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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE REVIEW PAPERS:

AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

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FOREWORD

Canada's defence policy review statement is slated to be released in May 2017, a week or two before Prime Minister Justin Trudeau travels to Brussels on May 25 for a meeting with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) heads of state. All of them are expected to be there: on April 12, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited the White House to ensure that US President Donald Trump attends the summit as well.

Trump is also the main reason why Canadians are still waiting to see this important policy document. Drafted in 2016 following an extensive review, the white paper — its actual title has not been made public — has probably been continuously updated since then in order to account for a new sense of uncertainty that the actions of the new US administration has generated about the future of international order in general and of Canada–US relations in particular.

An ever-more intense demand from Washington that "most of its allies" increase their military spending is symptomatic of these larger transformations. This is a clear complication for Canada. According to the latest federal budget, defence remains a lower priority item. Citing a larger-than-projected deficit at $29.4 billion — now projected to fall to $14.4 billion by 2020–21 — the Trudeau government moved to "re-profile" billions in new capital funding at the Department of National Defence. What this means is that new warplane, warship, and other big-ticket purchases are delayed until the 2020s.

The new white paper may or may not address these realities directly. Far more likely is a general statement of how growing instability and new challenges mark the global security environment, thus adding new complexity to the roles and tasks that the Canadian Armed Forces will undertake at home and overseas. But beyond finessing the Trump effect and the lack of the money for defence in one way or another, what else will this new document do?

This policy brief provides some context for looking at this question. It does so through a compelling compare-and-contrast of the ways in which the reigning white papers of Canada's three key allies — Australia, France, and the United Kingdom — approach their strategic outlook, force acquisition, and defence spending.

This brief is also the first in what I hope will become a series of student-authored policy briefs published by the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS). Its eleven authors — Yerke Abildayeva, Mustapha Ali-Hashi, Zainab Feroz, Robertho Day Isaac, Alexander Marquardt, Maxime Perreault-Varin, Edin Sabotic, Marc L. Tremblay, Mackenzie Waddell-Harris, Ryan Ward, Heidi Zaker — were all students in API6339 The Economics and Politics of Canadian Defence, an MA-level class I co-

taught at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) in Winter 2017 with Dr. Binyam Solomon, Senior Defence Scientist, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis at Defence Research and Development Canada. (Suffice it to say, although the content of this course informs the content of the brief, the final responsibility for the arguments and judgments in this document rests with the authors.) Beginning with the relatively spare theoretical formulation of concepts such as "national interest" and "strategy," the authors examine how the three documents issued by Canada's allies between 2013 and 2016 deal with the perennials of defence white paper writing, from explaining to the pursuit of strategic aims at the national level to estimating the pace of transformation in world politics to addressing procurement as well as recruitment and retention challenges.

In doing this, the authors make two compelling contributions. One is designing a basic codebook for interpreting how white papers — and arguably all similar policy documents — frame problems and solutions, challenges and opportunities. The other is an informed opinion on the ways in which a close reading of Australian, British, and French white papers could inform debate and discussions of the incoming Canadian white paper. Read it and learn from it.

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INTRODUCTION

This report provides a comparative analysis of defence review papers (DRP). The report compares three documents published by the Australian, British, and French governments: Australia's 2016 Defence White Paper (WP), the UK's National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2015 (NSS & SDSR), and France's Livre blanc : Défense et sécurité nationale, 2013. Each paper assesses national security strategy and objectives, identifies national security risks, and outlines how they intend to address these risks.

The report begins by describing the context surrounding the development of the DRPs, and includes details such as the development process, number of documents published, and time horizons. The report then explores key themes identified through content analysis, including national interest categories, values and strategy, alliances, emerging norms, personnel and resources, defence spending, and procurement strategy. The report concludes by acknowledging the different approaches to defence and security, and suggests how insights from this comparative analysis can inform Canadian defence policy.

CONTEXT

The change in security environments is a common catalyst for development across all three papers. The emergence of new challenges including regional tensions, terrorism, and the threat of cyber-attacks calls for new strategies, capabilities, and spending. Further, each paper voices dissatisfaction with past defence reviews. Australia's capability plans have previously been criticized for being disconnected from defence strategy and budget. The 2010 UK review was criticized for being a treasury-led review, dictated by budgetary considerations, rather than a strategic assessment of the resources needed by the armed forces.1 The 2015 UK document was also developed in response to Russia's actions on NATO's eastern flank, as well as the end of their Afghanistan operations, which differentiates it from Australia and France. The rapid rise of China is a reason behind Australia's WP development. France's assessment for a new review is broader in nature; it refers to major economic and international changes since its last WP in 2008.

The development process is consistent across all papers. All documents incorporated input received through a consultation process with politicians, research institutions, industry experts, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations. The French WP explicitly refers to alliance white papers (UK 2010, USA 2010) as part of its consultation efforts. A whole-of-government approach was chosen for the development of all three documents. The UK publication, led by the Cabinet Office, encompassed a broad range of departments, including the Home Office, the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).2 The Ministry of Defence alone led previous security reviews. The Australian process involved the Department of Defence, Veteran's Affairs, Immigration, Border Protection, and Foreign Affairs and Trade. Lastly, the French government sought input from Parliament, the National Intelligence Commission, Overseas France, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and the Economy, the Interior, Defence, and Higher Education and Research.

Interestingly, each country published a different number of documents. The UK NSS & SDSR were merged into a single document for the first time in 2015, which links defence strategy with decisions on investments and capabilities. The UK also separately published a government-led National Security Risk Assessment. In contrast, Australia's WP is a part of a new "defence trilogy" approach, comprising an Integrated Investment Program (IIP) and a Defence Industry Policy Statement (DIPS). While the French WP is a single document, the government has also published key

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[1] House of Commons Library, "The 2015 SDSR: A Primer" (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 19 November 2015), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7235, p. 4.

[2] Ibid., p. 3.

supporting documents, such as the "Horizons Stratégiques" slides or the 30-year forward-looking plan "PP30."

The UK document presents no legal commitment. However, for it to be seen as "credible," each of the 89 commitments it sets out must be "implemented, followed through and monitored."3 To meet this objective, a new Sub-Committee of the National Security Council was created and tasked with overseeing implementation. The Australian publication encompasses a similar set of recommendations. The newly repositioned Australian Defence Committee is held responsible for the leadership, coordination, and implementation efforts for the changes proposed by the document. The French WP, although initiated by virtue of a legislative presidential decree, does not rely on legal binding for its recommendations.4 The Livre Blanc did, however, call for the drafting of a Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM), or law for military programming, which is a national defence spending law.

The time horizons differ for each document. The Australian paper places heavy emphasis on the medium term, providing a detailed 10-year spending plan. It also includes a 25-year strategic outlook. The rationale for this decision is to deliver a strong long-term plan that incorporates necessary funding for infrastructure, skills, and capabilities. The timeframe for France's white paper extends over 15 years to ensure long-term security though the defence strategy will be revised every 5 years. The UK sets out its national security strategy for five years (2015–2020); the coalition government in 2010 pledged to undertake a review every five years to avoid the gap that had developed between the 2010 SDSR and its predecessor, the 1998 Defence and Security Review.5 However, the recent change in the political environment because of Brexit may require a new security review before 2020.6 The UK Government did, however, publish an official policy document in February 2017 underlining the themes of their goals for negotiations with the EU, such as trade, immigration, sovereignty, and border controls between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.7

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3 Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: First Report of Session 2016–17* (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2017), https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtnatsec/153/153.pdf, p. 37.

4 République de France, *Livre blanc : Défense et sécurité nationale, 2013* (Direction de l'information légale et administrative, Paris, 2013), http://www-dam.cea.fr/missions/docs/Livre-blanc-sur-la-Defense-et-la-Securite-nationale-2013.pdf, p. 148.

5 House of Commons Library, "The 2015 SDSR," p. 3.

6 Malcolm Chalmers, "Would a New SDSR Be Needed After a Brexit Vote?" (Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016), https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/chalmers_brexit_sdsr.final_.pdf

7 BBC News, "Brexit Plan Published in Government White Paper," 2 February 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38836906.

NATIONAL INTEREST

The protection of national security is identified as the most important national interest category across all three documents. In France, the "protection of the national territory, its population, and French nationals abroad is a vital and fundamental obligation of the State." Similarly, in Australia, the highest priority of the government is to "keep our nation safe and protect our way of life for future generations." Lastly, in the UK, the first national security objective is to "protect the people" at home, in their overseas territories, and abroad. The UK and Australia briefly discuss the importance of sovereignty as part of the overall objective to protect national security, whereas France emphasizes preserving sovereignty in all circumstances throughout its paper. A parallel across all three countries is the extension of the territorial definition of security to incorporate cyber security, thus reflecting the growth of non-traditional threat vectors. See Appendix A for a comparison of national interest categories.

National security is deeply intertwined with prosperity. For each country, prosperity is key to achieving national security objectives. Whereas France's idea of economic prosperity is closely linked to the prosperity of the European Union, both Australia and the UK clearly identify the interdependence between prosperity and security. The UK treats national security and prosperity as two sides of the same coin, as evidenced in the Prime Minister's Foreword, where David Cameron states, "Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa." The UK paper sets out investments to meet the range of threats, while recognizing the imperatives of balanced budgets and the importance of trade and worldwide prosperity to national well-being. In fact, the UK paper has been criticized, with commentators arguing that national security remains of secondary importance to prosperity.

A notable difference among the three countries is the UK's national security objective to project global influence and the role of the armed forces in achieving this objective. In the UK, force projection is viewed as the overall purpose of the armed forces. The nation's image as a "guardian of global order" is evident in the DRP; a national security strategy aims to strengthen the armed forces so they remain world leading. Although France and Australia both aim to enhance armed forces capabilities, the notion of global influence is not incorporated into their respective strategies.

VALUES AND STRATEGY

In order to achieve domestic security goals, both Australia and France produced strategies that involve investing in enhanced defence capabilities, ensuring that defence forces and security-related organizations have the necessary resources to carry out projects and missions. Both countries also define links to their national

research and development sectors as key partners in meeting security goals. Interestingly, the UK mainly defined its security strategy with respect to "softer" approaches such as building diverse and integrated communities.

On the international scale, Australia's and France's conceptions of security are intrinsically linked with secure and stable nearer regions so alliances are a crucial aspect in maintaining each nation's respective national security. While Australia and the UK explicitly link their alliances and partnerships to defending a rules-based international order, France indirectly mentions this as part of its desire to continue with NATO missions.

CHALLENGES AND THREATS

To reiterate, France and Australia complement each other in their identification of the gap between defence capabilities and available funding and resources as a key domestic challenge for their respective DRP. Notably, both DRPs also indirectly fault past governments in allowing the funding-capability gap to reach its current state. Meanwhile, public health and major natural disasters, including disaster response, are stressed as domestic challenges for the UK.

Not surprisingly, all three countries converge in their assessment of instability and uncertainty in the security environment as the key international challenge facing defence. This includes failed states and the related proliferation of non-state actors engaged in international terrorism, more complex future conflicts that involving cyber threat elements, or the possibility of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks, the increasing militarization of states, and the proliferation of weapons. Both France and the UK mention health related challenges, environmental events such as natural catastrophes, as well as the growth of organized crime as other crucial threats. Interestingly, only the UK included resource insecurity as a future challenge, which perhaps speaks to its situation as a resource-deprived nation reliant on trade.

OPPORTUNITIES

Given these challenges, all three countries recognize the need to match strategy and capability plans for their defence forces with appropriate, sufficient, and most importantly, available resources and investments. For Australia, an essential element of this is investing heavily in partnerships with both the domestic defence industry and the science and technology research organizations. France also defines autonomous R&D capacities as crucial to implementing its DRP. Australia is also distinct in that its approach to addressing challenges involves both cultural and organizational reform through the implementation of the First Principles Review.

Both countries also acknowledge the role of enhanced intelligence capabilities as a key means of deterrence, part of an effective prevention and protection strategy. In particular, Australia focuses on investing in a more agile and potent defence force, and decreasing bureaucratic hurdles in the provision of security. Moreover, Australia and France emphasize how joint responses and international defence partnerships based on shared security interests are key to achieving defence strategy goals.

ALLIANCES

Economists, historians, and political scientists have long studied the role of alliances in national defence production. All three white papers indeed underscore the centrality of alliances and, more generally, relationships with partners, including multilateral organizations. Bilaterally, Australia and the UK discuss the special relationship with the United States. The US and NATO were first addressed in the British paper, affirming that they remain the touchstone of UK security. Similarly, Australia emphasized the US as a key strategic partner.

A significant difference between Australia, France, and the UK is regional alliances. France places strong emphasis on European security, recommending improvements to the structure of the EU to enhance the security of its members. The UK discusses the "Euro-Atlantic Area" and the importance of key Eastern European and Scandinavian defence partners. Australia's regional alliances differ; it has a strong South-Pacific defence and security alliance, particularly with New Zealand and the US. Further, Australia seeks to strengthen regional security architectures that support transparency and co-operation by working with the Five Power Defence Arrangement and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus.

NATO is a common alliance across the three countries and a foundation of British Security. The UK commitment to NATO is affirmed through its target of spending 2% of GDP on defence. Australia, although not a formal member, refers to co-operation with NATO within its global partnerships framework in order to achieve rules-based international order. NATO is also a pillar of the French defence policy; however, France stresses that NATO must "take into account the differences of priorities that require each member of this Alliance to assume their own responsibilities." Throughout its paper, France emphasizes its strategic autonomy, underpinned by national ownership of its essential defence and security capabilities. France is fully committed to NATO, but stresses the importance of maintaining its own decision-making autonomy and freedom of action.

EMERGING NORMS

The most important emerging norm in defence is the dynamic security environment. Cyber defence as a new strategic context is illustrative of an emerging norm. All the DRPs discuss increasing capabilities to combat new threats, including cyber threats. This encompasses an increase in research and development (R&D) to ensure the armed forces are capable of dealing with such threats. The amount of emphasis each country places on cyber threats illustrates the need to redefine attacks as no longer strictly physical, but also occurring in the cyber world. This development requires an innovative response and an increased partnership with the defence industry to enhance science and technology research while increasing defence capabilities. An example of such an innovative response by the UK is the Joint Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities Group.

Climate change is mentioned across all three documents, though the attention given to the topic varies. The Australian WP says climate change will exacerbate natural disasters and extreme weather, thereby threatening economic development and food security. Climate change is mentioned several times in the document, though mostly in the context of emerging challenges. The Australian document provides a simplistic focus on climate change and does not expand, but its mention as a topic of concern for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) suggests that climate change should be regarded as a tangible threat likely to play an uncertain future role.

The French WP offers a similar explanation, adding that regions already affected by extreme weather will most likely suffer in the future as climate change increases its frequency and severity. The French publication differs in its acknowledgement of changing sea-lanes as Arctic ice recedes, thereby making the claim that new sea routes will bring new strategic considerations. The British publication frames climate change as a factor in threatening food security and population growth, thereby creating instability in some of the world's most vulnerable regions. The authors use the Middle East and Africa as their examples of regions most likely to be affected negatively by climate change. They conclude that changing weather patterns will disrupt all facets of life in vulnerable regions, making political instability and violence all the more likely.

While all three publications discuss climate change, and express largely similar concerns, the British WP is the most explicit in its belief of the implications of climate change for future generations. The French are unique in mentioning the changing Arctic geography as an emerging strategic consideration. The lengths to which each paper discusses climate change (disclaimer: discussion is brief) suggests they do not yet preoccupy the WP authors as a top factor, but their mention shows foresight, and a subtle acknowledgement that climate change will become a potential driver of regional and world instability.

Diversity is another emerging norm. Two countries explicitly addressed the issue of diversity within defence. The UK stated that their defence industry workforce would be 15% female by 2020. They will also review whether women should take a full role in armed combat. Contrary to the 15% the UK is striving for and the belief that women may not be able to fulfill a full combat role, Australia stated that 15% of the ADF is already female, which is an underrepresentation of women. It is Australia's goal to increase this figure, ensuring that the women recruited can attain all jobs, with an emphasis on high-level positions. France defines its personnel as interchangeable by using the phrase "our women and men."

Lastly, mental health was a very important issue raised in the Australian WP; a full section is dedicated to detailing how they will look after their "people." This was unique to the Australian WP. Australia is trying to develop a new norm of intensive care during and after service to active personnel, their families, and veterans.

PERSONNEL

The personnel policies found in the UK DRP are the most conservative. The DRP commits to maintaining the current size of the British armed forces, although it rebalances personnel slightly in favour of the navy and air force (700 personnel in total). However, there is a significant increase (1,900 personnel) planned for Britain's security and intelligence agencies. In regard to the working and living conditions of service members, the DRP promises initiatives to improve work/life balance, promote diversity, and make it easier to transfer between the reserves and regular forces. Overall, the British paper devotes little space to personnel issues.

Australia's DRP, on the other hand, devotes a large section to personnel issues. A number of initiatives to improve conditions of life for service members and to promote diversity are announced. The improvement of conditions for service members is promoted primarily as an aid to recruitment. The DRP notes that, in current Australian society, it is now more difficult to interest individuals in military careers, and therefore greater incentives are required to attract recruits. Diversity initiatives are justified in similar terms, but also in "integrationist" terms, as a necessary harmonization of the armed forces with broader Australian values. Although the number of personnel is set to increase by 2,500, the overall percentage of the budget devoted to personnel will be reduced. Australia plans to specialize in high-tech, capital-intensive defence sectors, relying on allies able to deploy large numbers of personnel at a lower marginal cost.

The French WP largely rejects the "integrationist" framework found in its Australian counterpart. The "special status" of the armed forces is repeatedly reaffirmed, as are the particular demands of military service. However, the French WP displays

sensitivity to the difficulty of attracting recruits in modern affluent societies and proposes improved training opportunities, grievance procedures, and prospects for promotion to entice recruits. Although the WP calls for a reduction in the defence workforce by 34,000, this is justified by the necessity of cutting costs, rather than by considerations of marginal cost and alliance co-operation, as in the Australian case.

DEFENCE SPENDING

National security strategy drives defence spending (see Appendix B for a cross-country comparison). Australia shows the greatest commitment to increasing defence spending; this is likely due to the difference in strategic situation of the three countries. France and the UK both enjoy a highly formal alliance with the United States and NATO, as well as with friendly countries in Europe. The spillovers from these alliances restrain the demand for defence expenditure in these countries. Australia, however, is geographically isolated and enjoys a less formal alliance with the United States. For this reason, Australia is increasing its spending rapidly, so that it can effectively strengthen the capacity of its local partners, showing a willingness to contribute to its own defence, thus attracting American support.

A significant common point in the spending priorities of all three countries is the concerted focus on intelligence. This not only involves expanding intelligence organizations, but also investing in new and upgraded intelligence-gathering equipment. This is a key aspect of modernization for all three countries.

The defence reviews serve as an operational guide for defence budgets. Australia's plans are fully costed; the paper places heavy emphasis on the importance of predictability, both for the ADF and for the defence industry. It is therefore expected that the Australian budget will be subject to less revision than that of the UK or France. In the UK case, the paper was planned in parallel with the Spending Review, which sets out budget allocations to government departments, including those charged with the implementation of the defence and security review.

PROCUREMENT STRATEGY

The Australian government used its DRP as an opportunity to align defence industry investment with defence capability needs. The 10-year defence plan provides the funds needed to carry out the IIP released alongside the DRP. The IIP signals to the defence industry the capability needs of the ADF so industrial partners may shift their operations to providing the capability needs outlined in the DRP. Theoretically, this will eliminate the asymmetry of information between the defence industry and the government. The paper's plan for the defence industry emphasizes integration into global supply chains and export competitiveness rather than an attempt at autarchy.

Major procurement projects include the government's decision to support the continuous building of ships in Australia, thereby sustaining jobs and creating prolonged contracts for domestic shipbuilders.

The French WP acknowledges the defence industry as crucial to equipping the armed forces to satisfy capability needs. Budget reductions threaten the defence industry and many firms are concentrated in select regions, thereby endangering the livelihood of regional workers. Therefore, the focus is on maintaining certain industries that are key to a sovereign defence industry, and on the protection of industry worker jobs. Public investment in defence industries must be maintained to meet the needs of the military, thereby sustaining jobs, providing the right tools to the armed forces, and driving research and development that may carry over into the civilian market. The French WP plans to continue supporting exporters and acquiring equipment to satisfy NATO requirements.

The UK DRP pledges to spend £178 billion on defence equipment through 2024–25, and has created partnerships with the defence industry to drive competitiveness and support exporters. The DRP calls for launching a defence innovation initiative and publishing a national shipbuilding strategy that debuted in 2016. All efforts are made to "drive" the defence industry and to maintain leading technologies, including mutually beneficial collaborations with international partners. The MoD also plans to use a new independent procurement regulator to oversee the acquisition of new frigates and submarines. All three statements emphasize internationally competitive and globally integrated defence industries, a position beneficial in economic terms but one that raises questions regarding emergency preparedness and the "surge capacity" of local defence industries.

CONCLUSION

The Australian, French, and British papers have different approaches to the defence review process. However, they share many similarities, as evidenced through key themes that drive national security strategies, including common national interests, threats, alliances, and emerging norms. Further, each country progressively builds a policy rationale and narrative in sequential steps. Each begins by defining the nation's place in the world, followed by an analysis of the regional and global strategic outlook. Each nation then defines the defence strategy they intend to follow, incorporating a discussion of the defence capabilities they aim to maintain or acquire. Lastly, there is a discussion of financial considerations. This systematic approach avoids the danger of presenting a simple "shopping list" of desired capabilities, and provides a basis for future re-evaluation and modification of projects and priorities in response to changing circumstances.

One particular strength of the Australian WP is its rigorous costing and focus on predictability. This is facilitated by the separation of the WP from the more detailed investment and industrial strategy papers, which can be modified while maintaining the more general commitments in the WP. The UK, in contrast, seems to risk excessive future modification by combining its defence and security policies in one document.

The national security green paper released by the Canadian government in 2016 suggests that for the time being, security and defence papers should remain separate as per the Australian model. If information released in the 2016 green paper is incorporated into the upcoming Canadian white paper, then the Canadian government may take a similar approach to their British counterparts. At present, however, the Canadian government's national security and defence policy objectives remain separate.

The British paper provides a model in terms of recovering from a damaging period of austerity. By emphasizing stability and the slow growth of funding commitments, the British paper maps out an approach for restoring defence capacity after a period of funding reductions, while avoiding excessive commitments that are likely not to be met. However, given Canada's reluctance to allocate resources to defence, this model may not be applicable to our circumstances. Rather, the French WP, with its emphasis on efficiency and restrained spending targets, more closely resembles Canada's likely future funding trajectory. In this regard, it is important to note the French WP's careful attention to strategy and the required capabilities to implement this strategy. In this way, the paper ensures that cost-efficiency will not come at the expense of core capabilities. This provides a model for Canada in pursuing genuine efficiency rather than cost-savings at the expense of national interest.

Since the 2017 federal budget did not indicate an increase in defence spending, but rather deferred spending, the upcoming Canadian white paper may have to redefine its strategies and priorities in order to match strategy to budget realistically. Should this be the case, the French WP may well be the best point of comparison since it gives most detail on how to tailor national defence strategy in light of the budgetary challenges. This report acknowledges that the experience of these nations will not translate directly into the Canadian context; it also acknowledges that a good defence review alone does not guarantee effective defence policies. Rather, effective implementation mechanisms and a supportive political environment are required to ensure that a defence strategy is effectively carried out. We hope that this comparative analysis will provide important strategic insights worth considering in evaluating Canadian defence policy.

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APPENDIX A: COMMON NATIONAL INTEREST CATEGORIES

Australia	France	United Kingdom
The safety and security of the Australian people	Protect national territory and French nationals abroad	Protect the people
ADF capabilities	Guaranteeing the ability to complete military missions	Renewed investment and spending in defence capabilities
A secure, resilient Australia	Protection of French territory	Domestic resilience
The government is strengthening defence's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities	Sufficient authority and power to intelligence agencies and special forces	Increase the capabilities of the armed forces and intelligence services
Deepening regional and international security partnerships	Security of the EU and Europe	UK's security relationships with states and multilateral organizations in the "Euro-Atlantic area
Work closely with our ally the United States and other international partners	Co-operation with NATO allies (US, Canada) to guarantee security of Europe and North Atlantic space	NATO and the US remain the touchstones of UK security
Opportunities to increase Australia's economy and security as the Indo-Pacific region grows in economic and strategic weight	Economic independence	Promote economic prosperity
Stable rules-based global order	Contribution to an international order based on peace, justice, and the rule of law	Help strengthen the rules-based international order and its institutions
Provide domestic counter-terrorism support when necessary	The anti-terrorism plan enables a global approach to the terrorist threat both on the national territory and to	Tackle terrorism head-on at home and abroad in a tough and comprehensive way, counter extremism, and

	our interests outside France	challenge the poisonous ideologies that feed it
To counter the growing threat of cyber-attack, the government is improving our national cyber security capabilities	The capacity to detect and protect ourselves against cyber attacks	Remain a world leader in cyber security
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations	Peace building therefore requires a global approach, including a consistent political strategy with all the levers available to the international community able to come to the aid of countries in crisis or threatened by crisis	Expand our world-leading soft power and our global reach to promote our values and interests, using our diplomats and development assistance
The government will recognize the fundamental input to defence capability provided by the Australian defence industry to ensure it delivers the support defence needs	The defence industry is a key component of France's strategic autonomy	Working with industry to ensure we have the capabilities and equipment that we need

Interests and Relationships (Number of mentions)

	Autonomy/ Self-Reliance	Alliance/ Partnership	Rules-based Global/ International Order
France	19	55	7
United Kingdom	0	66	28
Australia	2	57	49

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APPENDIX B: DEFENCE SPENDING

Australia	France	United Kingdom
Defence budget of $32.2B in 2016–17	Invest €174.2B between 2014–19 (5-year plan)	£34.4B for 2015–16
Committed to reach $42.4B by 2020–21	€364B between 2014–2025 (10-year plan)	£38.1B by 2019–20
$58.7B by 2025–26		Promises to meet NATO target spending of 2% GDP on defence
Investment plan allocates approximately $195B in the decade up to 2025–26 for investment in new and enhanced capabilities		

APPENDIX C: DEFENCE REVIEW CODEBOOK

QUESTION INDEX	PART I
1	Country Name
2	How many defence documents have been published?
3	What is this defence document primarily about? (in order of importance)
4	Catalyst for document development?
5	How was this document developed?
6	Number of documents? If there is more than 1 document, what are the additional documents for?
7	Does this document require legislative approval?
8	Was there a joint effort between different government departments + agencies in developing the defence document (Y/N)? List the contributors.
9	How is defence handled institutionally in the jurisdiction? (Who is responsible?)
	PART II
10	What are the frames used to define national security, values, security, and strategy? (Domestic)
11	What are the frames used to define national security, values, security, and strategy? (International)
12	What domestic challenges are identified for the country's particular defence policy? (in order of importance)
13	What international challenges are identified for the country's particular defence policy? (in order of importance)

14	Who is identified as the leading cause of the Q10? (in order of importance)
15	Who is identified as the leading cause of the Q11? (in order of importance)
16	What are the frames used to identify opportunities for achieving national security via defence policy? (Domestic)
17	What are the frames used to identify opportunities for achieving national security via defence policy? (International)
18	How are alliances and bi-/multi- relations with other states discussed? What states/alliances are explicitly mentioned?
19	What is the nature of the solution? (Domestic)
20	What is the nature of the solution? (International)
21	Who is identified in relation to the solution in Q14?
22	Who is identified in relation to the solution in Q15?
23	Does the defence document discuss emerging norms such as gender, technology? If so, in what context?
	PART III
24	Does the defence document serve as an operational guide for the budget?
25	How much money does the defence document state the country will spend, and by when?
26	Does the defence document discuss defence spending as % of GDP? If so, what % of GDP are they planning on spending and by when?
27	Is there any indication as to where most of the investment will be placed? (in order of importance)
28	Does the defence document discuss a defence procurement strategy?

29	Does the defence document discuss personnel (FTEs)? Will there be an increase or decrease in FTEs?
	PART IV
30	What is the proposed time frame the defence document covers?
31	How many years (exactly) does the defence document cover?
32	Is a rationale provided for proposed time frame covered by the defence document?
33	Are there any review and evaluation strategies for the implementation of the defence document?
34	When is the next defence document slated for?

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