


# SPECIAL REPORT

ASPI-KAS

2nd Australia-Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue  
3-4 November 2016, Canberra



- CERTAIN**
- EXPECTED**
- PROBABLE**
- POSSIBLE**
- NOT EXPECTED**



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Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

April 2017

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## Acknowledgements

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Participants at the first Australia–Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, October 2015.



Participants at the second Australia–Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, November 2016.



# INTRODUCTION

In October 2015, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) joined with the Regional Programme Political Dialogue, Asia and the Pacific of the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Foundation), or KAS, to host the first Australia–Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, a Track 1.5 dialogue between Australia and Europe on counterterrorism.

Two months earlier, ASPI had established its new Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre.

Australia and European countries were involved in various multilateral counterterrorism initiatives, including military operations in the Middle East for some as members of the coalition against ISIS, and dealing with terrorist threats and attacks within their borders. In 2015, France had experienced two fatal terrorist attacks, and ISIS had claimed responsibility for a major attack on Istanbul airport.

Just a month before the October 2015 dialogue, Australia experienced its third terrorist attack since the raising of the terror alert level in 2014: the shooting murder of Curtis Cheng in Parramatta.

The threat from ISIS was causing particular concern, as it was seeking to undertake attacks outside the Middle East to counter and distract from the military operations against it in Iraq and Syria.

The first Australia–Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, which was held at ASPI in Canberra on 19–21 October 2015, involved officials from Australian and European diplomatic, military, security and law enforcement agencies, who came together with academics, think-tankers and multinational agencies to talk through the key issues in counterterrorism.

The success of this multinational and cross-disciplinary event was affirmed by all attendees, who supported making it an annual event.

Thus in 2016 the 2nd ASPI–KAS Australia–Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue was held, again in Canberra.

In the intervening year, much had occurred in the terrorism and counterterrorism environments.

The issues discussed in the dialogue are covered in this special report, but it is hard to capture the vibrancy of the discussions, both around the table during the formal program and on its margins.

We at ASPI and KAS deliberately kept the group relatively small in order to provide the opportunity for true dialogue and engagement, but also ensured that the group was diverse and that different voices and perspectives were heard.

The group captured this energy in the concluding session, electing to try to progress some modest initiatives through the dialogue's core members over the next year, optimising the connections made at the 2016 meeting.

While the dialogue operated under the Chatham House rule for the non-attribution of personal comments and views, this special report brings together the key issues and themes discussed, including a suggested forward plan for action by the group.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 3–4 November 2016, the 2nd ASPI–KAS Australia–Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue was held in Barton, Canberra, Australia.

**Countering violent extremism.** The dialogue commenced with a session on countering violent extremism (CVE) to ground discussions by considering the factors that were fostering and creating violent extremism, and what might be done to prevent that. This format proved effective throughout the dialogue, as discussions in each subsequent session reflected upon the relationship with CVE.

**The homegrown terrorist threat and countering online messaging.** Delegates agreed that delineating between directed, enabled and inspired terrorist attacks is complex. One factor differentiating the Islamic State (IS) from other terrorist groups is that it claims attacks stated to have been done in its name, without any evidence of involvement by the group. However, the ‘lone wolf’ moniker applied to some attacks was agreed to be misleading and potentially unhelpful; the term ‘lone actor’ is preferred. Participants noted that the number of truly isolated, self-radicalised individuals is very low.

As IS loses its territory and so-called ‘caliphate’ in the Middle East, its members will be split between withdrawing to safe havens, such as is being seen around Raqqa at present, and remaining to fight. As a consequence, some foreign fighters will attempt to return home, and small cells are likely to disperse across the world, fighting under the narrative of avenging the caliphate. While it will be difficult for fighters to return to Australia without being prosecuted, Southeast Asian foreign fighters may find it easier to return home. As they link up with resurgent terrorist groups across the region, this will increase the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia, as well as the related threat to Australians and Australian interests in the region.

**Countering terrorism and lessons learned.** Australia and Europe share many similarities in attempting to counter terrorism. As democratic and liberal societies with respect for human rights, Australia and European countries have experienced shock at being the target of terrorist attacks, including by people who had settled in or were born in those countries. While of those countries involved in the dialogue only France and Belgium had experienced recent mass-casualty terrorist attacks, all delegates reported significant effort and resources being put into counterterrorism (CT) activity across legislative, policy and operational areas, as well as CVE and counter-radicalisation. Common areas of focus included improved information sharing between agencies and between countries, the revision of legislative powers in relation to terrorism and foreign fighter offences, CVE and counter-radicalisation. A focus on prevention as well as response is vital.

**Counterterrorism strategy and architecture.** CT needs harmonised activity across a wide spectrum of government agencies to be effective. Increased coordination both within governments and at the international level is essential to intercepting terrorists. Increased intelligence sharing at the interagency and international levels is a necessary step to avoid terrorists exploiting jurisdictional differences. This will help to establish global norms against terrorism.



While advanced economies are able to devote significant resources to combating terrorism, it is more difficult to find the resources necessary to do the same in developing countries. Without appropriate funding, they can't build the active and supporting capabilities needed to prevent terrorism and prosecute terrorism offences.

**Border security.** The securitisation of borders is having a knock-on effect on migration, in combination with economic and political factors. The global economy relies on the free movement of goods and labour. Balancing free movement across borders with securitisation will be important to continue economic development and prevent countries and regions from turning inward.

**Future Australian–European CT cooperation.** In the final session of the dialogue, the delegates reflected on the discussions. They agreed to the following aims, which are to be progressed through the next year under the leadership of the ASPI and KAS hosts:

1. **Understand existing relationships.** Undertake a high-level stocktake of relationships and opportunities in the Australia–Europe CT environment.
2. **Produce a quarterly Australia–Europe CT Bulletin.** Capture key events, incidents and developments.
3. **Track 1.5 dialogue on CVE.** Convene a dialogue between officials, academics and practitioners, focused on CVE.
4. **Maintain a CT Dialogue Core Group.** Maintain the network, including by exploring the best way to enable information sharing and collaboration.
5. **Link with other organisations.** Look for opportunities to engage other organisations, including through existing processes.
6. **Annual workplan.** Develop a workplan for the CT Dialogue Core Group for the year ahead.
7. **Report.** Report on the annual ASPI–KAS CT Dialogue and the issues identified to share findings broadly and also shape the focus of future activity, including the next CT dialogue.

# COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

## *Countering violent extremism: gender, community involvement, program evaluation*

The Australia–Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue commenced with a session on countering violent extremism (CVE) to ground discussions by considering the factors that were fostering and creating violent extremism, and what might be done to prevent that. This format proved effective throughout the dialogue, as discussions in each subsequent session reflected upon the relationship with CVE.

## Building trust relations between the government and the community

The current phenomenon of anti-government movements in Western countries has an impact on governments' abilities to progress CVE initiatives. A recent example is the October 2016 announcement by the Muslim Council of Britain that it will establish its own CVE program as an alternative to the British Government's official CVE program, Prevent.<sup>1</sup>

The 2016 Edelman Trust Barometer indicates a broader trend of lack of faith and trust in government institutions, particularly among the general population compared to more 'informed' members of the population. Australia and many European countries report higher levels of trust in business than in government, and around 50% of the population do not trust government.<sup>2</sup>

Research indicates that trust is embodied in the grounded experience of individuals. Those individuals in communities at highest risk of radicalisation and violent extremism in Australia typically have a negative experience with government through engagement with the police and the legal system. The relationship between the government and the community must improve, as community trust in government is a key indicator of the success of CVE efforts and intervention.

Communities are 'empowered' (this is almost a tired term) but lack the ability to harness that power to be able to work effectively with government. There's a trust disconnect between the two.

This leads to an unhelpful relationship in which government agencies are accused of not engaging in community-led CVE strategies, while an increasingly strident anti-government sentiment in community discourse translates into community members not using or engaging with government CVE measures, such as Australia's National Security Hotline.

Additionally, a push for women's participation in CVE contexts will fail unless the trust gap is bridged in the first instance. Women's engagement and participation in current CVE models is limited, and their fear of being seen as complicit either with radicalisation or with government authorities is a barrier to their participation.

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1 V Dodd, 'Muslim Council of Britain to set up alternative counter-terror scheme', *The Guardian*, 20 October 2016, online.

2 Edelman, *2016 Edelman Trust Barometer, global results*, online.

Right-wing extremist rhetoric feeding into mainstream sentiment has further exacerbated relations between affected communities and governments.

Trust is a two-way issue. Government trust of communities is also something to be worked on. And trust doesn't appear to be measured.

### CVE efforts in Europe should be reframed to allow individuals to develop positive identities

Official CVE initiatives often promote the concept of 'shared national values' or a 'moderate' version of Islam to underscore CVE efforts. However, this may inadvertently feed the extremist narrative. Islamist extremist propaganda tells us that the liberal West—with Europe at its heart—is the target. It alleges that there's a clash of values between Islam and the West, that liberal democracies are incompatible with Islam, and that Muslims must side against the West. This provides the basis on which individuals such as Australia-based alleged ISIS supporter Harun Mehicevic could state that pledging allegiance to Australia through the citizenship oath was impossible: 'There is no *bayah* (pledge) to *kuffar* (unbelievers). We can only give a *bayah* to a Muslim leader.'<sup>3</sup>

Extremists use identity narratives in their attempts to attract recruits, particularly youth. This is problematic, as it dismisses the desire of young people to create their own identity. That narrative can't be shaped by 'shared national values' or a 'moderate version of Islam'. Attempts to do so may be counterproductive because terrorist groups exploit ideas of generational conflict, and youth often choose to distinguish themselves from the values of their parents or the wider community.

Some recent research on disengagement instead suggests that approaching people with respect and empathy is more likely to elicit favourable outcomes. In evaluating CVE efforts in Europe, we need to take into consideration how transferrable those programs are on a cross-border scale, given the restrictive 'national element' to their overarching frameworks.

### Evaluating practical approaches to strengthening social cohesion and community resilience in preventing violent extremism

Research and a strong evidence base are critically important in developing CVE programs. But the experience to date is that translating research into practical programs is extremely challenging. This area is the subject of current research and requires ongoing focus and development.

Rising right-wing sentiment has raised the idea of fear of the 'other' in CVE discourse. This rhetoric has real-world implications for the practical approach to social cohesion and CVE. Traditionally, the CVE approach in some states of Australia has been based on law and order. However, a recent shift in thinking has recognised the need for a social cohesion priority. Such approaches recognise the core needs for shared responsibility, an evidence base, cooperation and an understanding of risk and failure. New methods of cooperation involve aspects of co-designing solutions, trust and sharing power. The monitoring and evaluation of CVE programs through tangible indicators measuring social cohesion, the sense of public trust and diversity are crucial to identify gaps and areas for improvement and to ensure alignment with national-level frameworks.

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3 J Dowling, S Landy, A Devic, T Minear, 'Harun Mehicevic hits out at Australian values in al-Furqan rants', *Herald Sun*, 20 April 2015, online.

# THE HOMEGROWN TERRORIST THREAT

*The homegrown phenomenon: 'lone wolves', inspired attacks and foreign fighters*

Historically, every terrorist threat in Australia has had its origins in and links to an issue overseas. The current terrorist phenomenon of Sunni Islamist extremism affecting Australia is directly linked to the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the growth of IS.

## Foreign fighters

Around 200 Australians have travelled to the Middle East and engaged as foreign terrorist fighters. Those who might return to Australia will have enhanced radical ideology and have been desensitised to violence, and both of those factors will have an impact on the domestic terrorist threat environment. Some of those who have been stopped from travelling ('preventees') have turned their attention to onshore attacks, which are encouraged by IS.

Europe shares these problems, with the added complication of the geographical proximity of the conflict to Europe. To date, around 7,800 foreign terrorist fighters in the Middle East have been from Europe, including 680 French citizens and around 900 Germans (approximately one-third have been killed, one-third have returned, and one-third remain).

Analysis of foreign fighters has identified three typologies:

1. **The Defender.** Also known as the humanitarian jihadist, inspired by injustice and seeking to address ills in the world. This type is typically inspired by research and history and needs a compelling story to inspire their commitment.
2. **The Seeker.** Inspired by machismo, bravado and seeking adventure through jihad. Typically, seekers weren't observant Muslims or even Muslim at all before commencing jihad.
3. **The Follower.** This type goes to jihad with friends. Research indicates that a person is more likely to be in Syria or Iraq if they already know someone there or are travelling with someone else who wants to go there.

## Attacks: directed, enabled, inspired?

Delineating between directed, enabled and inspired terrorist attacks is complex. One factor differentiating IS from other terrorist groups is that it claims attacks stated to have been done in its name, without any evidence of involvement by the group.

Delegates agreed that the 'lone wolf' moniker is misleading and potentially unhelpful and preferred the term 'lone actor'. The number of truly isolated, self-radicalised individuals is low (for example, Jake Bilardi was the closest example in the Australian environment). Most homegrown attackers have contact with a network of people online and in the community, who enable or direct their attacks or do both. Terrorists' use of encrypted messaging platforms such as Whatsapp and Telegram has made tracing links between attackers and facilitators significantly more difficult.



Lone-actor and low-capability inspired attacks remain the most likely in Australia, but the lesson from the Orlando and Nice attacks is that this style of attack can still be significant.

### The Islamic State is repositioning itself to become an insurgency and transnational terrorist group

As IS loses its territory and so-called 'caliphate' in the Middle East, its members will be split between withdrawing to safe havens, such as is being seen around Raqqa at present, and remaining to fight.

As a consequence, some foreign fighters will attempt to return home, although that may be hard for them for a range of reasons. It will be too logistically difficult for them to move *en masse*, so instead small cells are likely to disperse across the world, fighting under the narrative of avenging the caliphate. While it will be difficult for fighters to return to Australia without being prosecuted, Southeast Asian foreign fighters may find it easier to return home. As they link up with resurgent terrorist groups across the region, that will increase the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia, as well as the related threat to Australians and Australian interests in the region.

The Iraq and Syria conflict is sowing the seeds for the next attacks on the West, just as the war in Afghanistan created the environment for 9/11 and other attacks, but the turnaround time frames are much quicker.

### Al-Qaeda

Compared to IS, al-Qaeda is likely to focus on Syria rather than on the West; this has been stated by Abu Muhammed Julani, the leader of al-Nusra in Syria and allied to al-Qaeda.<sup>4</sup> Al-Qaeda is demonstrating a more sophisticated theological program in its territories than IS, including by suspending public punishments such as stonings, in order to maintain local support. Notably, al-Qaeda has continued to grow and develop while IS has attracted most attention from the West and may emerge stronger after IS's demise.

#### **In contrast to a global decline in other forms of violence, terrorism is on the rise**

In the OECD countries, nine times more people died from terrorism in 2014 than in 2001. The spread of this violence has been uneven. While 14 OECD countries experienced deaths from terrorism over the period, 92% of those deaths occurred in terrorist attacks in only two countries: Turkey and France. IS has been responsible for 42% of deaths from terrorism in Australia and Europe since 2014.

Transnational trends have revealed three important things.

1. Major terrorist attacks occur in 'bursts', so governments must be prepared for multiple attacks.
2. The tactics used in attacks are learned and replicated by other terrorist groups, so what occurs on the other side of the world matters.
3. Domestic terrorist networks can still pose a threat after the decline of their core groups. Cells may continue to radicalise, recruit and facilitate terrorist attacks for decades after. This places emphasis on long-term planning to eradicate terrorism and deradicalise actors.

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<sup>4</sup> Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in 2016, but its membership, leaders and affiliation with al-Qaeda remain.

# COUNTERING TERRORISM AND LESSONS LEARNED

*French, Australian and German experience*

## The French experience

France was left in disbelief after learning that many of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in 2015 were French citizens. French republican values of liberty, equality and fraternity are taught as the basis of education in the French school system and further reinforced as the basis of belonging to French society.

In response to multiple terrorist attacks in France, the French Government has engaged in a range of CT initiatives. Key recent developments include the following:

1. In July 2016, France launched a new national database to track convicted terrorists. This measure, as well as other enhancements to ensure more collaboration between agencies, will increase intelligence sharing between CT authorities, including police, and correction systems.
2. France has taken a proactive approach to combating extremist speech and the promotion of Islamist extremism. For example, 80 extremist imams have been deported since 2012.
3. Based on lessons learned from terrorist attacks in France, the authorities have revised command, control and communications arrangements for those agencies involved in various areas of CT. These arrangements range from understanding first responders through to working with victims of terrorism; in the latter case, victims of terrorism have been brought under the purview of the Ministry of Defence to receive support similar to that for veterans.
4. Substantial legislative review has been undertaken to support prevention and response. For example, legal amendments mean that individuals involved in terrorist activity can now be prosecuted without a need to establish a link between the activity and a specific terrorist plot, as was previously the case.

## The Australian experience

Counterterrorism operations and investigations in Australia are increasing in both number and complexity. As the Syrian conflict continues, the risk to Australians extends globally. Current groups of interest for Australian CT authorities include Australians travelling to fight with terrorist groups, returning foreign fighters, Australians providing support to conflict zones and those planning onshore attacks. Of 200 Australians who have travelled to Syria or Iraq, 110 are currently engaged with terrorist groups and 40 have returned, many of whom remain security concerns; the remainder are judged to have died in theatre.

Trends in Australia include more youth involvement, smaller scale attacks, a shorter time frame between planning and attempting attacks and high use of the internet for terrorist purposes. The last factor highlights the need for early detection mechanisms and groups such as the National Disruption Group across all phases of diversion, disruption and investigation. Since the national threat level was raised to 'Probable' in September 2014, Australia

has experienced four attacks and 11 disrupted plots. Because investigations increasingly have an international nexus, cooperation with foreign partner agencies and forums such as Interpol is critical. Identifying emerging trends and threats is crucial in the current fluid and fast-paced terrorism environment.

### The German experience

The situation in Germany has to be seen in the broader context of the European Union. Using the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) initiated at Europol in 2016 and the existing EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), information sharing is expected to increase between EU member states, enabling more coordinated investigations and responses to attacks. EU members have historically been reluctant to share security-related information, but have identified a common purpose in CT.

In an attempt to assist in CT missions, Germany will invest \$65 million in Turkey's Incirlik military base, which supports the US-led military campaign against IS. In-country, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced her Nine-Point Security Plan in July 2016. The plan includes incremental increases in security personnel, the formation of a decryption agency, enhanced CT training for the German army, research and prevention work, stricter gun regulations, improved information sharing and interagency cooperation between intelligence services. Another new aspect is the inclusion of an early warning system relating to the detection of radicalisation as well as faster repatriation of people whose requests for asylum have been denied.

# COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND ARCHITECTURE

## *Counterterrorism strategy and architecture: national and international*

Prevention is the primary focus of Australia's CT strategy. CT needs harmonised activity across a wide spectrum of government agencies to be effective. Increased coordination both within governments and at the international level is essential to intercepting terrorists. Increased intelligence sharing at the interagency and international levels is a necessary step to avoid terrorists exploiting jurisdictional differences. This will help establish global norms against terrorism.

While advanced economies are able to devote significant resources to combating terrorism, it is more difficult to find the resources necessary to combat terrorism in developing countries. Without appropriate funding, they can't build the kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities needed to prevent and prosecute terrorist offences. Terrorism is based on attrition, and the economic drain it represents puts a severe burden on those economies. A prominent example is the case of Mali, where the government and resident UN peacekeeping mission called in 2016 for more assistance to counter al-Qaeda-linked terrorists. International and regional support is vital to prevent countries without resources from becoming long-term generators of terrorism.

CVE efforts must be equally effective online and offline to produce results. Online CVE has two distinct and separate roles. The first is in building community resilience to terrorism. This involves broad strategic communications to entire communities. The second requires much greater precision targeting of counter-messaging for people at risk of radicalisation. This raises an important question: should governments design counter-messages or should they be emphasising their country's particular narrative to hold the 'centre of gravity' around identity, rather than ceding it to the terrorists? In any case, digital counter-narratives need tangible reinforcement in the physical world to make them credible for people at risk of radicalisation.



# BORDER SECURITY

## *Border security and emerging threats*

The border is a vector for terrorism and counterterrorism. International problems can be transferred across borders into the domestic environment and domestic problems can similarly be exported internationally.

The key to appropriately managing the border is enhanced intelligence and information sharing between jurisdictions and countries.

European border security initiatives have focused on three key areas for collaboration:

1. Screening at borders
2. Document identification
3. Information sharing.

Under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolutions, efforts to date appear to be working, as is evidenced by the dwindling numbers of foreign terrorist fighters, but this has taken time. The international community needs to be prepared to continue this work, as there will be more conflicts that will also affect borders after the current terrorism crisis.

Training is critical to build capabilities at the border, such as identifying forged documents. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is leading a range of training activities to enhance border management capabilities in Europe. In the past two years, this has included training more than 300 Ukrainian border guards, of whom the top graduates go on to be trained as instructors. A Border Management College has also been established in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

Travel documents, the information they hold and the integrity of that information are the key. While the use of biometric e-passports has increased significantly and continues to grow, not all countries issuing e-passports participate in the Public Key Directory (PKD) system, which manages the exchange of information across the system. For example, while 55 of the OSCE's 57 partners have e-passports, only 26 of them use PKD. This means that there's a need to raise awareness of the PKD system.

The volume of goods, people and services moving across borders in today's globalised world is so large that it must now be managed strategically. Governments must work with the private sector on this, as many parts of their borders are managed by private operators, such as the International Air Transport Association. The securitisation of borders that is following this management is leading to a security focus on migration in combination with economic and political factors. The global economy relies on the free movement of goods and labour, so ensuring an appropriate balance with security will be important to continue economic development and prevent countries and regions from turning inward.

In the context of this enhanced border management and surveillance, frameworks for data management and security will be vital to states. There will be an increasing burden on government to provide data security to citizens

and businesses. As Western economies leverage their economic and military edges on information, intellectual property theft by adversaries is becoming a central national security issue. States will need to develop transparent legal frameworks around citizens' data. People have two identities: one is as a citizen and the other as a 'netizen', or person engaged in a borderless world through the global communications network.<sup>5</sup> A convergence of public and private data may occur as states seek to co-opt the private sector into providing data on terrorism. However, as large-scale hacking becomes more common, there are questions about both the public and private sectors' ability to protect data. Coordination and investment in cyber capabilities are needed to manage this security issue.

There remain a number of pragmatic problems that affect border security. Geography is problematic for some, as borders may be porous, difficult to monitor or extensive (such as, for example, Mongolia's 8,000-kilometre land border in sparsely populated country). Developing and failed states may also lack the resources and training to secure their borders.

These issues exacerbate related problems with bribery, a lack of screening measures and the misuse of travel documents. In a world of finite resources, these concerns must be understood and managed as part of securing global borders.

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5 'Netizen' is a term used to describe a habitual user of the internet, who is therefore actively engaged in online communities, or is a citizen of the internet. See M Hauben, R Hauben, *Netizens: on the history and impact of usenet and the internet*, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1997.

# PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

In the final session of the dialogue, Ms Jacinta Carroll and Dr Beatrice Gorawantschy led a discussion among delegates on the key issues and outcomes arising from the dialogue, including whether there was any opportunity for future Australian–European cooperation on CT.

Four questions were posed to the group:

1. What is the added value of this forum?
2. What do we want from this forum in the future?
3. How could we and this forum contribute to broader CT efforts?
4. What should we be doing in between annual meetings?

The group affirmed the overall value of the forum, noting in particular the benefit of bringing together a small and diverse group of practitioners and policymakers from across the spectrum of CT issues in a multilateral environment. The added value of this dialogue is its sustainability, the continuity of stakeholders involved and the regular implementation of activities. In the future, it is intended to also hold the event in Germany to enable a close exchange with official German counterparts.

It was noted that, as the dialogue was in its second year, there was now a core group of individuals and organisations as well as a broader network to draw upon, and there were opportunities to continue engagement with some delegates to progress particular activities during the year.

The following areas and actions were agreed by delegates to be useful areas of cooperation. ASPI and KAS, as co-convenors of the dialogue, will work with delegates to progress these initiatives.

## *Future Australian–European CT cooperation*

- 1. Understand existing relationships.** Undertake a high-level stocktake of relationships and opportunities in the Australia–Europe CT environment. This is to include multilateral, state, territory and provincial level initiatives and engagements.
  - a. Consider partnering with the Australia–EU Partnership Framework to help progress CT initiatives arising from the Australia–EU 2017 conference.<sup>6</sup>
- 2. Produce a quarterly Australia–Europe CT Bulletin.** Capture key events, incidents and developments, including findings of major inquiries, key legislative changes, law enforcement and lessons learned.
- 3. Track 1.5 dialogue on CVE.** Convene a dialogue between officials, academics and practitioners, focused on CVE.

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<sup>6</sup> *Australia – European Union (EU) Partnership Framework*, Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. online.

- 4. Maintain a Counter-Terrorism Dialogue Core Group.** Maintain the network, including by exploring the best way to enable information sharing and collaboration.
- 5. Link with other organisations.** Keep the focus on Australia and Europe, but look for opportunities to engage other organisations, such as the EU and OSCE, based on existing bilateral processes such as the Australia-EU Partnership Framework and the recommendations of the Australia-Germany Advisory Group. Opportunities are to be identified from the stocktake.
- 6. Annual workplan.** Develop a workplan for the Counter-Terrorism Dialogue Core Group for the year ahead. Activities are to be practical and achievable and focused on fostering collaboration within the network and progressing useful research and initiatives. Identify thematic initiatives for research under the auspices of the dialogue.
- 7. Report.** Report on the annual ASPI-KAS Counter-Terrorism Dialogue and the issues identified in order to share findings broadly and also shape the focus of future activity, including the next dialogue.



# APPENDIX 1

## Agenda

Venue: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 40 Macquarie Street, Barton

Thursday 3 November 2016	
0830–0900	Registration
0900–0915	Welcoming remarks by ASPI, KAS and the German Embassy Mr Peter Jennings PSM, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Dr Beatrice Gorawantschy, Director of Regional Programme Political Dialogue, Asia and the Pacific, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) Ms Gerda Winkler, Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Ms Jacinta Carroll, Head, Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre, ASPI
0915–1030	Session 1: Countering violent extremism Chair: Dr Tobias Feakin, Director National Security Programs, Head of International Cyber Policy Centre, ASPI Panellists: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Professor Michele Grossman, Director of the Centre for Cultural Diversity and Wellbeing, Victoria University</li><li>2. Ms Katja Theodorakis, Graduate Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University</li><li>3. Ms Therese Robinson, Acting Chief Resilience Officer, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Victoria</li></ol> Discussion
1030–1100	Morning tea

1100–1215	<p>Session 2: The homegrown terrorist threat and countering online messaging</p> <p>Chair: Mr Andre Rakoto, specialist in defence and security issues, France</p> <p>Panellists:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Representative from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation</li> <li>2. Dr Shiraz Maher, Deputy Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King's College London</li> <li>3. Mr Alan Foulkes, Senior Analyst, South East Asia Branch, Office of National Assessments</li> </ol> <p>Discussion</p>
1215–1245	<p>Case study: Terrorism in the OECD</p> <p>Mr Murray Ackman, Research Fellow, Institute for Economics and Peace</p>
1245–1330	Lunch
1330–1500	<p>Session 3: Countering terrorism and lessons learned</p> <p>Counterterrorism lessons learned from attacks and disruptions</p> <p>Chair: Lieutenant Colonel Ashley Collingburn, Visiting Fellow, ASPI</p> <p>Panellists:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mr Andre Rakoto, specialist in defence and security issues, France</li> <li>2. Commander Jennifer Hurst APM, Acting Assistant Commissioner for Counter Terrorism, Australian Federal Police</li> <li>3. Dr Peter Roell, Founder and President, Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy</li> </ol> <p>Discussion</p>
1500–1530	Afternoon tea
1530–1700	<p>Session 4: Counterterrorism strategy and architecture</p> <p>Chair: Dr Shiraz Maher, Deputy Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King's College London</p> <p>Panellists:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mr Chris Constable, Deputy Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet</li> <li>2. Mr Paul Foley, Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</li> <li>3. Mr Thomas Wuchte, Head, Transnational Threats Department / Action Against Terrorism Unit, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</li> </ol> <p>(Apologies from Ms Jamie Lowe, Coordinator, Centre for Countering Violent Extremism, Attorney-General's Department)</p> <p>Discussion</p>
1700–1715	<p>Closing remarks for Day One:</p> <p>Ms Jacinta Carroll, Head, Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre, ASPI</p>

Official Dinner	<p>Keynote speakers:</p> <p>H.E. Mr Sem Fabrizi, Ambassador of the European Union to Australia, Delegation of the European Union</p> <p>Mr Tony Sheehan, Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet</p>
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Friday 4 November 2016	
0830–0900	Registration and coffee
0900–1030	<p>Session 5: Border security</p> <p>Chair: Dr John Coyne, Head, Border Security Program, ASPI</p> <p>Panellists:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mr Thomas Wuchte, Head, Transnational Threats Department / Action Against Terrorism Unit, Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe</li> <li>2. Mr Don Smith, Commander, National Security Branch, Australian Border Force</li> <li>3. Dr Ben Evans, Assistant Secretary, Strategy, Department of Immigration and Border Protection</li> </ol> <p>Discussion</p>
1030–1100	Morning tea
1100–1200	<p>Session 6: Prospects for future Australian–European counterterrorism cooperation</p> <p>Chairs:</p> <p>Ms Jacinta Carroll, Head, Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre, ASPI; and</p> <p>Dr Beatrice Gorawantschy, Director of Regional Programme, Political Dialogue, Asia and the Pacific, KAS</p>
1200–1300	Lunch
1330–1500	<p>Visit to the Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination</p> <p>Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1 National Circuit, Barton, ACT</p>

# APPENDIX 2

## Dialogue outcomes – an action list for future Australian–European counterterrorism cooperation

- 1. Understand existing relationships.** Undertake a high-level stocktake of relationships and opportunities in the Australia–Europe counterterrorism environment. This is to include multilateral, state, territory and provincial level initiatives and engagements.
  - a. Consider partnering with the Australia – EU Framework Agreement to assist progressing counterterrorism initiatives arising from the Australia–EU 2017 conference.
- 2. Produce a quarterly Australia–Europe CT Bulletin.** Capturing key events, incidents and developments including findings of major inquiries, key legislative changes law enforcement, lessons learned.
- 3. 1.5 Track Dialogue on CVE.** Convene dialogue between officials, academics and practitioners focussed on CVE.
- 4. Maintain a CT Dialogue Core Group.** Maintain the network, including exploring the best way to enable information sharing and collaboration.
- 5. Link with other organisations.** Keep focus on Australia and Europe, but look for opportunities to engage other organisations such as the EU and OSCE based on existing bilateral processes such as the Australia – EU Partnership Framework Agreement and the recommendations of the Australia–Germany Advisory Group. Opportunities to be identified from the stocktake.
- 6. Annual workplan.** Develop a workplan for the CT Dialogue Core Group for the year ahead. Activities are to be practical and achievable, focussed on fostering collaboration within the network and progressing useful research and initiatives. Identify thematic initiatives for research under the auspices of the Dialogue.
- 7. Report.** Report on the Annual ASPI–KAS CT Dialogue and issues identified in order to share findings broadly and also shape the focus of future activity including the next CT Dialogue.

# APPENDIX 3

## Participants

### European delegation

**Mrs Olga Cogen**, First Secretary (Political), Royal Belgian Embassy

**Mrs Julie Duhaut-Bedos**, First Secretary and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of France

**Ms Beate Gabrielsen**, First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy

**Dr Shiraz Maher**, Deputy Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King's College London

**Mr Andre Rakoto**, specialist in defence and security issues, France

**Dr Peter Roell**, Founder and President, Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy

**Mr Bruno Scholl**, Counsellor, Delegation of the European Union

**Mr Ingo Speck**, First Secretary, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

**Ms Katja Theodorakis**, Graduate Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University

**Mr Greg Thomas**, Foreign and Security Policy Team, British High Commission

**Ms Gerda Winkler**, Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

**Mr Thomas Wuchte**, Head, Transnational Threats Department / Action Against Terrorism Unit, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

### Guest speakers

**Mr Murray Ackman**, Research Fellow, Institute for Economics and Peace

**Dr Ben Evans**, Assistant Secretary, Strategy, Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP)

**H.E. Mr Sem Fabrizi**, Ambassador of the European Union to Australia, Delegation of the European Union

**Mr Tony Sheehan**, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator

**Mr Don Smith**, Commander, National Security, DIBP

### Guests

**H.E. Ms Unni Kløvstad**, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Royal Norwegian Embassy

**H.E. Mr Jean-Luc Bodson**, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Royal Belgian Embassy

## KAS

**Dr Beatrice Gorawantschy**, Director of Regional Programme Political Dialogue, Asia and the Pacific

**Ms Katharina Naumann**, Programme Manager, Regional Programme Political Dialogue, Asia and the Pacific

**Mr Patrick Rüppel**, Programme Manager, Foreign and Security Policies, Geopolitics, Regional Programme Political Dialogue, Asia and the Pacific

## Australian delegation

**Mr Darren Bark**, Deputy Chief of Staff and Policy Director, Deputy Premier, Government of New South Wales

**Mr Chris Constable**, Deputy Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC)

**Mr William Elischer**, Director Counter-Terrorism Middle East, Africa and South Asia, Counter-Terrorism Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)

**Mr Paul Foley**, Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism, DFAT

**Mr Alan Foulkes**, Senior Analyst, Southeast Asia Branch, Office of National Assessments

**Dr Brad Grant**, Chief Researcher Border and Trade, Policy Research and Statistics Branch, DIBP

**Professor Michele Grossman**, Director of the Centre for Cultural Diversity and Wellbeing, Victoria University

**Ms Colette Hull**, Senior Adviser, International Engagement, Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination, PMC

**Commander Jennifer Hurst APM**, Acting Assistant Commissioner for Counter Terrorism, Australian Federal Police (AFP)

**Ms Sharon Johnson**, Military Strategic Commitments, Department of Defence

**Mr Terry Kennedy**, Director Strategic Engagement, DIBP

**Mr Manas Pandey**, Senior Analyst, Counter-Terrorism Command; Manager, Specialist Intelligence Team, Victoria Police

**Ms Therese Robinson**, Acting Chief Resilience Officer, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Victoria

**Mr Alexander Wills**, Counter-Terrorism Middle East, Africa and South Asia, Counter-Terrorism Branch, DFAT

## ASPI

**Ms Jacinta Carroll**, Head of Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre

**Lieutenant Colonel Ashley Collingburn**, Visiting Fellow

**Dr John Coyne**, Head of Border Security Program

**Dr Tobias Feakin**, Director National Security Programs, Head of International Cyber Policy Centre

**Mr Peter Jennings PSM**, Executive Director





**Ms Sofia Patel**, Analyst

**Mr Alexander Vipond**, Intern

**Ms Thulasi Wigneswaran**, Intern



Some previous ASPI publications



**ASPI-KAS**

2nd Australia–Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue

3–4 November 2016, Canberra