cooperation

The principles of the United Nations Charter
The UN and OAS resolutions on the fight against transnational crime
The United Nations Convention against the organized transnational crime (Convention of Palermo)
Bilateral and multilateral agreements for cooperation in combating transnational crime

Source: Developed by the author with the data from the Government of Colombia 2013.

According to a brochure of the Colombian Chancellery, the initiative is being developed in the bilateral and multilateral fields, looking to share experiences and capabilities with the objective of maximizing the effectiveness in the fight against the organized transnational crime, and in so generating new international standards. In this regard, it should be noted that, according to the same document, the Government projects its relations with countries and organizations from a dynamic point of view, which allows adaptation in a flexible manner to the security challenges of the future, since the definition of schemes of technical assistance and cooperation among States is an effective tool to prevent and tackle crime affecting societies. For this reason, the Strategy emerges as a response to the needs of security cooperation with Latin America, providing to the homologous institutions from the soliciting countries the mechanisms and methods of cooperation, training, technical

and legal assistance. The question to be answered now is “how is it made?”, offering a portfolio of *on-demand services* in the following areas of cooperation:

Table 2 - Areas of cooperation and security services in Colombia

Area of cooperation	Services
Organizational development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design and implementation of management systems. • Doctrine. • Model of institutional culture. • Incentives within the institution.
Fight against drug trafficking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land, sea and air interdiction. • Control of substances and chemical precursors. • Control of drug production. • Prevention of drug consumption. • Control of ports and airports.
Combating organized transnational crime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asset laundering. • Human trafficking smuggling of migrants. • Kidnapping and extortion. • Traffic of weapons. • Cybercrime. • Ecological traffic. • Traffic of nuclear and biological material.
Citizen Safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Urban and rural security. • Road Safety. • Criminal groups. • Criminal Investigation. • Police Intelligence.
The fight against corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of reliability. • Incorporation and selection of staff. • Monitoring and evaluation.
Human rights and international humanitarian law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training and advisory services on human rights. • Instruction in international humanitarian law. • Advice on operational law and rules of engagement.
Strengthening operational capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aviation Training. • Coast guard training. • Creation of combat capabilities. • Special Forces. • Military intelligence.

Source: Developed by the author from the Government of Colombia 2013.

What is the methodology? Each project of cooperation starts once the Colombian government receives a request of cooperation from a requesting

country, through the development of four stages which are observed in the **table 3**. However, it is disturbing that the specific information about the initiatives of individual cooperation are not publicly available.

Table 3 - Stages of the process of cooperation in security Colombia

Phase 1 Reference shared	It is performed a joint diagnostic on the needs and priority areas of work of the client
Phase 2 Planning	<p>Accomplished the phase of reference, there comes the planning of the activities of training, of the number of students, the headquarters where the different processes of training, update and capacitation will be developed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposal of Plan of Work • Validation and ratification of the Plan of Work • Financing
Phase 3 Implementation	<p>This phase materializes according to the progress of the Plan of Work previously agreed by the parties. It is about strengthening the human and institutional capital through basic courses, technical assistance, internships and specializations...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Specializations • Technical assistance • Internships • Training of instructors
Phase 4 Monitoring and evaluation	<p>This is done in parallel to the implementation of the program in order to verify the results obtained in the different training courses.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Matrix of monitoring • Evaluation and adjustments • Indicators of management • Impact

Source: Developed by the author through a compilation from the Government of Colombia 2013.

Parallel to the intensification of the efforts to export its experience to nations of Latin America and the Caribbean through the *South-South co-operation*, the Government of Colombia aimed at convincing Washington of deepening its commitment with third countries to ensure that the considerable decrease in the funds of assistance registered since 2008 did not translate into a devaluation of the bilateral relations. For this reason, Colombia began in February 2012 a *High Level Strategic Security Dialogue* (HLSSD) with the

United States, a forum in which the increase of the training by the Colombian security forces of their Latin American counterparts was a central theme, such as an anonymous Defense Department official said: "we are building a detailed action plan where we and the Colombians will coordinate who does what... so that we can leverage... the resources and capabilities that we have to carry out in an effective manner the work of development of capabilities and training in America Latina" (Isacson and Withers 2013,25).

Several months later, in the VI Summit of the Americas held in Cartagena, the Presidents Juan Manuel Santos and Barack Obama announced the creation of the *US-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation* (USCAP) to support the construction of capacity in Central America, the Caribbean and finally, in South America starting from April 2013. This initiative responds to a regional desire to stop the uncertainty caused by the region's criminal organizations, and demands that the United States facilitate the deployment of Colombian trainers to participating countries, as well as the transport of students from the same countries so that they attend military schools and police academies located in Colombia, with the aim of contributing to the ongoing efforts of protecting citizens and counteracting the transnational organized crime in Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. Thus, "the Department of State with the support of the Department of Defense, directs USCAP in United States, while the Ministry of Defense of Colombia is the manager of doing so in that country" (Roman 2015,68).

For its part, the International Affairs Office on Narcotics and Law Enforcement started to plan the realization of trainings on the application of law in the participating countries in conjunction with the National Police of Colombia, while SOUTHCOM worked at the same time with Colombian military forces on the development of military training activities. The allies identified and proposed key areas for capacity development and created the first list of events for the four original associate countries comprising USCAP: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. Costa Rica and Dominican Republic were incorporated in USCAP in 2014.

In a simultaneous manner, the Department of State made political maneuvers to inform to the participating countries, to the United States missions and to the officials of cooperation in security of the SOUTHCOM about USCAP and the areas proposed for the development of capabilities. In the military field, the Southern Command established a kernel to USCAP and coordinated in greater depth the operative aspects and the initial settings of the training agreements with the officials of cooperation in security in the participating countries. Thus, USCAP includes three types of agreements:

In the first place, the Mobile Training Teams (MTT) are responsible for the deployment of the Colombian instructors towards the associated countries to perform complex training, tactical and operational activities of 20 to 25 members of the selected military units personal, usually in the place. In second place, the Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) are small encounters between 10 to 15 participating experts that discuss an specific topic of interest, usually in rooms of Conference with some visits. In third place, the personal of the participating countries is sent to Colombia to attend schools and academies in the country (Roman 2015,69).

The agreements of cooperation in matters of military security of USCAP includes from tactical, technical and infantry procedures to training on Command and Control of the Joint Operations Center, and from border security to aircraft detection and monitoring. USCAP also deals with all the military domains, reinforcing the doctrine of the participating countries, always prioritizing the rights human and considering the military support for the civilian agencies, when appropriate. Indeed, the popularity of USCAP increased as did the number of events from the original 19 events in 2013 to 55 in 2014 and 85 in 2015 (Roman 2015,70).

The kernel of USCAP in SOUTHCOM performs the planning and operational synchronization of all the events of military capacity development of USCAP in close coordination with members of the joint personal of the Command, the Deputy Minister of Defense of Colombia, the Military Forces of Colombia, the components of the US foreign service, the Secretariat of the National Guard of United States, the officials of cooperation in security and the participating countries. The allies meet during two planning and synchronization workshops in order to manage and coordinate the continuous training and at the same time comply with the growth requirements.

The planning of USCAP requires that all the allies work together to ensure that the program carries out the proposed events as they were planned, as well as their activities of development of capabilities in the areas agreed. The workshops are very specific and require a considerable preparation to ensure that the participants obtain the maximum benefit. The planning for the workshops begins with the development of templates that include the key areas of development. The officers of cooperation in security work together with the military forces of the applicant countries to identify the type of military training necessary to meet the requirements of the key development areas. Once the countries agree on the types of training considered more urgent, the list is sent to the military forces of Colombia to be reviewed and for determining what type of training will comply with the established requirement.

On the other hand, with the beginning of the peace dialogues be-

tween the Colombian Government and the guerrilla in November 2012, the *diplomacy of security*, as the once Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Finch called it, acquired an additional urgency because if the armed conflict that has lasted more than half a century was supposed to end, the current size and capabilities of the Colombian armed forces, its vast experience in different types of missions including the State construction, and the new demand for their knowledge will add a new dimension to the challenges of the post-conflict situation. Hence, in any stage of the transition towards peace, the following elements would inevitably be addressed: the responsibility by alleged violations to human rights, the adjustment of doctrines, the operational state of the military force and the budget to the new reality (probably, under a process of reform in the security sector, as happened in El Salvador and Guatemala). Notwithstanding, the close link with the Pentagon and the new international activism can provide the perfect argument to justify that military budgets remain high, in order to respond to internal and external threats. In effect, during the 2013 accountability of the Ministry of Defense to the Congress it was exposed the game plan of the Government of Santos to put this excess capacity in use abroad (Bargent 2015).

Following that reasoning, it is essential to note that in June 2013 Colombia signed a Convention with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a *global partner* for access to their bank of good practices, being the first of its type with a country of the subcontinent, this will increase right away their participation in peace operations (El País 2013). Also, it is worth highlighting that in the framework of the Union of South American Nations it has acquired a leading role in the creation of the Council for strengthening the cooperation in citizen security, justice, and against the transnational organized crime; besides its active participation in the South American Defense Council regarding the World Drug Problem.

Ultimately, senior governmental officials of both nations have claimed that joint security activities abroad are of vital importance to achieve their respective goals: for Colombia it involves consolidating its projection as a regional and global leadership and the planning for the post-conflict situation; while for United States it represents the continuity of an effort to interrupt the flow of illegal drug through its borders and combat the criminal violence and State weakness in the Western hemisphere.


“All inclusive” service

According to a 2014 report of the Department of Defense, that U.S.

agency has intensely backed the programs of security training offered by Colombia. Although “it supervises, manages and observes the training activities, there appears to be little control of them as there is no sufficient capacity to monitor them all” (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015). For that reason, it is vital to establish a system of monitoring and evaluation to determine the quality, the utility, the effectiveness or the consequences of these programs. Furthermore, a Government source stated that the selection process of students is designed, but not for teachers. Neither there is a review of the contents of the courses, which allows that Colombians *tropicalize* the American curricula. In other words, they are allowed, without supervision, to put their personal stamp to the contents. Many of these courses are taught in Colombia, “but instructors also travel to recipient countries, either for short training or for extended periods to teach in war schools or in police academies” (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015). American Government officials have confirmed that although Colombia pays the wages of instructors, United States pays travel expenses, accommodation and meals for teachers and students.

In fact, during 2013, United States supported 39 assistance activities in which a total of 619 students were trained (see **Figure 1**). In 2014, that number was increased by 152, as a result 6,526 police and soldiers of 10 countries of the Western hemisphere received training, more than five times the number of staff trained in 2013 (see **Figure 2**).

Figure 1 - Plans of Triangular Cooperation: Colombia-United States (2013)



Source : Extracted from the Government of Colombia 2014.

Figure 2 - Plans of Triangular Cooperation: Colombia - United States (2014)



Also, it is estimated that for 2015 the number of activities will have exceeded 205. Henceforth, since 2013, the number of soldiers that received training from the Colombian military with American backing has increased 720%. Documents of the Department of Defense estimate that approximately 1470 will have received training in 2015. Similarly, the number of police officers who received training courses coordinated by the Department of State increased nearly 600%, with figures ranging from 848 students in 2013 to 5,830 in 2015 (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015).

Supporting that version, a PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Ministry of Defense points out that a total of 9.720 training activities were carried out for members of Latin American armed forces between 2010 and 2013, focusing mostly on Central America, with 5.061 training activities (see Figure 3).

Similarly, it is appropriate to point out that the Office of International Affairs of the National Police of Colombia reported that "between 2009 and 2013, it provided training to 21.949 people from 12 countries of the sub-continent in skills such as land, air, maritime and river interdiction, police testimony, explosives, intelligence operations, psychological operations, and JUNGLE Command, the elite program of anti-narcotics police designed with the backing of the United States" (Tickner 2014,3).

Figure 3 - Cooperation Activities with members of North, Central and South America armed forces (2010-2013)



Source: Extracted from the Government of Colombia 2014.

Despite the variety of nationalities trained, it is possible to conclude that Colombia has focused on a group of countries where the distinct problems related with drugs have emigrated, among the Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. It can serve as an example that within the framework of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) the National Police of Colombia participates in a Project of Regional Police Reform in Central America, funded mainly through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) of the Department of State.

In so being, the courses include topics related with financial crimes and confiscation of actives in Nicaragua, police intelligence in El Salvador, judicial and fiscal protection in Guatemala, basic riparian operations in Panama, tactical answers in Honduras, land interdiction, fixed and rotatory wing pilots in Costa Rica, handling of informants, citizen security, and operations of civil affairs in Dominican Republic. Also, it is worth mentioning that “the National Police of Colombia provides training and assistance in themes such as communitarian patrol, training of instructors of the Police Academy, and development of training curriculum for Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Panama” (Tickner 2014,4), according to the press release of

April 2013.

Similarly, it should be highlighted that in 2014 about 160 Paraguayan soldiers belonging mostly to the special forces, received training from the Colombian army in counterinsurgency operations given the upsurge of attacks by the Paraguayan People's Army (EPP in Spanish), the small but troublesome Marxist guerrilla of the guarani country. Indeed, both Governments have sustained that EPP receives training from the FARC, and that a faction of the Paraguayan guerrilla known as Armed Peasant Association (ACA in Spanish) is acquiring the same organizational dynamics of the Colombian insurgents, reason by which a parallel exchange of knowledge between the security forces of the guarani country and Colombia is considered as a natural response (Obando 2015).

In that same direction, the U.S Government has stimulated Peru to work more closely with Colombia, as said the once Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta during a visit to Lima in October 2012: "the United States is ready to work with Peru in joint planning, exchange of information and trilateral cooperation with Colombia to address our shared concerns on security" (Isacson and Withers 2013,26) making direct allusion to the control exerted by remnants of *Sendero Luminoso* on drug trafficking in the region of the Valley of Apurimac, Jan and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM in Spanish).

Furthermore, Mexico requested advice from Colombian officials that pursued Pablo Escobar with the objective of recapturing Joaquin *El Chapo* Guzman, highest leader of the Cartel of Sinaloa, who escaped from a high security prison in July 2015. Hence, three retired Generals, recognized by having finished with the leaders of the cartels of Medellin, Cali and Norte del Valle in the 1980s and 1990s (this includes Pablo Escobar, chief of the Cartel of Medellin and the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, heads of the Cartel of Cali), traveled to that country to share their experiences with the Aztec authorities that were after the trace of *El Chapo* (LaFuente 2015).

The risks associated to a non-traditional export

Although Colombia has a vast experience in the type of operations that police and armed forces must perform today in Latin America (such as investigations on organized crime, drugs interdiction, efforts to arrest the drug barons, among others), the expansion of its training raises certain concerns, especially when the American Government is paying the invoice.

First, the Colombian authorities have said that all of its international training programs use the same protocols regarding human rights as the

ones used within its armed forces. However, “few different mechanisms of investigation on human rights have seem to be implemented to ensure that the worst practices, as corruption and impunity, are not transferred by Colombian instructors along with the best ones” (Tickner 2014,8). Henceforth, before promoting Colombia as an example in security subjects, the United States should require a detailed report on what teachings are being exported to members of security forces in other latitudes.

To that respect, Jose Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch for the Americas said: “it is clear that United States has not been able to carry out a serious analysis or a scrutiny of the actions committed by the Colombian security forces with the training, intelligence and equipment offered by the Government of United States during all these years” (Lohmüller 2015a). This is worrying considering that the Colombian armed forces have been denounced by breaking human rights, including 3,700 alleged extrajudicial executions, also known as *false positive* (a practice that consists in reporting civilian deaths as fighting enemies), the greater part of which occurred between 2002 and 2008.

According to Human Rights Watch, more than 800 members of the Army (active or retired) have been convicted as part of the scandal of the *false positives* (Lohmüller 2015a). However, so far no officer has been convicted with the rank of Brigade Commander or senior positions. Indeed, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has expressed interest in analyzing the widespread and systematic pattern of the extrajudicial executions in Colombia, in so far as “there are enough reasons to believe that [these acts] were committed due to a policy adopted at least at the level of certain brigades of the armed forces, which constitutes a State policy or of an organization for committing crimes against humanity” (Lohmüller 2015a).

For this reason, it is important to determine the unwanted results that may arise when emphasizing certain indicators to measure the positive impact of the efforts against organized crime because “variables that use the security forces to measure success, and the reward system to encourage desired outcomes, may pervert the fight against enemy groups and lead to widespread abuses. In fact, by placing an emphasis on the number of enemy fighters killed as a measure of success in operations (something that has been called *the counting of bodies syndrome*), and to reward those who have greater results in this regard, the Colombian army created a mentality that led to the systematic practice of *false positive*” (Lohmüller 2015a)."

This caused that the count of fatalities became a misleading and dangerous representation of the progress on combating non-State armed actors. Also, it is crucial to perform a strict supervision of the forces responsible for

executing the government policies and to punish the responsables for abuses, because as the Colombian experience shows, not engaging in it can give space to widespread violations of the rights of those that the government supposedly aims to protect.

Linked to the former, it is possible to hold that the export of the Colombian model did not seem to measure the results that came along with providing security. I.e., the goals of the process, as the number of hectares fumigated, must not be confused with the real results, as the damage that illegal drugs cause in the society. Precisely that took place in Colombia, “those US officials continuously mistook the *achievements of the process* with real results. However, soon they realized that there is a significant gap between reaching the objectives of eradication and truly influencing the trafficking of drugs, or between increasing the count of bodies and establishing the presence of a functional State in territories without law” (Isacson and Haugaard 2011,18). For example, despite the fact that it is one of the indicators used to measure success, the rate of impunity (the proportion between crimes, verdicts and sentences) often says more about the initiatives against crime than the number of arrests, courts built, or trained prosecutors.

Regarding the anti-narcotics policies, the data about the price and the purity of the drugs for sale in the streets indicates if the supply is being affected, although it is complex to determine if an apparent trend is a mere noise in the short term or a powerful sign in the long term. Another type of indicators, perhaps even more important, are the changes in the damage caused by the drugs, such as the size of the population consuming or the trend of the crimes related with the drugs and the sanitary emergencies (Isacson and Haugaard 2011).

On the other hand, exporting the Colombian security model as a co-operation strategy does not seem to contribute for strengthening the capacities of the civil government, reducing impunity, or creating opportunities for the excluded sectors. I.e., strengthening the government cannot only mean the deployment of the military through the national territory because, if the representatives of the government, in this case the military forces, commit abuses against the human rights or acts of corruption with impunity, their presence could be more harmful than beneficial, especially for the internal cohesion of the State.

Strengthening the civil government means ensuring that no vulnerable sector of the population lives without government. The *areas without law*²

² This concept refers to certain portions of a territory within which clear distinctions between internal and external security issues, as well as between criminal and military aspects, disappear, serving as a refuge and sanctuary for terrorist and criminal organizations (often linked to

do not exist in a vacuum: they are occupied by criminal groups that threaten the population. If something has been made clear by the Colombian experience is that *State* should assume much more than the presence of armed forces or police in the streets, because if it is true that security is the most basic of public goods that a State must provide to its citizens, the military occupation *per se* cannot generate the necessary conditions for economic prosperity or the exercise of basic freedoms. Consequently, the military occupation of these spaces is useless when the rest of the government (education, health, public works and justice) do not arrive quickly.

In fourth place, it is somewhat ironic that Juan Manuel Santos, the first President in the world to make a public request for a sincere and informed debate on the advantages and shortcomings of existing strategies on the drug issue, is also exporting, together with the United States, some of the basal elements of the militarized focus which according to him deserve closer examination. Therefore, it is to be seen if the current programs of anti-narcotics training can adapt to the citizen security needs of the receptor countries of the cooperation between Colombia and the US, without necessarily reproducing the discredited and, often, counterproductive logic of the *War against the Drugs*.

In that sense, and based on rising rates of violence and drug trafficking in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador (sub-region known as the Northern Triangle), James Stavridis (2015) has argued that the United States must work with these nations to apply some of the many valuable lessons learned in Colombia. This includes a combination of factors as external help, local determination and diverse key tools to face the security problems. Consisting, according to him, of a strategy of intelligent power (*Smart Power*): a combination between diplomacy, economic and financial security, and help to the development. I.e., something that the United States supposedly effectively accomplished in Colombia and can now do in Central America.

Notwithstanding, invoking the imaginary of Colombia when speaking of helping other Latin American countries is a dangerous simplification of the challenges the region faces in matter of security. Indeed, the analogy made by Stavridis (2015) is based in superficial similarities, completely omitting key differences between the situation of Colombia in the end of the 1990s and the countries of the North Triangle of Central America today, which open serious questions on the convenience of using the Andean nation as a model to follow.

one another) that evolve in the place with total impunity, being supported in part by the local population. See: Bartolomé 2015, 204.

For example, the sources and territorial nature of the violence and insecurity in the North Triangle are different from the Colombian situation. The most obvious contrast is related to the absence of an active insurgency or a network of paramilitary groups, given that the main threat of security in that sub region is urban crime (such as kidnapping and extortion) by gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha and District 18. And in contrast to the Andean country, the drug trafficking organizations that operate in Central America are conveyors, as in the geopolitics of the drug this area is used mainly for the transit of drugs and laundering of actives (Lohmüller 2015b).

And although certain military capabilities (as the obtaining of intelligence) are necessary for dismantling the transnational criminal organizations that operate in the region, the military consultants offered by Colombia are of little use to Central America, because the challenge posed by the gangs requires performing a stronger police work and reinforcing the capacity of the police for investigating crime; likewise, a criminal and judicial system that actually works is also needed. Therefore, it is possible to hold that the configuration of a Colombian model for its extrapolation to so different contexts as the described previously, expresses a disproportionate symbolic construction and a strategic myopia on the part of United States.

Conclusions

Throughout this work it has been analyzed how the Colombian government has seen in its *International Cooperation Strategy on Integral Security* a useful tool that has allowed:

- Changing the predominant narratives of failed State to those of security exporter country with the aim of successfully reinserting the country in the international concert;
- Strengthening its relationship with United States raising it to a strategic plan as a reliable partner at the regional level (guarantying the continuity of their assistance); and
- Facing the process of restructuring the Armed Forces with an approach to post-conflict situation.

In this sense, the size and current capabilities of the Colombian Armed Forces added a new dimension to the challenges of post-conflict because, in any stage of transition to peace a considerable reduction of staff is

present, raising the following questions: what to do with the surplus? And how to channel the skills of the military toward other activities? This is essential in order to avoid an eventual criminalization of their members insofar as there is concern about the vacuum that the organized crime may fill in the Colombian illegality once the FARC leave the weapons behind, leading to a new cycle of crime and violence in the Andean country.

Similarly, it has been able to note that this security cooperation scheme has proved to be beneficial for the United States given that outsourcing the police-military assistance through Colombia, has allowed the US to direct from behind in accordance with the model of *moderate or low impact intervention* that Washington is currently pursuing, avoiding all the financial and political costs that it entails. However, it is disturbing to observe that despite the impunity of the corruption scandals and violations of human rights, particularly the extrajudicial executions (or *false positives*) led out by the Colombian security forces, Washington continues to show Colombia at a world level as a successful example in the *War against Drugs*, not giving great importance to the counterproductive effects that this model of security generates.

Finally, while it is undeniable that Colombia has acquired significant experience in counterinsurgency and anti-narcotics operations after half a century of armed conflict, Latin America is not Colombia; that is, the *policy-makers* should be cautious when using the Colombian experience as a roadmap to advance actions in the region, avoiding indiscriminately applying their lessons as universal recipes, thus ignoring the particular territorial nature of violence and multiple sources of insecurity in other nations that are not in a situation of conflict, such as Mexico and the Northern Triangle of Central America.

Indeed, the clearest contrast between both situations relates to the absence of an active insurgency or a network of paramilitary groups, as the main threat of security in these nations is the crime at the urban level (such as kidnapping and extortion), led by cartels such as Los Zetas and Los Caballeros Templarios in Mexico or by gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha and District 18 in Central America. It is worth mentioning, in the case of Colombia we are talking of a non-state armed actor with political and ideological motivations, while in Mexico and the North triangle there are illegal actors with purely economic motivations. And in contrast to Colombia, the drug trafficking organizations that operate in Mexico are managers and the ones operating in Central America are conveyors, in the geopolitics of the drug this area is used mainly for the transit of drugs and laundering of actives.

REFERENCES

- Alarcón, D. 2013. Colombia tiene más experiencia que cualquiera en la lucha contra las drogas. *El Espectador*. Accessed on 9 July, 2016. <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/elmundo/colombia-tiene-mas-experiencia-cualquiera-lucha-contra-articulo-432690>
- Bartolomé, M. 2015. La inteligencia estratégica y sus requisitos para la seguridad en América del Sur. En *Gestión de Inteligencia en las Américas*, editado por Russell Swenson y Carolina Sacho Hirane, 201-220. Washington, DC: National Intelligence University Press.
- Bargent, J. 2015. Las implicaciones del proceso de paz para el futuro de las fuerzas armadas de Colombia. *Insight Crime Crimen Organizado en las Américas*. Accessed on 17 October, 2015. <http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-del-dia/implicaciones-proceso-paz-futuro-fuerzas-armadas-de-colombia>
- Bosworth, J. 2015. Sobre el apretón de manos entre el jefe de las FARC y el presidente de Colombia. *Insight Crime Crimen Organizado en las Américas*. Accessed on 17 October, 2015. <http://es.insightcrime.org/analisis/apreton-jefe-farc-presidente-colombia>
- Colprensa. 2013. "Buena parte del país está en posconflicto": Ministro de Defensa, Juan Carlos Pinzón. *El país*. Accessed on 18 October, 2015. <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/hoy-buena-parte-pais-esta-posconflicto-ministro-defensa>
- El País. 2013. Colombia firmó acuerdo de cooperación en seguridad con la Otan. *El País*. Accessed on 17 October, 2015. <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/noticias/colombia-firmo-acuerdo-cooperacion-seguridad-con-otan>
- González Bustelo, M. 2014. The US and Colombia: building an exportable model of security. *Open Security Conflict and peacebuilding*. Accessed on 12 October, 2015. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/mabel-gonzalez-bustelo/us-and-colombia-building-exportable-model-of-security>
- Gurney, K. 2015. ¿Es cierto que el 82% de Colombia está libre de FARC como afirma el Ministerio de Defensa? *Insight Crime Crimen Organizado en las Américas*. Accessed on 16 October, 2015. <http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-del-dia/esta-colombia-libre-farc-como-afirma-ministerio>
- Isacson, A y Withers G. 2013. *Hora de Escuchar: Tendencias en asistencia de seguridad de los EE.UU. hacia América Latina y el Caribe*. Washington DC: Oficina en Washington para Asuntos Latinoamericanos (WOLA).

- Isacson, A y Haugaard L. 2011. *Un relato aleccionador: Las lecciones del Plan Colombia para la política exterior estadounidense hacia México y otros países*. Washington DC: Oficina en Washington para Asuntos Latinoamericanos (WOLA).
- Kaplan, R. 2006. *Imperial grunts*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Kinosian, S y Haugaard, L. 2015. Estados Unidos no debería exportar el ‘éxito’ de la guerra de Colombia contra las drogas. *Insight Crime Crimen Organizado en las Américas*. Accessed on 18 October, 2015. <http://es.insightcrime.org/analisis/estados-unidos-no-deberia-exportar-exito-guerra-colombia-contra-drogas>
- LaFuente, J. 2015. From the trail of Pablo Escobar to the hunt for ‘El Chapo’. *El País Internacional*. Accessed on 13 May, 2016. http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/07/30/inenglish/1438249322_904623.html
- Looft, C. 2012. Before Americas Summit, US Points to Colombia as Security Success. *Insight Crime Organized Crime in the Américas*. Accessed on 19 March, 2016. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/before-americas-summit-us-points-to-colombia-as-security-success>
- Lohmuller, M. 2015a. Ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Colombia: lecciones para Latinoamérica. *Insight Crime Crimen Organizado en las Américas*. Accessed on 13 March, 2016. <http://es.insightcrime.org/analisis/ejecuciones-extrajudiciales-colombia-lecciones-latinoamerica>
- 2015b. Plan Colombia no es la panacea para los males de Latinoamérica. *Insight Crime Crimen Organizado en las Américas*. Accessed on 15 April, 2016 <http://es.insightcrime.org/analisis/plan-colombia-panacea-males-latinoamerica>
- Ministerio De Relaciones Exteriores. 2013. *Estrategia de Cooperación Internacional en Seguridad Integral*. Bogotá: Gobierno de Colombia.
- Ministerio De Defensa Nacional. 2014. *Diplomacia para la seguridad: La estrategia de Colombia en la lucha contra la DOT*. Bogotá: Gobierno de Colombia.
2015. *Logros de la Política Integral de Seguridad y Defensa para la Prosperidad*. Bogotá: Gobierno de Colombia.
- Obando, V. 2015. Colombia entrena paraguayos para combatir al EPP. *El Espectador*. Accessed on 10 June, 2016 <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/colombia-entrena-paraguayos-combatir-al-epp-articulo-577954>
- Román, S. 2015. Una alianza exitosa: El plan de acción de los EE.UU. y Colombia en materia de seguridad regional. *Diálogo*: 68-72.

- Stavridis, J. 2015. We know how to end drug violence in Central America. *Foreign Policy*. Accessed on 11 June, 2016 <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/18/we-know-how-to-end-drug-violence-in-central-america-colombia-drug-war/>
- Thomas, J y Dougherty, C. 2013. *Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).
- Tickner, A. 2014. *Colombia, the United States, and Security Cooperation by Proxy*. Washington DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).
- Tokatlian, J. 2008. La construcción de un Estado Fallido en la política mundial: El caso de las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Colombia. *Análisis Político*, 64 (5): 67-104.
- Wills, S. 2015. Colombia atraviesa los meses menos violentos en más de 30 años. *Diálogo Revista Militar Digital*. Accessed on 24 January, 2016. <http://dialogo-americas.com/es/articles/rmisa/features/2015/10/22/feature-06>

ABSTRACT

This purpose of this article is to analyze the emergence of the initiative of the *diplomacy of security* (2012) driven by the Chancellery and the Ministry of Defense of Colombia as a model of cooperation in the field of security and defense. Secondly, it explains the role of United States in the aforementioned initiative. Finally, it examines the main implications of that scheme of assistance in the strategies of security implemented by the countries of the subcontinent.

KEYWORDS

Colombia; Cooperation; Post-conflict.

Received On August 25, 2016.

Accepted On December 12, 2016.

Translated by Luísa Acauan Lorentz

NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY AND THE PROTECTION OF THE CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN BRAZIL

Iure Paiva¹

Introduction

The most diverse countries and regions of the planet have long faced the challenge of preventing and overcoming real or imminent situations that may in some way disrupt the security of their energy infrastructure, requiring ostensive and effective military intervention in the surveillance, control and defense of such environments. The cases are the most varied, including prevention and response to criminal actions against oil and gas wells and platforms, attacks on hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, refineries, wind and solar farms, transport ships, ports, tanks, oil and gas pipelines, among others, whether located in the continental or oceanic region. Problems widen and require different types of responses as cyber attacks on electronic information and monitoring systems, as well as the occurrence of natural events of catastrophic dimensions, are observed.

The onslaught of any internal or external agent against the critical or strategically valuable energy infrastructure of a State can cause the interruption or collapse of the supply of one of the most essential inputs to the maintenance of a country's survival and development conditions and of its society in general. And, among the many actions necessary to protect the energy production, commercialization and consumption chain, it is imperative to adequately organize the defense of such a complex through the actions of the armed forces (Navy, Army and Aeronautics), given the specific nature of certain threats. Since the critical energy infrastructure represents a capital

1 Adjunct Professor of the Department of International Relations at Universidade Federal da Paraíba (DRI-UFPB) and of the Postgraduate Program in Political Science and International Relations (PPGCPRI/UFPB), with a PhD in Political Science (UNICAMP) and an LL.M. E-mail: iurepaiva@hotmail.com

element for a country, it is expected that the issue occupies a prominent place in the construction of its defense strategy.

Considering the context described above, this text presents an analysis on how the protection of Brazilian critical energy infrastructure is addressed within the scope of the national defense policy, seeking to better understand how the security of energy supply in Brazil is outlined. The analysis developed in this text is concerned with answering three basic questions: 1- Which are and where are located the main Brazilian critical energy infrastructures referring to the chain of oil, by-products and natural gas? 2- To which extent is the protection of these infrastructures provided for in the national defense policy, in particular, in the main documents dealing with the matter? 3- How is the planning of employment of Brazilian military power in the prevention and response to threats or attacks against the infrastructure related to the aforementioned sources?

In examining the national literature, it seems that there is not an adequate attention to this issue in the studies dedicated to energy security in Brazil, at least regarding a more specific and detailed approach to what is determined by the national defense policy on the protection of Brazilian critical energy infrastructure, except for a few rare exceptions (Demeterco 2014; Vicente 2014). In general, the issue is dealt with marginally in the context of issues related to security and national defense challenges (Silva and Costa 2009; Hage 2008), and to the consequences of possible conflicts in the face of instabilities in the regional contours (Nasser and Moraes 2014; Acioly and Moraes 2011), to the increase in transnational illicit activities (Reis 2011), to the disputes over the demarcation of maritime zones and sovereignty over natural resources (Silva 2013; Martins 2010), to the necessity of protection of oil and gas reserves in the pre-salt layer (Oliveira, Cepik, Brites 2013; Metri 2009), as well as to the possibility of confrontations resulting from the interference of extra-regional powers in the Atlantic and South America (Vidigal 2014; Thuswohl 2008).

The analysis of critical infrastructure protection developed in this article is embedded in issues related to the military dimension of energy security, which generally comprehends a discussion of the need to defend, through military action, both reserves and national structural energy complexes against threats that may affect its perfect functioning and maintenance of the livelihood and progress of society and the country as a whole. The approach from a militaristic or defense-related perspective will be based on scenarios and analysis that involve the use of force or of the other military devices related to energy disputes, criminal acts, military conflicts, operational incidents, or natural events, which may result in the partial or total interruption of en-

ergy supply.

The reflective and discursive universe of studies in the case of the military dimension of energy security tends to be centered on issues such as the identification of domestic or transnational threats of physical or virtual attacks resulting from the action of state or non-state actors against energy reserves or infrastructure. Similarly, it involves analyzing the offensive and defensive capabilities of a particular country, a regional security complex or the international community, against events that may cause instability to the energy supply or the lucrative flow of such resources to the consumer market. The major purpose of this reflection is related in general to the maintenance of the necessary conditions for the continuous and adequate energy supply at the national, regional and international level, depending on the sphere of analysis.

However, it is worth mentioning that studies and practices on the protection of critical energy infrastructure are much broader, since engineering systems, for example, suffer occasional equipment failures and require periodic maintenance, which implies measures that involve both private and public sectors, depending on the case (see Aradau 2010, Farrel et al. 2004). Similarly, energy security can have different dimensions ranging from political and military to technical and economic ones, noting, for example, that economists are mainly concerned with the macroeconomic impacts emanating from rising energy prices and the dangers of economic losses due to possible supply failures (see Ciut 2010; Bielecki 2002).

This paper seeks, therefore, to contribute, in some way, to the overcoming of a gap in the national literature, proposing a specific, systematic and in depth study on a specific aspect of the protection of the Brazilian critical energy infrastructure. In order to comply with this intent and answer the aforementioned questions, in addition to this introduction, the paper has four more parts. In the next section, the main objective is to present some conceptual frameworks on the subject, in addition to identifying which are and where are the main infrastructures of production, commercialization and consumption of energy in Brazil, especially those related to the chain of oil, by-products and natural gas, with the objective of obtaining a concrete reference point for the analysis of vulnerabilities and the answers necessary for its defense.

In the following section, the main scope is to verify how the security of energy infrastructure is effectively incorporated and treated as a military dimension in Brazil, in particular, to analyze how it conforms to the two main defense policy documents in the country: the National Defense Policy and the National Defense Strategy. The fourth section focuses on the evaluation

of aspects related to the planning of Brazil's military offensive and defensive capability, aiming at protecting the infrastructure related to the sources mentioned above, in the midst of the main (external) threats perceived by the Brazilian government and by scholars. Finally, final considerations are presented with some conclusions in order to systematize the results obtained from the reflections carried out throughout the text.

Critical infrastructure and energy security in Brazil: oil, gas and by-products

The concept of critical infrastructure in Brazil is precisely defined by Article 2 of Ordinance No. 2 of the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic (GSI / PR), of February 8 2008, which "Establishes Technical Groups for Security of Critical Infrastructures (GTSIC) and other measures". According to this ordinance "IEC [Critical Infrastructures] are considered as installations, services and goods that, if disrupted or destroyed, will have serious social, economic, political, international or national security impact." The Article 3 of the above-mentioned document lists, between items I and V, the priority areas of critical infrastructure, without prejudice to others that may be defined, with an energy-related infrastructure being nominally included. The others refer to the transport network, water, telecommunications and finance.

The aforementioned GSI / PR Ordinance, and no other official federal government document, currently establishes a precise definition of critical energy infrastructure in the country. In contrast to Brazil, Canada, for example, has the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, which, among other aspects, defines precisely the meaning of the term:

Critical infrastructure refers to processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government. Critical infrastructure can be stand-alone or interconnected and interdependent within and across provinces, territories and national borders. Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic loss of life, adverse economic effects, and significant harm to public confidence (Canada 2009).

Based on the aforementioned definition, it can be said that the critical or strategically valuable energy infrastructure refers to the chain of extraction, production, processing, transportation, commercialization and consumption

of energy of fundamental importance to the survival and development of the country and its people in general, whose disruption or destruction can still have repercussions in the international sphere (Paiva 2015, 151). However, it should be emphasized that it is not any hydroelectric plant, pipeline, storage or logistics structure that has strategic value, but those that actually have the potential to cause the impacts previously mentioned and have a national or international repercussion (Demeterco 2014, 07).

With regard to the critical energy infrastructure in Brazil that involves oil, natural gas and by-products, it can be affirmed that much of it is located in or near the maritime area. In this sense, the essential structures mentioned initially include those located in the midst of Atlantic waters, and are related to hydrocarbon extraction, exploitation and storage bases, peculiar physical environments such as maritime transportation routes of energy resources, and watercraft, pipelines and other means of flow of fossil products extracted from the sea. On the other hand, there is also the infrastructure located in the coastal zone, which is related to the generation, processing, storage, transfer and transportation of energy resources. In this case, the following structural energy complexes are present in or close to the coastal zone: the centers of refining and storage of petroleum and production of derivatives; natural gas processing units; and the circulation pipelines of petroleum, by-products, natural gas, ethanol, solvents and others.


One of the starting points for understanding the relationship between critical energy infrastructure and the Brazilian Atlantic territorial extension lies in the fact that most of the proven reserves of oil and natural gas located in Brazil are found in the South Atlantic, respectively about 94.9% and 88.2% of the national deposits of these sources are in marine soil (ANP 2015, 70-73)². Regarding oil production, official data reveals the same preponderant role of the South Atlantic, with 92.5% of this resource being produced from the sea (ANP 2015, 75). Gas production in offshore fields does not reach the same numbers when compared to oil, but they are no less prominent, since 73.3% of the country's gas originates from the ocean (ANP 2015, 82).

In the midst of this reality, it is worth noting that, according to data provided by the Brazilian Navy's Directorate of Ports and Coasts (Brasil 2016), in order to meet the economic exploitation of hydrocarbons derived from the

2 ANP Ordinance No. 9, dated 01/21/2000, defines proven reserves in the following terms: "Reserves of oil and natural gas which, based on the analysis of geological and engineering data, are estimated to recover commercially from uncovered and evaluated reservoirs, with high degree of certainty, and whose estimate considers the current economic conditions, the usually viable operational methods and the regulations established by Brazilian petroleum and tax legislation."

sea, there are 237 structural energy complexes in Brazilian waters, of which 177 were in operation and 60 were deactivated. This infrastructure refers to fixed, self-lifting and multi-legged platforms, drillships and probes and production, storage and transfer floating systems. As can be seen, from the cartogram below, most of them are found in the basins present along the Brazilian coast, given their predominance in such region.

Cartogram 1 - Effective basins in the areas of the Union and with the productive units in areas contracted with discovered and undiscovered conventional resources



Source: Ministry of Mines and Energy and Energy Research Company (MME, EPE 2015a, 241)


In addition to the infrastructural complexes linked to the oil and natural gas reserves in Brazil located in the oceanic region, there is also the infrastructure located in the coastal zone, which is related to the generation, processing, storage, transfer and transportation of energy resources. In this case, the following structural energy complexes can be highlighted: the centers of petroleum refining and production of derivatives; natural gas processing units; and the circulation pipelines of petroleum, by-products, natural gas, ethanol, solvents and others.

When verifying the geographic location of the 17 national industrial complexes responsible for the petroleum refining and the production of petroleum products in Brazil, it is verified that the majority is located in the

Brazilian coastal zone or in cities that are very close to the sea³. In addition to performing the refining process, such complexes are also responsible for the storage of most of the oil, petroleum products (gasoline, diesel, fuel oil, Kerosene aviation), intermediate products (turpentine and diesel) and ethanol that supply the country, whether originating from domestic production or from the external market. Similarly, when analyzing the location of the 15 national production centers that account for the processing of natural gas in Brazil, it is found that they are also located predominantly in the Brazilian coastal zone⁴.

The cartogram below shows perfectly how close to the Brazilian coast the petroleum refineries and the centers of production and processing of natural gas, industrial complexes of great relevance for national energy security are.

Cartogram 2 - Refining and Processing Units - 2014



Source: National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP 2015, 105)


The movement of petroleum, by-products and ethanol in Brazil is also closely related to the Atlantic Ocean, since most of the storage terminals

3 The refineries are located in the states of Amazonas (Reman), Ceará (Lubnor), Rio Grande do Norte (RPCC), Pernambuco (Rnest), Bahia (RLAM and Dax Oil), Rio de Janeiro (Manguinhos, Reduc), São Paulo (Recap, Replan, Revap, RPBC and Univen), Minas Gerais (Regap), Paraná (Repar) and Rio Grande do Sul (Riograndense and Refap).

4 The processing centers are located in the states of Amazonas (Polo Urucu), Ceará (Polo Lubnor), Rio Grande do Norte (Polo Guimarães), Alagoas (Polo Alagoas), Sergipe (Polo Atalaia), Bahia (Polos Candeias, Pojuca and São (Polos Cacimbas and Sul Capixaba), Rio de Janeiro (Polos Reduc and Cabiúnas), São Paulo (Polos RPBC and Caraguatubá) and Paraná (Araucária).

and pipelines carrying such resources are located near the Brazilian coast. The terminals are a set of properly equipped facilities for receiving, shipping and storing petroleum products and other fuels, which can be classified as maritime, fluvial, lacustrine and terrestrial⁵. The country has a total of 1,939 tanks, distributed in 108 authorized terminals, including 9 ethanol collection centers (21 tanks), 56 waterways terminals (1,442 tanks) and 43 terrestrial terminals (476 tanks). The waterway terminals concentrate most of the nominal storage capacity (69.6%) and the largest number of authorized tanks (74.4%) (ANP 2015, 113). Although there is a diversity of water and land terminals in Brazil, it can be seen from the map below that most are located in the Brazilian coastal zone.

Cartogram 3 - Petroleum and Derivatives Production and Movement Infrastructure - 2014



Source: National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP 2015, 117)

Regarding the infrastructure related to the movement of energy resources, it is important to highlight that there is a whole fleet of ships that cross the sea lanes. Cabotage navigation, for instance between ports and terminals within Brazil, is responsible for much of the transportation of oil and gas from offshore platforms to refineries, fuel distribution between coastal terminals, etc. (ANTAQ 2014). According to data from the National Agency


⁵ The definition was based on the one proposed on the website of the National Petroleum Agency at: <<http://www.anp.gov.br/?id=582#t>>. Accessed: May 22, 2014.

for Waterway Transportation, among the groups of merchandise transported in national cabotage in the first half of 2014, the movement of “Fuels, Mineral Oils and Products” stands out prominently, accounting on average for 76.5% of the tonnage handled in that period between Brazilian ports (ANTAQ 2014, 4).

The infrastructure related to energy movement in Brazil also includes pipelines, which contribute to the circulation of oil, by-products, natural gas and other products such as ethanol and solvents. By 2014, the country had 601 pipelines that stretched for 19.7 thousand kilometers. The most extensive part of the pipeline network is used in the movement of natural gas (gas pipelines), whose extension is 11.7 thousand km, using 110 ducts. These structures available for the circulation of oil and by-products (oil pipelines) total 422 installations that extend for 7.9 thousand km. The rest of the network (37 ducts - 76 km) is used to move other products, such as ethanol and solvents (ANP 2015, 116).

The cartogram previously shown (circulation of oil and derivatives) and the following (natural gas movement) show that a considerable part of these pipelines related to the energy infrastructure is close to the Brazilian coastal zone, once again revealing the importance of the country’s maritime space because of the need to ensure national energy security.

Cartogram 4 - Natural Gas Production and Movement Infrastructure - 2014



Source: National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP 2015, 118).

The South Atlantic is equally important for Brazil as it represents the

main route of entry and exit of various energy resources to the country. The importance of these maritime routes in the export and import of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas to Brazil is indisputable, especially when analyzing official data indicating where these resources circulate to reach the country. According to information available in the “AliceWeb” system of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), in the period from 2005 to 2015, practically all exports and imports of oil and by-products from Brazil - 99.9% - occurred through the Atlantic sea lanes⁶.

From the data provided by the MDIC, also in the “AliceWeb” system, between 2005 and 2015, Brazilian natural gas exports are also mainly made through maritime transport⁷. Although the volume transported through oceanic routes is not equivalent to that of the export of oil and by-products, its relevance for the commercialization of Brazilian natural gas abroad is undeniable, as can be stated from the data table below.

In regard to the importation of natural gas, it is verified that the importance of maritime transport loses space. The main reason is the role of Bolivian gas in meeting the national demand, which occurs through terrestrial gas pipeline. However, it should be noted that between 2005 and 2015, the participation of the maritime route in the importation of natural gas has been increasing, mainly due to the increase in the acquisition of natural gas in the foreign market, in order to meet the growing demand of the Brazilian market.

Table 1 - Exports and imports of natural gas in Brazil by maritime route

EXPORTS											
Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total Volume (106 kg)	100,2	25,1	34,8	4,1	11,1	4,1	60,3	247,1	78,4	75,1	1,3
Maritime Route (%)	100	100	98,7	84,6	99,8	60,5	97,5	99,92	100	99,9	99,75
IMPORTS											
Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total Volume (106 kg)	1.061	1.756	2.107	3.714	2.359	4.037	4.529	5.959	7.997	15.286	16.856
Maritime Route (%)	7,2	10,48	11,34	12,43	21,53	34,44	24,35	33,47	39,30	40,57	44,64

Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (“AliceWeb” system)

⁶ The search in the “AliceWeb” system was done with the code “2709” for oil and “2710” for derivatives of the Mercosur Common Nomenclature.

⁷ The search in the “AliceWeb” system was done with the code “2711” of the Mercosur Common Nomenclature.

On the one hand, the dependence of the Brazilian market on imports of oil, by-products and natural gas requires the government attention to ensure that the roads through which these products arrive in the country are protected, so as to guarantee the domestic supply and indispensable means for national development. On the other hand, considering that the exports of such resources are an important source of dividends for the Brazilian economy, with a considerable rising trend for the next years (due to the pre-salt discoveries), it is a matter of safeguarding the necessary conditions for the appropriate use of opportunities for generating wealth for the country.

The next section will find out in which the extent the protection of this whole infrastructure is present in the main documents that deal with the national defense policy.

Protection of the Brazilian energy infrastructure of oil, gas and by-products in the national defense policy

Concerning the military protection of critical or strategically valuable energy infrastructure in Brazil, there is currently no legislation and official documents within the scope of the Brazilian federal government that deal exclusively with the issue in the sphere of national defense. On the other hand, the telecommunications sector already has a considerable political, institutional and conceptual framework, consolidated in official documents, among which we can highlight the “Basic guidelines to the manager of information and communication security: version 2.0” (Brasil 2016), the “Strategy of information and communications security and of cyber security of the federal public administration for 2015-2018: version 1.0” (Brasil 2015), the “Green paper: cyber security in Brazil” (Brasil 2010a), and the “Reference guide to the security of critical information infrastructures” (Brasil 2010b).

However, this does not mean that the main instruments of national defense policy guidance do not take into account the need to ensure the protection of the infrastructure of recognized strategic value for the country, including that related to energy. In this sense, one can highlight the predictions found in the National Defense Policy and in the National Defense Strategy. The former stands out as the highest-level document in national defense planning, establishing objectives and guidelines for the preparation and use of national military capacity. The other relates to the organization and orientation of the Armed Forces to better carry out their constitutional destiny and their attributions in peace and war.

The National Defense Policy refers to the “infrastructure of strategic

value” only twice, but does not use the term or bring specific directions in the sense proposed in the analysis presented in this text. Initially, the NDP uses the expression when it addresses “The regional environment and the strategic contour”, highlighting the benefits of initiatives to promote infrastructure improvement in the South American region: “The expansion and modernization of South America’s infrastructure can make the connection between its productive centers and the two oceans, facilitating development and integration” (Brasil 2005). The second mention occurs in the section that addresses the policies and actions that can contribute to the achievement of National Defense objectives, in expressing the need to “strengthen the infrastructure of strategic value for National Defense, primarily transportation, energy and communications” (Brasil 2005). The energy infrastructure, in this case, is considered much more as a means to promote national defense, and not properly an end to be achieved by the Brazilian military.

However, this does not mean that the NDP does not take into account the need to guarantee protection to the energy infrastructure of recognized strategic value for the country, especially that present in the waters or in the coastal area of the South Atlantic. However, such a forecast is made indirectly, as it can be observed through the extensive interpretation of other passages of its text.

The military defense of the Brazilian energy infrastructure would be safeguarded by the NDP - in the terms of the present study -, by establishing as a guideline that the planning of the national defense should include, as a priority, the areas where the greatest concentration of political, economic power and abundance of resources are found. In this sense, it specifically mentions coastal regions and Brazilian jurisdictional waters in the South Atlantic (Brasil 2005). In this case the NDP precisely points out that in this area are the largest national oil and gas reserves, as well as the main route through which almost all Brazilian foreign trade passes (Brasil 2005). In addition, it should be pointed out that this document emphatically indicates that there is a possibility in this century that disputes over energy sources and other scarce natural resources will intensify, which may become an object of international interest and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, leading to possible conflict scenarios (Brasil 2005).

In such circumstances, it is not sensible to say that the Brazilian Armed Forces are supposed to protect only the energy resources and the transportation routes of these goods, and ignore the defense of the related infrastructure, since in a case of conflict both would be, inseparably, menaced by conflicting agents. Possible disputes relating to the global scarcity of resources and the domain over specific natural assets, including energy, would

thus constitute an equal threat to the security of national energy-related infrastructure, given the inseparability of the issues in the promotion of security and national defense. As an essential element for the country's development, the Brazilian government could not disregard this factor as a central element in shaping the national defense policy, aiming to protect, among others, Brazilian energy interests in the South Atlantic region.

Considering the previous discussion, in the context of the National Defense Policy, the safeguarding of the Brazilian critical energy infrastructure in the Atlantic through national military power is based mainly on a debate regarding the protection of strategic resources and the domain of vital spaces over which the country must guarantee the exercise of sovereign rights. In this sense, it also reveals, in an objective way, the perception that energy is one of the central determinants of power and wealth in international relations, and may be the target of foreign greed. Because of this, in this intricate board, it is of capital importance for Brazil, and for any country in general, not only the defense of the energy sources themselves, of the area where they are and of the routes through which such resources circulate, but also the protection of any related infrastructure complex, without which it is not possible to operate all that chain, which allows to exploit energy economically.

The National Defense Strategy (2008), on the other hand, is much more objective and emphatic about the need to protect the infrastructure of relevant strategic value for Brazil, among which the ones related to energy stand out. First, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphatically confirms that the Brazilian government should have as one of its focuses the proactive defense of the oil platforms located in its jurisdictional waters (Brasil 2008), which, as previously mentioned, are responsible for most of the oil and natural gas production in the country. In addition, it also establishes as a priority the proactive defense of Brazilian naval and port facilities (Brasil 2008), precisely where a large part of the country's national infrastructure for storage, transportation and transfer of energy resources is located. In the same sense, it also emphasizes the need to be "[...] ready to respond to any threat, by State or by non-conventional or criminal forces, to maritime trade routes" (Brasil 2008), which consist in the main routes for circulation of energy resources in Brazil.

In general terms, the NDS also addresses the protection of critical infrastructure, including energy infrastructure, by planning the spatial distribution of military installations and the quantification of the means necessary to effectively address the national Armed Forces' Employment Hypotheses. The determination, in this case, is categorical in the sense that "[...] the National Defense System has the means to improve surveillance; to control airspace,

land borders, territory and Brazilian jurisdictional waters; and the national strategic infrastructure" (Brasil 2008, emphasis added). The insertion of this orientation in the field of the "employment hypotheses" of Brazilian military power is especially important since, given the indeterminacy and unpredictability of the latent threats to the country, strategic infrastructure is chosen as a priority object in national defense planning.

In another passage, the protection of energy infrastructure of vital importance to Brazil is once again recognized by the NDS, in this case, for representing a determining factor for national development. In this sense, it determines that the Ministry of Defense, in planning the spatial distribution of the Armed Forces in the national territory, prioritizes, among other things, "the maintenance of troops in the center-south of the Country to guarantee the defense of the main demographic, industrial and economic concentration, as well as that of infrastructure, particularly the energy generator" (Brasil 2008, emphasis added). The directing of the troops in this continental region of the country ends up focusing exactly where much of the energy infrastructure that is connected to the South Atlantic - as demonstrated in the previous section - is found, whether in the ocean waters or in the Brazilian coastal zone.

The National Defense Strategy then states that the increase in the level of National Security should emphasize "[...] measures for the security of critical infrastructure areas, including services, in particular with regard to energy, transport, water and telecommunications" (Brasil 2008, emphasis added). As stated in the NDS, the increase in the level of National Security will be incumbent upon all instances of the State. However, in the case of the aforementioned structural complexes, the responsibility lies with the "Ministries of Defense, Mines and Energy, Transport, National Integration and Communications and the coordination, evaluation, monitoring and risk reduction duties carried out by the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic (GSI / PR)" (Brasil 2008). By virtue of this determination, it is understood why the definition of the concept of critical infrastructure fell precisely to the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic, as previously cited.

The establishment of this safety net undoubtedly has as one of its focus the concern with the maintenance of national energy security, given its strategic condition. In this context, both the National Defense Policy and the National Defense Strategy guide the Brazilian government to be diligently prepared and have the means to respond appropriately to threats from internal and external agents that may inflict some sort of constraint on its energy interests.

The following section will verify how the planning of force employ-

ment of the Brazilian military power takes place regarding the prevention and response to threats or attacks against the infrastructure related to the oil, gas and by-products chain mentioned above.

Strategies of Brazilian military action in the defense of the national energy infrastructure of oil, gas and by-products

The National Defense Strategy outlines in a specific way how actions should be developed in order to exercise surveillance and defense of jurisdictional waters and the Brazilian coastal zone, which will directly and indirectly affect the protection of Brazilian critical energy infrastructure. In this sense, it establishes primarily that the main role in the defense of this space will be in charge of the Brazilian Navy, developing its actions towards three objectives: denial of the use of the sea, control of maritime areas and the projection of power (Brasil 2008).

The way in which the Brazilian Navy will implement these objectives, according to the aforementioned document, will be unequal and joint, in order to respond effectively to the challenges presented (Brasil 2008). According to the NDS, the priority will be to guarantee the means to deny the use of waters under Brazilian rule, in order to counteract any concentration of enemy forces that may approach Brazil by sea (Brasil 2008). The denial of the use of the sea to the invader is therefore considered the reference point for the organization of Brazil's maritime defense strategy.

The denial of the use of the sea to the enemy is defined by the Brazilian Navy in the following terms: "Basic task of Naval Power that consists of hampering the establishment of control of maritime area by the enemy, or the exploitation of this control through the destruction or neutralization of its naval forces, the attack on its maritime communication lines and points of support" (Brasil 2007, 168). The main purpose of this measure is, above all, to prevent enemy forces from advancing or remaining freely in Brazilian waters, land and airspace. The main action in these cases is to impose different obstacles on the invaders, thus preventing them from investing in any way against the country.

There are a variety of situations that may require denial of the use of the sea by the Brazilian Navy because it has a negative impact on the security of Brazilian critical energy infrastructure in the South Atlantic. Current literature from both civil and military academic circles usually mentions at least four types of threats (see Paiva 2015, 159-194). The first threat is the neo-traditionalist, which in reality are 'old threats' that stem from unlawful actions

such as piracy, terrorism and illegal trafficking (Reis 2011). The reports from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2013), for example, accurately point to the South Atlantic, especially Brazil, as an important route for crimes relating to illegal transnational flows involving money, drugs, arms and people. During the Navy's Blue Amazon operation, held in February 2014, part of the training was the retake of an oil platform, considering that a terrorist group was aiming to control this infrastructural complex (see Mathias 2014).

The second is the instability of the countries bordering the South Atlantic, as internal political, economic and social vicissitudes may transcend borders and become a threat to Brazil's energy security. One focus of Brazilian concerns is the Gulf of Guinea, on the west coast of Africa, a region close to areas where a considerable part of Brazil's oil and natural gas production is located. This may jeopardize Brazilian energy production, the flow of energy resources in the maritime routes that cross the region, as well as all related critical infrastructure (Amroim 2013; Fiori, Padula, Vater 2012; Fonseca 2011).

The third threat refers to the plea against Brazilian sovereignty over its jurisdictional waters in the South Atlantic, which may address Brazil's exclusive possession over the areas where the energy sources and all the stationary and mobile infrastructure present in that territory are located. The Defense White Paper (Brasil 2012c, 45) alludes to the possibility of conflicts arising from disputes involving the delimitation of sovereign rights over the maritime territorial extension of Brazil. In this regard, it points out that although 152 countries have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, there are still non-adherent countries, including major powers, which in the future may become a source of disputes. The questioning of Brazilian property of the areas surrounding the pre-salt region could trigger a conflict (Oliveira; Cepik; Brites 2013, 4), which would certainly also jeopardize all critical energy infrastructure.

The fourth threat would come from the actions of extra-regional powers seeking to preserve their interests in the South Atlantic zone. Regarding the international oil trade, "Due to its geographic and nautical characteristics, the South Atlantic basin allows the rapid transportation of large commercial volumes, particularly the ones that goes through the Cable Route where 66% of European oil and 26% of North American oil pass" (PENHA 2011, page 222). This scenario is a threat to Brazilian energy security due to the zones of instability that can be created if the interests of these extra-regional powers in the South Atlantic are countered.

According to the NDS, the defense of the national critical energy infrastructure also requires the control of the maritime area, whose definition

is also established by the Brazilian Navy in the following terms: “Control that aims to guarantee some degree of utilization, even if temporary, of limited, stationary or mobile maritime areas, exercised in the intensity appropriate to the execution of specific activities “(Brazil 2007, 68). The primary intention of maritime area control is to ensure that the region is continuously monitored so as to maintain the necessary conditions for its proper use according to the national interests. Under such circumstances, Brazilian naval power is employed in ordinary or extraordinary actions involving the daily surveillance of the national maritime space. If necessary, the effective response in case of real or notable danger will be carried out from the denial of the use of the sea, as previously demonstrated.

Regarding the defense of the national energy infrastructure, the control of the maritime area is of great relevance, especially in times of peace, and would, for example, ensure, through the monitoring of routes, the coordinated and uninterrupted flow of international energy resources trade for the country. On the other hand, surveillance would also focus on constant attention to the natural, stationary and mobile resources that are found in Brazilian jurisdictional waters in the South Atlantic, whether or not they belong to the country, thus ensuring that national production of oil and natural gas develops regularly in the region. In addition, constant patrols and monitoring would also play a significant role in preventing and restraining environmental damage from problems on oceanic platform of fossil fuel extraction, or from watercraft carrying such resources, facilitating a faster and more effective response.

A key factor in this task is the development of the Brazilian Surveillance System (SISBRAV), which will integrate all the country's monitoring and control systems, including the Blue Amazon Management System (SIS-GAAz). The latter will function as a monitoring and control system for maritime security and for the protection of the Brazilian coast. The intention is to make SISGAAz the Navy's main command and control system, aimed at managing activities related to the sea that involve surveillance, monitoring, prevention of pollution, natural resources, among others. Besides, it aims to increase knowledge about the maritime environment and the positioning of naval operations to respond promptly to crises or emergencies occurring on the Brazilian coast (Brasil 2012c, 71-72).

The Brazilian Armed Forces are constantly carrying out training, system alignment, testing and tactical procedures exercises for the defense of jurisdictional waters and the national coastal zone, which include the protection of energy resources, related infrastructure and routes where most of these goods circulate in the country. In this sense, we can mention Operation

Atlântico, which consists of one of the main joint interventions of the Armed Forces in the Brazilian coastal and oceanic area, whose third version (held in November 2012) was attended by approximately 10,000 military personnel. According to information from the Ministry of Defense, integrated actions included exercises to protect national critical energy infrastructure, both in deep waters and in coastal regions, with one of its focuses being ports, refineries and hydroelectric and nuclear power plants⁸.

The second edition of Operation Blue Amazon, was held in March 2015, under the coordination of the Naval Operations Command of the Brazilian Navy, which deployed the largest number of troops and means used simultaneously in Brazilian waters, and had as objectives the intensification of the enforcement of laws and regulations and the repression of illicit acts of all types. During Operation Blue Amazon, the Brazilian Navy carried out, in addition to other activities, exercises to defend ports, oil and water terminals, and, with the support of Petrobras and Transpetro, conducted exercises in the Campos Basin, focused on the security of oil platforms and of ships moving in the region⁹.

Finally, the protection of the national critical energy infrastructure by the Brazilian Navy involves the projection of power, which refers to the “Strategy that is developed through cross-border military participation, in situations that allow international respect for the country, for own initiative or in response to requests from external agreements, in order to dissuade potential aggressors and to support national interests related to the maintenance of international peace” (Brasil 2007, 99). The objective of this strategy is related to the expansion of Brazil’s maritime military capacity, so that it is able to contribute to the formation of national interests not only in its territory but also in external areas or “targets”, precisely through imposition of force or the threat of its employment. In this sense, the National Defense Strategy states literally that “projection of power in the areas of strategic interest” is one of the “desired capabilities for the Armed Forces” of Brazil (Brasil 2008).

In the context of energy security - including the defense of the national energy infrastructure - the importance of the *projection of power* emerges at the moment when the Brazilian government conceives the need to act through

8 Information from the website of the Ministry of Defense of Brazil. Available at: <http://www.operacoes.defesa.mil.br/web/guest/atlantico-3?p_p_auth=LMPxlyD6&p_p_id=56&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=maximized&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-3&p_p_col_count=1&_56_groupId=10138&_56_articleId=53544#.U5a5M_ldVps>. Accessed: 12 December 2015.

9 Information from the website of the Brazilian Navy. Available at: <https://www.mar.mil.br/gdn/noticias2015_mar_resultados_amazonia_azul.html>. Accessed: 22 April 2016.

the expression of military capacity before the actors (state or non-state actors) who operate in the international order, exercising it through effective postures and measures, which can generate conditions of cooperation or conflict in different contexts. Brazilian military actions in this regard may be necessary in the scenario of interdependence and competition that characterize world energy trade, with the aim of preserving national interests in its own territory, or with countries which either supply or consume energy resources. Brazil's objective in such circumstances may range from stimulating or strengthening national prestige to limiting the power of influence of other nations. However, it is important to emphasize that the National Defense Strategy is particularly emphatic in pointing out that in this international insertion, "Brazil will rise to the forefront of the world without exerting hegemony or domination" (Brasil 2008, 01).

According to this prediction, Brazil should have the military capacity to warn or ward off any threat in certain circumstances. Regarding this debate, former Minister of Defense Celso Amorim (2013) highlighted the importance of the Submarine Development Program (Prosub), created in 2009, which provides Brazil with the possibility of constructing submarines, including of nuclear propulsion, which leads the country to another level in international relations. However, all this has a cost, which consequently increases the country's international visibility and imposes greater challenges for the government and Brazilian society. The projection of power would not properly be an absurd, but something even desirable, but one has to realize that it is "[...] one of the most complex and expensive tasks for a Navy, since it implies not only a Marine Corps In permanent readiness [...], but large ships and some sort of airdrome ship" (Bertonha 2009, 25).

Facing some uncertainties, it is not absurd to say that the Brazilian leading role in energy, or any other reason, can lead to antagonisms in times to come, which is not to say that the country should transform into any form of a war machine, but rather that it should be prepared to protect its national interests in the South Atlantic region. The demand for energy resources in this area, for example, can overcome the economic dispute, becoming a "game" that may involve the projection of military power, so as to gain privileged positions in the energy supply markets among countries in the region. From this point of view, considering both the protection of Brazil's critical energy infrastructure and national security as a whole, the South Atlantic "[...] should be regarded as an important means of projecting power, of defense and security of territories of the countries located on both its sides, requiring an active presence of these countries capable of enforcing their rights and interests" (Fiore, Padula, Vater 2012, 133-134).

By establishing effective actions for the advancement of hostile forces, denial of the use of the sea, maritime area control and power projection are therefore of fundamental importance for active and concrete Brazilian energy security, as it improves the protection network of the complex national energy chain in the South Atlantic (including platforms, drill rigs and production, storage and transfer floating systems) and energy infrastructure located in the coastal zone (transfer/storage port terminals, oil and gas pipelines, refineries, etc.).

Final thoughts

The issues that were dealt with in the present study regarding the critical and strategically valuable energy infrastructure for Brazil allow us to reach some conclusions. These conclusions deserve to be highlighted and presented clearly, so that specific scenarios and challenges could be taken into comprehensive awareness by the government, society and other national actors seeking to establish strategies for the sustainable development of the country over the years.

One of the conclusions to be highlighted, initially, is that the protection of energy infrastructure of strategic value for Brazil is related to discussions on national security and defense. According to the analysis carried out, the protection of Brazilian energy infrastructure is conceived as a security issue insofar as it is identified as a determining factor for the preservation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, for the promotion of national interests, free of pressures and threats, as well as an element that guarantees Brazilian citizens the exercise of their constitutional rights and duties. On the other hand, it is a question of national defense because the security of such complexes requires, among other initiatives, a set of State measures and actions, with emphasis on military expression, against preponderantly external, potential or manifest threats, which are also intended to guarantee the protection of the territory, sovereignty and national interests. This perception about the framework of the protection of critical energy infrastructure in Brazil as a matter of security and national defense also derives from and is in perfect harmony with the definition given to the referred themes in the NDP (Brasil 2005).

The second conclusion to be highlighted is that the analysis performed throughout this paper showed that the South Atlantic and the Brazilian coastal region are particularly important areas for Brazilian energy security, not only because the main oil and natural gas reserves are located in

these spaces but also, and not least, because most of the critical infrastructure related to the production, commercialization and consumption of such resources in the country is located there. Brazilian jurisdictional waters include complexes that are essential for the economic exploitation of hydrocarbons, such as fixed, self-propelled and multi-legged platforms, drillships and production, storage and transfer floating systems, as well as oil and gas pipelines. In the coastal zone, we can highlight the industrial complexes of petroleum refining, production of derivatives and the centers of production and processing of natural gas in Brazil, as well as several complexes of pipelines, ports and terminals for receiving, shipping and storage of various energy resources that supply many regions of the country.

The onslaught of any enemy agent from the South Atlantic may result in the loss of Brazilian control over the country's main fossil energy producing region and the destruction of a significant part of the national energy infrastructure, thereby causing disruption of the supply of essential resources the country needs, whether to ensure its survival and development in general, or to maintain its "war machine". In all these circumstances, one can perceive the risks to which the country's energy interests may be exposed if due attention is not paid to the role that the armed forces should play in the oceanic region under Brazilian domain and in Brazilian strategic contours.

The third conclusion that has been reached refers to the evaluation of the insertion of the protection of energy infrastructure of strategic value for Brazil in the main documents that guide national defense policy, specifically in the National Defense Policy (2005) and in the National Defense Strategy (2008). Summing up, it can be argued that such documents objectively record concern about the possibility of international conflicts over scarce resources, including energy, and other external threats that may affect national energy security. Faced by this, they emphasize the need to defend, through the armed forces, trade routes, national energy sources and infrastructures, against threats that can directly affect domestic supply. A general analysis allows asserting above all that the defense policy in force in Brazil includes as one of its objectives to meet the imperative of maintaining the continuous supply of energy in the country, considering it as a priority issue.

More specifically, it can be said that the NDP makes no direct reference to the protection of the country's critical energy infrastructure, which does not mean that it ignores the issue. The military defense of such complexes would be guaranteed by the PDN to the extent that the use of offensive and defensive national military power focuses on the protection of strategic resources and the domain of vital spaces where they are, including, specifically, the coastal regions and the Brazilian jurisdictional waters. On the other

hand, the NDS is emphatic about the need to protect energy infrastructure of significant strategic value for Brazil, with direct guidelines on the proactive defense of oil platforms, naval and port facilities, as well as the safeguarding of the energy generation productive complex in general, including those located in the South Atlantic area.

Finally, the fourth conclusion from this analysis identified that the Brazilian Navy has the primary role of protecting, controlling and monitoring the national energy infrastructure complex that is located in the Brazilian maritime territorial extension in the South Atlantic. The actions, in this sense, include the denial of the use of the sea, the control of maritime areas and the projection of power. It is also worth mentioning that Brazil's position on the military dimension of national energy security is that of a security provider, not admitting the possibility of delegating such mission to other countries, nor does it pretend to be a mere spectator in the strategic-military situation in the region.

Last but not least, one aspect that should be emphasized, still within the scope of the fourth conclusion, is that the military actions for the maintenance of Brazilian energy supply have an impact on other issues of the national interest, such as: the promotion of foreign policy (cooperation in the area of defense with bordering countries), environmental protection (containment of damage due to oil platforms problems), maritime commercial development (protection of ports and maritime routes), generation of technology, employment and income (driven by the Brazilian defense industry).

REFERENCES

- Abreu, Guilherme Mattos de. 2007. "A Amazônia Azul: O Mar que nos Pertence." *Cadernos de Estudos Estratégicos* (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos da Escola Superior de Guerra - Brasil), 6: 17-66.
- Acioly, Luciana; Moraes, Rodrigo Fracalossi de. 2011. *Prospectiva, Estratégias e Cenários globais: Visões de Atlântico Sul, África Lusófona, América do Sul e Amazônia*. Brasília: IPEA, 2011.
- Amorim, Celso. 2013. *Pirataria e terrorismo na África podem afetar Brasil*, diz Amorim. Interview with BBC Brazil. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2013/05/130502_amorim_entrevista_pai_jf.shtml> Accessed 5 January 2016.
- ANP (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis). 2015. *Anuário estatístico brasileiro do petróleo, gás natural e biocombustíveis*:

2015. Rio de Janeiro: ANP.
- ANTAQ (Agência Nacional de Transportes Aquaviários). 2014. *Panorama da Navegação Marítima e de Apoio: Informativo Semestral – 01/2014*. Brasília: ANTAQ/014.
- Aradau, Claudia. 2010. “Security That Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection” *Security Dialogue*, 41: 491-514.
- Bertonha, João Fábio. 2009. “Uma política de defesa nacional”, *Meridiano* 47 103: 24-28.
- Bielecki, J. 2002. “Energy security: is the wolf at the door?” *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 42: 235-250.
- Brasil. (Presidência da República. Casa Militar. Departamento de Segurança da Informação e Comunicações). 2016. *Guia básico de orientações ao gestor em segurança da informação e comunicações: versão 2.0*. Brasília: Presidency of the Republic.
- _____. 2015. (Presidência da República. Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, Secretaria-Executiva, Departamento de Segurança da Informação e Comunicações). *Estratégia de segurança da informação e comunicações e de segurança cibernética da administração pública federal 2015-2018: versão 1.0*. Brasília: Presidency of the Republic.
- _____. 2005. **Política de Defesa Nacional**. Decreto nffl 5.484, de 30 de junho de 2005. Accessed 12 February 2016. <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2005/Decreto/D5484.htm>.
- _____. 2008. *Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*. Decreto nffl 6.703, de 18 de dezembro de 2008. Accessed 12 February 2016. <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2008/Decreto/D6703.htm>.
- _____. 2012c *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional* Accessed 12 February 2016. <<http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/livrobranco/lbdndigital/#/0>>.
- _____. 2010a *Livro verde: segurança cibernética no Brasil*. Brasília: GSIPR/SE/DSIC
- _____. 2010b. *Guia de referência para a segurança das infraestruturas críticas da informação*. Brasília: GSIPR/SE/DSIC.
- _____. 2007. (Ministério da Defesa). *Glossário das Forças Armadas*. Portaria Normativa Nffl 196/EMD/MD, de 22 de fevereiro de 2007. 4..
- Canada. 2009. National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure.
- Caroli, Luiz Henrique. 2010. “A Importância Estratégica do Mar para o Brasil no Século XXI”, *Cadernos de Estudos Estratégicos*, Centro de Estudos Estratégicos da Escola Superior de Guerra (Brasil) - 9: 118-158.

- Ciut, Felix. 2010. "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?", *Security Dialogue*, 41(2): 123-144.
- Costa, Darc. 2009. A estratégia nacional e a energia. *Centro de Estudos Estratégicos, Leituras*. Accessed 20 May 2012. <www.esg.br/uploads/2009/03/darc5.pdf>.
- Demeterco, Fernando Antonio. "Segurança das Infraestruturas Críticas", *Coleção Meira Mattos - Revista das Ciências Militares*, Rio de Janeiro, Jul. 2014. ISSN 2316-4891. Accessed 4 May 2016. <<http://www.eceme.ensino.eb.br/meiramattos/index.php/RMM/article/view/197>>.
- Farrell, Alexander E., ZERRIFFI, Hisham; DOWLATABADI, Hadi. 2004. "Energy infrastructure and security", *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resourc.*, 29: 421-469.
- Fiori, José Luís (Coor.); Padula, Raphael; Vater, Maria Claudia. 2012 *A projeção do Brasil na América do Sul e na África subsaariana, e o controle da bacia do Atlântico Sul*. Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ - Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos (CGEE), Se. Research report.
- Fonseca, Carmen. 2011. "O Brasil e a Segurança no Atlântico Sul." *Nação e Defesa*, No. 128.
- Hage, José Alexandre Althayde. 2008a. *Bolívia, Brasil e a Guerra do Gás - As Implicações Políticas da Integração Energética na Estratégia e na Segurança Nacional Brasileira* (orientador: Shiguenoli Miyamoto). Thesis (doctorate) – Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Postgraduate Program in Political Science,.
- Marinha Do Brasil (Diretoria de Portos e Costas - Gerência de Vistorias, Inspeções e Perícias Técnicas). 2016 *Relatório das plataformas, navios sonda, FPSO e FSO*. Accessed 11 March 2016. <https://www.dpc.mar.mil.br/sites/default/files/ssta/gevi/conformidades/plataformas/Dec_conf_plat.pdf>.
- Mathias, José Carlos. 2014. A Operação Amazônia Azul. NBR, Accessed 21 April 2014. Interview. Available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5msE5SWDW1I>>.
- Metri, Paulo. 2009. "Pré-Sal: riqueza, poder e discórdia." *Tensões Mundiais*, 5(9): 141-165.
- Moreira, José Benedito de Barros. 2007. "Apresentação", *Cadernos de Estudos Estratégicos, Centro de Estudos Estratégicos da Escola Superior de Guerra (Brasil)* – 06: 8-11.
- Oliveira, Lucas Kerr de; Cepik, Marcos A. C.; Brites, Pedro Vinicius. 2013. Pré-sal e a segurança do Atlântico Sul: a defesa em camadas e o papel

- da integração sul-americana. In: *Seminário Brasileiro em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais* (SEBREEI), Porto Alegre, UFRGS, 21-23.
- Paiva, Iure. 2015. *As dimensões militares, ambientais e econômicas da segurança energética: análise a partir dos desafios e oportunidades do Brasil no contexto internacional*. Doctoral thesis (Postgraduate Program in Political Science) – Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas-SP.
- Penha, Eli Alves. 2011. *Relações Brasil- África e Geopolítica do Atlântico Sul*. Salvador: Edufba.
- Reis, Reginaldo Gomes Garcia dos. 2011. Atlântico Sul: um desafio para o século XXI – as velhas ameaças se perpetuam nas novas?. In: ACIOLY, L.; MORAES, R.F. de (Orgs). *Prospectiva, estratégias e cenários globais: visões de Atlântico Sul, África Lusófona, América do Sul e Amazônia*. Brasília: Ipea, 61-82.
- Silva, Alexandre Pereira da. 2013. “O novo pleito brasileiro no mar: a plataforma continental estendida e o Projeto Amazônia Azul”, *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 56 (1): 104-121.
- Silva, Francisco Carlos Teixeira da. 2012. Política de defesa e segurança do Brasil no Século XXI: Um esboço histórico. In: Silva Filho, Edison Benedito da; MORAES, Rodrigo Fracalossi de. *Defesa nacional para o século XXI: política internacional, estratégia e tecnologia militar.: organizers.* – Rio de Janeiro : Ipea,, 49-82.
- Vicente, Elizeu Pereira. 2014. “A proteção de infraestruturas críticas em energia”, *Coleção Meira Mattos - Revista das Ciências Militares*, Rio de Janeiro, Jul. ISSN 2316-4891. Accessed 4 May 2016. <<http://servweb.eceme.ensino.eb.br/meiramattos/index.php/RMM/article/view/196/165>>.
- Thuswohl, Maurício. 2008. EUA reativam IV Frota e preocupam dirigentes da AL. *Carta Maior*, Accessed 8 July 2014. <http://www.cartamaior.com.br/?/Editoria/Internacional/EUA-reativam-IV-Frota-e-preocupam-dirigentes-da-AL/6/14205>>.
- UNODC (Escritório das Nações Unidas sobre Drogas e Crimes). 2013. *World drug report 2013*.. Accessed 20 February 2014.<https://www.unodc.org/documents/lpo-brazil//Topics_drugs/WDR/2013/PT-Referencias_BRA_Portugues.pdf>.
- Vidigal, Carlos Eduardo. 2014. “As Malvinas e o petróleo: perspectivas”. *Boletim Meridiano* 47 15(143): 19-27.

ABSTRACT

The study developed in this paper aims to analyze how the protection of Brazil's critical energy infrastructure is dealt with under the national defense policy in order to better understand how the military dimension of energy security is outlined in Brazil. With the intention of achieving this goal, it seeks, initially, to identify which are and where are located the main Brazilian critical energy infrastructure relating to the oil chain, petroleum products and natural gas. Next, it aims to examine the extent to which the protection of such structural complexes is provided for in the national defense policy, particularly in the main documents dealing with the subject in the country. Finally, it observes how is the planning of the Brazilian offensive and defensive military power in the prevention and response to threats against the infrastructure related to the above-mentioned sources.

KEYWORDS

National defense policy; Energy security; Critical infrastructure.

Received on July 15, 2016.

Accepted on November 25, 2016.

Translated by Diego Bortoli

CURRENT OVERVIEW AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTEGRATED DEFENSE LOGISTICS IN SOUTH AMERICA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE REGIONAL DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Edson Aita¹

Álvaro Vasconcelos Studart²

Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira³

Introduction

This paper aims to analyze the current overview and future prospects for an integrated defense logistics in South America, emphasizing the South American countries' defense industries, seeking to formulate considerations on the perspectives for the creation of a regional defense industry base.

South America can be defined as a strategical region, for besides being surrounded by both the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean, it possesses the world's largest rainforest, an immense amount of productive land, huge potential

¹ PhD candidate in Military Sciences from the Postgraduate Program in Military Sciences (PPGCM) at Meira Mattos Institute for Political and Strategic Studies, at the Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército (IMM / ECEME). Master of Military Operations and Graduate in Military Sciences. Researcher at the Brazil and the Americas Group and at the Laboratory of Defense Studies (LED). E-mail: edaita2004@yahoo.com.br.

² PhD candidate in Military Sciences from the Postgraduate Program in Military Sciences (PPGCM) at Meira Mattos Institute for Political and Strategic Studies, at the Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército (IMM / ECEME). Specialist in teaching in Higher Education. E-mail: alvarostudart@gmail.com.

³ Full Professor of Political Science at Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE). PhD in Political Science at the University of Essex and Post-Doctorate in International Relations at the Institute of Higher Studies on Latin America, Sorbonne, Paris III. Researcher at CNPq and CAPES and Coordinator of the Center of American Studies. E-mail: guedes@hotmail.com

for natural, energetic and mineral resources, among which the abundance of water, the diverse biodiversity and the oil and natural gas production can be highlighted, attributes that always attract international attention. History, however, teaches that only those who can defend their riches can enjoy them, and the only countries that have effective means for the defense of its own interests are those that dominate its technology and production (Amaral, 2014).

According to Herz (2010), South America is seen as the second most pacific region in the world, following Europe, but that doesn't mean it can afford to be defenseless. The relative political stability, the economic development perspectives and the increase of the commercial relationships make South America a region with potential for integration, in such a way that a greater cooperation regarding the defense sector could present an alternative to the strengthening of South America's defense industry base, allowing the development of the defense and security systems the region needs. This would be eased, as stated by Pecequillo (2008), because the 21st century brought about a demand for the update of the global and multilateral tradition, causing an evolution through the convergence of the bi and multilateral levels of foreign policies, aiming to expand and combine the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the strategic partnerships, offering a favorable environment to new cooperation models.

In order to ensure a peace and security zone and greater cooperation among the South American countries, in May 2008 the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) was created, with very ambitious aims⁴, comprised of 12 countries in South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Among the objectives, those that directly impact on the subject of this paper are highlighted, with very clear directives such as "industrial and productive integration" and "implementation of common or complementary policies and projects on research, innovation, technological production and transference in order to increase the local scientific and technological capability, sustainability and development" (Brazil 2012a). In line with this scope, in the end of the same year, through a Brazilian initiative, the South American Defense Council (SADC) was created, and among its general aims the building of a regional defense identity and the integration of the defense industry bases can be found (SADC/UNASUR 2008).

UNASUL and SADC are tangible aspirations, for we must take into account that its member states have similar socioeconomic realities and challenges to their development, and common historic experiences. Besides, the

4 See Article 3 of the Decree No. 7,667, of Jan 11th, 2012 – Constitutive Treaty of the UNASUL (Brazil 2012a)

political leaderships of these countries have long had a tradition of proximity, easing the mutual comprehension and allowing for a pacific accommodation of a number of national interests. This is vital, for according to Serrano (2008, 109), in a regional integration process “it is fundamental that the decision makers have the political will to integrate”.

Furthermore, the similarities of the cultural aspects can't be forgotten, as well as those related to the languages and the socioeconomic realities. It also must be said that much of the region share geographical characteristics. In the north, for instance eight countries have the Amazon biome, while the south cone share extensive grasslands and the same exit to the Atlantic Ocean, which if in the past was reason for disagreement, today is of common access, bringing development above all to Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.

In this way, the affinities, allied with the newly created SADC, create conditions to the implementation of common projects in the defense area, among which the development of materials, weapons and military equipment, reinforcing a Defense Industry Base (DIB) in the subcontinent and a Defense Logistics scaled to developing countries sharing most of the same strategical surroundings.

To achieve this study's objectives, the paper is divided in three section, besides this introduction and the final considerations. The first one is dedicated to the theoretical references regarding defense logistics and the relevant aspects of a DIB. The current conjuncture is then approached in relation to an integrated defense logistic in South America. In the third section the future prospects regarding said logistic and the creation of an integrated industrial base regarding defense are presented.

Theoretical References

According to Kress (2002, 8), defense logistics can be understood as a discipline that includes the resources necessary to keep the means necessary to the military process functional, in order to achieve its desired results. To him, “logistics are one of the most tangible components of a combat” and is composed of “creative and non-formal” attributes, revealing a certain artistic facet, needing for its good management, of “common sense, experience, imagination and the ability to improvise”.

According to other authors, logistics includes a significantly wider scope of challenges involving the purchase, support and the removal of constraints, besides the storage and physical movement of materials. They highlight, furthermore, that the activities related to logistics usually rely on

the good will of the involved states, commonly hindering the process (Yoho, Rietjens and Tatham 2013). In the same sense, Kress (2002) stresses that the decisions related to defense and its logistics are usually designed in the political level or, exceptionally, in the strategical level. The decisions taken, be them right or not, good or bad, have impacts in the long term, especially those that affect the research and development (R&D) and the purchases, and those impacts are usually followed by economic implications, reverberating in the society.

In this wider scope of defense logistics, reaching not only the purchase, but the development of assets and related products, it is fundamental the concept of defense industry or DIB. According to the National Policy of the Defense Industry, DIB is:

The group of state and private companies, as well as civilian and military organizations, that participate in one or more of the stages of research, development, production, distribution and maintenance of strategic defense products (Defesa 2005).

Furthering this definition, DIB can also be described as a group of industries in a country or region that specifically produce military assets such as missiles, warships and artillery, and could also include those industrial sectors that produce goods destined for civilian use, if most of its products are destined to the defense market (Markowski, Hall and Wylie, 2010).

To facilitate the understanding, Dunne (1995) present a classification of the materials produced by the DIB: large lethal weapons or systems of small weapons; non-lethal weapons, but strategic products, such as vehicles and fuels; and other products consumed by the military such as food and uniforms. The weapons may have a high technological value added, creating very expensive systems, such as a war ship or plane, or even smaller weapons, including less technology and much smaller prices, such as a revolver or a pistol. Much of the equipment produced by the defense industry, bearing both a lot and little technology, can still be of dual use, in other words, depending on how they are produced, can be employed both to military and civilian uses.

The defense industry is an area that demands heavy investment and high technology. That is the reason why we must take into account that the economy, defense logistics and politics are directly related to the defense capabilities of a country, reflecting both in their deterrent potential, as the operability of their Armed Forces. In this sense, inputs much inferior to the needs may bring negative consequences to the sector and, consequently, to the operability of the troops. The preparing and employment actions of

the military power are, therefore, intrinsically interdependent and cannot be dissociated of the capabilities of the industry of defense materials and services (Da Silva and Musetti 2003).

A preponderant factor, in regards to the purchase of defense products (DEPRO) is that the expenses come much before the effectivity of the investments is known, something only confirmed during moments of crisis (Markowski, Hall and Wylie 2010). From that comes the difficulties many governments face when justifying to the public their budgets and expenses with this kind of product. This difficulty is even greater in countries not directly involved in military conflicts or where the perception of a foreign threat is significantly removed from the population's daily lives, as is the case of many South American countries. For it is exactly in this context that the cooperation through the sharing of the investments seem to better maximize the available resources, showing to be a viable option, especially in an area of elevated costs such as defense.

Dunne (1995) highlights that the development of a Defense Industry tends to usually be beneficial, for it leads to the technological development of a number of sector, to the creation of jobs and the hiring of qualified professionals. Hartley (2006), however, stresses that the costs to the upkeep of a purely national DIB are too high, demanding a high commitment from the government, opposing the need for the same government to invest in the social welfare. This observation imposes to the decision makers the need for new ways to obtain DEPRO. According to him, a good alternative would be the cooperation among countries, in a way that offers benefits to the creation of an efficient industrial defense policy. He also stresses that the free market between the partner states would lead to specialization gains (countries specialized in the production of certain assets) and competition gains. The joint development of DEPRO avoid the duplicity of expenses with R&D, while the greater amount of goods to be produced reduces its production costs, leading to economy of scale and knowledge.

In fact, if we look at it in a wider way, after the end of the cold war and the decrease in the demand for weapons and war platforms that followed, the global defense market and industry had to restructure themselves. According to Reppy (2000), in 1998, with the wave of merges and downsizings, the world was limited to only four big companies in the sector, with the fourth producing double what the fifth did. In this context, Reppy begins to demonstrate the current importance of the small and medium companies in the defense sector, especially since the tendency towards electronic uses began to show. He states that, in a context of electronic systems, the association between small and medium companies that dominate part of the necessary

technologies is eased, overall in the most basic levels of these systems, where there is also a greater possibility for their dual use.

Analyzing the transformations of the United States Armed Forces, Drombowsky and Gholz (2006) highlight the need of interoperability among the different systems, especially the electronic and communication ones. Yoho, Rietjens and Tatham (2013) draw attention to the same interoperability, that according to them must guide any initiative towards logistical and industrial integration, particularly in a context where military operations tend not only to be carried out in a joint way, but often combined.

Da Silva and Musetti (2003) report that, from the National Meeting of Military Logistics, in 2002, it was concluded that the actions of preparation and employment of military power must be closely associated to the national capacitation of the defense industry and that the development and maintenance of a national industrial base, technologically developed and able to minimize external dependency, are strategic and priority objectives of the military logistics. However, it is a fact that less developed countries are able to produce only a small fraction of its defense needs (Markowski, Hall and Wylie 2010). In this sense, developing countries, such as the South American ones, without exception do not have all the conditions needed to increase the strategic capability of its arms industry in all the necessary fields. As stated by Matthews and Yan (2010, 268), it would be often necessary to share the “burden of defense”, being cooperation an opportunity to overcome such a limitation and develop the sector. This is especially true for a region such as South America, that, relatively to other regions in the world, is practically free of important intraregional conflicts.

De Negri (2005), highlights that the international commerce slows the process of technological development of less developed countries, or of those that enter the international commerce with a technological disadvantage. Thus, Amaral (2014), stresses that regional integration is the available option for us to start a process of overcoming of the limitations imposed to us by the great powers, particularly in regards to access to cutting-edge technology⁵. In this sense, Markowski, Hall and Wylie (2010), even before suggesting scientific cooperation, are more modest, highlighting that a solution to the purchase of defense products for less developed countries would be the joint purchase, in other words, the union of two or more countries to this end. To

5 Amaral explains that the US and the countries that hold the technology have been embargoing initiatives such as the commercialization of the Tucano and the AMX with Venezuela, as the planes have originally North American components. He also mentions other examples, such as the US having pressed FIAT AVIO not to join a joint venture with Infraero and the Chinese Yuzhnoye with the objective of launching rockets from Brazil (Amaral 2014).

the defense production, the authors stress the effectiveness of the joint venture process.

In terms of cooperation involving less technologically or military developed countries, examples such as that of Singapore, that joined Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Taiwan and Malaysia to overcome some limitations in its defense area, especially regarding the land and air space necessary to trainings and reformulation of its defense industrial base are mentioned (Matthews and Yan 2010). In the same way, the Dutch government have been stimulating agreements regarding the sharing of the workload with neighboring countries. They have been coordinating their purchases aiming to prevent the fragmentation of the industry and improving sustainability in the long term for its defense related industries (Dirksen 2010).

Because of this, it seems that it would be ideal to seek integration, for in terms of cost-benefit the cooperation and development of a regional defense industry are advantageous. Beyond this, “the integration is a kind of regionalism that provides the region with the opportunity to become a relevant actor of the international system. It includes commercial trades and cooperation in both the economic and sociopolitical spheres, surpassing the exclusively intergovernmental model” (Serrano, 2008, 109). Exactly because of this, this integration must be sought not only in the political level, but also directly in the industrial and scientific level, involving the production and development of defense inputs. For that, increasing mutual trust among all countries would be the main aspect necessary to the creation of a regional cooperation in the defense sphere (Saint-Pierre and Palacios Junior 2014).

Current overview on integrated defense logistics in South America

To begin approaching specifically the integration of the defense logistics in South America, we resort to Abdul-Hak (2013), who states that there is a repressed demand for military products in South America, that could be partially met through South American industrial cooperation in matters of defense. However, the same author, when studying regional industrial cooperation regarding defense, makes an analysis, followed by a diagnosis, leading her to conclude that the sector is in a modest situation and that, under these circumstances, there is only a limited capacity for integration.

In relation to the South American armored vehicles industry, for instance, only three companies have managed to produce and sell to the Armed

Forces in the region. These are the ENGESA⁶ - *Grupo de Engenheiros Especializados S/A* (Brazilian), the TAMSE⁷ - *Tanque Argentino Meridiano Sociedad del Estado* (Argentinean), and the FAMA⁸ - *Fábricas Maestranzas del Ejército* (Chilean). The first two declared bankruptcy and the last one was reduced to the condition of service provider of maintenance of armored vehicles, without greater production capabilities (Abdul-Hak 2013).

The following table represents the sales of armored vehicles, of Brazilian making, made to South America, not only showing Brazil's past strength in the sector, but also a South-American interest for regional products with quality.

Table 1 – Brazilian made armored vehicles sold to South American countries

Country	EE-9 Cascavel	EE-11 Urutu
Colombia	123	56
Paraguay	30	10
Uruguay	15	-
Ecuador	32	18
Bolivia	24	24
Brazil	408	223

Source: Da Silva, 2010

Since August 2007, the Fiat/Iveco company was hired to work in the project of the Guarani (armored wheeled medium reconnaissance vehicle), developed by the Brazilian Army, and installed a factory dedicated to the project in Sete Lagoas, in Minas Gerais. Besides specifying all the requisites necessary to the vehicle and choosing the manufacturer, the Brazilian Army participated in all the stages of the project and holds its intellectual property and royalty rights in the event of exportation. It is important to point out that Argentina, as an emergency, purchased 16 of the vehicles, to be used in the Joint Combined Peace Force “Cruz del Sur”⁹ (During 2012). Because of this, it can be observed that the South American armored vehicles industry, formerly

6 ENGESA was a Brazilian company created in 1963. It even became the biggest global producer of armored vehicles, such as the EE-9 Cascavel and the EE-11 Urutu. Before going bankrupt, in 1993, sold its products to 18 countries. Available in <https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engesa>. Access in Mar 13th, 2016.

7 Founded in 1979, stopping production in 2001 (Abdul-Hak 2013).

8 Created in 1811 and still functioning (Ibidem).

9 Standby force available to the UN, since 2011, comprised by troops from the Armed Forces of Argentina and Chile (Ruz 2008).

below desirable levels, begins to gain new impulse with the Brazilian project, with strong possibilities of exports to the South American countries, as happened to the Urutu and Cascavel in the close past.

In terms of campaign artillery, Brazil and Argentina are the ones that stand out. AVIBRAS, Brazilian company in the artillery segment, is the biggest in South America (Abdul-Hak 2013). The company is responsible for the production of the 70mm rocket artillery system Astros Hawk, with a 12-km range, and the multiple platform saturation rocket system Astros II, with a range from 9 to 90 km. Currently, it is working on the Astros 2020 project, consisting in the development and construction of a tactical missile with a range of 300 km and the adaptation of a launcher for said missile. The same company also develops the unmanned aerial vehicle “Falcão”, a totally national tactical reconnaissance and surveillance vehicle, that will work together with the Astros system (Avibras, 2015). In Argentina, through an agreement signed by the country’s Defense Ministry and the *Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares* (DGFM), in 2008, the rocket system Lanza VC CP-30 was developed, able to launch the “Pampero” rocket, with 105 mm, and the SABOT, with 127 mm, and a range from 30 to 35 km (Argentina, 2012).

The regional naval industry, according to Vilela (2009), has been showing itself to be more consistent, with a majority of state companies. In the Brazilian case, there is a capability to build, modernize and repair conventional submarines. The technological content of the sector in Brazil also benefits from the country’s knowledge of the enriched uranium production technology, fundamental to the project of a nuclear propelled submarine. The Navy’s Arsenal in the Rio de Janeiro has the biggest repair docks in South America. In this area, it is important to highlight that Brazil also has about 50 shipyards along its coast, some of them with a large size, which contributes to the resurgence of the Brazilian naval industry, especially stimulated by Petrobras’ demands for platforms, crafts and similar (Rosa 2014). Although it is currently turned to civilian uses, a prospective regional demand could justify a “spin-on”¹⁰ to the uses of this capabilities.

In Argentina, the *Tandanor* shipyard have capacity to the construction, modernization and repairs not only of war-ships, but also tugboats and merchant ships, and counts with modern ship elevation system of up to 55.000 tons (Tandanor 2016). The *Astilleros Rio Santiago* company, another state company, stands out in the construction, modernization and repairs of warships

¹⁰ The most traditional term of the industrial and defense areas is the “spin-off”, when a research destined to military ends yields technologies and capabilities to the civilian production. The “spin-on” would be the opposite, when the civilian know-how would be used in the military production.

of the Argentinean Navy. This shipyard was responsible for the construction of the 6 Meko corvettes and is able to build destroyers, besides building merchant ships of up to 60.000 tons. In Chile, the ASMAR (*Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada*) shipyard is the one responsible for building and repairing military ships for the national security. Recently landing crafts, ocean patrol ships and high-speed pneumatic boats were built, and the destroyers and frigates of the Chilean Navy were modernized (Asmar, 2016). In Peru, the SIMA company provides the Peruvian Navy with construction and repair services and is able to repair type 209 submarines (Vilela, 2009).

Colombia, through the COTECMAR (*Corporación de Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo de la Industria Naval Marítima y Fluvial*), has already developed an ocean patrol ship. The company has a contract to deliver six more to the Armed Forces, and, according to analysts, is able to build strategic fleets and frigates. The corporation also developed and built river patrol-motorboats (LPR-40 MKII), having exported four to Brazil. Besides, both countries work together in the development and project of patrol-motorboats to be used in the Amazon River (Pelcastre 2014).

In relation to the aeronautics industry, stand out in the studied region the *Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica* (EMBRAER), the *Helicópteros do Brasil* (HELIBRAS), the *Empresa Nacional de Aeronáutica* (ENAER), in Chile, and the *Fábrica Argentina de Aviones* (Fadea). Among these, EMBRAER is the one with the greatest exporting potential, being South America already an important market for military planes. It is important to stress that the company produces the light training and attack aircrafts Super Tucano that, besides being purchased by the Brazilian Airforce (FAB) and the Colombian Airforce (FAC)¹¹, were recently selected by Chile and Ecuador to integrate their forces. Currently, the company also develops commercial aircrafts, for the air forces' demand is insufficient to guarantee the company's operations (Vilela 2009).

Fadea recently began development and fabrication of the IA-63 Pampa III, a plane designed to the capacitation of the Argentinean Armed Forces and other aerial missions, such as light attacks. The company also demonstrated ability to provide weapons systems, landing gear and communication equipment, including partnerships with Brazil and Chile (Argentina, 2016; Comenzó, 2015). Fadea also provides maintenance to the FAC's C-130 aircrafts and the Brazil Navy's (MB) AF-1/1A (Ibidem).

Helibras is the largest helicopter manufacturer in South America, responsible for the production and sale in Brazil of aircrafts from the Air-

¹¹ The Super Tucano was successfully used in the attack against FARC guerrillas in Ecuadorian territory. Said action increased the value of the use of the aircraft in low heights bombardment operations.

bus Helicopters, world's largest provider in the sector. Develops cutting edge technology and is able to produce a number of helicopter models answering to civilian, government and military demands, having delivered, up to 2014, more than 750 helicopters to the national market. The company produces 8 different models of military helicopters to the Brazilian Armed Forces (Heli-bras 2015).

ENAER is a Chilean state company founded in 1984, internationally recognized for the production of aircrafts and air structures in operation around the world, particularly in South America. Its participation in joint projects with important companies, such as EMBRAER, is joined by the production of the training aircraft T-35 Pillan, in operation in countries such as Spain, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Chile itself. Besides, it also produces the attack aircraft T-36 Halcón, provides maintenance and modernization services to the aircrafts' systems of the Chilean Air Force (FACH) (Enaer 2016). It is important to stress that this company performs maintenance in Boeing 707, 737 and MD 80 aircrafts, besides producing parts of fuselage and empennage, standing out the empennage set of the aircraft ERJ-145, to EMBRAER (Vilela 2009).

Still in relation to the aeronautics industry, a good example of integration is the development program of the KC-390¹², of EMBRAER, that involves industries from Argentina, Portugal, And Czech Republic that, besides providing specific components, already ordered aircrafts. In the Argentinean case, Fadaea provides the frontal landing gear doors, right frontal door, part of the rear access ramp, flaps and tail cone (Argentina, 2016). The participation of Fadaea in the KC-390 Program, strengthens the cooperation between the technological and industrial bases of defense of both countries (Embraer 2011).

Another example is related to the modernization contract of 14 EMB-312 Tucano aircrafts of the FAC. The contract is a result of the offset obligations of EMBRAER, resulting of the sale of 25 Super Tucano aircrafts in 2005 and comprises the transfer of technology and know-how to the *Corporación de la Industria Aeronáutica Colombiana* (CIAC) (Defesa/Fiesp, 2012). CIAC is also building the T-90 Calima aircraft, that will be used to strengthen the capabilities of the FAC's *Grupo de Vuelos* (GRUEV) and performs maintenance, modernization and repairs in high complexity aircraft (Pelcastre 2014).

The Colombian defense industry has been increasing its production throughout the years, with the impulse of new projects and modernization and development efforts of the business sector and the Defense Sector So-

cial and Business Group (GSED). GSED is part of the Colombian Defense Ministry and is responsible for leading and orienting the corporative policies of 19 defense sector companies. The Colombian industry has specialized in developing and producing technical and tactical weapons to be used in asymmetrical combat, particularly against criminal organizations. Among the Colombian companies working with the defense sector, besides those previously mentioned, stands out INDUMIL (*Industria Militar Colombiana*), responsible for the production of the Galil SAR and Galil AR assault rifles, the Córdova pistol, guided missiles to the FAC and the maintenance of vehicles of the Infantry of that Army (Pelcastre 2014; Resdal 2014).

In regards to other branches of the Brazilian defense industry, we can mention the *Indústria de Material Bélico do Brasil* (IMBEL), responsible for the production of assault rifles and carbines 5,56 IA2; different calibers and characteristics pistols; knives; Temporary Shelter Systems of high performance; radio-equipment; computerized system for the guiding and coordination of artillery fire; large caliber munitions for mortars, cannons and howitzers; diverse emulsions and explosives (Imbel 2015). The IA2 rifle was first purchased by the Brazilian Army to replace its Light Automatic Rifles (FAL) and have good export potential (Plavetz 2016).

The Chilean defense industry, through the FAMAE, has conditions to produce and repair light weapons, such as assault and instruction rifles, submachineguns, munition to 5,56 mm and 7,62 mm rifles and 60 mm, 81 mm and 120 mm mortars, besides rockets of different calibers and purposes. FAMAE has strategic partnerships of commerce and joint production with Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia (Guevara 2013).

Brazil has been, for the last year, going through a process of renovation and retrofitting process. More than that, with the aim to accomplish the National Defense Policy (PND) and the National Strategy Defense Directives (END), and effort has been made with the main objective of capacitating the Defense Industrial Base so that it can obtain autonomy in technologies indispensable to defense. In this context, the Armed Forces articulated projects of technological modernization and update. Among this projects, many are being developed nationally and other with technology transfer (Brazil 2012b)¹³.

Among them, stands out the *Sistema Integrado de Monitoramento de*

13 Among the projects including technology transfer stands out the Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos (PROSUB), that comprises an industrial base responsible for the construction of the base of the hull of the nuclear submarine and conventional submarines, besides the building of a reactor prototype to the first nuclear propelled submarine, and the Gripen project, consisting in the acquisition of supersonic fighters from the Swede company Saab.

Fronteiras (SISFRON). Project led by the Army and with national reach, with installation of mobile bases, radars, sensors, integrated and cryptographed communication, development of software and infrastructure to monitor and watch 16,886 kilometers in the regions bordering other countries, involving 588 cities in Brazil, in 11 states (Defesa, 2015). Furthermore, it stimulates the capability of the national industry in the search for autonomy in technologies indispensable to defense.

In all this context, the *Centro Tecnológico do Exército* (CTEx) has been standing out. Although its roots are in 1946, the CTEx has been gaining importance since the promulgation of the END, in 2008, and the Brazilian DEPRO law, of 2012¹⁴ (DCT, 2016). These activities are developed through the nationalization, modernization and procurement of technologies with dual uses, through partnerships with companies and universities (Nogueira et al, 2014), currently working on about 14 projects, among them radars and automated repairs to machine guns. Highlight to the Air-transported General Use Light Vehicle (VLEGA) Gaúcho¹⁵, which is being developed through scientific-technologic exchange with Argentina (DCT, 2016). In a general way, the CTEx is working with a number of public financing sources, in accord to ideas defended by Mazzucato (2014), with state responsibility for the financing of innovations, in all opportunities that private initiative does not wish to participate, seeking to recover these investments through patenting, royalty payments and the creation of a specific R&D fund.

An aspect that already contributes to an integrated defense industry is that South America present as one of the richest regions in the planet in regards to natural resources considered strategic for having direct application in the defense industry, being as such hardly replaceable, in accordance to the following table:

14 Law No. 12598, of Mar 21st, 2012. Available in: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/Lei/L12598.htm

15 The Air-transported General Use Light Vehicle named Gaúcho is the Scientific-Technologic Exchange project between the Brazilian and Argentinean armies, being a vehicle for use of air-transported troops. The project began in April 2004. In Brazil, the project is being led by the Centro Tecnológico do Exército (CTEx) and, in Argentina, by the Dirección de Investigación Desarrollo y Producción of the Army (Moraes 2010).

Table 2: Strategic mineral reserves available in South America

Material	Use	% of the regional production in relation to the world, in 2012	Main producers in the region
Aluminum	Metallic structures and alloys	4%	Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela
Antimony	Batteries, glasses	3%	Bolivia
Copper	Ammunition, ballistic material, engine components	45%	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru
Chrome	Aircraft components	1,5%	Brazil
Molybdenum	Ammunition, ballistic material, engine components, aircrafts	25%	Argentina, Chile, Peru
Niobium	Magnetic materials, radars e communication systems	93%	Brazil
Platinum	Electronic components	0,8%	Colombia
Lead	Ammunition	12%	Argentina, Brazil
Renius	Electronic components	52%	Chile
Tantalum	Electronic components	14%	Brazil
Titanium	Ship structures, aircrafts e missiles	0,5%	Brazil
Tungsten	Ammunition, ballistic material, engine components	2%	Bolivia, Brazil
Uranium	Nuclear fuel	0,4%	Brazil

Source: Atlas 2014 (Resdal 2014, 85)

On the other hand, a considerable challenge to the strengthening of the South American defense industry has been the technologic intensity that characterizes the area's regional production. There is a lack of specialized personnel (doctors, scientists, technicians) and techniques that allow the increment in value of the regional DEPRO. At the same time, the imports are not always an advantageous option in light of the clauses imposed by the main exporting countries – particularly the US – to the sale of cutting edge military material to peripheral countries (Abdul-Hak 2013).

From what has been exposed so far, we can observe that, currently, the South American defense industry is in practice very little integrated. Argen-

tina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia centralize the sector's industrial production, but there is still very few interaction among the countries, being limited to a few bilateral accords or deals between small groups. It can be noted, however, that there is a lot of room to the integration and the developing of a regional synergy, for which it becomes fundamental that the larger countries support the smaller ones, those less economically developed, but with great consuming potential and close geostrategic realities and threats.

Future perspectives on integrated defense logistics in South America

This section in the paper intends to analyze the future perspectives for the integrated defense logistics in the region. To that end, urges that the South American countries go from the mutual confidence building stage to the process of formation of a South American defense identity, considering the new cooperative politics reality in the region, its vulnerabilities and potentialities, projected scenarios, national and regional interests, the need for adequate means and preparation to face old latent threats and the convergence of new ones (Saint-Pierre and Palacios Junior 2014).

In this sense, the role of the SADC stands out. Although it is a reality, its effectiveness in the integration of the subcontinent's defense logistics still relies on the consolidation of its practices and initiatives, placing it as an important ally of the future perspectives of the sector. The SADC has as one of its attributes the role of acting as an articulator of measures for the creation of strengthening of mutual trust and, with particular emphasis, the industrial integration in defense. In this point, it has been seeking to promote the exchange and cooperation in the scope of the defense industry (Abdul-Hak 2013).


In the same way, the SADC seeks to perfect the bilateral and multi-lateral experiences of the governments, including through the mapping of the expenses in defense of the member states of UNASUL. To this end, it was attempted to design a methodology to measure the defense expenses to South America, as an important element of the confidence building initiatives, improving the transparency and fiscal responsibility among the states of the South American region, and between them and their societies (Saint-Pierre and Palacios Junior 2014). In this context, to work together with the SADC, was created the South American Center on Strategic Defense Studies (CEED)¹⁶, in charge, in general lines, of the "generation of knowledge and

¹⁶ The main objective of the CEED is the consolidation of a South American thought in mat-

diffusion of a South American strategic thinking” (Unasul, 2010). Aiming to increase the transparency and allow the mapping of expenses, the CEED was responsible for the development of a Defense Expenses Common Measurement Methodology, used to generate the South American Register of Added Expenses in Defense (RSAGD). The first version of this document was presented to the SADC in 2014, with information from the years 2006 to 2010, and is available in the public webpage of the CEED (CEED 2014; Resdal 2014).

The activities carried out by the SADC are organized around four cooperation axes: defense policies; military cooperation, humanitarian actions and peace operations; defense industry and technology; and training and capacitation (Sanahuja and Escáñez 2014). The Graph 1 presents the evolution of the number of activities of the SADC, by cooperation axes, between the years of 2009 and 2013.

Graph 1: Evolution of the number of SADC’ activities by cooperation axes



Source: Sanahuja and Escáñez (2014)

Already in the year 2014, of the 25 activities promoted by the SADC, 40% were related to the defense policies axis, 20% to the military coopera-

ters of defense. To this end, the organ is responsible for the elaboration of strategic studies to advise the SADC, approaching among other topics regional approaches on the concept of security and defense, “identification of challenges, risk factors and threats (...) to the regional and global security”, besides “promoting the building of a shared vision that would allow a common approach in regards to regional defense and security” and, finally, “contributing to the identification of common conceptual focuses and basic alignments that allow the articulation of policies in regards to the regional defense and security” (Unasul 2010).

tion, 16% to the defense industry and technology, and 24% to the training and capacitation (Resdal, 2014). Complying with this paper's objective, the Table 3 details the Axis 3 (Defense Industry and Technology) proposals, since 2010 and up until 2016. In this way, there seems to be a concern and planning by the Council in relation to the integration of the defense industry in the long term, remaining the need of effective actions to its concretization to be taken by the member states.

Table 3: Activities of the Axis 3 – Defense Industry and Technology – proposed by the SADC between the years 2010 and 2016.

Activity	Responsible	Co-responsible	Action Plan
Manage the consolidation of the diagnosis of the defense industry and technology of the member states.	Ecuador	-	2010-2011
Promote a sector panel on methodology, regulation and conformity evaluation, emphasizing the defense sector.	Brazil	-	
To develop and implement an integrated information system on defense industry and technology.	Ecuador	Venezuela	
To identify the possible common areas of strategic association in order to promote complementarity, research, technical cooperation and technology transference.	Argentina	-	
To promote an International Basic Industrial Technology Seminar – Defense and Security, to encourage cooperation and the exchange of defense science, technology and industry in South America.	Brazil	Venezuela Peru Colombia	2012
To develop and implement an integrated information system on defense industry and technology.	Ecuador	Venezuela	
To promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation in industry and technology among the nations integrating the South American Defense Council.	Venezuela	Ecuador Colombia	
To conform a Work Group to present a feasibility report on the development and regional production of a Basic Training Aircraft – Primary South American .	Argentina	Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela	

To promote a South American Basic Industrial Technology Seminar – Security and Defense, to encourage cooperation and exchange in the scope of UNASUL of mechanisms that promote and attribute to the regional industries greater priority and special regulations to the purchases, hiring and development of defense products and systems, as well as the development of an integrated information system on defense industry and technology.	Brazil	Ecuador Colombia Venezuela	2013
To create a Work Group aiming to present a project to the development and production of an unmanned aircraft system.	Brazil	Argentina, Chile Venezuela	
To create a Work Group to verify the possibility of development of an industry of production of operational rations.	Venezuela	Argentina, Guyana, Brazil, Colombia	
To formulate a strategic plan to the medicine production in the defense scope.	Argentina	Brazil Uruguay	2014
To present the project, development and production of a regional UAV.	Brazil	Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador	
To present the project and development of an industry of rations, to the event of catastrophes or military exercises.	Venezuela	-	
To promote a seminar to socialize the integrated information system on defense industry and technology and a cataloging seminar in the scope of the SADC.	Argentina Ecuador	Brazil Peru	
To promote a seminar of encouragement on the South American defense industrial base and DEPRO cataloging.	Brazil	Colombia Ecuador	2015
To promote the III Cataloging Seminar and the Defense Industry Policies Seminar of the member states of the SADC, in a way that allows the synergy of the South American defense industry policies.	Brazil Chile	-	2016

Source: the authors, adapted from CEED (2016)

In a more practical field, it can be observed that the national companies involved in the refitting and modernization of the Brazilian Armed Forces, such as AVIBRAS, ATECH, MECTRON, ORBISAT, HELIBRAS, EMBRAER, among others, are developing systems and products that have no competitor of the same size in Latin America and have been shown to be very competitive in other continents. Projects of large figure such as the PRO-

SUB¹⁷ and the SISFRON are allowing a technological leap for the national defense industry with real possibilities of demand expansion.

The SIVAM/SIPAM¹⁸, SISFRON and the Strategic Borders Plan projects have been drawing attention of the countries in the region, concerned with the surveillance of their territories, especially regarding the transnational crimes issues (Defesa/FIESP 2012). In the specific case of the SISFRON, that for being employed exactly at the border regions, that by nature is shared with the neighbor country, is a project with an essentially sharing nature. It is also to be stressed that, having no issues regarding borders demarcation, Brazilian's concern with cross-border crimes is also shared with the neighbor states, being the integration of the means used to fight it one more vector to allow greater effectiveness of the actions in the region.

In this area, we can mention some embryos of industrial cooperation initiatives. Chile, for instance, intends to develop a Borders Plan inspired in the Strategic Borders Plan. Bolivia intends to install border watch radars, in a way to fight drug trafficking. Colombia, in its turn, showed interest in creating a bilateral borders plan to fight organized crime. While Peru received Brazilian technical support to the assembling of a real-time information gathering center via satellites to ease the surveillance of the common border (Ibidem).

Furthermore, the Argentinean government has recently shown interest in the Supersonic Fighter Gripen, an aircraft being produced through a partnership between the Brazilian company EMBRAER and the Swede SAAB. The intention of the neighbor country, besides purchasing the aircraft, would be to develop the Gripen in a joint way, with EMBRAER ceding to Fadae a part of the fabrication process of the product, particularly related to parts supply, as already happens with the KC 390¹⁹ (Argentina 2016).

Thus, it seems that the modernization projects promoted by the Brazilian Armed Forces will reflect positively in South America, as the region will be able to participate actively, be it through the purchase of DEPRO, or partaking in the continued development of the products, or, even, the production. Many of the current concluded and ongoing projects were developed with active participation of the CTEx, that has been using self and public (through FINEP²⁰) financing. Besides the formation of human resources in the Military

17 Project of the Brazilian state, led by the Brazilian Navy, aiming to build a national Nuclear Submarine.

18 Amazon Surveillance and Protection System.

19 Argentina provides the frontal landing gear doors, right frontal door, part of the rear access ramp, flaps and tail cone.

20 Development organ of the Science and Technology and Innovation Ministry (MCTI).

Engineering Institute (IME) in Rio de Janeiro, many engineers participate in exchange programs with research center, mainly in the north hemisphere, including as part of wider government programs, such as the Science Without Borders Program²¹. There is, thus, room to think about cooperation projects inside the continent, in areas related to defense R&D.

According to the Defense Industry Department of the São Paulo Industries Federation (Defesa/Fiesp, 2012), the development of DEPRO cooperation programs is becoming a reality. There is the intention to take advantage of the existing conditions and increase the industrial cooperation with Chile in the naval and armored vehicles maintenance areas. With Colombia, is sought to build a fluvial craft and also an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). With Argentina, besides the existing projects, the demand is for the development of a South American satellite launcher. It is stressed that the projects aimed at cooperation in the defense area contribute to the sharing of R&D expenses and the increase of the volume of production because of the demand. In this way, better prices also benefit the Armed Forces, that will be able to rely on more accessible equipment. With the same view, the Brazilian and Chilean Defense Ministries have been debating agreements in the areas of cybernetic defense, cataloging, joint doctrines, space cooperation, environment and meteorological surveillance and defense technological and industrial development (Parceria 2014).

As was seen, UNASUL and SADC have been promoting efforts to create a greater integration among the defense industries. Based on discussions and projects in the scope of the SADC, the countries member of the UNASUL have decided to jointly produce a UAV model to be utilized in the region, as shown in table 3. The initiative has the objective of promoting greater integration of the scientific development of the DIB of the countries in the region. The new vehicle has as its main objective the monitoring of strategic region and those of difficult access, to do so, it will have to be able to act both in Amazon, a hot, humid region dominated by low altitudes, as in cold and high regions such as the Andes. However, it will not bear arms, not being characterized, thus, as an aerial combat vehicle (Plavetz 2014; Sanahuja and Escáñez 2014).

Furthermore, the project to the development and production of a South American basic aircraft for the training of military pilots is ongoing, called IA-73 UNASUL I, a kind of Super-Tucano aircraft, to be utilized by all

21 The Science Without Borders Program of the MCTI seeks the consolidation, expansion and internationalization of science and technology, of Brazilian innovation and competitiveness through exchanges and international mobility, which in practice is substantiated with the selection to the award of grants of scholarship in varied academic levels abroad.

countries in the region. This project, besides aiming to stimulate the integration of military, of intelligence and of technological industries requirements of each state, seeks to promote greater technological independence, seeing that a considerable fraction of the military technology originates in the central countries and has elevated costs (Dias et al 2014).

According to these authors, to the development of the UNASUL-I, Brazil allocated 38 million dollars and Argentina 16 million, while Ecuador and Venezuela destined 3 million dollars each. They also inform that the project already has a demand of 92 aircrafts, with Argentina showing interest in the purchase of 50 products, Ecuador 18 and Venezuela 24. It is interesting that Brazil, despite contributing financially to the building of the aircraft, did not show interest in purchasing them, possibly for already having its own training aircrafts. So, to Brazil the project is an opportunity to consolidate its regional leadership in the military industry area, given its greater technological and financial resources, and to Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela the program shall support the development of their defense industries, mainly through the exchange with Brazilian companies (Dias et al 2014). The concretization of the above-mentioned projects has the potential to bring the region to a new, differentiated level in relation to its industrial cooperation.

It is indispensable to highlight the need for the creation of conditions so that the South American countries with more limited budgets have access to these and other projects, still restricted to a small group of states, be it in the development or in the purchase. This initiative would strengthen the rapprochement among the countries, ratifying the mutual trust discourse and the effective development of a truly regional defense strategy, further stimulating the region's economy, reducing costs, among other advantages already mentioned. In this sense, Mazzucato (2014) points out the promotion and development banks as a solution, such as the BNDES, for they have greater flexibility and less immediate expectations related to yields and, according to her, have been having positive outcomes in a number of areas.

Abdul-Hak (2013) stresses that, in a general way, regional cooperation in matters of science and technology is an opportunity for countries with less resources, for it allows the collective insertion in a sector of high international competitiveness, induces the sharing of expenses and eases the access to products, installations, reciprocal experiences and knowledges. This cooperation would be the result of a negotiation process in which all parts attempt to maximize their benefits. It demands a commitment supported by investments and long schedules for research and technological maturation. In this way, the deepening of the military R&D in the scope of the SADC will demand the consolidation of a trust environment and of strong political commitment of

the states.

Vilela (2009), in his turn, positions himself even more incisively, stating that the fusion of companies of the defense sector in South America would be beneficial for, through the creation of a conglomerate of companies in the subcontinent, there would be an opportunity for these industries to increase its participation in the global market. Going even further, he points out that the creation of a regional conglomerate, joining companies in different sector, such as the aerial and naval, could allow South American companies to partake in joint ventures with cutting edge companies of developed countries²². In this way, this conglomerate could benefit of technology transfer that could provide it with new capabilities and a greater participation in the global market.

In a more immediate way, it is believed that the combined South American participation in peace missions is an excellent opportunity for logistical integration, able to generate dividends that would catalyze the integration of the regional DIB. The Haiti mission marked the beginning of this process, generating new room to the coordination among the highest decision-making politics spheres²³. The cooperation in the military and logistical aspects towards the accomplishment of operations brought the region's countries closer together. This constituted a new element in terms of political relations among the states and is another step forward in relation to the matters involving regional security (Llenderrozas 2007).

Seeking to draft a prospective vision of the South American integration, Medeiros Filho (2010), in his doctoral thesis, conducted interviews with military personnel from South American countries serving in the Command and General Staff School of the Army and with Brazilian personnel that served in South American countries. Some of the observations are interesting to this paper, as shown below.

The Chilean showed themselves favorable to the expansion of a possible regional arms industry, particularly involving Brazil and Argentina. The Paraguayans see in the cooperation process the possibility to access more modern war materials, as the country do not produce defense material, only ammunition and weapons pieces and clothing. The Bolivians believe it would be positive to receive military support and perceive that the integration of the

22 It is to be observed that similar processes happened in developed countries with the end of the Cold War, as previously stated through Reppy (2000) and the description of the adaptation of the English scenery during that time.

23 It must be noted that, even though in Haiti there is not a presence of a Combined South American Battalion, with a unified command, there is the presence of military contingents of a number of countries of the region.

regional defense industry could offer improvements to their incipient military materials industry, detaching itself from foreign providers. Finally, the Peruvians show themselves to be favorable to the advance of the military cooperation, particularly in the scopes logistic support, aerial surveillance and interchange of intelligence in the fight against drug trafficking.

Regarding specifically R&D, Abdul-Hak (2013) states that the lack of specialized human resources and the opposing international pressures are the two challenges to be overcome by any military R&D project in the regional sphere. Furthermore, in order to be a definitive intensification of this area in the subcontinent, the assimilation of regional technology will be necessary in various countries, as well as the capability necessary to the management of this process. Thus, Brazil must cooperate to the sector, seeing that the country tends to be the main producer of South American military R&D.

So, it is observed that there is rhetoric and diverse perspectives of defense logistics integration in South America, particularly to the creation of a regional defense industry base. Such a process is slow and gradual and, when concretized, will be very positive to the whole region, with real political and economic gains to all states.

Final considerations

Defense, in its essence, demand an elevated investment by the state, at the same time as it demands a defense industrial base able to produce the tools that guarantee the security of a country or region.

Regarding the current situation of the DIB of the South American countries, Brazil seems to have the most consistent and diversified industrial park of the region. Although there are some partnerships, including in a multilateral perspective, these are not yet very numerous. Some bilateral initiatives stand out, especially between Brazil and Argentina. When searching for a perspective point of view, UNASUL, through the SADC, has been showing that it will have a protagonist role in the process of integration of the South American defense logistics, mainly in relation to the creation of a regional DIB. However, measures must be implemented in a way that overcomes the still pending political and economic barriers, besides increasing the mutual trust among the states.

In practical terms, it is observed that the regional industries currently with greater development, such as the Naval and Aeronautical industries, could seek a more effective integration, which would allow them to become even more embracing and have their technological potential expanded. Those

in deficit, or still developing, such as the armored vehicles industry, could receive incentives from the governments or a pull from private investors, so that they can rebuild and go back to producing in favor of the South American market.

The political will of the states and economic of the companies, be them state or private owned, are of paramount importance to the concretization of the DIB's integration and strengthening process. To that end, the need for the creation of fiscal, legal and economic incentives in a regional level is stressed, as is the implementation of a solid and embracing patenting policy, with the collection of royalties to a regional fund, measures that, combined, would accelerate the process and turn feasible the materialization of the discourses, towards the consolidation of an integrated defense logistics to South America, with effective gains to all countries in the region.

The more economically developed states would need to be willing to invest resources in the less developed countries, contributing to reduce the existing asymmetries. Such an action, that could be carried out by state owned banks of development incentive, would facilitate the integration, besides generating a greater regional synergy. It must be stressed, however, that although some South American countries have less available capital to the investments in defense, they have needs in the area and present a great consuming potential.

The need for big investments to the defense productive sector and to the R&D in the area would be reduced through regional cooperation, combined with the integration of the entire South American market, for it would allow for the sharing of expenses, scale gains and the increase of the added value of the commercial products of other areas. The reduction of expenses would allow for more purchases of DEPRO, benefiting both the companies and the security and defense interests of the involved states. The integration would also allow the increase of the technological intensity of the DEPRO, with the potential to leverage commerce flows among the countries and abroad, besides reducing the need for extra-regional imports.

The increase of the commerce and circulation of DEPRO in the region would collaborate even further to the credibility of the product and, consequently, to its commerce outside of South America. The result would bring more rentability and a positive reflex to the trade balance, increasing the exports of products with greater added value. Furthermore, the increase in demand would allow the generation of greater needs of maintenance inputs, to guarantee the products life cycle, which could lead to the creation of subsidiaries or local partnerships to carry out maintenance and possible modernizations, contributing thus to the expansion of the DIB and the technological

development of the involved countries.

It is indispensable to stress, as presented by this paper, that the South American defense market has Brazil as a central actor, main technological and producing center. In this way, it seems to be the country's responsibility the leadership of the process of development of a DIB able to increase the region's technological autonomy, but that at the same time brings development to all countries, through a cooperation process, as opposed to a exploration or domination one.

Finally, the initiatives and current perspectives of the strengthening of an integrated defense logistics in South America, especially in regards to the regional defense industry, present great advantages to all members of the region, both in the strictly defense aspect, and the economic and political spheres. This integration will grant greater international projection and strategic autonomy, strengthening the countries deterrence, and bringing other tangible benefits to the economy and population as a whole.

REFERENCES

- Abdul-Hak, Ana. 2013. *O Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano (CDS): Objetivos e interesses do Brasil*. Brasília, FUNAG.
- Amaral, Roberto. 2014. "Política de Defesa de um país emergente", in: A. Monteiro; E. Winand; L. Goldoni (Orgs.), *Defesa da Amazônia*, São Cristóvão, Editora VES.
- Argentina. 2012. "Ejército Recibe os Lanza VC CP-30". *Defesanet [online]*, 19 dez. 2012. Disponível em: <http://www.defesanet.com.br/terrestre/noticia/8965/Argentina---Ejercito-Recebe-os-Lanza-VC-CP-30> . Accessed on: 20 de dezembro 2015.
- Argentina. 2016. "Argentina se ofrece a comprar el Gripen a Saab a cambio de uma parte de la fabricación. *Infodefensa.com [online]*, Buenos Aires, 06 jul. 2016. Disponível em: <http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2016/07/06/noticia-argentina-ofrece-comprar-gripen-cambio-parte-fabricacion.html>. Accessed on: 02 August, 2016.
- Asmar. 2016. *Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada*. ASMAR: *Astilleros desde 1985* [página oficial]. Disponível em: <http://www.asmar.cl/index.html>. Accessed on: 06 June, 2016.
- Avibras. 2015. *Sistema VANT – Veículo Aéreo Não Tripulado*. Disponível em: <https://www.avibras.com.br/site/pt/programas-militares/siste->

- ma-vant-veiculo-aereo-nao-tripulado.html. Accessed on: 20 December, 2015.
- Brasil. 2012a. *Decreto Nfl 7.667, de 11 de janeiro de 2012. Tratado Constitutivo da União de Nações Sul-Americanas*. Brasília, Diário Oficial da União.
- _____. 2012b. *Livro Branco de Defesa*. Brasília, MD.
- CEED. 2014. *Registro Sul-Americano de Gastos Agregados em Defesa*. Disponível em: http://www.ceedcds.org.ar/Portugues/09-Downloads/RSGD-2006-2010_PORT.pdf. Accessed on: 15 June, 2016.
- _____. 2016. *Planos de Ação CDS*. Disponível em: http://www.ceedcds.org.ar/Portugues/07-Conselho_Defesa_Suramericano/02_Planos_de%20Acao.html. Accessed on 02 July, 2016.
- DCT (Departamento de Ciência e Tecnologia). 2016. *Centro Tecnológico do Exército*. Disponível em: <http://www.ctex.eb.br/historico>. Accessed on: 08 June, 2016.
- CDS/UNASUR. 2008. *Estatuto para el Consejo de Defensa Suramericano*. Brasil.
- Comenzó. 2015. “Comenzó a volar el Pampa III, el avión construido en la Fábrica Argentina de Aviones”. *Télam [online]*. Buenos Aires, 18 September, . 2015. Disponível em: <http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201509/120441-fabrica-argentina-de-aviones-pampa-iii.html>. Accessed on: 06 June, 2016.
- Da Silva, Carlos; Musetti, Marcel. 2003. “Logísticas militar e empresarial: uma abordagem reflexiva”. *Revista de Administração da Universidade de São Paulo*, 38(4): 343-354.
- De Negri, Fernanda. 2005. “Inovação tecnológica e exportações das firmas brasileiras”. *Anpec – Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia*. Natal.
- Defesa. Ministério da Defesa. 2005. *Política Nacional da Indústria de Defesa. Portaria Normativa Nfl 899/MD, de 19 July, 2005*. Brasília, Diário Oficial da União.
- _____. 2015. *Exército Brasileiro apresenta Sisfron e detalha operação de vigilância forte na fronteira*. Disponível em: <http://www.defesanet.com.br/fronteiras/noticia/17383/EB-apresenta-Sisfron-e-detalha-operacao-de-vigilancia-forte-na-fronteira/>. ACCESSED ON: 24 JUNE, 2015.
- DEFESA/FIESP, DEPARTAMENTO DA INDÚSTRIA DE. 2012. *INTEGRAÇÃO SUL-AMERICANA EM DEFESA: PERSPECTIVAS E DESAFIOS*. SÃO PAULO, FIESP.
- Dias, Anna; Carasek, Carolina; Siebuer, Jonathan; Merkle, Vanessa. 2014.

- “UNASUL-I, um passo rumo à integração regional sul-americana”. *Word Press [online]*, 11 jul. 2014. Disponível em: <https://onial.wordpress.com/2014/07/11/unasul-i-um-passo-rumo-a-integracao-regional-sul-americana/>. Accessed on: 08 August, 2016.
- Dirksen, Erik. 2010. “National Defence Organisation and defence procurement in The Netherlands”. In: Markowski, Stefan; Hall, Peter; Wylie, Robert (Orgs.). *Defence procurement and industry policy: a small country perspective*. Nova Iorque, Routledge.
- Dombrowski, P. J.; GHOLZ, E. 2006. *Buying military transformation: Technological innovation and the defense industry*. Nova Iorque, Columbia University Press.
- Dunne, Paul. 1995. “The Defense Industrial Base”, in: K. Hartley; T. Sandler (Orgs.), *Handbook of defense economics*, [s.l.], Ed. Elsevier.
- During, N. 2012. “Projeto Estratégico Guarani: Um Ponto de Inflexão”. *Defesanet [online]*, 21 set. 2012. Disponível em: <<http://www.defesanet.com.br/guarani/noticia/7828/P>>. Accessed on: 19 December, 2015.
- EMBRAER. 2011. “Embraer Defesa e Segurança e FAdeA assinam Contrato de Parceria para o Programa KC-390”. *Defesanet [online]*, 14 abr. 2011. Disponível em: <http://www.defesanet.com.br/laad2011/noticia/611/EMBRAER-Defesa-e-Seguranca-e-FAdeA-Assnam-Contrato-de-Parceria-para-o-Programa-KC-390>. Accessed on: 07 August, 2016.
- ENAER. Empresa Nacional de Aeronautica de Chile. 2016. *Fabricación de Aeronaves y Aeroestructuras* [página oficial]. Disponível em: <http://www.enaer.cl/>. Accessed on: 07 June, 2016.
- Guevara, Eduardo F. 2016. *Las Industrias de la Defensa en Chile. Exposicion para Seminario CDS Brasil*. Out. 2013. Disponível em: http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2013/mes10/seminario_ct/chile_eduardo_fernando_guevara.pdf. Accessed on: 07 August, 2016.
- Hartley, Keith. 2006. “Defence industrial policy in a military alliance”. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(4): 473-489.
- Helibras. 2015. *Conheça a HELIBRAS* [página oficial]. Disponível em: <https://www.helibras.com.br/empresa/conheca-a-helibras/>. Accessed on: 21 December, 2015.
- Herz, Mônica. 2010. “Segurança Internacional na América do Sul”. In: JOBIM, N.; Etchegoyen, S. W.; ALSINA, J. P. S. (Orgs.). *Segurança Internacional: perspectivas brasileiras*. Rio de Janeiro: FGV.
- Imbel. 2015. *Indústria de Material Bélico do Brasil* [página oficial]. Disponível em: <http://www.imbel.gov.br/index.php/produtos>. Accessed on: 21

December, 2015.

- Kress, M. 2002. *Operational logistics: The art and science of sustaining military operations*. Monterey, Springer Science & Business Media.
- Llenderrozas, Elsa. 2007. "Los incentivos de Argentina, Brasil y Chile para participar en la misión MINUSTAH en Haití. Su impacto en los mecanismos de cooperación en operaciones de paz." 93f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Relações Internacionais). Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO/Argentina) – Universidad de San Andrés en cooperación con la Universidad de Barcelona, Buenos Aires.
- Markowski, Stefan; Hall, Peter; Wylie, Robert (Orgs.). 2010. *Defence procurement and industry policy: a small country perspective*. Nova Iorque, Routledge.
- Matthews, Ron; Yan, Nellie Zhang. 2010. "Small Country Total Defence: A Case Study of Singapore". In: Markowski, Stefan; Hall, Peter; Wylie, Robert (Orgs.). *Defence procurement and industry policy: a small country perspective*. Nova Iorque, Routledge.
- Mazzucato, M. 2014. *O Estado Empreendedor: desmascarando o mito do setor público vs. setor privado*. São Paulo, Portfolio-Penguin.
- Medeiros Filho, Oscar. 2010. "Entre a cooperação e a dissuasão: políticas de defesa e percepções militares na América do Sul". 240f. Tese (Doutorado em Ciência Política) – Departamento de Ciência Política da Faculdade de Filosofia de São Paulo, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.
- Moraes, R. F. de. 2010. "A Cooperação Brasil-Argentina na Área Militar: Da Autonomia Das Forças Armadas Às Relações Estratégicas (1978-2009)". 237f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Relações Internacionais) - Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.
- Nogueira, S. P.; Barbosa, J. G. P.; Pitassi, C.; Longhi, F. A. A. 2014. "A Relação Entre Estrutura Organizacional e Processo de Inovação: um Estudo de Caso no Centro Tecnológico do Exército". *Revista Gestão & Tecnologia*. Pedro Leopoldo, 14(2): 151-179.
- Parceria. 2014. "Parceria vai alavancar indústria de defesa no Brasil e no Chile". *Defesanet [online]*, 10 set. 2014. Disponível em: <http://www.defesanet.com.br/bid/noticia/16760/Parceria-vai-alavancar-industria-de-defesa-no-Brasil-e-no-Chile/>. Accessed on: 12 May, 2016.
- Pecequillo, Cristina Soreanu. 2008. "A política externa do Brasil no século XXI: os eixos combinados de cooperação horizontal e vertical". *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*. Brasília, 51(2): 136-156.

- Pelcastre, J. 2014. "Industria Militar Colombiana vende armas e tecnologia em nível internacional". *Diálogo Revista Militar Digital [online]*, 25 jan. 2014. Disponível em: http://dialogo-americas.com/pt/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2014/01/25/industria-militar. Accessed on: 21 December, 2015.
- Plavetz, Ivan. 2016. "Processo de produção do fuzil IA2 da IMBEL". *Tecnologia e Defesa [online]*, 26 jan. 2016. Disponível em: <http://tecnodefesa.com.br/processo-de-producao-do-fuzil-ia2-da-imbels/>. Accessed on: 02 agosto de 2016.
- . 2014. "A UNASUL e o seu VANT regional". *Tecnologia e Defesa [online]*, 04 dez. 2014. Disponível em: <http://tecnodefesa.com.br/a-unasul-e-o-seu-vant-regional/>. Accessed on: 08 Agosto de 2014.
- Reppy, J. 2000. *The Place of the Defense Industry in National Systems of Innovation*. Cornell University.
- Resdal. 2014. *Atlas comparativo de la defensa en América Latina y Caribe: edición 2014*. Disponível em: <http://www.resdal.org/assets/atlas-2014-completo.pdf>. Accessed on: 12 nov. 2015.
- Rosa, Maria A. 2014. "Indústria Naval – 50 estaleiros no Brasil". *Defesanet [online]*, 13 ago. 2014. Disponível em: <http://www.defesanet.com.br/prosuper/noticia/16386/Industria-Naval---50-Estaleiros-no-Brasil/>. Accessed on: 13 December, 2015.
- Ruz, Maria Inês. 2008. "La Fuerza de Paz Cruz del Sur: cooperación chileno-argentina". *Estudios Internacionales*, 160: 107-118.
- Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis; Palacios Junior, Alberto Montoya Correa. 2014. "As medidas de confiança no Conselho de Defesa Sul-americano (CDS): análise dos gastos em Defesa (2009-2012)". *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, (57)1: 22-39.
- Sanahuja, J. A.; Escáñez, V. M. 2014. "Seguridad y defensa en Suramérica: cooperación y autonomía en el marco de UNASUR". *Anuario de Integración*, 10: 487-530. Disponível em: <http://www.cries.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/19-Sanahuja-Montenegro.pdf>. Accessed on: 23 April, 2016.
- Serrano, Lorena Oyarzún. 2008. "Sobre la naturaleza de la integración regional: teorías y debates". *Revista de Ciência Política*, vol.28, no.3: 95-113.
- Tandanor. Ministerio de Defensa. 2016. *Complejo Industrial y Naval Argentino* [página oficial]. Disponível em: <http://www.tandanor.com.ar/index.php>. Accessed on: 07 de Junho de 2016.
- Unasul. 2010. *Estatuto del Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de Defensa del Consejo*

jo de Defesa Suramericano. Guayaquil. Disponível em: <http://www.unasursg.org/images/descargas/ESTATUTOS%20CONSEJOS%20MINISTERIALES%20SECTORIALES/ESTATUTO%20DEL%20CEED.pdf>. Accessed on: 12 nov. 2015.

Vilela, Fernando de Sousa. 2009. "Integração das Indústrias de Defesa na América do Sul". Rio de Janeiro: *Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval*, 14: 155-172.

Yoho, Keenan D.; Rietjens, Sebastiaan; Tatham, Peter. 2013. "Defence logistics: an important research field in need of researchers". *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management*, 43(2): 80-96.

ABSTRACT

This work aims to analyze the current situation and future prospects of an integrated defense logistics in South America, with emphasis on the defense industries of South American countries. To do so, it was made a wide bibliographical and documentary review on the subject in question. The South American Defense Council (SADC), established in 2008, has as one of its objectives the creation of an integrated defense industrial base in South America, in order to achieve greater regional autonomy and reduce the costs of R&D and production of defense products. However, while analyzing the literature, it is observed that currently there is still a shy interaction between countries, summing up to a few bilateral agreements or arrangements between small groups. On the other hand, when picturing the future scenario, it appears that the rhetoric is likely to be realized, which would benefit the entire region, with the possibility of real political and economic gains to the States. There seems to be room for integration and the development of a regional synergy, for which it becomes critical that the larger countries support smaller countries, disadvantaged economically, but still with great potential and consumer realities and close geostrategic threats.

KEYWORDS

Defense industry; South American integration; Defense logistics.

Received on November 14, 2016.

Accepted on December 20, 2016.

Translated by Salvatore Gasparini Xerri

UNASUR IN A COMPARATIVE LIGHT: THE RELATIONS WITH VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA

Fabio Luis Barbosa Dos Santos¹

Introduction

The goal of this article is to examine, in a comparative perspective, the relation of Venezuela and Colombia recent governments with the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Since the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, the self nominated “Bolivarian Revolution” in Venezuela is seen as the most radical process of change amongst the countries that constituted the so-called progressive wave in South America, intensified with the presidential inauguration of Lula da Silva in Brazil and Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, in 2003. In those years, the Colombian political scenario went through a different inflexion, one that accentuated the proximity of this country with the United States. In the last years of the 20th century, *Plan Colombia* was conceived, which led to the break of peace negotiations between the State, under the administration of Andrés Pastrana, and the insurgence. The militarist approach to deal with the internal conflict accentuated with the election of Alvaro Uribe, in 2002, that coincided with the rise of the rhetoric of war on terror on the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001 in the United States.

It was in this context, in which Colombia and Venezuela were identified as the polarities of South American politics, that UNASUR was created in 2008. This article will restore some aspects of the Venezuelan foreign policy in that moment, emphasizing its relations with UNASUR and Brazil, in the light of its project of regional integration. Then, we will present a similar analysis regarding Colombia, emphasizing the inflexion on the country's regional policy due to the choice of peace negotiations made by Santos government.

¹ Professor of the Department of International Relations at Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP). PhD in Economic History from the Universidade de São Paulo. E-mail: faboroso@gmail.com

By keeping up with the evolution of the relation of Venezuela and Colombia with UNASUR, in a period that coincided with Partido dos Trabalhadores' (PT) administrations in Brazil, it is evident the moderate orientation of this institution, that faced the initial hostility of Uribe's government but did not endorse the radical pretensions of chavism. As a whole, the result of this analysis indicates a paradoxical situation, once the symbolical organization of the South American progressive wave seems to be more important nowadays to consolidate peace in Santos' Colombia, than to help Venezuela overcome the crisis that threatens the continuity of bolivarianism under Maduro, which is suggested by the contrasting expectations between these governments when it comes to UNASUR's role regarding the challenges they face.

Even though the creation of UNASUR resulted from the convergence of efforts from various governments and should not be seen as a mere extension of the Brazilian regional policy, the significant convergence of postures adopted in these first years by UNASUR and the conciliatory orientation of the foreign policy practiced by PT administrations in Brazil, causes a reflection upon the reach and the limits of this orientation, in a moment when the reflux of the regional progressive wave invites to problematize its legacy.

Venezuela

Seen in a continental perspective, the election of Hugo Chávez to the presidency in 1998 reveals a pattern, in which the implementation of the neoliberal agenda led to a sharp wear of conventional parties, opening space to the election of alternative candidates. In some cases, parties historically identified as leftists were elected, as Frente Amplio in Uruguay and Partido dos Trabalhadores in Brazil, meanwhile in other countries new figures triumphed, seen as alternatives to the prevalent politics, as Morales in Bolívia and Correa in Ecuador. In this context, the singularity of the Venezuelan process was the determination with which its President faced the constraints to social change, progressively radicalizing the self nominated "Bolivarian Revolution", when its congeners frequently stepped back from their original purposes and restrained neoliberal management (Webber, Carr 2013).

Initially, this radicalization emerged as an answer to the conflicts resulting from the government's intention to take back control of oil surplus. It was fundamentally this dispute, and not the constituent process, that initiated coup attempt of April 2002, reverted by the conjunction of popular reaction and the action of military loyal to the President. In the following months, the oppositionist offensive took the form of a lockout, that had as an axis the inter-

ruption of oil exports with the standstill of the state-owned company PDVSA (Maringoni 2004).

Besides the success in destabilizing the economy, provoking a fall of 27% in the GDP of the first semester of 2003, the resulting political balance of the clash decisively inclined the correlation of political forces in favor of the government. Determined to revert the anti national inclination of the oil policy practiced since 1975, the government realized a purge in PDVSA, firing about 18 thousand employees from a total of 42 thousand. At the same time, social politics were intensified, especially with the so called *misiones*, that answered to the double will of attending denied popular demands and stimulating organic basis of support to the regime, in a process that counted with the decisive participation of the army, against the obstacles that state bureaucracy put in the relation with chavism (Monedero 2013, 18).

In the regional plan, the clashes that resulted in a initial radicalization of chavism coincided with the moment when Lula da Silva assumed the presidency of Brazil and Nestor Kirchner, the government of Argentina, both in 2003. Identified with the popular repulse to neoliberalism, these heads of State pointed to a new era in South American relations, signaling the strengthening of the bond between the countries of the region, as a way to sovereignty. In particular, the new Brazilian government would act with force in this direction. Chancellor Celso Amorim announced that the compromise with regional integration was characterized by a “sharp consciousness of the interdependence between the destinies of Brazil and our south american neighbors” (Amorim 2004).

In this context, the failure of the negotiations to implement the Free Trade Area of the Americas, evidenced in the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata in 2005, was seen as a victory of the progressive governments against the interests of the United States. In the following years, the progressive wave would be strengthened with the election of Tabare Vázquez in Uruguay (2005), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007) and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008). It was during this potential counter-hegemonic movement in the region that UNASUR was constituted in 2008, an organization that had as its first Secretary-General the former Argentine president, Nestor Kirchner.

However, this narrative can be problematized when seen from the Bolivarian point of view and of the relations of this country with PT administrations in Brazil. Kenneth Ramírez proposes to analyse these relations from three distinct moments, described alternatively as convergence periods, between 2005 and 2007; differentiation, between 2008 and 2013; and, from this year and beyond, administration of the crisis (Ramírez 2015).

The first period, marked by attempts to build consensus among countries, extended from the dissolution of FTAA and the establishment of UNASUR. In the internal plan, during those years the Bolivarian process witnessed an ideological radicalization, which is expressed in the incorporation of an anti imperialist rhetoric in 2003, leading to the proposition of a Bolivarian socialism announced since 2004, that some will describe as a “socialism of the 21st century” (Dietrich 2005). This counter-hegemonic orientation will gain new strength with the proposition of the Communal State from 2006 onwards.

This last proposal indicated the desire of rooting the process in a popular basis, extending beyond the State apparatus, the Army and Chávez himself. For this reason, the Vice-Minister of the Popular Power for Communes and Social Movements, Alexis Toledo, said that his ministry “had to have a finite existence” (Toledo 2014). However, this movement was not consensual among the own Chávez’s basis, once the decentralization of State power contradicted the rationality inherent to the military centralism and also countered the interest of many parties of bolivarianism, that now were part of state power (Figueroa 2015). This fissure, that evidenced the tensions between the strengthening of the State and of popular democracy, that have always accompanied chavism, explains the only electoral setback witnessed by its leader: the defeat in the popular consultation of 2006, that intended to deepen the movement in this second direction.

In the international plan, an alternative policy flourished, emphasizing regional integration as part of a strategy towards multipolarity, signaled with the launching of ALBA in 2004 (originally “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas”) in counterposition to FTAA, the constitution of Petrocaribe in 2005, the accession in Mercosur in 2006, finalized in 2012, added to the strengthening of relations with countries such as China, Iran, Russia and Belarus. Even though superficially ALBA seems to converge with the “sharp consciousness of the interdependence between the destinies of Brazil and our South American neighbors” described by Amorim, the biggest country of the subcontinent never thought about adhering to the initiative. There were two fundamental reasons for that, an economic and a political one.

From a substantive point of view, ALBA signaled to an integration that went beyond the commercial dimension, involving fields like education, health, culture, communication, among others (Aponte, Amézquita 2015). The exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban doctors and the creation of the television channel Telesur, even though not directly connected to ALBA, are emblematic of this intention. In the economic field, innovative ideas were proposed, like a single system of regional compensation (SUCRE), that aimed

to mitigate regional dependence on a strong currency; or the formation of joint investment companies, like Petrocaribe. The singularity of the initiative was summed up in the following lines: “ALBA choose the logic of commercial cooperation, solidarity exchange and economic complementarity between different national productive structures as general principles of its philosophy, in an effort to extend the revolutionary solidarity across the continent” (Cerezal, Simarro, Soler 2013c 152).

Last but not least, by proposing a comprehensive Latin America (and not South American) integration that transcended the mercantile dimension, ALBA signaled for the construction of an alternative political project to the continent. It is no accident that Cuba is the country that quickly followed Venezuela, subscribing the original bloc declaration in december of 2004 (Espinoza 2013, 303).

However, this logic did not find resonance in the Brazilian project, in which the wish for a multipolar world was not translated into political radicalization. The economic substrate of PT’s policy of regional integration was the strategy to support the internationalization of big enterprises of national capital or based in the country, understood as the vector of the national capitalist development: is the policy of the “national champions”. This support was materialized especially through a business diplomacy, performed by Itamaraty, and by BNDES (National Bank for Economic and Social Development) credit policy. In general, PT rationality understands that the internationalization of Brazilian corporations would serve as a material basis to regionally project the country’s influence, modifying its international insertion pattern. In one word, it would turn Brazil into a *global player*.

From this point of view, ALBA was of little economic interest to Brazil, once it did not bring enough attractive business with it (Cerezal 2015). In the political dimension, the initiative was interpreted as a project that answered to Venezuelan, and not Latin American, interests. Furthermore, this country’s protagonism was seen as rivaling the projection desired by Brazil, despite the personal empathy between Chávez and Lula (Ramírez 2015; Ramos 2015).

When seen from this standpoint, the creation of UNASUR agreed in 2007 should not be seen as the height of a political convergence between governments identified with the progressive wave on the subcontinent, but it should be interpreted as one among many Brazilian initiatives that limited the geopolitical reach of ALBA. As a result, in practice the Venezuelan counter hegemonic pretensions were neutralized. Considering this scenario, Ramírez says that, from the Brazilian point of view, in reality chavista Venezuela was always a “thorn in the side” (Ramírez 2015).

The political rationality inherent to UNASUR, as defended by the

Brazilian diplomacy, is clearly opposite to ALBA, since this one seeks the lowest possible common denominator to be reached between countries. Clearly, the reach of an organization that gathers countries with different politics, such as the case of Venezuela and Colombia in the creation of UNASUR, would be limited. This restriction is reinforced by the type of the decision adopted, that has to be consensual, answering to a Colombian requirement that hereafter limits the innovation capability of the entity. Faced by this reality, UNASUR performance tends to be limited to the political sphere (Sanahuja 2012) and more specifically to the solution of problems in member countries that may have regional implications, as we will analyze later in the Colombian case.

The Brazilian lack of interest limited the reach of ALBA to Andean countries governed by progressive Presidents, Bolivia and Ecuador, besides Cuba, Nicaragua and some Caribbean islands: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. However, the innovative character of the initiative was considerably restrict and frequently resumed to an oil diplomacy, in which the supply of oil with low costs brought the expectations of sympathetic relations with Venezuela in international organizations. So, during the crisis initiated by the expulsion of Colombians from Venezuela in August 2015 that led to the closure of the country's borders, the Colombian proposal for OAS to mediate a meeting between the countries, contrary to Venezuelan interests, was defeated by one vote. On the other side, the policy realized by Venezuela through ALBA and Petrocaribe lacks reciprocity. In the middle of an economic crisis that started in 2013, the country was forced to sell, with substantive discount, debts to receive from Jamaica and Dominican Republic (Cerezal 2015). Even the engagement of Bolivia commanded by Morales in ALBA has been instrumental, mainly attracted by Venezuelan resources that are now scarce (Villegas 2015).

It is in this perspective that the second moment of recent relations between Brazil and Venezuela is understood, marked by the determination to moderate the radical potential of the Bolivarian process, aiming to neutralize its regional projection. As a consequence of these dynamics, it was not Brazil who approached ALBA, but it was Chávez who adhered to Mercosur, an organization whose orientation he had frequently criticized, naming it as neoliberal. At the same time, the Bolivarian relinquished to the Brazilian perspective over UNASUR as a regional umbrella organization with a dominant political character, that imposed itself over the desire of an anti-neoliberal regional integration envisioned by its leader (Sanahuja 2012). In both cases, Venezuela accepted the limited benefits these initiatives offered as a counter-

weight to US virulence, in a unfavorable global context to alternative projects to neoliberalism, in particular the ones with socialist inspiration.

A second characteristic of the differentiation between the Brazilian strategy in relation to Venezuela is related to the proposition of a “new regional financial architecture” that was present in that moment. The creation of COSIPLAN as an UNASUR organism in 2009, to which IIRSA was subordinated, fed the expectation to invert the original rationality of the portfolio projects associated to the initiative, referred to open regionalism. Under the aegis of UNASUR, it was intended to give the institution a diverse meaning, referred to developmental regionalism, understood as a type of integration that would promote “the physical integration between the countries, a fundamental step to the integration of production chains of suppliers and related producers, aiming at the formation of scale economies and the own integration of South American societies” (Desidera Neto and Teixeira 2012, 32).

In economic terms, this challenge implied minimizing the role of multilateral institutions that conceived the initiative, the Inter American Development Bank (IDB), the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) and the *Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata* (FONPLATA). This was due to the fact that the strictly merchant logic that guided these institutes prevented the investment in works relevant for regional integration, but that would be less profitable. This presence should be counterweighted with the role of other financing organisms, notably the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). Simultaneously, proposals emerged in the direction of a new regional financial architecture, guided to reduce the region’s dependence in relation to international financial institutions. It was in this context that the Bank of the South was created in 2009, with the formal accession of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (Aponte García 2015).

However, the proposition of this new financial architecture has been blocked since then by Brazil itself. In this country, the Central Bank and the Department of Treasury still challenge the use of international reserves to finance investment. Meanwhile, it continues to receive a 1% interest in US treasury bonds, even though at the other end of this financial engineering the world’s highest interest rate is paid (Barros 2015). Although one of the main proponent of the new architecture, the Ecuadorian economist Pedro Paes, minimizes this question arguing that the contribution of international reserves would be preceded by numerous measures that do not imply onus of this nature to the countries (Paes 2015), the perception that prevails is that the Bank of the South did not work out because of political reasons: the institution predicts equal voting power to countries independent of the contribution

they make, in a different model from FMI's. This arrangement would not be of any interest to the intended Brazilian leadership, what evidences the power motivations underlying the regional integration discourse (Acosta 2015).

Making comments on this situation, the Brazilian representative in IIRSA meetings stated that the problem of Bank of the South was that Venezuela wanted money to invest in non-refundable education and social projects (Parkinson 2015). According to Ramírez, Chancellor Celso Amorim would have said that he did not like "done deals", suggesting that the bank would have been designed in default of Brazilian interest (Ramírez 2015).

With the presidential inauguration of Dilma Rousseff in 2011, the differentiation of policies between Venezuela and Brazil would have accelerated. This movement was also motivated by personal questions, such as the small interest of the President for international politics and even for her supposed discomfort in relation to Chávez background and to the protagonism of the military institution in his government (Ramos 2015).

However, the crisis that intensified with the death of Chávez in March 2013, followed by the election of Nicolás Maduro by a narrow margin, caused another inflexion on the relation of PT governments with bolivarianism. The Brazilian stance, always moderate, since then, started to press for regime reform. It was in this scenario, that Lula wrote a letter, delivered by Marco Aurelio Garcia one year after the death of Chávez, advising Maduro to accept his role as a reformist of Chávez' legacy, instead of intending to be a second Chávez (Ramírez 2015). According to Lula, in a context where UNASUR offered to mediate the dialogue with the opposition "Maduro should try to lessen the political debate to fully dedicate himself to govern, to establish a coalition policy, to build a minimal program and to reduce the tension (...) Venezuela should have a five-year pact to work against blackouts, fight against inflation and to be self sufficient in food production" (Lula 2014).

In that moment, the government faced supply problems, growing inflation (60% in 2013) and a foreign exchange imbalance, expressed in a notable disparity between the different currency bands practiced, and the price of dollar in the black market – all problems that would get even worse in the following years. Retrospectively, the vulnerabilities of the proposal recommended by Lula to Maduro, involving a coalition policy, a social pact and the lessening of tensions, got evident in the evolution of the Brazilian situation itself. But in that circumstance, moderated critics of the regime resounded the advices of the Brazilian leader: "This model can result in a vibrating and non-polarized democracy, a competitive economy with social inclusion and and 'active and assertive foreign policy – such as Lula himself enjoyed saying" (Ramírez 2014). Actually, the counterpoint between chavism and Lula

was not new: while watching the anti-Chávez manifestation in 2006, I was approached by many Venezuelans that complimented Lula in contrast to their President.

Maduro did not follow this alternative, for several reasons. He mainly fought for the social conquests of the processes and resisted the pressures for economic reform because he was afraid of the social costs of the known alternatives, all of them of anti popular and anti national characteristics. To give an example, the economist based in Harvard, Ricardo Hausman, has been the spokesperson of a two-way summed path: the default to the Chinese that had already bought Venezuelan oil futures, and the rapprochement with the United States and the IMF. Hausman suggestion include selling food received by the country from international donations in order to make cash (Hausman 2016). However, faced by the fast degradation of day to day Venezuelan conditions, even analysts that are sympathetic to the process question if the subsequent political wear would not have been higher than the social cost of changes (Lander 2015).

During the parliamentary elections in Venezuela, in the 6th of December 2015, the inflation was estimated in 150% according to non official data, since the government did not publicize figures throughout the year. The shortage problems worsened and the foreign exchange imbalance increased: in the official exchange the dollar was quoted to 6.30 bolivars, while in the black market it exceeded the mark of 800 bolivars for one dollar. The International Monetary Fund forecasted a recession around 10% for the country in the year (Ramos 2015).

These elections were surrounded by expectations and tension. It was feared that the government would lose its parliamentary majority, suffering its first defeat in the ballots since the 2006 consultation. Depending on the setback magnitude, it may lead to a recall referendum, that could abbreviate Maduro's term.

Against this backdrop, the opposition rose its tone, denouncing the possibility of fraud. Then, the government opened negotiations for the coming of international missions that could testify the process' legitimacy. Rejecting the participation of OAS, largely identified with the United States, the Venezuelan government bet all its fortune in a UNASUR mission. However, the negotiation process unleashed was turbulent and many felt Brazil's participation as hostile.

In general lines, there was a verbal proposal associated to the President of the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE), Dias Toffoli, at that time, proposing a mission of UNASUR observers chiefed by Nelson Jobim. This proposal was not well received in Venezuela because Toffoli had recently re-

ceived well-known figures of the anti constitutional opposition, that defends the immediate and, if necessary, violent destitution of Maduro – known as *la salida*. It is the case of the wives of Leopoldo Lopez and Antonio Ledezma, that were arrested. Furthermore, it was suspected that Jobim himself was unfriendly to the Bolivarian process (Constant 2015; Urbina 2015).

According to the national coordinator of Venezuela in UNASUR, Elvis Urbina, the pro-tempore presidency of the entity, that in that moment was exercised by Uruguay, transmitted the Venezuelan request for more names as a veto to Jobim (Urbina 2015). As a reaction, Toffoli declared that TSE would not participate in any electoral mission in Venezuela, what put the country in a difficult situation, because it counted with this presence to evaluate the process for the international community. The impotence of the PT government to revert this situation caused a deep discomfort amongst Bolivarians, referring to the feeling that the South American neighbor was abandoning Venezuela. At the same time, Venezuelan negotiators questioned the harsh conditions proposed by UNASUR, that, in their vision, imposed exceptional clauses in relation to international law and to inter american law (Constant 2015).

As a whole, the feeling that the Brazilian political crisis accentuated the distance from the PT administration in relation to the Bolivarian process prevailed, in a moment that the Dilma government was making growing concessions to conservative sectors, expecting to sustaining her mandate. Simultaneously, Cuba reacted to the Venezuelan crisis by accelerating the rapprochement with the United States. Ramírez, including, creates the hypothesis that the sanctions to Venezuela were used as an exchange currency with Us republicans against the encirclement of Cuba (Ramírez 2015).

At the end, UNASUR sent a last minute mission, headed by the former Dominican President Leonel Fernández. This mission only endorsed what the Carter Institute had observed in all previous electoral processes: Venezuelan elections are one of the most reliable in the world. The overwhelming defeat of bolivarianism, that elected less than a third of the parliamentarians, attested this fact.

However, the difficulties faced in the relations with UNASUR and mostly with Brazil, in a crucial moment for the bolivarian process, left a bitter taste. As a diplomat of this country mentioned, friends are known in times of difficulty. The election of Macri in the same month of December, followed by the likely deposition of Dilma Rousseff, showed that this loneliness tends to grow.

Colombia

When UNASUR was established in 2008, Alvaro Uribe was in his second consecutive mandate as President of Colombia. In this country, like in Peru under Fujimori, the fight against guerillas already extinct in other parts served as a pretext for exception regimes, that condemned left forces to a defensive position that tended to isolation. In the last twenty years, Colombia and Peru composed with Chile, still marked by the legacy of dictatorship, a group of countries generically identified with a counterpoint to the progressive wave in South America.

However, more than an uninterested government in South American integration, Colombia under Uribe was seen as a threat to regional security and stability for its intimate association with the United States, inflated by the war on terror rhetoric incorporated on the fight against insurgency. Actually, the political ascension of Uribe was identified with the promiscuous relations between drug trafficking, paramilitarism and the Colombian politics, known in the country as “parapolitics” (Cepeda and Uribe 2014).

His first election in 2002 was fed by the failure of the peace negotiations made by the conservative Andrés Pastrana, in the demilitarized zone known as “el Caguán”. Beyond the historical obstacles to a democratic way out to the conflict, in that moment the determination of the paramilitarism to sabotage the negotiations was strong, expressing a sector of society that was opposed to any understanding. At the same time, the transnationals that paid taxes to the guerillas canalized resources much more substantial to American lobbies in favor of a military solution to the conflict. After all, the ambivalence of the government in this negotiation process, in which the conversations did not imply in a military truce, was evident in the adoption of *Plan Colombia*, in a moment when the dialogs were still in course².

In tune with the climate of “war on terror” that followed the 11/9 attacks, Uribe declared a stage of siege four days after his inauguration, at the same time he denied the political statute of the insurgence, implicitly recognized by previous governments. By categorizing the guerillas as terrorist organizations, the government denied the political roots of the conflict, asserting bases for a generalized criminalization of social protest (Estrada Álvarez 2014).

² The Plan Colombia was an agreement conceived in 1999 between the administrations Clinton and Pastrana, predicting advisory and resources that converted the country in the third global receptor of US aid (after Israel and Egypt), under the pretext of combating drug trafficking. The plan contributed to bury the peace negotiations then in progress with the insurgence and potentialized the militarization of the colombian state (Oidhaco 2000).

The political project headed by Uribe instrumentalized class violence through a national interest ideology, expressed in the notion of “*seguridad democrática*”. Beyond poisoning the political environment with a discourse that criminalized the popular opposition, that was ostensibly replicated by the big press, it was intended to consolidate the subjective and objective basis of a project of power. In other words, the Uribe bloc proposed to dispute the hegemony over the country through a project that involves the political organization of a diversified and powerful sector of the Colombian society, that turns violence into a way of life and turns war into business:

Protected by a self defence discourse with which they intended to legitimate themselves, the paramilitary and their managers involved the poorest population in war, offering the possibility of social ascension in an adverse context, creating a regime of terror and complicity that, far from being limited by the counterinsurgency fight, allowed them to conquer lands, city halls, governments, congress seats, control and silence criticism, influence and participate in the economic activity and seek, as proposed by the ones that signed the celebrated Pacto de Ralito the “refoundation of the motherland”. (Cepeda and Uribe 2014: 76)

As expected, the military action initiated under the aegis of *Plan Colombia* was focused on the areas under the influence of the guerrilla, with the regions dominated by narcotraffic and paramilitarism remaining untouched – the ones that served as a pretext for the plan. In 2004, similar to the original plan, the so called *Plan Patriota* was implemented, that contributed to regionalize the conflict. The apex of this tendency occurred in March 2008 when a base of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was bombed in Ecuadorian territory, killing twenty five guerrilla fighters – among these Raúl Reyes, one of the main leaders of the organization. This Colombian action provoked the rupture of diplomatic relations with Ecuador, meanwhile Venezuela called for consultations all of its entire diplomatic body in Bogotá.

In that moment, the discomfort generated by the Colombian unilateral action created an opportunity for Brazil to advance the proposal of the creation of a South American Security Council bound to UNASUR, which was established in the following months. Initially, Colombia resisted in incorporating itself to the initiative. On the other hand, Venezuela intended to give concrete content to the Council, naming what would be, in its perspective, the risks and threats to regional security: the activation of the fourth US fleet, the military basis of this country on the region, narcotraffic and other forms of organized delinquency, fourth generation war, among others. However, the Brazilian proposal prevailed, that intended that the Council to be a forum of

dialogue and policy coordination. As a result, Colombia announced its accession to the proposal still in July 2008 (Comini 2015).

However, the discomforts generated by the policies adopted by Uribe rebounded in the following months, with the disclosure of an agreement predicting the assignment of seven military basis in Colombian territory for US use. In a meeting of heads of state of the recently formed UNASUR in Bariloche, in August 2009, Chávez read a document approved by the Pentagon five months ago, in which stressed out the country's interest on the Palenque-ro basis, in Colombia. This meeting and the following ones were marked by tense negotiations, in which it was demanded that the country would advertise the terms of the deal, giving written guarantees that this foreign support would not be used to attempt against neighboring countries. Some interpreted the colombian intransigence in this respect, frequently seconded by the peruvian Alan García, as an attempt to break UNASUR itself (Bruzzone apud Luzzani: 382). In the end, the tensions dissipated: Colombia published the deal, that predicted inclusive legal immunity to US personnel, but did not give the expected written guarantees.

As a whole, the dissonant stance of Uribe in contrast with most of South American countries explains the late and reticent entrance of Colombia in UNASUR, such as its hesitation in joining the entity's Security Council. Actually, the country had little interest in the organization, besides fearing that it was instrumentalized by the Venezuelan government – or by the “*castrochavismo*”, as Uribe used to say. Given this situation, it is plausible that the Colombian entry in UNASUR was based on a fundamentally negative motivation: the concern not to isolate itself (Betancourt Vélez 2015).

In practice, Uribe government radicalized a historical principle of the Colombian foreign policy known as *Respice Polum* (looking North), based on the premise of alignment with the United States (Pastrana and Vera 2012). Under Uribe, this orientation coincided with an identification with the Bush administration to an extent that the Colombian President publicized his support to McCain in the dispute against Obama, breaking the US consensus in relation to Colombia during the process. As a result, from 2008 on, when the democrats obtained majority in the Congress, the support to *Plan Colombia* diminished at the same time that conditions related to human rights and ambiental issues emerged, in addition to collecting research on *false positives*³ (Pastrana 2015). Besides the proximity with the United States, Uribe privileged relations with countries that classified insurgent groups as terrorists – which

³ Young people dressed in guerrilla uniforms and murdered by the Army with the goal to make their executors obtain the government reward, stipulated in around US\$ 1.900 in 2005 (Fundación Lazos de dignidad 2014).

is not the case of Brazil. The country cultivated close ties with Israel, especially in the security field, and until today is the only country of the region that does not recognize the Palestine State (De Currea-Lugo 2013).

In this framework, despite the accession to UNASUR, the relations with Venezuela remained tense until the end of Uribe's government. While Chávez claimed the recognition of the belligerent status of FARC, Uribe denounced in July 2009 that the Venezuelan government had provided guns to the insurgent group. Chávez claimed that the referred guns had been bought in Sweden in the 1980s and that they would have been taken by FARC in an assault to a Venezuelan naval station in 1995. Chávez said that the equipment was worthless and accused the Colombian government of bad faith. In the beginning of 2010, Uribe returned the accusations, blaming the neighbor country in an OAS Assembly of covering FARC campings. The relations between the countries reached their lowest point, leading to the rupture of diplomatic relations in the moment Uribe ended his mandate.

Uribe's attempts to run for a third presidential term were blocked, but the President elected as his successor Juan Manuel Santos, former Secretary of Defense of the government. Santos was a politician from a traditional lineage of the country's dominant classes and won the elections in 2010 with a discourse of continuity in relation to the previous administration. Indeed, there were no substantial changes neither in the economic policy nor in the social programs, and the criminalization of the popular movements continued.

Notwithstanding, Santos made a different political reading on the Colombian situation, what led him to turn away from Uribe. The new President understood that the FARC had considerably weakened in the past years and that the context was favorable to negotiate peace. This perception corresponded to the interest of parts of the dominant classes, whose business would be favored by a peace environment in opposition to those who support Uribe and thrive in the midst of war (Alarcón 2014).

This reading had two main consequences: in the internal plan, the option to reopen the dialogue with FARC in Havana in 2012 provoked a distancing in relation to Uribe, that soon transformed into opposition. In fact, in the following presidential elections of 2014 the second shift between Santos and the candidate supported by Uribe, Oscar Iván Zuluaga, transformed into a plebiscite about the continuity or not of the peace negotiations.

An important second consequence was that the search for peace motivated a change in Santos' foreign policy because he understood that to achieve this goal regional cooperation would be valuable, if not necessary – even if that did not mean any distancing from the US. As a consequence the

Colombian foreign policy, without depreciating OAS – a pan american forum where historically the US exercise dominant influence –, started to valorize UNASUR role.

Immediately, the new President seeked, successfully, to distend the relations with Venezuela and Ecuador, as a premise to enrich the relations with other countries of the region. On the symbolic plan, the new orientation was expressed in the sharing of the mandate of UNASUR General Secretary between Colombia and Venezuela, following the death of Kirchner in the end of 2010. When this shared mandate ended in 2014, another Colombian assumed the highest post of the organization, the former president Ernesto Samper. According to the researcher Ronal Rodríguez, one of the consequences of this movement was that an international siege to FARC was closed, including leading Chávez to press the organization to sit in the negotiation table (Rodríguez 2015).

Another consequence of this process led by Santos was that UNASUR was disassociated of Chavism by the Colombian big press and the country's public opinion. In the words of Londoño, the mistrusts related to UNASUR emptied (Londoño 2015).

However, the crisis initiated by the expulsion of Colombians from Venezuelan territory in August 2015 explained the topic's sensitivity. Confronted with the expansion of paramilitarism in the country, in part played by Colombians, in that moment the Venezuelan government took the polemic decision of deporting 1.532 Colombians, according to United Nations (UN) data, and decreed the closure of the borders between the countries. On the whole, the action resulted in the return of at least 18.377 citizens to their country of origin for fear of the unfoldings of the situation, which was described by the Colombian State as a "humanitarian crisis" (Jara 2015).

I analyzed this crisis in other article (Santos 2015). Here, it is important to emphasize that a *tweet* from Samper sympathetic to the Venezuelan situation unleashed fierce criticism to its behavior and UNASUR itself. The *tweet* said: "A year ago we denounced the danger of the intromission of Colombian paramilitary in Venezuela. Today we confirm that it is a reality" (El Universal 2015).

This declaration was interpreted by the country's big press as an endorsement to the Venezuelan version to the crisis. The expectation that Samper would take the Colombian side, incompatible with his role, initiated an intense mediatic attack to the General-Secretary and the organization as a whole. Angrier voices, like the one from the country's former president and OAS former General-Secretary, Cesar Gaviria, proposed the country's withdrawal from UNASUR. Meanwhile, sectors supported by Uribe instigated

chauvinism, accusing the Venezuelan government of proceeding “like Hitler did with the jews”, affirming that “the castrochavista dictatorship of Venezuela is dedicated to incite the hatred against Colombian people” (BBC 2015).

The balance of the controversy, in the wake of what was described by a Colombian diplomat as the “unlucky *tweet*” of Samper, was that UNASUR political pledge to interfere on the crisis had emptied (Jara 2015). On the other hand, as seen previously, Venezuela neutralized the Colombian demand on OAS. After all, the crisis was addressed in a bilateral way with the mediation of the Ecuadorian chancellor Ricardo Patiño.

Besides the histrionic threats made on this context, frequently for internal consumption, it is unlikely that Colombia or any other country of the region would have any interest in abandoning UNASUR in this moment. Because, like the Director of Political Affairs and Defense stated, the Bolivian diplomat Mauricio Dorfler, a country never knows when it will need UNASUR (Dorfler 2015).

In particular, the compromise of Santos government with the entity is protected by a sober and pragmatic vision about its role. In a general way, UNASUR is seen by Colombians as a propitious space to address international issues the member states may have, and, in particular, those of regional scope (Londoño 2015; Jaramillo 2015). In this perspective, UNASUR should be affirmed as a mechanism of intermediation and political solution of conflicts (Pastrana 2015), at the same time that it serves as a space to consolidate joint regional positions (Jara 2015). As seen, this approach points to an eminent political role of the organization.

In the specific case of Colombia, UNASUR has been projected as an institution of central importance in the so called post-conflict, that is, the period that will start with the signature and popular approval of the peace agreements in case the government current efforts are successful. Because like Londoño said, the agreements are not peace itself, although peace passes through the agreements (Londoño 2015). In the moment, the situation goes in the direction of a quick solution, because with the authorization of the Constitutional Court countersigned in July, the government intends to hold a plebiscite on peace still in September 2016.

UNASUR can work, altogether with United Nations (UN), as a guarantor of the process in many aspects. From the insurgent point of view, there is notorious insecurity in relation to the respect of democratic guarantees, that should enable their social reintegration and their political participation. It is important to remember that the country has nefarious precedents in this field. In the 1980s, *la Uribe* agreements signed with FARC have originated Patriotic Union, that quickly converted into the third national political force.

This rise triggered an extraordinary repressive wave: between 1988 and 1995, 6.177 political murders were accounted, besides 10.556 murders made for reasons assumed as political. The dead include almost every politician elected by UP between senators, deputies, mayors and councilors, besides two presidential candidates, Jaime Pardo Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo (Giraldo 1996).

On the other side, this theme is one of the aspects most criticized by people against the agreements, that consider that guerrillas criminals cannot remain unpunished. In this perspective, the agreements are interpreted as a left victory and a humiliation to the country.

There are peace opponents in both extremes, however with very different power of action. On the FARC side, there are signs that the head of organization has limited control over its own basis. This explain actions like the ambush that killed eleven soldiers in April 2015, threatening the continuity of the conversations in Havana: it is a sector of FARC contrary to the agreements. On the other hand, on early 2014, the magazine *Semana* published operation *Andrômeda*, revealing an illegal spying plan realized by the army, intercepting communications, inclusive from the government delegates in Havana. Thus, besides modifications on military command operated under Santos, the government counts with counterintelligence operation of this kind, that include services of a Britain agency, to keep the military in line (Betancourt Vélez 2015). Because if the insurgents remember the UP genocide, on the State side it is clear that the military blocked the peace negotiations under Bettancourt in the 1980s.

In the hypothesis that peace prevails, UNASUR can be the star of the show in diverse topics related to demobilization, like fiscalization and keeping of reclaimed arms; assuring that the demobilized do not be followed; and UNASUR should also have an important role in questions related to refugees and immigration (Rodríguez 2015). Because as a consequence of violence on field, it is estimated that the country produced about 5 million internal refugees and 9 million economic refugees, numbers that can only be compared to Congo. Between 1998 and 2008, approximately 760.000 families were ejected, leaving behind about 5.5 million hectares of land (Centro Nacional 2013).

Besides these questions, many analysts understand that, with the dismantling of the guerrilla, narcotraffic will rebound (Pastrana 2015; Londoño 2015). In some regions, particularly in the country's South, the guerrilla has joined with narcotraffic in such a way that it is hard to trace a line that separate it from the *bandas criminales* (bacrim). Others point that the guerrilla has become a way of life for many young people and expect that there will be a migration towards the bacrim, like happened when paramilitary groups were demobilized under Uribe. In short, they understand that the main obstacle to

peace will no longer be political, but criminal.

From this point of view, an efficient confrontation of narcotraffic will demand regional collaboration. Accepting as a premise the failure of the militarist strategy based on repression and fumigation of cultives, in which *Plan Colombia* fits, there is the understanding that it will be necessary to modify the dominating approach to the narcotraffic problem. In this sense, UNASUR can offer an innovative reference, once it has already approved in 2015 a joint position, with the Colombian accession, pointing to an alternative focus. In opposition to the rationality of militarization of the drug combat, it defends an approach that separates traffickers from consumers, pointing to the decriminalization of the consumption, the reject on absolute prohibitionism and the priority to human rights (Nascone 2015). The legalization of production, selling and consumption of weed in Uruguay, the consumption of the coca leaf in Bolivia, the decriminalization of drug users in Ecuador and the regulation of the medicinal use of weed in Chile are some of the experiences that point to this direction. Simultaneously, agricultural policies to encourage farmers to alternative crops to coca will be necessary, what will be a particular challenge in the Colombian scenario, where the free trade agreements have exposed local agriculture to international competition, often subsidized (Pismel and Chagas 2014).

The convergence between the search for peace in Colombia and a lead role for UNASUR has been expressed in a significative way in interventions of its General-Secretary, Ernesto Samper. Besides his controversial presidency in the 1990s, that coincided with the boom of narcotraffic in the country, Samper has set himself up as an uncompromising supporter of the process. More than that, by defending a “holistic” approach of peace (Samper 2015), his position gets closer to left readings in which peace does not get confused with the absence of armed conflict, but is understood as a process that demands social, cultural and economic changes.

In short, Santos government counts with UNASUR to build peace, and UNASUR can find in the Colombian situation an opportunity to affirm its role.

Conclusion

Even though a superficial reading suggests that the creation of UNASUR was in tune with the counter hegemonic designs identified with the Venezuelan bolivarianism, in opposition to the pro-US orientation prevalent in Colombia, our research qualifies this reading. By following the evolution of

the relation of these countries with UNASUR, in a period that coincided with PT administrations in Brazil, we observe that UNASUR constrained right extremism, identified with Uribe, and was also against left radicalism, exemplified by Chavism. The result of this analysis indicates a paradox, as the organization that symbolizes the legacy of the South American progressive wave nowadays reveals itself, important to the country that showed the most hostile to integration, in so far it seems of little efficiency to support the process that invested more in this direction. The option of Santos government for the political negotiation as a way to bring peace to the country showed an unheard valorization of UNASUR role, referred to as a necessary regional cooperation in a post-conflict scenario. Although it can not be said that the Colombian peace process is an agenda of the right – on the contrary, it is supported by the majority of the progressive forces of the country – there is little doubt that its implementation under a conservative government under every other aspect signals for a peace under a neoliberalism stance, and not for social change. Meanwhile, the deepening of the internal difficulties of Maduro government in Venezuela has corresponded to the feeling of growing regional isolation. In this country, UNASUR has showed little instrument, besides political mediation to mitigate difficulties faced by the Bolivarian process, where there are signs of a neoliberal restauration.

The moderated orientation of UNASUR reflected, in a certain way, the prevailing positions of the Brazilian diplomacy during PT administrations. However, in a moment when the so called progressive wave reflows in South America, the ambiguities of this bet for moderation are evident not only on the domestic plan, where a former ally came into the presidency in the midst of a spurious process, but also in the regional perspective, where UNASUR seems more useful to the government that aims a conservative change than to the one that would like to preserve change.

Some observed with bitterness that the impeachment process in Brazil was approved in parliament in April 17th of 2016, a date in which peasant movements celebrate as the day of the fight for land, in memory of the massacre of Eldorado dos Carajás. But few remembered that this is also the day that UNASUR was baptized, in the energy dome of the Margarita Island in Venezuela in 2007. In 2014, the date was consecrated as the day of the “Union of the South American Nations”. It remains to be seen what kind of union will be possible for the subcontinent and who will benefit from it from now on.

REFERENCES

- Amorim, Celso. 2004. 'Conceitos e estratégias da diplomacia do governo Lula'. *DEP- Diplomacia, Estratégia e Política*. 1(1): 41-48.
- Aponte García, Maribel. 2015. 'La teorización del nuevo regionalismo estratégico en el ALBA-TCP'. Em:_____.; Amézquita Puntiel, Glora. *El ALBA-TCP. Origen y fruto del nuevo regionalismo latinoamericano y caribeño*. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.
- _____.; Amézquita Puntiel, Glora. 2015. *El ALBA-TCP. Origen y fruto del nuevo regionalismo latinoamericano y caribeño*. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.
- BBC. 2015. Qué se dice de la crisis de la frontera entre Venezuela y Colombia en Caracas y Bogotá? 25/08/2015. Accessed on 21 September, 2015.<http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/08/150825_america_latina_venezuela_colombia_ambos_lados_fronteras_amv>.
- Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica. 2013. *Basta Ya! Colombia: memorias de guerra y dignidad*. Resúmen. Bogotá: Imprensa Nacional.
- Cepeda, Iván; Uribe, Alirio. 2014. *Por las sendas de El Ubérrimo*. Bogotá: Ediciones B.
- Cerezal, Manuel; Simarro, Ricardo Molero; Soler, Alberto Montero. 2013. 'El SUCRE: orígenes, funcionamiento y perspectivas de futuro para la integración latinoamericana'. Em: Martins, Carlos Eduardo. *Los retos de la integración y América del Sur*. Buenos Aires: Clacso, 2013.
- Comini, Nicolás. 2015. 'El origen del consejo de defensa suramericano. Modelos en pugna desde una perspectiva argentina. Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional'. Accessed on 22 July, 2016. <<http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/revista/?q=content/el-origen-del-consejo-de-defensa-suramericano-modelos-en-pugna-desde-una-perspectiva>>.
- Currea-Lugo, Víctor. 'Colombia y el Estado palestino'. Em: Jost, Stefan (ed.). *Colombia: una potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior*. Bogotá: Konrad Adenauer, 2a ed.
- Desidera Neto, Walter; Teixeira, Rodrigo. 2012. "La recuperación del Desarrollo en el Regionalismo Latinoamericano". In:_____. *Perspectivas para la integración de América Latina*. Brasília: CAF; IPEA.
- Dietrich, Heinz. 2005. *Hugo Chávez y el socialismo del siglo XXI*. Buenos Aires: Nuestra América.
- El Universal. 2015. 'César Gaviria plantea que Colombia salga de Unasur por postura de Samper' 26/8/2015. Accessed 20 September, 2015 .<<http://>

- www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/150826/cesar-gaviria-plant-
ea-que-colombia-salga-de-unasur-por-postura-de-samp>.
- Espinosa, Eugenio. 2013. 'Teoría y practica de la integración regional: una
visión desde el sur: el Alba'. Em: Martins, Carlos Eduardo. *Los retos de
la integración y América del Sur*. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.
- Giraldo, Javier. 1996. *Colombia: the genocidal democracy*. Monroe: Common
Courage Press.
- Hausman, Ricardo. 2016. 'De que se trata el proyecto sobre Venezue-
la que está haciendo Harvard?' Disponível em: [http://prodavinci.
com/2016/06/27/actualidad/de-que-se-trata-el-proyecto-sobre-vene-
zuela-que-esta-haciendo-la-universidad-de-harvard-por-ricardo-haus-
mann/](http://prodavinci.com/2016/06/27/actualidad/de-que-se-trata-el-proyecto-sobre-venezuela-que-esta-haciendo-la-universidad-de-harvard-por-ricardo-hausmann/). Accessed on 22 July, 2016.
- Lula da Silva, Luis Inácio. 2014. 'Oposição e governo iniciam diálogo na
Venezuela com a mediação da Unasul'. Accessed on 22 July, 2016.
<[http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/oposicao-governo-iniciam-dialo-
gos-na-venezuela-com-mediacao-da-unasul-1-12127392](http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/oposicao-governo-iniciam-dialogos-na-venezuela-com-mediacao-da-unasul-1-12127392)>.
- Luzzani, Telma. 2012. *Territorios vigilados. Como opera la red de bases militares
norteamericanas en Sudamérica*. Buenos Aires: Debate.
- Maringoni, Gilberto. 2004. *A Venezuela que se inventa*. São Paulo: Perseu
Abramo.
- Monedero, Juan Carlos. 2013. 'Venezuela y la reinvencción de la política: el
desafío del socialismo en nuevos escenarios'. Em: *Observatorio Social
de América Latina*, N. 33. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 15-37.
- OIDHACO- Oficina Internacional de Derechos Humanos Acción Colombia .
Plan Colombia : Una estrategia sin solución. Madrid, 2000. Accessed 7
September, 2013 <[http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/oidha-
co2.html](http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/oidhaco2.html)>
- Pastrana, Eduardo; Vera, Diego. 2013. 'De Uribe a Santos: continuidad o nue-
va orientación de la política exterior colombiana?'. Em: Jost, Stefan
(ed.). *Colombia: una potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su
política exterior*. Bogotá: Konrad Adenauer, 2a ed..
- Pismel, Matheus Lobo; Chagas, Rodrigo Simões. 2014. *Colômbia: movimentos
pela paz*. Florianópolis: Insular.
- Ramírez, Kenneth. 2014. 'El consejo de Lula' Accessed on 22 July, 2016 [http://
covri.com.ve/index.php/2014/04/15/el-consejo-de-lula-por-kenneth-
ramirez/](http://covri.com.ve/index.php/2014/04/15/el-consejo-de-lula-por-kenneth-ramirez/).
- Samper, Ernensto. 2015. Conferência na VII Congresso do CLACSO, Me-
dellín, 17/11/2015.

- Sanahuja, José Antonio. 2012. 'Regionalismo post-liberal y multilateralismo en Sudamérica: El caso de UNASUR'. In: SERBIN, Andrés; MARTÍNEZ, Laneydi; RAMANZINI JÚNIOR, Haroldo; *El regionalismo "post-liberal" en América Latina y el Caribe: Nuevos actores, nuevos temas, nuevos desafíos*. Anuario de la Integración Regional de América Latina y el Gran Caribe 2012. Buenos Aires: Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales.
- Santos, Fabio Luis Barbosa dos. 2015 'Colômbia e Venezuela: tensão nas fronteiras e o papel da UNASUL'. *Conjuntura Austral*, 6: 36-47.
- Webber, Jeffery; Carr, Barry. 2013. *The new Latin American left. Cracks in the Empire*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

INTERVIEWS

- Acosta, Alberto. 2015. Ex-presidente da Assembleia Constituinte no Equador e ex-ministro do governo Correa. Quito, setembro.
- Barros, Pedro Silva. 2015. Diretor de Assuntos Econômicos da UNASUL. Quito, setembro.
- Betancourt Vélez, Ricardo. 2015. Professor da Pontifícia Universidade Javeriana. Bogotá, novembro.
- Cerezal, Manuel. 2015. Assessor do Banco Central da Venezuela, pesquisador da Universidade Bolivariana da Venezuela. Caracas, novembro.
- Constant Rosales, Hector. 2015. Diplomata e professor da Universidade Central da Venezuela. Caracas, novembro.
- Dorfler, Mauricio. 2015. Diretor de Assuntos Políticos e Defesa da UNASUL. Quito, setembro.
- Estrada Álvarez, Jairo. 2014. Professor da Universidade Nacional da Colômbia. Bogotá, julho.
- Figuerola, Amilcar. 2015. Dirigente do Partido Socialista Unido da Venezuela (PSUV). Caracas, novembro.
- Fundación Lazos de Dignidad. 2014. Bogotá, julho.
- Jara, Luz Estela. 2015. Diplomata, delegada da Colômbia na UNASUL. Quito, setembro.
- Jaramillo, Mauricio. 2015. Assessor da Secretaria Geral da UNASUL. Quito, setembro.
- Lander, Edgardo. 2015. Sociólogo. Medellín, novembro.

- Londoño, Julio. 2015. Diplomata e militar, ex-ministro das Relações Exteriores da Colômbia (1986-1990), embaixador em Cuba (1998-2010). Bogotá, novembro.
- Nascone, Mariano. 2015. Diretor de Assuntos Sociais da UNASUL. Quito, setembro.
- Paes, Pedro. 2015. Economista, um dos idealizadores de uma 'nova arquitetura financeira'. Quito, setembro.
- Parkinson de Castro, João Carlos. 2015. Coordenação-Geral de Assuntos Econômicos da América do Sul. Montevidéu, dezembro.
- Pastrana Buelvas, Eduardo. 2015. Professor da Pontifícia Universidade Javeriana. Bogotá, novembro.
- Pietro Alarcón. 2014. Advogado, professor da PUC. São Paulo, maio.
- Ramírez, Kenneth. 2015. Diretor do Consejo Venezolano de Relaciones Internacionales. Caracas, novembro.
- Ramos, Felipe. 2015. Missão do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) na Venezuela. Caracas, novembro.
- Rodríguez, Ronal. 2015. Diretor do Observatório da Venezuela, Universidade do Rosário. Bogotá, novembro.
- Toledo, Alexis. 2014. Vice-Ministro do Poder Popular para as Comunas e os Movimentos Sociais. Caracas, agosto.
- Urbina, Elvis. 2015. Coordenador nacional da Venezuela no COSIPLAN. Montevidéu, dezembro.
- Villegas, Pablo. 2015. Pesquisador do CEDIB. La Paz, julho.

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the relation of Venezuela and Colombia with Unasur since its creation in 2008, with the purpose of exploring the reach and the limits intrinsic to a regional institution that incorporated countries with different governments in its original moment.

KEYWORDS

UNASUR; Venezuela; Colombia.

Received on August 23, 2016.

Accepted on December 11, 2016.

Translated by Vitória Kramer

BOLIVARIAN FOREIGN POLICY: VENEZUELA'S INTERNATIONAL INSERTION DURING HUGO CHÁVEZ FRÍAS FIRST-TWO MANDATES (1999-2007)

Pedro Henrique de Moraes Cicero¹

Introduction: Basis, objectives and periodization of the Bolivarian Foreign Policy

According to Romero (2006), the foreign policy presented during the administration of Hugo Chávez was characterized, among other dimensions, by the non-exclusively commercial use of hydrocarbons for the international projection of the country. According to the author, this characteristic put the so-called "Bolivarian diplomacy"² against the previous Venezuelan governments, since, from its beginnings and due to that specificity, the proposal sought the opposition to the *status quo* established in the regional and international levels.

In this sense, the initial understanding assumed by the Bolivarian government over international politics focused on denouncing and combating the [global] distribution of power. This position has already appeared in several documents from before the victory in the election, in which the political group led by Chavez blamed part of Venezuela's underdevelopment Venezuelan on the so-called "powerful nations"³. Thus, when he assumed

¹ Coordinator of the International Relations undergraduate course at Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (UFU) (2015-2017), Adjunct Professor at UFU, PhD and MSc in Political Science from the Universidade Estadual Campinas (UNICAMP). E-mail: pedrohenrique@ufu.br

² "Bolivarian Diplomacy" and "Bolivarian Foreign Policy" are the commonly used names (Romero 2006, Jácome 2011) to refer to the international actions undertaken by the Venezuelan government after the election of Hugo Chavez in 1999. In this sense, this international dimension is the political project established internally, which was denominated "Bolivarian Revolution".

³ As it appears, for example, in the section on international conjuncture exposed in the docu-

the presidency, Chavez began to orient Venezuelan foreign policy, which was predominantly based on the struggle for the strengthening of multipolarity in International Relations.

This project was based on the diagnosis of the existence of only one pole of power in the International System (the United States), which in turn produced a disheartening scenario for other nations, since, unlike the bipolarity experienced during the Cold War, there was no counterbalance to the “neoliberalizing and globalizing” project disseminated by Washington. On this issue, Chávez stated in an interview to Foreign Affairs magazine:

We must fight against a unipolar world and in favor of a new international order that has been talked about for decades, but that has remained in the speech. A fair, democratic, balanced international policy is indispensable. But to achieve this, we must contribute to the creation of this pluripolar world 4(tradução nossa).

Guided by that diagnosis, the initial actions of the Bolivarian foreign policy (BFP) intended to contribute to the articulation of alternative power poles in the international institutional framework built from the American hegemony. Chávez and his followers announced their commitment to the ideals of solidarity and Latin American unity expressed by Simón Bolívar in the mid-nineteenth century, which were recovered and fused to the situation of interdependence among nations in the contemporary international system. The Venezuelan president was therefore convinced that to overcome dependence and underdevelopment, it was essential to build a project and a collective strategy among his Latin American counterparts (Lander 2005).

However, such principles alone would not have meaning if they were not put into practice through concrete experiences. These, in turn, were linked to the domestic political situation, which influenced and guided the external commitments of a government that, from the beginning, was diplomatically active. Based on this interface, this article intends to emphasize the articulations between the two levels - internal and international - as a crucial element for the argumentative construction of the potentialities and weaknesses presented by Bolivarian diplomacy in its attempt to effectively contribute to the establishment of modifying practices of the status quo in the context of contemporary international relations.

ment entitled “Alternative Bolivarian Agenda”, which was published by the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200 in 1996, which can be accessed in full at: <http://www.imprentanacional.gob.ve/web/libros/libros/Libro-Rojo-II-2-14-fs-web.pdf>.

4 The interview, whose title is “Globalización: La enfermedad del nuevo milenio”, can be accessed at: <http://www.foreignaffairs-esp.org>

In general, the performance of Venezuelan diplomacy during the first two presidential terms fulfilled by Hugo Chávez Frías was marked by two interstices in which a proactive and somewhat audacious stance was adopted, merged with a period in which the troubled domestic situation sharply halted its "internationalist impetus." Based on the detailed study of these three moments, this text aims to characterize and problematize the most relevant actions and foundations incorporated by the Bolivarians in the context of international politics.

The first diplomatic offensive (1999-2001)

The first moment of an outstanding performance on the part of the Bolivarian Diplomacy took place between 1999 and 2001, being characterized by the combination of an aggressive and blunt discourse that, in practice, remains diluted by the implementation of projects and more moderate initiatives. Initially, BFP had to follow up and fit into the broad program of institutional reconfigurations proposed by the new representative to the country. Thus, in line with the initial effort to articulate a constitutional process⁵, which envisaged the "re-founding of the Republic," the position adopted by the new government in relation to the foreign policy previously established was also based on criticism and, consequently, on the need to substantial changes.

To that end, José Vicente Rangel, the first Bolivarian chancellor, focused his interventions and speeches on the argument that the foreign policy of the past did not respond to the interests of the Venezuelan people because it was too elitist. He added that Chávez's election clearly demonstrated the desire for drastic changes in national politics, which, of course, should also be extended to the management of international politics. Hence, the imperiousness of putting into practice an innovative, eminently sovereign and solidary diplomacy that was a faithful reflection of the transformations established in the internal structures of the nation for the benefit of the popular sectors (Boersner 2009).

Thus, in this initial moment, and in general terms, the Bolivarian government has striven to articulate and lead the group of Latin American countries committed to press for the establishment of international relations

5 Chávez's main political stance during the 1998 election campaign expressed the need for a complete overhaul of Venezuelan political institutions. In order to do so, it proposed to establish a constitutional process, which, through a plebiscite, was approved by the population as early as 1999. In a context in which 121 of the 131 constituents were Chavez's coreligionists, the country's new Constitution promulgated On December 15, 1999, mirrored, to a great extent, the government program presented by the Bolivarian leader.

and organizations centered on the principles of equity and solidarity, which, consequently, would help build a scenario of greater social justice in the region. Chávez, thus, emerged as the mainstay of the other rulers who made up the so-called Latin American “new left”⁶ that ascended to power in the early years of the new millennium with platforms critical of the paradigm of neoliberal globalization.

In this sense, and in view of the negative [or not] profile of neoliberal principles, Chavez deliberately brought his diplomacy closer to the Latin American governments he considered “progressive”; In turn, he began to avoid alliances with the countries that, for the Bolivarian president, were run by “oligarchs” and therefore behaved like US officials on the regional scene. Such a position has, in the first instance, resulted in the weakening of bilateral relations with Colombia and Mexico, given their permissive and conciliatory positions vis-à-vis US interests in the region. On the other hand, there was a marked diplomatic rapprochement with Cuba (Boersner 2009).

In turn, with regard to international economic relations and especially the oil and trade policy signed during the first three years of the Bolivarian government, emerged two main strategies: the commitment to strengthen the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and also the effort to diversify the partners and the scope of Venezuelan foreign trade. Both strategies had as a common motivation the struggle to dampen the country’s economic dependence on exports to the United States, so that the diplomatic corps was mobilized to partner with new trade consortiums around the world, as well as to strengthen existing links.

The Venezuelan President and his most prominent advisers were therefore firmly committed to working within the oil cartel with a view to rearticulate it and thereby to consolidate the necessary political force to undertake more systematic actions regarding fuel pricing in the international market. In addition to the extremely important objective price increase, given the characteristic rentier of the Venezuelan economy (Cicero 2015) - the struggle for OPEC’s re-articulation also stood as an opportunity for BFP to present its “business card” in order to strengthen multipolarity in the International System.

6 Chávez's election in 1998 was the first in a series of victories of candidates considered “anti-neoliberal” in the Latin American political scene at the turn of the millennium. Whatever the specificities of each of these governments, there were important similarities among them, for example, the need to establish a “counter-agenda”, based on the struggle for state sovereignty, international solidarity and the feasibility of collective mechanisms that aid in the endogenous development of these nations (Miranda 2012).

Even in the face of the political heterogeneity of the cartel⁷ participants Chávez and the Venezuelan diplomatic apparatus succeeded in their goal and, from September 27th to 28th 2000, Caracas hosted the II OPEC Summit. At that time, most of the member countries were represented by their heads of state or by members of the bureaucratic high-ranking. The resulting document from the conference - the "Declaration of Caracas" - listed the agreements reached between the oil-exporting countries, which, among other deliberations, committed themselves to comply with the stable price⁸ policy, to aggregate the tax on industrialized products as an essential component for the definition of the final selling price of the barrels and, also, to strengthen the cartel's institutional links.

In turn, with respect to the effort to diversify Venezuelan trading partners, the obtained results were conflicting. On the one hand, oil exports continued to be directed, in large measure, to traditional markets, especially to the United States. Of course, maintaining fuel supplies at levels similar to those registered in the period immediately prior to Chávez's inauguration was a key element in Washington's complacent posture before the speeches delivered by the Venezuelan leader (Illera 2005).

However, despite the aforementioned stability of trade flows in view of the United States, some diplomatic actions were carried out to geographically reorient not only the country's oil exports but also trade in non-rentier economic activities. Already at that time, China emerged as the nation with the greatest potential to establish, in practice, the deepening of relations with previously non-traditional consorts. In the same direction, BFP has instituted a number of actions aimed at intensifying trade relations with Europe and, from them, replacing the importation of US industrial inputs with capital goods from the "old world". The Venezuelan government also committed itself to granting more favorable tax and tax conditions to European companies that wanted to establish business in the South American country. This difference in the treatment was responsible for the significant drop in US investments in the country. In contrast, between 1999 and 2002, French in-

7 Among the members of OPEC is Saudi Arabia, whose royal family historically takes a conservative stance and averse to events that could serve as the stage for potentially disruptive discourses of the international *status quo*.

8 The proposal presented by the Venezuelans during the Summit and accepted by other members of OPEC was aimed at maintaining the price of a barrel of oil at the level of US \$ 22 and US \$ 28. The trade strategy to achieve such stability was based on the following mechanism: if the fuel value exceeded the \$ 28 limit for more than 20 working days, the cartel countries would inject an additional 500 million barrels a day into the world market; In turn, if the price were below the minimum value established, the inverse measure would be adopted (Arriagada 2005).

vestments in Venezuela increased six-fold. In the same period, the volume of business carried out in the country by Swiss and German companies tripled (Hidalgo 2009).

Thus, having achieved successes in its initial two foreign policy objectives - the strengthening of OPEC and the diversification of the country's trading partners - the Bolivarian government gathered forces to continue positioning its strategy in 2001 with a view to multipolarity in the International System by not supporting the proposal of the hemispheric Free Trade Area (FTAA) presented by the US government.

This position was made during the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec, in which the Venezuelan diplomatic representation focused on defending two central points: first, the need for, also in International Relations, to extrapolate representative democracy, and thus to add to diplomatic practice elements that would enable citizens to participate directly in decision-making on policies that concern the sovereignty of their countries. Secondly, the imperative to oppose the urgency demanded by Washington in its strategy to consolidate the hemispheric free trade area as early as 2005, regardless of studies and broad debates on the positive and negative impacts that such initiative would bring to the Latin American economy. Such attitudes are expressed in the "Québec Declaration"⁹, in which Venezuela "reserved its position" in relation to strictly representative democracy within the framework of the OAS, as well as to the maximum deadline of December 2005 for the entry into force of the FTAA agreement.

The first setback (2001-2003)

However, the first diplomatic offensive of the Bolivarian regime was halted and, to some extent, interrupted by serious instability in domestic politics experienced between the second half of 2001 and 2003. The institutional crisis occasioned by the incisive performance of opposition groups and organizations to the Chávez government caused, during this period, numerous damages to the country, which were also felt in Venezuelan businesses and political activities signed internationally (Romero 2010).

In this sense, even more than the ephemeral coup d'état in April 2002, the articulation of the "Paro Petrolero"¹⁰ was the action that represent-

⁹ The final document prepared by the participating countries in this meeting can be accessed in full at <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/summits/quebec>.

¹⁰ The political events called "Paro Petrolero" consisted in the stoppage of labor and economic activities by a significant portion of the population as a way of expressing their discontent with the government headed by Hugo Chávez. The economic devastation generated by the shut-

ed, at least in the sphere of foreign policy, the greatest obstacle to the country during that troubled period. In addition to the commercial losses imposed on the country, the drastic decrease in the production and commercialization of Venezuelan fuel due to the sabotage of PDVSA's activities also generated instability in international capitalist production, as the industrialized countries were suddenly left out of access to an important reserve of hydrocarbons. To make the scenario even more disheartening for the latter, the paralysis of Venezuelan production occurred concurrently with another time of great political tension - the invasion of Iraq by the United States - a situation that also greatly impacted the international oil trade.

In view of this situation, the resolution of the Venezuelan oil impasse was taken as a priority by the international community, which played a decisive role during the process that finally ended the *lock-out*. To that end, two political leaders played a key role: former US President Jimmy Carter, who shortly after being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2002, offered himself to mediate the conflict between the Bolivarian government and the opposition; In turn, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva - recently installed president of Brazil - jointly with the leaders of Chile, Mexico, Spain, Portugal and the United States, created the "Group of Venezuela's Friends", which succeeded in appeasing the clashes by proposing to hold a recall referendum as a mechanism to resolve the controversy (Boersner 2009).

Chávez's victory in the referendum¹¹ coincided with the robust rise in oil prices in the international market. Consequently, Venezuelan tax receipts rose as well. The new scenario, internally, allowed the Bolivarian government to promote the expansion of public expenditures, which were directed primarily to finance a series of social programs - the so-called "*Misiones Bolivarianas*" - that were then built (Cicero 2010).

At the international level, the rise in the price of the barrel of oil also provided a resumption of the proactive stance on the part of the Caribbean country, which had the necessary material conditions to articulate more assertive and direct diplomatic actions. Here, again attesting to the rentier characteristic of the model of economic development practiced in Venezuela, it is fundamental to emphasize the importance and the role of "guarantor" exercised by the oil in the process. It was, undoubtedly, the condition of a hydrocarbons exporting country that gave much of the resources needed to

down culminated in the 27% drop in Venezuelan GDP during the first quarter of 2003 (Vera 2005).

11 After a troubled process of collection of signatures by political parties and organizations opposing Bolivarianism, on August 15, 2004, the litigation occurred, and its final result, by a margin of 58.25% against 41.74%, favored Hugo Chávez Frías.

finance the most auspicious projects ever implemented. Thus, as will be detailed in the next section, without such contributions from the international hydrocarbons trade, the regional integration projects proposed by the BFP and focused on the non-exclusively commercial use of oil as an instrument of foreign policy could hardly have left the paper.

The second diplomatic offensive (2004-2007)

The period beginning in 2004 and extending through 2007 is characterized by the intense performance of BFP in the international context, and especially in the inter-American scenario. During this time, given the excellent economic conditions provided by the boom in oil prices that characterized those years, Bolivarian diplomacy made the international insertion of the country more complex and multifaceted. Venezuela has from then on adopted a proactive and determined posture to make “social development” a priority on the agenda of its international relations.

The two main regional initiatives created by the Venezuelan enterprise in this period - the “Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas” and its articulation in the energy sector, the “PetroAmerica” project - will be detailed in order to add another dimension to the analysis on how the condition of oil-exporting country shaped the choices and action of Venezuelan foreign policy.

ALBA: Regional Integration beyond the economy

About ALBA, at the outset, it is important to point out that such an initiative was articulated in order to try to break with the trajectory hitherto instituted by the other Latin American and Caribbean integration projects, whose apex, at that moment, was materialized in the framework of the FTAA negotiations. In addition to important differences in relation to the countries that would comprise it - including Cuba¹² and excluding the US and Canada - ALBA emerged as an alternative to the model of hemispheric trade integration orchestrated by the United States precisely because it contradicted the

¹² Cuba's participation in the ALBA framework is a good example to portray the uniqueness of the proposed integration presented by the Bolivarian alternative. Under the terms of the agreement, the Caribbean island enjoys important commercial benefits provided by the Venezuelans, who in turn are aware of the economic difficulties faced by Cuba and, therefore, take action to help the neighboring country. As a counterpart to the assistance provided, from programs designed under the auspices of ALBA, Cubans provide a remarkable number of qualified professionals designated to work especially in the areas of health and education in Venezuela and in the other countries that have joined the initiative.

emphasis that this proposal gave to the neoliberal assumptions in driving the process.

In turn, the Bolivarian integration project is predominantly based on struggles against poverty and against social exclusion through the adoption of equitable strategies of cooperation among nations. In general terms, and taking Villa's argument (2007, 42), it can be said that "Venezuela conceives an integration process on bases not only economic, but also profoundly political."

Therefore, in view of the principles and guidelines to be exercised within the framework of ALBA, it is proposed to build a system capable of combating asymmetries and catalyzing endogenous national and regional development, which would help mitigate latent social inequalities in the Latin American context. In this sense, it is extracted from its constitutive documents¹³ that the integration principles proposed by the initiative are solidarity, complementarity and compensatory financing to tackle asymmetries and differential treatment between countries according to the circumstances.

In order to materialize them, the proposed actions are concentrated in three main cores, namely: to provide financing for both commercial and infrastructural activities and to reduce the budgetary commitment resulting from the import of energy by the countries of the bloc; invest directly in social projects, especially in the areas of health and education; And enter into trade agreements not based exclusively on material/financial reciprocity¹⁴.

In this sense, rather than a direct contraposition to the principles and mechanisms envisioned by the initiative of regional integration proposed by the Americans, ALBA also substantiated an opposition to neoliberal globalization established in the inter-American scenario. Such assertive stance is justified because previously mentioned constitutive documents consider asymmetric trade relations between developed and developing countries as a central obstacle that greatly hampers the eradication of poverty in the latter. To remedy this situation, the Bolivarian alternative encourages preferential treatment for both the nations and the less privileged social sectors that are

13 Such information is contained in the official document entitled "What is ALBA", available at http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/pdf/alba_mice_en.pdf.

14 Non-reciprocity and compensatory trade (through direct exchange of products) are the two main ways in which the principles of fair exchange and differential treatment are applied in the context of ALBA. In addition, trade agreements are negotiated on a case-by-case basis, allowing flexibility to remedy specific difficulties according to the circumstances of each country. In this sense, for example, Cuba agreed to guarantee duty free access to Venezuelan imports, as well as to remove all non-tariff barriers; Venezuela, in return, eliminated only non-tariff barriers (Girvan 2008).

part of them. This position is firmly established by the need to address the trade discrepancies caused by the deterioration of the terms of trade, which potentialize the situation of endemic poverty faced by so-called “peripheral countries”.

Through ALBA, the BFP’s intention of leading a regional integration process based on the protagonism of issues related to economic development and social justice was consolidated, as well as the appreciation of Latin American culture and traditions, fundamentally, from the resumption of Simón Bolívar’s political heritage (Altmann 2009). This proposal reverberated with relative success in the regional context and, after a decade of its foundation, the International Organization is composed of eight nations (Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela).

Regarding its members, it is important to emphasize the low level of industrialization presented by them, a situation that makes them continue dependent, even participating in the initiative, on exports of low value-added products, which are mostly transacted with the industrialized countries. Such dynamic is perverse for the concrete advance of the ALBA’s contest practice, since the persistence of unequal trade flows between central and peripheral countries translates into one of the factors that contribute most to the maintenance of inequality in international economic relations.

“Diplomacy of Petroleum” in Bolivarian times

As for the materialization of the initiatives signed within the framework of ALBA, it is worth mentioning here the efforts made by the Venezuelan foreign policy apparatus to assert itself as the main economic asset of the country for the development, catalyzing or deepening the intra-MERCOSUR political-commercial relations. Thus, a broad strategy, historically used by the Caribbean industry to enhance its international insertion was rebuilt: the so-called “petroleum diplomacy”¹⁵.

Specifically in the context of ALBA, this mechanism was embodied

¹⁵ According to Poetner (2011: 87), the foreign policy strategy known as “oil diplomacy” can take on two facets, namely: “one is the result of applying force and hegemony to control this energy resource [oil]; the other is the open and arbitrary use of oil wealth to influence events in other countries. The first situation revolves around the creation of domination and subordination between countries through the control of oil resources. The dependence of oil-importing countries may be further reinforced if they are sold at preferential prices or term. The second situation focuses on the current exercise of the power of wealth in order to gain influence and power over other states by acting directly on their governments or on opposition groups or movements”.

through the implementation of the “PetroAmerica Project”, which proposes, in general terms, to promote and deepen energy integration among Latin American countries. On the current political scenario that determines the progress [or not] of this process, Fuser considers (2011, 01):

Few ideas are able to mobilize such unanimous support from South American political and business leaderships as for the need for greater energy integration among the countries of the region [...] Energy integration is presented, consensually, as a necessary and a possible goal.

In this sense, and benefiting itself from the political scenario described above, BFP sought to promote regional energy coordination in order to, given the abundance of resources available to Venezuelans, coordinate and leverage fuel supply to neighbors, especially the Caribbean and Central American ones.

In doing so, in addition to making the sale of oil, the Chavez-led government also consolidated its political influence in the regional context, inasmuch as energy integration, as proposed, represented a “good deal” for the importers of oil. Thus, the interdependence largely due to the hydrocarbons trade gave the necessary conditions for BFP to assume, in that moment, the innovative and combative posture that, among other initiatives, managed to articulate ALBA itself, which, its flagrant weaknesses, represents an important Bolivarian contribution in its attempt to strengthen multipolarity in the International System.

In this context, PetroAmerica represents, in turn, an initiative for energy integration under the auspices of ALBA. According to PDVSA's non-electronic exhibition, “a PetroAmerica is a proposal for energy integration of the continent's people in the ALBA,” which is “based on the principles of solidarity and complementarity of countries, not just the democratic resource of the people”, and it is conceived as a “geopolitical enabler guided towards establishing mechanisms of cooperation and integration for the energy resources of the Caribbean regions, for Central and South America as a basis for a socioeconomic of the people of the continent”.¹⁶

The set of actions that comprise PetroAmerica therefore constitute, therefore, an important part of the petroleum policy practiced by BFP, which, based on an integrationist proposal, aims, essentially, to value the commercial and political interests of the Latin American countries with regard to the control and sovereignty over its energy resources. Thus, practices such as the

16 Free translation of the guidelines at http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.sp/design/readmenuprinc.tpl.html&newsid_temas=46.

sale of oil below market price and the consolidation of financing channels for politically aligned countries have become the mechanisms used to operationalize the “Bolivarian petrodiploamacy”. Through the initial approximation of agreements made in the energy field, Venezuelans sought to gather allies for their demands and proposals articulated in the International System, as well as instigated the creation of new International Organizations based on innovative principles adverse to US influence, with ALBA being the best-finished example of this effort (Cicero 2015).

In practice, the plan essentially seeks to promote the integration of Latin American and Caribbean state energy companies to implement agreements and joint investments in activities related to the exploration and commercialization of hydrocarbons. In this sense, the proposal gives a strategic importance to the sector, with a view to integrating the establishment of multilevel governance of energy resources at the hemispheric level, so as to ensure coordinated action among the participants, as well as the planning and assessment of long-term challenges and needs (Jácome 2011).

In order to achieve these objectives, there was a focus on the synergy of knowledge, material capacity and experience accumulated by public companies throughout their specific trajectories in the negotiations involving the exploration, purchase and distribution of hydrocarbons. On the reason for being of the complementary initiative Ruiz-Caro (2006, 24):

The agreements in PetroAmerica involve the integration of state energy companies in Latin America and the Caribbean to implement agreements and joint investments in the exploration, exploitation and commercialization of oil and natural gas [...] Such actions are part of the current Venezuelan policy that aims to favor all neighboring countries by buying in the region instead of resorting to the ‘first world’.

The Venezuelan proposal was initially formulated aiming at the founding of a single company, which would bring together the state hydrocarbon companies of the region. To the extent, however, that the difficulties to materialize such negotiations were presented, changes were made in the integration mechanisms, with the prioritization of sub-regional agreements, each with its own characteristics and specificities, which made possible the effectiveness of actions.

The first step in this sense was taken on October 19th 2000, when, in the city of Caracas, it was signed or “Energy Cooperation Agreement”¹⁷ (ECA).

¹⁷ The Agreement can be read in its entirety at: <http://www.sela.org/media/2087691/di-6-evolucion-petrocaribe-esp.pdf>.

At that time, representatives of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic signed bilateral agreements for the purchase of hydrocarbons from Venezuela. An intention was also announced to extend the conditions to all other countries that requested and that, in the judgment of the Bolivarian diplomacy, to the necessary characteristics to appear as beneficiaries of the treaty.

It provided for the sale of crude oil or refined by-products with a fifteen-year term for the amortization of the purchase and sale contracts, in addition to a grace period of up to one year and an interest rate of not more than 2% year. In this sense, the ten agreements only varied in relation to the volume of Venezuelan oil available to the countries, which is calculated according to the specific characteristics, energy structure and consumption of each nation. The terms of trade offered by the Venezuelans were the same for all buyers.

The "Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement" (CCA) signed with Cuba, in 2002, was also added to this set of negotiations. While the latter is still in force, the ECA was absorbed by the "PetroAmerica" initiative, which still offers commercial conditions more favorable to the oil exchange involving the Central American and Caribbean nations.

Since 2004, benefited by internal political stability, the recovery in the international prices of hydrocarbons and after the successful consolidation of the ECA, Bolivarian diplomacy has enjoyed a favorable political-economic scenario to invest even more in the deepening of its international initiatives. Thus, based on the oil boom and the institutional "boom" of the Bolivarian Revolution - materialized by the conquest of all the seats of the National Congress in the legislative elections of December 2005 - the position adopted by BFP was proactive in promoting regional energy integration to qualify the country's participation in the inter-American scenario.

Specifically, as a milestone in this rescheduling of the Bolivarian international insertion, important efforts were made to implement the "PetroAmerica" project in practice. As a result of this strategy, there were three sub-regional energy integration initiatives: "PetroSur", "PetroAndina" and "PetroCaribe". After a decade of activities, these projects presented disparate results. While the first two did not advance satisfactorily - for a number of reasons, which were exposed and problematized in another paper (Cicero 2015) - "PetroCaribe" achieved significant achievements, which will be briefly outlined below.

“PetroCaribe”: energy and social integration

This initiative, established on June 29 2005, on the occasion of the signing of the “Agreement on the Energy Cooperation of Heads of State and Government of the Caribbean”¹⁸, counts, until the present date, on the participation of the following States: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia and Suriname. The action is conceived as an incubator of policies and projects linked to the energy sector, which aims to promote the integration of Central American and Caribbean countries both through the use of natural resources and through the political coordination of relations among its members.

In general terms, the main objective that led to the integration between these nations was the intention to articulate public policies related to the energy issue to facilitate commercial complementarity and political narrowing among the group. For this, the proposal is based on two fundamental pillars: first, in the solidarity of a surplus energy state - Venezuela - with countries with few sources and energy resources; And second, in the recognition of the asymmetries between the levels of economic development presented by the nations involved and the intention to mitigate them (Girvan 2008).

It is hoped, therefore, to promote regional integration guided by the principles of unity, cooperation, complementarity and socio-economic development. From these bases, the Bolivarian government, in the first ten years of PetroCaribe’s activities, estimated that it financed the amount of 200,000 barrels per day of fuel under the initiative, a figure that alone significantly exceeded the cooperation offered by the developed countries within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals proposed by the United Nations (Ruiz-Caro 2006).

In this sense, the “PetroCaribe” project fulfilled the innovations advocated by the BFP in the field of energy cooperation, insofar as the strictly commercial sphere was extrapolated to include in its role of competence actions such as: the planning of the energy policy of the country-members, from the exploitation of hydrocarbons in the available deposits until transportation to the consumer market; the construction of new plants to refine and store the fuel; to urge the development of the petrochemical industry and to finance the necessary training and technological assistance to guarantee the efficiency

¹⁸ The Agreement can be fully conferred at: http://www.sela.org/attach/258/EDOCS/SRed/2013/09/To23600Di_No._3_Cooperacion_Acuerdo_PETROCARIBE-Final_doc_Rev_21-8-13.pdf.

of the commercial activity; articulate and promote the establishment of state-owned energy companies in countries where they do not exist¹⁹.

Respecting, therefore, the same integrationist *logic* proposed under the “umbrella” project (comprehensive) PetroAmerica, the Caribbean initiative is characterized by going beyond of the commercial foundation. This particularity, however, does not annul the attractions offered in this area, insofar as PetroCaribe allows the importing countries of the Venezuelan fuel several economic advantages. Under the other benefits, the agreement will give the former a grace period of up to two years to pay their hydrocarbon consumption, as well as expresses the Venezuelan commitment to unilaterally bear the costs of installing the necessary infrastructure to carry out and qualify the commercial practice through, for example, the construction of refineries in Cuba and Jamaica.

In addition, in order to operationalize the according PetroCaribe, the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA founded a subsidiary company, **PDV Caribe S.A.** The activities carried out by the company are focused on the materialization of contracts and the logistical support necessary for the implementation of the regional integration initiative. About the purposes of the new company, complements Jácome (2011, 05):

Currently Pdvsa sells crude and its derivatives on credit and receiving countries have up to 25 years to pay, with an interest rate of 2% if the barrel is less than \$40 and 1% if it exceeds that figure. The signatories receive the products with a financing of 40% when the price exceeds 50 dollars, 50% if it is above 80 and 60% when it reaches 100 dollars or more.

In other words, in view of these conditions, the statement by Óscar Arias, then president of Costa Rica, did not come as a surprise, and in the course of the [unsatisfactory] negotiations aimed at the inclusion of the Central American country in PetroCaribe, publicly stated in an official visit to the European Union that the credits and resources for cooperation provided by the Venezuelans to the region amounted to four times the amount offered by the Americans. On the basis of IMF calculations, in countries such as Guyana, Jamaica and Nicaragua, the volume of financing obtained through the programs linked to PetroCaribe amounted to between 4% and 5% of the GNP of these nations (Altmann 2009).

Thus, with regard specifically to the country's energy integration

19 Objectives set out in the Cooperation Agreement.

policy 2007 was especially beneficial in view of the fact that PetroCaribe members concluded negotiations that not only reaffirmed efforts for energy integration between the signatory states, but also, have expanded their scope of action towards the principle of social development. To that end, among other deliberations, the agreement was formalized according to which the initiative should transcend the energy scope to place itself in the spaces of productive integration and social development through actions such as: the establishment of agreements for the purchase of originating products from the least developed countries (poultry, fishery, sugar and banana production, among others) by the countries with the highest relative development; the construction of hotel infrastructure for the joint exploration of tourism; the articulation and implementation of common social programs to improve their impact, as well as the joint development of air and sea transport as an indispensable requirement for the implementation of integration.²⁰

Final Considerations

Considering the arguments presented here - which sought to portray, fundamentally, the impacts of the international hydrocarbons trade on the articulation and practice of foreign policy carried out during the first two mandates fulfilled by Hugo Chavez - it is possible to identify in this a pattern of relatively stable behavior, that is, the use of the so-called “petroleum diplomacy” as the promoter of an integrationist proposal that has discontinued the one practiced during the period of neoliberal hegemony in our region. In the same sense, the present study emphasizes that, due to its rentier economic structure, the country has a very unstable position in the context of international economic relations today, in that its strengths and weaknesses are mostly linked to the, sometimes expressive, sometimes insufficient, resources obtained from the sale of oil.

Thus, if within the internal scope the Bolivarian government did not achieve the necessary conditions to dismantle the network commanded by the transnational corporations involved in the exploitation of Venezuelan hydrocarbons (Cicero 2015), Chávez and his co-religionists had a little more room for maneuver, however limited, when taking part in international politics. In this logic, during the non-rare boom periods (notably at the beginning of the

²⁰ The declaration where these proposals are presented is available at: <http://www.granma.cu/granmad/secciones/petrocaribe/cumbres-cel/acuerdo-3.html>.

term, through the re-articulation of OPEC, and for much of its second presidential term), Venezuela, once again in its recent history, has put into practice the “petroleum diplomacy” to increase and qualify its political-economic insertion in international relations.

As a result, by using the “PetroAmerica” project - an ambitious regional energy integration initiative, which is well-articulated to the innovative proposal put forward by ALBA - BFP, backed by petrodollars, has made significant progress in expanding its commercial presence and its political weight in inter-American relations. A limited, but relevant, contribution was made by the Bolivarians to the cooling of US hegemony and, consequently, to the attempt to promote the multipolar rearticulation of power relations in the International System.

On the other hand, even in those moments - and even more so in those cases which the oil prices were falling, as in 2009, for example - the capacity to sustainably qualify and expand the international insertion of the Bolivarian proposal was mitigated by the political-economic ties imposed on a peripheral country such as Venezuela in the context of the international division of labor.

REFERENCES

- Alfonso, H.D. 2006. Hugo Chávez y Cuba: subsidiando posposiciones fatales. *Nueva Sociedad*, (205): 141-158.
- Altmann, J. 2009. *ALBA: institutions and mechanisms*. Quito: Publicaciones de La Secretaria General de FLACSO.
- Arriagada, G. 2005. Petróleo y gas en América Latina: un análisis político y de relaciones internacionales a partir de la política venezolana. *Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos*, (20): 01-35.
- Benzi, D. e Zapata, X. 2013. Geopolítica, economía y solidaridad internacional en la nueva cooperación Sur-Sur: el caso de la Venezuela bolivariana y petrocaribe. *América Latina Hoy*, (63): 65-89.
- Boersner, D. 2009. Incidencia internacional de la política exterior venezolana. *Nueva Economía*, (17)29: 35-73.
- Cicero, P.H.M. 2015. *O rentismo petroleiro e suas implicações para a política externa venezuelana*. Tese de doutorado. Campinas: Universidade Estadual de Campinas.
- Danese, S. 1999. *Diplomacia Presidencial*. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks.

- Fuser, I. 2011. Segurança energética, nacionalismo de recursos e integração na América do Sul. *Seminário Discente FFLCH/USP*. Disponível em: [http://www.fflch.usp.br/dcp/assets/docs/SemDisc2011/Sessao_IX_Fuser.pdf]. Accessed on: 30 November. 2015.
- Girvan, N. 2008. *ALBA, PETROCARIBE and CARICOM: issues in a new dynamic*. Disponível em: [http://www.normangirvan.info/girvan-alba-caricom-mayo]. accessed on: 30 November. 2015.
- González, M. 2003. El petróleo como instrumento de política exterior en el gobierno del presidente Hugo Chávez Frías. *Revista Venezolana de Análisis de Coyuntura*, vol. IX, (02): 59-87.
- Hidalgo, M. 2009. Hugo Chavez's "Petro-Socialism". *Journal of Democracy*, (20) 02: 78-92.
- Illera, O. 2005. La política exterior de Chávez: proyección de la Revolución Bolivariana en las Relaciones Internacionales. *Revista Desafíos*, (12): 209-240.
- Jácome, F. 2011. Petrocaribe: la fase actual de la diplomacia petrolera venezolana en el Caribe. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Policy Paper*. Disponível em: [http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/la-seguridad/08722.pdf]. Accessed on: 30 November, 2015.
- Lander, L. 2005. Petróleo y democracia en Venezuela: del fortalecimiento del Estado a la subversión soterrada y la insurrección abierta. *Revista Galega de Economía*, (14)1-2: 01-14.
- Mayobre, E. 2005. *La propuesta de Petroamérica y la Integración Energética de América Latina y el Caribe*. Caracas: ILDIS.
- Miranda, J.A.A. 2012. *A política externa da Venezuela no governo Hugo Chávez Frías: atores civis e militares*. Tese de Doutorado. Porto Alegre: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
- Poertner, M. 2011. Venezuela Oil Diplomacy and Voting in the U.N. General Assembly. *Journal of International Service*, (20)01:85-108.
- Romero, C.A. 2006. Venezuela y Estados Unidos: ¿una relación esquizofrénica? *Nueva Sociedad*, (206): 78-93.
- . 2010. A política externa da Venezuela bolivariana. *Plataforma Democrática*, (4): 02-36.
- Ruíz-Caro, A. 2006. *Cooperación e integración energética en América Latina y el Caribe*. Santiago: División de Recursos Naturales e Infraestructura, CEPAL.
- Smith, S; Hadfield, A. e Dunnet, T. 2008. *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Vera, L. 2005. *Liderazgo Político, Renta y Política Económica: la gestión económica en la era Chávez*. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.
- Villa, R.D. A política externa venezuelana de Chávez para a América do Sul: entre a ideologização das identidades e as necessidades do pragmatismo. *Observatório Político Sul-Americano*, Análise de conjuntura, (10): 35-49.

ABSTRACT

The article investigates, in three stages, the Venezuelan foreign policy exercised between 1999 and 2007. Initially, efforts were made to strengthen OPEC. Yet, between 2001 and 2003, the internal political crisis had a negative impact on the international insertion sought by the Venezuelans. Finally, between 2004 and 2007, the initial proactive approach was taken based on "diplomacy of oil."

KEYWORDS

Foreign Policy; Venezuela; Petroleum.

Received On 4 April, 2016.

Accepted On 13 December, 2016.

Translated by Maria Gabriela Vieira

PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research, exclusively, on international relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), and, since 2014, it is part of the Faculty of Economics of the same institution in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil's choice for an "active, affirmative and propulsive" foreign policy in the beginning of the 21st century converged with the analyses and projections put forward by NERINT through its numerous seminars and publications.

An outcome of its activity was the creation of an undergraduate course in International Relations (2004), ranked the best in Brazil according to the Ministry of Education (2012), and a Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (2010), as well as the bimonthly journal *Conjuntura Austral* and the bilingual and biannual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*. In addition, since 2016, NERINT offers a bilingual Research Bulletin, published every two months by graduate and undergraduate students and researchers of the Centre. Thus, besides the advanced research, prioritarily focused on emerging countries, NERINT is also the birthplace of undergraduate and graduate programs, not to mention its intense editorial activities.

PPGEEI

The Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master's and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and Inter-

national Relations (NERINT), established in 1999. Other main partners are the Centre for Studies on Technology, Industry, and Labor (NETIT/FCE) and the Center for International Studies on Government (CEGOV). In 2004, an undergraduate degree in International Relations was created at the Faculty of Economics/UFRGS; in 2005 the Center for Studies on Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), recently renamed as Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRA-FRICA), was created. All these actions enabled the rise of an independent line of thinking propped by specialized bibliography.

The research tradition that gave rise to PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of the trends of the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and economics from the beginning of the century confirmed the perspective adopted, which allowed the intense cooperation with the diplomatic and international economic organizations in Brazil. The course is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the integration of emerging powers in international and South-South Relations.

The Program's vision emphasizes strategic, theoretical and applied methods, always relying on rigorous scientific and academic principles to do so. For this reason, it has been approached by students from all over Brazil and several other countries, and it has established partnerships in all continents. Thus, the Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies is a program focused on understanding the rapid changes within the international system. Alongside NERINT, it publishes two journals: *Conjuntura Austral* (bi-monthly) and *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* (biannual and bilingual). PPGEEI has three research lines:

International Political Economy

It focuses on the international insertion of the Brazilian economy and other major developing countries in South America, Asia and Africa; discusses the characteristics and effects of globalization; and develops comparative and sectoral studies concerned with the effects of the internationalization of companies and productive sectors. Special attention is paid to international financial crises and its effects on Brazil and other countries of the South.

International Politics

It emphasizes the analysis of the process of formation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. It seeks to confront patterns of international integration of strategic countries in South America, Africa and Asia, considering institutional patterns, trade policy, structures of intermediation of interest, governance, International Law and the role of actors of civil society in the South-South axis of contemporary International Relations.

International Security

It approaches the defense, strategy and security issues in the international system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at the global level, but systematically introduces the question of the regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes, military issues and the impact of information technology in the Digital Age.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in Brazil-South Africa Centre of Studies (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG) of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA in order to cover the whole of Africa. At the same time, the South African series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The Centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, to support the development of memoirs, thesis and undergraduate works, to congregate research groups on Africa, to organize seminars, to promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, to establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, to publish national and translated works on the field, and to expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the African continent and its relations with Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focuses on "Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African Conflicts", "Integration and Development in Africa", "African Relations with Great Powers", and "Inter-African Relations".

SUBMISSION STANDARDS

1. AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations publishes only articles;
2. The research articles must contain a maximum of 12 thousand words;
3. The footnotes should be of a complementary nature;
4. The bibliography must follow the rules of the Chicago system (Author-date or note-bibliography), specifying the used literature at the end of the text;
5. Contributions must be original and unpublished, and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;
6. Contributions must contain the full name of the author, their titles, institutional affiliation (the full name of the institution) and an e-mail address for contact;
7. The complete filling of the submission form by the authors is mandatory;
8. Contributions from undergraduate or graduate students are allowed, as long as in partnership with a Professor or PhD, which will appear as the main author of the work;
9. Manuscripts from only one author must be written by a Professor or PhD;
10. There is a limit of three (3) authors per article;
11. Contributions must be accompanied of: three keywords in Portuguese or Spanish and three keywords in English; title in English and in Portuguese or Spanish; abstract in English and in Portuguese or Spanish, both with up to 100 words.
12. Submissions must be made through the journal website: <http://seer.ufrgs.br/Austral>

SUBMISSION PREPARATION CHECKLIST

As part of the submission process, authors are required to check off their submission's compliance with all of the following items, and submissions may be returned to authors that do not adhere to these guidelines.

1. Contributions must be original, and shall not have been submitted for publication in another journal; otherwise, it must be justified in "Comments to the Editor".
2. Submitted files must be in Microsoft Word, OpenOffice or RTF (as long as their size is up to 2MB) format.
3. URLs must be informed in the references when necessary.
4. The text must be single-spaced; Times New Roman typeface 12 pt must be used for the body of the text; italic is to be used instead of underline (except in URL addresses); Figures and Tables must be embedded in the text.
5. The text must follow patterns of style and bibliographical requirements described in the About the Journal section.
6. The identification of authorship of the work must be removed from the file and the Properties option in Word, thus ensuring the confidentiality criteria of the journal, accordingly with available instructions in the website.

PREVIOUS ISSUES

Available online on:
www.seer.ufrgs.br/Austral

Volume 4, Number 7 (Jan./Jun. 2015)

Editor's Note (*Paulo Fagundes Visentini*)

Grand Strategy: foreign and defense policy in a changing world (*Celso Amorim*)

The causes of World War 3: class, geopolitics and hegemony in the 21st Century – a re-reading of Arrighi, through McDermott, Schumpeter and Veblen (*Steven Colatrella*)

Naval relations between the United Kingdom and Brazil during the Cold War: the case of the purchase of the Vosper frigates (*João Roberto Martins Filho*)

A comparative analysis of Imperial Japan's predicament in China and U.S. quagmire in post-Saddam Iraq: similarities, lessons and implications (*Masahiro Matsumura*)

The emergence of the periphery in the World System: from the Bandung Conference to the Buenos Aires Conference (1955–1978) (*Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira, Klei Medeiros*)

Angola's regional foreign policy: changes facing the systemic order (1975–2010) (*Igor Castellano da Silva*)

Reflections on the Chinese Emergence (*Cesar Augusto Lambert de Azevedo*)

Development and the WTO: freedom for whom? (*Rafael Rosa Cedro*)

From the center to the periphery: Holy See's diplomacy ideological displacement after Pope Francis (*Anna Carletti*)

Domestic order and Argentina's foreign policy: the issue of the biofuels (*Cristian Lorenzo*)

Volume 4, Number 8 (Jul./Dec. 2015)

Editor's Note: Third World or Global South? (*Paulo Fagundes Visentini*)

United States, Latin America and the XXI Century World: forging a new geopolitical space (*Severino Cabral*)

Bandung, the Non-Aligned and the media: the role of the journal "Third World" in South-South dialogue (*Beatriz Bissio*)

Multilateralism and the UN in South Africa's Foreign Policy (*Chris Landsberg*)

Cape Verde: geopolitics and projection of a small island State in West Africa (*João Paulo Madeira*)

Terrorism in West African history: a 21st Century appraisal (*Walter Gam Nkwi*)

Radical Islamism in Algeria: evolution and current situation (*Yoslán Silverio González*)

Military modernization in the PRC: doctrinal change and practical implementation (*Thiago Malafaia*)

China and Vietnam in the South China Sea: disputes and strategic questions (*Talita Pinotti*)

Organization Theory and complex peacekeeping operations: notes from the MINUSTAH (*João Marcelo Dalla Costa*)

The Place for Combating Corruption on the Mercosur Agenda (2003–2015) (*Rogério Gesta Leal, Leonardo Granato*)

Volume 5, Number 9 (Jul./Dec. 2015)

Editor's Note (*Paulo Fagundes Visentini*)

Presentation: Special dossier about relations between Brazil and Angola (*Fabio Costa Morosini, Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin*)

Latin America's Slow Pace in the 21st Century (*Amado Cervo*)

The Culture of Political Instability and the Rapprochement of South America and United States (*Henrique Carlos de Oliveira de Castro, Sonia Ranincheski*)

Brazil and the regional leadership vacuum: the chinese-american advance (2011/2016) (*Corival Alves do Carmo, Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo*)

Oligarchical restoration and full neoliberalism reloaded: an essay on the roots of the twin crises and the 2016 *coup d'Etat* in Brazil (*Marcelo Milan*)

Political Economy of trade with the European Union: South Africa's pursuit of narrow self-interest (*Oscar van Heerden*)

Kwame Nkrumah and the pan-african vision: between acceptance and rebuttal (*Henry Kam Kah*)

Resurgence of militancy in Ogoniland: socio-economic perspective (*Oluwaseun Bamidele*)

Relations of Brazil with South Africa and Angola: efforts for the maintenance of security in South Atlantic (*Luiz Rogério Franco Goldoni, Sandro de Nazareth Ciribelli*)

Investment regulation between Brazil and Angola: internal factors, international context and the design of the Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI) (*Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Fabio Costa Morosini, Ely Caetano Xavier Junior*)

Brazilian Foreign Policy and Investments in Angola (*Pietro Carlos de Souza Rodrigues, Sonia Delindro Gonçalves*)

Transnationalism and Paradiplomacy in the economic relations between Brazil and Angola: the construction of the Capanda Hydropower Plant by the Construtora Odebrecht (*André Rodrigues Corrêa, Douglas de Castro*)

Impacts of cooperation? Comparing the national development banks of Brazil and Angola (*Patricia Alencar Silva Mello, Sarah Morganna Matos Marinho*)