

Security Implications of EU Enlargement

By Dr. Gerd Föhrenbach*

I. Introduction

The introduction of the Euro on January 1, 2002 was a defining moment for many people in the participating countries. The new currency has drawn attention to the European Union (EU) and stimulated the debate on the future of the Union. It has become clear that after the introduction of the Euro the next big project which EU members will have to deal with is the admission of a number of new members.

The enlargement of the EU, which will probably begin in 2004, creates many opportunities for the European continent. Officials in European capitals hope that it will lead to the peaceful resolution

of conflicts, the democratization of state structures, and the modernization of economies and societies.¹ However, the “old” member states do not yet seem to be fully aware of the challenges that come with the entry of 12, perhaps even 18 new members.² The debate in the general public has largely focused on financial issues.

The accession of the new members will have not only economic and financial consequences, but will also affect security policy. The following analysis concentrates on the implications of EU enlargement in the field of security policy. In particular, it will highlight some of the problems that may arise in a Union consisting of up to 33 members.

II. Political Aspects

The Treaty on European Union

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force on 1 May 1999, referred for the first time to the territorial integrity of the EU and the preservation of its external borders. According to Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), whose objectives include:

“- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and *integrity of the Union* in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; (...)

* Dr. Gerd Föhrenbach, Research Fellow, Bundeswehr Office for Studies and Exercises. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, *including those on external borders (...)*”³

This comes close to an at least indirect “definition of the Union as a security space”⁴

Furthermore, EU member states have committed themselves to solidarity. Article 11, paragraph 2 TEU stipulates that the members “shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”. EU members “shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.”

These provisions do not of course have the same value as the Article 5 mutual assistance clauses of the treaties of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). Nevertheless, the principle of territorial integrity might have “very serious conse-

quences”⁵ after enlargement, as a task force of the European Parliament has pointed out. It remains to be seen to what extent EU member states will comply with the principle of solidarity in an enlarged Union if - to give but one example - relations between Russia and the Baltic States were to sharply deteriorate.

Another source of friction in case of a crisis might be the different membership structures of the EU and the WEU. Only ten of the fifteen EU states are currently full members of the WEU; five countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) have partly strong reservations about military co-operation with the EU. A transferral of the Article 5 military assistance commitment of the WEU treaty does not presently seem to be politically feasible although a common defence would provide a good basis for co-operation in crisis management operations.

Co-operation mechanisms

The remarkable progress achieved in the field of the European security and

defense policy (ESDP) since 1999 should not obscure the fact that the national interests of the EU member states still differ significantly. The more members the EU has in the future, the more difficult the task of fashioning a coherent foreign policy for the Union will be. The necessity of making most decisions unanimously has proved to be a time-consuming procedure, which hampers quick political action. Despite this, barely any progress was made in Nice by the EU’s heads of states and governments towards extending qualified majority voting. Article 23 TEU states that decisions with military and defense implications will be taken unanimously by the Council.⁶ This system of decision-making will continue to provide individual member states with the option of vetoing the majority’s interests.⁷

In the future, it will thus be absolutely necessary to renounce the narrow, national perspectives in the field of foreign and security policy in order to find forms of flexible integration. It is widely acknowledged that an EU consisting of 25, 30 or

even more states cannot be governed with the mechanisms created for the six founding members. There are already several modes of differentiation existing in today's EU: the Schengen agreement (to which only 13 of the 15 members acceded), the economic and monetary union (only 12 of the 15), the WEU mutual military assistance commitment (only 10 of the 15), a number of "opt-out" clauses and other exceptions such as in environmental policy.⁸ In principle, the proposals for the formation of a "core Europe" (as espoused by German Christian Democratic politicians Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers), a "centre of gravity" (German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer) or an "avantgarde" (French President Jacques Chirac) all pursue the same objective: the preservation of the ability to act effectively in an enlarged Union. EU members must create the necessary conditions which will allow the process of integration to continue, if need be on several tracks and in different varieties.

The Future of Integration

However, there is an ongoing controversy between the old members as to the future of the EU. Between Berlin and Paris, the two self-proclaimed "engines" of the EU, profound differences exist about the direction which the European project should take.⁹ In an open letter published in October 2001, Jacques Delors, Felipe Gonzalez, Helmut Kohl and Jacques Santer criticized "continuing major weaknesses"¹⁰ within the EU which could be exacerbated by enlargement:

"Divided over Economic Monetary Union as well as over defence, Europe can agree neither on the objectives and methods of integration, nor on what more is needed in order to make a success of enlargement."¹¹

The entry of new EU members might well deepen the differences. Those new members in Central and Eastern Europe which until 1991 belonged to the "Eastern bloc" are likely to defend vigorously their still young national sovereignty. It

often appears that it is mainly the EU's prosperity which has attracted the candidates, not the notion of co-operation and integration (although this is a key prerequisite for the EU's economic success). Brussels's demands for an improvement of the co-operation among the states of South-Eastern Europe, for example, are sometimes regarded in that region, occasionally even by high government officials, as a "dirty trick"¹² to keep the Balkans away from Europe. In none of the candidate countries can a "sense of supranational eros"¹³ be observed, as Werner Weidenfeld said, "the candidate states do not comprehend the Western European founding notion - gaining common sovereignty by relinquishing national sovereignty."¹⁴

Against this background, an increasing number of voices can be heard demanding a consolidation of the Union before enlargement takes place. Helmut Schmidt, a former German chancellor, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a former French president, have been warning that "[h]aste to enlarge the Union can lead it into a

sequence of severe crises in the first decade of the new century.”¹⁵ Full integration is not a realistic goal for 30 countries that are very different in their political traditions, culture and economic development, the two elder statesmen maintain. They conclude that “[t]o attempt integration with that many countries can only lead to complete failure.”¹⁶

Furthermore, scepticism towards “Brussels” is growing among the population in the current member states. On average, only 48% of EU citizens support their country’s membership. Merely 41% of EU-Europeans say they tend to trust the Union’s institutions and bodies; almost the same percentage of people (40%) say they tend not to trust it.¹⁷ A decline in support for the EU can even be observed in some of the candidate countries.

To sum up, it seems possible that enlargement might lead to a weakening of the Union, with far-reaching negative consequences for all members. It is by no means certain that the EU success story can be continued after enlargement. As Jean-Claude Juncker, the Prime Minister

of Luxemburg, said after the lengthy negotiations at the European Council in Nice, “Never before have I realized so clearly how fragile Europe is.”¹⁸

III. Security Aspects

Alongside the political ramifications of enlargement, the EU will face a range of security challenges.

Cyprus

The accession of the Republic of Cyprus will most likely pose serious difficulties. Despite a slight easing of tensions between Greece and Turkey over recent months, the EU entry of the Greek-Cypriot part of the island might exacerbate the problems there, rather than help to solve them. In November 2001, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who ordered the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, threatened to annex the Turkish-occupied northern bit of the country if Cyprus were to join the EU. Officials in the U.S.

Department of Defense believe that Turkey might even try to blockade the island.¹⁹

If, as most observers expect, no settlement on the future of the country can be reached before the conclusion of the enlargement negotiations, the EU will find itself in a complicated position. If no agreement has been reached, the accession of the Greek part is likely to trigger a crisis. The possibility of a war between the two NATO allies cannot be excluded either. However, if the EU were to decide to postpone extending membership to Cyprus, Brussels might run the risk that Greece will stymie the entire enlargement process. Although the European Commission seems to anticipate the entry of the divided island, it remains unclear what the EU will eventually do.²⁰

The Balkans

In the context of the 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia, the EU held out the prospect of membership to states in South-Eastern Europe, which, in the words

of EU Commissioner Günther Verheugen, “would otherwise have had to wait long [for such an offer].”²¹ The well-intended aim of the “Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe” has been to discourage the peoples in the Balkans from the use of violence by showing them the way to Europe. The EU is now facing the challenge of having to deal with huge, often exaggerated expectations and the disappointments which accompany them.

A significant improvement of the security conditions in the Balkans, which would - at least in the medium term - allow the termination of the West’s military presence, has yet to occur.²² There is a certain danger that the EU might be overwhelmed by the complexity of the Balkan quandary. Javier Solana, the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, admits, “My worry is whether we can solve the problems in the Balkans (...).”²³

A part of the overall picture is what has been called one of the “unfortunate traditions” of Western policy towards the Balkans, namely “to pursue grand objectives without firm determination and with

unrealistically low expenditures”.²⁴ To be true, considerable amounts of money have already flowed into the region. But even the European Council had to recognize “the need to provide support in a much more co-ordinated, coherent fashion”.²⁵ If the effort to stabilize the region is to be eventually successful, it has to remain a very important issue on the West’s political agenda. Diminished attention to the need to re-build South-Eastern Europe might result in developments which could lead to the Balkanization of Europe instead of the Europeanization of the Balkans.²⁶

Relations with Russia

Due to its size, its nuclear arsenal and the minorities living in many Central and Eastern European states, Russia must still be considered an element of considerable uncertainty for Europe. It thus made perfect sense to concentrate on Russia in the first “common strategy” that the EU devised in 1999 in the framework of the CFSP.²⁷

Moscow’s position towards the EU and the enlargement process has by and large been positive. The Russian “Medium-Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)”²⁸ is aimed at, inter alia, the mobilization of “the economic potential and managerial experience of the European Union to promote the development of a socially oriented market economy of Russia”. During the period under review, Russia does not intend to join the EU. Moscow is seeking “to ensure pan-European security by the Europeans themselves without both isolation of the United States and NATO and their dominance on the continent”. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is seen as an instrument which could counterbalance the “Nato-centrism” in Europe.

Against this background, the caution of some officials in Central and Eastern European capitals in their stance towards ESDP becomes understandable. In Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States a sense of unease can be dis-

cerned with regard to the possibility that ESDP might weaken NATO and its security guarantee.²⁹

One may assume that a more distinctly military profile of the EU is likely to alter relations with Russia. Moscow may decide to take a tougher stance vis-à-vis Brussels if, for example, the future EU rapid reaction force were to be deployed in what Russia regards as its “near abroad” or if the EU were to develop a nuclear strategy (see below).³⁰ However, a substantial deterioration of Russia’s relations with the EU seems improbable since links to the largest integrated economic area of the world are indispensable to Moscow.

Currently, the struggle against terrorism forms the basis of a possible re-orientation of relations between the West and Russia. Nevertheless, the actions of the Kremlin will be decisive, not its rhetoric. It is widely known that Russia maintains close links to states such as Libya, Iran and Iraq which have supported international terrorism.³¹ Moscow also plays a dubious role in several of the conflicts on the southern rim of the former So-

viet Union. The involvement of the Kremlin in the future development of the EU will in any case be important, but the quality of mutual relations will be determined by Moscow’s domestic and foreign policy.

ESDP

According to the German foreign office, the creation of a common European Security and Defense Policy is a “key project for the realization of Political Union”.³² The objective is to “render the EU capable of independent action (...) in the whole spectrum of non-military and military crisis management”.³³ The effective combination of civilian and military means is to become the “hallmark” of the EU in the 21st century. In the military sector, EU members have agreed to be capable of deploying 50-60,000 troops within 60 days and sustaining forces for at least one year by the year 2003 (European Headline Goal). The forces will be charged with the implementation of the so-called Petersburg tasks.³⁴ As to civilian crisis

management, by 2003 the EU intends to be able to provide, inter alia, up to 5,000 police officers, up to 2,000 civil protection specialists and up to 200 civil administration experts for international missions. Their task will be to strengthen the rule of law, administrative structures and civil protection in countries outside the EU.

Despite the progress that has been achieved in the field of ESDP over the last two years, some important aspects have to be clarified if the European defense efforts are to be successful in an enlarged Union. Firstly, there is the issue of geographical limits. Where will EU forces be deployed? So far, EU members have been unable to agree on where the Union’s interests and responsibilities stretch. Probably not all political players are aware that there is hardly a part of the world which is not linked with one or several EU member states by defence relationships. Opinions among the members of the Union also differ with regard to the legitimacy of force, risk-taking, acceptance of casualties and the legal problems in multinational units.³⁵ Presumably none of these

problems will be any easier to solve in an expanded Union.

A second question is which EU country would be able to provide major troop contingents were the mission to take place in an area other than the regions where EU and NATO members are already militarily involved? British soldiers, for example, are presently deployed in Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Gulf region, southern Turkey, Sierra Leone, the Falkland Islands and East Timor. The British Ministry of Defence has therefore made the reduction of overstretch its "first priority".³⁶ In the German Bundeswehr, too, the reservoir of forces for the current missions is "still far to small",³⁷ says General Harald Kujat, the Chief of the German Federal Armed Forces Staff and incoming Chairman of NATO's Military Committee. This means apparently, to be succinct, that major EU missions can only be accomplished if the necessary troops are drawn from other crisis operations, which would in turn put those missions at risk.

Thirdly, the issue of military capabilities has to be mentioned. As shown at

the so-called Capabilities Commitment Conference³⁸ in November 2000, EU members have considerable deficiencies in their capabilities (examples are strategic sea- and air-lift, interoperability and command and control systems). In view of the budgetary pressures in all European countries, major improvements will be very hard to achieve. NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson said in mid-2001 about the ESDP efforts of the Europeans, "They've accomplished only about half the agreed-on projects for strengthening defense capacities, and they were only the easier ones."³⁹ The new EU member states, whose societies and economies are all undergoing a difficult transformation process, are unlikely to be able to make significant contributions to the improvement of the EU's military capabilities. Since the requirements for the accomplishment of difficult missions will not be given in the medium term, military operations under the aegis of the EU will for a longer time be limited to the lower end of the Petersberg spectrum.

Relations with the U.S. and NATO

The commitment of NATO and its leading power America is indispensable for security and stability on the European continent. Europe and the U.S. share common values, which have provided the foundation for those structures that have preserved peace, freedom and prosperity in the North Atlantic region for many decades. Furthermore, the presence of the U.S. in the Old World serves as a safeguard against the reawakening of European rivalries and thus helps to maintain the balance of power on the continent.

Tensions are nevertheless visible in the transatlantic relationship, which mainly stem from different geostrategic perspectives. The U.S. is both politically and militarily active almost all over the globe. By contrast, the Europeans usually confine themselves to their home region and adjacent regions. The defence of the common interests of the West - access to the oil reserves in the Persian Gulf, securing the openness of the international ship-

ping lanes, to give but two examples - is mostly left to the Americans. At the same time, Washington has to realize that quite often the EU's ESDP rhetoric is not matched by the Europeans' willingness to invest in the modernization of their forces. It remains to be seen whether the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 will lead to a fundamental re-orientation.

Of course, there is a certain contradiction between Washington's demand for improved military capabilities on the one hand and its anxiety about losing influence on the other. This requires, firstly, the development of a *transatlantic* security and defense identity.⁴⁰ EU members have to understand that the protection of their world-wide interests necessitates a sustained political as well as financial and military commitment. For its part, America should bear in mind that, since the international system is prone to crises, the future rapid reaction force of the EU will be a source of support for NATO and will thus add value to the transatlantic relationship.⁴¹

Secondly, the EU has to acknowledge its limits. Europe will not be capable for

a long time of conducting a military operation similar to the 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia without the Americans. It is therefore self-evident that NATO and the EU have to reach a "complementary division of military tasks"⁴² on a case-by-case basis.

Expectations of Germany

The EU candidate countries have high expectations regarding Germany's role in Europe. Due to the size of its economy and population, the Federal Republic is considered the principal EU power by the aspirant states. In an enlarged Union, Germany will, even more so than in the past, have to play a leading role - in the political and economic field, but also in security and defence policy. This offers much opportunity but it also requires the Germans to assume responsibility and to set good examples.

Over the last decade, however, tendencies have become apparent in German security and defence policy that have given cause for concern. One aspect relates to

the weight of the country within NATO and the EU. Berlin's influence depends on numerous factors, including the ability to co-operate successfully with its allies and partners. In this respect, observers say difficulties have been growing because Germany apparently lacks the willingness to allocate sufficient funding to meet the commitments it has made to the Alliance.⁴³ Senior military officers in NATO are worried that Berlin's position on NATO and ESDP "could increasingly be confined to rhetorical approval".⁴⁴ Such a policy could lead in the longer term to a decline in influence in both decision-shaping and decision-making.

Another aspect is the strength of the German armed forces. According to the "Cornerstones" paper of the Federal Minister of Defence, the Bundeswehr must be capable of sustaining one major operation or two medium-size operations over a longer period of time.⁴⁵ Yet its missions in the Balkans, which are comparable to two medium-size operations, are already posing serious challenges to the Bundeswehr. A major crisis elsewhere

requiring a military response would put the armed forces in a very difficult position.⁴⁶ Without jeopardizing other missions, Germany would probably not be able to provide a major contingent in case of, say, an Article 5 attack on Turkey. If there is one lesson that can be learned from the events of 11 September 2001, however, it should be the realization that numerous unpredictable risks continue to exist in the world. The Bundeswehr has to have the forces and the capabilities to combat these risks and threats. As German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping said, "Europe has global responsibility".⁴⁷ Not only the candidate countries expect a corresponding sense of responsibility from the largest EU member.

Nuclear Strategy

In the medium term, the EU's defence efforts might raise the issue of a European nuclear concept. In fact, over recent years it has become ever less plausible to imagine a British or French nuclear policy which would, in the event of a cri-

sis, act totally independently and without approval of the European partners.⁴⁸ All the same, nuclear strategy is a topic that most EU governments are reluctant to take up because of the general public's deep-seated aversion towards nuclear matters. Article 17 TEU, however, states that the common foreign and security policy shall include "all questions relating to the security of the Union" (although ESDP currently only refers to the Petersberg tasks). Provided that the process of integration continues after enlargement, a debate on the nuclear facets of ESDP would thus be part of the logic of integration.⁴⁹ Germany and France already agreed in 1996 to start talks on the "role of nuclear deterrence in the context of European defence policy",⁵⁰ but contacts have not been intensified.

IV. Conclusions

The end of the Cold War has opened a "window of opportunity" of historic dimensions. More than half a century after World War II, the enlargement of the EU

offers the opportunity to finally overcome the politically, economically and culturally unjustified division of Europe. The co-operative structures which the former enemies developed in the framework of the European Economic Community and, subsequently, the European Union have provided essential prerequisites for unheard-of prosperity and lasting stability in Western Europe. There are many reasons to believe that enlargement will help to achieve similar successes in the candidate countries.

Nonetheless, enlargement will fundamentally change the Union. The assertion that the EU has stepped into a "strategic trap"⁵¹ by promising to accept new members is probably an exaggeration. But the multitude of challenges the EU is facing will require sustained efforts to continue the success story of the Union. The objective of this analysis was to examine some of the political and security problems whose resolution will be crucial for the future of the EU.

As to the political aspects of enlargement, it has to be noted that the EU will

become more heterogeneous, which will necessitate the introduction of new, more flexible mechanisms for co-operation. To attempt to govern the Union with the rules of the Fifteen, which essentially originate from the six founding members, will prove unfeasible. Fundamental reforms are necessary. These should focus in particular on the voting procedures and should allow a broadening of qualified majority voting. In areas where this cannot be attained, changes would be desirable to prevent individual member states from blocking other countries. Furthermore, the rights of the European Parliament must be strengthened.

Since the institutional framework for ESDP has largely been established, the next big step in the field of security policy would be to define a common security strategy. As yet, there is no European strategic culture. Efforts should be made to find common answers to questions such as to the wider interests of the EU and a corresponding military concept. The goal could be the publication of a European white book.

Beside these conceptual issues, above all two factors are crucial for a *common* foreign and security policy. Firstly, there has to be a sincere willingness to co-operation on the part of both the current and the future members of the EU. In a crisis as well as during "normal" times security policy requires the ability to act efficiently and effectively. It should be in the interest of all members to pursue this objective. Secondly, adequate resources are needed in order to meet the defence-related commitments that EU members have made. Only a Union which has convincing political, civil and military means at its disposal will become a credible and successful player in security policy.

¹ See Wolfgang Wessels, "Zukunftsfähig? Die Europäische Union à 27", *Internationale Politik*, vol. 56, no. 2/2001, pp. 13-22; here: p. 14f.

² Currently the EU is conducting accession negotiations with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus. Turkey is considered a candidate country although the beginning of accession negotiations has been linked to some political criteria. Furthermore, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Croatia

and Macedonia were given a prospect of acceding in the framework of the Stability Pact.

In 1993, EU heads of states and governments laid down several economic and political criteria which have to be fulfilled for membership, the so-called Copenhagen criteria. See Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21/22 June 1993.

³ Italics G.F.

⁴ Elfriede Regelsberger/Mathias Jopp, "Die Stärkung der Handlungsfähigkeit der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik", Mathias Jopp/Andreas Maurer/Otto Schmuck (eds.), *Die Europäische Union nach Amsterdam: Analysen und Stellungnahmen zum neuen EU-Vertrag*, Bonn 1998, pp. 155-171; here: p. 159 (Institut für Europäische Politik, Analysen zur Europapolitik, vol. 13) (translation G.F.).

⁵ European Parliament, The Common Foreign and Security Policy and Enlargement of the European Union, Briefing no. 30, Luxemburg, 14 March 2000, p. 8.

⁶ Exceptions include the CFSP instruments of joint action and common position, about which decisions can be made by a qualified majority (Article 23 paragraph 2 TEU). In political practice, decisions have seldom been taken by majority voting. See Elfriede Regelsberger, "Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach 'Nizza' - begrenzter Reformeifer und außervertragliche Dynamik", *Integration*, vol. 24, no. 2/2001, pp. 156-168; here: p. 158.

⁷ See Martin Kremer/Uwe Schmalz, "Nach Nizza - Perspektiven der Gemeinsamen Europäischen

Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik", *Integration*, vol. 24, no. 2/2001, pp. 167-178; here: p. 172.

⁸ Nonetheless, it has to be kept in mind that these forms of differentiation were decided on unanimously even by those members who did not wish to participate. In an EU of 28 or 30 members still depending on unanimous decisions, problems may arise insofar as one or several countries might reject a specific form of differentiation for itself while simultaneously trying to block the realization of the project by the others.

⁹ See, for example, Jochen Hehn, "Jospin weist deutsche EU-Visionen zurück", *Die Welt*, 29 May 2001, p. 8 and "'Flötenspieler' Fischer: Védrine hält wenig von den Europavisionen seines deutschen Kollegen", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 November 2000, p. 10.

¹⁰ Groupement d'études et de recherches Notre Europe, *A Wake-Up Call for Europe*, 15 October 2001, in: *Internet* <http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/appele-en.htm>.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Udo Bergdoll, "Nur einzig nach Europa", *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 September 2001, p. 1 (translation G.F.).

¹³ Werner Weidenfeld, "Die Europäische Zeitenwende", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 December 2000, p. 8 (translation G.F.).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Valéry Giscard d'Estaing/Helmut Schmidt, "Time to Slow Down and Consolidate Around 'Euro-Europe'", *International Herald Tribune*, 11 April 2000.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union*, Report No. 55, Brussels, October 2001, pp. 11 and 34.

¹⁸ Quoted in: Michaela Wiegel, "Versprechen gehalten, Vertrauen gebrochen", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 December 2000, p. 3 (translation G.F.).

¹⁹ See Joseph Fitchett, "Turkey's Warning on Cyprus Vexes Western Allies", *International Herald Tribune*, 9 November 2001, p. 5 and "Crisis Ahead", *The Economist*, 8 September 2001, p. 36/37.

²⁰ See "Die EU rechnet mit Aufnahme eines geteilten Zypern", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 November 2001, p. 6.

²¹ Günther Verheugen, Interview with the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 19 September 1999, quoted in: Johannes Varwick, "Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg: Ein überforderter Stabilitätsanker?", Joachim Krause (ed.), *Kosovo - Humanitäre Intervention und kooperative Sicherheit in Europa*, Opladen 2000, pp. 185-200; here: p. 186 (translation G.F.).

²² See R. Jeffrey Smith, "Rule of Law Elusive as UN And NATO Run Kosovo", *International Herald Tribune*, 30 July 2001, p. 10 and Justin L. C. Eldridge, "Kosovo: Land of Uncertainty", *European Security*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 2001), S. 34-66.

²³ "Das ist eine Reifeprüfung für die EU", Interview with Javier Solana, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18/19 November 2000, p. 12 (translation G.F.).

²⁴ Berthold Kohler, "Was die NATO riskiert", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23 August 2001, p. 1 (translation G.F.).

²⁵ Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 23/24 March 2000, paragraph 54.

²⁶ See Varwick, "Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg", p. 187.

²⁷ See Cologne European Council, Common Strategy of the European Union for Russia, 4 June 1999.

²⁸ See Medium-Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010), Internet http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russian_medium_term_strategy/ (see *ibid.* for the following quotations).

²⁹ See Peter van Ham, *Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia*, The Marshall Center Papers, no. 1, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 30 April 2000, p. 25f.

³⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 30f.

³¹ See Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. and Russia Escalate War of Words Over Arming Rogue States", *International Herald Tribune*, 21 March 2001, p. 4 and "Poacher Turned Gamekeeper", *The Economist*, 22 September 2001, p. 32.

³² German Foreign Office, A New Chapter in the CFSP: The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), December 2000, Internet http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/eu_politik/gasp/esvp_html.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and peace-making missions.

³⁵ Alyson J. K. Bales, "European Defence: Another Set of Questions", *RUSI Journal*, February 2000, p. 38-43; here: p. 38f.

³⁶ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *White Paper 1999*, paragraph 70.

³⁷ Harald Kujat, Rede anlässlich des Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitischen Kongresses des Wehr- und Sicherheitspolitischen Arbeitskreises der CSU, München, 22 September 2001 (translation G.F.).

³⁸ See European Union, Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, Brussels, 20 November 2000, Internet <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/CCC.htm>.

³⁹ Quoted in: John Vincour, "Economic Slowdown Forces Europe to Scale Back Ambitions", *International Herald Tribune*, 10 July 2001, p. 1/6; here: p. 1.

⁴⁰ See Holger H. Mey, *Internationale Entwicklungen am Beginn des dritten Jahrtausends*, unpublished manuscript, Bonn, 30 June 2000, p. 77.

⁴¹ See Kremer/Schmalz, "Nach Nizza - Perspektiven der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik", p. 170.

⁴² Ibid. (translation G.F.).

⁴³ See Karl Feldmeyer, "Von den Kosten des Sparens", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 June 2001, p. 1.

⁴⁴ General (rtd.) Klaus Reinhardt, "Wo bleibt eure Zuverlässigkeit im Bündnis?", *Die Welt*, 16 August 2001 (translation G.F.).

⁴⁵ See The Federal Minister of Defence, *The Bundeswehr - Advancing Steadily into the 21st Century: Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal*, Bonn 2000, paragraph 54.

⁴⁶ See Karl Feldmeyer, "Auf dem Balkan überfordert", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 July 2001, p. 1

⁴⁷ Rudolf Scharping, "Europa hat globale Verantwortung", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 March 2001, p. 12 (translation G.F.).

⁴⁸ See André Dumoulin, "L'Identité européenne de sécurité et de défense et la dissuasion nucléaire", *Défense Nationale*, vol. 56 (2000), no. 8/9, pp. 20-37; here: p. 25.

⁴⁹ See Peter Schmidt, "Braucht eine europäische Verteidigungspolitik ein Nuklearkonzept? Dimensionen der Bewertung", Erich Reiter (ed.), *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2000*, Wien 2000, pp. 301-319; here: p. 307f.

⁵⁰ Gemeinsames deutsch-französisches Sicherheits- und Verteidigungskonzept, Nürnberg, 9 December 1996, paragraph 3.1 (translation G.F.).

⁵¹ Varwick, "Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg", S. 199 (translation G.F.).

The Baltic States, the 11th of September and the Baltic Defence College

By His Excellency the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden Mr. Björn von Sydow*

This article will briefly cover three areas - firstly the European security situation, secondly the changed world after the tragedy of the 11th of September and lastly the importance of a defence college for the fostering of fundamental values as democracy and other common values.

The Baltic Sea area is one of the areas in Europe where the security architecture has not been finally settled. This will only be done when the European Union (EU) has expanded to include the present candidates, when the Baltic States have reached their security goals, and when Russia's ties with the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) have grown to include much more substance than now. The Baltic region is part of a larger Euro-Atlantic context.

The security situation in the Baltic Sea region has never been so positive as it is now. The sub-regional co-operation is profound and intense. The volume of the practical co-operation is incomparable to other regions. We find co-operation bilaterally, as well as in many multilateral formats; the Nordic, the inter-Baltic, the framework of the Baltic Security Assistance Group and the Partnership for Peace framework. Not the least is the important inter-Baltic co-operation. The Baltic

Defence College is a result of this fruitful co-operation.

But, despite this favorable situation in our corner of the world, things have changed dramatically since the 11th of September. The acts of terror in the United States of America were an attack on all of us. Democracy has been attacked. But my firm belief is that democracy will withstand this onslaught. The terrorist attack on the USA was a crime against international peace and security. We can and will, never accept terrorism as a way of destroying the idea of democracy.

We live in an open world. We have gotten used to being able to travel freely,

* Prepared for a seminar held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia on October 16, 2001.

to visit other states and cultures, to exchange knowledge and experience, to establish contacts and ties of friendship across national frontiers, to freely express our ideas and thoughts. This gives us fantastic possibilities. And that is the world that we want.

We have been reminded of how vulnerable our open world is. How vulnerable our own democracies are, when faced with forces that are prepared to challenge the very core of democracy - the inviolable worth of the human individual.

One thing is clear: if democracy is not able to put a stop to terrorism, then terrorism will put a stop to democracy. What is needed now is unity. All the forces of democracy in the world must form a common front against terrorism.

We have seen that threats against our democracy can appear domestically as well as externally. States' defence forces normally handle external threats. Officers and soldiers, among many others are in this sense guardians of democracy.

The Baltic Defence College fosters fundamental values as democracy and other

common values, but also a number of more or practical issues. Democracy and common values are enormously important to all of us - young and old, men and women. For me as representing a supporting state it is a firm belief that in this area the Baltic Defence College plays and will play an important role.

The first years of the Baltic Defence College have been challenging. But we have seen, as expressed in the *Validation Report* from the U.K. Joint Services Command and Staff College, that the quality of the Course is admirable. This is of course a result of many factors working in the same direction. Let me only mention some of them; the important inter-Baltic co-operation, the Host Nation Support of Estonia, the contribution from Supporting States as well as hard work by teachers, staff members and students. It is my firm belief that the Baltic Defence College will play an important role in the development of the Armed Forces, but also for the entire society in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

NATO and the Baltic preparations after invitation to join the Alliance

By Lieutenant General Ove H.-G. Hoff*

Let me start by underlining that so far no invitation has been extended to Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. I have however accepted to speculate on the possible consequences of an invitation.

This article will be divided into three parts: the consequences of the 11th of September, the experiences from the integration of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and the challenges for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The attacks on the 11th of September 2001

Since early 2000 the Alliance has discussed the emerging asymmetric threats. Asymmetric because they do not conform to the symmetry known during the cold war, where the conventional and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) balanced one another. Asymmetric also because conventional forces are not structured to handle drug trade, terror-

ism, and chemical, biological or nuclear threats by terrorist organisations or rogue states.

The 11th of September brought the full reality to the world of the first example of an asymmetric attack with a global dimension. While the American led coalition responds to this, we can only guess what will be the outcome.

It is my opinion that the 11th of September attacks initiated a development that may well be a change of paradigm in European and global security. It would therefore be ludicrous to deal with Baltic mem-

* Lieutenant General O. H.-G. Hoff from the Danish Army has been Commander Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST since 2000. From 1996-2000 he was Chief of Staff at the Headquarters of the Chief of Defence, Denmark.

Prepared for a seminar held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia on October 16, 2001.

bership of NATO without taking this development into consideration.

Assuming that it will be possible to isolate the present conflict to a question of terrorism and preventing it from developing into a religious war an example has however still been set - an example that may well be followed by tens, hundreds or even thousands of young fanatics. This makes it a problem of extreme importance for every state.

Terrorism in a global scale is multidimensional. With the resources that could be made available to terrorist organisations and regimes there will be no limits to the weapons and delivery methods to be used. It will almost always be possible to exploit the advantage of surprise having no limitations on human sacrifices, collateral damage or civilian losses.

Therefore, it is of utmost importance for all people, who want to enjoy peace and stability, to stand together and isolate these small fundamentalist groups. Then the primary means to unveil plans and prevent terrorist actions are the intelligence services. Collecting and dissemi-

nation of information on their structures, organisations, non-military networks, training facilities and ways of recruitment will require a continuous collective national and multinational effort by military and non-military intelligence. This is necessary to dissect and destroy the structures of the terrorist organisations.

As the Alliance has decided that the 11th of September attack on the USA falls within the Article 5 on collective defence of the Atlantic Charter it is relevant to look into the means that the Alliance has at hand to deal with asymmetric threats. The answer is discouraging. NATO has neither the means nor the structure to deal with asymmetric threats. It is rather the opposite. Police and police intelligence is purely national and no state would leave it to an international organisation to be responsible for dealing with internal terrorist problems on their soil. Military intelligence is also a very sensitive issue and regarded as a purely national area. As it is well known from KFOR and SFOR states are extremely reluctant to share intelligence and we are currently taking the

first steps in the right direction to overcome this problem. Without the full access to intelligence it would not be possible for the NATO Command Structure to be responsible for a counter-terrorism operation.

To this comes that terrorism as we see it now tends to be global in nature. It will therefore go well beyond the borders of the Alliance. It is therefore with good reason that the present and possible future campaigns against asymmetric threats are and will be managed by coalitions of willing states.

This is not to say that NATO cannot play an important role. But as we have seen it will mainly be indirect support such as moral backing and co-ordination of national contributions to the coalition and advice on alert measures to be taken for the protection of states. The Alliance can, however, play an important role in the future through advising on the development of national defence structures in the Defence Planning Process and through improving procedures for collection, analysis and distribution of in-

telligence. The European Union (EU) can and must play an equally important role within the area of police intelligence as this is already formalised within the Schengen Agreement. We may well experience that intelligence assets will require an increased priority in national spending.

The threats of terrorist actions have brought national security into focus. For every state high priority has been given to analysing the vulnerability of national infrastructure being it power plants, food distribution, bridges, tunnels, preparedness of rescue and health capabilities, government installations, etc. In the Nordic states the Total Defence Concept, which was the tool to mobilise the total resources for defence during the cold war, has had a second birth. The Total Defence Concept is an extremely valid instrument also to co-operate initiatives within national security from local to government level. Also within this area the Alliance can play an important role in promoting the development of total defence structures through the defence planning process.

There is no doubt that for Alliance members the number one priority for the coming years will be the war against the emerging asymmetric threats. It is therefore obvious that national priority in the near future will tend to focus on means to handle these risks. Due to the global nature of terrorism this may well be at the expense of NATO unless the Alliance makes itself an important player in the co-ordination of national contributions.

Another area of major strategic importance is the relationship with the Russian Federation.

NATO and the Russian Federation

NATO is first and foremost a framework for collective defence. This was the case during the cold war and this is the situation today. The international security situation allows the Alliance to prioritise other tasks such as Peace Support Operations and partnership co-operation. But collective defence remains the core of Alliance tasks. No major conventional threat faces NATO today. Only

Russia would in the longer term be able to mount such a threat. The big question is therefore whether the 11th of September makes any difference. Looking at the last few years Russia has been an extremely reluctant partner for the Alliance. Russia has mainly worked to obtain advantages and influence in the strategic partnership with the Alliance without giving anything in return (apart from the Balkans). NATO is extremely unpopular in Russia, and nothing is done from the Russian side to change this. The NATO representation in Moscow has still not been established, and we see only extremely limited participation in Partnership for Peace activities if at all.

Since the 11th of September this seems to be changing. Russia has decided to line up with the global alliance against terrorism, and statements from President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov recently indicated that Russia is considering major changes in its position towards the USA and NATO. Whether this in the longer term may include Russian membership of NATO as indicated in the

medias is much too early to tell, but as enlargement is generally regarded a widening of stability nothing should be considered impossible in this sense. The recent co-operation about the nuclear submarine "Kursk" is a small sign in the same direction. It will probably not be easy for Russia to find a satisfactory role within the Alliance, and it will probably not be easy for the present Alliance to extend the Article 5 guarantee to cover the entire Russian territory including the Far East. Should Russia therefore continue this path of co-operation with the USA and NATO it is likely that there will be a requirement for totally redefined West European security structures. Who knows, perhaps we may in 10 years' time experience a redefinition of the Triple Crown concept to be a EU-Russia-USA strategic alliance. It will be most interesting to follow the Russian decisions in this sense in the coming years. Seen from the Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST one important benchmark will be whether Russia will decide to join and support a closer partnership co-operation in the coming years.

And especially whether the Russian military hierarchy will adhere to a policy of close co-operation. Until that materialises however the collective defence will continue to be the corner stone of the Trans-Atlantic co-operation.

It is against these major changes and trends in defence and security policy that the question of Baltic NATO membership should be assessed. Such an assessment could have the following consequences for the Alliance Command Structure, for the Alliance Force Structure and for the national defence planning:

It is not likely that new headquarters will be established in new member states. We saw this in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and the existing command structure will also in the next enlargement have the inherent flexibility and deployability to accommodate the requirements of command and control of an enlarged NATO.

The Supreme Allied Command Atlantic and the Northern Region Combined Joint Task Force Headquarter will still be the primary means for the conduct of

Alliance Out of Area Operations. National contributions to the command structure will form the core of the Combined Joint Task Force staff, while the land component and maritime component will most likely be formed on the basis of multinationally manned high readiness elements of the force structure. NATO Force Planning will most likely continue to focus on high readiness assets for crisis response operations. Assets with lower readiness should have a sustainment capability for Peace Support Operations.

Anticipating an increased role for the EU in crisis response operations EU member states and states aspiring for EU membership should make their high readiness assets as well as those with lower readiness available for the EU also.

The reduced focus on collective defence makes it appropriate to seek opportunities for task sharing and specialisation of national force structures.

Now before discussing Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania it might be interesting to see what can be learned from the last enlargement process.

***The experiences from the
integration of the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland***

At the Madrid Summit in July 1997 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks, they signed the Accession Protocols in December 1997. At the Summit in May 1999 the accession was endorsed and by November 1999 we saw the first Polish officer in the Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST in Karup, Denmark. Today we have 30 Polish and Czech personnel in the Headquarters.

The preparation for accession is a comprehensive process that will require some two years of intense planning. The time will to some extent depend on the number of states concerned. Of prime importance is the command of the English language. This covers both those involved in the discussions with the NATO teams and those expected to fill functions in the NATO command structure. A participation in NATO-led headquarters like KFOR and SFOR might be

helpful. But as integration develops it is also important that soldiers and Non-Commissioned Officers master the English language.

Important is also the states' ability to reach the required NATO security standards. Lack of compliance may be a difficult obstacle in the process. To this comes the Command and Control Information System connectivity, which must be in place if a seamless command system should be able to function. This is particularly important within the air defence area, as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe from the accession date will take over responsibility for the air defence. This may require legislative adjustments in the three Baltic States. It is also very important that the applicant understands the procedures related to the Capability Package process and the costing and budgeting process of infrastructure.

To accommodate the integration process following the accession NATO has developed a number of Target Force Goals. For the Polish and Czech Land Forces this was the following:

“By end of 2002 all Main Defence Forces are trained to conduct defensive and offensive operations at the operational and tactical level in accordance with ATP 35(B) Land Forces Tactical Doctrine”.

Similar Target Force Goals were developed for other areas and services.

In order to deal with the Target Force Goals Implementation Working Groups were established within the command structure and with representation of the relevant national headquarters. Minimum military requirements were agreed upon within the areas of security, air defence, infrastructure, force contributions and Communication and Information System.

The Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST is involved in the integration of the 1st Polish Corps and the Polish Navy. The aim is for the national force structure to reach full operational capability at some defined time. For the 1st Polish Corps this is 2004, so as it can be seen, this is a comprehensive process. From invitation to Full Operational Capability may well be 5–7 years, but it requires resources and efforts from the first day on.

During this process numerous workshops and training activities are planned and executed. An integration meeting with the Polish Navy supported by the Danish and German naval staffs has been held and Membership Action Plan Exercises with the staff of 1st Polish Corps has been conducted. For the navies it is important to address the maritime Command and Control structure, procedures and communication capabilities. During the process the force structure will have a possibility to be tested both during Article 5 and Non-Article 5 exercises.

The Baltic States and the enlargement of NATO

Turning to the three Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: Without disregarding national differences it would from a military and operational point of view be preferable to look at the Baltic States as one geographical entity. Doing this I will not go into a political discussion on whether each individual state or all states will or should become members

of NATO. But let me address the question of NATO accession in a general way. Let me also mention that the Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST is not involved in the Membership Action Plan process. If I therefore happen to present what may seem as conflicting advice please judge for yourself. In the process it will be found that sometimes the advice given from states or NATO does not reflect the reality that the Baltic States find themselves in. This may be financial issues, legislative issues, conscription, training systems, procurement or balancing requirements for Article 5 against Non-Article 5. Each of the Baltic States will have to decide what is best for the individual state and where each state find that it will get the most bangs for the buck.

The three Baltic States will be invited to join the NATO command structure. Their share will probably be relative to their share of the military budget. It is important that the Baltic States prepare dedicated, well-trained and linguistically skilled officers and Non-Commissioned Officers to fill positions in the command

structure. This is a heavy process, as they will most likely have to take over positions from NATO colleagues. It is important that each state make its own priorities as to where it want to be represented and at which level. The Baltic States should very carefully consider where they could have flag positions as the influence very often follows these. The number of these will be very limited. Denmark holds two 2/3 star functions on a permanent basis. It could be an advantage for the three states to do this together, so that they hold these functions on a rotational basis.

The three Baltic States will also want to be represented in the International Military Staff and in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, as these are the headquarters in Mons, Belgium, where the conceptual work is done. Representation at the Regional Headquarters Allied Forces North Europe in Brunssum, the Netherlands, is also advantageous as this is where the land based Combined Joint Task Force is embedded. Looking for land advice the three Baltic States could turn to the Reaction Corps Centre in Heidelberg, Ger-

many, but the relevant land advice for the Baltic level of forces could be found at the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland. For maritime expertise the Baltic States should look to the Allied Naval Forces North in the United Kingdom, but it would also be relevant for staff officers to join the Danish Task Group or an equivalent structure with the German Navy if the three states could make a bilateral arrangement on this. Air advice should be sought in the Allied Air Forces North in Ramstein, Germany, but a Combined Air Operations Centre position would also be very relevant. Then of course the Baltic States should be represented in the Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST in Karup, Denmark. The Headquarters primary focus is on the Baltic Sea Area and we anticipate a prime role in the integration process. To fill staff positions abroad is very expensive so a tough prioritisation will be required.

The Baltic States might want to contribute to the high readiness forces of the Alliance; Allied Command Europe Mobile Force Land or the Allied Command

Europe Rapid Reaction Corps. This is relevant but a proposal could be to focus initially on the build up of the national structures for home defence and to make this a longer-term goal. A relevant suggestion would also be to focus on a small, specialised asset, perhaps a Baltic asset set up between the three states. Benefits could of course be harvested from the work done on the Baltic Battalion and co-operation with the Danish Reaction Brigade could be considered as an idea. The Baltic Battalion would then be a contribution for the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps through the brigade, which is part of the 1st UK Division. But there are many other possibilities. And these would of course not keep any state from continuing provision of force contributions to the ongoing NATO operations in the Balkans. For the navies participation from time to time in the Mine Counter Measures Force North-Western Europe would be relevant. Should the thoughts on a Baltic Sea Stand By Formation come through that might also be a possibility. But at the moment

the focus in this sense is on multilateral exercise in the spirit of Partnership for Peace.

It is important that the three Baltic States find ways of linking their armies to the NATO force structure. The land formations of the NATO force structure are made up of national, (1st and 2nd Polish Corps), bilateral (German/US, German/Dutch and US/German Corps) and multilateral corps (Eurocorps and Multinational Corps Northeast). These corps made up of national divisions. Looking at this it is important to realise that the Alliance first and foremost is an integration project. The Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST was originally created to integrate the Danish and German navies. The former Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland was originally created to integrate the Danish and German armies in the Schleswig-Holstein area. Later this grew into a project of integration for the Polish Army or at least integration of the 12th Polish Division. That is why the Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland changed into the

Multinational Corps Northeast. This co-operation is extremely important for the development of common doctrine and operational procedures. It is also the basis for training in war fighting within an operational framework. A suggestion would be that the Baltic States in a general sense look towards the Multinational Corps Northeast as the overall co-operation partner for the Baltic armies, and that the Baltic States initially develop or if already there, assign a brigade from each of the three states for one of the divisions in the Multinational Corps Northeast. It could be a link between the Iron Wolf Brigade and 12th Polish Division, a Latvian structure and the 14th German Division and an Estonian structure and the Danish Division. This could be supplemented by partnership arrangements between brigade structures and brigades from the Danish, German and Polish divisions. In the longer term these training links and this co-operation might give the Baltic States the background for bringing their brigades together in a common Baltic division structure.

For the navies linking to the NATO force structure is not that complicated. It is important that the Baltic States further develop their relations with the Danish, German and Polish navies and that they continue to participate in their training and draw on their expertise. Shortfalls within Command and Control and communications should urgently be addressed and the Baltic States would benefit from developing a common - that is Baltic - recognised maritime picture. The Baltic Naval Squadron seems to be a valuable naval contribution to the force structure in the Baltic Sea area. It would however be necessary for the three Baltic States to consider the consequences of moving from a partnership co-operation to the NATO force structure.

With respect to air defence the Baltic States have some major problems. As mentioned before, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe holds the overall responsibility for the air defence of NATO Europe. The three states will for many years not be able to contribute to this and will not be able to maintain air sovereignty

and do air policing. Radars for the Baltic Air-Surveillance Network are urgently needed and the Baltic States would have to make bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states on covering the Baltic air space. It could be considered training pilots in the Danish, German or Polish air force and letting the Baltic pilots do exchange training in these air forces. The Baltic States might have to change legislation to cater for this. This would give the advantage of training pilots and perhaps even flying in their own air space without having to invest in unaffordable airframes.

Host nation support for external reinforcements is essential. The Baltic States should therefore within the national defence structures develop the necessary Host Nation structures. All these requirements will have to be balanced towards the increased focus on intelligence and national security as mentioned during the discussion on the consequences of the 11th of September.

Recognizing that the first steps have to be taken by Supreme Headquarters Allied

Powers Europe and the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, I want briefly to mention the support that the Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST could provide for the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into NATO:

Expand seminars/workshops on the NATO Operational Planning Process including Contingency Planning, Intelligence and Logistics matters, the future of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, NATO Command Structure, NATO Forces Structure, etc.;

Optimise the assistance in exercise planning activities especially “Exercise Cooperative Jaguar 2003” and the related Battle Staff Training;

Promote “On the Job training” at various NATO headquarters like it has been the case in the Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST since the Headquarters now have an Estonian officer in the staff, who will be heavily involved in the preparation of “Exercise Strong Resolve 2002”; the Headquarter would welcome Latvian and Lithuanian officers for this purpose too.

Assist in adapting national doctrines, procedures, Standard Operating Proce-

dures, Operational Plans, etc., to the NATO structure Standardisation Agreements and Military Committee documents.

Assists in the preparation of Operation Evaluation teams;

Conduct seminars and Host Nation Support.

As can be heard the NATO command structure and the Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST could play an extremely important role in the Baltic integration into the Alliance. One last questions that could be raised is therefore how the integration process could go hand in hand with the many projects within the Baltic Sea Steering Group. It can be said that moving from the status of partner state to that of invited NATO member or actually a NATO member fundamentally changes the basis for maintaining the Baltic Sea Steering Group. Most of the Baltic projects will find their natural life within the NATO integration plan and it will be difficult to keep straight lines between the two. It can because of that be suggested that the Baltic States consider this issue once the decision is taken.

Lithuania and NATO Enlargement

By Doc. dr. Gražina Miniotaitė*

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine, divides the world into five categories of states: a “hyper power”; powers with “world-wide influence” (France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, China, Japan and India); “mere powers” (e.g. Egypt, Spain, Italy and Poland); “powerless states” or “mere states” (Belgium, Sweden, Portugal, etc.) and “pseudo-states” (much of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe). According to this classification - a paradigmatically realist one - the Baltic States unquestionably belong to the group of “pseudo states” as they “have no means of influencing the situation around them”¹. Considered from this point of view, they can only be of

some interest in the context of the strategic calculations relevant to the Russian relations with the West.

Evidently, if we want to treat the Baltic case as a serious subject of analysis we need a different, more refined theoretical perspective. In will in my article try to answer the question - How can NATO best integrate the Baltic States in the Alliance in the period following the invitation and after accession - and what must the three states do? I will attempt to identify Lithuania’s security problems from within, analysing them as a case of international socialization, as entering into the NATO security community can be seen as that.

According to Karl W. Deutsch, security communities arise out of a process of regional integration characterized by the development of transaction flows, shared understanding and transnational values. What Deutch called a “we feeling” or shared identity also characterizes a security community. Lithuania belongs to the Northeast European region. The region is composed of ten states; with four of them being NATO members, three aspirants for membership and four members of the EU plus Russia with the Kaliningrad enclave. The region is a kind of historical laboratory where new principles of international relations are being formed and put to the test. What kind of

* Doc. dr. Gražina Miniotaitė is with the Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology. Prepared for a seminar held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia on October 16, 2001.

security community could be formed in the region?

The history of the region gives us two models of initiating a security community; Hans Mouritzen defines them as the Nordic method (Bottom Up) and the EU method (Top Down). “Bottom up means that mutual sympathies and trans-national ties develop spontaneously over a long time at the popular level”²². The beginning of the Nordic security community goes back to the 19th century, the security community emerged about 1905; whereas the institutions were not created until the post World War II period. The top down method starts with security visions from above, a common project and common institutions. It is the case of the Euro-Atlantic Security community. An important precondition for the emergence of the security community is a strong civil society.

Lithuania as well as the other Baltic States represents the second case of entering the security community. It is a state with a socialist past and with an intention of “returning to Europe”. In such circumstances we can talk about top down method

of forming the security community. However, in contrast to the western members of the security community, Lithuania started out with no close regional ties with other states and no independent civil society. In addition, long-standing civilizational and cultural ties, historical myths, symbols and images (the Battle of Zalgiris (Grünwald), the crusader as an ancient enemy, the myths surrounding the Dukedom of Vytautas, etc.) constituting the historical component of national identity, push in the opposite direction. The attitudes towards the West are far from uniform.

Thus integration of Lithuania into NATO is not only a problem of military interoperability, but also the problem of interoperability of norms and values. Or in other words it is a problem of international socialization. According to John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan socialization is “the process through which national leaders internalize the norms and value operations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into the community formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its

leadership position”²³. The goal of the socialization is to achieve argumentative consensus with the other members of the community and not to push through one’s own worldview and moral values.

From this point of view NATO and EU can be defined as constitutive institutions that contribute to shaping actors’ identities, values and interests by imposing definitions of member characteristics and purposes upon the governments of member states. At an institutional level, a successful internalisation of an applicant state is indicated by the integration of the fundamental community norms into the state constitution and their translation into (stable) domestic laws. Thus, the enlargement process can be analysed as a process of teaching and learning community values and norms.

The NATO enlargement is a deliberative project, based on certain normative principles, with stated ways of its implementation and supervision of the whole process.

The main normative documents defining the Alliance’s principles for accessing

new members are the Partnership for Peace Framework Document (1994) and the Study on NATO Enlargement (1995). They are based on a broad concept of security, “embracing political and economic, as well as defence components”. The Study also specifies some problematic areas which should be of particular concern for those seeking membership of the Alliance: “States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance”. An important condition is also applicant states’ military capability to contribute to NATO’s collective defence.

Now let us consider briefly how Lithuania’s Euro-Atlantic integration shapes state practices by establishing, articulating, and transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate state behaviour. In the article I will examine only one issue – “external territorial disputes”,

or – good neighborly relations. Lithuania has signed border agreements with all neighboring states. However, the sea border agreement with Latvia, signed not until 1999, is not yet ratified by Latvia. The border agreement with Russia, signed in 1997, is not ratified by the Duma.

The detailed analysis of the Baltic States’ border disputes leads to the conclusion that integration processes and the requirements for membership in NATO and EU usually prompt positive changes. One can easily discern the connection between NATO summits and the Baltic States’ attempts at solving their border disputes. The 1994 NATO Brussels Summit encouraged the revision of Lithuanian-Polish relations. The 1997 NATO Madrid Summit was a stimulus to Estonia and Latvia to drop their demands of including the treaties of 1920 in their border agreements with Russia. The 1999 NATO Washington Summit was a stimulus for Lithuania and Latvia to sign the sea border agreement. The conclusion is equally valid in relation to the ethnic disputes in Latvia and Estonia.

The delay to ratify the border agreement by Russia is a more complicated case. It is namely Lithuania’s quest for NATO membership and the related problem of the Kaliningrad region (transit, visas) that ultimately stands in the way of the ratification. However in the 10 years of independence there have been considerable changes in the treatment of the Kaliningrad problem in Lithuania - from the view of it as a direct threat to Lithuania’s security to the view that it is a common problem of the Baltic Sea region, to the solution of which Lithuania might contribute a great deal.

However, this conclusion is too optimistic and definitely is simplifying the process of enlargement and the security community building. Top down method of building the security community has its problematic points. One of them is that there exists a gap between the political elite and the population. We have total support of the NATO enlargement by the political elite and a hesitating attitude to the issue by the population.

On one hand, on the 23rd of May 2001 eleven parliamentary parties in Lithuania

concluded agreement on the defence policy for 2001-2004. According to the agreement, "Lithuania can secure long-term and stable security only by being a part of the NATO collective defence system". The parties have agreed on the essential directions and priorities as to the development of the National Defence System and have committed themselves to maintain defence spending at the level of 2% of the Gross Domestic Product.

On the other hand, as public opinion surveys show, popular attitudes towards membership in NATO are far from settled. A public opinion survey on security issues conducted in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in March 1998 showed that Lithuania's population was mostly supportive of the state's efforts to join NATO: 55% of Lithuania's, 47% of Latvia's and 54% of Estonia's population fully supported or rather supported these efforts,

In 1999 with an upsurge of anti-Western propaganda in Lithuania (related to the Kosovo events) and with actions against the increase of public spending on defence, popular support for Lithua-

nia's integration with NATO decreased. E.g. in Lithuania, according to the survey by "Vilmorus" in May 1999, those "against NATO" outnumbered for the first time those "for NATO" (32% and 31%, accordingly). Popular attitudes towards NATO became again more favourable after the Kosovo issue was closed. An influential, if not the dominant, factor in the Baltic States was Russia's mass media interpretation of the Kosovo events presenting NATO's involvement as a violation of international law and an encroachment on Yugoslavia's sovereignty. This shows that a substantial part of the Baltic States' population consider NATO primarily as a defence alliance ensuring member states' sovereignty rather than collective European security.

In September 1999 the Lithuanian government initiated a programme on informing the population about the Lithuania's integration into NATO. The programme is included in the Membership Action Plan. Perhaps because of the programme in January 2000 a survey by "Baltijos tyrimai" showed that Lithuania's

efforts to join NATO were fully approved by 38,6% of the respondents, totally disapproved by 14,3%, rather disapproved than approved by 30,7%, and 16,3% of the respondents had no opinion on the issue. The public opinion polls conducted in August and December 2000 indicated the rise of support for Lithuania's membership of NATO from 42% to 49%, the number of opponents decreased from 25,7% to 22,3%,

According to a later survey by "Baltijos tyrimai" (January 2001), membership in NATO was approved by 46% and disapproved by 35% of the respondents. It should be noted that after the terrorist assaults of the 11th of September the percentage of those favourable to Lithuania's membership of NATO increased sharply. Now two thirds, or 63,1%, of the population are favourable to membership in NATO, compared with 46% in early 2001.

In general, the response of the applicant states to the terrorist attacks against the United States of America is a litmus test that shows the level of their international socialization, an attitude to the

western security community values, norms and rules. Lithuania has by official letters expressed its strong support to the US policy.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania Antanas Valionis has in his letter addressed to Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State of the United States of America once assured the USA that Lithuania is ready to extend political, diplomatic and practical support for the USA in the fight against terrorism. The letter indicates that the Lithuanian Government has already granted permanent diplomatic clearance for the over flight of US aircrafts in the Lithuanian airspace. Currently the National Action Program on combating terrorism is being prepared as well as trilateral Baltic co-operation on developing joint measures in response to terrorist attacks against the USA is being intensified. As a partner and firm ally of the United States of America Lithuania is ready to take all the necessary means in addressing global challenges. Lithuania supports the NATO decision on possible application of the Article 5 of the Wash-

ington Treaty to the terrorist attacks against the USA.

By the results of a public opinion polls conducted by "Gallup International" in 30 states immediately in the aftermath of the terror acts in the USA on the 11th of September Lithuania was the most pro-American of all European states. More than 50% of the Lithuanian respondents believe that US foreign policy has a positive influence on Lithuania. The world population opinion average on this question is 31,78%. In Estonia it is 42%. However, less than the sixth of its population would welcome US military strikes against the states harbouring terrorists. Only 15% of the population agree that US government should launch a military attack against the states sheltering the organizers of the terrorist assaults in New York and Washington. This is close to the average percentage across the world, namely 14,73%. Thus we are, so to say, average Europeans.

Thus in trying to find an answer to the question "How can NATO best integrate the Baltic States in the Alliance in

the period following the invitation and after accession – and what must the three states do?" I have stressed the problems related to the processes of international socialization or joining the western security community.

First of all, it should be noted that the expansion of the western security community is a process that involves and changes all its participants, not only the applicant countries.

As already noted, the Baltic States' joining the western security community can be defined as a top-down case. Hans Mouritzen has aptly expressed its nature: "If you don't follow our norms and rules, you will be deprived of future benefits, and /or the option of NATO (EU) membership will vanish"⁴. That is, the top down method is related to power projection.

The problematic point of the method is the rivalry between the applicant states that is inevitably generated. And this is sure an obstacle to the formation of a stable security community. Possibly this circumstance, not merely that of cultural differences, that explains why despite the grow-

ing co-operation between the Baltic States it does not transform into a shared identity, or “we feeling”. Latvia, trying to meet the norms and rules of NATO membership, will probably ratify the treaty by 2002, the year of NATO summit.

It is evident that in the process of integration with Euro-Atlantic structures Lithuania will have to deal with a number of very practical issues: Revoking the entrance-free regime with the Kaliningrad region of Russian Federation; reviewing Russia’s commercial and military transit to the region (most of it is through Lithuania; electricity supplies to the region are also mediated by Lithuania); protecting Lithuanian investments in the region constituting a major part of all investment there; and there is also the issue of the future facing the ethnic Lithuanian minority of 20.000 in the region.

The new international situation that has emerged in the aftermath of the events of the 11th of September gave a new impetus to NATO attempts at bringing Russia closer to the western security community. Russia can play an important role in fight-

ing international terrorism. That stimulates more active attitude to Russia in Lithuania. The Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus in his address to the “Vilnius-10” Summit in Sofia, Bulgaria in 2001 emphasized that Lithuania and the other Baltic States have a vision and a strategy of further developing their co-operation with Russia. This vision includes four points: First, “we are prepared to build on our successful cooperation with the neighbouring regions of Russia and make it a priority”. Second, “together with Russia we have a common interest in regional and economic growth and prosperity”. Third, “we are committed to promote cooperation between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic institutions even after NATO and the EU expands”, and finally, “Russia should come into peace with its history, and we are ready to help it in this uneasy process”.

However, both the rhetoric of some Lithuania’s politicians and the public opinion polls show that the role of NATO as a security guarantor is mainly associated with territorial defence and, in the

case of Lithuania, defence against potential threats from Russia.

Thus, the rapprochement of the value attitudes of NATO states and the applicant states is to remain an urgent task for all members of the security community even after the acceptance of new NATO members.

I suppose that both for the member states and for the Baltic States it is important to stimulate public and research activities that help answer the following question: Under which conditions are the EU community norms, rules and values internalised in the domestic practices of the Baltic States and how they influence political and social change?

¹ Hubert Veldrine, *The New York Review of Books*, 12th of April 2001, Vol. XLVIII, No. 6, p.18.

² Hans Mouritzen, “Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2001, p. 304.

³ Ikenberry, John G. and Kupchan, Charles A., “Socialization and Hegemonic Power”, *International Organizations*, 44 (3), p. 289.

⁴ Hans Mouritzen, “Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2001, p. 308.

Lithuanian National Plans and Priorities before the Prague Summit

By H.E. Mr. Linas Linkevičius, Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania*

We live in a constantly changing geo-strategic environment. The recent crises in Kosovo, Macedonia and the terrorist attacks against the USA demonstrate the new challenges to NATO. Although NATO is, first and foremost, for collective defence, it is no longer an ordinary military Alliance. The missions of NATO are no longer limited to traditional military security. The international security situation prompts the alliance to steadily expand into other important functional areas such as crisis management or combating international terrorism. The September 11th terrorist acts, being the first example of an asymmetric attack with a global dimension, have brutally exposed

the new challenges to the world community. They reminded us of how vulnerable our open world is, how vulnerable our democracies are, when faced with forces that are prepared to seek the destruction of our societies, values and human lives. More and more often we have heard that free trade, global interdependence, and economies without borders decreased relevance of national security and defence. The terrorist attacks have brought national security into focus again. For every nation, a high priority has been given to analysing and diminishing the vulnerability of national infrastructure such as power plants, bridges, tunnels, government installations, industrial sites

as well as to revising the preparedness of rescue and health services.

The terrorist attacks against the USA have changed the NATO alliance. First of all, September 11th brought to an end the post-Cold War era and increased interdependence between the USA and Europe. NATO, and particularly the USA, is preoccupied with the anti-terrorist campaign and how to deal with asymmetric threats, which is a brand new challenge for the Alliance. As of today, NATO enlargement is not a top priority on the NATO agenda. But at the same time, there are clear positive signals that the September 11th events by no means will slow down or disturb the process of NATO

* Prepared for a seminar held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia on October 16, 2001.

expansion. Quite the opposite, these new challenges have reinforced the relevance of the enlargement project. Acts of aggression serve as a direct proof that the NATO enlargement, aimed at expanding the zone of stability and predictability and enhancing common security, should proceed even more actively.

The U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his letter to the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs has stressed that recent events “have not deterred the United States from the purpose to forge a Europe truly whole, free and secure”. NATO Secretary General George Robertson said at the Summit of NATO aspirant countries (the Vilnius Group) in Sofia, Bulgaria: “the enlargement process will not be held hostage by any terrorism or individual terrorists. We are not going to be deflected”. In a message from the U.S. President George W. Bush, sent to Sofia Summit, it was stated that his Administration is more strongly committed than ever to the eastward enlargement of NATO in the light of the September 11th attacks against the USA. “The United States will be prepared

to make concrete, historic decisions with our Allies at the Summit in Prague”, he pledged.

The freedom Consolidation Act, adopted on November 7 by the U.S. House of Representatives, is the unprecedented step of approving security assistance funds (55 mill. USD) for the countries that aspire to join NATO. The three Baltic States were earmarked as recipients along with four other applicant countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria) from the Vilnius Group. This legislation’s political significance is fourfold:

- It demonstrates substantially broad American support for NATO enlargement;
- The share of the Baltic States in the overall funding are proportionally higher than the share of the other four countries, which reflects both the Baltic effort in preparing for NATO membership and political backing for their candidacies.
- The timing of the vote, on the eve of the U.S.-Russia summit, was helpful in dissuading the Russian President Vladimir Putin from trying to place NATO’s Baltic enlargement on the bargaining table.

• This level of political support increases the U.S. power to lead the European Allies towards admitting the Baltic States into the Alliance next year. It suggests, moreover, that a more comprehensive round of admissions is a politically realistic goal for the next year’s summit.

A big debate is going on with regard to Russia’s softening stance towards NATO enlargement. Is it a turning point in the U.S.-Russia relations? Is it likely that a new NATO-Russia partnership is emerging? There is no single answer to those questions. Looking at the last few years, Russia has been an extremely reluctant partner of NATO, mainly working to obtain advantages and influence from its strategic partnership with NATO, without giving anything in return. What we can see now, is that Russia has decided to line up with the global coalition against terrorism. Statements by President Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov have recently indicated that Russia is considering major changes in its position towards the USA and NATO. Whether this will include a Russian NATO membership in

the longer term is too early to tell. During his meeting with Lord Robertson, Putin made it plain that while he did not like the idea of the Baltic States joining NATO, he was not going to invest political capital in attempting to stop it. The enlargement is generally regarded as widening of stability: a larger NATO means a more stable region, and Russia is coming to appreciate the benefits of stability on at least some of its borders. It is increasingly preoccupied with the turbulent Islamic south and, in a longer term, with China. Putin now appears to feel that the benefits of close relations with the West outweigh the drawbacks. The most important point is that the major problem of all the discussions is not an enlargement itself but NATO co-operation with Russia. Putin backed a NATO proposal to set up a new body for deepening and widening the relations between Moscow and Brussels. This is an invaluable opportunity to deeply involve Russia in resolving broader security issues.

It is against these major changes and trends in international security environ-

ment that the question of the Baltic NATO membership should be assessed. NATO enlargement will help to create an alliance of democracies sharing and defending common ideals. It is particularly relevant to the realities of today. Lithuania welcomes the Alliance's decision to further pursue the enlargement and extend new invitations at the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002 to those countries that have completed their membership preparations. The readiness to assume membership obligations by the aspirant countries has been and remains a pivotal ingredient in the considerations over who is to be invited to join the Alliance.

Lithuania's preparations for membership

The current state of security affairs in Lithuania is arguably the best ever achieved in history. The country enjoys peace, relative prosperity, sustained economic growth and co-operative relations with foreign partners. Integration into NATO is one of the most important tools

in achieving that. Lithuania's eligibility for NATO membership is being strengthened through a successful implementation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP), issued to the candidate countries at the Washington Summit in 1999. Lithuania is actively taking part in this process, and is currently in the third MAP cycle for 2002. The achievements over the last two years clearly confirm that the MAP has been a major success and a proper instrument of preparations for membership. NATO feedback on our progress through the MAP constitutes a vital input and a reality check for our further work.

In retrospect, if to compare the three MAP cycles, the first one was a learning process for both NATO and the aspirants, as one would expect with any new programme. During the second cycle, NATO streamlined the process and provided a set of genuine assessments. The Lithuanian Progress Report of the 2nd cycle of the MAP helped Lithuania to appreciate that the national plans, as well as undertaken international commitments, were more ambitious than resources per-

mitted. It was really 'down-to-earth' assessment of which goals were affordable and which were not. The 3rd round outlines how the revised plans, prepared in line with the Progress Report of 2001, will be implemented. In Lithuania, the third cycle is regarded as playing a critical role in the next enlargement decision to be made in Prague.

Parliamentary and public support

The MAP process has positively influenced the growth of the inter-ministerial co-ordination within Lithuania and has become increasingly important tool for our government to build parliamentary support for necessary resources, as well as public support for NATO membership. Lithuania remains committed to allocate 2% of its GDP for national defence. The Law on the National Defence Financing Strategy sets the defence expenditure level of 1.95-2% of the GDP for the year 2001. The continuity of Lithuania's foreign, security and defence policy was declared last May by all our parliamentary parties by

concluding the Defence Policy Agreement, covering the period until 2004. The parties expressed their support for NATO integration and defence reform and obliged themselves to support maintaining defence spending at the level of 2 % of the GDP. The general public endorsed this agreement. The Public Relations Programme, launched by our Government two years ago, has already yielded encouraging results. According to the opinion polls, support for NATO membership rose from 49% at the beginning of 2001 to the 64% by the end of the year.

The perspective that the budgetary constraints will not hamper the practical implementation of the MAP is based on encouraging economic figures. Over the past years, the Lithuanian economy has been showing clear signs of recovering from the Russian crisis of 1998. The Ministry of Finance estimates a 4% GDP growth in 2001, while the estimated annual growth rate of GDP for the year 2002-2007 is 4.7-5%. Moreover, the foreign trade with the European Union (EU) has reached new heights and comprises

45,6% of all foreign trade. Finally, at the beginning of 2001, the EU authorities credited Lithuania's economy as being a functioning market economy. These positive developments prove that the country is set on a track of prosperity and sustainable economic development.

Political issues: Priorities of foreign policy

Lithuania's key foreign policy priorities, closely related to integration into NATO, are promoting good neighbourly relations and contributing to regional security and stability. Lithuania fully endorses the broad approach to security outlined in NATO's revised Strategic Concept and takes the principles of this Concept as a departure point in formulating the objectives of its defence and security policies. Lithuania supports the Alliance's goals of reinforcing Euro-Atlantic security and stability and preserving the transatlantic link, and directs its security policy to promoting good relationship with all countries in the Euro-Atlan-

tic region. As a result, for instance, all state border and national minority issues have been settled to the satisfaction of all interested parties.

This fully applies to Lithuania's relations with the Russian Federation. The main trend in this area has been building transparency and mutual trust, based on the principles of equality, reciprocal benefit and openness. By means of dialogue, Lithuania makes best of effort to demonstrate to Russia that the course towards NATO membership and all other elements of Lithuania's security and defence policy are in no way directed against the legitimate security interests of Russia. Lithuania's co-operation with the Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation, in the framework of regional co-operation, is a success story. It is being continuously emphasised that the Kaliningrad exclave should be further demilitarised and receive new economic impetus. Over the recent years, Lithuania has been working to make the Kaliningrad Region a 'window of opportunity' and model for a wider co-operation between Russia and

the expanding European Union. Thus already today Lithuania forges its relations with Russia as an integral element of NATO-Russia and EU-Russia partnership and co-operation. It is in Lithuania's interest to contribute to a smooth development of the region by engaging it in the co-operative projects, regional and cross-border activities, and people-to-people contacts. It would also help to allay the emerging Russian fears that the region might become closed or isolated as a consequence of the EU and NATO enlargement.

It has always been Lithuania's constant wish to have transparency and predictability in the defence-related dialogue with Russia. In 2001, a bilateral agreement was reached on additional Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). The countries exchanged extra quotas for the evaluation visits under the OSCE Vienna Document'99, and agreed to exchange information on military forces in Lithuania and Kaliningrad in the format of the CFE Treaty. The Russian military observers are also in-

vited to the biggest military exercises in Lithuania (e.g. *Baltic Challenge, Amber Hope*) on a regular basis. Meanwhile, the Russian military transit is proceeding without any major problems. Russia essentially complies with the rules set by Lithuania. The legal framework for the military transit currently in place also leaves more latitude for Lithuania to ensure that it does not become an obstacle to the EU or NATO integration.

In its relations with Belarus, Lithuania continues pursuing a so-called policy of 'selective engagement', which implies maintaining pragmatic relations that cannot be interpreted as a political recognition of the legitimacy of the regime established by President Alexander Lukashenko. Lithuania does not want Belarus to be isolated on the international arena, as it would not help its eventual democratisation. In the military realm, similar CSBMs as with Russia have been agreed upon with Belarus, which puts substance into the overarching principle of 'selective engagement'. 'Selective engagement' also includes sending and receiving military observers

to the military exercises and practical co-operation between the border guards in combating illegal trafficking of people and goods as well as co-operation between the NGOs and other activities.

***Defence co-operation with NATO
and Partner countries***

Lithuania has developed a robust network of regional defence-related co-operation with many NATO and Partner Nations. Increasing involvement in the activities of the German-Polish-Danish defence co-operation triangle, two strategic partnerships (with the USA and Poland), bilateral co-operation with partners in Europe, including, but not limited to, NATO's major European Allies, the Nordic countries, and the new NATO members serve as the most prominent examples. Internationally supported Baltic defence co-operation projects with Latvia and Estonia deserve special mentioning. Along with the combined Lithuanian-Polish Battalion, the entire complex of BALT-projects will become a natural ex-

tension of the NATO Integrated Military Structure in the region, once Lithuania and other two Baltic States have been accepted to NATO.

Since 1994 Lithuania has been contributing to the UN and NATO-led peace support operations: UNPROFOR II in Croatia, IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo, and AFOR in Albania. Today, the Lithuanian troops are deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) together with the Danish contingent, and in Kosovo (KFOR) together with the Polish unit. Lithuania is also providing a transport aircraft to NATO, operating from the air base in Naples (Italy), to perform tactical airlift support for KFOR/SFOR missions. With a view of increasing its ability to effectively react to international crisis, Lithuania is developing the National Crisis Response System compatible with NATO. By means of such practical contribution Lithuania demonstrates its political solidarity with the Alliance's policy in the region and the readiness to act jointly with NATO forces. Under the same banner of

contributing to building security in Europe, Lithuania also continues active involvement in the OSCE dialogue and participation in long-term missions in Georgia, Kosovo and Moldova.

Lithuania pursues the parallel course towards the EU accession and makes a contribution to the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In Lithuania's view, strengthening ESDP does not mean duplication of or competition with NATO structures. NATO remains the fundamental organisation for European security. Creation of the European Rapid Reaction Forces is aimed at contributing to strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic link and sharing the burden of costs and responsibility. Lithuania continues to promote American involvement in the European security architecture and closer co-ordination between NATO and the EU, the latter having access to the infrastructure and assets of the former, where NATO as a whole is not engaged. In the EU Capabilities Pledging Conference, Lithuania offered to contribute to the EU capabilities with the

same pool of forces that has been identified for the Adapted Planning and Review Process (PARP). Lithuania proposed operational assets that include the Lithuanian components of the Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian battalion BALTBAT and Lithuanian-Polish battalion LITPOLBAT, as well as a motorised infantry battalion of Panevėžys, two naval vessels, one helicopter and two transport aircraft. Lithuania set a special focus on adding small-size land Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and military medical support units. This is meant as a menu list, from which the EU will be able to pick necessary assets. The bulk of the Lithuanian contribution is expected to meet the Headline Goal deployability and sustainability requirements by 2003. In addition, Lithuania offers, with the immediate effect, to the EU two of its national training grounds for the EU troops training purposes. The overview and update of these proposed assets was presented during the EU Capabilities Improvement Conference (CIC) in Brussels in November 2001.

Legal issues

In the legal sphere, Lithuania attaches great importance to the creation of necessary legal framework for integration into NATO. The Government Commission on NATO Integration has screened the Lithuanian national legislation and established that the major legal acts, starting with the Constitution, were not in conflict with any obligations, which Lithuania would have to undertake under the body of international agreements related to its future membership in NATO.

Lithuania's Progress Report provided some critical remarks concerning legal aspects of Lithuania's future participation in both collective defence operations in accordance with the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and in Non-Article 5 'out-of-are' operations, as legal and procedural barriers existed to deploy forces in a timely manner. On the request of Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, the Danish experts prepared a study, reviewing Lithuanian legislation in force and con-

ducting its comparative analysis in the light of the experience of different Western partners. Taking into account remarks by the Alliance experts and the Danish analysis, simplified and more transparent provisions of the Law on International Operations, Military Exercises and other Arrangements have been prepared and approved by the Seimas (Parliament). In addition, Lithuania's legal framework for defence procurement, prohibiting long-term contracts, drew some criticism. As a consequence, the Seimas approved an updated law that would permit 3-year contracts.

The development of a system of national laws providing the framework for a national security and defence policy has also been completed. This includes the National Security Concept, the laws on Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service, on Compulsory Service, on Total Defence and resistance to Aggression, on Intelligence, on Protection of Classified Information and others. The national Security Strategy will be in place by the beginning of 2002. In

2001, the State Defence Council approved the Lithuanian Military Defence Strategy. This Strategy was the missing link in the hierarchy of conceptual documents guiding Lithuania's security and defence policy. However, it is a living document and some changes will inevitably be introduced in order to reflect the constantly changing strategic environment and ensure that defence-planning staffs have the best available basis to assess the defence priorities.

Defence / military issues

During the second MAP cycle, Lithuania has made progress in developing command, control and communication system, new force structure, professional military education, training and doctrine, logistics, infrastructure, airspace surveillance and control, and the quality of life for the military. At this stage, the need to prioritise in developing the national defence system became an imperative. Lithuania's highest priority in implementing the Partnership Goals (PGs) is the need

to provide realistic and resource based tasks in the Annual National Plan. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) Progress Report has been immensely helpful in reviewing our defence development plans and modifying priorities. We found PARP helpful in our force planning; the PGs were especially useful in aligning resources among competing priorities.

The main goal of Lithuania's defence reform is to find the best balance between the capabilities required for the defence of the state, carrying out peace time missions, present and future international commitments and the resources available to support and sustain these capabilities. Key words for the new structure of our armed forces are realistic and achievable. Lithuanian armed forces are being prepared for self-defence and will be capable of engaging in the full spectrum of the Alliance's missions: to conduct Host Nation Support (HNS) operations, training for international crisis response/ Peace Support Operations and Article 5 collective defence operations. The priority has been given to the development of the ef-

ficient, reliable, and mobile Ground Forces and small, mission tailored Air Forces and Navy. The Progress Report criticised the previous Lithuanian defence plans for four combat brigades as too ambitious.

The adjusted plans envisage a fully operational Reaction Brigade tailored for a mission of reinforcement of our territorial forces and fighting in potential Article 5 operations on Lithuanian soil or immediate neighbourhood under NATO command deployed by the end of 2006. Already by November 2002 Lithuania will provide a battalion-size NATO compatible unit to be deployed for Article 5 operations as a part of the Allied force outside the Lithuanian territory. Meanwhile, Lithuania continues its participation by company-size contingents in NATO-led international crises response operations on a rotational basis. Under the revised plans, a unified and effective chain of command can be best assured with an organisation consisting of two military regions (Western & Eastern) with the elements of mobile (regular) and ter-

ritorial forces (the National Defence Volunteer Forces - NDVF) and one mobile Reaction Brigade for reinforcement in the direction of a possible conflict. In this respect, integration of the NDVF into regular forces is a paramount task. Territorial defence forces will be under the command of the military regions. Once reorganisation has been completed, the peacetime strength of Lithuanian Armed forces will be over 16,000 (active reserve - no more than 25,000). It is worth mentioning that recently the Ground Forces Commander has been appointed. He has full command over the Ground Forces including the NDVF. In wartime, the Ground Forces Commander would assume responsibility of the overall Operational Commander.

Among other objectives in the development of the national defence system there are:

- Establishment of an effective reserve training and mobilisation system;
- Preparation of infrastructure, personnel and procedures for HNS opera-

tions (reception of possible partner reinforcements):

- To ensure defence of the 1st Air Base from air threats and continue formation of the Air Defence Battalion;
- To develop infrastructure of 1st and 2nd Air Bases;
- To prepare the Navy infrastructure for HNS.
- A further development of a centralised logistics system:
 - Ensuring participation of military units up to a company size in NATO-led crises response operations and, from November 2002 onwards, participation of military units up to a company size in collective defence operations outside the Lithuanian territory;
 - To enhance logistic support of the territorial forces.
 - Development of the training and education system:
 - Development of an effective air space monitoring and control system:
 - To integrate BALTNET into NATO Air Space Surveillance and Defence System;

- To implement the 3D medium range air surveillance radar procurement project.

These objectives constitute the core of the national plans and are central for the Lithuanian ANP and PARP. The PARP is the principal tool of implementing the MAP and developing Lithuania's defence forces to meet NATO standards and, particularly, to prepare for the Alliance's collective defence planning practices.

Resource issues

The ability to finance the future plans and programmes and to ensure that the most cost-effective resource options are chosen is a precondition for the establishment of efficient Armed Forces, capable of undertaking the assigned tasks. Resource management is being carried out through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), which includes strategic planning, resource allocation according to the programmes, financial management and performance evaluation. The PPBS ensures that maximum defence capability is achieved in the most efficient

and cost effective manner. In accordance with the PPBS, all of the defence objectives are covered by nine long-range State Security Enhancement Programmes and accompanied by the performance criteria in five areas: manpower (individual training), collective performance, armament and equipment, deployability and sustainability. These criteria are applied to the Land Forces, Air Forces, Navy and logistics to evaluate both the quantitative and qualitative progress in achieving objectives. From these defence objectives programme co-ordinators derive their specific tasks and undertake activities to be completed in support of them.

The enlargement process continues to play a vital role in shaping the progressive transformation of military establishments of Central and Eastern Europe. Both the MAP and PARP have helped to create a structure of defence reform and inter-departmental co-ordination. Lithuania has an affordable plan, is resourcing it and is implementing it to build its credible defence forces and be ready to assume international commitments includ-

ing those under the Article 5. To quote one NATO official, "NATO enlargement is a political decision but military reform will result in a political message".

NATO-Russia relations and NATO enlargement in the Baltic Sea Region

By Frederic Labarre, MA *

NATO-Russia versus US-Russia relations

The creation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in Paris in May 1997 is the best indication that an attempt was made to formalize to a certain degree NATO-Russia relations, which in effect means a clear separation from US-Russian bilateral relations.

This helps (but does not always succeed) in ensuring that no linkage is made between issues that are respectively of US

and NATO jurisdiction. While this was not the immediate intent, the creation of the PJC tentatively resolved an asymmetry in two regimes of relations. For the first time in history, Russia had a “voice” in NATO, while its favourite means of diplomacy, bilateralism¹, was maintained and untainted by other matters dealt separately with the US.

The PJC is a forum for consultation and consensus building with Russia.² It is not (nor ever was meant to be) formally institutionalised. Except for bi-annual Ministerial meetings, regular ambas-

sadorial contact and the capacity to set up working groups and committees³, there never was evidence of the desire to turn these into a structure resembling a trans-Atlantic security council. It is true that it represented a breakthrough in post-Cold War relations with Russia, and while there were many successes to celebrate⁴, the PJC hit a serious snag by spring 1999.

This is when the Kosovo air campaign erupted. It may be construed that there is no difference between Russian relations with the US and NATO because Russia used the opportunity to withdraw from

* Mr. Frederic Labarre, MA, is a Fellow of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Nova Scotia, Canada and advisor to the Ministry of Defence of Estonia. The article was prepared for “Enlargements in Europe: An outlook from a Nordic Perspective”, 2nd to 3rd of November 2001, Karlberg Castle, Sweden.

the PJC. Then Prime Minister Yevguenyi Primakov signified his disagreement with the decision to go ahead with the air war by returning straight back to Moscow while en route to Washington. But this snub cannot have meant anything past initial disdain. Russia has a relationship of financial dependence on the United States. It counts on Congress to free funds to its benefit (mostly funds that help it repay the huge Soviet-era sums it owes to Germany and Special Drawing Rights to the International Monetary Fund), and therein lies the principal difference. The United States is essential to Russian interests, and have greater leverage than NATO. As a result, Russia has cut off its ties with NATO in March 1999⁵, but resumed a certain level of dialogue with the US especially after Yeltsin's abdication.

Another indication that serves to show the difference between the two regimes of relations is the question of missile defence. The prodigal "son of Star Wars" re-emerged as an issue of US-Russian tension in the closing months of the Clinton administration.

"In the spring of 1999 the combined impact of NATO's Kosovo operation and the American push to deploy a national missile defence resulted in a sharp increase in reliance on nuclear weapons. The war in Kosovo sharply increased the perception of a potential threat emanating from NATO, which could not be deterred by conventional weapons alone. The still-lingering concern over NATO expansion in 1997 made this perception particularly acute: since the summer of 1999 the Russian Army has regularly trained to defend against a large scale, "Kosovo-style" air-attack. For its part, the National Missile Defence (NMD) can, theoretically, render the Russian nuclear deterrent impotent in ten or so years, making the country more vulnerable to conventional attack".⁶

Implicit in this declaration is the inherent separation between NMD and NATO's capabilities as two different threats to Russia, needing to be dealt with separately. The two are related in the Russian perception, but they cannot be linked in terms of diplomacy because of the existence of the PJC, which allows Russia to

express its concerns (when it participates) to some NATO members who would perhaps share its position on other matters like NMD.

Similarly, NATO's nuclear arsenal being in fact that of the USA, it has no real authority to deal with such matters unilaterally. So the two items are in fact separated, leading to two different approaches. It follows that relations are different from Russia towards NATO and towards the USA. Hence for the purpose of our research we can safely concentrate on the fate of NATO-Russia relations without exaggerating the place that US-Russia relations may take in the debate.

***Other elements affecting
NATO-Russia relations***

This discussion has allowed us to highlight issues of extreme importance when one considers NATO enlargement to the Baltic States. Since NATO enlargement and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) are both priorities of the new Bush administration, there were fears that Russia might

force a trade that would be detrimental to the Baltics, namely, that Russia would somehow “allow” the BMD to go ahead in exchange for NATO stopping its enlargement drive.⁷

This is unlikely to materialize because, as the excerpt above demonstrates, when Russia’s national security perception is concerned, it is NATO’s capabilities and the US anti-missile capability that are threatening, not the enlargement itself. Russia therefore needs to neutralize *both* threats. With the projection capability of NATO, it matters little whether BMD has been dropped, or vice-versa. Enlargement, in this sense, only offers a tactical advantage, and does not represent the geo-strategic imbalance that Russia sometimes presents it to be. This is why Russia has lately been reiterating⁸ the opinion that no NATO bases should be located on its borders (while vociferously remaining opposed to enlargement). Furthermore, this exchange scenario would involve overruling the opinion of some (or all) of the NATO members, perhaps endangering the Alliance. In any case, the Bush adminis-

tration, in true meritocratic style, seems determined to reach both goals. A recent Survival essay seems to add weight to this notion, claiming that a broad consensus concerning the NMD debate is being reached.⁹ If this were occurring “in the back” of the Baltic States, the question of their membership into NATO would rapidly disappear from political debate.

What the preceding debate has yielded is that elements unrelated to enlargement can affect Baltic perceptions, which in turn propel the debate further, as if in an ever-accelerating upward spiral. These are not the only events that have served to envenom the relationship between Russia and NATO; the resumption of the war in Chechnya re-ignited the second bid for NATO membership by the Baltics.¹⁰

“When one sees what is happening in Chechnya, one should make the conclusion that Russia is at high level of military readiness and poses a potential threat...”¹¹

As a result of this and of the Baltic States’ “bitter experience of relations with a neighbouring country”, it comes as no

surprise that there is a desire to join NATO.

One philosophical/psychological factor that may reveal inconsistencies in the accession discourse of the Baltic States is the gap between the idealism that NATO embodies since its transformation from a common defence to a collective security instrument¹², and the inherent realism of the Baltic States’ flight away from Moscow’s sphere of influence. The necessity to become “like-minded” with NATO members, implemented by virtue of the condition posed at the April 1999 NATO Summit in Washington to maintain harmonious relations with neighbours¹³ is hijacked by historical and geopolitical realities, and made even worse by the perceived insistence of Moscow at keeping tensions high to disqualify the Baltic States for membership.

Interestingly, as NATO-Russia relations unravel, the 1999 conditions as outlined in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process are less and less emphasized, although the Baltic States themselves continue to make efforts in the direction of

closer ties with their former “occupier”. In the articles I have collected through my internet search, results have yielded only one article where this necessity is reiterated by a Western official.¹⁴ As long as there are tensions between NATO and Russia, thus, the Baltics’ claim for membership is consistent with their perception of Russia.¹⁵ As soon as NATO-Russia relations improve, they run the risk of demonstrating that they seek membership for common defence rather than collective security purposes, thereby increasing the mindset gap between themselves and NATO, and enhancing Russia fears that NATO enlarges against it.

Having raised all these issues, we are better prepared to examine the positions of NATO and Russia concerning enlargement since the autumn of 1999.

NATO and Enlargement

In all fairness to NATO’s extraordinary rise and staying power in the post-Cold War era, we cannot discuss its enlargement after Kosovo without putting the debate

briefly in context. The question of enlargement prior to Kosovo needs to be summarized and there are three points that should be made clear.

The first point is that the Article 10 of the Washington Treaty allows for the admission of new members. The controversy obviously revolves around the fact that enlargement is occurring in the absence of the threat that spawned NATO in the first place.

The second point is that the 1995 Enlargement Study set precise guidelines for any state hopeful of admission into the Alliance. The peace and quiet enjoyed in Central and Eastern Europe is without a doubt owed to this policy, requiring states to settle outstanding disputes peaceably, resolve border differences, care for their minorities, and declare genuine good relations with neighbours. These conditions continue to exist.

The third point is the fact that while the first round of enlargement was cautious, the second round is taking place at a snail’s pace, yet seems even more certain than the first one. The difference is that

this time, there is a possible escape route for NATO, should it choose not to enlarge. The Membership Action Plan, unveiled at the April 1999 Washington Summit, basically sets the direction of the reform of the aspiring states in defence and military terms, while emphasizing certain political requirements, described in the 1995 Enlargement Study. This way NATO can adjust the speed of enlargement without invoking Russia as a cause of slows downs (or accelerations). All the burden of adaptation is placed on the shoulders of new applicants, and they know it. Despite their apparent weakness, they have nevertheless succeeded in affecting the discourse on enlargement, as we shall see.

These points now clear, we can better monitor the evolution of the enlargement debate within NATO through its Secretary General’s declarations.

When Lord Robertson of Port Ellen took the NATO office in the fall of 1999, he outlined five goals for the coming years. First was the contribution of NATO to the Stability Pact of South East Europe. The second was the Defence Capabilities

Initiative (DCI) followed closely (because it is somewhat related) to the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Only fourth came close co-operation with Russia. Finally, closer links between NATO and its partners were advocated, mostly through a strengthening of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) processes.

Enlargement was mentioned only *en passant* as part of this last point, and occurring “early in the next century”.¹⁶

It seemed that at the time, and correctly, the most urgent task on the agenda was the Balkans. One may be tempted to advance the theory that as the enlargement debate took over centre stage in the following months, it deflected energies from that priority and may have negatively helped the eruptions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).¹⁷

One cannot academically prove that the way the priorities were outlined indicated an order of importance. However, belief in the notion that the priorities were lined up in order of importance can be inferred

by the fact that the Balkans were indeed the central piece occupying all efforts, and NATO-Russia relations were clearly lower because Russia’s withdrawal from the Permanent Joint Council meant that any renewal of relations had to be initiated by Moscow. But Brussels clearly had a part to play, and this may be why there is only a cursory reference to enlargement, as a way to induce Russia to come back.

It is also evident that references to enlargement will vary in frequency and intensity depending on the audiences. Therefore it is not surprising to see other aspects emphasized as priorities in Lord Robertson’s speech of 15 November 1999 at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Amsterdam.

What is conspicuous in that speech is the total absence of any reference to Russia, and a corresponding increase in the question of enlargement’s status, worded thus:

“...[O]ne of my key responsibilities will be to prepare NATO for the next round of enlargement. NATO’s Heads of State and Government have committed to con-

sider further enlargement no later than 2002... The door to NATO will remain open as an important part of [the MAP] process”.¹⁸

So the link with partners was being upgraded through the common desire of all member states. It is important here to stress that this is the aggregate policy of the members, and not of NATO. Implicit in this remark is that Russia has somehow changed in the perception of the Allies. This shift cannot be blamed on Russia’s evasion of the PJC, but on its renewed adventures in Chechnya. Russia’s simple return to the PJC could not be the end of NATO’s attempt to re-establish ties with Russia. Acknowledging rapprochement with Russia at a time when it started waging a brutal and inexplicable war in Chechnya may have exposed NATO to inconsistencies with its recent intervention in Serbia (indeed, the contradictions were highlighted several times since then in academic circles).¹⁹

Lord Robertson devoted a significant part of his subsequent speech at the Sir Frank Roberts Memorial lecture on Feb-

ruary 2nd 2000. A refrain that would catch so many Baltic ears was then uttered for the first time; NATO enlargement is part of the ongoing process of the “completion of Europe” through its deepening and widening. But the responsibility of the success of this widening remained with the applicants, as the MAP process was described as the tool to maybe achieve membership.²⁰ Lord Robertson’s declaration underscored the necessity to achieve this widening in the context of improving NATO-Russia relations.

The intellectual point that the MAP fostered security by giving hopefuls the incentive to carry out reforms by settling outstanding disputes was not lost to Russia. Many in the Baltics claim that Russia is being difficult for the simple sake of multiplying obstacles on the way to NATO. In other words, there is no Russian will for improved relations with the Baltic States since this would open the door to NATO even wider. For this reason, it is impossible for NATO to ignore Russia while proceeding with enlargement. Lord Robertson outlined the basics of a

policy of renewed relations with Russia because the enlargement is as much the plan of the NATO members as it is the desire of applicants. Russia could not be left out in the cold. Lord Robertson advocated a role for NATO that would be, at minimum

“...persistent engagement. To claim a leading role [for NATO] is clearly not realistic. Other institutions may well be able to offer more to Russia at this stage of Russia’s difficult transition... If Russia’s successful transition is in our interest, we must help that transition succeed... That is why I am determined to get the NATO-Russia relationship back on track”.²¹

The other institutions Lord Robertson spoke of, and the “stage” at which Russia was, were the Council of Europe, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Russia’s troubles in Chechnya respectively. Henceforth, NATO would keep silent on the Chechen question (not that it said much previously) and leave wrangling on that subject to these institutions.

A week later, Lord Robertson spoke before the Bulgarian National Assembly and unsurprisingly devoted a large part of his address on the topic of enlargement. For the first time in his tenure, he assured that “others will follow” Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO.²² But more significantly, he outlined in no uncertain terms what was expected of applicants.

“They must be ready to make the reforms which are needed. They must tackle the crucial issues, such as defence reform, without delay. They must not shy away from taking tough and painful decisions and must allocate sufficient resources to their reforms. Fine words are not enough. They must be backed by deeds.”²³

A few months later, in May the exact same words were spoken at the Joint Wilton Park/Atlantic Council Conference in Slovenia.²⁴ There, Lord Robertson indicated that the relationship between applicants and NATO in the framework of the MAP would become more “interactive”.²⁵ Later at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, he reiterated the applicants’

responsibilities with the twist that Russia occupied a larger part of the debate with a common desire between Moscow and Brussels to re-ignite the PJC.²⁶

In this last respect, the Secretary General's speech gave credit to President Vladimir Putin for the rapprochement, but he took care of giving certain initial limits to co-operation, revolving around such topics as nuclear safety, peacekeeping, and counter proliferation.²⁷ As a result, Robertson felt safe enough at the end of May 2000 to claim that Russia and NATO were "overcoming the Kosovo syndrome".²⁸ As Russia gradually reintegrated the PJC, two achievements of note were celebrated: The agreement to open the NATO information office in Moscow as soon as possible and an agreement on a work plan for the remainder of 2000.²⁹

All this would seem to shift the focus exclusively on the process of getting the NATO-Russia relationship back on track at the expense of other priorities, mainly the enlargement issue, but this is not the case. All the while reports were given about the status of the MAP process, in other

words, of the enlargement itself. The MAP process and the NATO-Russia relationship became priority by mid 2000, and altered significantly the order of the agenda that Lord Robertson had set himself nine months earlier. Enlargement and NATO-Russia relations reigned supreme before the Parliamentary Assembly's very eyes.

One of the reasons for this refocusing comes after the publication of the Russian military doctrine and of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation in April 2000, themselves formed by the events of 1999.

"The transition of NATO to the use of force (military force) beyond the zone of its responsibility and without the sanction of the UN Security Council, which has been elevated to the level of a strategic doctrine, is fraught with the destabilisation of the strategic situation in the world."³⁰

The Russian military doctrine came to the support of the national security concept by adopting a decidedly more assertive tone, indeed, says Dr. S. J. Main, a more "interventionist" one. One omi-

nous sign, is that the final version, adopted in April 2000, omits to mention that Russia would abide by the provisions of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Agreements or the Paris Charter³¹, just as NATO has refused to go through the UN Security Council for Kosovo, one hears Russian planners sarcastically adding in their thoughts. The initial October 1999 version of the Russian military doctrine did not fail to mention these international documents.

A more worrying trend is that some parts of the Doctrine can be interpreted as Russia being willing to intervene in favour of its citizens in what is rapidly being forgotten as its "near-abroad". This is indeed a trend that would seem at odds with the desire expressed by Brussels to get closer to Moscow, and one that has definite consequences for the future of relations between NATO and Russia (and also with the West in general).

In July musings of Russia one day joining NATO were uttered, but Lord Robertson was careful to say that this was not a priority for a long time to come.

But he did reiterate that the PJC was there to regulate NATO-Russia encounters in a manner that defined the areas of discussion in basically the same way as his previous speech in Bratislava in May.³² So NATO-Russia relations were as important – and as stalled – as ever. By September, however, indications were that the relationship was back on track, and the Secretary General was close to declaring unmitigated success. Yet, there was no mentioning of the enlargement. Instead, issues of importance to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) – (it was a SACLANT Symposium, after all) were emphasized, such as lifting capability.³³

Enlargement was back in the news at the speech to the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria the following month. On this date, expectations of NATO membership were mitigated when Lord Robertson said that the decision as to the “who” and “when” would be “based on many factors.”³⁴ Compliance to the MAP was an important part of the assessment, leading to believe that some other considerations, presumably the requirements of the 1995

Study, would also count.³⁵ Hitherto, MAP participants had been lulled to believe that the MAP was the only criterion. NATO did not divulge (nor does it intend to divulge) the “who”, but alluded to the “when” by saying that the process of enlargement would be “reviewed no later than 2002”.³⁶ Furthermore, the topic of enlargement preceded the necessity to reinvigorate NATO-Russia relations.

This minute shift is the result of applicants’ pressure, applied mostly through the press. As time went by, NATO seemed to volunteer more and more information about what will happen at the 2002 Summit. Yet, implicit in the insistence of keeping NATO-Russia relations on track (in expectation of the future round of enlargement), is its exclusive linkage with the addition of new members from the former Soviet sphere. This is inevitable. NATO’s policy of engagement is impossible in parallel with enlargement. The latter will destroy the former.

Another shift in the debate in favour of the enlargement track came at the end of October 2000. In speaking of the “Six

Levels of Partnership”, Lord Robertson implied that partners, sooner or later, would become full members, provided that they meet the necessary requirements, and achieve successful transition and integration. This sparked cautious optimism in some former Soviet Republics who saw in that the notion that their turn would come since “membership is simply the logical conclusion of partnership.”³⁷ Even more significant, the Secretary General said that for the others “we cannot promise a timetable for accession nor guarantee their membership. But we will not keep one half of Europe at arm’s length forever.”³⁸

A conscious differentiation between what NATO considers to be historical or geographical Europe was being made from those other partners who were not part of the MAP process. These words were directly intended for the MAP countries, the “Vilnius Nine” of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.³⁹ While NATO-Russia relations remained behind the MAP process in importance, they were

nevertheless improved, as NATO was moving beyond simple engagement.

“Getting back to the status quo before Kosovo is not enough. We should aim higher. We should aim for a relationship where a disagreement in one area does [not] lead to a breakdown of our entire co-operation.”⁴⁰

So towards the end of 2000, a noticeable improvement in the quality of the NATO-Russia relationship could be witnessed. In addition, the prospect for inclusion of some (or all) of the Vilnius Nine was becoming clearer. So clear, in fact, that responsibility for enlargement was beginning to be shared by NATO because it is “serious about enlargement, and [that is] why the Alliance is giving focused feedback to each of the nine aspirants.”⁴¹

Three days later, he confirmed that a Summit would take place in 2002, one where “further invitations” would be “considered”.⁴² Meanwhile, enlargement was the number one topic on the agenda, with NATO-Russia relations as a close second. In that last respect, Lord Robertson

called ever more confidently for the crisis-resilient relationship that could “survive disagreement over single issues, such as enlargement or Kosovo”.⁴³ In a way, that was a signal to Russia that it had no veto over enlargement. More substantially, however, it is the first time that NATO felt confident enough to mention the K-word and enlargement in the context of improving relations. While there is the implicit understanding by NATO that pushing too much on unilateral “Out-of-Area” intervention or enlargement issues may prove damaging, Russia is given to understand that she has no say in Alliance policies.

A week later, the Secretary General met with the Parliamentary Assembly with a strong message about DCI and Euro Atlantic ties, and the question of Parliamentary consent to enlargement was briefly discussed.⁴⁴ This topic is important, because with improving NATO-Russia ties, there is a possibility that Moscow may try to influence member States individually to stymie the consensus over enlargement without incurring defeats in NATO-

Russia relation or bilateral relations. Certainly, one can rightly be fearful of this eventuality when one looks at the unequal treatment given to the subject by German officials.⁴⁵

Strangely enough, it is Germany’s late Manfred Wörner who was the earliest advocate of enlargement (after all, he presided over the reunification and NATO integration of his own state in 1990). This is why it is bizarre to see his countrymen displaying apparent second thoughts. This is because Germany has immense stakes in good relations with Russia, namely, the repayment of Soviet era debts to the amount of some \$40 billion. The issue of the Kaliningrad enclave – once part of the German Empire – is of interest to Russia as well, and Moscow may have found therein the tools it needs to stall enlargement by enrolling Germany. While this is a very remote possibility, Germany being undeniably stronger than Russia all by itself at the present time, speaking with German diplomats, one gets the feeling that Moscow’s voice carries a lot of weight in Berlin.

Robertson kept his cards to himself regarding enlargement stressing the process of “review” and mentioning Prague as the venue for the NATO Summit, but no date. NATO-Russia relations became a case for celebration; “Russia is coming to realize that NATO is here to stay, and that we need a *modus vivendi* with each other.”⁴⁶ In the same breath, Robertson said, in anticipation of the opening of NATO’s Moscow information centre, that “NATO needs to be more effective at conveying to the Russians what the Alliance is, what it does and why—because Russians need to understand more clearly that NATO is not, nor does it want to be, a threat to their security.”⁴⁷

At this juncture, a new international event had come to rock the Baltic scene; that of the alleged presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, a question we will delve into in the next part. Lord Robertson is right in saying that NATO is misunderstood, but by whom? Certainly, the public ignorant of what NATO really is may be puzzled⁴⁸, but there is no doubt that the Russian leader-

ship understands where the allies come from and can recognize a defensive body when they see one. Furthermore, they can certainly read that the new strategic concept of the Alliance does not treat Russia as a threat.

What Lord Robertson downgrades as a simple misunderstanding is vastly different to Russian leaders. To them, resistance to NATO is trench warfare. They have dug in and are refusing to give up any ground on the subject, although we will see later that they in fact have. Immobility is a matter of principle. Lord Robertson could not make them move simply on the merits of a new NATO, but on the acknowledgment of Russia’s core interests, cryptic for “give us something in return”. This is something that deeply worries the Baltic, shaken by their Molotov-Ribbentrop experience. When the Alliance says that enlargement “is not about encircling or excluding Russia”⁴⁹, the Russian leadership knows this.

Proceeding with the ongoing MAP process, Lord Robertson beseeched the Nine to orient their defence reform away

from Cold War structures, and more towards interoperable, modern, small but capable forces, adding that he would “rather be tough in 2001 than apologetic in 2002”⁵⁰, implying that something concrete regarding enlargement would happen. Some days later, at the Mountbatten address, Lord Robertson went a step further by saying “every democratic country must have a free right to choose its own security arrangement.”⁵¹ Repeating this OSCE mantra has since been the main activity of spokesperson from Tallinn to Ljubljana, as if it could ward off their fear of Russia’s veto on their membership.

Saying that Russia has no veto does not mean automatic acceptance. It just means that Russia will not be the reason for rejection. Furthermore, what applicants forget at their peril is the fact that, as NATO enlarges, the Alliance members are choosing their “security arrangement” too. In other words, the choice is not one-sided. The character of the Alliance must not be changed by the addition of members, regardless of their origin, but neither must applicants delude themselves

into thinking that they are de facto allies because some of the actual NATO members may not “choose” a 28 state strong Alliance. This choice too, is legitimate.

Yet, the Nine and the Baltic States in particular have reasons to remain hopeful: NATO concedes that “when a *European* democracy is able and willing to make a real contribution to Euro Atlantic security, then the Alliance has an *obligation* to consider their [*sic*] application for membership.”⁵² Once again, emphasis is put on *European*, but the term *obligation* is certainly good news for the Baltic States and the rest of the Nine, despite the “homework” that remains to be done.⁵³

Meanwhile in March, a “State of the Alliance” address by the Deputy Secretary General opined that the NATO-Russia freeze was a thing of the past.⁵⁴ To underscore this achievement, Lord Robertson felt compelled to base much of his Erasmus University speech on the NATO-Russia relationship, insisting on the broadening dialogue within the PJC towards crisis-resilient co-operation that even included theatre missile defence.⁵⁵

By the middle of 2001, there could be no doubt that NATO had achieved a significant breakthrough in its relations with Russia. While these improvements could not lead to believe that Russia would actually welcome enlargement⁵⁶, NATO felt that the time had come to produce more signs of its willingness to enlarge by holding a Parliamentary Assembly in Vilnius. But if Russia had accepted to anchor its relationship with NATO in the PJC, it remained that it kept a free hand in most everything else. This is why no Russian representative was sent to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Vilnius in late May 2001.⁵⁷

While the venue acted as a message unto itself, Lord Robertson pointed to the fact that Allies stood ready to give assistance to NATO hopefuls, but steering clear of the trap of naming names of possible new members, he indicated that the requisites of the 1995 Study had largely been met, and that relevant efforts (and the subsequent evaluation for membership) may hinge more on MAP performance.⁵⁸

This section can be confidently concluded by quoting Lord Robertson’s June

20th speech where he announced that “NATO hopes and expects, based on current and anticipated progress by the aspiring members, to launch the process of enlargement at the Prague Summit in 2002.”⁵⁹ No more “reviews” or “consideration”, the “zero option” out, NATO *will* enlarge in 2002. Had Lord Robertson divulged any more information as to the “who” of the process, the progress in meeting Partnership Goals (PGs) and Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) would have stopped. This is a telling indication that the decision to accept new members is not necessarily only political, but is based more and more on the actual contribution that “aspiring members” can make. Baltic-Russia relations are less important in the decision, and therefore, so are NATO-Russia relations. One has to remember that aspiring members (itself a term pregnant with meaning) from the Baltic are fleeing their former occupier but are also limited in their military capabilities and are short on resources. This means that the impetus that NATO is trying to fight off—the desire to reap the benefits of Arti-

cle 5 while not contributing more to effective and interoperable self-defence—would take over as Baltics' scarce resources would be automatically shifted to meet domestic and EU urgencies.

It needs to be said that these efforts, conditions for membership, were not suffered by the three previous invitees, and this is why more and more, Baltic leaders are pointing to the West's *moral obligation* to accept the Baltic States as members. In effect, the latest members are modernizing at the same time as "aspiring members" but the Baltics are doing it with the issue of national survival as chief motivator.

The preceding analysis has shown that as time went on, enlargement occupied more and more space and became NATO's number one priority, never outdone by the parallel need to restore the NATO-Russia relationship. The enlargement debate evolved in favour of the Baltic States and other MAP participants in the context of improving relations with Russia. This would therefore give us reason to believe that the next round of enlarge-

ment, which is sure to come in 2002, will proceed without a hitch. But this conclusion counts without Russia's position, which we examine in the next section.

Russia and enlargement

When using media debate as the basis for analysis, it is useful to remind the reader of certain aspects of contemporary diplomacy and negotiation. Because the nation-state is no longer the sole actor of international relations, "our changing world demands that we broaden our conceptual framework."⁶⁰ The tools in existence to initiate processes ever increasing in complexity, such as diplomacy and the use of force, are no longer sufficient due to the high degree of interdependence between States. Reliance on unofficial dialogue is extremely important in contemporary international politics. It allows the sides to gauge each other's position without incurring political losses or committing to risky endeavours such as discussion of sensitive issues, which are not ripe to be addressed. Such unofficial dialogue

corresponds broadly to what Fred Ikle termed "side-effects negotiations"⁶¹, or negotiations aimed at keeping the sides talking until new developments determine a more official course of action. This is why analysis of media sources is useful in this case, because it may help to indicate progression and relative importance of a debate.

Early in October 1999, the question of Baltics accession to NATO was still linked to the situation of ethnic minorities living in the Baltic States. In the case of Lithuania, Russia made exception because of the generous provisions that state had granted to its Russian minority. Granting equal rights to Russians living in Lithuania was comparatively easier than for Estonia and Latvia who feared that an ethnic vote might constitute a fifth column that would nullify their independence. Yet even for Lithuania, Moscow still opposed NATO enlargement, and wilfully tried to disqualify it from membership by refusing to ratify a border agreement.⁶²

Russia's position was that it did not mind "Lithuania's aspiration of integra-

tion into the [EU]”, but “disapproved of its NATO aspirations.”⁶³ Inherent in the chosen wording is the explicit intent to deflect from NATO membership by suggesting that Russia has a say in regional affairs. This is why the Baltics fear being relegated into a grey zone⁶⁴ where they are at the mercy of Russia, effectively threatening their independence.

Until May 25th 2000, Russia had issued “sharply worded statements against the enlargement of NATO.”⁶⁵ This phrase best illustrates the position of Russia concerning the matter and the limits of its activities in trying to prevent the enlargement from happening. But in mid 2000, the West extended an olive branch. General Rainer J. Jung expressed the view (reproduced by Interfax) that enlargement “must not ignore Russia’s interests.”⁶⁶

It is not an accident that this statement follows the publication of the Russian military doctrine by less than a month. Ever since that moment, Germany has cooled off her enthusiasm for NATO enlargement. It did not prevent the Baltic States from expressing dismay at Russia’s

new stance in international affairs, and for good reason.

It disquieted the Baltics because the rhetoric was thus formalized as the “...absence of understanding between our countries on security in the Baltic region and disrespect for Russia’s concerns over NATO enlargement plans.”⁶⁷ References to Russia’s concerns have never left the debate since.

Acknowledgement of Russian interests begs reciprocity. It also propels the debate further by adding the element of “concerns” and forces a discussion on that level. In other words, bouncing statements for and against enlargement on either side of the net like a badminton sparrow soon proves sterile. The debate was enriched by the addition of the term “concern”. It forced all sides to elevate discussion on this new terrain. While this analysis would seem to make sense, it cannot account for the occasional spice added by veiled and open threats coming mostly from people in lower levels of responsibility: “[Russia considers] the further spread of NATO military infrastructure to Russia’s borders a threat to

[its] security.”⁶⁸ The statement goes on to say that if NATO enlarges further “Russia reserves the right to draw the corresponding conclusions and take steps to guarantee its own security.”

These “steps” could include Russian reconnaissance mission on Baltic’s territories as Dmitri Rogozin, Chairman of the Duma’s Committee on International Affairs muses.⁶⁹ Such threats, whether open or veiled, have been made frequently, but they are an indication of inter-agency rivalries within the Russian bureaucracy, rather than a difference in perception or approaches to the problem. In that respect, the author of severely hawkish statements towards the West, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, is expected to lose his job, partly due to a structural shake-up, partly due to his personal stance on NATO enlargement.⁷⁰ The best estimates of Russia’s capabilities, in conjunction with Russia’s commitments regarding the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) from 1990, do not lend any credence to the verbal threats.

Should these words be dismissed? No, but added emphasis should be put on the more constant statements of higher level Russian officials. As it turns out, the attention should be turned to Sergey Ivanov, now Defence Minister and close to President Vladimir Putin. His statements implement the reciprocation alluded to earlier and gives an indication that the debate is moving in the direction of disdainful acceptance of NATO enlargement. This shift is important because officially, it does not attempt to prevent Baltic membership, and moves the debate a step further by ruling out the use of force to prevent Baltic membership, although it would bring an "additional reaction", he added that "the presence of *only one military-political group will not bring security*."⁷¹

The emphasis on the presence of "one group" is consistent with the military doctrine and national security concept of Russia. Ivanov's statements represent an important nuance in the debate. Russia may still advocate the abolition of NATO, but it recognizes that it may be here to

stay. As a result, a *modus vivendi* must be found. This is why early in 2001, Russia's position was that it was

"Against NATO becoming the sole—the sole—basis for providing all European security. At the same time, we recognize that NATO is an integral part of this security. However, it should not be allowed to dictate the rules of the game and determine literally all European security."⁷²

Soon thereafter, Ivanov was appointed Defence Minister. An important member of President Putin's entourage, his words can be taken as Russia's official position. Ivanov is not alone with this new perception. A former deputy Foreign Ministry official, Andrey Fiodorov, explained that "NATO is just one of the components of international security and overvaluing its role might have an unfavourable influence upon relations with the Baltic countries."⁷³ From his mouth comes the most eloquent and powerful shift in position yet. Such a shift, some feel, should have been reciprocated in turn by NATO and it has been in some respect at the Bush-Putin Presidential Summit in Ljubljana,

Slovenia in mid June 2001. President Bush, by effecting a close rapprochement with President Putin, reinforced Putin's domestic position (and some would say, damaged his own) contributing to the silencing of the army critics in Russia.

While this would indicate an upward trend in NATO-Russia relations leading to a hopeful conclusion of the next round of enlargement at Prague, events such as the discovery of tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad enclave have tainted the debate because of the proximity to Baltic interests. For lay people, there is little difference between tactical and ballistic missiles. What counts is the "nuclear" nature of the weapon, which brought back President Bush's BMD priority temporarily on the front burner. This had the effect of unnerving the Baltic States as the notion of a possible trade-off between NATO enlargement and BMD could be made at their expense. The Baltic addition to the tactical nuclear weapons debate briefly envenomed relations between NATO, the USA and Russia. Whatever the consequences, the possibility of a trade-

off of NATO enlargement for Russian blessing over BMD was too serious to remain ignored by the Baltics. While the most vocal neighbour concerning the Kaliningrad controversy remained Poland, her rhetoric soon cooled down⁷⁴ when it dawned that raising the issue of nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad would soon be linked to the presence of US weapons of the same type elsewhere in Europe (and the corresponding need to remove them).⁷⁵

While the Baltic States were clearly worried about reports that contradicted Russia's pledge to keep the Baltic nuclear-free, they were even more of the possibility that the leak had been engineered to give added incentive not to accept Baltic States into NATO.⁷⁶ Yet all levels of Russian officialdom have vehemently denied the presence of the weapons in the enclave.⁷⁷ So the leak was not engineered by them to embarrass the Americans. When the author tried to get a sense of the source of that leak to Bill Gertz, who published the story in the Washington Times, no indication as to the origin of the information was given.

For Baltic Ministers, the event was entirely political. With the whirlwind of speculation caused by the "nuclear leak", the linkage made automatically with BMD has prompted some political leaders in the Baltic to warn against turning Baltic NATO membership into a bargaining chip. Lithuanians are of the opinion that "[if] the US gets mixed up in negotiations on both issues at the same time, there is the possibility of mutual concessions. Russian diplomats may soften their position on missile defence by asking to postpone an invitation for the Baltic States to join NATO."⁷⁸

The Latvian Foreign Minister sought to reassure but could not fail to raise the Molotov-Ribbentrop spectre as a historical torn in the side of the Baltic States. In his own way, he cautioned the West against a trade-off by saying that "the best provocation would be setting up a grey zone [aut.: what a trade-off would actually achieve] in the Baltic region which would undermine stability."⁷⁹

When in Warsaw, Poland, President Bush put these fears to rest by saying,

"we will not trade away the fate of free European people."⁸⁰ This gave the signal to the Baltic States that they need not fear for their future, that enlargement would take place as it advances "the cause of freedom". It sent the message to Moscow that BMD and the enlargement were unrelated issues, to be dealt separately. And if one understands the premium put on winning in Beltway politics, these are two issues where the President of the United States of America intends to prevail.

Since then, Russia's position was modified once more. An article in *Eesti Ekspress* of July 12th 2001 spells out how it views enlargement now. What Russia actually opposes, predictably, is the installation of bases or military hardware close to its borders. And in this, the authority in Defence, Ivanov, agrees, because he said that the approach of military bases to Russian borders "would require an additional reaction"⁸¹.

All this leaves the academician—and the reader—with the same sense of unease as the Baltic leaders concerning the enlargement of NATO and Russia's possible re-

action to it. Yet the progression of the debate shows that enlargement from being a “global mistake”, has been largely accepted through Russia’s acquiescence of OSCE principles that any and all states have the legitimate right to determine their own security. At the same time, the security concept of Russia says that its overarching goal is to stymie US influence and the enlargement of military blocks. Therefore Ivanov tells the truth when he says he opposes a single determinant for European security.

That he has succeeded many times in expressing this view without finding an echo in the West may be taken as testimony to the fact that NATO enlargement is not aimed at Russia, and that her goals are recognized as legitimate. This does not mean that NATO’s program and the US priority of BMD will be put on the back burner. Yet Moscow has modified its stance by objecting to the military hardware close to its lines. This seems to be a Russian concession, but any lengthy negotiations on the subject of NATO enlargement would have yielded that position. Common sense

would demand of NATO that it not contradict the rhetoric by making the reality on the ground different with NATO bases. And it has never been said anywhere that bases would automatically follow enlargement. Thus NATO’s position – that it is not an enemy – holds.

In the end, the bombast that came from irresponsible sources can be taken as bluff, but the fact that the threats, open and veiled, have not been condemned by high ranking officials, but merely passively contradicted by people like Yegorov (Governor of Kaliningrad) and Ivanov. These lend credence to the notion that there is a limit whither Russia can be pushed. In that context, the evolution of the debate over NATO-enlargement is not at odds with the recent successes and improvements in NATO-Russia relations.

Russia is limiting its opposition to NATO enlargement to verbal attacks in the press, while the two parallel tracks of improved NATO-Russia and US-Russia relations are explored. In this respect, it is important to muster the maximum amount of relaxation of tensions possi-

ble. Should Russia implement her “additional reaction” in the event of a Big Bang type of enlargement, it will be extremely difficult for it to attempt rash moves after months of improving relations and public “disdainful acceptance” of enlargement. We leave it to the conclusion to harmonize the preceding debates and to outline Russia’s options.

Conclusion

What the preceding argument has demonstrated is that on the one hand, without naming names, NATO has decided that it would enlarge at the 2002 Prague Summit. This admission comes after months of cultivated doubt, but it leaves no room for supposition.

After the enlargement debate and NATO-Russia relations have shot up the Secretary General’s priority ladder, we see that enlargement may take place without undue stress on the NATO-Russia relationship. What has in fact happened, to the credit of both NATO and Russia, is that the relationship between the two has im-

proved since Kosovo, partly because Chechnya is not discussed officially in NATO circles, partly because the issue of enlargement was decoupled from the general regime of relations desired by both sides.

As we have said, this rosy picture cannot be left as such. It needs to account for Russia's independent position. In that case, we see that Russia was dead set against enlargement in late 1999, without supplying more information as to her position. This position, despite some hiccups, has changed in parallel with Russia's improving NATO relations. There is no more talk of unilateral opposition, but rather, Russia's policies have been screened to leave the essential: Moscow refuses to leave European security to the care of NATO alone, and frowns on the establishment of bases on its borders.

What both debates have suggested is that only in the case where military hardware would be put near Russia would it react in an unpredictable fashion. Apart from the outlandish statements of various "officials", there is no indication that

violence will precede or follow NATO enlargement. Of course, writing a year and a half prior to the Prague Summit, it is difficult to make prognostics of that sort with a reliable degree of certainty. Nevertheless, the discourse surrounding the enlargement to Baltic States can give a hint to possible outlet of Russian disapproval.

1) Strengthening of the Kaliningrad region.⁸² This would occur in the prospect of a NATO-EU "encirclement" of the region, and would partly take place to prevent any prospective separation⁸³ of the enclave from Russia proper. It would take place in response to NATO enlargement, and may signify the abandonment or the violation of the CFE Treaty commitments.

2) A military union with Belarus.⁸⁴ As we have said, this is already in the works and together with a strengthening of Russian ties to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states, may effectively spell the creation of a "competing" security block.

3) Retreat from Europe, abandonment of a number of confidence and security

building measures and agreements.⁸⁵ This would be at odds with calls to preserve such treaties as the 1972 ABM Treaty.

But already, some water must be poured into the wine. A strengthening of the Kaliningrad region cannot go unnoticed by neighbouring states, and would alarm states, such as Poland and Germany, who have demonstrated good-neighbourly relations with Russia. In fact, Russia has an incentive not to alarm Germany in particular, in view of the large amounts of money the latter is owed. Furthermore, the region's governor has often noted that he did not envision a revision of planned cutbacks,⁸⁶ and looks forward to constructive relations with the NATO and EU neighbourhood. In the end, however, the status of forces in Kaliningrad remains Moscow's decision.

With regards to the military union with Belarus, recent criticism may point that it is more a hindrance than an advantage. But one of the solutions advocated is absorption of Belarus.⁸⁷ In view of President Alexander Lukashenko's hubris on power, it is quite likely that Belarus too

will seek to evade Russia and so it would seem that this prospect, despite recent hostile war games towards the Lithuanian border,⁸⁸ would not be viable for it would almost certainly be resisted by Minsk. On the other hand, Lukashenko may feel that NATO is being enlarged against Belarus,⁸⁹ and not against Russia.

As for isolationism, it seems that all the Russian calls for the avoidance of “red lines” indicate the need for interdependence and contact with the West. The nuance here – and this is relevant for another essay – is whether Russia would use its contacts benevolently, or would try to pressure its surroundings. In the beginning of this paper, we pointed out that improved relations with the USA and NATO does not mean that Russian habits of statecraft have changed. Reliance on bilateralism does not preclude good relations on one hand and nostalgic hegemonism on the other. There is the danger that the West can be lulled to sleep by associating tension-free exchanges with Russia as a fundamental change in mentality. Russia can maintain good relations

with the West in the face of certain enlargement while it reasserts pressure in what is left of its “near abroad” in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

It seems in the end that Russia has no other option but to accept NATO’s enlargement and swallow that bitter pill. It does not look like Russia is in a political position to affect the outcome, or to produce a reaction that would be politically beneficial. Still, observers note that “rather than just blathering on as Boris Yeltsin did, Putin would be able to find adequate responses in prevention and reprisal.”⁹⁰

Epilogue

Early in July, a strange conjuncture developed to allow for a serious debate about the inclusion of Russia into NATO. Deutsche Presse Agentur interpreted the words of White House spokesman Richard Boucher, in the wake of the Bush-Putin Slovenian Summit, as lifting the US objections to Russia joining NATO. Spokesman Boucher made it quite clear that the Bush administration was making

sure that Russia continued to be oriented towards Europe, and that there was a qualitative change (although he did not comment on the exact nature of that change) with regards to the question of Russia’s eventual membership.⁹¹ Considering Mr. Boucher’s word in a vacuum leaves the impression, indeed, that nothing has changed from the academic reality and theoretical possibility that Russia may one day be part of NATO.

What affects the context significantly is the near simultaneous article published by long-time russophile Charles Kupchan, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and Georgetown University professor, who co-wrote an article that outlined the advantages of the Russia in NATO option.⁹² Coupled with the fact that President Bush was briefed by Russia-friendly Michael McFaul from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), and you have a cocktail that clearly delineates a new US policy towards Russia. The CEIP advocates postponing NATO enlargement until 2005 and maintaining the ABM situation as

it is.⁹³ Undoubtedly, a lot of what President Bush confided to Mr. Putin in Slovenia might have caught a very receptive ear in that new context.

So the debate of Russia in NATO is not academic anymore. Ever since the German Chancellor has envisioned that Russia should be in NATO sooner or later,⁹⁴ President Putin was quick to seize the occasion to at least test the waters by saying that NATO should either disband, reform, or *alternatively*, accept Russia in its midst.

“NATO was created to defend against common threats and reduce conflicts among its members, so what better way to prevent a new Cold War or something worse than to extend to Russia the prospect of NATO membership?”⁹⁵

It is beyond the purpose of this paper to argue what would happen to NATO should Russia join as a member. It is a safe bet, however, that NATO, as we know it would cease to exist. What matters with this debate is that it shows that NATO enlargement will not worsen the relationship between Russia and the Alliance and

neither will it envenom the relationship with the US. Further good news for the Baltic States is that this seems to indicate, in pure logic, that if Russia maintains its principled opposition to the enlargement, it does not view it as a tragedy anymore, since the inclusion of Russia into NATO, should Russia wish it, is more than a mental exercise based on legal facts. Although a long way off in the distance, it is a distinct possibility, provided the conditions are right.

The fact remains that the transformation of the Alliance would be so fundamental that it would nullify the ambitions of the Baltic States who are not after NATO so much as after Article 5. With Russia as a member, this clause is sure to disappear.

So while the debate of Russia in NATO is the final proof that there is little likelihood of the most dire Russian predictions (warnings/threats) ever materializing, it remains to be seen what kind of track NATO transformation will take from now on. As Rudolf Scharping confided: “a new security system to include North

America, Europe and Russia is inevitable in the next 10 years.”⁹⁶

For the millions who have suffered under Soviet tyranny, it is not impossible that their political representatives will demand that Russia meet extraordinary conditions before joining, in addition to the “usual” NATO conditions of good-neighbourly relations, democratic leadership of the military, reform of the armed forces, etc. Whether meeting these conditions and being part of a NATO devoid of its Article 5 guarantees will mean the same amount of security to them as if Russia was still out is speculation.

This new European security architecture that seems to be looming in the distance will require serious thought. Crucial questions need addressing: should a need for a common defence inclusive of Russia be needed, for how big a Europe? For what missions? Against whom? Does the inclusion of Russia signify a thinning out of NATO? Will Baltic security be better served by having Russia in NATO? What kind of capability will NATO require then?

¹ Author's notes from a conference on Baltic Security held in Tallinn, 15 December 1999 at the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburg University lecturer Stanislav Katchenko revealed that the system of relations that Moscow was favouring was akin to that of the XIX century; Machiavellian and bilateral.

² NATO: "NATO Handbook 2001", Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, January 2001, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/130202.html

³ Peter TRENIN-STRAUSSOV: "The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in 1997-1999: Anatomy of a Failure", Berlin Information Center on Transatlantic Security (BITS), #99.1, July 1999, www.bits.de/public/researchnote/nr99-1.html

⁴ Klaus-Peter KLAIBER: "The NATO-Russia relationship a year after Paris", Brussels, NATO Review, autumn 1998, p.17-18: "In late April [1998], Ambassadors discussed nuclear weapons issues for the first time, including doctrine and strategy and nuclear safety. This meeting demonstrated that Russia and NATO do not shy away from exchanging views on sensitive matters. In May, we consulted on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes." See also TRENIN-STRAUSSOV: Op.Cit.

⁵ TRENIN-STRAUSSOV: Op.Cit.

⁶ Nikolai SOKOV: "A New Old Direction in Russia's Nuclear Policy", Disarmament Diplomacy #50, September 2000, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/50newold.htm>

⁷ "Latvian Foreign Minister Believes no Russia-US Deal at Baltic Cost Possible", Riga, BNS, 13 June 2001 (via FBIS). The Minister's belief are more anchored in his belief in NATO members' morality and common sense rather than their sound evaluation of what Russia's challenges are, however.

⁸ This was a condition of the creation of the Permanent Joint Council in 1997.

⁹ Ivo H. DAADLER & Christopher MAKINS: "A Consensus on Missile Defence?", in Survival, Volume 43 #3, Autumn 2001, pp.61-66.

¹⁰ "Latvian President: Latvia Ready for Dialog with Russia", Moscow, Interfax, November 18 1999, (via FBIS). "...Latvia is anxiously following the situation in the North Caucasus."

¹¹ "Latvian President: Russia Potential Military Threat", Moscow, Interfax, December 1, 1999, (via FBIS).

¹² For a thorough discussion of this transformation, see David S. YOST: "NATO Transformed", Washington DC, USIP Press, 1998.

¹³ NATO: "NATO Handbook 2001", Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, January 2001, §3, web version, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/130202.html

¹⁴ "Estonia must keep good relations with Russia—NATO Deputy Secretary General", Tallinn, ETA News Agency, 9 February 2001, (via FBIS).

¹⁵ For example, Estonian Defence Minister Jüri Luik's speech at the 10th PfP Seminar in Tartu, on 13 June 2001, where he said that the West had a moral obligation to include new applicants, while those same applicants' desire to join was

simple realism. Mr. Luik reconciles the differing drives by saying that Baltic States principles would match Europe's only if the "Second World War was brought to an end" by the factual admission of the Baltic States.

¹⁶ "Remarks to the Press by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, upon his arrival at NATO", 14 October 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s991014a.htm>

¹⁷ Turkey recognizes Macedonia under its constitutional name.

¹⁸ "Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at the Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Amsterdam, Netherlands", 15 November 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s991115a.htm>

¹⁹ Russian academics have pointed to the West's moral failure to denounce Moscow's actions in Chechnya at the occasion of the ISODARCO 13th Winter Seminar on "Greater European Security in the Aftermath of Kosovo", held in January 2000, in Andalo, Italy.

²⁰ "The Expanding Europe and its Relevance for both the British and the Germans" - Lord Robertson's Sir Frank Roberts Memorial Lecture, Lancaster House, London, 2 February 2000, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000202a.htm>

²¹ Ibid.

²² "Speech by Secretary General at the Bulgarian National Assembly", Sofia, Bulgaria, 10 February 2000, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000210a.htm>

²³ Ibid.

²⁴“NATO in Southeast Europe in the 21st Century” Secretary General’s Speech at the Joint Wilton Park/Atlantic Council Conference Brdo Castle, Slovenia 11 May 2000, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000511a.htm>

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ “The New NATO in the New Europe”, Secretary General’s speech to the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava, Slovakia, 11 May 2000, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000511b.htm>

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ “Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly”, Budapest, Hungary, 30 May 2000, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000530a.htm>

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ “National Security Concept”, approved by Presidential Decree 1300 of December 17, 1999; issued in Presidential Decree 24 of January 10, 2000, Disarmament Diplomacy #43, January-February 2000, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd43/43nsc.htm>

³¹ Dr S. J. MAIN: “Russia’s Military Doctrine”, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, UK, <http://www.ppc.pims.org/Projects/csrc/OB77-SJM.htm>

³² “NATO in the 21st Century”, speech by the Secretary General to the Millennium Year Lord Mayor’s Lecture, London, UK, 20 July 2000, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000720a.htm>

³³ “NATO’s New Agenda: More progress than meets the eye” Remarks by the Right Honourable

Lord George Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General of NATO, SACLANT Symposium, Reykjavik, Iceland, 6 September 2000, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000906a.htm

³⁴ “NATO’s Partnerships”, speech by Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, at the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, Sofia, 12 October 2000, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001012a.htm

³⁵ Yet, a Canadian representative at NATO said that the question of minority rights would no longer be considered a factor in the Baltic States membership ambitions.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ “The Six Principles of Partnership”, speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, at the ATA General Assembly, Budapest, Hungary, 31 October 2000, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001031a.htm

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ These countries developed the “Big Bang” theory of enlargement at a meeting in Vilnius in 2000. http://balticsww.com/meri_nato.htm One can dispute the wisdom of employing the word “Bang” in speaking of NATO enlargement.

⁴⁰ “NATO and the Challenges of Security in the Euro-Atlantic Area”, speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, Vienna, Austria, 2 November 2000, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001102b.htm

⁴¹ “Security in the Wider Europe”, speech by the Secretary General, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium, 10 November 2000, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001110a.htm

⁴² “NATO’s Challenges”, European Policy Centre Breakfast, Brussels, Belgium, 14 November 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/14.htm

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Speech by Secretary General Lord Robertson to the Annual Meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly, Berlin, Germany, 21 November 2000, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001121a.htm

⁴⁵ “German Speaker Expresses Measured Support for Latvia’s NATO bid”, Riga Leta, 24 May 2001, (via FBIS). See also the strange discrepancy between the positions of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in “German Chancellor Backs Admission of Baltic States into NATO”, Moscow, Interfax, 6 June 2000, and on the very same day “German Chancellor ‘reserved’ about Baltics’ Wish to Join NATO”, Tallinn, BNS, 6 June 2000 (both via FBIS).

⁴⁶ “NATO in the New Millennium”, speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, Manfred Wörner Memorial Lecture, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin, Germany, 25 January 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010125a.htm

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ “Russian Poll Shows Over Half Afraid of Baltic States’ NATO Membership”, Tallinn, BNS, 26 May 2001, (via FBIS).

⁴⁹ Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, Conference on Security Policy, Munich, Germany, 3 February 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010203a.htm

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ "NATO in the New Millenium", Secretary General's Mountbatten Lecture, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, 15 February 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010215a.htm

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ "The State of the Alliance - a Good News Story" - Speech by the Deputy Secretary General at the 11th International Antalya Conference on Security and Cooperation, Antalya, Turkey, 30 March 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010330a.htm

⁵⁵ "Communicate" - Speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General at the Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Netherlands, 23 April 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/a010423a.htm

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ "NATO PA Secretary General regrets Russian Duma Decision to Boycott Session", Tallinn, BNS, 26 May 2001, (via FBIS). See also: "NATO Parliamentary Forum Disappointed with Russia's non participation", Moscow, Interfax, 28 May 2001, (via FBIS), and "Russia Duma to Boycott NATO PA in Vilnius", Tallinn, BNS, 17 May 2001, (via FBIS).

⁵⁸ Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Spring Session in Vilnius, Lithuania, 31 May 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010531b.htm

⁵⁹ "NATO - Managing the Challenges of Today, and Tomorrow" - Speech by the Secretary General at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington DC,

20 June 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010620a.htm

⁶⁰ Harold H. SAUNDERS: "Prenegotiation and circumnegotiation", in *Managing Global Chaos*, Chester Crocker et al Eds., Washington DC, USIP Press, 1999, p. 423

⁶¹ See: Fred Charles IKLE: "How Nations Negotiate", New York, Random House, 1964.

⁶² "Lithuanian Foreign Ministry Formulates New Russia Policy", Vilnius, BNS, 22 December 2000, (via FBIS). See also "Primakov Disapproves of NATO Integration", Vilnius, BNS, 2 November 1999, (via FBIS).

⁶³ "Primakov Disapproves of NATO Integration", Vilnius, BNS, 2 November 1999, (via FBIS).

⁶⁴ "Latvia: Russia Wants to Retain Baltic As Gray Zone", Tallinn, BNS, 2 November 1999, (via FBIS). See also "Latvia: President Rules Out Russian Tutelage Ever Again", Moscow, BNS, 4 April 2000, (via FBIS) and Yevghenyi VOSTRUKHOV: "Latvia is Being Prepared for Total Defence", Moscow, Obshchaya Gazeta, 24 May 2000.

⁶⁵ "Russia Sees Estonia As Serious Economic Partner", Tallinn, BNS, 29 May 2000, (via FBIS).

⁶⁶ "NATO General: Expansion Must Recognize Russia's Interests", Moscow, Interfax, 25 May 2000, (via FBIS).

⁶⁷ "Russian Official Criticizes Latvia's NATO Bid and Attitude to Minorities", Moscow, Interfax, 16 June 2001, (via FBIS). See also "Russian Defence Chief Sees Positive Signs in Ties With NATO", Moscow, Interfax, 5 February 2001, (via FBIS).

⁶⁸ "Russia May Retaliate if NATO Eastward Expansion Continues: Army Official", Moscow, Interfax, 16 February 2001, "Russia Remains Opposed to Lithuania's NATO Bid", Vilnius, BNS, 23 March 2001, "Russia Not To Attend Vilnius Session of NATO Parliamentary Assembly", Vilnius, Interfax, May 24 2001, and "Russian Security Council Secretary: No Former USSR Republics Must Join NATO", Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 6 June 2001, (all via FBIS).

⁶⁹ "Russia Parliament Official Says Estonian NATO Bid to Ruin Relations", Tallinn, BNS, 16 February 2001, (via FBIS).

⁷⁰ "RUSSIA'S IVASHOV EXPECTED TO LOSE HIS JOB", Moscow, AP, 3 July 2001.

⁷¹ "Russia Rules Out Force to Stop Baltics Joining NATO", Moscow, Interfax, 29 May 2000, and also Pavel KORYASHKIN: "Russia Said to Still Oppose NATO Expansion", Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 29 May 2000, (both via FBIS).

⁷² "Russian Security Council Chief in 'Rare Interview'", BBC Monitoring, 13 February 2001, www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=288724&brief=text

⁷³ "Baltic States Seek Russian Assurance of Kaliningrad Peace", Warsaw, PAP, 11 April 2000, (via FBIS).

⁷⁴ "Poland's Foreign Minister Plays Down Russian Missiles Reports", Warsaw, PAP, 4 January 2001, (via FBIS).

⁷⁵ Viktor LITOVKIN: "We and the World Community: A Dish for Reheating", Moscow, Obshchaya Gazeta, 18 January 2001, (via FBIS).

⁷⁶ "Baltic States Anxious About Kaliningrad Weapons", Cracow, PAP, 7 January 2001, (via FBIS).

⁷⁷ "Kaliningrad Governor Denies Deployment of Nuclear Arms in Region", Interfax NW, 5 January 2001, "Russian Foreign Minister Denies Rumours of Nuclear Weapons Deployment", Moscow, Interfax, 6 January 2001, "Russian Embassy in Riga Denies Reports of Nuclear Weapons Re-deployment", Riga Leta, 8 January 2001, Anatoly YURKIN: "Academic Dismisses Allegations About Kaliningrad Nuclear Weapons", Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 8 January 2001, and LITOVKIN, Op. Cit., (all via FBIS).

⁷⁸ "Lithuanian Politician Warns Baltic NATO Membership Bargaining Chip for Russia", Vilnius, BNS, 14 May 2001, (via FBIS).

⁷⁹ "Latvian Foreign Minister Believes No Russia-US Deal at Baltic Cost Possible", Riga, BNS, 13 June 2001, (via FBIS).

⁸⁰ "President Bush Speaks to Faculty and Students at Warsaw University, 15 June 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/index-htm

⁸¹ "Russia Rules Out Force to Stop Baltics Joining NATO", Moscow, Interfax, 29 May 2000, (via FBIS).

⁸² "Lithuania Wants Continued Cooperation With Russia", Tallinn, BNS, 17 February 2000, (via FBIS). See also "Baltic States Seek Russian Assurance of Kaliningrad Peace", Warsaw, PAP, 11 April 2000, (via FBIS), but mostly "Russian Official Warns Against Turning Kaliningrad into

"besieged fortress", Kaliningrad, ITAR-TASS, 24 March 2001, (via FBIS) and "Russia to Step Up Security if Baltic States Join NATO", Moscow, Interfax, 19 February 2001, (via FBIS).

⁸³ "Primakov: Russia Faces Threat to Territorial Integrity", Kaliningrad, ITAR-TASS, 4 November 1999, (via FBIS).

⁸⁴ Sergei OSTANIN: "Russia, Belarus Continue Efforts to Set Up Joint Army Unit", Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 12 April 2000, (via FBIS).

⁸⁵ "Former Soviet President Warns Russia Will Retaliate if Baltics Join NATO", Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 28 February 2001, (via FBIS).

⁸⁶ "Russia Will Cut Its Troops in Kaliningrad Region by 2003- Governor", Kaliningrad, ITAR-TASS, 14 February 2001, (via FBIS). See also Vladimir SLUZHAKOV and Aleksey CHICHKIN: "Interview with Governor Vladimir Yegorov of Kaliningrad", ISP, 22 March 2001, (via FBIS), see also "Kaliningrad Leaders See Benefit of Poland's NATO Entry- Lithuanian MP", Vilnius, BNS, 5 March 2001, (via FBIS).

⁸⁷ "They Call This an Equal Rights Union", Moscow, Obshchaya Gazeta, 21 June 2001, (via FBIS).

⁸⁸ "Lithuanian ruling party to probe reports about unfriendly exercises in Belarus", Vilnius, BNS, 8 September 2000, (via FBIS).

⁸⁹ "Latvia has no intention to turn against neighbours - Foreign Minister", Riga, BNS, 7 May 2001, (via FBIS), and "Belarus Regards NATO Enlargement As 'Historical Mistake'", Minsk, Interfax, 23 March 2000, (via FBIS).

⁹⁰ "Russian Experts Warn of Tensions With NATO Over Baltic", Rome, ANSA, June 5 2000, (via FBIS).

⁹¹ U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON RUSSIA & NATO: U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing Index, 2 July 01. Below is a portion of the exchanges with emphasis.

QUESTION: In terms of building this partnership, the Russians over the past few years have been consistently raising the issue of joining NATO. President Putin referred to it, even in the press conference, the joint press conference with the President in Ljubljana. We remember that the previous administration basically rejected the idea, at least the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did. So I would like to ask whether anything has changed, what is the attitude of this current Administration to that issue?

Mr. BOUCHER: Well, I think if you look at the press conference in Slovenia, you will see that President Bush addressed the issue as well there. The position has always been that NATO membership remains open to European countries who are ready and willing to shoulder the burdens and responsibilities of membership. The treaty itself provides that NATO members, by unanimous agreement, may invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to the treaty. So the door is open to anyone who is ready and willing to assume the burdens and responsibilities of membership.

I would say whatever Russia's particular decision and then and/or NATO's particular decision on this point, we have made quite clear, the President has made quite clear, that we want Russia to continue to look to Europe. The Secretary said it, I think a couple weeks ago, that we believe that Russia's future lies as part of an enlarged Europe, and that that is the goal, the general policy goal, whatever happens with regard to specific institutions.

QUESTION: But when you look at it, nothing has changed from the previous administration to this one.

Mr. BOUCHER: No, I don't think I would precisely say that. Without trying to characterize the view of the previous administration, I would say that this Administration believes that the door should be open, and that Russia's destiny is clearly in Europe. And we intend to work with Russia to see – to help them fulfill that destiny.

⁹² James CHACE & Charles KUPCHAN: "Bring Mother Russia Into the Fold", LA Times, 1 July 2001.

⁹³ "An Agenda for Renewal: US-Russia Relations" Washington, DC, CEIP, 2000.

⁹⁴ "Schoreder Does Not Rule Out Eventual Russian NATO Membership", Berlin, AFP, 8 August 2001, via Russia Today. <http://www.europeaninternet.com/russia/news.php3?id=583782§ion=default>

⁹⁵ Peter BAKER: "Russia in NATO? For Now, Just Talk. Larger Debate Surrounds a Non Issue", Washington Post, 12 August 2001, staff writer

Steven Mufson contributed to this report. See also Jonathan RAUCH: "Putin is Right: Russia Belongs in NATO The Potential Prize is Breathtaking; the Erasure, Once and For All, of Divisions in Europe" National Journal, 04 August 2001.

⁹⁶ Arnaud De BORCHGRAVE: "Room for Russia in NATO?", Washington Times, 17 August 2001.

After 11th September

By Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen (DA A)*

During the past the human generated “earthquake events” normally had their epicentre in Europe, even if the largest part of the world’s human population lives elsewhere. Only two happened in America.

The first event was the testing of the first nuclear weapon in the New Mexican desert in the summer of 1945. It confirmed the entry of the U.S. on the world stage as a superpower. The collapse of the will of the challenging superpower, the Soviet Union, became evident in Europe, with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The second was the attacks on 11th September against symbolic centres of the now only remaining superpower. Since the 1989-1991 events in Europe, U.S. foreign

policy might be characterised as a low priority policy area, by inertia in facing-up to the changed situation, as well as confusion with shifting focus and varying will to sustain commitments. All this has now changed with the direct terrorist attack against the American “heart”. The responses to the attacks have been focused under the heading the “War against Terror”, determined and comprehensive. However, the elements of the response are likely to be revolutionary for many parts of the world.

In some fields, however, the reaction to the attacks just brought an existing development to its next logical phase. Since the end of the Cold War and especially since the televised disaster in Somalia, the

U.S. has only accepted the subordination of its troops to a foreign UN commander once: to a Danish commander of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UHPREDED) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The U.S. totally dominated all military operations in the 1990-91 Gulf War. To make the IFOR and SFOR deployments of U.S. troops acceptable, it took place under U.S. NATO commanders and thus under close control of the national U.S. Command Authority. However, during the Kosovo conflict, Washington felt unhappy with this level of control. The Pentagon felt irritated and constrained by the alliance framework – it did not control directly and effectively. This unhappiness led to the premature

* Michael H. Clemmesen is the Commandant of the Baltic Defence College.

retirement of the responsible SACEUR, General Wesley C. Clark. The control of operations in Afghanistan has totally excluded non-U.S. influence on important strategic, operational, and tactical decisions. The American command chain may have been open to – mainly British – good advice, but the choice of whether to accept the advice or not, seems to have been completely American.

The abject weakness of potential allies to influence the outcome of any likely future conflict (with Israel as the only exception) means that American support will depend on accepting de facto full U.S. control. If this is a correct observation, the European allies have been placed in a situation where the future development of NATO, will be even less balanced than hitherto. The U.S. NATO allies must clearly underline “Out of Area Operations” even more in the alliance strategy as well as in the command and force structure development to remain relevant to the U.S. decision-makers – and thereby keep NATO from withering away by neglect. However, there is even a lesser chance now than hith-

erto, that the U.S. will accept more than symbolic non-U.S. influence on operations. In order to make it interesting for the U.S., not to choose complete independent action, states will have to be ready to make forces available in much the same way, as the British Dominions did to Great Britain in the two world wars. Only a common and massive European effort to develop a balancing independent large-scale intervention capability, might lead to a different future.

The strength of the U.S. position and the willingness to use it is clear in other areas as well. The U.S. sought and got Russian support for its use of the Central Asian republics, as platforms for its war in Afghanistan. By doing this, a new platform for U.S.-Russian relations was established. However, the alternative was in reality non-existing, as resistance would have placed Russia as de facto protector of the terrorists. Russia basically had the same options as Pakistan, and the choice was the same. This, however, does not give Russia any major credit that can be used in other policy areas. That you do the

right thing in one situation does not give you rights to block other necessary developments in other U.S. high priority areas, such as the development of a Ballistic Missile Defence system or the enlargement of NATO with states that belong in the organisation in American eyes.

That the American Bush administration perceives the war against terrorism as a general campaign against terrorism, is becoming clearer and clearer every day. The signs come in different areas. One is that the Al Qaeda prisoners, taken during the war in Afghanistan, have initially been denied the formal position and rights of Prisoners of War according to international conventions. They are detained and treated as suspected criminals in very much the same way as the United Kingdom treated Northern Irish terrorists, during a phase in the campaign there.

The American decision to redefine nearly all elements of its foreign and national security policies after 11th September is having important effects all over the world. Just the most obvious examples:

In the Middle East, the Palestinians and their supporters in the region have to find other tools than terrorism in their war of liberation, if they want to get effective international support for their cause. It is doubtful that the PLO leadership has the freedom of action, to conduct such a fundamental change in its strategies.

Pakistan has helped terrorists in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir to destabilise the province by, provoking a brutal Indian repression campaign. As the militarily weaker state in relation to India, terrorism was the only available tool in its revisionist foreign policy. However, as we now have a situation where the U.S. and its allies define even a "freedom fighter" that uses terrorism, as just a terrorist, the situation is fundamentally changed. As the campaign in Afghanistan is almost concluded, the U.S. dependence on Pakistani support and bases is nearly over.

Pakistan is not the only state that faces a new situation. States on the Horn of Africa and in the Middle East, which have used or sheltered terrorists, are quickly adjusting to the new situation.

The different Irish terrorist organisations face serious difficulties. It is probably only a matter of time, before the U.S. can intensify its support for anti-terrorist campaigns in Latin America. Both Russia and China are benefiting from the new situation by getting freer hands in their campaigns against separatists in Chechnya and Sin-kiang.

The effects on the world political framework are so substantial, because the U.S. armed forces were able to adapt their forces and procedures to the very difficult situation in and around Afghanistan, where the traditional American force structure profile would be unavailable or ineffective: Naval sea control forces with an amphibious assault capability, massive air power for winning air superiority and for precision attacks on key infrastructure, and heavy land forces with an appropriate logistic tail linked to a massive forward deployed base establishment.

The new successful combination of long-range air force assets and light land-force elements, presents a threat to most of the potential target states and organi-

zations. The force mix maintains a clear technological superiority over all other armed forces, it has a reconnaissance package of satellites and un-manned aircrafts with long times in the target area, it is capable of the flexible use of all aircraft carrier combat aircraft (including air defence fighters), it is willing to employ land mobile special operations forces and other land forces in harms way, given fire support by effective direct combat air support with precision and area munitions from long range heavy bomber aircrafts.

The post-11th September events have made brutally clear how totally dominant the U.S. has become on the world stage, and how willing she has become to use her military and diplomatic muscles in support of well defined interests, if necessary unilaterally. The Baltic States are benefiting initially due to the clear U.S. support for their NATO membership. When, however, they have gained their membership of NATO and the EU, they will face the dilemma: Europe's position in increasingly unipolar world – the same dilemma as all other European states face.

The World After September 11th: Change and Continuity

By Assistant Professor Tomas Jermalavičius, Deputy Director of Strategy and Political Studies Department,
Baltic Defence College

September 11th, 2001 has become the date used most frequently by the media, diplomats, politicians, the military, academics and ordinary citizens across the world in discussing current affairs or trying to anticipate what the future holds. The horrendous terrorist attacks against the United States, perpetrated on that day, have profoundly shocked the world community. The destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York and a part of the Pentagon building in Washington D.C. with the loss of 3,000 lives, were the first attacks on the United States since the Japanese offensive against Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 and were even

more outrageous given that the absolute majority of the casualties were civilians. Just as in the wake of Pearl Harbor, the September atrocities set the United States on the path of war. This time against the global terrorist network *al Qaeda* led by pariah Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, who allegedly masterminded these atrocities and rendered support to their execution, as well as against the regimes which harboured or sponsored the terrorist groups.

Soon after the attacks, the United States having secured backing of a broad international coalition and assisted by its allies, launched a multidimensional cam-

paign with the aim of disrupting *al Qaeda*, capturing Osama bin Laden and dissuading the so-called 'rogue states' from further pursuit of policies of supporting international terrorism. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which has been hosting bin Laden and his training camps for several years, became the first target of the war on terrorism as the USA employed its formidable air force against the Taliban military assets and infrastructure and, in conjunction with the offensive of the Afghan opposition on the ground, succeeded in evicting the Taliban from power. The war goes on and probably will continue on different fronts and in dif-

ferent theatres for a long time to come. Its outcome and effects remain to be seen. However, although bearing in mind the uncertainty that war brings into the world affairs, the implications of the September 11th events can already be assessed and generalised with a measure of confidence.

This article will explore the ways that September 11th has already influenced and still can affect the world politics in the future. It will attempt to provide some perspectives on what these events have brought or can possibly bring into the international relations and what the implications are to the international system as a whole and to the processes within it. The major aim of such an effort is to clarify whether September 11th should be considered as a new departure point in world politics where one can start talking of different characteristics of the international system, new dynamics of processes in this system and new nature of international relations, than of those prior to September 11th. The reason for addressing this issue is that the developments in

the aftermath of the terror acts in the United States have led many to believe that September 11th heralds a dawn of a new era in international relations and that a completely new world order is likely to take shape as a result.¹ Significant shifts in the policies of the major actors such as the USA or Russia, as well as ensuing revisions of security policies may indeed justify this interpretation. By some accounts, worrying isolationist connotations of the U.S. foreign policy, especially with regard to regional conflicts across the globe, and the unilateral instincts of the U.S. administration arguably have been replaced with the policies of deep engagement and multilateralism. At the same time Russia has made an impressive u-turn from being more or less antagonistic *vis-à-vis* the West towards seeking rapprochement with, if not lasting integration into it. These are just a few aspects of the developments which have taken place since the terrorist attacks, provoking thoughts about fundamental change. The psychological shock also adds to the tendency of adopting a stand where the world is be-

ing looked upon through different lenses than before the attacks.

Legitimate as it may seem, however, interpreting September 11th as a new departure point for the whole functioning of the international system and conduct of international relations can prove to be a too radical and, at the same time, a somewhat simplistic way of conceptualising the importance of the September 11th events. While acknowledging the fresh facets of world politics, brought about by the terrorist attacks, the paper will argue that their impact should rather be assessed in the light of developments preceding them and dating back to the end of the Cold War when the bipolar international system collapsed and the new world order started taking shape. This would entail September 11th being the most instructive and the sharpest symptom reflecting the characteristics of the post-Cold War international environment that we have experienced so far, rather than a trigger of the entirely new processes leading to disintegration of the current architecture of world politics. To a certain extent Sep-

tember 11th has removed some of the ambiguities about the world we are facing, at the same time bringing other uncertainties in, which are reinforced by the war on terrorism and the results it may produce. In addition, it will be suggested to supplement this conceptual approach with interpreting the September 11th attacks as the event accelerating and catalysing the processes which have been in motion for some time already. In accomplishing this task, the inquiry will compare post-September 11th developments, frequently cited as an indication of the upcoming dramatic changes, with the setting which has emerged since the end of the Cold War. It will address the major underlying questions such as: to what extent have the characteristics of a post-Cold War international system been altered (or not affected) by September 11th? Is the post-September 11th pattern of interaction between the actors in this system indiscernible prior to the attacks and therefore completely new? Have any significant modifications been made in a way that the nature of conflict within the

system is understood? It is these three interrelated areas - international system, international relations and international conflict - which will constitute an organising analytical framework for dealing with the task.

By looking for the connections between the post-September 11th events and the processes before the attacks, the paper will largely ignore the strategic issues of the ongoing war on terrorism, although the already visible effects of the war will come into play in the discussion. The military realm as such remains beyond the scope of this inquiry, just as more or less conspicuous shifts in domestic politics and social attitudes in the USA or its allies at this war, caused by September 11th. Omitting from the analysis the latter certainly makes this effort less comprehensive. However, it rests on the assumption that as profound as their effects might be, domestic developments do not translate directly into change of the international environment, although they can facilitate it and serve as one of the sustaining factors for a specific mode of international

relations. Finally, the effects of the terrorist attacks upon the prevailing security paradigm will not be examined on a premise that the September 11th events are not inducing any significant changes in this area, since terrorism and related threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have been already incorporated into the notion of comprehensive security, which obviously will not be revisited.

The first part of the paper will provide an overview of the post-Cold War international setting prior to September 11th. The argument that the international system became unipolar after the collapse of the Soviet Union and that the USA has been acting as a hegemon in the international system ever since will be central and lay ground for placing September 11th into a broader context. The major lines of international conflict in the post-Cold War environment will be elaborated here, including some discussion of a model suggested by Samuel Huntington and known as a theory of the 'clash of civilisations'. This account will build a

basis for the second part, where the effects of the terrorist attacks on the unipolar structure of the international system will be appraised, where the reactions of the USA and the rest of the world will be taken to support the argument that unipolarity has been strongly but not unequivocally underlined. For obvious reasons, the focus will be set on the USA and its foreign policy. Shifts in the ways that the USA perceives and is likely to shape its hegemonic posture in international relations will be analysed and it will be argued that though the United States is becoming a mature hegemon, the expectations of multilateralism in the U.S. foreign policy are not likely to be fulfilled. The post-September 11th rapprochement between the USA and Russia will be dwelt upon to emphasise continuity in international relations and the accelerating impact of the terrorist attacks on the processes already on track before September 11th. Finally, the effects upon the major strands of international conflict will be assessed in this part, arguing that only one of them has been at least

temporarily inactivated and that the Huntingtonian vision of the 'clash of civilisations' remains inapplicable but potentially plausible.

I. The post-Cold War setting

The post-Cold War international system, which has been evolving during the 1990s, has several key features built into it and discernible quite well in the fluid international environment. This is necessary in the effort to detect changes of significance to the whole system after September 11th. First of all, it is unipolarity, which replaced bipolar world of confrontation between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. They were at the centre of the two conflicting blocks of states and acted as their consolidating forces, as well as drivers of the international conflict generated by the ideological differences. The United States, by virtue of its economic, military and political power, has been the only superpower

in world affairs for the last decade, since disintegration of the Soviet Union. Thus, almost by default, the USA emerged as the hegemonic state in the international system, capable of promoting its values and interests across the globe with unprecedented efficacy and virtually without any serious resistance from the system. The ideological dimension, built into the US post-Cold War foreign policy and centred on the issues of human rights and freedoms as well as free markets, has been both appealing and intrusive. A number of countries, previously not renowned for democratic practices, have chosen the democratic path of development, associating themselves with the worldview promoted by the hegemonic power. Those remaining outside this trend have been subjected to a strong external pressure, orchestrated by the USA and ranging from diplomatic and economic sanctions to military intervention. The last element of the American hegemonic position was a ring of credible and loyal allies, associating their security with the U.S. guarantees and ability to project military power

globally and directing their foreign policies in such a way as to ensure continuous U.S. presence and commitment. Thus, America has firmly established itself at the core of the international system, exercising significant influence on its processes and serving as the arbitrator, seeking stability of the system. The phenomenon was given the name of a new *Pax Americana* in the early 1990s by a number of authors (William Odom, Charles Krauthammer, etc.).²

Being in a position to pursue unilateral solutions as well as wielding enormous influence, it nevertheless remained reluctant to explicitly adopt and exercise its hegemonic posture in the international relations, especially with respect to the regional conflicts requiring a prolonged military commitment and involvement in post-conflict reconstruction. Although having been conspicuous in the Middle East and Northern Ireland conflict resolution efforts as well as restoring democracy in Haiti in 1994, it was hesitant to be fully involved in the Balkans in the early 1990s. This feature of avoiding the

role of the 'global policeman', which can be seen as being tailored to the hegemonic posture, was further reinforced by the failure of intervention in Somalia in 1993 and led to ignoring the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. At the same time, even such a selective or even half-hearted U.S. engagement, sustaining its hegemonic status and unipolar structure of the international system, evoked unfriendly and sometimes hostile reaction from some of the system's actors. To a higher or lesser degree anti-American policies have become a determining characteristic of a number of states. An interesting aspect of this reaction is that some states, such as Russia or China, showed displeasure not about the U.S. power *per se*, but about the unipolarity that this power created. Entertaining the concept of multipolarity, where the international system was envisaged as organised around several balancing each other power centres possessing their own spheres of influence, they moved to challenge the USA not on the basis ideology, but for the global scope of its hegemonic outreach. At the same

time, another group of states, mostly characterised as undemocratic, felt a far bigger threat from being exposed to the values and ideology that accompanied the U.S. hegemony than to the hegemony itself and saw resistance as a prerequisite for survival of their regimes and ideologies. These two types of anti-American motivation can be discovered in mixture as the case of China suggests. However, the latter motivation produced one of most sustainable lines of the international conflict during the last decade – the United States and its allies *versus* so-called 'rogue states' such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Sudan or Libya. Containment of the rogue states, which are embarking on policies of acquiring weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring terrorism, has occupied a large proportion of the US foreign and military policy agenda since the Gulf War in 1991, although the policy itself dates back to the years of the Cold War. Then overshadowed by and subordinated to the confrontation with the Soviet Union, this conflict has become one of the major pri-

orities in the post-Cold War era. In addition, it falls into a more general trend of conflict between the democracies and undemocratic regimes, which has reasserted itself during the last decade. Deriving legitimacy of its hegemony from the cause to spread human rights and freedoms and also by virtue of representing those values most robustly, the United States has appeared at the front-end of this standoff, reserving the right to intervene, on behalf of the international community and with its support, in internal conflicts where human right violations were leading to the spread of violence and humanitarian disasters. The air campaign of NATO against Yugoslavia to stop the ethnic cleansing in its separatist province of Kosovo in 1999 heralded the full maturity that this doctrine had reached. Moreover, once the destabilising effects of internal conflicts to the international system have been acknowledged, the humanitarian justification of intervention to a great extent overlapped with the compelling need to prevent internationalisation of the domestic conflicts. In this re-

spect, interventions into so-called 'failed states', where the central government was barely functioning or not functioning at all and the hostilities between various factions or warlords led to massive human rights violations as well as regional instability, became yet another element woven into the broader framework of post-Cold War international conflict. Bosnia, Somalia and Sierra Leone stand out as the most prominent examples during the last decade. Failure in Somalia has made the United States lukewarm to this kind of interventions, especially if regional instability did not directly threaten the U.S. interests and humanitarian considerations prevailed. The Clinton Doctrine, articulated in 1994 by the U.S. President Bill Clinton, specifically argued for the presence of national interests to bring the USA into such conflicts.³ As a result, other nations had to take the lead in such missions (the UK in Sierra Leone, Australia in East Timor), which testifies both the selective use of the hegemonic power by the USA and the US ability to set a standard for addressing challenges to the inter-

national system to be followed by others. These three interweaving and overlapping facets of international conflict, with the United States more or less at their centre because of the unipolar nature of the international system, are supplemented with the friction, generated by the globalisation process and its consequences. It manifests itself as a social protest against the globalising world, when disaffected groups challenge the social groups and commercial structures, considered winners of a rapid technological, economic and sociopolitical transformation, as well as the state governments and international institutions, viewed as tools facilitating globalisation. Globalisation, perceived as a threat to identities, welfare and values of some groups, provokes backlash which sometimes turns into violence (e.g. the anti-globalisation movement protests during the World Trade Organisation summit in Seattle in 1999 or during the Genoa summit of G8 in 2001). It can hardly be called an international conflict in a strict classical sense, since the challenge that brought about the conflict

emanated not from the state actors, but from societies. However, born within the states, it transcended their borders by targeting foreign governments, international organisations and even other societies. Furthermore, it had a propensity of translating itself into the inter-state rivalry between the rich, developed states and the poor, less developed countries vulnerable to the pressures of globalisation and having large segments of their societies unable to adjust to and capitalise on this process. In geographical terms it has become common to draw the line of conflict between the North and the South (the rich North *versus* the poor South), which has replaced the East-West axis of the Cold War confrontation. The United States emerged as the biggest beneficiary of globalisation and, to a certain extent, its strongest driving vehicle through the promotion of free trade and through competitive advantage stemming from its technological leadership. According to Peter Van Ham, '...the swell of economic and cultural globalisation is often seen as the USA's ultimate soft-power resource.'²⁴

Hence one of the most prominent targets of the social discontent over globalisation and a scapegoat for the plight of the underdeveloped states of the South.

The post-Cold War picture of international conflict presented above is neither exhaustive nor attempting to incorporate a vast array of theoretical approaches formulated in the last decade or so. Since the end of the Cold War a number of conceptual visions on how the future international conflict will look like have been competing for recognition. In the current context, the one espoused by Samuel Huntington is worthwhile mentioning. In the early 1990s he argued that the ideological confrontation between the two superpowers for a number of reasons was being gradually replaced by the 'clash of civilisations'. He argued that '...the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.'²⁵ Huntington defined civilisations primarily as cultural entities and argued that there was an inherent friction between them, leading to violent conflicts in the regions where civilisations

overlapped or came into a direct geographical contact with each other. Armed conflicts in the Balkans, Trans-Caucasus, the Middle East, Kashmir and other places were explained in these terms. The Huntingtonian model has been criticised and contested on various grounds, especially for a not so much reliable criteria of defining civilisation as well as for the tendency to see the clash of civilisations where it was absent in the origins of some particular cases of conflict. However, Huntington's observations retain validity in what is perceived as a conflict between the West and the rest of the world. He argues that 'the West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values.'²⁶ This behaviour provokes responses from the non-Western states and societies unwilling to accept and internalise Western values and beliefs such as liberal democracy or human rights. The four lines of conflict,

outlined previously, can easily fit into this notion as its different strands. For instance, Huntington essentially explains the existence of 'rogue states' as one of the forms of response to Western civilisational hegemony and expansion. Yet again putting the dominant trend under the title 'the West *versus* the Rest' can pose difficulties in analysing specific cases. But, flawed as it may be, Huntington's theory provides some valuable insights into the dynamics of international conflict and brings to the attention of the academic discourse cultural differences as one of the ingredients feeding into the dynamics of international conflict. 'The West *versus* the Rest' aspect encapsulates quite well what has been taking place in the unipolar international system under the hegemonic sway of the United States, although it does not necessarily carry the explanatory power sufficient to understand and explain all the frictions and conflicts in international relations. Cultural differences should not be viewed as the primary cause of conflicts despite the fact that they do play their part in exacerbating the tensions over which conflicts erupt.

International relations have been evolving within the parameters of the unipolar international system and under the influence of the aforementioned tensions in it for the last decade. This rough outline of how the world looked like prior to September 11th does not suggest, however, the presence of clarity and simplicity, conducive to rational and effective decision-making necessary to address challenges and threats, as it may seem. The multidimensional character of the international conflict inevitably produced fluidity and ambiguity, making it difficult to prioritise policies and to come to grips with the whole complexity of the post-Cold War world and the direction it has been heading to. For the USA in particular it raised a number of questions on what the nature of its hegemonic policy should be, whether the unipolarity could be sustained in a long term, where the US national interests and priorities lie and what the major sources of threats to them are. As a result, the U.S. policy seemed to

lack coherence and, in many instances, was reactive rather than proactive. Its remarkable feature was that the U.S. reluctant and selective engagement in the world affairs had continuously aroused fears among the U.S. allies over the possibility that the tremendous U.S. power would allow it to retreat into self-isolation from the world affairs in order to reduce the costs of being the world hegemon and, at the same time, seek and impose unilateral solutions once the vital U.S. interests were threatened or challenged. The policies of the new administration of President George W. Bush, who took office in the beginning of 2001, aggravated these concerns, as the administration was clearly inclined to pursue the unilateralist policy schemes. The plans to deploy the National Missile Defence (NMD) system, designed to protect the continental USA from the missile attacks by the hostile regimes, emerged as the ultimate manifestation of the 'go-it-alone' approach. A string of decisions not to co-operate or even to undermine multilateral efforts in various fields, perceived as inconsistent with the U.S. national in-

83

terests (such as the Kyoto Protocol on the greenhouse gas emissions, strengthening the verification regime of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention, ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, etc.) seemed to confirm these worrying trends and stirred further controversies over the gap between the actual U.S. behaviour and the responsibilities inherent to the role of the global hegemon as perceived by the rest of the world. In this respect, the September 11th events have indeed introduced more clarity on how the hegemon should behave and what kind of challenges should be given a higher priority. However it can be easily noticed that the post-Cold War international system has not been shocked to an extent, as to start shifting away from unipolarity, although it is less certain whether this pattern will endure in a long term, as it will be suggested later. These observations as well as the trends in international relations and the characteristics of international conflict will be elucidated in the second part of the article.

II. The September 11th attacks and their impact

The attacks perpetrated against the hegemonic power of the unipolar world are inevitably set to reverberate through the whole international system. September 11th was the first time in the post-Cold War era when the United States was challenged with such destruction and hit at the heart of its financial and military power. Dramatic as it is, the attack should not be assessed as the focal point at which the previous international system together with the dynamics of international relations and international conflict built into it have ceased to exist and something entirely new have replaced them. A strong case can be made to suggest that September 11th should be analysed in terms of continuity rather than drastic change.

Unipolarity highlighted but not unequivocal

First of all, the international system remains fundamentally unipolar. The attacks have done nothing to undermine the U.S. power (economic, financial, political and military), the ability to project it globally or dependency of the rest of the world upon the United States, even if it was the original motive behind them. On the contrary, this characteristic has become more significant, as the strong incentive for the United States to exploit more vigorously its unique position in the international system has appeared. A strong assertion of unipolarity is noticeable behind the words of President Bush, aired during his address to the Congress in the aftermath of the attacks, where he framed the imperative for the world community by saying that 'every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.'⁷ Thus little choice has been left for the rest of world but to rally be-

hind the USA or bear the consequences of either indecision or opposition. The world reaction to the terrorist attacks followed this imperative word by word. The U.S. allies, driven by moral repulsion of the atrocities and a strong commitment to support the USA as well as by common threat perception, offered all possible assistance, as evocation of the Article 5 of the NATO founding treaty on collective defence demonstrates. Some states, such as Russia or China, responded along similar lines, but more out of expedience and pragmatic considerations, hoping to reap benefits such as legitimisation of their domestic policies (Russia's war in a breakaway republic of Chechnya, for instance), more favourable treatment by the USA in the areas of trade and finance and, in the case of Russia, the U.S. assistance in dealing with the threats to its national security. Even some countries featuring on the list of the 'rogue states', such as Sudan, Libya and Iran, felt compelled to condemn the attacks against their ideological enemy and if not to co-operate, then at least to avoid obstructing in any

way the U.S. response.⁸ All this reveals the extent to which the U.S. policy has become central to the world affairs and to which the world has become dependent on the United States. It can be concluded, therefore, that September 11th events have become yet another landmark, accentuating the unipolar nature of the international system.

On the other hand, certain connotations appeared after September 11th which used to underpin the bipolar structure of the international system, as the history of the Cold War shows, and which may upset the above account. Firstly, it is the sense of the overwhelming threat to security and value system of the American society, echoing perception of the Soviet threat of the Cold War years. The terror of September 11th has created the same sense of profound insecurity, vulnerability and uncertainty as the fear of nuclear attack by the Soviet Union, and the effort to redress this threat equally dominates the U.S. security and foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, a strong and powerful sense of the U.S. mission ensues both

from the need to respond and from the freshly acute realisation of the U.S. position in the international system as the only nation capable of delivering that response to protect the *status quo*. At the Asian-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summit in Shanghai, President Bush succinctly defined this new sense of mission claiming that 'this conflict is a fight to save the civilised world'.⁹ One can easily draw parallels with the Cold War, when the United States acted on behalf of the free world to fend off the communist ideological expansion. Yet another facet resembling the bipolar confrontation is the renewed usage of the word 'containment' to shape and define the U.S. strategy, only this time aimed at containing the terrorist threat in general rather than the state actor.¹⁰ The impression of a non-coincidental parallel with the Cold War containment strategy is being strengthened by the warnings of the U.S. leadership that the USA as well as the allies should be preparing for a long haul in this struggle to contain terrorism.¹¹ To push the parallel even further, it is obvious that the

war on terrorism, just as the Cold War, will not see a continuous and sustained military action. Intelligence operations, covert action, financial and law enforcement measures will probably be more important tools employed to cope with the threat. Finally, it is obvious that September 11th will be followed by a deep U.S. engagement and global activism as it is being realised that any unresolved regional conflicts or continued existence of the 'failed' states will be a breeding ground for extremism and the terrorist activities and that eventually the United States will become their ultimate target yet again. Having dismissed the U.S. role in state and nation building prior to September 11th, the U.S. administration seems to be revising this approach as campaign in Afghanistan draws to a close. The emerging U.S. determination not to leave any vacuum for extremism to thrive thoroughly resembles the effort to be actively present in all regions as a part of the anti-Soviet strategy. The only element missing in this picture to complete the bipolar structure is the second pole of the inter-

national system. However, the pole could be conceptually constructed if one defines it not as an equally powerful hostile state with its sphere of influence, but as an amorphous structure, comprised of the terrorist networks, 'rogue states' and even large segments of some societies exercising strong anti-American sentiments, all united by ideology. President Bush has already showed determination to add state actors along the terrorist networks to the adversary's profile by declaring that 'any nation that continues to support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime',¹² although carefully avoiding any allusions to the social dimension of the conflict. In such a case, the notion of an asymmetric confrontation would apply, where one side is easily identifiable, well structured, organised and has an obvious leader (the USA), while the other side remains more or less elusive, complex and without the centre of gravity inherent to the opponent, but nevertheless capable of inflicting significant damage to the interests of the adversary as well as keeping him mobilised and

insecure and commanding the level of individual and social loyalties that are to be reckoned with. This account would certainly be a huge departure from the conventional and modest assessment of the consequences of the September 11th events to the international system. However, transition from the unipolar to bipolar world is a possibility rather than the current reality and can materialise only if the new definition of what constitutes the pole in the international system is universally accepted and if the U.S. resources become so overstretched as to lead to the world less dependent upon the USA as an arbiter and the source of security and where loyalty to the U.S. hegemonic leadership is easily traded and shed. The latter possibility has already been noted by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, who observed that 'one of the difficult things in the next few months is going to be establishing which of our allies of convenience...can become real allies over the longer term...and which ones are going to just switch sides.'¹³ It is also important to note, that application of the strategies of the bipolar system can be

carried out in the unipolar world all the same, as the containment of the 'rogue states' through the mechanisms of international sanctions during the 1990s shows. This may especially be the case given, that the key policymakers of the Bush administration are much more familiar with the strategies of the Cold War and eager to employ them rather than innovate. Being mindful of the reactions to September 11th within international system, discussed earlier, it would be premature to announce demise of unipolarity, although the highlighted aspects of the post-September 11th developments should lead the analyst to be more flexible and open-minded in future categorisations. Enthusiastic use of techniques and rhetoric, intrinsic to the bipolar structure of the international system by the Bush administration, can become a self-fulfilling prophecy in the end.

II.2 The maturing hegemon and international relations

In the international relations, one can discover a mix of change and continuity

of the pre-September 11th patterns of interaction. The most significant change perhaps should be associated with the way that the hegemonic power (the USA) has been acting since the terrorist attacks. Having been averse to the role of a global policeman and hesitant to commit itself wholeheartedly to building security and prosperity wherever such a need arises for the last decade, the United States seems to start interpreting its position in the world politics more robustly, appreciating that the selective engagement, let alone self-isolation, cannot prevent hostile acts and challenges. As the U.S. secretary of defence Donald H. Rumsfeld wrote: 'Forget about "exit strategies"; we're looking at a sustained engagement that carries no deadlines.'¹⁴ It is more likely now that the U.S. engagement will be far deeper and wider than previously, even in the places where the U.S. interests seem to be largely absent. The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines, failure of states in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or Somalia, the Palestinian

intifada and many other developments and events, are set to receive or are already receiving a far bigger U.S. attention, than prior to September 11th. Essentially, the United States is undergoing transformation from being a reluctant into being a mature hegemon, ready to throw its power and resources into the troublesome spots where opportunities for the U.S. opponents to undermine the U.S. interests can present themselves. The declared readiness to stay in Afghanistan and assist its newly formed government as long as it takes to build a viable state can serve as a precursor of the revised U.S. approach to its international responsibilities.¹⁵ The willingness to sustain the global engagement, though, can still wither away as a sense of crisis and pressure for action subside. Some analysts have expressed their doubts over whether such a transformation will be sustained. As Professor Niall Ferguson of Oxford University puts it: 'The U.S. has the resources: but does it have the guts to act as a global hegemon and make the world a more stable place?'¹⁶ Meanwhile, the expected reversal from unilat-

eral to multilateral methods of formulating and implementing the U.S. policies¹⁷, which implies more consensus building and appreciation of the interests of the other states, has failed to materialise. A broad anti-terrorist coalition which the USA sought to assemble before taking any military action, represents the pursuit of a theoretical imperative of isolating the enemy diplomatically and strategically, rather than introducing multilateral modes of policymaking and implementation. To be accurate, multilateral elements have indeed emerged in the U.S. policy. Reinvigorated interest in the opportunities offered by the United Nations, largely absent until recently, can be presented as an example.¹⁸ Concern over not alienating valuable allies in the war against terrorism is also playing its part. But the overall trend of the United States being ready to consult but seeking to avoid any constraints that the multilateral action usually entails, especially in the military realm, continues unabated just as prior to September 11th. Furthermore, the policies of eluding or even undermining

some multilateral binding arms control agreements, seen as an undesirable constraint to the U.S. freedom of manoeuvre and set on track during 2001 or even earlier, remain firmly in place. The United States further refuses to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and has ruined any chances of making the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention more credible through strengthening its verification regime,¹⁹ despite the risk of upsetting its allies and creating the atmosphere of double standards so readily endorsed by the foes. The same holds true for the U.S. determination to dispense of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, viewed by the former adversaries and current allies alike as a cornerstone of the strategic stability, in order to open gates for the deployment of the NMD system. President Bush has already announced that the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty is imminent. Thus the USA did not grow any more sensible to the concerns of the international community after September 11th. Instead, it is exploiting the moment to make the cause for a new strategic

framework stronger and more acceptable. Relations with Russia perhaps best exemplify the continuity of the same pattern of interaction as prior to September 11th.

The U.S. relations with Russia have been developing as an uneasy mixture of cooperation and disagreement for the last decade. A number of issues such as NATO enlargement and the Alliance's 'out-of-area' operations as in the Balkans, the NMD system and the fate of the ABM Treaty, non-proliferation, Russia's two wars in Chechnya and its meddling in the so-called 'Near Abroad' have been poisoning the new agenda of bilateral relations almost all the time. With President Bush taking office, it was widely expected that the U.S. policy towards Russia would be far more assertive and less conciliatory, than under his predecessor. As Russia's President Vladimir Putin was also seen as a person preferring a tough stand in foreign policy to regain Russia's lost status in international affairs, it was tempting to conclude that the two states would slide back into permanent confrontation, although less dangerous than during the Cold War, but

nevertheless potentially bruising and damaging enough to prompt concerns. Post-September 11th developments seemed to render those concerns irrelevant. Both states have found a common uniting issue since terrorist threat has been long regarded by Russia to be the most dangerous to its national security. Given that shared threat perception is always a starting point for building an alliance, Russia's determination to join the anti-terrorist effort can be interpreted as drawing it closer to the West. Some Russian officials went so far as to ponder once again the possibility of Russia acceding to NATO and to tone down objections to the accession of the Baltic States into the Alliance.²⁰ NATO also moved to reshape and upgrade its relations with Russia and make them to better reflect the post-September 11th realities.²¹ More importantly, Russia has become an indispensable ally of the United States during campaign in Afghanistan, sharing intelligence and expertise on the region and lifting objections to the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, perceived as Russia's

'backyard' in terms of influence and strategic interests. Washington, in turn, was quick to suspend criticism of Russia's military campaign in Chechnya, acknowledging that at least some part of Russia's argument for military action was valid and legitimate.²² This was followed by the announcement of bilateral cuts in nuclear arsenals during the summit in Texas in November, applauded as heralding a new era in the strategic relations of the former Cold War adversaries and laying ground for a new strategic framework, while addressing Russia's anxieties over the U.S. intentions to abolish the ABM Treaty.²³ Although not abandoning their opposition to the NMD, Russia's officials sound more realistic and more assured on this issue than previously.²⁴

Positive as they are, these developments, however, are neither entirely new nor rooted solely in the events of September 11th. The dawn of a new era in strategic relations between Russia and the United States was declared during the June summit between Bush and Putin last year in Ljubliana, Slovenia. On the same occasion,

both sides pledged to work on putting substance into the envisioned framework of their strategic relations.²⁵ In a similar vein, Putin has been softening Russia's vehement opposition to further NATO enlargement quite for a while, replacing threats of an adequate response with arguments questioning the rationale of the enlargement.²⁶ Russia even failed to come up with a usual counter-statement after President Bush had outlined his vision of Europe 'free and united' endorsing NATO enlargement project in Warsaw, Poland, last year.²⁷ Not to mention that Russia has been already talking of not excluding the possibility of joining the Alliance some time in future, although tailoring this idea to a set of conditions deemed unacceptable by the West. Russia's drift towards the West, therefore, could be noticeable already before the September 11th attacks. A more co-operative agenda has been unfolding without the effects of the terrorist attacks. The observers and policy analysts, taking note of the pragmatic nature of Putin's policies, seemed to have somewhat underesti-

mated his pro-Western credentials. Meanwhile, after September 11th Putin is taking stock of the pro-American sentiment in the Russian society and seeks overcoming the hardliner conservative elements in Russia's establishment by redefining Russia's interests in order to strike a chord with the West.²⁸ The USA has also utilised the moment to give a fresh momentum to the dynamics set into motion during 2001. Both sides have reached understanding of where the commonality of their interests lies, which was blurred by mutual disagreements and suspicions before the terrorist attacks. September 11th has only accentuated the ongoing change in the bilateral relations and helped to remove the obstacles to the process of rapprochement on both sides. Assessment by the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell that September 11th 'did not start something, it accelerated'²⁹ is very much valid in the post-September 11th U.S.-Russian relations and perhaps is applicable in the international relations in general. The way that September 11th events are influencing the post-Cold War patterns of inter-

national conflict is somewhat more complex, but nevertheless does not redefine its lines as dramatically as it may have been expected. The next part of the article will dwell upon the September 11th impact on major cleavages in the international system, described previously.

Change and continuity in international conflict

On September 11th, three lines of international conflict out of four seem to have blended together into one shocking blow to the USA, the state residing at the very core of the international system and emerging as a nod where those lines of conflict intersect. Firstly, the global terrorist network *al Qaeda* spreading well over 60 states and born out of the pathological hatred to the United States as a power allegedly seeking to destroy Islam as the cultural and religious phenomena and to subjugate the Muslims exemplifies very well the by-product of globalisation process and accompanying frictions. Osama bin Laden personifies those un-

able to accept the post-modern way of life and social values, brought about by globalisation, and reacting with anger and destruction to being pushed into obscurity and irrelevance in the contemporary world.³⁰ In a way, anti-globalisation protesters causing havoc in the streets during the WTO or G8 summits and *al Qaeda* terrorists represent the two sides of the same coin in terms of the origins of their discontent. Also, just as the protesters on the streets, while skilfully capitalising on free communications, movement of finances and new technologies which are sustaining globalisation, the terrorists attacked the state embodying globalisation itself, and accomplished this by selecting the targets symbolising financial and commercial as well as military might of the U.S. dominated and led world. Furthermore, they managed to strike a chord with anxieties and sensitivities of the societies in the Muslim world, unveiling the tensions created in those societies by modernisation and exposure to the effects of globalisation.³¹ Without going into detail and leaving the roots of terrorism for

other inquiries to explore, it is enough to record that the social and ideological cleavage in the international system, brought into being by globalisation, is strongly present behind the September 11th attacks. Secondly, the 'rogue states' *versus* the United States line also manifests itself here, as the former are long suspected by the latter of sponsoring and supporting international terrorism. The presence of this conflict behind the terrorist attacks is obvious despite the fact that some of the 'rogue states' were quick to issue condemnations of the atrocities. At the very early stage of war on terrorism, the U.S. administration made it clear that this connection would be central to the U.S. anti-terrorist strategy. During his address to Congress, President Bush stated that 'any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.' Arguments within the U.S. administration over whether Iraq, one of the most prominent pariah states, should be the next target after Afghanistan in the anti-terrorist campaign, have further reinforced perception

that the terrorist attacks are closely associated with existence of the 'rogue states'.³² The failed states also inevitably come into play in the analysis, as Afghanistan constituted the ground for recruiting and training terrorists and the physical base of the *al Qaeda* leadership. Mostly neglected since the failure to restore the governing structures and order in Somalia, they turned out to be the safe haven for the training and operational activities of the terrorist network. Afghanistan has immediately become a target of the U.S. war on terrorism, and Somalia as well as another state balancing on the edge of failure, Yemen, have been named to be likely to draw the anti-terrorist action of the USA.³³ A sober realisation by the USA that the existence of failed or weak states is not favourable to the U.S. interests simply because it can further stimulate the terrorist threat and, therefore, cannot be ignored, will be shaping the American strategy for the foreseeable future. Thus three lines of international conflict, recognisable well before September 11th and having led to the terrorist attacks, are

likely to remain in place. The only cleavage that has been obscured by September 11th is the one between the democracies and undemocratic regimes for various reasons not qualifying for the status of 'rogue'. Pakistan and the states of Central Asia serve as the best examples of how undemocratic regimes have ceased to be the trigger for conflict and turned into partners of co-operation. Pakistan, widely regarded as gradually slipping into becoming a 'rogue state' or even a failed state, or both, under the rule of General Pervez Musharraf, is now one of the most valuable U.S. allies.³⁴ The United States seems to be ready to tolerate undemocratic regimes as long as they remain loyal to the USA in its war on terrorism and until these regimes retain a degree of control over their territories and populations necessary to prevent the rise of extremism and development of the new terrorist 'pockets'. Meanwhile, the authoritarian rulers can enjoy the legitimacy of their repressive policies, mocked as 'fighting terrorism' long before September 11th, obtained as a result of the changed U.S.

attitude.³⁵ It remains to be seen whether turning blind eye on the undemocratic practices in the other states for the sake of strategic co-operation will be a short-term U.S. strategy or a long-term trend as the calls to prepare for a long haul may suggest. The note of caution is that such an approach during the Cold War produced all sorts of troubles for the policymakers in the post-Cold War era, including anti-Western sentiment in many societies.

One of the biggest fears of the international community, though, was that the U.S. response to the terrorist acts would indeed validate the Huntingtonian model of international conflict by turning the whole struggle into a clash of civilisations, between the U.S.-led Western world and the Islamic world. At the outset of a bombing campaign in Afghanistan, the arguments that the United States was punishing the whole Muslim society for the atrocities perpetrated by a group of criminals and that it would antagonise the whole Muslim world were at the core of criticism of the U.S. strategy.³⁶ Signs of out-

rage, spreading through the Muslim societies, over the bombing and the civilian casualties were apparent as the demonstrations in Pakistan or lack of endorsement by the Gulf states coming under the pressure of their societies not to support the campaign demonstrated.³⁷ An unfortunate parallel between the crusades and the current war on terrorism, evoked by Bush, was not helpful at all in presenting the campaign as an effort directed against the 'rogue' elements and not as manifestation of the long-harboured Western hostility to the Muslims.³⁸ Talk of the West, and the United States in particular, exploiting the opportunity provided by September 11th to unleash its power against the Muslim states and societies has become common among the Muslims.³⁹ Given that any war tends to harden the attitudes and push them to the extremes, the terrorist attacks may well induce proliferation and consolidation of anti-Muslim and anti-Western sentiments in Western and Muslim societies respectively, thus pitting them against each other and bringing about something resembling the clash

of civilisations. However, this remains a very remote possibility, since the USA and its allies have made every effort to isolate and discourage any domestic anti-Muslim hysteria as well as to win the hearts of the Muslims by disassociating Osama bin Laden's cause from their grievances. As a result of a relatively measured and self-restrained U.S. response and a carefully mastered public relations campaign to convince the Muslim societies of the absence of any broader anti-Muslim motivation behind this response, the views that this is a war between Western and Islamic civilisations are confined to the margins of those societies.⁴⁰ Commitment to stay in Afghanistan and help to re-build the country destroyed by the decades of civil war served very well to strengthen the message of assurance. Nonetheless, September 11th underlines the fact that perceptions can be pushed by terrible events at such directions as to turn the theories, currently lacking credibility, into a dominant explanation of why the conflict is taking place. The terrorist attacks and the following Osama bin Laden's propaganda

to unite the Muslims behind his religious cause to destroy America and other 'infidels' may have rendered Huntington more relevance it has had before in the eyes of many, even though the terrorist attacks can be better explained in other terms than the clash of civilisations. It takes and will continue requiring a sustained and carefully crafted policy and action to steer both sides away from the overwhelming perceptions of confrontation between Western and Islamic civilisations in accordance with Huntington. Huntington was not entirely right prior to September 11th, remains such afterwards, but he still can become right as the war on terrorism continues.

III. Conclusions

Provoked by numerous accounts that the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11th have dramatically changed the world, this article explored a moderate avenue of interpreting the importance of these events to the world affairs. Taking three interrelated

dimensions – international system, international relations and international conflict – as the analytical framework, it endeavoured to place September 11th into general post-Cold war setting which emerged during the preceding decade. Preoccupied with the question whether September 11th should be conceptualised as a trigger of change or a symptom of what has been evolving already for some time, the analysis leads to accepting the latter way of interpretation. Certainly, this does not imply that nothing has changed at all. Our perceptions and understanding of the terrorist threat, of destructiveness it can bring and of the means which terrorists can use to exploit our vulnerabilities have acquired completely new dimensions and, more importantly, are now rooted in a terrible experience rather than theoretical models and hypothetical contingencies. But the world politics, with some minor adjustments and some new probabilities, remains a continuation of the pattern set prior to the attacks. The unipolar international system is not showing any signs of collapsing,

even though the strategies and characteristics of the bipolar world have appeared, causing to ponder the theoretical possibility of neo-bipolarity and the need to revise the notion of the system's pole. The world-wide rallying behind the United States underscores the extent to which the USA has positioned itself as the central power in the international system, ensuring its functioning, stability and security. The USA remains a hegemon in the international relations dictating the rules of the game as well as the nature of responses to the challenges from within the system. Its influence, interests and policies continue formulating imperatives for the other actors. Only this time, reluctance to exercise the hegemonic influence is giving way to a wider and deeper global engagement to prevent further challenges like the one on September 11th, bringing closer the USA to the role of a 'global policeman' it sought to avoid but has come to realise it has no choice but to assume. The hopes of multilateralists have been dashed, however, and the expected shift towards multilateral decision-making

in international relations has failed to take place as the USA remains unwilling to accept any external constraints although displays more readiness to consult, before making the decision. Finally, most of the strands of international conflict remain in place after September 11th. Pressure upon the 'rogue states' will persist and will even intensify. Interventions in the failed states will be as instrumental in ensuring security of the international system as ever before. And globalisation will continue generating social and economic tensions with implications to international relations. Only those who believe that further expansion of democratic values and practices can guarantee peace and stability will be temporarily upset as the United States needs allies in its war on terrorism, whether they are democratic or not. And the Huntingtonian clash of civilisations, which was not driving international conflict before September 11th, is not becoming a reality, although its coming into being is another probability exposed by the terrorist attacks. September 11th events are symptomatic

of the trends and developments preceding them. They accentuate the characteristics of the post-Cold War setting and have also accelerated some processes, such as rapprochement between Russia and the USA, by making their rationale more obvious. September 11th atrocities, thus, is not a new departure point from which we could start counting the days of a post-post-Cold War era. Certainly, the continuing war on terrorism may make difference, but it is rather a war which will consolidate the current world order instead of installing a new one. Most probably President George W. Bush will not enter history along with Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt or even George Bush Sr. as an architect of a new world order, despite his merits for fighting terrorism.

¹ See Moisi, Dominique, 'Welcome to the New, New World Order', *Financial Times*, September 13th, 2001.

² See Tickner, J. Ann (1995), 'Re-visioning Security', in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 183, 184.

³ See Slim, Hugo (1995), *Military Humanitarianism and the New Peacekeeping: an Agenda for Peace?* at www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a015.htm (accessed on May 17th, 2000).

⁴ Van Ham, Peter (2001), 'Security and Culture, or, Why NATO Won't Last', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 32, no.4, p. 398.

⁵ Huntington, Samuel P. (1993), 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20th, 2001, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed on December 14th, 2001.

⁸

⁹ See 'Defining the Challenge: Who Asked Mr Bush to "Save Civilisation?"', *The Guardian*, October 24th, 2001.

¹⁰ See Hoagland, Jim, 'America Can't Wage the Anti-Terror War Alone', *The International Herald Tribune*, January 14th, 2002.

¹¹ See Grant, Tracy, 'Bush Braces Country for War', *Washington Post*, September 15th, 2001.

¹² Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20th, 2001, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed on December 14th, 2001.

¹³ Dao, James & Schmitt, 'U.S. Hawk Hints Iraq Won't Be Next Target', *The International Herald Tribune*, January 9th, 2002.

¹⁴ Rumsfeld, Donald H., 'A New Kind of War', *The New York Times*, September 27th, 2001.

¹⁵ See The White House Report *The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days*, at <http://>

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html, accessed on January 15th, 2002.

¹⁶ See the contribution by Prof Niall Ferguson to the joint Guardian-RUSI conference on New Policies for the New World, published in The Guardian, October 31st, 2001.

¹⁷ See Naim, Moises, 'Even A Hegemon Needs Friends and Allies', Financial Times, September 14th, 2001.

¹⁸ See Remarks by the President to United Nations General Assembly, November 10th, 2001, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html>, accessed on January 15th, 2002.

¹⁹ See 'Bush's Hang-ups', The Economist, December 15th-21st, 2001.

²⁰ See "Why Not Accept Russia Into NATO? Interview with Sergei V. Stepashin", Business Week Online, September 21st, 2001, on Johnson's Russia List (JRL), Issue 5454, at <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5454-7.cfm>, accessed on January 15th, 2002.

²¹ See Finn, Peter & Baker, Peter, 'NATO and Russia Reinventing Relationship', Washington Post, November 15th, 2001.

²² See Politkovskaya, Ana, 'Remember Chechnya', Washington Post, November 14th, 2001.

²³ See Sanger, David E., 'Bush and Putin Agree to Reduce Stockpile of Nuclear Warheads', The New York Times, November 14th, 2001.

²⁴ See Wines, Michael, 'Facing Pact's End, Putin Decides to Grimace and Bear It', The New York Times, December 14th, 2001.

²⁵ See Charlton, Angela, 'Bush, Putin Face Diplomatic Hurdles', Associated Press report on Johnson's Russia List (JRL), Issue 5037, June 18th, 2001, at <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5307.html>, accessed on July 10th, 2001.

²⁶ See 'Putin Softens Tone on Baltic Quest For NATO', Jamestown Foundation Monitor, September 6th, 2001 on CDI Russia Weekly at <http://www.cdi.org/russia/170.html>, accessed on September 9th, 2001.

²⁷ See Remarks by the President in Address to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University, Warsaw, Poland, June 15th, 2001, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html>, accessed on January 15th, 2002.

²⁸ See McFaul, Michael, 'Putin's Risky Turn Westwards', The Christian Science Monitor, November 9th, 2001.

²⁹ See 'U.S. and Russia to Complete Talks on Arms Control Pact', The New York Times, December 11th, 2001.

³⁰ See Neier, Aryeh, 'Warring Against Modernity', Washington Post, October 9th, 2001.

³¹ See Friedman, Thomas L., 'One War, Two Fronts', The New York Times, November 2nd, 2001.

³² See Woollacott, Martin, 'Saddam Will be the Next US Target, One Way or Another', The Guardian, November 16th, 2001.

³³ See Ottaway, David B. & Ricks, Thomas E., 'Somalia Draws Anti-Terrorist Focus', Washington Post, November 4th, 2001.

³⁴ See Keller, Bill, 'The World According to Colin Powell', New York Magazine, November 26th, 2001.

³⁵ See 'The New New World Order?', The Economist, October 5th-12th, 2001.

³⁶ See Ruthven, Malise, 'This Man May Become Our Nemesis', The Guardian, October 10th, 2001.

³⁷ Hirst, David, 'The West Ignores Arab Resentment at Its Peril', The Guardian, October 9th, 2001.

³⁸ See Ford, Peter, 'Europe Cringes at Bush "Crusade" Against Terrorists', The Christian Science Monitor, September 19th, 2001.

³⁹ Freedland, Jonathan, 'The War Bin Laden Has Already Won', The Guardian, October 10th, 2001.

⁴⁰ See Fidler, Stephen, 'Washington Wages a War of Diplomacy', Financial Times, November 8th, 2001.

Russia's Military Reform: Political Trajectories

By Assoc. Prof., dr. Raimundas Lopata and Assoc. Prof., dr. Česlovas Laurinavičius*

Russia's state and identity crisis that commenced with the end of the cold war has inevitably touched the military of the state.

Military reform has been discussed over the last decade in Russia, with decidedly mixed results. In practice, reform has primarily meant further cuts in the size of the armed forces (from 5,1 million to 1,2 million) with some moderate organizational changes. Reform under Pavel Grachev (defence minister in 1992-1996) basically amounted to a gradual hollowing out of the military structure inherited from the Soviet Union. The army

was cut but not reformed. Igor Rodionov's tenure (defence minister in 1996-1997) was marked mainly by his increasingly strident complaints of the meagre finances available to the army and advocated preparations for a theatre-wide conventional war with NATO. The most significant steps toward not just a smaller but also restructured military have taken place under Igor Sergeev (defence minister in 1997-2001). Further cuts were enacted in a more logical fashion - assembling of a small number of "permanent readiness" divisions has been started, it was tried to integrate all components of

strategic deterrence under one command and to reduce the number of military districts¹.

However, several factors played a major role in the trajectory of the military development: the Kosovo crisis, the second Chechnya War and the 'Kursk' submarine catastrophe.

Russia, as response to the NATO operation in Kosovo, laid a new emphasis on a nuclear deterrence, which should compensate for the weakness of the conventional forces. At the meeting of Russia's Security Council on the 29th of April 1999 there were prepared three secret de-

* Associate Professor, dr. Raimundas Lopata is the Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius, Lithuania. Associate Professor, dr. Česlovas Laurinavičius is also with the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius, Lithuania.

crees. One of them allegedly prescribed the development of new tactical weapons. Neither the content of those decrees nor their implementation has become known². Nevertheless, the military manoeuvres in Kaliningrad that imitated the scenarios of “de-escalation” mission spoke for themselves (Russia’s military doctrine signed in April 2000 confirmed this)³.

In 1999 the reactivated use of the armed forces in Chechnya determined preconditions for the authoritarianism of Putin and for the emergence of a hypertrophied status of the military. In every public speech in early 2000, Acting President Vladimir Putin reiterated the key message: “The Army has regained trust in itself and society believes in and trusts its Army”⁴. At this juncture the situation could end up with the formation of the military authoritarianism.

However, in 2000 the *Kursk* submarine catastrophe brought the public attention to the disastrous deterioration of the military. Without any doubts the accident had a huge impact on Putin’s authority as well as on a presumable model of the

military authoritarianism. The urgent need to restructure and reorganise the whole military system was confirmed during the series of the meetings of the Security Council during autumn 2000⁵. Thereby Putin faced the dilemma: How to reform (modernise) the military by keeping up political leverage that assisted in the forming the authority of Putin? Therefore Kremlin’s trajectory with regard to the military reform reflects certain contradiction. The military issue implicates two scopes reflecting the above-mentioned ambivalence.

Reshuffle of the top of the military and security establishment

At the end of March 2001, in appointing a retired KGB Lieutenant General Sergey Ivanov to head the Defence Ministry and making a senior woman official Lyubov Kudelina from the Finance Ministry one of his deputies, Putin claimed to have begun de-militarising Russia and justified his decision by saying that as Security Council Secretary, it was Ivanov

who oversaw the inter-ministerial working group that drew up a military reform program. Now he will have to implement this programme⁶. The fact that Putin has appointed a close ally to the Defence Minister’s job suggests he really does consider military reform a top priority and resigned the principal that the military reform was given to the military “to preoccupy themselves with”.

The new Deputy Defence Minister responsible for the financial and economic issues is a well-known specialist Lyubov Kudelina, who will also head the Defence Ministry’s Chief Military Budget and Finances Department. When one considers that the defence budget represents one-fifth of the total state budget, the importance of this job is obvious. Over the past decade the structure has been much criticized for its poor performance and two of Kudelina’s predecessors have been dismissed. There seems to be a new awareness that the department needs qualified civilian specialists. The Defence Ministry’s Financial Inspectorate and Labour Department, where new directors are to be ap-

pointed, will be subordinate to Kudelina⁷.

The dismissals followed given appointments. A top Russian Defence Ministry official known for hawkish statements toward the West Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, the Head of the Department for International Military Co-operation, is to lose his job. Ivashov has become known for strong statements against NATO's eastward expansion, blaming it for being a "criminal organization" and for the US plans to deploy a missile defence system. Presumably the situation can be interpreted as Russia's interest in military co-operation not only on bilateral but as well on international-institutional basis. By the way, Mikhail Dmitriev, the person from Putin's entourage, former professional intelligence agent, and incumbent Deputy Defence Minister was appointed to head the Military Technological Co-operation Committee of the Defence Ministry. The outspoken, hawkish General Valery Manilov was ousted as the First Deputy Chief of Russia's General Staff⁸.

Nevertheless, is it realistic to expect serious reforms from the obedient

"aparatchik" and implementer of Putin?⁹

It could be expected that the appointment of Ivanov, the person closely related to Putin, will put an end to the conflict between former Defence Minister Sergeyev and the Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin over differing approaches to the army reforms. However, it is hardly credible that this factor points to the reformist potential of Ivanov. It is more likely that Putin has started a disassembling of the military establishment (mostly based on the Soviet clan-corporate principal) replacing it by the bureaucracy structures consolidating a so-called vertical line of power. A statement of Ivanov made during his visit in Minsk, Belarus, in April 2001 confirms the version: "Today, the discussions are over. The armed-forces reform plans have been approved by the President, and it is time to implement the approved decisions"¹⁰.

In reality, however, the appointment of one or even several civilians to the top defence posts could end up doing more to discredit the idea of de-militarisation rather than furthering its cause. To say

nothing of the state of the civil society in Russia, it is worth noticing that Kremlin does not feel any need to inform the public on what is going on in the military. In the meantime, changes in the personnel at the top of Defence Ministry follow the old tradition – Kremlin changes potentially disloyal persons.

Except the interest to consolidate the power of Putin, these appointments, maybe, do not change anything. The Defence Ministry is still a military rather than a political institution. Russia does not yet have the hundreds of civilian officials with solid military knowledge it will need. Nor does it have top generals open minded enough to take orders from a Minister close to the President, let alone from not-so-high-ranking civilian officials. Real demilitarisation of the political institutions would have to start by removing the military status from the dozens of ministries and government agencies run on military lines. Instead, it looks as though the military contingents in these government bodies will in some way or another be made subordinate to the Defence Minis-

try. This could lead to the emergence of a militarised behemoth, encompassing over two million people, even with the planned military cutbacks. The problem is that Kremlin does not seem to understand that de-militarisation of the military related ministries is an important element in establishing civilian control. And this is not the only step - it is equally important to encourage greater openness and transparency. But as Security Council Secretary, Ivanov preferred to keep all plans as secret as possible - the military-reform plans are still secret to this day. And as for Kudelina, when she was in charge of the military budget at the Finance Ministry, she insisted on maximum secrecy¹¹.

***Cutbacks in numbers in the
Armed Forces***

Ivanov particularly emphasises that cutbacks are to take place in the number of servicemen. Over the coming three years, the armed forces are to be cut by 365.000 servicemen (respectively the Ground Forces by 180.000, The Navy -

50.000, the Air Forces - 40.000; in total 90.000 during 2001) and 130.000 so called civilian specialists. Given that the state cannot even properly feed and arm all its soldiers¹², this looks like a perfectly rational decision.

The biggest cuts can be expected in Siberia, the Far East and in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Cuts will also affect Russian troops in Trans-Dnestr and in the South Caucasus¹³. Though some army corps will be disbanded it is emphasized that cutbacks would not involve units on permanent combat readiness and the number of soldiers in some of them (the South-Western and Central-Asian Strategic Zones) will even be increased¹⁴. While having reservations some analysts envisage certain changes in the priorities of Russia's security policy (Islamic extremism as the main threat)¹⁵.

The significance of the cutbacks under way requires new approaches in the armed forces. The battle over Russia's defence budget for 2002 shows that the Defence Ministry is prepared to bring military wages in line with those of public servants and in parallel to abolish the ben-

efits for the military. This could be interpreted as a tendency of shifting to a professional army¹⁶. Ivanov does not mask such intention. Asked when Russia would move from conscription to a professional army, Ivanov said at the moment it was "impossible to say", because it depended on the economic situation. The Defence Minister pointed out that the changeover cannot occur overnight, and that in the US - for example - it took 10 years¹⁷.

On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the decrease of the armed forces that started during the period of Gorbachev was fitful partly because of the financial deficit. Let us not forget that this is the third major cutback since Soviet times. The armed forces have shrunk, but this has not led to any proportional increase in effectiveness. The resources saved were allocated to maintaining the structure, but not to reorganising it. Military authorities are following a simple logic in their planned cutbacks - if they can spend more money on each soldier, servicemen will serve better and have more resources. The catch is that this logic does

not work. The problem is that the reform program's authors have not veered an iota from the principles on which the Soviet Army ran¹⁸.

The reality of the matter is that compulsory military service in Russia is not compulsory for everyone. According to General Vyacheslav Putilin, Head of the General Staff's Chief Recruitment Department, 88% of young men who are called up get their service deferred. It is no secret that many educational establishments exist for the sole purpose of granting these deferrals. Putin also finds himself forced to admit that the best of those able to military service are dodging it. More than half of the draftees have never studied or had a job. It's pure fantasy to imagine that these young men will become the soldiers of the 21st century. But despite all this, the "office" generals are doing all they can to prevent the changeover to a professional army. The state's military and political leadership still does not see the need for a corps of professional Non-Commissioned Officers. One official argument the Russia's top generals give is

that a professional army would mean drastically increasing the defence budget¹⁹.

So long as the conscript system remains in place, there will not be any real quality improvement among soldiers. Meanwhile the traditionalism of Russian office generals, the concepts of mutually assured destruction and "all-azimuth defence", "ideology of total siege" still substantially point to the existence of the conscript system²⁰. Eventually the references that establishment of professional army requires a long time confirm the resistance against the plans of the establishment of professional army.

The correlation between the cutbacks and the officers' corps should be taken into consideration as well. Effective reform means that there will be winners and losers within the military. The point is that the Russian officers corps is not immune to what is going on within the state as a whole. In Russia, with its bureaucratic and organizational politics, the majority of officers who have remained in the military through the 10 years period of institutional decline believe, that they have

no employment alternatives²¹. Essentially, what this all boils down to is that cutbacks in the armed forces will not result in any serious change.

***Changes in the command system
of the armed forces***

The contretemps regarding the structure of the armed forces were personified for a long time, when the former Minister of Defence Sergeyev and the Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin came out openly as antagonists. The discussion on what armament should prevail demonstrated serious organisational tensions between two institutions as well as the race for influence. In the framework of the discussion, the earlier created Russian Forces of the Strategic Purpose (RVNS) as a separate branch of the Army, has undoubtedly been expected to carry and enhance the weight of Sergeyev. However, Kvashnin managed to take over the initiative by both appealing to the war in Chechnya and calling to prioritise conventional armament.

A substantial moment was November 2000 when Kvashnin proposed strict division of functions between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff²². Under this plan, the Defence Ministry would take on political and administrative functions, while the General Staff would be responsible for the operational command of the troops. The concrete project was supposed to be presented to Putin in January 2000. However, the project has still not been worked out²³.

Such a situation speaks of portentous tension between the Kremlin and the General Staff. The next link down in the command chain is the Military Districts, which have both administrative and operational functions. Kvashnin's proposals would simply fragment command of the military. If they were implemented, Putin, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, would lose his direct link with the troops. At the same time the General Staff - the agency responsible for planning military operations for every occasion - would get the chance to meddle directly in political life. Currently, as an

expression of the tension, Chief Command of the Ground Forces, whose Commander (Colonel General Nikolai Kormilcev) is designated to be a Deputy Defence Minister, has been revived. He will take the supervision of military detachments and will be responsible for the military training of all armed forces. In parallel it is tried to overcome the fragmentation of the military establishment. The military reform is treated as a structural issue and is to be conducted in association with the reforms proceeding in other "power institutions", including the Ministry of Interior, headed by Boris Gryzlov who is closely related to Putin²⁴.

However, the status quo is that the Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin extends his influence with the help of political capital made in Chechnya. So the talks about the possibility that Kvashnin can be removed are doubtful²⁵.

It means that while Sergeyev will be a loser in the bureaucratic infighting, it will not be clear whether the General Staff will emerge as a winner. Nevertheless, the most important is that two tendencies develop-

whether the "office generals" representing hierarchy of the army will take over the influence or whether the power of the army hierarchy will be broken through introduction of civil institute in the military sphere? In other words, we observe a silent discussion on the form of potential authoritarianism in Russia: Military authoritarianism or modernised authoritarianism based on an extensive social-political basis.

Priorities for armament

It was decided that the Russian Armed Forces would be given a structure based on three main branches (the Ground Forces, the Navy and the Air Force)²⁶. This could be interpreted as the return to the priority equalising conventional and nuclear armament. It is planned that the Strategic Missile Forces will form a branch of their own (till 2002) that will exclude the Space Forces, which will be made into a separate wing. Such thoughts both presume that nuclear armament is a prerequisite to retaining the superpower image and can be one of the answers for

the US missile defence plans. However, in one of his first interviews as a Defence Minister, Ivanov said that the decision to make the Space Forces a separate wing is not a response to the US plans to deploy a National Missile Defence. Ivanov spoke perfectly seriously about how the Space Forces could back armed-forces subdivisions on a tactical level²⁷.

But even in this framework it is very well known that the Russian Space Forces have half the satellites of the US Space Command, which really does provide tactical support for the army troops. Furthermore, 70% of the Russian satellites have already expended their service life²⁸. It is not at all certain that they can fulfil their original tasks - strategic intelligence, early warning of missile attacks and communication.

Finally in May the fire at the Russian satellite control centre showed how far the plans to create an independent space force are from reality. It took almost a day to put out the fire at this strategic military site, suppressing the fact that Russia does not have the specialized fire fighting equip-

ment needed to fight this kind of fire²⁹. All this leads to the conclusion that making sure the early warning system functions reliably at all times, is not a major Russian defence priority. Moscow does not seriously believe for a second that the USA could launch a sudden nuclear attack.

Generally, according to the last reports Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal is aging and shrinking and strategic delivery vehicles have limited operational lives³⁰. Russia's heavy missiles will be withdrawn from service in 2008 and they have long since passed their guaranteed service life (SS-19s (Stiletto) would rapidly reach the end of their operational life after 2007, the SS-24 (Scalpel) will be phased out by 2007 regardless of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), few if any SS-18s (Satan) and SS-25s (Sickle) would remain by the end of 2010, the number of operational Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) may drop precipitously over the next decade as Russian Ballistic-Missile Submarines, Nuclear-fueled, (SSBNs) reached the end of their service lives³¹).

With or without treaties, Moscow will be forced to dramatically reduce its nuclear arsenal over the coming years.

It is unlikely that Russia will be able to build new missiles of this class. During the Soviet time, these missiles were built in Ukraine. For understandable reasons, Moscow is hardly likely to risk developing its missile-building potential on a foreign state's territory. This leaves the most modern of the Russian missiles, the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) SS-28 (Topol-M). These missiles are designed to carry three warheads. It had been hoped at one point that Moscow would be able to produce 30 new SS-28s each year, but the reality is no more than 10 a year; and last year, only four new missiles were produced³².

Having the capabilities of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal in mind it is possible that Moscow is following a more rational logic. An indication of this is a recent statement by Sergeyev, who said that what matters today, is not so much the number of warheads or the discussion how to balance a strong nuclear ca-

pability with a robust conventional force structure, but the military command system³³. The analysis above demonstrates that Sergeyev can appeal to the main issue - forthcoming political system in Russia. The same could be said about the influence of economy on the military domain.

Economy and the military reform

Russians openly declare that the pace and success of military reform in Russia and its security policy will depend on the economic situation. Even without discussing the Strategy of Russia's Development till 2010, by German Gref and planned annual growth of economy by 5 - 5,5%, the decision on Russia's long-term defence strategy is still an open question.

First of all, it relates with a possible correlation between Putin's course towards more functional, market-oriented economy and Russia's huge and unreformed defence-industrial complex, which employs two million people³⁴. At the beginning of April Deputy Prime

Minister Ilya Klebanov, who oversees the military-industrial complex, said that the reform programme of the sector would be presented before May. The programme has not been approved yet. It is known that the draft programme supposes creating 30 - 40 vertically organized holdings, consisting of the most effective defence enterprises, for the different arms production sectors. All companies in the holding would have to hand over controlling stakes to the state. The programme's authors say this would allow the state to concentrate its limited resources on the most important military programmes. It would also free the military-industrial complex from needless competition³⁵.

The paradox is that these plans are not new at all. The first plan to create holdings along arms-sector lines appeared a decade ago. Then, as now, the main idea was not so much to rationalize production, as to maintain cosy jobs for military-industrial complex bureaucrats. This same aim lurks in the current programme. Russia has only a handful of effective defence enterprises, and they are effective

only because they export arms to China, India and "rogue states".

On the other hand the decision on Russia's long-term defence strategy relates with the real funds for the military reform, as well as with the situation in the defence budget. Over the past eight years, the armed forces have made only one-off arms purchases. Arms procurement accounts for 6% of total defence expenditure as opposed to a minimum of 20% in NATO member-states. The greater share of Russia's defence budget, according to Ivanov - 70% goes to wages, food, uniforms and so on as opposed to 25 - 27% of the defence budget in NATO states. Modern military technology accounts for 15 - 20% of Russia's arsenals, while the figure for NATO is 60 - 70%. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the armed forces have not purchased a single new military transport plane. Most money the military receives goes to maintaining and modifying old arms and technology³⁶.

In financing terms, the defence budget expenditure for 2001 has risen more than 150% compared with the previous year

(from 140 billion roubles to around 230 billion roubles, and it is planned to increase defence spending to 262 billion roubles for 2002³⁷). But this is a low figure. Former Defence Minister Sergeyev said, that given the financial limitations for buying new arms and technology, money would be spent primarily on extending the service life of existing technology³⁸.

Nevertheless, there are vital claims to sustain nuclear parity with the USA in Russia. Considered projects of the answers regarding, the US plans for the missile defence confirm such intention. One of such projects supposes four scenarios. So-called minimal deterrent scenarios envisage 1.500 Strategic Nuclear Warheads (SNW), i.e. 17 billion roubles per year or 8% of the defence budget. The second scenario - "to keep the USA in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty" - foresees 2.500 SNW, i.e. 20 billion roubles or 10% of the defence budget. For the implementation of the third scenario - "to hold back the U.S.A. from the arms race" - Russia would need up to 3.500 SNW, i.e. 40 billion roubles or 17% of the defence budget and fi-

nally, the fourth scenario - "deterrent from conventional, wide-ranging attack" suggests 6.000 SNW, i.e. 50 billion rouble or 25% of the defence budget³⁹.

Having in mind the still lasting inertness of the military-industrial complex, such considerations demonstrate the tendency to maintain Russia as a militarised authoritarian state. However, the statements that Russia is able to implement the scenarios by "tightening its belt" are questionable. Verification of the economic validity of the described scenarios is complicated particularly as there is no transparency in Russia's defence budget. For example, who could describe the state of Russia's conventional armament in the case of the fourth scenarios, without saying nothing about the living conditions of Russia's citizens or the perspectives of the civil society?

Meanwhile, according to Alexei Arbatov and Aleksandr Golts, Moscow should give preference to the model that projects to reduce the SNW to 1.500, to decrease the military personnel to 0,8 million and to change the ratio between

maintenance and investment portions of defence budget to 50 - 50% in the long run⁴⁰. In that case it should be said that the Russian leadership has come to the conclusion that nuclear deterrent does not automatically mean having a nuclear parity with the USA. Nevertheless this model will allow modernising of conventional force structure able to operate not only at the frontiers of the former Soviet Union, but eventually realising the claims of a great power (e.g. qualified for military actions in the Balkans).

All the discussions demonstrate that the crucial factor in defining Russia's long term strategy is not the number of SNW and the quantity of conventional forces, but the principle response to the question, what will be the evolution of Russia's political system and how Russia sees its position in the international system?

Undoubtedly, The Second Chechnya War plays a major role in the future of Russia's political system. As for the war in Chechnya, its continuation enables Putin to keep public opinion in mobilization mode and to accuse the opposi-

tion of any sins he pleases, from insufficient patriotism to treason. For the second time, Russia is burying its potential for economic development in Chechnya. There is now little room for manoeuvre in the economy - the positive effect of devaluation has worn off, world oil prices are falling, the debt crisis continues and the temptation to soften the blows by printing money as elections roll around, will only worsen the financial situation⁴¹.

Putin is not going to be drawn into another Afghanistan, nor is he going to withdraw from Chechnya. It should not be forgotten that Putin's appealing for assurance of national security in internal politics means, that he behaves as written in the textbooks of realism - he emphasised that the main political function of national security is the validation and legitimating of the use of force and weakening of internal opponents. Such thoughts re-emphasise the inertness of the direction towards the military authoritarianism.

Regardless of the fact that the war in Chechnya revealed the limitations of Rus-

sia's existing military capabilities, it annually costs of about 25% of the defence budget and Russia's losses rise to 2.500 with 8.000 wounded in action⁴² the Kremlin is not going to fall back. Taking into account the support of Russia's public opinion for the military campaign, it is hard so far to forecast eventualities, which can be seen in connection with the current information on the new political initiatives, helping to solve the problem and able to symbolize the shift from the course towards the military authoritarianism.

Conclusions

It is always hard to forecast Russia and particularly in the meantime, when Russia propagates the idea of specific development and stands for the idea of a multipolar global order. In addition, the influence of multiple specific economic, social and cultural factors is unpredictable for the still on going post-communist transformation in this part of the world. That is why the answers to all ques-

tions related to Russian security, its direction and perspectives of its military components, could hardly be given with much certainty.

Nevertheless, all analysed aspects of Russia's military reform confirm the dilemma: Will Russia choose the way of the modern, though authoritarian, state with a wide-range social-political base, modernised (civilian control, professionalism, modern armament) as well as carrying the functions of minimal deterrent army; or will Russia take the direction towards the military authoritarianism, i.e. will it still desperately lay claims to the status of superpower, will it allow the military-industrial complex to manifest by inertia and to dominate the Soviet-type office generals standing for the ideas of the Soviet-type conscription? Fundamentally it means a conditional decline of the living conditions in Russia and stagnation in the development of civil society.

The context analysed reveals the necessity of Western political and diplomatic pressure on Russia's military sector. At

the same time it is essential to promote the segments of market economy and civil society, to encourage the Kremlin to find the political solution in the Second Chechnya War, to evolve from the model of Soviet (Prussian) military sector. Various military servicemen training and re-training programmes, opening of the world armament market for the reformed Russian military-industrial complex would be helpful.

¹ Baev P., "Putin's military reform. Two Trajectories for the First Presidency" - The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Library, 2001, No. 6, p. 4 - 6, "Prospects for Military Reform in Russia" in <http://www.ceip.org/files/events/asp?pr=2>

² Sokut S., "Russia's Priority State Interests" in *Nezavysimoe Voennoje Obozrenie*, 17 - 13 May 1999, No. 17.

³ Sokov N., "The "Tactical Weapons Scare" of 2001", CNS Reports in <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/raports>

⁴ Shukshin A., "Russia's Putin Praises Army, Promotes Generals" in Reuters, 21 February 2000, Johnson's Russia List, No. 4125.

⁵ Trenin D., "Russia's Military in Crisis" in <http://www.carnegie.ru>

⁶ Smith A., "Russian Chronology. January - March 2001", CSRS, London, 2001, p. 51.

⁷ Mukhin V., "Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the Top", *The Russia Journal*, <http://www.russiajournal.com/index.cgi>, May 4, 2001.

⁸ "Radical Military Reform Finally Takes off in Post-Soviet Russia", April 6, 2001 in <http://www.wps.ru/chitalka/military/en/>; "Russia's Ivashov Expected to Lose His Job", Associated Press, 3 July 2001.

⁹ Bennett G. Ivanov, *The New Russian Defence Minister*, CSRS Occasional Brief, London, 2001, No. 81, p. 3 - 5.

¹⁰ Mukhin V, Op. Cit.

¹¹ Antonenko O., "Putin's "New" National Security Team", IISS Reports, March 29, 2001. Golts A., "Civilian Goes to Top, but Same Old Approach" in *The Russia Journal*, <http://www.russiajournal.com/index.cgi>, March 30, 2001.

From the perspective of "secrecy-openness" an interview with Kudelina is eloquent: "*Lyubov Kudelina: vopros ob otmene lgot voenosluzhaschim ne stojit*", April 2, 2001 in <http://www.strana.ru/>

¹² For instance, daily bread allowance is 750 gram per head. In reality 150 - 200 gram. For more details, see Bogachov D. *Osobenosti polevoj kuchni* in *Argumenty i Fakty*, July 2001, No. 27, p. 6; Sivkova V. *Kto kormit armiju?* in *Argumenty i Fakty*, July 2001, No. 27, p. 6.

¹³ Golts A., "*The Russian Military's Exercises in Futility*" in *The Russia Journal*, <http://www.russiajournal.com/index.cgi>, February 24, 2001.

¹⁴ "Sergej Ivanov: Plody Voennoj Reformy Pojavitsia nie Ranshe 2004 g" in *Izvestia*, June 25, 2001.

¹⁵ Golts A., "*Signals of Reform, but under Soviet Principles*" in *The Russia Journal*, <http://www.russiajournal.com/index.cgi>, May 4, 2001. Orlov A., Vladimir Putin Odobril Plany Voennyh in <http://www.strana.ru/>

¹⁶ Golts A., "*Battle begins Over Russia's Defense Budget Cash*" in *The Russia Journal*, July 7, 2001.

¹⁷ "Sergej Ivanov: *Plody Voenoj Reformy...*"; Golts A., "*Battle Begins Over Russia's Budget Cash*"; Mukhin V., "*Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the Top*".

¹⁸ Golts A., "*Signals of Reforms, but under Soviet Principles*".

¹⁹ Golts A., "*Why the Generals don't want a Professional Army*" in *The Russia Journal*, April 24, 2001. *V Blizhaischije 5 let v Rosiji ne budet Profesionalnoj Armiji* in <http://www.strana.ru>, June 5, 2001.

²⁰ Egorov I., *Genshtab: Rosija ne Gotova k Profesionalnoj Armiji* in <http://www.strana.ru>, November 11, 2000.

²¹ Zisk K., "*Putin and the Russian Military*", <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/ponars/>; Wallander C. A., "*Conference Report. December 2000*", <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/ponars/>; "*Soldiers Worry About Road to Civilian Life*" in *The Russia Journal*, May 15, 2001.

²² Smith M. A., "*A Russian Chronology. October-December 2000*", London, 2000, p. 58.

²³ Golts, "*Signals of Reform, but under Soviet Principles; Minoborony i Genshtab Chiotko Razgranichat Funkcii*", <http://www.strana.ru>, March 29, 2001. Orlov A, *Kadrovyje perestanovki v Minoborony budut poetapnymi*, <http://www.strana.ru>, April 26, 2001.

²⁴ Arzumanova M. Silovyje, *Organy Nuzhno*

Reformirovat v Komplekse, in <http://www.strana.ru>, April 2, 2001; Baev P, *Op. Cit.*, p. 9.

²⁵ Korotchenko I., *Generalnyj Shtab Zhdut Peremeny* in *Nezavosymoje Voennoje Obozrenije*, June 15, 2001.

²⁶ Orlov A., *Op. Cit.*

²⁷ Mukhin V., “*Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the Top*”.

²⁸ Golts A., “*Signals of Reform, but under Soviet Principles*”.

²⁹ Golts A., “*Russia’s Superpower Illusions go up in Smoke*” in *The Russia Journal*, <http://russiajournal.com/index.cgi>, May 18, 2001.

³⁰ “*Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union*”, CNS Print Publication, 2001, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/print/nsr2.htm>

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 14 – 17, 19.

³² Golts A., “*Kremlin Moves to Rekindle Cold War Missile Plan*” in *The Russia Journal*, June 28, 2001.

³³ *Op. Cit.*

³⁴ “*Prospects for Military Reform in Russia*” in <http://www.ceip.org/files/events/trenin.asp>

³⁵ Golts A., “*Greedy Bureaucrats Hinder Defense Reform*” in *The Russia Journal*, April 4, 2001.

³⁶ The details were presented by Yuri Baluyevski, Head of the General Staff’s Chief Operations Department in Mukhin V., “*Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the Top*”.

³⁷ Golts A., “*Battle Begins over Russia’s Budget Cash*”.

³⁸ Mukhin V., “*Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the Top*”.

³⁹ Solovjov V., *Rosija Drognula Pered Amerikanskoj NPRO* in *Nezavisimoje Voenoje Obozrenije*, June 22, 2001.

⁴⁰ Arbatov A., “*The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*”, *The Marshall Centre Papers*, 2000, No. 2, p. 15 – 26; Golts A., “*Kremlin Moves to Rekindle Cold War Missile Plan*”.

⁴¹ Stephen Ch., “*Changes in Power Structure*” in *The Scotsman*, May 10, 2001.

⁴² Trenin D., “*Russia’s Military in Crisis*” in <http://www.carnegie.ru>

The Military situation in the Baltic States¹

By Mr. Edgars Andersons

On literature, the Baltic States are usually called “small” although their total area is not that unimportant at all. It is roughly as large as two thirds of Northern Germany or the UK, it comprises about half of Japan or California and it is about one and a half times larger than the area of the BeNeLux states (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Regarding transport and commerce, the Baltic States are perfectly situated between Eastern and Western Europe. They are agriculturally self-sufficient. Shale in Estonia and waterpower in Lithuania and especially Latvia create optimal conditions for power generation and the industrial development of these states. After World War II, oil fields even were found in

Lithuania and Latvia. The forests in the Baltic States, especially in Latvia, can be regarded as one of their great natural riches. Moreover, the Baltic States are not as poor in mineral resources as commonly assumed. An important factor in the Baltic States was the development of industry based on local materials, but that later turned into a specialization in electrical engineering, precision instruments, chemistry and similar branches. This industry, especially in Latvia, could more easily compete with the great powers on the world market. The long coast of the Baltic Sea with its great ports, especially Riga, Ventspils (Windau), Liepāja (Liebau), Tallinn (Reval) and Klaipeda (Memel), is of considerable economic importance for the Baltic States. Although

the Baltic Sea gives access to the Atlantic Ocean, one should pay attention to the fact that it belongs to the so-called border seas, which creates certain military difficulties. The Baltic States are also a natural focal point for international traffic routes in the air, on railroads and roads. The land’s surface is mostly very suitable for the building of transport infrastructure.²

However, the military situation of the Baltic States must be regarded as highly dangerous. They are in the northern section of a long and narrow line of smaller states that are an obstacle for access from Russian territory to the Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. One should always be aware of the fact

that the Russian empire, known today as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), makes up one sixth of the earth's total surface area. The situation of the Baltic States was aggravated by the fact that access to the Baltic Sea was easiest precisely in their territory. This fact poses a serious threat to the independence of the Baltic peoples as long as the Russian empire exists and the non-Russian peoples that are under Russian influence (about one half of the general population) do not gain sovereignty. To the rear of the Baltic people – in the West – is the open sea. The Scandinavian peoples on the other side, remembering their sad experiences in the past, have always tried to stay away from the problems of the European continent and especially of the Baltics and to remain in relative isolation on the Scandinavian Peninsula. However, the Baltic and Finno-Ugrian people have been able to stay on the coasts of the Baltic Sea for more than 4,000 years although they have lost wide areas in Northern and Central Russia.³

The German Empire bordered the Baltic States in the Southwest. Just like in

the Middle Ages, it has been a serious threat to the independence of the Baltic States in modern times. But centuries-old experience has taught the Germans that the Baltic “horn” – situated far in the North-east and under German rule – has always been extremely difficult to defend and, thus, constantly endangered in military terms.⁴ Therefore, the opinion has developed that support for the bastion of the independent Baltic States and an encouragement of the right of self-determination of the Baltic people against the presumptions and the pressure of the non-Baltic people (especially those of the Russians), would be the best solution for the German interests.⁵ Unfortunately, this understanding came to late.

An extremely unfavourable factor is the small Baltic population. Only six million people live in the area, among them an unusually high number of descendants of late immigrants such as Russians, Poles, Germans, Jews, White Russians, Swedish and others. Estonia and Lithuania (except for the areas of Petseri, Vilnius, and Klaipeda) were nationally quite uniform,

whereas Latvia's situation in this respect was threatened. In recent years, as much as 25% of Latvia's population has been non-Latvian.⁶

Another negative factor was the centuries-old alienation between the Baltic people and lack of a sense of community. Even while the Baltic States were independent, little was done to remedy this situation. Only when the threatening clouds of World War II started gathering did, the Baltic peoples realize that they shared a common destiny. But then it was too late to combine their powers on a large scale.⁷

In international literature one can find the view that the independence of the Baltic States was just a short incident in world history and that the Baltic people did not play a part in political, economic and military terms in the past. This opinion is completely wrong. In the course of history, the fact went unnoticed that the Baltic and Finno-Ugrian people have been able to stay in their present areas of settlement for 4,000 to 5,000 years, that about 2,000 B.C. the Baltic peoples inhabited

an area that extended from the Urals to the Oder and from Estonia to Central Poland and that from the birth of Christ up to the sixth century the Baltic tribes, had reached a cultural peak that was quite remarkable compared to their neighbours.⁸ For several centuries, the Latvian and Estonian tribes not only resisted the simultaneous pressure of the Scandinavian and Slavic tribes, but also started counterattacks into the areas of the Swedes, Danes and Slavs.⁹ The Baltic peoples showed unusual persistence and bravery and were militarily successful against enemies that often were technically better equipped during the crusades. The Estonians' fight for freedom against the Swedes, Danes and Germans lasted from 1191 to 1227¹⁰ and the resistance of Latvia against the combined German powers lasted considerably longer – from 1186 to 1290. The Order of the Brothers of the Sword was destroyed and the Livonian Order was severely beaten.¹¹

The Lithuanians not only managed to hold their ground against intruders, but also enlarged the area under their con-

trol several times until it stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, becoming the largest state in medieval Europe.¹² The combined powers of the Poles and the Lithuanians stopped the advance of the Tartars and the Mongols towards Europe, saved several Russian areas from the Mongolian yoke, slowed down the Germans' drive towards the East by beating the German Order in 1410, and absorbed the Ottomans' advance towards the Holy Roman Empire.¹³ Unfortunately, the Lithuanians lost their political and even cultural independence to a considerable extent during the union with Poland, although kings from the Lithuanian Jagellons-Dynasty governed both states for several centuries.¹⁴ The Poles on their part made a historic mistake when they tried to subjugate not only the people of the states they had conquered – White Russians, Ukrainians and Latvians – but also the Lithuanians, who were their allies and much larger in number. The Poles were not interested in a confederation in which these peoples would have had equal rights.¹⁵ This

mistake cost the Poles, as well as the unfortunate peoples who were linked to them, dearly.

Although the German conquerors saved the Latvians and Estonians from becoming assimilated by the masses of the Slavs, connected them with Western culture and did not try to Germanise them, they committed a crucial mistake in exploiting these peoples in the interest of German squires and merchants ever more mercilessly. A deep rift opened up between the German immigrants and the native peoples, a rift that weakened the bastion of Livonia and was hard to overcome. Although Latvian and Estonian units fought bravely under their own commanders, together with German troops of the Livonian League against the Russian intruders in several battles, the Livonian League fell apart. The conflict between the leading groups was to blame for this. In the following centuries the leading German social classes mainly tried to defend their own interests and privileges and failed to unite the native peoples against the supremacy of foreign states.¹⁶

Although the local landowners subjected the majority of Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians to serfdom, these peoples did not lose their national and military spirit even under the most severe conditions. The great Estonian revolt of 1343 against Danish and German supremacy, which liberated the whole of Northern Estonia for a short period, proved this.¹⁷ In 1372, the Lithuanians conquered the Kremlin in Moscow.¹⁸ During the Livonian War Latvian and Estonian peasant armies operated.¹⁹ Units of Latvian soldiers were among the troops of Sweden and the Dukedom of Courland. Latvian soldiers fought not only in their native country, but also in Poland, Austria, and the Netherlands and some soldiers and seamen even showed up in the colonies of the Dukedom of Courland, in Africa and America.²⁰ In 1560, the Estonians even liberated a part of their country again for a short period of time.²¹ During the Great Nordic War, twelve Latvian infantry battalions and artillery units fought on the Swedish side.²² When Latvia and Estonia fell under Rus-

sian control, soldiers of these peoples were in Russia's army and fleet, where they held positions at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.²³ During Napoleon's invasion and during the Crimean War, there were purely Latvian navy and army units in the fight against the invaders.²⁴ When the Lithuanians came under Russian control, the opposite happened. Lithuanian units volunteered for the fight against the Russians in 1812.²⁵ In the part of Lithuania that had fallen to Prussia, the Prussian army had two Lithuanian cavalry regiments for many years.²⁶

The times of the Russian administration were nevertheless the hardest trial for the Baltic peoples. Several revolts, undertaken by Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians against the local authorities of the Russian, German-Baltic and Polish landowners and against the Russian administration, clearly show this. These uprisings reached their peak in the great Polish-Lithuanian revolutions of 1830-1831 and 1863-1865²⁷, the Estonian Mahtas War of 1858²⁸, and the bloody revolution of all three Baltic people, but especially of

the Latvians and Estonians, in 1905, when these countries were more or less under control by their own people.²⁹ Lithuanian and, in smaller numbers, also Latvian emigrants also took part in the American Civil War. The first victim of this war was the Latvian Martiðž Bucioðž.³⁰ During the Spanish-American War, Lithuanian emigrants even sent their own military units.³¹ All the above shows that the period of oppression that lasted for centuries could not suppress the national consciousness and the instinct for truth, justice and solidarity among the Baltic people. Latvians and Estonians not only had training opportunities in the Russian army and fleet, but were also able to gain experience in the highest commanding positions. The Catholic Lithuanians were not accepted as officers into the Russian armed forces.³² Instead the political leaders of Lithuania had – due to the long period of proud independence – the clearest and the farthest-reaching political goal: the restoration of Lithuania's independence. The part of the Lithuanian population that was under Russian control was

more strongly oppressed economically and culturally than the other Baltic people. Although the political goals of the Latvians and Estonians were not as far-reaching as those of the Lithuanians, these peoples were able to create a solid economic and cultural foundation for greater self-determination and, eventually, for independence.³³

The lessons of World War I and the fight for freedom

Since 1795, all the Baltic states, with the exception of a small area in Prussia inhabited by Lithuanians, were under Russian rule. Except for the short period of Napoleon's invasion, the Baltic peoples did not have the slightest hope of getting rid of the Russian control. A pact with Germany would only have meant strengthening of the local German oligarchy. Because of the Polish weakness and lack of understanding, the Lithuanians bitterly regretted their co-operation with them during the revolutions of 1830 and 1863. The Russian Revolution of 1905 gave rise

to greater hopes among the Baltic people; the majority of the local leaders, however, even then only hoped for an autonomy of their peoples. Only unusually big international changes could help the Baltic peoples to gain the longed-for independence. Extremely favourable conditions were created by World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the collapse of the German Empire, the right of self-determination of the people proclaimed by the Entente and the widespread economic and political preparedness of the Baltic peoples for an independent life.

The Baltic region – just like in earlier great wars – became a battleground right at the beginning of World War I, a fact that did harm especially to Lithuania and Latvia. The native soldiers that were mobilized in the Baltic area had to withstand first the advance of the German army, but later also had to undertake the first invasion into East Prussia. Tens of thousands of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian soldiers were put into Russian units, where they fought bravely under the command

of incompetent and corrupt Russian generals. Right from the beginning of the war, the soldiers showed excellent bravery, steadfastness, and contempt for death. Observers of the Battle of Augustova compared the 20 Russian Corps, which was almost completely comprised of the Baltic soldiers, to Napoleon's guards. The success of the Baltic soldiers was described as the Russians' success by the press. Roughly 20,000 Latvians, as many Lithuanians, and many Estonians fell in the name of Russia's glory, their people not gaining any advantages by that.³⁴ In the big rearguard actions, however, two Latvian garrison-battalions were able to draw attention; 70% of the men were wiped out.³⁵

Latvian politicians achieved the creation of national Latvian light-infantry units. From 1 August 1915 and onwards, they consisted of some battalions, later of eight combat regiments and one reserve regiment that were combined in two brigades, for a short period in one division.³⁶ These units, commanded by their own officers, broke through the German front lines several times by using new tac-

tics and rescued Russian units out of hopeless situations. Due to their bravery and successes they were so different from Russian units, that they drew the attention not only of Western military observers, but also of the international press.³⁷ Unfortunately, these excellent Latvian units were thirsty for glory and wanted to get attention and thus let themselves get manoeuvred into hopeless situations, paying a high toll of lives during the offensive of July 1916 and the heroic offensives of Christmas 1916 and New Year 1917. They all led to negative reactions among the soldiers. The complete national-Latvian units consisted of approximately 45,000 men. About 10,000 Latvian soldiers found their death in these units, e.g. during the defence of Riga in September 1917.³⁸ All together about 35,000 Latvian soldiers fell in Latvian and Russian units during World War I.³⁹ The Latvian soldiers found a way of drawing the attention of the Russians and their allies to their victims, but the Latvian people did not gain any advantages from these victims of World War I. Only after the Revolution of 1917 did

two Latvian regions – Vidzeme and Kurzeme – get autonomy; Latgale did not receive it, and the whole area of Latvia was not united into one national territory. After all, the Russian government had to take into account the morale among the Latvian units.⁴⁰

The Estonian political leaders were long in doubt whether it was worthwhile having the Russian government draw up Estonian national units. They were afraid that all Estonian units might be annihilated in one single battle, whereas with a distribution of the soldiers along the whole, long Russian front, there was hope that the basis of the Estonian people would survive.⁴¹ Yet in the end, the opinion prevailed that national units would be necessary for the achievements of their political goals. On 21 April, the first Estonian infantry regiment was formed.⁴² Due to the weakness and the retreat of neighbouring Russian units, this regiment suffered a great deal when defending its positions, just as the Latvian regiments did.⁴³ Only as late as 19 December, did the Estonians get permission to es-

tablish an Estonian division, something they had really done already. In contrast to the Latvian brigades, who were pure infantry units, the Estonian division was allowed to raise an artillery brigade, a cavalry regiment and a technical unit.⁴⁴ Maybe because the units were formed so late, the commanders of the Estonian division (in contrast to the Latvian commanders) managed to avoid militarily and politically unnecessary bloodshed and to prevent a distribution of the Estonian units across Russia after the breakdown of the front. Some Latvian units broke up; others were transferred to Russia, where, after the Bolshevik Revolution, they were forced to fight as a special division for the Bolsheviks, while their home was being occupied by German troops.⁴⁵ Later, an Estonian soviet-division was formed in Russia.⁴⁶

As the representatives of the Lithuanian people abroad had demanded full independence right at the beginning of the war, the commanders of the Russian armed forces tried to prevent the formation of national Lithuanian units. The

first four Lithuanian battalions and two squadrons were created as late as August and September 1917.⁴⁷ Many Latvian and Estonian officers were in the Russian army, even in the highest ranks, but there were only few Lithuanian officers. Towards the end of the war, Lithuanians were trained as officers in spite of their religious belief. Now there were some Lithuanian officers among the lower ranks, but there were virtually none in the higher ranks. Those soldiers who remained on the Bolshevik side after the revolution dispersed for the most part.⁴⁸

In February and March 1918, units of the Estonian division – in co-operation with the Germans – helped liberate the later proclaimed *Estonian Republic*, but in March the German military administration disarmed the Estonian units; only badly armed militias remaining.⁴⁹

The Lithuanians did not do any better. In January 1918, a Lithuanian battalion deserted to the Germans in the Rovno area in the Ukraine. Until August, the Germans used this battalion for garrison duties, but then sent it to Lithuania, where

it was immediately disbanded.⁵⁰ The German authorities did not approve of the formation of Lithuanian self-protection units. As the Latvians were considered to be the most radical, all men fit for service that had been in the Russian army were brought into prison camps.⁵¹

The Latvian light-infantry units that were distributed across all of Russia were of greatest importance on the front in the Russian Civil War. To a certain degree, this was also true of the Estonian Soviet-units. These units showed extraordinary bravery, discipline, and sense of responsibility in the fulfilment of military tasks under the command of their own officers. They also differed very much from the revolutionary Russian units, that – for the most part – were very undisciplined.⁵² Some Latvian and Estonian officers who were cast away in Russia were also appointed to highest position in the armed forces of Soviet Russia. They commanded brigades, divisions, armies and even army groups and fronts.⁵³ The Latvian Colonel Joachims Vacietis was even in command of the whole armed

forces during critical times.⁵⁴ Latvian units held the front and won the battles of Kasan’j, Orla, Perekop and others, that decided the outcome of the Civil War.⁵⁵ Military observers of the Entente and Germany acknowledged the importance of the Latvian units and tried to win them over. All of them, however, made a crucial mistake because they regarded the Latvians as mercenaries that would fight in the name of anything for money, but they did not promise independence and social justice.⁵⁶ Two Latvian regiments and a Lithuanian battalion nonetheless fought for the allies in the Far East, where they sustained heavy losses, while the Estonian legion played a role in Northern Russia.

When the German Empire collapsed, the national governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had the chance to start their work. Although Soviet Russia had given up the Baltics in the Treaties of Berlin and Brest-Litovsk, its government nonetheless tried to re-conquer them after Germany’s breakdown.

World War I was over. The right of self-determination for the people had been

declared, and the League of Nations had been founded. But several small states, among them the Baltic States, still had to fight hard to protect their independence. The Baltic States were dragged into the conflict between the communist and anti-communist powers, into the imperialistic contest of several states and into the attempts by the communist and anti-communist Russian governments to get the Baltic States under their control again.⁵⁷

The proclamation of independence by the Baltic States was not sufficient. The Baltic States had to use their own armed forces in order to defend their national interests. The leaders of the Baltic States had to recognize that the Western powers ignored the right of self-determination that they themselves had declared⁵⁸ and that they only took advantage of the Baltic States in their own national interest and in order to get support for the anti-communist forces in Russia. Moreover, these leaders did not get any promise of a future independence for the Baltic people.⁵⁹ The democratic government of Germany, which approved of Baltic independ-

ence in principle, was too weak to influence the huge administrative and military machinery, which for the most part was led or influenced by people who were in favour of imperialism. Some of the German revolutionary forces on their part sympathized with or were against any continuation of the war against Soviet Russia in the interest of the Entente. The latter did not promise any support for Germany's victims nor consider any compensation in the peace treaty.⁶⁰ The eighth and tenth German armies were supposed to defend the Baltic region until the Baltic States were able to defend themselves. But war-weary and influenced by Bolshevik propaganda, they retreated to the German borders and dispersed.⁶¹ The voluntary units that took their place came under the influence of politically short-sighted and reactionary people. After some successful battles against the Bolshevik forces that threatened not only the Baltic States but also Germany, these people manoeuvred the voluntary units into the fight against the anti-communist forces in the Baltic States. The best example was the

Battle of Cesis (Wenden) in June 1919 against the Estonian and Latvian troops. The German armies could have gained the status of liberators of the Baltic States, as had happened in Finland. But instead they earned the eternal hatred and suspicion of Estonia and Latvia. If the Battle of Cesis had ended with victory for the German troops, this would have been reason enough for an occupation of Germany by the armies of the Entente. We have to emphasize that the attack on the Estonian and Latvian troops was made although the German command had given contrary orders. A disadvantageous outcome of the Battle at Cesis would have exposed the Baltic States to a complete pincer movement by the Bolsheviks. But the national forces won, and the German reputation was severely damaged.⁶²

All of the above shows that the Baltic States could not rely on any declarations. They really needed their own armed forces. Similarly, strong co-operation was essential.

When World War I was coming to an end, only Estonia was practically able to

form a small army in a short period of time. The largest part of the forces, including the commanding ranks, had survived, but they were lacking arms and money. German help was very reluctant and small. Support by the British fleet and the Finns was most important, but nevertheless the Estonians had to rely mainly on their own abilities, their resourcefulness and their toughness.⁶³

The majority of the Latvian soldiers were in Russia or in German Prisoner of War camps. The Latvian troops that were in Russia were used by the Russian Soviet government to oppose in the name of a Soviet Latvia the Latvian national government. At that time, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Soviet Russia was the Latvian Colonel Joachims Vacietis, who was a Latvian patriot, but still was loyal to Russia's Soviet government, hoping to find support for Latvia's independence there.⁶⁴ At first, there were no soldiers, no weapons, and no money in Latvia. There was a very radical atmosphere among the population, who had suffered tremendously during the war.

This situation was aggravated by the negative attitude of the leaders of the German civilian government and of the majority of the military commanders towards Latvian independence and the creation of the national Latvian forces. These people were still influenced by imperialistic and colonialistic ideas.⁶⁵

In Lithuania, the military units were better preserved, but they did not have any qualified officers, weapons, or money. As Lithuania was right on the Russian-German border and as Germany as well as Lithuania was in conflict with Poland, the German government agreed upon partial support for the state of Lithuania. This support dropped when Lithuania made official claims for the Klaipeda (Memel) region.⁶⁶

All the Baltic States were economically extremely weakened. Furthermore, Latvia and, to a large extent, Lithuania were very much destroyed. Financial and economic support by the Western powers was very small and came under very unfavourable conditions. Weapons and other material delivered was mostly worn out and damaged.⁶⁷

The Baltic States, that were virtually foreign to one another, started some kind of diplomatic co-operation, especially Latvia, Estonia and Finland, whereas Lithuania was only partially involved. But the newly formed military forces operated independently from one another.⁶⁸

Yet, some remarkable examples of co-operation should be mentioned as they always ended with important military or political victories that gave the states involved the same advantages and sense of security. The co-operation between the Estonian and the Latvian Northern Army in the battles at Cesis and Jugla (Jegel) in June and July 1919 should be especially mentioned, although the neutrality of the Latvian Southern Group, which was under German control, was a negative factor.⁶⁹ The Estonian army also covered and protected a part of the Latvian border in the East until December 1919. In the summer of 1919, it actively took part in the fights against the Bolshevik forces that were threatening Latvia.⁷⁰ The Lithuanian army on its part held its ground against the Bermondts Army without any Estonian or

Latvian support for a long time and finally defeated it. This was in the interest of all the Baltic States.⁷¹ Unfortunately, one has to point out the belated co-operation between the Latvian and Lithuanian armies in November 1919 in this connection. The Lithuanians are not really to blame for their late involvement because they had to fear possible aggression by the Polish troops.⁷² Despite the fact that Poland did not recognize an independent Lithuania, but was aiming at a Polish-Lithuanian Union, Poland promised not to take advantage of Lithuania's situation during the threat by Bermondts. Its army even protected the Eastern border of Lithuania, while the largest part of Lithuania's troops was involved in fights with Bermondts.⁷³ Co-operation between the Latvian and Polish armies during the offensive in January 1920 against the Soviet forces was very successful. We have to stress that Poland was the only big state that did not demand any payment for its help.⁷⁴

To be historically true, we must also emphasize that Germany, whose voluntary

units liberated Western Latvia, helped with the formation of new Latvian troops from January until May 1919⁷⁵ and supported the Lithuanian army just as long, did not receive any compensation.⁷⁶

The considerable help to Estonia by the Royal Navy from December 1918 until January 1920 has to be mentioned as well as the support by British and French naval units during the fights of the Latvian army against the Bermondts Army in October and November 1919. The presence of the British fleet itself was some kind of guarantee and moral support for the independence fighters in the Baltic States.⁷⁷

The Russian Soviet government, who - at the beginning of the invasion - had tolerated the formation of military forces by the Soviet governments in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia for political reasons, later tolerated their disintegration because of new political considerations and made peace with the national governments of the Baltic States. The real reason for this disintegration of the Baltic

Soviet troops was the violent and short sighted politics of the Soviet government and the aversion of the troops themselves to fighting against national forces. Most of the Baltic soldiers mobilized by the Soviets found ways of going over to the national forces in order to continue their fight together with them.⁷⁸

Viewed in its entirety, another negative factor was the insignificant mutual demands by the Baltic States to correct the borderlines that were a disadvantage to the common military and political outline.⁷⁹ However, the Baltic States were able to solve their problems rather early, in 1920 and 1921.

During the wars of liberation of the Baltic States, only two attempts were made to consolidate the action of the armed forces. The British General Frank. G. March initiated the first one on 26 August 1919. The anti-Bolshevik troops of General Yudenich, Estonian and Latvian troops, the anti-Bolshevik Russian-German troops of Bermondts as well as the Polish and the Lithuanian armies

were supposed to start a common offensive against the Bolshevik troops.⁸⁰ The second attempt, initiated by the British General Arthur J. Turner, was made on 6 January 1920 and was supposed to create a military alliance among the Baltic States. Representatives of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian armies agreed in Valga/Valka (Walk) upon regular meetings and the standardization of war material, but a political agreement or a defensive alliance did not follow this meeting. The political leaders of the Baltic States missed a unique chance to gain greater security and international prestige for their states.⁸¹

After initial misjudgement of what was happening and apathy in the history of the wars of liberation, one could witness a spontaneous growth and more strength among the national forces. A clear example is the formation of a national army in Latvia.⁸² Estonia showed the greatest stability. Latvia showed the same level of stability after it had overcome difficulties that originated from external and internal negative forces. There was less sta-

bility in Lithuania. The interference in politics by the army often created dangerous situations that could have ended with a catastrophe.⁸³ Latvia and partly Estonia, too, were negatively influenced by the service of some of their troops in the Latvian and Estonian Soviet divisions. However, these divisions, which fought at the heart of the Red Army and won crucial victories over anti-Soviet Russian forces that were averse to independence of the Baltic States, indirectly helped to secure the independence of the Baltic States.⁸⁴ Yet, one has to keep in mind that the Baltic States had to fear an attack by Soviet Russia through the period of their independence. The Soviet government was only waiting for the right moment to consolidate its power in the Baltic States. Such favourable conditions developed in 1939/1940 and then again in 1944/1945.

Though poorly armed and their actions often impeded by foreign politicians, the armies of all three Baltic States were enormously successful on the battlefield.

At the end of the war, the Estonian national army consisted of 74,500 men and had 39 artillery batteries, 10 armoured trains, 8 armoured cars, 28 aircraft and 10 warships. During the war of liberation, the Estonian army lost 3,588 soldiers (2,236 of them fell at the front) and had 13,775 injured.⁸⁵ The Latvian army had – at the end of the war – 76,394 men, 91 pieces of artillery, 707 light and heavy machineguns, 5 armoured trains, 8 armoured cars, 5 tanks and 19 aircraft. It lost 3,046 men and had 4,085 injured.⁸⁶ At the time, the Lithuanian army had 60,000 men in four divisions and 3 cavalry regiments, 48 pieces of artillery, 450 heavy machineguns, 4 armoured cars, 1 armoured train, and 18 aircraft. During the war, Lithuania lost 614 men and another 822 died of their injuries. There were 1,175 injured and 154 invalids.⁸⁷ In World War I, the Latvians had lost about 35,000 men, the Lithuanians approximately 15,000. The exact number for Estonia is not known. During the Russian civil war, the Latvians lost at least 20,000 men. The Estonian casualties were high

in number, as well. Lithuanians also fought in the British and American units that fought for the Entente in Siberia.

This overview shows the military spirit and the absent fear of death among the Baltic peoples. It also shows that, because of the unfavourable geographic situation and the historical conditions, the Baltics lost a great part of their “national strength” in the battle for the interests of foreign powers, without gaining a real advantage for their own states. Considering the overall political and military situation as well as the conditions that were unfavourable for the independence of the Baltic States, one has to say that the Baltic politicians and their military leaders were very successful and showed extraordinary competence in securing the independence of the Baltic States. Their co-operation could have been more extensive, but we have to admit that the Baltic States were not really able to help one another as they all had to suffer from the collapse of the economy that the World War I and the exploitation by the occupying powers had brought about.

***The Situation of the Baltic States
after the War of Liberation***

In the first decade of independence, the leaders of the Baltic States were somewhat optimistic about their military situation. They had full confidence in the League of Nations and believed that the people of the world seriously wanted peace after the extraordinarily destructive and bloody World War I. They were fully confident also not only about the treaties made, but also about the self-interest of the great powers, which would not allow one state or a bloc of states to gain control over the Baltic States.⁸⁸

The leaders of the Baltic States did everything imaginable to foster peace, overall co-operation and disarmament. They not only signed, but also ratified all international treaties that had these goals.⁸⁹ It was not the fault of the Baltic States, but because of the egoistic interests of the great powers that all these treaties remained no more than paper and were not brought fully to life.

In their resistance to the Soviet Union and, later, to Nazi Germany, the Baltic States defended the goals of the League of Nations and remained members up to the last day of their independence.⁹⁰

The political leaders of the Baltic States tried to forget that they had not been accepted into the League of Nations in 1920 only because the other states feared that due to their prominent geographical situation, they might have to help defend the independence of these states.⁹¹ In 1921, at last, the majority of the members of the League of Nations had the courage to accept the Baltic States into their number.⁹² The lack of a common spirit and courage was typical of the actions of the League of Nations during its entire existence. It was paralyzed by the exaggerated egoism of its member states and by the lack of intention to seriously co-operate and support peace. The members soon realized that they had to rely on their own moral, economic and military power. Thus, the smaller states always emphasized their complete neutrality in cases of conflicts.

Hopes that the League of Nations would guarantee the Baltic States' independence grew weaker. Yet, the leaders of these states believed the victorious powers of World War I would be able to maintain their leadership position for a long time and that it was in their interest to support the independence of the Baltic States, directly or indirectly.⁹³

But the Baltic States were mistaken in this respect, as well. They viewed with concern the disagreement between the UK, France, the USA, Japan and Italy as well as their economic and even military competition and their lack of co-operation. However, the two biggest potential threats to Baltic independence, Germany and the Soviet Union, were weak due to war and revolution, a fact that somewhat lessened these worries. Until 1933, the Baltic States even saw a democratic Germany as a guarantor of independence.⁹⁴

The gigantic neighbour in the East, the Soviet Union, caused the greatest concern. Although the Baltic States did everything to give the Soviet Union convenient access to their ports in order to build eco-

nomical ties with them, it was clear that the loss of the Baltic coast was very painful, not only because of political prestige, but also for practical reasons. The Gulf of Finland, which also meant the Russian part of the Baltic Sea, was covered with ice for six to seven months of the year. During these months, the navy as well as the merchant fleet of Russia were captives of the ice and they could not be stationed in the ports of the Baltic States. It was very inconvenient for a great power to be dependent upon the small Baltic States for the transport of goods, especially as it really had to fear that these states might soon be under the influence of hostile great powers or power blocs.⁹⁵

Another concern was the aim of world revolution declared by the Soviet Union. A seventh of the Latvian population as well as a large number of Estonians and Lithuanians had remained in the Soviet Union. Among these Balts, the flames of hate against the democratic governments of the Baltic States were fanned and the Communist Information Bureau (KOMINFOM) supported by the Soviet Union as well as

Baltic organizations in Russia repeatedly promised the re-introduction of the soviet system in the Baltic States by revolutionary means.⁹⁶

Spies, saboteurs and political agitators were continuously pouring across the borders of the Soviet Union into the Baltic States. This could not lead to good relationships between the Baltic States and the Soviet Union, although the latter had been the first one to recognize the independence of the Baltic States and had waived all claims to their territory.⁹⁷

The Baltic States' fear of the Soviet Union was later somewhat calmed by the fact that the most extreme groups were removed and those in power wanted to avoid wars as long as the social system was not consolidated and the armed forces were not ready for an offensive.⁹⁸

The growing military power of Nazi Germany was a real concern as well as its aggressive ideology and its open efforts to expand which were also aimed at the Baltic States and Eastern Europe in general. From 1933 and onwards, military planners in the Baltic States had to reckon

with an invasion from the West as well as from the East.

At least there was some hope that the neighbouring quarrelling powers would not allow each other to take up position in the Baltic region, but would rather keep it as a kind of a buffer zone between each other, at least as long as they did not intend any open conflict.⁹⁹

The self-destructive policy of the Western powers and the real, ideological, demographical, and military weakness of Poland, the “fifth European great power”, created real concern among the leaders of the Baltic States during the last years before World War II. In Latvia and Estonia, they did not fear any military conflict between Lithuania and Poland because of the Vilnius area conflict. Still, the latter was a senseless hindrance to political and military co-operation between all the small states situated between Germany and the Soviet Union and to a concept of some kind of defence system in an obviously hopeless situation.¹⁰⁰

During the first post-war years, Latvia and Estonia regarded the UK as its strong-

est ally, whereas Lithuania saw the same in Germany and Poland in France. Towards the end of World War I, the British were without doubt interested to support the efforts undertaken by the Baltic States to reach independence in order to weaken their enemy, Germany. Moreover, they wanted to create possibly long-lasting chaos for their potential competitor Russia, no matter whether it was Bolshevik or anti-Bolshevik.¹⁰¹ Later, the UK supported the Baltic States only to prevent the Soviet Union from invading Europe through their territory and in order to tie them to itself economically.

From the point of view of the UK, the Baltic States were too far away, geopolitically too endangered and economically too unimportant. British military bases in the Baltic region would have been in constant danger. They would have been right on the border zone of Russia and Germany, far away from the British Isles, and their access would have been very complicated because of the “closed” character of the Baltic Sea. The missing agreement between the Baltic States also pre-

vented the possibility of far-reaching co-operation.¹⁰²

Representatives of the UK admonished the Baltic as well as the Scandinavian States repeatedly during the first post-war years to build closer political and military connections, but all in vain. It did not only seem to be unwise, but also dangerous to make treaties of military support with several small states that did not get along with one another.¹⁰³ The British did not want to get involved in the meaningless quarrels among the Baltic States, but they used them, especially Estonia, as a base for spying against the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁴

After the emergence of the Third Reich of the Nazis, the British were aiming at a confrontation between the latter and the Soviet Union, hoping both totalitarian powers would destroy each other without the UK getting involved.¹⁰⁵ When it became fully clear that German policy was more dangerous for the Western powers than the Soviet Union, the UK reluctantly approached the Soviet Union shortly before the war to induce Germany to come to an agreement with the Western pow-

ers. In this connection, the idea of a guarantee for the Baltic States was initiated by the Soviet Union. This suggestion was dangerous for the Baltic States due to several suspicious conditions. The UK and France were in reality unable to give effective guarantees to the Baltic States as Germany lay between them.¹⁰⁶

The interest of France in the Baltic States was different from that of the UK. Both powers were political and economic competitors. As long as Germany did not go directly against the UK economically, the latter was interested in a relatively strong Germany as a useful business partner. However, it was France's interest to keep the weakened Germany down as long as possible and to build up a group of new allies under the leadership of an enlarged and strengthened Poland east of Germany replacing Russia, which had been lost as an ally. Moreover, France tried to get back the enormous amounts of money invested in Russia by putting pressure on the state.¹⁰⁷ Should it have been possible to come to a direct agreement with Germany or the Soviet Union,

France was prepared to leave Poland and the other East European states to their fate.¹⁰⁸

Nevertheless, there was some exchange of information between the general staffs of France and the Baltic States. Several Latvian officers were trained at French military academies, and most of the Latvian war ships were built in France.¹⁰⁹ But that was all.

In the first post-war years, Latvia and Estonia refused to enter a military alliance with Poland as long as the latter did not settle the conflict with Lithuania in a way that satisfied both states. Because of that, Latvia and Estonia were not even indirectly integrated into the French system of military alliances.¹¹⁰

Latvia and Estonia did not directly cooperate with Germany militarily, but German military literature and German military know-how were used to a large extent.

Lithuania had close connections with Germany for some time concerning military supply and the qualification of high-ranking officers.¹¹¹ For a long time, Germany and the Soviet Union played Lithua-

nia off politically against Poland. Although Lithuania felt safe from further aggression by Poland because of its co-operation with them, Germany and the Soviet Union did not help Lithuania re-gain the Vilnius region nor did they plan to protect Lithuania from potential further aggression by Poland. Germany's only intention in case of a Polish attack was to take back the Klaipeda (Memel) region that it had lost to Lithuania in the Treaty of Versailles.¹¹² The aggressiveness of Nazi Germany in the question of re-gaining the Klaipeda (Memel) region put an end to the close military co-operation between Germany and Lithuania.¹¹³ With the Soviet Union, Lithuania did not maintain any military co-operation at all. It only bought a limited number of expensive field guns.¹¹⁴ As the Western powers were not interested in an obligation to defend the East European states and the League of Nations was not a safeguard for safety and peace, the only option was a regional military bloc. There were two realistic possibilities: a neutral Nordic bloc of the Scandinavian and Baltic States, or a defensive alliance of

all states from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea that had a common border with the Soviet Union.¹¹⁵

To the Baltic States, a Scandinavian-Baltic bloc seemed to be the best solution. This bloc would have been situated wholly to the north of the Central European area of conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, and the problems concerning territory between Poland and Rumania on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other would not have affected it directly either. But the politicians of the Scandinavian states were of the opinion that the Soviet Union would soon try to take up its position on the Baltic coast again and thus absolutely refused to enter into any kind of connections with the Baltic States. The Scandinavian states felt quite safe in their isolation as a peninsula and in their long-lasting tradition of neutrality.¹¹⁶ Therefore, Finland and the Baltic States had only one option, to come to an agreement among each other and to find a better solution. Until 1922, the orientation towards the Baltic States was predomi-

nant in Finland; then its orientation shifted towards Scandinavia. Finland's politicians regarded the Baltic States as more endangered than their own state. Finland is so far up north that it cannot have the linking function that is so characteristic of the Baltic States. Historically and politically, Russia had already previously considered Finland to be an autonomous entity. Moreover, it would not see the crucial necessity of having bases in Finland if it could have them in the Baltics. In case of a war, the Gulf of Finland, which separates these states from Finland, would have made an alliance with the Baltic States difficult. The united navies of Finland and the Baltic States were also too weak to keep the strong Soviet navy in the Eastern part of the Gulf. But especially, the Finns feared a co-operation with Poland, which they regarded as a danger to their security. That is why Finland wanted to get as close as possible to the neutral Scandinavian bloc and refused to co-operate militarily with the Baltic States.¹¹⁷ The only element of co-operation was that Finnish military observers took part in general staff meetings

of the Baltic States and Poland in the 1920s and the beginning 1930s. The most senior officers of Finland, Estonia and Latvia visited each other several times and observed military manoeuvres. In individual cases, Estonia and Latvia took advantage of the recently created Finnish armaments industry.¹¹⁸ Except for Lithuania, the Baltic States did not make use of the highly developed Swedish armaments industry. Economic considerations were the reason. Sweden did not need the products of the Baltics; thus, the expensive weapons and ammunition would have had to be paid with cash, which the Baltic States could not afford because of their financial difficulties. The British as well as the French demanded that the Baltic States should buy weapons and ammunition primarily from their states if they wanted to sell their goods in the UK and France. However, it was mainly used and very old weapons that were sold to the Baltic States. In case of a war, there would have been no hope of securing a continuous supply with spare parts and ammunition from these countries. The traffic with Sweden was much less disturbed and safer.¹¹⁹

For military protection, the Baltic States either had to join together or they had to seek co-operation with the strongest neighbour of the Soviet Union: Poland, and its ally, Romania. Such co-operation would automatically have dragged the Baltic States into the Polish border disputes with Germany and the Soviet Union, and further into the conflicts in the Balkans and the border disputes of Romania and the Soviet Union. Seen from the outside, Poland was a big and powerful state, but in reality, it was unstable and weak. A large part of the Polish territory was not ethnically Polish, especially along the border with the Soviet Union. Only two thirds of Poland's population were Polish, the rest was composed of Ukrainians, WhiteRussians, Germans, Lithuanians and Jews. Only five percent of Poland's border was common with friendly Romania. With the latter, Poland did not maintain close relations although a military convention had been concluded. Everywhere else Poland bordered hostile states: Germany, the Soviet Union, and Lithuania, with all of which it had border disputes.

The border with neutral Latvia was only 106 km long. The latter had been Poland's ally during the wars of liberation. But Poland's action against Lithuania, whose historical capital and wide border areas it had occupied in 1920, as well as the threat posed to Lithuanian independence in general and territorial claims also against Latvia forced it to avoid closer relations with this state.¹²⁰

Theoretically, Lithuania and Poland were even at war, and in 1926 Lithuania was the only one of the Western neighbours of Russia to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the USSR.¹²¹ Poland protected Lithuania against a possible attack by the Soviets with its territory which stretched northwards to the east of Lithuania. But the military leaders of the Baltic States did not have a high opinion of the big Polish army because of its old-fashioned organization. From a strictly practical point of view, Estonia would have been willing to approach Poland, but Latvia as Lithuania's neighbour refused to do so. Because of Latvia's opposition, the project of a military alliance between Estonia, Latvia and Poland failed.¹²²

There were only two alternatives left: a military union of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and the union Estonia-Latvia. For many years, Lithuania demanded that a military union of the Baltic States be armed mainly against Poland. But Latvia and Estonia rejected this demand. Poland might have been the only source of fairly reliable support against an attack by Germany or the Soviet Union. Until 1933, Lithuania was also little interested in a closer union of the Baltic States as it regarded Germany and the Soviet Union as natural allies against Poland, which Lithuania considered to be its main enemy.¹²³

A military union of Estonia and Latvia was the only option left. So it was; but this union was not a very important fact, as we will see later.¹²⁴ In the long line of neighbours of the USSR, each state considered itself to be less endangered than the others for some reasons. For each state its own, often egoistic, interests were more important than the common ones. The feeling of a common destiny and a common region was still poorly developed.

Latvia's Military Situation

After the overview of the unfriendly general situation, we have to take a closer look at the military conditions in each of the Baltic States. Latvia (65,791.4 km²) was the largest of the Baltic States and was situated in the middle of this group of states. With regard to population (1939: 2,001,900), it was in second place. The common border (1939) with friendly Estonia was 374.6 km long (19.94%), the one with the hostile Soviet Union 351,3 km (18.66%). The common border with Poland was 105,9 km long (5.64%), and the one with friendly Lithuania 570.4 km (30.3%). The coast was 479 km long (25.46%), one fourth of the overall length.¹²⁵ No natural obstacles, disregarding small rivers, lakes, marshland, and small woodlands, protected this state boundary. In case of an invasion by the Soviets, the defence was planned to really start in the middle of the state, along the line Pededze, Lake Lubans and Aiviekste (Ewst), an area with broad marshlands and large wooded

areas and further along the Daugava (Düna), which would also have been an important natural hindrance in case of a German invasion.¹²⁶

Concerning food and clothing, Latvia was self-sufficient. But it was completely dependent on foreign states for fuel and heating, disregarding the large supply of wood and the power generation started in the last years of Latvia's independence. Latvia's industry was the most developed of all the Baltic States. The metallurgical industry, the car-parts industry, precision engineering, the manufacture of appliances and instruments (e.g. the world's smallest camera "Minox"), aircraft and ship construction in Riga and Liepaja and the arsenal in Riga have to be mentioned. The latter built guns and machine guns as well as infantry- and artillery-ammunition. Latvia also produced mines and anti-submarine weapons.¹²⁷

75% of Latvia's population were Latvians, the rest was made up of several nationalities who were represented only in small percentages (1938): 10.6% Russians, 4.8% Jews, 3.2% Germans, 2.5%

Polish, 1.4% White Russians, further Lithuanians, Estonians and others. The minorities had complete cultural autonomy and in the Latvian army their sense of Latvian citizenship was strengthened.¹²⁸ The Latvian army was comprised of 2,200 officers and 23,000 sergeants and other ranks in 1938. The annual draft was about 13,500 men, but it decreased during the last years of independence. The police had only about 3,100 men, the border guard had about 100 officers and 1,100 men. The Voluntary Home Guard reached 35,000 men. According to American information, the trained reserves were about 170,000 men, whereas the untrained reserves were 20,000. In theory, Latvia could deploy an army of 200,000 men, but in reality only 130,000 to 180,000 could be armed. In times of peace, 10 out of 1,000 inhabitants of Latvia were members of the armed forces, the ratio for the Home Guard was 28 out of 1,000 citizens. These figures changed from year to year, of course. Latvia was divided into 15 defence regions. During the last years of independ-

ence, the troops were supposed to be mobilised within three days (i.e. 72 hours).

In times of peace, the armed forces had four infantry divisions, with a total of 12 infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment. Each infantry division had one field artillery regiment. The First, Second and Third Infantry Regiments and the Kurzeme Artillery Regiment belonged to the First Division, whose headquarters was in Liepāja (Liebau). The Second Division consisted of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Infantry Regiments as well as the Vidzeme Artillery Regiment. This division's headquarters was in Riga. The Third Division consisted of the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Infantry Regiments and the Zemgale Artillery Regiment. The Fourth Division had the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Infantry Regiments the Cavalry Regiment and the Latgal Artillery Regiment. Its headquarters was in Daugavpils (Dünaburg). The Technical Division consisted of the Engineer Regiment, the Tank Regiment (later the motorized brigade), the Air Force Regiment, the Intelligence Unit, the Armoured Train Regiment and the Coastal Artillery Regi-

ment. The four field artillery regiments mentioned above, the heavy artillery regiment, the anti-aircraft regiment, the special artillery section, the tank regiment and the coastal artillery regiment were under the control of the Chief of Staff of the Artillery concerning training, weapons and organisation. The Staff Battalion, which corresponded to an elite guard unit in other armies, was independent. All naval forces were united in a squadron under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

In times of peace, an infantry regiment had two battalions – 50 officers, 700 sergeants and men, the reinforced regiments had three battalions – 80 officers, 1,220 sergeants and other ranks. In case of a war, each regiment would have been enlarged up to three battalions. The weapons consisted of English Ross-Enfield M-14 rifles, Lewis-light-machine-guns and Vickers-Bertier heavy machineguns, all with calibre 7.7 mm. The production of light machineguns of the type “Bren” had been started in the state. They were more useful in combat. During the last years, the

regiments also received 47 mm Böhler anti-tank guns and 7 cm Skoda infantry guns. Further, they were equipped with 81 mm Stoks mortars. Each regiment had reconnaissance companies; some also had bicycle and ski companies. The cavalry regiment had five squadrons and one heavy machinegun squadron, the remount squadron, two bicycles squadrons and one battery, all together 1,200 horses and 1,200 men, four cannons, English Lee-Enfield 7.7 carbines, Madsen light machineguns and Vickers heavy machineguns. At an experimental stage, there were also bicycle battalions and motorcycle companies that were planned to join the army.

Each artillery regiment had two units with two gun batteries and one howitzer battery; thus the whole regiment had six batteries with 24 guns and six howitzers. All regiments had English 18 Pounder (8.38 cm) guns and 4.5" (11.43 cm) howitzers. English 13 Pounder (7.62 cm) and Russian 75 mm (M-02) guns were in reserves. For war times, three units (36 guns) and one to two anti-aircraft batteries (four to eight guns), which was 40 to 44 guns

altogether, was intended for each field artillery regiment.

The heavy artillery regiment consisted of three units, including the anti-aircraft batteries that were organized into an independent anti-aircraft battalion. In the heavy artillery regiment, there were at least 30 heavy guns or howitzers of different type and production country. Except for some German howitzers, all these were out-of-date. Out of the four trains of the Armoured Train Regiment, three were in Daugavpils (Dünaburg) and one in Riga. With regards to material, six armoured trains and 6" Canet ship guns were intended for two batteries of railway artillery.

The overall firepower comprised: six 10.5 cm, one 152 mm (6"), 10 77 mm, three 12 pounder howitzers and five 6" Canet Guns, two 38 mm anti-aircraft guns and 36 heavy machineguns. In times of peace, the regiment had 40 officers and 245 sergeants and other ranks.

In the sea coastal fortress Daugavgriva (Dünamünde), the Coastal Artillery Regiment had five batteries (20 guns), one

search light battery and one auxiliary ship. As weapons, they had Russian 3", 6" Vickers and 6" Canet Guns and one anti-aircraft battery. In times of peace, the regiment had 500 men. Mobile railroad coastal batteries were in preparation. The anti-aircraft regiment had 15 batteries - Russian 3" (76-mm) and 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns. It had about 1,000 men. Anti-aircraft batteries were also formed for all divisions, except the Third.

The Autotank-Regiment had six armoured cars, two heavy, one medium and six light tanks as well as 18 tankettes (a small tracked reconnaissance vehicle). Altogether six armoured cars and 27 tanks. Moreover, it had 40 trucks and 15 motorcycles. For times of war, each division was supposed to have three tankettes (21 altogether). In 1938, the regiment was restructured into a motorized brigade with five battalions in three motorized groups. Furthermore, motorized anti-tank units were planned.

The engineer regiment consisted of two battalions and 500 men, including the bridge and the pontoon company. The

intelligence battalion had four companies.

The air force regiment had three units, 100 to 150 aircraft in three fighter squadrons in Riga, one reconnaissance squadron in Gulbene, one long distance reconnaissance squadron in Krustpils and one naval aviation wing in Liepaja.

The Latvian navy had one minelayer gunboat, two minesweeper-minelayer boats, two submarines, one auxiliary submarine and some motorboats. A minelayer (3,000 tons), four submarines and twelve hydroplanes were planned. There was also a coastal observation service.

The border guard brigade had five battalions and one fast patrol boat. The self-defence organisation was divided into 19 Home Guard regiments and consisted of cavalry and motorcycle-units with a tankette, one railroad Home Guard regiment, one aircraft Home Guard regiment as well as several Home Guard Battalions. It also included 12,000 women. The Air Home Guard had 24 aircraft. In contrast to the other Baltic States, the Home Guard organization in Latvia was not subordinate to the Ministry of War, but to

the Ministry of Social Affairs. Nevertheless, 150 active officers and 100 sergeants provided military training in the organization.¹²⁹

Of all the Baltic States, Latvia had the best traffic network. In 1940, there were 1.880 km of highways, 9.621 km of first-class roads, 7.625 cars, 4.321 motorcycles, 3,466 km of railway tracks, 294 locomotives, 11 motor wagons and 6.684 wagons. Further, there were three large seaports and several small ones. In 1940, the Latvian merchant fleet had 89 steamers, seven motor ships and seven sailing ships, altogether 103 ships with 120.676 register tons. The civilian aviation system had a large number of training and sport planes as well as two middle-sized passenger aircraft.¹³⁰

In times of war, Latvia planned to operate with 130.000 men in seven divisions, two regiments of special cavalry squadron with a strength of two regiments, three motorized brigades, three to four bicycle battalions, three to four special artillery units, and one fleet. A Supply Division and garrison unit would be kept in reserve.

Should the Soviet Union attack the covering force would consist of one battalion and one company of the Seventh Regiment in Vilaka and Liepna, one battalion and two companies of the Ninth Regiment in Ludza, Zilupe and Karsava, one battalion and one company of the Tenth Regiment in Daugavpils, later in Kārsava and Dagda. Together with three to four battalions of the border guard and a mounted battery these forces would have had to defend a front line of 200 to 260 km from the Estonian border to Piedruja and Sengallen respectively. Thus, real defence was not planned for the first days, just a delaying action.

The Fourth and Third Division with the First Cavalry Regiments, but without the Eight and Twelfth Infantry Regiment were supposed to cover the mobilization of the forces and the occupation of the defence line Malupe – Pededze – Litene – Lubana – Varaklani – Livani – Daugavpils and to withdraw to the line Pededze – Lake Lubana – Krustpils. They were supposed to accomplish that by following the Estonian troops with their left wing and

– in their centre – by using the natural defence line in the marshland around the Lake Lubans and the widespread forests in the north. Should the Fourth Division still be able to move east if necessary, the command of the Third Division could easily lose connection to the Seventh and Eight Regiments that were further north. To subordinate these regiments to the Third Division after the arrival of the First and Second Division at the front would have been very problematic. A retreat of the Fourth Division along the left bank of the Daugava into the area of the Aiviekste would have been very difficult, too. The Second Division was supposed to deploy east of Rezekne. The fourth mobilization plan had three prepared alternatives: A, D, and K. Alternative A intended a deployment of armed forces for a defence against an attack by the Soviet Union, whereas option D planned the same if Germany attacked. Alternative K consisted of simultaneous defence against the Soviet Union and Germany.

Option A had been worked out in all details; option D had been prepared rela-

tively thoroughly. Option K was only outlined in rudiments as a co-operation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union appeared to be hardly imaginable.

According to option A, the main forces should be deployed on the line Skrudaliena-Lielborna-Izvalta-Andrupene-Kaunata-Stocerova-Berzgale-Nautreni-(Rogovka)-Tilza-marshes north of Tilza-Kuprova-Liepna-Pededze River, with other troops covering them. After this deployment, the following was planned: either a defence on this line, an offensive in order to re-gain the third of Latgale lost during the mobilization or a retreat to the line of the Lake Lubana in order to prepare the decisive defence battle. The First Division Group (three divisions) would have operated on the right and the Second Division Group (two divisions) on the left. The border between these two division groups would have been the northern bank of the Lake Lubans-Karsava. The Supreme Commander would have had two divisions in the areas of Madona, Barkava, Lubana and Cesvaine at his disposal. Each division

would have received one unit of heavy artillery and a certain number of reconnaissance flight hours. Positions were supposed to be occupied by the fifth day of mobilization, which seems to have been too optimistic.

Option D comprised the defence against Germany. The main idea was to deploy the armies some kilometres north of the southern state border as protection by the Lithuanian army was expected. Engineer plans did exist, but only for limited works. The forces were supposed to operate in two division groups, whereas the cover units should remain at the eastern border.

Option K existed only in outlines. Three divisions were supposed to operate towards the south, four towards the east.

After the ceding of bases to the Soviet Union in 1939, a fifth mobilization and defence plan was worked out, but now a defence of the state was almost impossible. According to options A and D of plan four, a further defence of the Daugava line was provided for. In case of an attack by the Soviet Union, a fur-

ther retreat to Lithuania and a following internment in Germany was planned.¹³¹ Neither Latvia nor the other Baltic States believed that each or all together would have to fight without any support by one or the other great power. Treaties or even plans, however, for such a co-operation did not exist, not even with neighbouring Poland. Military observers of the great powers classified the Latvian armed forces to be behind the Finnish and Estonian forces regarding the degree of readiness. Soldiers and regular officers were considered to be good to very good. Their endurance and courage were praised, but cruelty that had been supposedly noticed was criticized. The assessment of higher officers was altogether bad, with some remarkable exceptions. Reasons were old age, insufficient training, lacking initiative and bureaucratic mentality. Regarding supply and weapons, Latvia's army was considered to be better than Estonia's, but worse than Lithuania's. In the opinion of the US observers, the divisions that would have had to be established after the beginning of the war could

have moved to the front as late as 30 to 60 days after the proclamation of the mobilization. Active divisions could have reached the front within 24 hours. The morale and composure of the Latvian army were rated high. Thus, success was expected not only in defensive, but also in offensive battles.¹³²

The Military Situation in Estonia

Regarding the area (47,549 km²) and population (1939: 1,133,917), Estonia was the smallest Baltic state, but its borders were the longest. The common border with friendly Latvia was 374.5 km (9.4%) long, the one with the hostile USSR 258 km (6.3%), of which 145 km went across the 84 km long and 31 km broad Lake Peipsi, a further two km across the endangered Mehikoorma Strait and across the Lake Pskov, which was a little more narrow than the Lake Peipsi. The coastal border comprised 1,159 km as the crow flies. Because of the many bays and 818 islands, the coastal border was some 3,449 km long (84.3%).¹³³

The section between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipsi was relatively easy to protect, the Narva River being a natural obstacle. The area north as well as south of the river is marshy and wooded. Only a seven to eight km broad gap along the West-East railroad and the highway was easily accessible for a potential enemy. The chain of lakes made up by the Lake Peipsi and the Lake Pskov was a great advantage. Regarding defence, the area south of the Lake Pskov was less favourable, but not hopeless. The area is sandy and without any transport routes. In the middle section, there was a deep valley in a north-south direction that could be used for defence. The marshy and wooded area of the Lida and Vruda Rivers extended widely. Should these positions be lost, the Estonian army could retreat to the line Pjusa-Pskov-Pankjavitsa-Laura-Liepna, the 9 km wide middle section between Pskov and Pankjavista being the most endangered. Furthermore, the Estonians could retreat to the line Lake Võrtsjärv-Emajõgi River-Lake Peipsi. A defence of the long coastal border was virtually impossible.

The navy and the coastal batteries alone could defend Tallinn, which was also protected by several islands. With the help of the Finnish fleet, Estonia could close off the Gulf of Finland between Tallinn and Porkkala with a mine field.¹³⁴

Concerning food and clothing, Estonia was self-sufficient. Yet, the situation concerning food was not as good as in Lithuania or Latvia. Shale (about 5,500,000 tons [sic]), out of which petrol and machine oil were produced and which was also used as fuel, was an important natural resource.

Regarding the ethnic composition of the population, Estonia was the most homogeneous. 88.2% of the population were Estonians, 8.2% Russians, 1.5% Germans, 0.7% Swedish, and 0.5% Latvians.¹³⁵ Usually 0.98% to 1.2% of the population were in the armed forces. The number of those drafted was 12,000 men, but it decreased in the last years. In earlier years, the armed forces consisted of 14,000 to 17,000 men, but in 1938 there were only 11,358 men (1,358 officers). The police had 1,200 men, the border guard 1,200

men, and the Home Guard units 60,000 men. According to the Intelligence Service of the USA, the total number of people organized, including police, border guard and Home Guard unit was 51,000 men, including reserves 121,000 men and including untrained reserves 161,000 men (14.2% of the population). The whole state had three defence districts (corresponding to the number of divisions in times of peace) and eight defence counties (corresponding to the number of brigades in times of war).

In times of peace, the Estonian army had three infantry divisions. The staff of the First Division was in Rakvere and comprised the defence counties Narva and Võru-Järva. The First Infantry Regiment, the Fourth and Fifth Infantry Battalion, the First and Second Artillery Group and two trains of the Armoured Train Regiment in Tapa belonged to this division. The staff of the Second Division was located in Tartu (Dorpat). The defence counties of Tartu, Petseri-Võru and Valga were under its command. The Seventh Infantry Regiment, the Second, Third and

Eighth Infantry Battalion, the Partisan Battalion Kuperjanov, the Cavalry Regiment, the Third and Fourth Artillery Group and two tank platoons belonged to this division. The staff of the Third Division was in Tallinn. The defence counties Harju, Pärnu-Viljandi and Lääne-Saare belonged to it. The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Infantry Battalion and the Partisan Battalions Kaleva, Scouts and Sakala, the Fifth Artillery Group, the Tank Regiment, the Engineer and Intelligence as well as the Guard Battalion were in this division. At the beginning of 1940, the Fourth Division in Viljandi and Pärnu was created.

The First and Seventh Infantry Regiments were active units. Each regiment had 2,000 men. The recruits were trained in independent battalions that were supposed to be transformed into regiments in case of war. Half of the staff and line officers of these regiments were regular officers. In case of war, there would have been 14 infantry regiments, each one having 3,331 men (107 officers). In each division, two brigades with two infantry

regiments each were planned. The normal personnel strength of a division in peacetime was 100 officers, 400 sergeants, and 2,500 men. In peacetime, the regiments had two battalions each; in wartime it would have been three. The weapons of the infantry were obsolete: Russian 7.62-mm-rifles from 1891, Madsen light machinegun, calibre 7,69 mm and Russian Maxim heavy machinegun, calibre 7.62 mm, from 1905 and 1910. There were also English 7.7-mm Lewis light machineguns in reserve. The arsenal of the War Department started to standardize the calibre to 7.69 mm. Towards the end of independence, it was planned to equip the infantry with infantry guns and anti-tank weapons. Experiments with heavy mortars, calibre 81 mm, with anti-tank rifles from Solothurn, with anti-tank cannons from Bofors, calibre 37 mm, and with heavy anti-tank guns from Rheinmetall were undertaken. In Võru and Narva, there was already anti-tank batteries.

The First Cavalry Regiment was in Tartu. It had three sabre, one machinegun, and one skiing and bicycle squadron, one

combat vehicle company (six tanks and six tankettes) as well as a technical unit. The weapons were: English Ross-Enfield-Mid. 14 rifles, calibre 7.7 mm, six heavy machine guns, 16 light machineguns and the weapons of the armoured vehicles. In case of war, the regiment would have had to operate together with Latvian units in the area of Laura between Boberikova and Vöborka. As a quick retreat was planned for the Latvian army at the beginning of the war, the Estonian cavalry might have been able to form a link between the Latvian and the Estonian armies. The First Cavalry Regiment was also the basis for the Second Cavalry Regiment, which would have been raised in Tartu at the beginning of a war.

In the Estonian army, there were five artillery units. The first and the third group were active units. According to the League of Nations and to information from the German Intelligence Service, Estonia had more than 70 field guns and 60 heavy guns besides anti-aircraft guns and infantry guns in 1938. The artillery was divided into 11 field, six heavy and 17

coastal defence batteries. The division-artillery was organized in artillery groups. The First Division had the first artillery-group (four batteries) in Olgino and the second group in Rakvere - heavy artillery and material for another four batteries. The third artillery-group (with four active batteries in Pskov) and the fourth group belonged to the Second Division - two batteries in Tartu and one in Võru. The fifth artillery-group of the Third Division, with material for four new batteries, was under the command of the Fourth Division that was to be created. In its place, a new, sixth group was created in Tallinn (Reval). This group was supposed to have towing vehicles, which did not arrive by the beginning of the war. Thus, old Russian guns had to be used.

Each battery had four guns or howitzers and 90 men (four officers) with 60 horses in peacetime. Most guns were outdated, Russian 76 mm guns from 1902, English 84 mm and French 76 mm cannons, English light howitzers, calibre 114 mm, Russian heavy 102 mm cannons from Schneider (1910), English 102 mm, Ger-

man 150 mm and Russian 152 mm howitzers (the latter from Schneider, 1909). Horses were used to tow all guns. Towing vehicles were still in an experimental stage.

According to Estonian information, the coastal artillery had 10 batteries: one 30.48 cm (12") battery in Äigna, 20.32 cm (8") batteries in Suuropi and Viimsi, two 152.4 mm batteries in Äigna, two in Naissaare, one in Suuropi and two 13 cm batteries in Viimsi. The anti-aircraft artillery had three batteries with twelve guns, one searchlight and one chemical defence company.

In the last years, the tank regiment had three tank and armoured car companies, one transport company, one training company, and two batteries. One unit had four old heavy English tanks Mark V, twelve old light Renault-17 tanks, six modern Polish TK 3 tankettes, 12 self-made Crossley-Austin armoured cars. In reserve, there were several heavy armoured vehicles of the type Garford. The regiment had about 400 men. In 1924, Estonia still had two armoured trains regiments, later only one with 350 men. The regiment had

one heavy broad-gauge armoured railway-train with one 152 mm, two 119 mm, two 105 mm cannons and four heavy-machine guns, two light broad gauge and one narrow-gauge armoured train, each with two 76 mm guns, eight heavy machineguns and six light machineguns.

The air force consisted of three air divisions, in Rakvere, Tartu, and Tallinn, as well as of the naval aviation division in Tallinn with auxiliary units. Each division had two reconnaissance squadron and one fighter squadron with nine aircraft each, the naval aviation division had one reconnaissance squadron (six aircraft) and one fighter squadron (four aircraft). Altogether, there were 54 reconnaissance and 27 fighter aircraft as well as 10 naval aircraft, a total of 91, but 125 when counting the training aircraft. In 1937, there were 540 men in the air force.

The engineer regiment had three engineer battalions, each having one gas-welfare, railroad, search light, transport, work, training, and reconnaissance company. The reconnaissance battalion had three reconnaissance and one other company.

The base for the Estonian navy was Tallinn. The fleet comprised the Sea and the Peipsi Divisions, the coastal artillery and the garrison administration, altogether 2.100 men (of whom 900 were in the coastal artillery). Initially, the fleet had two large destroyers, one torpedo boat, six gunboats (two on the Lake Peipsi), two minelayers, two mine boats, two patrol boats (one on the Lake Peipsi), four icebreakers, three vessels of the hydrographical service, five tenders and one tug. The largest part of these ships was old and worn-out. The maintenance of this fleet demanded tremendous resources.

In 1933, the Estonian government sold the two large destroyers and agreed upon a programme for the development of a new fleet. Two submarines, eight patrol boats, twelve torpedo boats and ten fast patrol boats were planned. As funds were scarce, the programme was cut down to two U-minelayers, four motortorpedo-boats, and twelve aircraft. During the last years of Estonia's independence, the navy had two submarines, four motortorpedo-boats, four gunboats (two on the Lake

Peipsi), two patrol boats (one on the Lake Peipsi), one customs cutter, five icebreakers, four hydrographical ships, five tenders and one tug. Altogether the tonnage was 5.200 tons, not including the icebreakers and those ships that belonged to the sea route Civilian Maritime Administration.¹³⁶ The Estonian merchant fleet had 304 ships (143 steamboats, 60 motor ships and motor sailing ships as well as 101 sailing ships) with 214.000 register tons.¹³⁷

In Tallinn, there was a large arsenal with departments for machineguns, artillery, optics, foundry, smithy, handguns, electronics, carpentry, leather goods, and much more. Ammunition for rifles and artillery was produced there, shells and army rifles as well as light and heavy machine-guns were produced for the Home Guard units.¹³⁸

The number of cars in 1940 was 3,618; there were 2,476 trucks, 285 busses and 1,401 motorcycles. Estonia had 195 steam and 22 electric and motor locomotives, 529 passenger and 5,633 goods wagons, three radio stations, six commercial airplanes, eleven ports and twelve airports.

The total length of the railway system was 1,702 km. The total length of first order highways was 2,531 km and second-order highways 8,168 km.¹³⁹

In case of a war, 100,000 men in eight brigades and in the navy were supposed to be mobilized. The amount of uniforms and equipment was sufficient, but the weapons were generally bad and outdated. The Estonians relied on the competence of their intelligence, who would have discovered any movement of Soviet troops towards Estonia early. They also believed in the ability of their defence county officials to mobilize the soldiers within one to 24 hours.

The First Infantry Regiment and the First Artillery Group were in Narva, Narva-Jõesuu, Kuurtna and Vasknarva, two armoured trains were in Tapa, and one air force squadron was in Rakvere. These forces had to reinforce the border guard units, to occupy the line of defence along the Narva River, to close off the river crossings at Narva-Jõesuu, Krivasoo and Vasknarva, and to observe the enemy's movement in the Gulf of Finland and up

to the line Mustvee-Oudova, where the area of responsibility of the Second Division began. 50 steel-concrete bunkers were erected at the threatened sector between Riigi and Kulgu. The staff of the army had calculated that the Soviets were able to move three to four divisions to the Narva front within seven days. The active units of the Estonians were able to take their positions on the first day and to counter the attack by the enemy for the next three days. Although the Soviet air force might be able to attack main targets, they would not be able to confuse the decentralized Estonian system of mobilization. The regiments would have gathered by train, by car, and through night marches. They could have been mobilized within three days, and within the next two days they would already have been at the assembly points. On the fifth day, the First, Fourth and Fifth Infantry Regiments, the First and the Second Artillery Group would have reach the front, the Tenth Infantry Regiment would be in Rakvere, the Reserves-Regiment in Tallinn, and the Scouts-Regiment in the area of

Haapsalu. However, the US observers assumed that the Estonian army would not be completely ready for war in less than seven to 10 days after the beginning of the war.

The Seventh Regiment, the Third Artillery Group, the First Cavalry Regiment, one anti-tank company, one armoured car and tank company, one armoured train and the Second Air Division were planned to be at the front of Petseri. These forces would have had to defend the line Lake Pskov-Irbosk Valley-Velje Lake, then for five days the line Piussa-Petseri-Pankjavitsa-Laura, then Piussa-Lepssaare-Vastsellina-Misso. They also would have had to watch the movements by the enemy on the Latvian territory. In the south, there were no fortifications. Instead, artillery and field fortifications would have had to do the job. The enemy was expected to need five to seven days to move three to four divisions and tank and artillery units from Pskov to Ostrov. In order to absorb the offensive, the Estonians would have had the Kaleva and the Põlva-Sakala Regiment at their disposal on the sixth day, the Sec-

ond Kuperjanov Regiment from Pskov to Misso, the Seventh, Eighth and Third Infantry Regiment, the First Cavalry Regiment, the Fifth, Fourth and Third Artillery Group, the Sixth Infantry Regiment close to Ape, and the Ninth Infantry Regiment in the area of Pärnu-Mõisaküla. This would be all of Estonia's forces.

As the Soviet Union had only very weak forces on the Lake Peipsi (some landing crafts), the two gunboats of the Estonians and three more sent by the base in Tartu could have defended the shore line reasonably well for two to three days, especially the dangerous strait of Mehikoorma, where the Lake Peipsi and the Lake Pskov meet each other. Local self-protection units would have supported the war ships.

In the Baltic Sea, the Estonian navy could not compete with that of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it was widely known that the Soviet Navy Command was afraid of the strait between Aegna and Porkkala. Soviet submarines could pass this strait in order to sink Estonian supply vessels, and ships could launch landing crafts. To prevent any provoca-

tion of the Russian fleet, the Estonian fleet could only start laying mines after the start of hostilities. The submarine minelayer would protect the area around the island of Suursaar and Tütarsaar and the minelayers on the line Äigna-Porkkala. With support by the Finns, another mine field in the area of Suursaar, Tütarsaar and Lavansaar could have been laid out, while submarines and a large Finnish armoured vessel (with 8" guns) would have offered protection during the operation.

At worst, the Estonians would try to retreat to their capital and to fight a final battle of despair, or to flee to their islands. According to calculations of American observers, the ammunition could last for about two weeks of fighting. But supposedly the army could only defend Estonia one or two weeks if no other states than Latvia supported them.

In case of an attack from the Soviet Union, Estonia intended to co-operate with Latvia, something it did not want to do in case of a German attack. Estonians considered a German attack on Lithuania to

be possible; they also thought that Latvia might be endangered. But even shortly before the World War II, they were convinced that for the next ten years Germany was not interested in an occupation of the Estonian islands as a base for their actions against the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁰ Estonia's military planners saw danger only in an attack by the Soviets. Estonia regarded its other neighbours and Poland as its natural allies and hoped for a German intervention, but it did not expect any help from Western European powers. The Estonians were worried because the Finns avoided any relationship with the Baltic States to protect their Eastern borders and sought protection in the Scandinavian bloc. The Scandinavian States publicly proclaimed that they did not wish to get into any kind of relations with the highly endangered Baltic States. Moreover, the Estonians were worried about the unsteady foreign policy of Latvia. Estonia's military planners doubted whether Latvia really intended to resist any ultimatum or an open invasion. Estonians were especially worried by missing fortifications on

Latvia's eastern border and by the Latvians' plan to retreat to the line Pededze-Lake Lubans, which opened the whole southern front of Estonia and virtually destroyed its defence system. There were also problems with direct co-operation under common command. Until the abrupt change in the Latvian military command in 1940, Estonia's military command did not rely upon Latvia's preparedness and ability to command the armed forces under modern combat conditions. The Estonians believed that in case of co-operation, the Latvian Supreme Command would try to use the Estonian army not to defend its own country, but Latvia.¹⁴¹

Western observers all agreed that the Estonian army was the best one of all Baltic States although it was most poorly armed and had the shortest training for soldiers. The Estonian officers were believed to be highly qualified, the Estonian soldiers were said to be tenacious, brave, intelligent and patriotic. In co-operation with the armed forces of the great powers, the Estonian army was regarded to be a potential force not only

for defensive, but also for offensive actions.¹⁴²

The Military Situation in Lithuania

With a population of 2,575,300, Lithuania was the largest Baltic state. Its area (55,670 km²) was the second largest. The length of the border was 1,367 km. Lithuania did not have a common border with the Soviet Union, but 525 km (37.7%) bordered hostile Poland, 272 km (20.5%) the dangerous German Reich, and only 570.4 km (41.8%) bordered friendly Latvia. The border regions were in the main completely open, except for a small section from Zarasai to Giedraiciai in the northeast, where a group of lakes was situated, and another section in the Southwest, where the Nemunas River formed the natural border to Germany. In the coastal area, the Lithuanian part of the Kurzeme Spit was separated from the rest of Lithuania by the German part and the Kurzeme Lagoon. Furthermore, Lithuania had only limited sovereignty in the

Klaipeda (Memel) region (2,848 km²). Germany did everything possible to keep the idea of separatism alive in this region. Because of the lost, nationally mixed Vilnius region (3,244 m²), Lithuania was technically at war with her second largest neighbour, Poland.¹⁴³

Concerning food supply, Lithuania was not only self-sufficient but even exported food. In contrast to Latvia and Estonia, however, its industry was not very developed.

The population was more uniform than in Latvia. 80.6% were Lithuanian, 7.15% Jewish, 4.1% German, 3.04% Polish, 2.3% Russian, 0.7% Latvian, 0.2% White Russian, etc. 80% of the population were Catholic, in contrast to Lithuania's northern neighbours, who were mainly Lutheran.¹⁴⁴

In 1939, the army of Lithuania consisted of 24,000 men (1,100 officers, 500 war administrators, 1,400 sergeants). On average, 1.25% of the population were in the armed forces; 13,000 to 17,000 men were drafted each year. The police had 4,000 men, the border guard 3,500 men, and in the Home Guard units there were

55,000 men. In theory, Lithuania could have mobilized up to 250,000 men. Out of technical and financial considerations, only 120,000 to 135,000 men were supposed to be mobilized.

The Lithuanian army consisted of three infantry divisions; a fourth division was being formed. The First, Third and Fourth Infantry Regiment as well as the First and Second Artillery Regiment belonged to the First Division in Panevezys. In the Second Division, whose headquarters were in Kaunas, were the Second, Fifth and Ninth Infantry Regiment and the Third Artillery Regiment. The Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Infantry Regiment and the Fourth Artillery Regiment were in the Third Division, whose headquarters were in Siauliai. Towards the end of independence, only one artillery unit had been formed in the Fourth Division, which was being established in Kedainiai.

Most of the infantry weapons were obsolete, but modernization did take place. The army had 7.9 mm Mauser-Mod. 24 rifles, Praga light machineguns and Maxim M. 08 heavy machineguns. There

were experiments with Stokes-Brandt trench mortars, infantry guns and anti-tank guns. One infantry regiment had 2,279 men.

The cavalry brigade with headquarters in Kaunas had three regiments: The Hussar Regiment in Kaunas, the Ulan Regiment in Alytus, later in Taurage, and the Dragoon Regiment in Taurage, later in Vilnius. There was also a unit of mounted artillery, three bicycle companies and one armoured car company. Each cavalry regiment had about 1,000 men.

The field artillery had about 120 guns in 10 units. These guns were mostly outdated: French 75 mm Schneider M. 97 and Russian Putilov M. 02 75 mm cannons. The heavy artillery had 48 pieces in six units. The weapons were 155 mm and 105 mm howitzers made in Germany. In reserve, there were also English 127 mm and French Schneider guns, calibre 155 mm. The anti-aircraft unit had 150 modern Swiss Oerlikon 20 mm and 12 old English 75 mm cannons from Vickers, modern sound detectors and searchlights. During the last years of independence, there was no fortress artillery and

no armoured trains anymore, as they were considered to be impractical.

In Kaunas there was a tank battalion with twelve light French Renault M 26/27 tanks and 51 Swedish tankettes made by Skoda as well as one armoured car company with twelve armoured vehicles made by Renault and Landskrona.

Each of the three divisions had one engineer battalion. A reconnaissance battalion was also planned for each division, but up to the end of the independence there were only two such battalions.

The Lithuanian army had the strongest air force of all the Baltic States. Some of the reconnaissance, training and fighter aircraft (of the type "Anbo") were produced in Lithuania. The air force had eight air stations and four landing strips at its disposal. It was divided into reconnaissance (three squadrons), fighter (four squadrons), bomber (one squadron) and training groups (two squadrons) and had schools, workshops and supply units. Some of the aircraft were out-dated, but in their place modern machines were arriving. In 1937, 795 men served in the air force. In 1939

the air force had 110 air craft, 80 in the units and 30 in reserve.

The fleet had only one patrol vessel with mine laying capability and six armoured customs boat. Six submarines, several fast patrol boats, minelayers and coastal batteries were planned. But the loss of Klaipeda destroyed these plans for armament.

The weapon factory Radviliskis had produced rifle, machinegun and artillery ammunition since 1938. It also repaired rifles and completed orders of the air force.

In contrast to Latvia, the Home Guard organization in Estonia and Lithuania was subordinate to the War Ministry. Lithuania's Home Guard unit was divided into 12 infantry regiments and one dragoon regiment. There were also engineer, reconnaissance, air and Naval Home Guard Units that were partly motorized. Plans that included the training of Home Guard members for partisan war were not realized.¹⁴⁵

Concerning traffic routes and means of transportation, Lithuania was the weak-

est of the Baltic States. In 1939, Lithuania had only 1,526 km of railroad and 1,481 km of solid roads. It had 205 locomotives, 313 passenger and 4,351 goods wagons, 1,765 cars, 298 trucks, 298 buses and 619 special cars. The merchant fleet consisted of only 11 ships with 10,299 register tons. Moreover, Lithuania had only two ports, i.e. in Klaipeda (Memel) and Svetoji. In the whole state, there were only two radio stations, in the last year just one.¹⁴⁶

In contrast to Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania really had only one friendly neighbour: Latvia. It had to reckon with a direct attack by Germany or Poland and with an indirect attack by the Soviet Union through Latvia or Poland. In case of a war, Lithuania could only operate with five infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades. Active units were the First Regiment in Ukmerge, the Seventh in Taurage and Zemaiciu Naumiestis and the Ninth in Marijampole and Vilkaviskis. Their stock was enlarged and they were reinforced by artillery. Until 1939, the Sixth Regiment in Klaipeda and Plunge was also

an active unit; then it was transferred to Telsiai.

Until 1935, the mobilization plans consisted of mobilizing the units within one week after the beginning of the war (12 days according to the US information). Stasys Rastikis achieved a decentralization of the mobilization and thus shortened the time span to 24-72 hours. Weapons and clothing were divided among the mobilization points. A quick modernization of the equipment now also took place.

Although Lithuania sought to reclaim the Vilnius region from Poland, its plans for war against Poland were of completely defensive nature. Just as defensive were the plans for a resistance to potential attacks by Germany or the Soviet Union. The Lithuanian army hoped for a support by Latvia in these two cases or even for an active involvement of the Western powers. The defence plans against Poland and Germany had priority, those against the Soviet Union were of second importance. The Lithuanian Army Command hoped to be able to fight for two weeks without foreign support.

In case of an invasion by Polish or Soviet troops, a retreat to the line Kaunas-Nevezis was planned, later to the Dubysa River. With its high banks, this river was almost the only natural obstacle in the inner part of the country. A defence line with bunkers also existed there. In case of a German attack, a retreat to the Dubysa was planned, as well. The retreat to the Dubysa after an attack from the East would have meant the giving up of the largest part of the state and a simultaneous opening of the southeast front of Latvia. In case of a Polish or Russian attack, a retreat towards Germany after the loss of the Dubysa-line was intended. During a German attack, the Lithuanians wanted to retreat into the Latvian territory after the loss of the Dubysa-line.

During the last two years of their independence, Lithuanians started the enlargement of the peace time strength of the armed forces. The Third Infantry Regiment was intended to be the basis for a fourth division in the region Kedainiai-Raseiniai-Seredzius. When the Vilnius region was regained in 1939, the Lithua-

nian army command transferred the First Infantry Regiment and the Third Dragoon Regiment to that place.¹⁴⁷

Western observers did not judge the Lithuanian army in friendly terms. They regretted the unusual influence of politics and chauvinism in the Lithuanian officer corps. According to their judgement, many high-ranking officers of Lithuania were political creatures who were incompetent to fulfil their tasks and were not interested in their completion. Positive changes in the command of the Lithuanian army could only be noticed in the very last years of independence. In contrast to the other armies of the Baltic States, the Lithuanian soldiers' quality was judged to be only satisfactory, the main reasons being the low general education and insufficient training. Nevertheless, the soldiers were regarded to be tenacious, physically strong, modest and especially suitable for the partisan war. Although everyone acknowledged that the equipment of the Lithuanian army was more modern than that of the other Baltic States, they still assumed that this army could not be used in offensive actions.

However, there was no doubt that it was suitable for a defensive war. The opinion that the Lithuanians would be more fit for a partisan war than the other Baltic peoples is interesting. Observers viewed the extraordinarily frequent change of the War Minister, the Supreme Commanders and the Chiefs of Staff as well as the intrigues in the army undertaken by various political groups negatively. All of this not only influenced the officers' morale, but also the morale among the soldiers in an unfavourable way.¹⁴⁸

As a gap in the defence system along the border with the Soviet Union had developed due to the politically independent line of Lithuania, it can be assumed that western military observers regarded this aspect as highly important. Nobody, however, blamed Poland.

***The Military Co-operation of the
Baltic States***

Latvia and Estonia were the only states in Northeast Europe that had concluded a military alliance. This alliance was based

on traditions from the war of liberation. The basis of this alliance was the treaty of 7 July 1921, which was extended in the treaties of 1 November 1923, and 17 February 1934. The alliance was of a defensive character. The Estonian-Latvian defence treaty of 1934 gave similarly interested states the opportunity to join.¹⁴⁹ On 12 September 1934, all three Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – came together in the Baltic Entente, but the treaty only consisted of a general co-operation among the states and regular conferences of the Foreign Ministers, but not of military co-operation.¹⁵⁰ Estonia and Latvia categorically refused to conclude a military treaty with Lithuania before the latter had solved its conflicts with Poland and Germany. However a military treaty was not concluded when Lithuania was forced in March of 1938 to re-establish diplomatic relations with Poland and when it lost the Klaipeda (Memel) region to Germany in March of 1939.

Despite the existing military treaty, military co-operation between Estonia and

Latvia was really very meagre. There was – to a small extent – an exchange of officers to learn about the military training of the other state, to establish connections, and to learn the language of the neighbour. In 1930 and especially in 1931, large, common army and navy manoeuvres of both states took place, but were not repeated in the following years. In individual cases, the three Baltic States exchanged weapons or sold them to one another. To a small extent, the arsenals of all three states also co-operated.

During the whole period of their independence, the Baltic States were not able to agree upon common defence plans in case of a threat. The self-interests of each state seemed to be more important than the common interests. Each Baltic state hoped - for little convincing reasons - that it would be able to prevent the loss of its independence, even if one or both of the others had already lost it. Western observers pointed out the extraordinary fear that showed in all foreign policy actions of the Baltic States. Each Baltic state had the strong wish to avoid any provocation of

the Soviet Union. A military union of the Baltic States was considered to be possible reason for an attack by the Soviet Union. Yet, there are indications that at the time of the creation of the Baltic Entente in 1934, it was in the interest of the Soviet Union to have a Baltic military bloc between itself and emerging Nazi Germany. This view changed later, of course. From 1933 on, the Baltic States also avoided provoking Nazi Germany, which did not want to see a Baltic military bloc come into existence. The German diplomatic representatives repeatedly pointed out the hostile relationship with Lithuania because of the Klaipeda (Memel) region to Latvia and Estonia, and tried to use the disagreement between Latvia and Estonia by showing itself as the understanding and benevolent great power to the latter. Poland too repeatedly pointed out to Latvia and Estonia that it did not want any military agreement of the Baltic States with Lithuania. Therefore, all three Baltic States tried to remain absolutely neutral and even weakened their conditions to the League of Nations (refusal of the obligations of the

members of the League of Nations mentioned in Article 16).

A Baltic bloc could have mobilized an army of 550,000 men, which would have been a notable force even on an international scale. One has to remember that neither the Soviet Union nor Germany or Poland, because of the constant threat to their borders, would have been able to turn their entire forces or a substantial part of them against the Baltic States under any conditions. The Vilnius and the Klaipeda (Memel) problems were tricky and dangerous, but a military union of the Baltic States could have been formed because of the international situation without being influenced by threats of certain states, threats that were not serious anyway. Among the international community, self-confidence, unity, and power is rated higher than the splitting up of forces and the idea of neutrality. Western observers have made many ironic remarks about the extreme individualism of the Baltic politicians, about the exaggerated emphasis on solely nationalist interests, and about the inability to co-operate in

the common interest and for the protection of security. The great powers took care not to reach any military agreements with the individualistic, small Baltic States, which were not connected to one another.

Of course, the question arises how much the Baltic States could have co-operated militarily and what they could have done to foster such a co-operation even before a treaty had been concluded. The answer is: A lot!

It is a sad fact that the Baltic States – during the whole period of their independence – felt very foreign to one another and that they really did not know each other. It often happened that the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians treated each other not only with benevolent humour, but even with sarcasm. Unfortunately, the latter happened a lot on an international level, during talks between representatives of these peoples and those of the great powers. Measures that supported mutual learning of history, culture, and economy of the neighbours started late and remained small. There was almost no understanding of the common

fate and the common goal, and very little was done to foster mutual respect and friendship as well as the development of a co-operation. Such efforts came too late, were too small and too “official” to reach larger parts of the population. Much more could have been done!

Each Baltic state had a different national language. There was no common *lingua franca*. Older generations were partly able to communicate in Russian, to a small extent also in German, but in Lithuania in Polish. It would have been perfect if the citizens of the Baltic States would have understood the language of the other two states, but this was virtually impossible. Because of the geographic situation, it was important for the population of the Baltic States to learn international languages, making it even more difficult to learn the languages of the neighbouring states in addition. Sure, there were people that spoke these languages, but they were only a few. After the war, the Baltic States stressed their independence from Russia and Germany and their attachment to Western Europe. Thus, Russian or German were rejected as

the first foreign language. However, they could not decide which of the western languages, English or French, should be chosen as the first foreign language. So, English and French were taught at the same time, German being the second foreign language. School graduates, however, had only acquired a basic knowledge of these languages and did not normally use them in everyday life. The majority of the high-ranking officers could also communicate in Russian, but the younger ones hardly understood the language. On the other hand, the majority of the older officers – with few exceptions – spoke neither English nor French, and a large part did not speak German, either. An agreement on a common foreign language that could have been used for mutual communication in the Baltic States would have been highly necessary. Scandinavians understand without difficulty all their languages; nevertheless they can all also communicate in English and mostly in German.

During the whole period of independence, the Baltic States did not develop an economic union. The small states even com-

peted with each other economically and were unfit for broader economic co-operation. Estonian shale could have partly solved the fuel problem, but the quarrying started too late and was too little. Regarding fuel, the Baltic States were dependent upon Poland and even more so upon the western powers, which on their part were far away from sources of raw material. Latvian water power also remained unused for common economic measures.

Without any effort, a standardization of the organization of the armed forces could have been implemented, as well as a unifying of ranks, badges, etc., but nothing happened.

Each of the Baltic States spent about one fifth of its budget on weapons and the daily needs of the armed forces. These amounts were tiny compared to the purpose aimed at, but they were tremendous for the small states that had suffered a lot and had to do it without any international help, especially when compared to the larger and luckier countries. Thus, the resources had to be used wisely. The supply of the armed forces with uniforms, towing ma-

chines and food posed no problems. But weapons were a very great problem. They had been acquired during the struggle for liberation in insufficient amounts. They consisted of different systems, were for the most part out-dated, and partly even defective and without spare parts.

The weaponry had to be standardized and modernized. If the three states had acted together, it would have been easier, more convenient, and also cheaper. Because of political and economic combinations, the governments of the Baltic States and their troops did not co-operate, though. The weapons of the armed forces of the Baltic States were, thus, varied and made up of very different systems, which also limited the possibilities of a co-operation extremely. Not even an agreement on the standardization of ammunition was reached. The Estonians used Russian ammunition; the Lithuanians used German, and the Latvians English ammunition. In case of a war, ammunition supply would have been very limited and in Estonia's and Latvia's case even impossible. If the three states had been able

to agree on common ammunition for light weapons, they would have become independent from foreign states at least in this respect and would have saved a lot of money by producing the material needed in their own state. In addition, they could have helped each other out. Finland produced light artillery and mortars herself. The Baltic States, with nearly double the population, could have accomplished that even more easily. During all years of its independence, Lithuania built fairly good training and fighting aircraft. Latvia did so as well during the last years of independence. But the Baltic States did not cooperate in this respect either, but wasted resources in mutual competition.

The supply of heavy weapons had to be concentrated on states that were accessible most conveniently in terms of traffic and from which spare parts could also be received in wartime. Sweden would have been the best choice. Due to economic considerations, the Baltic States ordered nearly no weapons in Sweden. The latter had few economic relations to the Baltic States, whose products it did

not need. Moreover, Sweden demanded payment in cash. The UK and France, on the other hand, threatened not to take products from the Baltic States if weapons were not bought from them. Usually, the Baltic States received only out-dated weapons for a price that was at least twice as high as for the English and French forces. Lithuania also bought a few weapons from the Soviet Union, but their guns were also out-dated and very expensive. The Baltic States also feared to have relations to a state whose political leaders supported elements that were aiming at their eventual incorporation into the Soviet Union. The weapons became more and more complicated and more and more expensive, making a close co-operation between the Baltic States essential. In 1939, a modern English destroyer already cost a fortieth of the whole Latvian defence budget. Today twice the annual budget of 1939 would be needed to buy one single supersonic aircraft, to say nothing of missiles.

The question of a supreme command in wartime was also important. It seems as

if the Baltic States hoped to co-operate with some great powers, which would have taken over command then, of course. There were no treaties between the Baltic States and the western powers nor any plans for potential co-operation in wartime. There were arrangements between Latvia and Estonia for a potential common supreme command in wartime. But questions of prestige and about military qualification as well as political considerations and memories from the war of liberation were brought up. Estonia regarded its supreme command as more competent, which western military observers confirmed in their evaluations. The Latvian forces, on the other hand, would have been nearly twice as strong. The Estonians had a low opinion of the long-time Latvian War Minister, who had not supported them in the Battle of Cesis (Wenden) and in times of peace had not cared about the completion of his military knowledge, but - according to several observers - wanted to become supreme commander. The Estonians also remembered how they were forced during the war of liberation to hold a consider-

able part of the Latvian front although their forces were urgently needed somewhere else. The fact that the Latvians were in an extraordinarily unpleasant situation had been forgotten. The Latvians on their part had the suspicion that the Estonian supreme commander would try to use the Latvian forces mainly for the defence of Estonia, whereas the Estonians thought the Latvian supreme commander would use the Estonian forces mainly for the defence of Latvia. The defence plans of both states were diametrically opposite. Nevertheless, the plans provided for co-operation between the Latvian Eighth Daugavpils Infantry with its Fourth Battalion and the Estonian First Cavalry Regiment at the beginning of a war.

Shortly before World War II, the Lithuanians did not raise any objections that a Latvian general would command the combined forces of the Baltic States, but the Latvian government did not want to be politically connected with Lithuania. Thus, the question of a common supreme command remained unsolved. Western observers pointed out that the

supreme command only started to put really highly qualified and gifted officers into leading positions during the last year before the catastrophe. They would have been able to command troops under modern combat conditions. Names shall not be mentioned in this article.

The Baltic States shared a common fate. A militarily advantageous situation would have come up for them in connection with a democratic and liberal Russia behind them, as many Western observers pointed out. But such a situation did not exist. If the Soviet Union threatened Europe, only a common resistance of all European states would evoke hopes for deliverance. In the opinion of Russian and Western observers, the individual Baltic States were militarily without value, but joined together they would have been a significant enemy. Much could have been done to consolidate this defence power over 20 years, but almost nothing happened. External factors are partly responsible for this, but to a large extent the leaders of the Baltic States have to take responsibility, too. The Baltic States were

not the only ones, the “regional guilty”. The Scandinavian States as well as the states in the Balkans had to learn the hard way during World War II. At any rate, the armies of the Baltic States had a great moral importance for the strengthening of national self-confidence of the Baltic people and could have posed a considerable threat to a potential attacker.

¹ Offprint from *Acta Baltica* 1969, INSTITUTUM BALTICUM.

² For a general overview, the following sources can be referred to: Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), *The Baltic States* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938); Louis Tissot, *La Baltique* (Paris: Payot, 1940); Max Friederichsen, *Die Zentraleuropäischen Randstaaten mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Baltischen Dreihund-Problems Lettland, Estland und Litauen* (Rifa: Selbstverlag, 1921).

³ United States of America National Archives, Record Group 165 - Military Intelligence Division (Hence: *USA, N.A., R.G. 165*) - General Analysis.

⁴ Already during World War I did Theobald von Berthmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German *Reich*, comment on General Ludendorff's project of the annexation of the Baltic territory, pointing out the difficulties such an incorporation would implicate.

⁵ Such views were already met with response in German *Reichstag*-discussions from 1916-1918. See

ed. Andersons, *Latvijas vesture 1914-1920*, Stockholm: DAUGAVA, 1967), pp. 165-166, 216, 272-273, 286-287.

⁶ Royal Institute, pp. 30-38.

⁷ Edgars Andersons, "Toward the Baltic Entente - The Initial Phase", *Pro Baltica, Mélanges dédiés à Kaarel R. Pusta* (Stockholm: Publication du Comité des amis de K. R. Pusta, 1965), pp. 41-42, 50. Hence: Andersons, *Toward the Baltic Entente - The Initial Phase*.

⁸ Marija Gimbutas, *The Balts* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 21-29, 43-172.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 153-158; Alfred Bilmanis, *A History of Latvia* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 33, 35; Ewald Uustalu, *The History of Estonian People* (London: Boreas Publishing Co., 1952), pp. 31-32.

¹⁰ Uustalu, pp. 32-48.

¹¹ A. Bilmanis, pp. 53-83.

¹² Constantine R. Jurgela, *History of the Lithuanian Nation* (New York: Lithuanian Cultural Institute, Historical Research Section, 1948), pp. 45-145.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-160.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 161-163, 229-250.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 265-352.

¹⁶ Edgar Dunsdorfs, Arnolds Spekke, *Latvijas Vēsture 1500-1600* [Latvia's History 1500-1600], Stockholm: Daugava, 1964, pp. 67-73, 172-184.

¹⁷ Uustalu, pp. 54-56.

¹⁸ C. R. Jurgela, p. 100.

¹⁹ Dunsdorfs, Spekke, *1500-1600*, pp. 41-42, 67-73, 127-141, 172-184, 678-680.

²⁰ Edgar Anderson, *The Couronians and the West Indies*, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Uni-

versity of Chicago, August 1956, pp. 59, 110, 146, 229, 309, 311.

²¹ Dunsdorfs, *1500-1600*, pp. 127, 129.

²² Edgars Dunsdorfs, *Latvijas vēsture 1600-1710* (Stockholm: Daugava, 1962), pp. 50, 100-102, 159-165.

²³ Edgars Dunsdorfs, *Mūžīgais latviešu kaŗavīrs* [Eternal Latvian Soldier] (Melbourne, Australia: Generāļa Kārija Goppera fond, 1967), pp. 189-192; Edgars Andersons, *Latviešu cīnās vēstures notikumos* [The Latvians' Fights in the course of history], in *LAIKS*, XIX, No. 26 (1959), April 1, 1967.

²⁴ Edgars Andersons, "Krimas kauč Latvijā" [Crimean War in Latvia], in *Cēia Zimes*, No. 9, March 1952, pp. 367-372; No. 10, July 1952, pp. 450-455.

²⁵ Jurgela, pp. 385, 394.

²⁶ Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December 20, 1963.

²⁷ Jurgela, pp. 408-416, 427-456.

²⁸ Uustalu, pp. 109-110.

²⁹ Bruno Kalnins, *De Baltiska staternas frihetskamp* [The Fight for Freedom of the Baltic States], Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1950, pp. 33-42.

³⁰ Dr. Constantine R. Jurgela, personal interview on November 21, 1968.

³¹ Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December 20, 1963.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 34-38; Pulkv. [Col.] Dr. Gustavs Grīnsbergs, letter from January 22, 1962; Colonel Elmar Lipping, letter from April 17, 1963; Gen. Jānis Lavenieks, interview on

November 16, 1968.

³⁵ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 47-49.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-85, 92-93.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-92, 96-97.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-104, 107-109, 113-133, 218-225.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 186-189.

⁴¹ *Eesti vabadussõda 1918-1920* [Estonia's Fight for Freedom 1918-1920], Tallinn: Vabadussõja Ajaloo komitee, 1937-1939; I, pp. 53, 63-70, 525-526; E. Andersons, *1914-1920*, p.207.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Eesti vabadussõda*, I, pp. 70-71, 93-95; Kindral [General] Johan Unt, Tallinn: Kaitsevägeade Staabi, VI, Osakonna kirjastus, 1931, pp. 28-29, 31.

⁴⁴ Eesti, Haridusministeerium [Estonia, Department of Education], *Eesti Maa, Rahu ja Kultuur* [Estonia, People and Culture], Tartu, 1926, pp. 17-19, 34-37, 62, 268.

⁴⁵ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 225-226, 276-277, 301.

⁴⁶ *Eesti vabadussõda*, I, pp. 123-124; Johannes Tipner, *Punaarmee Eesti vaeosade võitlustest 1917-1920* [The Fights of the Estonian Units in the Red Army], Tallinn: Eesti riiklik kirjastus, 1957, pp. 20-22.

⁴⁷ Kari Archyvas, I, pp. 73-79, 84, 100-101, 234, 268, IV, 182-190.

⁴⁸ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, p. 209.

⁴⁹ *Eesti vabadussõda*, I, pp. 84-86; Unt, p. 34.

⁵⁰ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, p. 209.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 226-226.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 257-260, 301-309.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 310, 592.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 586-591.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 328-330; Winfried Baumgarten, *Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918*, München: Oldenbourg, 1966, pp. 240-241.

⁵⁷ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 624-626.

⁵⁸ Edgars Andersons, "British Policy Toward the Baltic States", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, October 1959, pp. 276-283, 285-286.

⁵⁹ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 475-494, 499-500.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 343-346.

⁶¹ Edgars Andersons, *British Policy*, pp. 277-278.

⁶² Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 394-398, 406-414, 427-441, 456-471.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 415-417; Edgars Andersons, "An Undeclared Naval War", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, April 1962, pp. 41-50.

⁶⁴ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 367-376.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 352-363.

⁶⁶ *Pirmasis nepriklausomos Lietuvos dešimtmetis 1918-1928*, Kaunas: Iðleido Vyriausias Lietuvos Nepriklausomybės 10 metu saukakatuvėms komitetas, 1930 [The First Ten Years of Lithuania 1918-1928, Kaunas: Highest Committee for the Preparation of the Tenth Anniversary of Lithuania's Independence, 1930], pp. 64-65; *Karo Archyvas I* [War Archives], pp. 140, 161; Friedrich Janz, *Die Entstehung des Memelgebietes* [The Origin of the Memel-Region], Berlin-Lichterfelde: Edwin Runge, 1928, pp. 59-60.

⁶⁷ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 490-492.

⁶⁸ Edgars Anderson, *Toward the Baltic Entente -*

The Initial Phase, p. 44.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

⁷⁰ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 553, 556, 568.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 506-536.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 536-537.

⁷³ J. Pukauskas, Jonas Steponavičius, *Lietuvos kariuomenė*, Kaunas: Iðleido Sajunga ginkluotoms krašto pajegoms remti [Lithuania's Army, edited by the Association for the Support of the Armed Forces of the Country], 1938, p. 8; Konstantinas Pukas, *Priilgnis i praeiti* [Look into the Past], Chicago: Terra, 1959, p. 394.

⁷⁴ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 568-575.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 367-375, 378-383, 394-398, 406-414, 434-441.

⁷⁶ Forschungsanstalt für Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, *Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps* [Research Institute for War and Military History, Descriptions of the Post-War Fights of German Troops and Volunteer Corps], Berlin: E.S. Mittler u. Sohn, 1936-1939, I, p. 128; II, p. 58; III, pp. 159, 161-162, 167-168, 203, 206-208.

⁷⁷ Edgars Andersons, *An Undeclared Naval War*, pp. 43-78.

⁷⁸ Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 404-406, 445, 552.

⁷⁹ Edgars Andersons, *Toward the Baltic Entente - The Initial Phase*, pp. 50-51.

⁸⁰ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, First Series, 1919-1929. ed. Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, Rohan Butler, J. P. T. Bury (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1947-1961), III, pp. 54, 69, 72-73, 81-82, 86-87, 93, 225. 81 *Les Problèmes de la Baltique*

(Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, Division des relations internationales et de l'éducation, Bulletin, No. 8/9, Publications de la Conciliation internationale, 1934), pp. 731-732; Frank Percy Crozier, *Impressions and Recollections* (London: T. W. Laurie, 1930), pp. 245-246.

⁸² Edgars Andersons, *1914-1920*, pp. 566-567, 584, 615.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 600.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 586-592.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 566-567.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 584.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 615.

⁸⁸ *USA, N.A.*, R.G. 59, 860. P 00/115; Germany, Foreign Office, Microcopy T-120, R. 1466, D 596533; 3. 2783, E 378494-95; *Latvju Enciklopēdija*, Stockholm: Trīs Zvaigznes, 1950-51, I, pp. 108-109, 528-529.

⁸⁹ *USA, N.A.*, R.G. 59, 860. I.00/71; 860. M.00/56; Fçliksks Cielçns, *Laikmeti maiòà* [The Change of Times], Stockholm: Memento, II, pp. 256-260, 349-374.

⁹⁰ Bilmanis, pp. 386-387.

⁹¹ League of Nations, *The Records of the First Assembly, 1920, Plenary Session, 27th Meeting, Annex 6*, pp. 634-636; John Spencer Bassett, *The League of Nations. A Chapter in World Politics*, London: Longman, Green & Co., 1928, pp. 101-102.

⁹² *British Documents*, First Series, XI, pp. 714-715, 732-737; League of Nations, *Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Sessions, 16th Plenary Meeting*, pp. 318-319, Annex A, 334; Cielçns, *Laikmeti maiòà* [The Change of Times], II, pp. 181-191.

⁹³ Former long-term Secretary of the War Minis-

try of Latvia, Pulkv. [Col.] Pčteris Kaðeps, letter from March 24, 1962.

⁹⁴ Edvards Virza, ed. *Z. A. Meirovics*, Riga: Z. A. Meirovica piemiõas fonda izdevums, 1935, pp. 85-86, 90-91; Vilhelms Munters, "Meirovica ārpolitikas orientācija [Orientation of Meirovics' Foreign Policy], in *Sjeijs*, Vol. I, No. 3 (1937), pp. 235-236; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 1466, D 595311-12.

⁹⁵ Pulkv. Pčteris Kaðeps, letter from March 24, 1962.

⁹⁶ Latvijas PSR Zinātdoku Akadēmija, Vēstures un materiālās kultūras institūts, *Latvijas PSR Vēsture*, III [Scientific Academy of the Latvian SSR, Institute of History and Material Culture, History of the Latvian SSR, Vol. III], ed. K. Strazdiņš, Riga, 1959, pp. 338, 356-361, 370-372; Jürgen von Hehn, *Die Entstehung der Staaten Lettland und Estland, der Bolschewismus und die Großmächte* [The Origin of the States of Estonia and Latvia, Bolshevism and Great Powers], ed. Horst Jablonovski, Werner Philipp, Vol. IV (Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin, Historische Veröffentlichungen, 1956, pp. 127-128, 163.

⁹⁷ *Latvijas PSR Vēsture*, III, pp. 232-239, 244-245, 247, 249, 156-258, 274; *USA, Nat. Arch.*, 860. P. pp. 18, 21; 860. P. pp. B/8, 14, 32, 860. I. 00/92; 860. N. 00/62; 860. P. 00/50; 860. I. 00/31, 33, 45, 60; 860. N. 00/55; 860. N. 00/B./3; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2778, E. 374516.

⁹⁸ Pulkv. Pčteris Kaðeps, letter from March 24, 1962.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Edgars Andersons, *British Policy*, pp. 276-289.

¹⁰² Edward W. Polson Newman, *Britain and the Baltic*, London: Methuen & Co., 1930, pp. 224-226; John Duncan Gregory, *On the Edge of Diplomacy (Rambles and Reflections 1902-1928)*, London: Hutchinson & Co., 1929, pp. 87-88.

¹⁰³ United States of America, Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia, 1918*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931-32, II, pp. 839-841, 849.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with the leader of the former intelligence service of the Eastern part of Poland, Jerpy Niezbrzycka (pseudonym: Richard Wraga) on July 11, 1964.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Jānis Ritenis, "Great Britain and the Baltic States During the Anglo-French and Soviet Talks of 1939", Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Politics, University of Adelaide, February 1966.

¹⁰⁷ Cap. Jerpy Niezbrzycka, interview on July 11, 1964.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Col. Edvins Mednis, letter from March 11, 1964; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2781, E. 377014-16; Sīpols, *Slepenā diplomātija* [Secret Diplomacy], pp. 81-84, 90-91, 96-98, 215-216; *USA, Nat. Arch.*, R. G. 165.

¹¹⁰ Edgars Andersons, "Toward the Baltic Union, 1920-1927", *Lituanus*, Vol. XII, No. 2 (1966), pp. 37-38, 44-45, 48.

¹¹¹ Col. Edvins Mednis, letter from March 11, 1964.

¹¹² Edgars Andersons, "Toward the Baltic Un-

ion, 1927-1934", *Lituanus*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1967), pp. 6-8; *USA, Nat. Arch.*, 860. P. 00/105; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2311, E 154-226; R. 2777, E 374025-26; R. 2779, E 374974-76.

¹¹³ Capt. Jerzy Niebrzycki, interview on July 11, 1964.

¹¹⁴ *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG, 165, DD 21/8, from September 20, 1935.

¹¹⁵ Col. Pčteris Kaðeps, letter from March 14, 1962.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Edgars Andersons, *1920-1927*, pp. 37, 49-50; Col. Pčteris Kaðeps, letter from March 14, 1962.

¹¹⁸ *USA, Nat. Arch.*, 860. I. 00/60, 61; 760. I. 6111/119, 120, 121; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 1466, D 596349, 51-52, 62, 68-71; R. 3605, E 685 736; Latvijas Saicima, VIII Session, 10th meeting, kol. 354-355; Sīpols, *Slepenā diplomātija*, pp. 132, 133, 139, 217, 220.

¹¹⁹ Col. Pčteris Kaðeps, letter from March 14, 1962.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *USA, Nat. Arch.*, 860. I. 00/141; 860. P. 00/102; Leonas Sabaliūnas, "The Politics of the Lithuanian-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 1926", *Lituanus*, Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 101.

¹²² Col. Pčteris Kaðeps, letter from March 14, 1962.

¹²³ Edgars Andersons, *1927-1934*, pp. 17-19, 22-28.

¹²⁴ Edgars Andersons, *1920-1927*, pp. 356-357, 42-44.

¹²⁵ *Latvia Country and People*, ed. Jānis Rutkis (Stockholm: Latvian National Foundation, 1967), p. 154.

¹²⁶ Lt. Col. Kārlis Augstkalns, letter from April 27, 1967.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Latvia Country and People*, pp. 302-303.

¹²⁹ *USA, Nat. Arch.*, Rg 165, 10641-355/5, 2621-74/1, 2587/52-6, 2621-53/7, 2667-D-59; Col.-Lieut. Kārlis Augstkalns, letter from April 27, 1967, May 5, 1967; League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book 1938* (Geneva: Series of League of Nations Publications, IX, Disarmament, C. 206, M. 112, 1938, IX), pp. 566-567; Kurt Passow *Taschenbuch des Heers, Ausgabe 1939* [Pocketbook of the Army, 1939 edition] (Munich, 1939), p. 229; *Latvija i ejo armija* (Moscow, 1938), pp. 60-61, 80-81; Col. Pēteris Kačēps, letter from January 23, 1963; Col.-Lieut. Jānis Druvaskalns, letter from March 19, 1963; Col.-Lieut. Kārlis Plūmanis, MS. 1962 (Mobilisation); Col.-Lieut. Jūlijs Īkulis, letter from January 13, 1964, February 17 and March 2, 1964; Gen. Voldemārs Škaistlauks, letter from March 21, 1962; Gen. Eduards Kalniņš, letter from August 20, 1962; Col.-Lieut. V. Ginters, letter from March 7, 1963; Col.-Lieut. K. Zīverts, letter from February, 1963; Capt. Adolfs Blāiis, letter from August 26 and October 19, 1963; Capt. Kārlis T. Dakteris, letter from April 29, 1967; Gen. Jānis Lavenieks, letter from July 12, 1962; Col.-Lieut. Pēteris Džērve, letter from December 10, 1962, and February 4, 1963; Capt. Antons Buls, letter from October 15, 1962, and August 4, 1967; Capt. Teodors Dreimanis, letter from January 24, 1962, and March 2, 1967; Col.-Lieut. Vilis Hāzners, January 31, 1967 (connection); Col.-Lieut. Jānis Rucels, August 3 and 16, 1962, March 18, 1967; Eng. Kārlis Irbitis, April

19, 1967; Capt. Edgars Mittenbergs, February 19 and August 26, 1962, March 18, 1967; Capt. Roberts Riks, December 16, 1960; Capt. Kārlis Ercums, November 2, 1968; Capt. Arvids Strazdiņš, November, 1962.

¹³⁰ Rutkis, pp. 237, 451-457; *Latvijas Tirdzniecības Flote* [Latvia's Merchant Fleet], 1934, 1940; Former Minister Dr. Alfreds Valdmanis, letter from February 15 and March 10, 1963; *Air Pictorial*, 1957, pp. 254-257; H. Volck, "The Irbitis Line"; Eng. K. Irbitis, letter from April 19 and 28, 1967.

¹³¹ Col.-Lieut. Kārlis Augstkalns, letter from August 8, 1962, April 27 and May 2, 1967; *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, 1064-355/5; Germany, Foreign Office, T-454, R. 92, 53 (Gen. Oskars Dankers).

¹³² *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, 2621-41/1; 2587-52/6; 2584-67/2; 10641-355/5.

¹³³ Villibald Raud, *Estonia*, New York: The Nordic Press, 1953, p. 33.

¹³⁴ Maj. Kohn Madise, letter from April 4, 1966; *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, S. 2503-118.

¹³⁵ Raud, p. 34.

¹³⁶ Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; Capt. Elmar Lipping, correspondence from 1966; *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, 2780-1; 2775-3/9; 2780-1, 2, 3, 5/1; 2881-DD-2. 7/1; 2584-44/7, 9, 10; 2737-18/1.

¹³⁷ Raud, pp. 73-76.

¹³⁸ *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, Estonia - *pasim*.

¹³⁹ Raud, p. 76.

¹⁴⁰ Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, November 20, 1937.

¹⁴¹ Germany, Foreign Office, MC T-120, R. 1807, 411573-75; Gen. Rudolfs Bangerskis, *Mana mīpa atmiņās* [Memories of My Life], Copenhagen:

Imanta, 1959, II, pp. 91-92.

¹⁴² *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6.

¹⁴³ Anicetas Simutis, *The Economic Reconstruction of Lithuania After 1918*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. 15-16.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-14.

¹⁴⁵ *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, 2587-55/1; 2587-53/6, 7, 11; 2724-DD-21/9; 10641-342/3; Gen Stasys Rastikis, letter from April 12, 1959, and January 4, 1963; interview on June 12, 1959; Gen. Mikas Reklaitis, letter from February 3 and 14, 1964; Col.-Lieut. Kazys Alikāuskas, "Lietuvos kariuomenė" (ms., 1958)

¹⁴⁶ Royal Institute, pp. 191-194.

¹⁴⁷ *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, 2587-52/7; 10641-342/3; Gen. Stasys Rastikis, letter from April 12, 1959, and January 4, 1963; interview on June 12, 1959.

¹⁴⁸ *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6; 2584-67; 10641-342/2.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 2584-67/2; Sīpols, *Dzimtenes nodevība* (Betrayal of the Fatherland), pp. 140-141.

¹⁵⁰ *USA, Nat. Arch.*, RG 165, 2584-67/1, 2731-10/1; RG 84, 760. M. 605/48 Bangerskis, II, p. 93.