Examining the Urban Dimension of the Security Sector

Research Report

Project Title:
Providing Security in Urban Environments:
The Role of Security Sector Governance and Reform

Project supported by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and
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List of Abbreviations

DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
EFUS	European Forum for Urban Security
EU	European Union
FARC	*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
HNP	Haitian National Police
ICCS	International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IOC	International Olympic Committee
MOUT	military operations in urban terrain
OG	Olympic Games
PMSCs	private military and security companies
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SENASP	Brazilian Ministry of Justice's National Public Secretariat
SSG	security sector governance
SSR	security sector reform
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WB	World Bank

1 Introduction: The New Urban Security Disorder

1.1 Puzzle and research problem

The notion that "the majority of the world's population is living in cities" has become one of the most recurrent catchphrases in contemporary scholarship pertaining to cities and urban issues, and is raised throughout diverse bodies of literature.[1] While more than half of the population of developed countries has resided in urban areas since the 1950s, only in 2008-09 is the global urbanisation rate said to have surpassed 50 percent. It is estimated that by 2020 more than half of the developing countries' populations will be living in urban areas – and that by 2037 half of the world's population will be living in cities and towns located in developing countries. Each month, five million people are added to cities in the developing world.[2] It is also expected that certain sub-groups of the population will be particularly affected by city-specific issues, as is the case with women and girls. Notably, it is predicted that "approximately 1.5 billion girls will live in urban areas" by 2030.[3]

In addition to growing urbanisation, the phenomenon of "urban gentrification" has become an increasingly salient issue.[4] Gentrification[5] is the process through which property prices are driven up due to an influx of wealthy residents and businesses in neighbourhoods previously inhabited by less well-off segments of the population. As property prices and living costs rise, residents who can no longer afford to live there often need to relocate to less pricy neighbourhoods, usually farther away from the city centre. Although gentrification is regarded by many as a normal and inevitable component of urban dynamics, it is also seen as potentially dangerous for social cohesion. Shifting demographics and the increasing homogenisation of certain neighbourhoods can lead to social fragmentation, which may cause insecurity and conflict. Such social or class divides generate considerable issues for urban security sector governance. Underprivileged areas or neighbourhoods have gradually developed on the outskirts of many majors cities, in part as a result of gentrification. Some of these, such as the "favelas"[6] in Brazilian cities or the "cités"[7] and "banlieues"[8] of France have faced significantly higher levels of criminality and socio-economic issues.

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[1] While, A. and Whitehead, M., 'Cities, Urbanisation and Climate Change', *Urban Studies*, vol. 50, no. 7 (1 May 2013): 1325.

[2] Plan International, Women in Cities International, UN-HABITAT, "Because I am a Girl: The State of the World's Girls 2010" (2010), *Digital and Urban Frontiers: Girls in a Changing Landscape,* Plan International: http://plan-international.org/girls/pdfs/BIAAG_2010_EN2.pdf, cited in "Adolescent Girls' Views on Safety in Cities: Findings from the Because I am a Girl Urban Programme study in Cairo, Delhi, Hanoi, Kampala, and Lima" (2010), https://plan-international.org/publications/adolescent-girls%E2%80%99-views-safety-cities, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[3] Ibid.

[4] D.K., 'What is Driving Urban Gentrification?', *The Economist*, 17 September 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/09/economist-explains-5, accessed on 28 November 2017; Shea, M., 'Berliners Are Waging a War Against Gentrification", *VICE*, 6 April 2013, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/9bn4x3/berlins-war-against-gentrification, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[5] A definition of "gentrification" is provided in chapter 2.1.

[6] A definition of "favela" is provided in chapter 2.1.

[7] A definition of "cités" is provided in chapter 2.1.

[8] A definition of "banlieues" is provided in chapter 2.1.

Thus, urbanisation presents a double-edged sword. While urban areas offer certain advantages over rural areas, such as economic opportunities, increased socialization and relatively high living standards, they also pose evolving and complex security and development challenges. Many cities suffer from weak or illegitimate governance, as well as ineffective structures for providing security, social services and rule of law. In particular, developing countries have suffered from both urban migration and weak governance.[9] This further contributes to the sustained presence of conflict and instability in urban environments and the subsequent need for urgent improvements in governance capacity to ensure that principles of good security sector governance (SSG) are implemented. Security sector reform (SSR) activities play a key role in this process.

This study argues that the urban context presents a microcosm wherein one might observe debates and developments on SSG and SSR that also take place at the national level – with relevant challenges and opportunities, applied practices and lessons learned from past or ongoing attempts to provide security for both people and the state. Moreover, as certain threats are more predominant in urban contexts, greater attention must be paid to the effectiveness, efficiency and democratic oversight of security institutions designed and responsible for meeting these specific threats. In urban contexts, security is provided by a range of parties. These include formal actors, such as the police, and informal actors, such as private military and security companies (PMSCs) and militias. In addition, oversight, management and governance bodies at state and community levels include city parliaments and state executives, as well as local grassroots and civil society groups.

The project started under the assumption that the urban environment poses a complex set of conceptual and empirical issues for research on security sector governance and reform, possibly pointing to a unique "urban security sector". If there is such a thing as an urban security sector, distinct from a national security sector, issues such as urban planning, urban-focused human security and human development in cities become relevant to security sector reform efforts. Important differences also arise between and among urban environments, requiring one to distinguish "megacities"[10] from other cities, capital cities from non-capital cities, and various forms of urban systems. Local forms of empowerment must be discerned, specifically in cities plagued by gang violence or corrupt police where the lines between formal and informal security sectors may be blurred.

However, it is not clear whether a unique "urban security sector" exists, whether it can be conceptualised as such, or whether it is merely a result of the national security sector's organizational dynamics that trickle down to the city level. While an analysis of urban security dynamics cannot be done in isolation of the country-level dynamics, the unit of analysis guiding this study is the city. This has been done to determine the similarities, differences and links between national and urban security sectors, which includes governance and reform dynamics. This study also investigates whether states distinguish between national and urban security visions, and if the urban context is treated as a separate entity in security sector governance practices and reform planning.

[9] This was acknowledged by UNICRI, see: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 'Urban Security', n.d., http://www.unicri.it/topics/urban_security/, accessed on 28 November 2017.
[10] A definition of "megacity" is provided in chapter 2.1.

The study aims to show that urban security sector dynamics differ depending on whether the city is situated in a developed, developing, fragile and conflict-affected, or post-conflict context.

The background research for this study emphasised that the urban environment has been largely overlooked as a unique setting for SSG/R in existing research, policy debates and practice. Similarly, while vast amounts of literature exist on urban violence and safety issues, the role of SSG/R in providing effective, efficient, people-centred and democratically controlled security has largely been ignored. Many policy studies that cover urban violence and its impact on development, livelihoods, health, poverty and humanitarian action have been published by the World Bank (WB), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and numerous think tanks, such as the Small Arms Survey. However, a considerable research gap remains on the intersection between urban violence, stability and institutions addressing security and justice issues. In light of growing interest and investment in urban safety and security, exemplified by the provisions of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11-Sustainable Cities and Communities, increasing our understanding of the urban security sector has never been more timely.

1.2 Purpose and research objectives

Project objectives

The principle objective of this project is to increase our knowledge of the security sector in urban environments. Based on information compiled through an extensive analysis of research conducted on the topic and a multi-city mapping exercise, the study was expected to contribute mainly to conceptual research on urban challenges and requirements for SSG/R. The template developed for studying urban security sectors was in turn designed for its potential to provide policy and operationally-relevant lessons for practitioners and local stakeholders involved in both security sector governance and security sector reform.

Evolving project objectives: Initial aspirations and eventual project focus

Initially, the project intended to focus on the following components: (a) background research; (b) identification of key questions and criteria for a large-N mapping of cities around the world and a small-N set of city case studies written by local experts; (c) carrying out the large-N mapping; (d) carrying out a selected number of small-N case studies; (e) analysis of points (a) to (d) and response to the main research questions; and (f) identification of main methodological challenges, main findings and suggestions for follow-up research.

After completion of the background study and a trial run of large-N mapping and small-N case study analyses, the decision was made to proceed without activity (d), conducting the selected number of small-N case studies. This decision was made for the following reasons: contrary to the researchers' expectations, the background analysis carried out for this study revealed very little previous work on urban security sector analyses. Thus, the project and its

contributors would not be able to build on previous work, which changed the task considerably. Moreover, once the key categories and questions for the large and small-N studies had been developed, it thus became clear that even large-N mappings would ideally require time-intensive and in-depth field research, much of it reaching far beyond the scope of the initial research idea and the means available to the researchers. Furthermore, in order to provide meaningful supplements to the large-N mapping of multiple cities, case studies covering the most important mapping topics would require authors to produce studies that would go far beyond the initially anticipated paper-length documents.

The criteria for case study analyses (both basic mapping of large-N sample and detailed assessments of small-N sample) were developed by the research team and with the help of participants at an initial project workshop. Once this was done, initial objectives and methodologies had to be adjusted in order to match the most fundamental project objectives with the available resources and capacities of the project team. In order to do so, the requirements for achieving realistic mapping results were first played through with the help of a "best-case" researcher in the project team. The selected city was Sao Paulo and the project member spoke Portuguese, had previously worked on urban security issues in Brazil and Sao Paulo in particular, and had access to a significant amount of material as a result of local contacts and knowledge. The researcher aimed to collect the information required for the Sao Paulo entry of the large-N mapping sample and afterwards outlined the effort required to produce a more in-depth qualitative case study. In both cases we estimated the time and effort it would take to replicate a large-N entry and case study paper. Even for someone with extensive knowledge of a specific city, the task far exceeded the time and resources that could be dedicated to this case study (let alone additional ones) within the scope of this project.

Alternative approaches were discussed within the team: The large-N mapping could focus on a limited number of cities, a majority of categories could be dropped, or the case studies could focus only on a particular facet of the urban security sector. However, these options did not seem feasible: Limiting the number of cities covered by the large-N study would reduce the study's chance to identify urban security sector patterns, while each entry would not benefit from greater reliability as the research would still be carried out from a distance as a desk study. Focusing case studies on only a limited number of facets covered by the large-N mapping would add little to the knowledge generated by the more superficial large-N mappings and would make it impossible to carry out cross-case study comparisons.

As the large-N mapping study is concerned, we decided to go ahead with a simplified version of the initial mapping template. Without similar knowledge about a specific city, as was the case with our colleague's knowledge of Sao Paolo, this task would take considerably longer. Without requisite language skills the sources consulted would be somewhat limited, with consequentially modest results for the mapping exercise. Still, this would allow us to include a considerable number of cities in the overall mapping and final comparative analysis. We realised, however, that this task could not be accomplished within the timeframe of the project and available human resources. As the main purpose is to show that such a mapping is indeed able to contribute important information about urban security sectors, we decided to invest additional time and human resources, and continued this exercise with the help of numerous interns and research assistants.

In terms of the small-N case studies, we decided to abandon that effort and instead focus our energies and resources on the large-N mapping. If the colleague would have proceeded with writing a case study on Sao Paolo, much of the project's research support funding would have been used up producing this one country case study, leaving few resources for other aspects of the project. Requesting an external author to write such a case study would not have been possible within the modest honorarium budgeted, particularly as we could not locate an expert who had done similar work in the past and who could have built on his/her previous work to produce such a case study.

In sum, during the course of the project's background analysis stage, the methodological approach to the project shifted: The initial aspiration to provide definitive and policy-relevant answers based on a large-sample mapping and a limited number of detailed case studies soon gave way to the realisation that both the complexity of the research puzzle as well as the availability of information would require a different approach. As our trial runs had shown, the availability of information in the context of a primarily desk-study-style research project, particularly in the case of the large-N mapping exercise, was very limited. Thus, considerable effort was required to collect even the most basic information required by each mapping criteria. Coding this information and subsequent quantitative analyses would be superficial and indicative at best. However, this approach allows one to develop and test a potential model template along which the security sector can be studied in urban contexts. Moreover, it highlights that practical knowledge can be gained from such a study on the nature of urban security sectors and requirements for improvements in security provision through SSR efforts. This approach can be replicated with greater resources and case study knowledge at any time – and, ideally, on a continuous basis – in order to develop the most appropriate policy options for improving security provision in urban environments.

Our initial aspirations had to be adapted to the financial realities and as a consequence, the project's new focus resulted in the subsequent research objectives.

Research objectives

This study aims to identify knowledge gaps and thus pursues the following research objectives:

1. Reviewing previous research into urban safety, security, security provision and security sector characteristics.
2. Developing a set of questions that help capture the essence of security sector characteristics in urban contexts.
3. Developing a better understanding of threats that are characteristic of specific urban contexts, as well as their consequences for the functioning (and governance) of urban security and justice institutions.
4. Examining how the governance of security and justice institutions reduces or intensifies urban violence and instability.
5. Providing support in reviewing the needs – and establish the priorities – for reforming urban security sectors where it proves necessary to do so.

1.3 Research questions

These objectives are translated into a number of underlying research questions that guide this study:

1. Do urban communities experience unique ‘urban threats’, unique requirements for response measures, as well as unique structures and processes that characterise their security sector?
2. Does this unique urban security sector context call for a differentiated understanding of and approach to SSG and SSR, with structures and processes that differ from national-level SSG/R?
3. Which lessons can be learnt from studying urban SSG/R contexts across different countries and regions?
4. What are effects of weak or inadequate security sector performance and governance on urban security?
5. To what degree are national SSR efforts undertaken with an urban focus? Even if there are no specific urban SSR practises, are there specific priorities that should guide urban SSR/G, drawing on global, regional, national and city-specific lessons and perspectives?

1.4 Research hypotheses

A number of key hypotheses drive this study. They represent assumptions developed by the research team while carrying out the background study, and include the following:

1. Urban communities do experience unique ‘urban threats’, feature unique requirements for response measures, as well as unique structures and processes that characterise their security sector.
2. This unique urban context calls for a differentiated understanding of and approach to SSG and SSR, with structures and processes that differ from national-level SSG and SSR. Thus, a unique urban dimension of SSG and SSR exists. Therefore, in the presence of (or for the planning of) national-level SSR strategies, the urban dimension of SSG/R should be an integral part of SSR assessment, planning and implementation.
3. There are lessons to be learned, both good and bad, from studying urban SSG/R contexts across different countries and regions.
4. There are patterns that characterise urban security sector contexts within specific regions, and across similar political systems.
5. Weak or inadequate security sector performance and governance are causes of urban insecurity and instability, while efficient, effective accountable security sectors contribute to urban security and stability.
6. Most national governments and international donors do not have a specific urban security policy vision, meaning SSG/R are not undertaken with an urban focus. Thus, specific priorities should guide urban SSG/R, drawing on global, regional, national and city-specific lessons and perspectives.

1.5 Methodology

This project combines desk studies and an extensive analysis of research conducted on the topic of the urban security sector in a diverse range of cities, focusing on security institutions and actors.

1.6 Outline of the project report

After this preliminary section on the project's research proceedings, the report subsequently introduces security threats and requirements of urban contexts in Part 2. It then discusses unique security challenges and security provision, as introduced in the existing literature. Based on these findings, Part 3 focuses on knowledge gaps concerning the urban security sector. In Part 4, the report introduces a detailed mapping of the urban security sector and explains how the mapping sample has been selected. Part 5 of the report analyses the collected data and draws some conclusions from the large-N mapping. Part 6 concludes the study with a summary of project findings in response to the research questions and hypotheses presented above.

2 Studying Security Threats and Requirements in Urban Environments

2.1 Defining the urban context

As has already been demonstrated, the research community uses different terminology and denominations to refer to places with a high population density. Before SSG/R can be discussed in an *urban* context, the term "urban" must first be defined. It is therefore necessary to establish a common understanding of concepts and terminologies. The subsequent, non-exhaustive list provides an overview of definitions for frequently recurring denominations used in the context of "urbanization".

***Table 1**: Definitions (urbanization/geography)*

Urbanization / Geography	
"banlieue"	"A suburb of a French city, especially Paris."[11] "France has all kinds of suburbs, but the word for them, *banlieues,* has become pejorative, meaning slums dominated by immigrants."[12]
"cité"	"Inside the *banlieues* are the *cités:* colossal concrete housing projects built during the postwar decades, in the Brutalist style of Le Corbusier. Conceived as utopias for workers, they have become concentrations of poverty and social isolation."[13]
city	"A large town."[14,15] "Any large town or populous place."[16]
conurbation	"An extended urban area, typically consisting of several towns merging with the suburbs of a central city."[17] "A city area containing a large number of people, formed by various towns growing and joining together."[18] "A clustering of towns or cities into an unbroken urban environment."[19]
"favela"	"(in Brazil) a shanty or shantytown."[20]

[11] "banlieue", *Oxford Dictionaries* (2017), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/banlieue, accessed on 28 November 2017.
[12] Packer, G., 'The Other France – Are the suburbs of Paris incubators of terrorism?', *The New Yorker*, 31 August 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-other-france, accessed on 28 November 2017.
[13] Ibid.
[14] "City", *Cambridge Dictionaries* (2016), http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/city, accessed on 5 December 2016.
[15] "City", *Oxford Dictionaries* (2016), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/city, accessed on 5 December 2016
[16] "City", *Collins English Dictionary (*2016), http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/city, accessed on 5 December 2016.
[17] "Conurbation", *Oxford Dictionaries* (2015), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/conurbation, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[18] "Conurbation", *Cambridge Dictionaries* (2015), http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/conurbation, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[19] "Conurbation", *Encyclo.co.uk* (2015), http://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-conurbation, accessed on 13 March 2015.

	"A very poor and crowded area of a city in Brazil."[21]
megacity	"A city with over 10 million inhabitants."[22] "A very large city, typically one with a population of over ten million people."[23] "A very large city, especially one with more than 10 million people living in it."[24]
megalopolis	"An urban complex, usually comprising several large towns."[25] "A region made up of several large cities and their surrounding areas in sufficient proximity to be considered a single urban complex."[26] "A very large urban complex (usually involving several cities and towns)."[27]
metropolis	"The capital or chief city of a country or region."[28] "The capital, the largest, or the most important city of a country, state, or area."[29] "A very large city, often the most important city in a large area or country."[30] "1. Any large, busy city; 2. The chief, and sometimes capital, city of a country, state, or region; 3. A central or principal place, as of some activity: the music metropolis of France; 4. The mother city or parent state of a colony, especially of an ancient Greek colony; 5. The chief see of an ecclesiastical province."[31]
metropolitan	"1. Of or characteristic of a metropolis; 2. Constituting a city and its suburbs ⇒ "the metropolitan area"; 3. Of, relating to, or designating an ecclesiastical metropolis; 4. Of or belonging to the home territories

[20] "Favela", *Collins English Dictionary (*2015), http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/favela, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[21] "Favela", *Cambridge Dictionaries (*2015), http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/favela, accessed on 5 December 2016,

[22] "Megacity", *Collins English Dictionary (*2015), http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/megacity, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[23] "Megacity", *Oxford Dictionaries (*2015), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/megacity*,* accessed on 13 March 2015.

[24] "Megacity", *Cambridge Dictionaries* (2015), http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/megacity, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[25] "Megalopolis" *Collins English Dictionary (*2015), http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/megalopolis*,* accessed on 13 March 2015.

[26] "Megalopolis", *Word Info (*2015), http://wordinfo.info/results?searchString=megalopolis, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[27] "Megalopolis", *Memidex* (2015), http://www.memidex.com/megalopolises, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[28] "Metropolis", *Oxford Dictionaries* (2015), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/metropolis, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[29] "Metropolis", *Encyclo.co.uk* (2015), http://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-metropolis, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[30] "Metropolis", *Cambridge Dictionaries* (2015), http://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-metropolis, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[31] "Metropolis", *Dictionary.com* (2015), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/metropolis?s=t, accessed on 13 March 2015.

	of a country, as opposed to overseas territories ⇒ "metropolitan France."[32] "1. Relating to or denoting a metropolis: the Boston metropolitan area; 2. Relating to or denoting the parent state of a colony: metropolitan Spain; 3. Christian Church relating to or denoting a metropolitan or his see: a metropolitan bishop."[33]
peri-urban	"Of or relating to an area immediately surrounding a city or town."[34] "Periurban area is characterized by a spread of settlements with extensive features, compared to the urban area which has a greater density. Lower density is the first condition distinguishing periurban areas from urban ones."[35]
periphery	"The outermost boundary of an area."[36] "The outer edge of an area."[37] "External boundary or surrounding region."[38]
propinquity	"The fact of being near something."[39]
urban	"In, relating to, or characteristic of a town or city"[40] "Of […] or in a city or town"[41] "Of, relating to, or constituting a city or town"[42]
urban century	The 21st century is the first urban century.[43]
urban dilemma	"The dilemma is exemplified by the paradoxical effects of urbanization in the twenty-first century: as a force for unparalleled

[32] "Metropolitan", *Collins English Dictionary (*2015), http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/metropolitan, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[33] "Metropolitan", *Oxford Dictionaries (*2015), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/metropolitan, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[34] "Peri-urban" (2015), *Merriam-Webster,* http://beta.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peri-urban, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[35] Beniamino Murgante, 'The Periurban City: geostatistical methods for its definition', in Massimo Rumor, Volker Coors, Elfriede M. Fendel and Sisi Zlatanova; *Urban and Regional Data Management* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2007): 473-484.

[36] "Periphery" (2015), *Collins English Dictionary,* http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/peripheries, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[37] "Periphery" (2015), *Cambridge Dictionaries*, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/periphery?q=peripheries, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[38] "Periphery" (2015), *Encyclo.co.uk,* http://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-periphery, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[39] "Propinquity" (2015), *Cambridge Dictionaries,* http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/propinquity, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[40] "Urban", *Oxford Dictionaries* (2015), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/urban, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[41] "Urban", *Cambridge Dictionaries (*2015), http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english-german/urban, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[42] "Urban", *Collins English Dictionary (*2015), http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/urban, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[43] Clarke Annez, P., Huet, G., Perterson, G. E. , *Lessons for the Urban Century: Decentralized Infrastructure Finance in the World Bank.* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2008), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6435/446450PUB0Less101OFFICIAL0USE0ONON1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed on 5 December 2017.

	development on the one hand, and as a risk for insecurity amongst the urban poor on the other."[44]
suburb	"An outlying district of a city, especially a residential one."[45] "An area on the edge of a large town or city where people who work in the town or city often live" or "the outer area of a town, rather than the shopping and business centre in the middle."[46] "A residential district situated on the outskirts of a city or town."[47]

Some threats or challenges (to security) can be observed more frequently in an urban context than a rural context. Some of these specific challenges and risks are listed and defined below:

***Table 2**: Definitions (threats)*

Threats	
burglary	"The crime of either entering a building as a trespasser with the intention of committing theft, rape, grievous bodily harm, or damage, or, having entered as a trespasser, of committing one or more of these offences (English criminal law)."[48] "Illegal entry of a building with intent to commit a crime, especially theft [cf. definition of "theft" below]."[49] "The crime of illegally entering a building and stealing things."[50]
gentrification	"The process of wealthier residents moving to an area, and the changes that occur due to the influx of wealth. As wealthier inhabitants move into an area that is already populated with lower-income residents, the neighbourhood begins to change as well. Often this will spark an urban renewal process, which cleans up the town, but often leads to an increase in rent, taxes, and other items. Sometimes this change means that the previous residents can no longer afford to live in that neighbourhood, which is why gentrification can sometimes be used in a negative context. However,

[44] Muggah, R., *Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence* (IDRC, 2012): vi, http://www.idrc.ca/EN/PublishingImages/Researching-the-Urban-Dilemma-Baseline-study.pdf, accessed on 5 December 2017.

[45] "Suburb" (2015), *Oxford Dictionaries*, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/suburban, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[46] "Suburb" (2015), *Cambridge Dictionaries,* http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/suburb, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[47] "Suburb" (2015), *Collins English Dictionary,* http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/suburb, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[48] "Burglary" (2015), *Collins English Dictionary,* http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/burglary, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[49] "Burglary" (2015), *Oxford Dictionaries,* http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/burglary, accessed on 13 March 2015.

[50] "Burglary" (2015), *Cambridge Dictionaries,* http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/burglary, accessed on 13 March 2015.

	many good changes also historically accompany gentrification, such as decreased crime rates and increased economic activity."[51] To gentrify: "renovate and improve (a house or district) so that it conforms to middle-class taste."[52]
hate crime	"The violence of intolerance and bigotry, intended to hurt and intimidate someone because of their race, ethnicity, national origin, religious, sexual orientation, or disability."[53] "Any of various crimes (as assault or defacement of property) when motivated by hostility to the victim as a member of a group (as one based on color, creed, gender, or sexual orientation)."[54]
robbery	"The crime of using, or threatening to use, force to steal."[55] "The stealing of property from a person by using or threatening to use force (criminal law)."[56]
theft	"([T]he act of) dishonestly taking something that belongs to someone else and keeping it."[57] "The action or crime of stealing."[58] "The act of stealing; specifically, the felonious taking and removing of personal property, with an intent to deprive the rightful owner of the same; larceny."[59] "To dishonestly appropriate property belonging to someone else with the intention of permanently depriving them of it. (Crimes against property)."[60]
unrest	"A disturbed or uneasy state."[61] "A state of dissatisfaction, disturbance, and agitation, typically involving public demonstrations or disorder."[62] "Disagreements or fighting between different groups of people."[63]
violence against	"Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result

[51] "Gentrification" (2015), *Business Dictionary*, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/gentrification.html, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[52] "Gentrify" (2015), *Oxford Dictionaries,* http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/gentrify, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[53] US Department of Justice, *Hate Crime: The Violence of Intolerance* (US Department of Justice, 2001).
[54] "Hate Crime" (2015), *Merriam-Webster,* http://beta.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hate%20crime, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[55] "Robbery" (2015), *Encyclo.co.uk,* http://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-robbery, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[56] "Robbery" (2015), *Collins English Dictionary,* http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/robbery, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[57] "Theft" (2015), *Cambridge Dictionaries,* http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/theft, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[58] "Theft" (2015), *Oxford Dictionaries,* http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/theft, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[59] "Theft" (2015), *ThinkExist,* http://thinkexist.com/dictionary/meaning/theft/, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[60] "Theft" (2015), *Encyclo.co.uk,* http://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-theft, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[61] "Unrest" (2015), *Merriam-Webster,* http://beta.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unrest, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[62] "Unrest" (2015), *Oxford Dictionaries,* http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/unrest, accessed on 13 March 2015.
[63] "Unrest" (2015), *Cambridge Dictionaries,* http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/unrest, accessed on 13 March 2015.

women	in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."[64]

2.2 Urbanisation trends

Urbanisation and its implications for economic development, political stability, social life and human security have been a recurrent theme in the context of a range of different bodies of work. Urbanisation is not a new trend. In fact, it has been observed as early as in the medieval period, when the first modern cities developed. Throughout the period of industrialisation, masses of manual workers from rural areas populated factory towns in England.[65] UN-HABITAT defines contemporary urbanisation as "a process of metropolitanization in which existing urban centres are expanding by virtue of the technical structures that make meaningful interconnection over longer distances possible."[66]

However, the contemporary literature seems to ascribe an entirely new dimension of urbanisation to the late 20th and 21st century. UN-HABITAT has already labelled the 21st century the "century of the cities."[67] Empirical data supports this claim: In 2008-09, the size of the world's urban population overtook that of the rural population for the first time in human history.[68] Today, between 3 and 3.5 billion people live in towns or cities; this number is expected to rise to between 6 and 6.5 billion people by mid-century.[69] This means that around two thirds of humanity will be living in urban environments, a dramatic rise from roughly one third only 50 years ago.[70] These changes will be the most dramatic on continents with significant numbers of developing countries: By 2030, 83 percent of the population of Latin American and the Caribbean will live in cities, up from 75 percent today.[71] In Africa, this number will increase from 38 percent to 55 percent in 2030; and in Asia and the Pacific region, it will climb from 37 percent to 53 percent.[72]

These trends are manifested in the phenomenon of megacities, which are urban agglomerations of more than 10 million inhabitants (see above: 2.1), two thirds of which lie

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[64] Article 1, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, GA Res. No. A/RES/48/104, 85th plenary meeting, 20 December 1993.
[65] Brockerhoff, M. and Brennan, E., 'The Poverty of Cities in Developing Regions', *Population and Development Review*, vol. 24, no. 1 (1998): 75–114.
[66] Coward, M., 'Network-Centric Violence, Critical Infrastructure and the Urbanization of Security', *Security Dialogue,* vol. 40, no. 4–5 (2009): 403.
[67] Teng, P. and Escaler, M., 'Food (In)security in Urban Populations', *Asia Security Initiatives Policy Series,* Working Paper no. 5 (2010): 1, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/NTS/resources/research_papers/MacArthur%20Working%20Paper_Paul_Teng_and_Margarita_Escaler.pdf, accessed on 5 December 2017.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Doar, S. and Law, Jonathan K., 'The Future City: Delivering Change in Urban Economies', *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, 2013, https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_future_city#comments, accessed on 5 December 2017.
[70] Brender, N., *Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence* (IDRC, 2012): 4.
[71] Teng and Escaler, 'Food (In)security in Urban Populations', 1.
[72] Ibid.

in the three continental regions of Latin America, Asia and Africa.[73] By 2015, it is projected that more than 600 million people will live in the approximately 60 such megacities worldwide. 23 of the 25 largest of these megacities will be located in developing countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa. In 2025, more than a dozen urban agglomerations will have over 20 million inhabitants, and some will likely have as many as 30 million.[74] In Africa alone, cities are growing by 15 to 18 million people per year.[75] This means that during the next quarter century, the urban population will grow almost twice as fast as the general population. It also means that the continent's urban population will more than double its current level of 373 million people by 2030, and that it will be larger than the total number of city dwellers in the entire Western hemisphere today.[76] Similar numbers exist for Latin America, as well as Asia, where cities in China and metropolitan areas in South Asia grow inexorably. These numbers can be broken down individually for different countries and cities.[77] However, together they yield much the same picture: "[The] world population is expected to grow from its current 6.8 billion to 9.2 billion by 2050 […] Virtually all of this population growth will take place in the urban areas of developing countries."[78]

Where do all these new urban dwellers come from, and why do they move to cities? How does urbanisation affect the nature and characteristics of cities? Which processes or trends can be or have been observed? In the following paragraphs, patterns of urbanisation trends that have come up in urbanisation literature from different fields will be introduced. Urbanisation trends and processes overlap, and are often discussed under different headers or categories, but can be summarised, we find, under *migration*, *consolidation*, *fragmentation*, and *informality*. Of these issues *migration* and *consolidation* will be highlighted in more detail below.

It has to be understood that, while these patterns have been identified in the literature as broadly generalisable, they nevertheless need not hold in all circumstances and situational contexts, particularly because not all environments are alike. There are certainly cases of cities that do not grow at all, or even shrink. However, the patterns discussed can be observed across a broad sample of cities in different time periods and regional or cultural contexts, and have important implications for other geographical contexts (i.e. rural) and fields of research and practice (i.e. migration studies).

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[73] Heeg, 'Megacities am Rande des Kollaps? Von Slums und "Gated Communities": Wie der städtische Raum zerfällt', 34.
[74] Teng and Escaler, 'Food (In)security in Urban Populations', 1.
[75] Commins, S., 'Urban Fragility and Security in Africa', *Africa Security Brief No. 12* (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2011): 1.
[76] Ibid.: 2.
[77] Chakrabarti, P. G. D., 'Urban Crisis in India: New Initiatives for Sustainable Cities', *Development in Practice* 11, no. 2–3 (2001): 260; see also Kraas, F., 'Megacities and Global Change: Key Priorities', *Geographical Journal* 173, no. 1 (2007): 79–80; Dorman, W.J, 'Informal Cairo: Between Islamist Insurgency and the Neglectful State?', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 40, no. 4–5 (2009): 422¸ and Cardia, N., 'Urban Violence in São Paulo', *Comparative Urban Studies Occasional Papers Series*, vol. 33 (Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 2000): 5, http://www.nevusp.org/downloads/down073.pdf, accessed on 5 December 2017.
[78] Teng and Escaler, 'Food (In)security in Urban Populations', 2.

Migration

When analysing migratory patterns, one can identify four directions or geographical movements of large and unprecedented flows of urban migrants. Firstly and most importantly, many authors rightly observe the importance of **rural-urban migration**. This type of urbanisation trend can be observed by the degree to which ratios of the urban population to the entire population of a country shift. It occurs with particular strength in countries that still have large rural populations that subsequently migrate to cities,[79] and where surplus labourers crowd into urban centres from underdeveloped rural areas.[80] Special consideration has to be paid to young people looking for economic opportunities.[81]

Secondly, as Buescher and Chakrabarti assess, **inter-city migration** from smaller cities, which often "lack adequate impetus to bigger cities", is "continuing along with the migration from rural to urban areas."[82] This has important implications, particularly for smaller cities, which may in fact shrink if they cannot compensate their migratory losses with additional rural migrants. This can have negative consequences for future prospects of economic growth and the overarching welfare of their populations.[83]

Thirdly, authors focusing on the "old" megacities from the Western and Northern hemispheres have pointed out **intra-city migration** movements from less attractive urban centres to the periphery (cf. *supra* 2.1), into more homogenous fringe-cities or "suburbia". This aspect was discussed above in the context of the phenomenon of gentrification. Traditionally a pre-dominantly American model, this trend can be observed in cities all over the world. Going back to the 1960s, authors seem to focus on the philosophical and socio-anthropological rather than the demographic or economic dimensions of "suburbia" in their studies. However, from a broader standpoint, the more recent tendency to focus on the fraying out of cities into surrounding areas in the form of informal settlements, gated communities, or slums may be part of such a migration towards peripheries (see below).

Fourthly, a branch of the literature focusing particularly on the East Asian region deals with dynamic in- and outflows of so-called **floating populations**, which are estimated to amount up to 50 million people in China alone. This line of research also focuses on the difficulties that such migrant workers bring for both urban and rural development. While some authors have in recent years observed a decline in floating populations due to more stable job markets, metropoles such as Shanghai still continuously battle with the comprehensive challenges large inflows of migratory workers, wandering populations and vagrants pose to metropolitan order and administration.[84]

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[79] Heeg, 'Megacities am Rande des Kollaps? Von Slums und "Gated Communities": Wie der städtische Raum zerfällt', 35.

[80] Chakrabarti, 'Urban Crisis in India: New Initiatives for Sustainable Cities', 260–261.

[81] Duijsens, R., 'Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization', *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 92, no. 878 (2010): 352.

[82] Buescher, C., 'Risiko-Lebensraum Megastadt. Eine soziologische Perspektive', in: Birle, P., Dewey M., Mascareño A. (eds.) Durch Luhmanns Brille (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2012): 145-171 ; Chakrabarti, 'Urban Crisis in India: New Initiatives for Sustainable Cities', 260.

[83] Buescher, 'Risiko-Lebensraum Megastadt. Eine soziologische Perspektive', 163.

[84] Lu, H. 'Becoming Urban: Mendicancy and Vagrants in Modern Shanghai', *Journal of Social History*, vol. 33, no. 1 (1999): 7–36.

What factors motivate peasant populations to migrate to cities, small-city dwellers to move to megacities, and metropolitan populations to slowly stretch into surrounding territories? Most broadly, the literature differentiates between two main sets of explanations for urban migration: *Push* and *pull* factors of migration. Of course, in any specific case more complex reasons are at play than the combination of only these two vectors.[85]

Push migration factors refer to the set of motivations that push populations to move away their current situation. Foremost among these reasons is economic pressure and poverty.[86] Particularly, large parts of rural populations in developing countries lose their occupational base as a result of, for instance, economic liberalisation. They choose to seek their fortunes in cities instead.[87] Elsewhere this phenomenon has been discussed in the context of "rural depression."[88] Correspondingly, Duijsens suggests that, "[i]n many cases the rural-to-urban flow is stimulated by the dire situation in rural areas, where poverty and lack of progress drive people out of their habitat […] As it is often the younger people who look for new opportunities, these […] trends […] create a vicious circle that leads to even greater rural deprivation."[89] Interestingly enough, this same pattern also leads to growing deprivation and poverty within cities that have to integrate large populations of rural poor. On the one hand, "many city dwellers, in their struggle to seize urban opportunities, become and remain trapped in a vicious circle of poverty and vulnerability, and their deprivation can in fact be worse than in rural areas."[90]

Push migration theories suggest that urban growth is primarily caused by an absence of opportunities in rural areas and impoverished regions, rather than by the presence of opportunities in urban areas.[91] Therefore, unless employment opportunities are created in rural areas, surplus labourers from impoverished regions, the hinterland and smaller cities lacking the potential for growth will continue to crowd into urban centres in search of work and opportunity.

While the literature highlights the role of economic pressures as the foremost driver of push migration into urban centres, conflict and conflict-related displacement play an important and potentially increasing role. According to the UNHCR, 50 percent of the world's 10-12 million refugees and likely more than twice that number of internally displaced persons and returnees live in cities.[92] Moreover, this seems to be the result of a direct relationship between post-conflict zones and urbanisation. As outlined by Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers, "[in] the wake of sovereign and civil conflict, fragile states continue to rapidly urbanize,"[93]

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[85] Duijsens, 'Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization', 352.
[86] A prime example of a factor that can be described as both "push" and "pull" is economic pressure, either in the form of rural poverty or the lure of prosperity that cities seem to emanate. Consequentially, economic reasons will be covered in both paragraphs.
[87] Heeg, 'Megacities am Rande des Kollaps? Von Slums und "Gated Communities": Wie der städtische Raum zerfällt', 34.
[88] Lu, 'Becoming Urban: Mendicancy and Vagrants in Modern Shanghai', 25.
[89] Duijsens, 'Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization'.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Chakrabarti, 'Urban Crisis in India: New Initiatives for Sustainable Cities', 260–261.
[92] Cited in Duijsens, 'Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization', 355.
[93] Beall, J., Goodfellow, T., and Rodgers, D., 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility', *Crisis States Working Papers Series* 2, Working Paper No. 85, Cities and Fragile States (2011), http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-

and secondly that "civil conflicts [themselves] drive urbanization."[94] Consequentially, civil conflict in cities that experience a large and rapid influx of populations displaced by conflict (and possibly affected by cultures of violence experienced during times of armed conflict) is a frequent occurrence. Similar dynamics occur with environmental pressures due to climate change, water depletion and erosion, but also natural disasters, pandemics or other events that may lead to large-scale and permanent displacement in specific regions or rural areas.[95]

Pull migration factors refer to the set of motivations that lure populations to a certain location. Again, when discussing urban growth, economic opportunity through greater income-earning possibilities (such as in the industrial and service sectors) is typically identified as the main reason.[96] This includes specifically urban occupations including begging,[97] better access to publicly conferred entitlements,[98] as well as other factors contributing to the "lure of the city." Duijsens explains that "cities are sites of great progress and prosperity in many areas, bringing wealth and opportunities to many of their citizens."[99] Consequentially, they "act as a magnet for many who aspire to reap the benefits, [who are] drawn by the prospect of a better life, in which they can share in the opportunities that the city offers."[100]

Urbanisation that follows jobs is generally assumed to add to overall economic growth through economies of scale and value-adding production chains. Notable exceptions are regions where no such dynamics have evolved: this is particularly true in many parts of Africa, due to consistent underinvestment;[101] and Latin and South America, where economic restructuring, trade liberalisation and economic stabilisation measures have brought reduced public expenditure.[102]

In addition to economic benefits, cities generally enjoy higher levels of public services, better infrastructure, more educational opportunities, doctors, lower child mortality rates, less frequent and less severe famines, as well as relatively higher safety.[103] Cities may have a "protective screen that [insulates] them from the violence" and often manage to stay relatively stable even during conflict.[104] Beall et al. argue that this is because "elites actively involved in warfare often work hard to keep cities secure, even if they are benefiting from the conflict at large […] Cities play a vital role in war economies and as hubs in associated national and transnational networks, which might be jeopardized by open urban conflict […] Elites themselves are often residents in cities and are averse to exposure to conflict, often

development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/wp85.2-cities-conflict-state-fragility.pdf, accessed on 5 December 2017.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Commins, 'Urban Fragility and Security in Africa', 1.
[96] Duijsens, 'Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization', 351.
[97] Lu, 'Becoming Urban: Mendicancy and Vagrants in Modern Shanghai', 25.
[98] Brockerhoff and Brennan, 'The Poverty of Cities in Developing Regions'.
[99] Duijsens, 'Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization'.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Commins, 'Urban Fragility and Security in Africa', 2–3.
[102] Brockerhoff and Brennan, 'The Poverty of Cities in Developing Regions', 75–76.
[103] Brockerhoff and Brennan, 'The Poverty of Cities in Developing Regions'.
[104] Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility'.

wielding consolidated coercive power to prevent conflict impacting too hard on urban centers […].”[105]

Lastly, cities are often more socially modern than rural areas: they are attractive to vulnerable groups, religious or ethnic minorities and progressive youth because they may offer degrees of freedoms and rights not available elsewhere. They are “the locus of social and cultural change […] Within the social domain, the opportunity for relative anonymity and the presence of people with similar attitudes and opinions outside people’s kinship groups and traditional social networks give rise to dynamics that stimulate new and modern thinking and expression.”[106]

Consolidation

Modern urban centres tend to consolidate in three important respects: demographically, economically, as well as territorially. Together, these trends lead to and reinforce a phenomenon described in urbanization literature as “urban primacy”. Firstly, cities grow population-wise. Large migration inflows, particularly of rural and other youth, combined with climbing birth rates and sinking child mortality lead to a generally favourable, but also potentially precarious demographic outlook for many cities. Research focusing on megacities specifically underlines the burden that possibly inexorable population growth puts on cities’ social, economic and eco-spatial structures.[107] Uncontrolled population growth in urban contexts may lead to unsustainable population densities, enormous traffic and health infrastructure problems, criminality, ecological damage, and the depletion of scarce resources. Yet, population growth in cities also yields dynamic potential: cheap labour, creative potential, stable social services and higher tax revenue.

Secondly, cities that are able to make use of this potential can serve as pivots through which national and urban economies are integrated into the world economy. While megacities of the global North have traditionally served as the control centres of the global economy, the new megacities of the South are increasingly “globalized places that enable market entries into other countries and capital markets” to a differing degree.[108] Indeed, urbanisation and integration into global economic networks seem to reinforce each other.[109] On the other hand, the corresponding rise of capital investment and new trade fuels changes in national and regional urban systems.[110] However, the connection to international markets also enables urban elites and power holders to access capital internationally rather than domestically, and thus evade taxation. Beall et al. argue that “[a]s taxation is generically a key component of state building, and as an urban tax base is generally considered critical, this uncoupling of taxation and the state-making enterprise constitutes a significant

[105] Ibid.
[106] Duijsens, ‘Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization’.
[107] Heeg, ‘Megacities am Rande des Kollaps? Von Slums und “Gated Communities”: Wie der städtische Raum zerfällt’, 34.
[108] Ibid.: 40.
[109] Ismail, O., ‘The Dialectic of “Junctions” and “Bases”: Youth, “Securo-Commerce” and the Crisis of Order in Donwtown Lagos‘, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 40, no. 4-5 (2009): 467.
[110] Wyly, E.K, ‘Continuity and Change in the Restless Urban Landscape’, *Economic Geography*, vol. 75, no. 4 (1999): 310.

departure from the historical experience of mature economies […]".[111] In addition, the increasing international pressure for open economies may also stifle new urban economies, and support primarily commodity exportation rather than economic modernization.

Thirdly, cities tend to consolidate territorially, by constantly enlarging and co-opting hinterlands and neighbouring rural areas into proto- and sub-urban settlements and circles of influence. Urbanisation, particularly in developing countries, leads to an extension of the largest cities beyond city and metropolitan boundaries. The demarcation and differences between city and countryside become blurry: cities become regions, a trend usually labelled "metropolitanization" or "suburbanization".[112] In 1998 Brockerhoff and Brennan observed that, "[m]etropolitan regional growth has sprawled along major expressways and railroad lines radiating out from urban cores, putting down new towns, industrial estates, housing projects, and other urban forms in areas hitherto agricultural and rural […]".[113]

Elsewhere, intrusive applications of town-planning principles, slum clearances and high property prices have driven people out of city centres. Entire populations are uprooted from residential quarters to pave the way for new administrative or business districts.[114] Where some authors suggest that "disparities in living conditions have existed in the past between residents of core cities and smaller places, but have declined over time as city economies have prospered [...]"[115], others argue that the amassment of all relevant and scarce resources of a region in megacities actually leads to a sharper difference between urban and the remaining rural contexts.[116] Either way, such territorial expansion has major repercussions for civic administration and politics in the urban context.

Finally, the enormous growth in size, population and economic strength can lead to urban primacy and functional dominance[117], which refers to a "hegemonic position, the overconcentration of power and decision-making structures (politico-administrationally, economically, socially and culturally) in a city".[118] What all cities have in common is "the fact that they concentrate power", both in absolute terms and especially in relation to the rest of their respective countries.[119] This holds particularly true for capital cities that, in addition to economic prowess, territorial size and cultural importance, are the residence of the state's central government. Notably, most other big cities also serve as the location of sub-state governments and power.

While in the "traditional" megacities of the past, this amassment has led to the acquisition of "global city" functions ("high density of management, control and coordination capabilities

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[111] Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility'.
[112] Buescher, 'Risiko-Lebensraum Megastadt. Eine soziologische Perspektive'.
[113] Brockerhoff and Brennan, 'The Poverty of Cities in Developing Regions', 86–87.
[114] Ismail, 'The Dialectic of "Junctions" and "Bases": Youth, "Securo-Commerce" and the Crisis of Order in Downtown Lagos', 467.
[115] Brockerhoff and Brennan, 'The Poverty of Cities in Developing Regions', 86–87.
[116] Buescher, 'Risiko-Lebensraum Megastadt. Eine soziologische Perspektive', 163.
[117] Goodfellow, T., 'The Bastard Child of Nobody'?: Anti-Planning and the Institutional Crisis in Contemporary Kampala', *Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2*, Working Paper no. 67, Cities and Fragile States (2010), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28474/1/WP67.2.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2017.
[118] Heeg, 'Megacities am Rande des Kollaps? Von Slums und "Gated Communities": Wie der städtische Raum zerfällt', 40.
[119] Duijsens, 'Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization'.

in cities such as Tokyo, London or New York, which contribute to the building and expansion as well as governance of worldwide economic exchange and globalization processes"), big cities tend to be limited in their economic, political and cultural dominance to the limits of their own respective countries.[120]

Trends of urbanisation have taken on dynamics that are estimated to continue far into the 21st century. In the literature on modern-day urbanisation, one can identify migration and consolidation as major elements or patterns of this dynamic. The sheer size in numbers and the distinct regional focus of modern-day urbanisation have led many authors to worry about possible future impacts, particularly on livelihoods and stability, in affected urban areas. Cities and megacities do not only grow, but seem to grow "at an alarming rate".[121] Inexorably and beyond sustainable rates, this results not only in challenges, but also in potentially disastrous consequences for urban populations and entire states.

Brockerhoff and Brennan summarise the terms that have been used to convey the new situation, such as "Cities of Despair", "The Giant Diseased City", which "evoke Dickensian images of London, Manchester, and other industrialising cities of the mid-1800s […] Such terms also revive dormant claims of over-urbanization in developing countries […], with the modification that human misery in cities, rather than negative consequences for national development, is now viewed as the distinct outcome of this phenomenon."[122]

How close, or causal, however, is this dangerous relationship? Scores of authors have struggled with an initially intuitive argument: the direct relationship between urbanisation and urban violence. As Hazen summarises: "Concerns about urbanization and growing urban populations are linked to the perception that violence and crime are urban phenomena […] Urban violence has 'reached unprecedented levels in many cities in the developing world."[123] In fact, mostly based on individual case studies, other authors come to the conclusion that "fast population growth is one of the variables associated with greater violence as it causes some disruption in the structure of the community**.** The distribution of violence in São Paulo seems to confirm this link between the rate of population growth and the occurrences of violence. Violence, in São Paulo, as expressed by homicide rates, is greater in the Metropolitan area where the population is growing at a much faster rate than the national average."[124] Explanations for this statistically relevant and potentially causal relationship may lie in the fact that "[p]eople coming from outside the community are people no one knows, possibly with different values and attitudes, which can contribute to conflict in a sensitive area."[125] Thus, urbanisation may have directly contributed to "new forms of violence", such as "fighting between well-organised gangs […] and conflicts linked to drug trafficking" and to the "collapse of law and order" in entire urban areas."[126]

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[120] Ibid.
[121] Teng and Escaler, 'Food (In)security in Urban Populations', 2.
[122] Brockerhoff and Brennan, 'The Poverty of Cities in Developing Regions', 75–76.
[123] Hazen, J.M., 'Understanding Gangs as Armed Groups', *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 92, no. 878 (2010): 369–386, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-878-hazen.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2017.
[124] Cardia, 'Urban Violence in São Paulo'.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Harroff-Tavel, M., 'Humanitarian Response towards Urban Violence', *Urban Violence and Humanitarian Challenges: Joint Report*, EUISS-ICRC Colloquium, Brussels, 19 January 2012, 32–37,

However, opponents of this criticism of urbanisation have disputed and disproven a direct link between urbanisation and violence, instead laying a focus on indirect links and relations. Brender argues in her summary based on the study by Robert Muggah that “[t]here are virtually no hard-and-fast correlations between cities and violence. Many cities experience chronic urban violence, but not all cities are equally violent, and violence in cities is by no means inevitable. As well, cities are not always more violent than rural areas, nor are bigger and denser cities always more violent than smaller ones. While the rate of population growth in cities appears to be connected to violence, the connection is neither direct nor absolute. Nevertheless, it is true that an array of cities in certain regions appear to have been consistently exposed to high levels of direct and indirect violence in recent decades.”[127]

Research indicates that there is only a weak relationship between urban growth and violence in OECD countries, according to Collins.[128] Instead, Brender quotes the WB and UN-Habitat in suggesting that “violence and related stresses on development are a function of the *pace* of urban growth rather than urbanization itself […] [T]he causal impact of rapid urbanization on rates of violence is not clear-cut”.[129] UN-HABITAT reports from 2007 and 2011 remind us that there are large urban agglomerations in both developed and developing countries with very low crime rates, as well as extremely fast-growing settlements where growth rates have a comparatively low impact on overall levels of crime and violence. More recent literature seems to focus on a (potentially unique) urban threat environment and a particular set of challenges that may both indirectly and directly impact the urban security landscape, leading to phenomena such as urban violence and fragility. These presumably uniquely urban threats and challenges are directly related to the patterns of urbanisation summarised in the above paragraphs.

2.3 Urban security challenges

Urban-specific challenges

As mentioned above, one of the initial assumptions of the present project is that the very nature of cities presupposes the existence of particular threats and specific security challenges, some of which are unique to urban environments. These challenges result in part from the concentration of mostly young people who hope to benefit from cities’ relatively high economic dynamism and opportunities. Often, they find themselves unemployed and faced with particularly difficult living conditions. This can lead to dire situations in which some turn to illicit sources of income or to participate in uprisings. The phenomenon of gentrification mentioned earlier means that modest urban dwellers (including young people) often end up living on the outskirts of major cities. They risk finding themselves in highly marginalised areas lacking adequate infrastructure and which are often more susceptible to natural disasters, such as floods, landslides and earthquakes. The latter has been particularly

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https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/urban-violence-and-humanitarian-challenges.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2017.

[127] Brender, ‘Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence’.

[128] Commins, ‘Urban Fragility and Security in Africa’, 4.

[129] Brender, ‘Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence’.

prominent in several coastal cities of the Global South, such as Caracas.[130] Many urban dwellers hence live in precarious conditions that put them at risk every day.[131]

It must be stressed that there is no established "direct and universal causal link between urban poverty, increased socio-economic inequality and rising violence."[132] Even if the correlation between socio-economic inequality and urban security issues appears logical prima facie, explaining contemporary urban violence requires the consideration of a complex range of variables. These include socio-economic features, state expenditure on security, and the nature of the justice system, which is said to be "often highly politicized and lacks respects for the rights of the poor."[133]

Although it is important to note that not all urban areas are inherently insecure, it is also vital to highlight the specific security threats faced by urban dwellers, especially in the most precarious urban areas (i.e. areas commonly situated on the outskirts of urban centres, usually referred to as slums, shantytowns, favelas etc.). Moreover, marginalised urban dwellers are often "those who suffer most at the hands of state security forces in 'wars on crimes', or at the hands of private sector actors such as land developers".[134]

The age of cities: which governance?

Precarious living standards in urban environments generate conditions for urban alienation, harsh competition and insecurity among urban dwellers. The centrality of cities (especially capital megacities) has grown tremendously, with some observers expecting cities to replace national governance given their increasing importance as "centres of political and economic power."[135] Capital cities have become "collision points between political control and exclusion, wealth and poverty, as well a tradition and modernity,"[136] hence constituting so-called *microcosms* of the national context.

Cities are also strategic locations for NGOs to establish their headquarters. This further adds to the growing role played by cities within wider circles of international governance. Nonetheless, the literature raises the concern that, although strategically located in cities, major NGOs working towards helping the lives of vulnerable communities do not seem to

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[130] Schnabel, A., Antillano A., Grande Alviarez I. C., Pedrazzini Y., 'Operationalising Human Security in an Urban Setting: The Experience of Caracas', in: Wiesmann, U. and Hurni H. (eds.), with an international group of co-editors, *Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives*, Perspectives of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South, University of Bern, Vol. 6 (Bern: Geographica Bernensia, 2011): 607-621.
[131] Abrahamsen, R., Hubert D. and Williams M.C., 'Guest Editors' Introduction', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 40, no. 4–5 (2009): 367.
[132] Ibid.: 367–368.
[133] Caldeira, Theresa, as quoted in Abrahamsen, R. and Williams M.C., *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 201.
[134] Moser, C.O.N., and McIlwaine C., 'Latin American Urban Violence as a Development Concern: Towards a Framework for Violence Reduction', *World Development*, vol. 34, no. 1 (2006): 89–112.
[135] Esser, D., 'Who Governs Kabul? Explaining Urban Politics in a Post-War Capital City', *Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2*, Working Paper no. 43, Cities in Fragile States (2009), http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/wp43.2-who-governs-kabul.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2017.
[136] Ibid.

deliver effective "urban services" because their operations are often concentrated in rural areas. Moreover, high levels of insecurity in some cities can prevent NGO staff from safely leaving their headquarters. They also lack the adequate expertise and networking capabilities to effectively coordinate their activities with other likeminded organizations.[137]

Despite the growing importance of cities in terms of international governance – given their preponderance as financial, power and operational centres – this might have come at the expense of security sector governance at the urban level. The latter seems to have gotten trapped between the growing importance and independence of cities, and the traditional role played by national governments in overseeing the security sector. Such a tension inevitably creates gaps and shortcomings in the governance of the security sector at the urban level.

Waves of civil disobedience in the Parisian *banlieues* in 2005 illustrate how the interplay between some of the urban-specific challenges addressed (migration trends, urbanisation, gentrification and inadequate urban governance) may generate situations of great urban insecurity and inadequate responses from those governing the security sector.[138] If urban areas are not governed in ways that effectively take into account and address socio-economic and political issues, such environments are prone to giving rise to the primacy of gangs and organised crime over cities.[139] This leads some analysts to describe urban security as "the oblique reflection of the state itself."[140] A major urban security challenge is therefore the difficulty to reconcile the role played by cities as financial and power centres with the nature and functions of the state at the urban level. [141]

Urban environments as central to post-conflict peacebuilding

This latter aspect manifests itself most prominently in violent and conflict-ridden urban environments, such as in Afghan cities where war and peacebuilding operations have attracted a range of international and donor organizations. These include: "the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the WB, the European Commission, UN-HABITAT, the governments of the United States, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland, the German Development Bank, international and regional organizations (such as the Aga Khan Development Network, Aga Khan Foundation, CARE, Afghan Civil Society Forum, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee and Caritas Germany), as well as local organizations such as the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and a number of others engaged in construction and engineering projects."[142] These organizations have been involved in trying to address urban sector issues and capacity building, yet they have generally lacked coordination among their activities, despite the existence of the Urban Management

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[137] Beall, Joe and Esser Daniel, 'Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities', *Issues Paper Series* (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2005), 28, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2916/1/Shaping_Urban_Futures.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2017.
[138] Abrahamsen et al., 'Guest Editors' Introduction', 368.
[139] See Reuland, P. Special Representative to the European Union, International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) quoted in: Cook, L. 'New Challenges in Urban Security', *Security & Defence Agenda* (2011), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131220/URBAN_Report_final.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2017.
[140] Abrahamsen et al., 'Guest Editors' Introduction', 368.
[141] Esser, 'Who Governs Kabul? Explaining Urban Politics in a Post-War Capital City'.
[142] Beall and Esser, 'Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities', 26.

Consultative Group (UMCG), which has played a role in harmonising the range of the above-mentioned organizations' activities in the urban sector.[143]

Cities as security sites

Another city-specific aspect has been the increasing use of cities as key sites for innovative security policies, as evidenced by the rise of new technological tools for surveillance and profiling.[144] The transnational nature of certain cities has indeed been aligned with the increasingly transnational global focus of policing and criminal investigation.[145] Among other reasons, this can be explained by the fact that terrorist attacks usually occur against target sites and individuals in urban environments. As a result, related counter-terrorism policies and measures have been high on the agenda of most governments and have mainly focused on protecting major cities and their inhabitants.

The city is therefore now seen as a site of "geopolitical contestation and strategies of intervention."[146] This involves both the above-mentioned 'soft' approaches to security, such as surveillance and policing, and the harshest forms of military force. In addition, as further explained in the section on the securitisation of urbanity below, growing emphasis on cities as crucial security sites and talks of the importance and urgency of addressing urban violence and instability have led security concerns to permeate the political space. This has resulted in increasing pressure on urban security sector governance and has tended to legitimise some of the harshest uses of force in urban environments.

It is important to stress and raise awareness about three crucial aspects pertaining to urban threats and urban security provision. These are the varying nature of urban spaces and drivers of insecurity; the securitisation of urbanity; and the gender dimensions of urban insecurity.

Different kinds of urban spaces, different drivers of insecurity

Firstly, one must not neglect the importance of adapting security provision in urban contexts to the particularities of those environments. Hence, "[t]he dynamics of youth gang violence in Tegucigalpa, Honduras are different from generalized rioting in London; reducing a high murder rate in New Orleans requires different policies than responding to ethnically driven civil war in Fallujah, Iraq."[147] Depending on the context, urban insecurity may take the form of "[e]ndemic gang[s], crime[s] of drug-related violence, gender-based attacks, ethnic strife, terrorism, or outright warfare."[148] Moreover, the reasons explaining why full-fledged violence breaks out in some cities and not others are not well understood and represent a

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[143] Ibid.

[144] Brennan-Galvin, E., 'Crime and Violence in an Urbanizing World', *Journal of International Affairs,* vol. 56, no. 1 (2002).

[145] Abrahamsen et al., 'Guest Editors' Introduction', 364.

[146] Ibid.

[147] Felbab-Brown, V., *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America. Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers* (Latin America Initiative at Brookings, 2011): 1-2.

[148] Moser, C.O.N. and Rodgers D., *Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: Global Policy Report*, Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: Violence, Cities and Poverty Reduction in the Developing World (Geneva: Urban Tipping Point (UTP), 2012).

major gap in research on urban insecurity.[149] These different forms of urban insecurity have varying consequences for economic development at the city and country levels as well as for the living conditions of the most vulnerable population groups. These variations also have an impact on research agendas and public policy. For instance, in Latin American cities, debates about public security tend to focus mainly on "crime, youth gangs and the police, and, in some cases, on death squads and paramilitaries."[150]

Therefore, because of the range of ways urban insecurity varies and manifests itself, one should not jump to hasty conclusions regarding the origins or causes of insecurity in urban environments. The "Urban Tipping Point" project (UTP) sheds important light on the phenomenon of urban violence. Most notably, the UTP project assessed four conventional claims about the drivers of urban violence, namely poverty and falling income; the emergence of large youth groups; the lack of attention to women's insecurity in public policies; and socio-spatial political exclusion. Through examinations of the causal links between those alleged drivers of urban conflict as well as case-studies, the UTP project findings challenged the assumption that poverty is causally linked to violence. Indeed both poverty and violence are systemic phenomena and poverty is most linked to violence "[w]hen the non-poor perceive the poor as a problem."[151] Instead the UTP project ends its assessment of the link between violence and poverty by referring back to Gandhi's famous quote suggesting that poverty might in fact be "the worst form of violence."[152]

Regarding socio-spatial political exclusion, the UTP project found that urban violence is more likely linked to urban political elites who are trying to maintain power, rather than to political exclusion per se. Interestingly, it is found that political *inclusion* might instead be linked to urban violence. For instance youth groups in Nairobi, Kenya, or Dili, Timor-Leste, have been recruited and instrumentalised by urban elites. On youth groups specifically as drivers of urban violence, the UTP project found no natural correlation. The case of the city of Dili and severe urban violence in 2006-2007 had previously been used as a primary example of the existence of the interlinkages between a large youth population and violence. However, the project found that it was more likely to be linked to long-standing unresolved political conflict than to the presence of youth groups.

Finally, the research indicated that gender-based violence may only be properly addressed when approached in relation to other forms of violence. Therefore, any policy or research agendas on gender mainstreaming should effectively integrate the links existing between gender-related violence and other forms of urban violence.[153]

The securitisation of urbanity

Secondly, a crucial concept that must be raised is the so-called "securitization of urbanity." Martin Coward talks of a "[r]eciprocal dynamic of urban securitization… in which the security

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[149] Ibid.: 1, 10.
[150] Wilding, P., '"New Violence": Silencing Women's Experiences in the "Favelas" of Brazil', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 42, no. 4 (2010): 719.
[151] Moser and Rodgers, *Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: Global Policy Report*, 11.
[152] Ibid.: 12.
[153] Ibid.

agenda is urbanized and urbanity is – insofar as it induces insecurity and vulnerability – securitized."[154] The concepts of securitisation and de-securitisation are commonly associated with the Copenhagen School that emerged from the Conflict and Peace Research Institute of Copenhagen. Most notably, Barry Buzan's seminal work *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*[155] launched a wider research agenda, to which he largely contributed alongside Ole Waever[156] and Jaap de Wilde.[157]

The securitisation process is observed along a spectrum on which public issues are positioned depending on whether they are "non-politicized", "politicized" or "securitized" (see figure 1 below). Essentially, securitisation is an extreme form of politicisation through which a given issue is framed to have a sense of urgency and priority due to its security dimension. Securitisation occurs through a so-called "act of securitization", which is composed of both a *speech act*, which associates the issue with a discourse of security and calls upon measures to address it urgently; and a *political act*, which manifests itself through concrete policies or decisions put in motion by political leaders, thereby acknowledging the security dimension of the issue.[158] According to the tenets of securitisation theory, in order to be successful, securitisation depends on a given target audience's acceptance or acknowledgment of the particular issue threat that justifies its securitisation.

Figure 1: *The process and spectrum of securitisation*



Source: Ralf Emmers[159]

[154] Coward, 'Network-Centric Violence, Critical Infrastructure and the Urbanization of Security', 399-400.
[155] Buzan, B., *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf, 1983).
[156] Buzan, B. and Waever O., *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[157] Buzan, B., Waever O., and de Wilde Jaap, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
[158] United Nations Human Settlements Programme, *What Does the Green Economy Mean for Sustainable Urban Development?*, Expert Group Meeting, 17-18 February 2011, Tribe Hotel, Nairobi, http://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/9707_1_593529.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2017.
[159] Emmers R., 'Securitization', in: *Contemporary Security Studies*. Ed.: Alan Collins, 4th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 170.

The concept of securitisation is important to raise and grasp in order to understand the dynamics of urban insecurity. Moreover, in order to prevent hasty conclusions, it is important to be aware of the processes of securitisation that might be operating both at the policy level and in the media. For instance, it has been observed that Brazilian media has tended to disproportionately focus stories linked to urban violence and insecurity on a few urban centres, such as Rio de Janeiro.[160]

Often securitisation is mistaken for militarisation, particularly when 'security' is used in a traditional sense and closely related to the concept of national security (in contrast to human security); focused primarily on direct security (as opposed to structural security); and, as suggested in Figure 1, related only to "existential threats" endangering the survival of the individual or the community.

This militarised concoction of the securitisation process thus defines a process of the "urbanization of security", whereby urbanised forms of organised crime increasingly target critical urban infrastructure.[161] Indeed, in addition to crime in cities, terrorist attacks in the US and in Europe have tended to target cities as symbolic and critical centres of power, as seen in New York City (2001) [162], Madrid (2004), London (2005), Minsk (2011), Oslo and Utøya (Norway, 2011), Kumanovo (Macedonia, 2015), Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), Nice (2016), Berlin (2016), Manchester (2017), London (2017), Barcelona (2017). The most extreme form of violence, namely war, has also increasingly taken place in urban centres, changing the nature of warfare dramatically. The urbanisation of war as such has put tremendous pressure on state militaries, which are traditionally trained to fight conventional wars on the battlefield. The complex terrains of urban centres, where insurgents commonly use the civilian population as human shields for strategic purposes, pose newfound challenges.[163]

The above trends have led to responses at the policy level, such as strengthened protection measures for high-profile buildings and increasingly complex regimes of surveillance.[164] As a result, security infrastructures, including "electronic surveillance, private security guards, and the laws and rules of conduct that can restrict actions (…)" have now become relatively ordinary in urban contexts. They are often framed as necessary – if not urgent – measures to combat anti-social behaviour, crime and terrorism.[165]

Although urban centres are undoubtedly vulnerable and targeted by various forms of crime and violence, thereby embodying the notion of an "urbanization of security" (or better: urbanisation of direct violence), one must be mindful of potential processes behind extreme variations of securitisation. As urban insecurity becomes increasingly politicised, potentially

[160] Wilding, '"New Violence": Silencing Women's Experiences in the "Favelas" of Brazil', 730.
[161] Coward, 'Network-Centric Violence, Critical Infrastructure and the Urbanization of Security', 414.
[162] Coaffee, J., 'Morphing the Counter-Terrorist Response: Beating the Bombers in London's Financial Heart', *Knowledge, Technology & Policy*, vol. 16, no. 2 (2003): 63–66.
[163] See for example: Gordon, N. and Perugini, N., 'Human Shields, Sovereign Power, and the Evisceration of the Civilian', *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 110 (2016): 329-334.
[164] Coward, 'Network-Centric Violence, Critical Infrastructure and the Urbanization of Security', 415.
[165] Coaffee, J., O'Hare P., and Hawkesworth M., 'The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 40, no. 4–5 (2009): 497.

disproportionate attention is given to direct security threats in specific cities or urban centres, and less to structural insecurity, which may be equally prevalent inside and outside of urban centres. Lack of attention to these dynamics can prevent the sustainability of security interventions and further entrench communal insecurity.

On gender and urban insecurity

In order to gain a more comprehensive view of urban insecurity, it is also important to disaggregate specific security challenges according to gender. Typically, women tend to be more vulnerable in the private sphere whereas men are more vulnerable in the public sphere. Hence, most attacks perpetrated on women are from attackers known to them, whereas men are commonly more prone to attack from unknown perpetrators. However, one must be extremely careful when analysing and disaggregating gender-related data; recent research on urban policing questions whether observed "decreases in domestic violence"[166] should be credited to the increasing criminalisation of family abuse or to the proliferation of nuisance property ordinances that discourage reporting.[167]

Types of attacks also tend to vary according to gender. It is widely recognised that men are more likely to die from violent assault, while women tend to be more prone to suffer from non-fatal forms of violence. Therefore, when attempting to measure urban insecurity, it is crucial to ensure that the data reflects these dynamics and other complex components of urban and human security. Unfortunately, this has not necessarily been the norm. For instance, statistics addressing homicide rates, gun and gang violence tend to overlook domestic, gender-based and structural violence and thereby fail to notice the urban security challenges particularly affecting women and girls. It is also worth disaggregating the type of crimes perpetrated into certain categories, as women are at a larger risk of being strangulated, while men are more prone to being hit or kicked.[168] Indeed, in light of such patterns, it seems that adopting gender-sensitive approaches to urban insecurity could better highlight crucial dimensions of urban security challenges and thereby contribute to "overcom[ing] the disconnect between urban politics and the realities faced by most urban inhabitants."[169]

Evidence suggests that gender-based violence is sometimes used as a strategy to escalate political and criminal violence, such as in the context of war or rivalries between urban gangs. Where women are targeted by men, violence can be based on a perceived form of masculine entitlement or be a way of subverting the masculinity of the opposition by demonstrating their inability to perform their "male role" as protectors. The ultimate form

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[166] US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 'Intimate Partner Violence Declined between 1993 and 2004', Press Release, Washington, DC, 2006, https://ojp.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2006/BJS07007.htm, accessed on 12 December 2017.

[167] Desmond, M. and Valdez N., 'Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 78 (2013): 138.

[168] 'Crime Statistics for England & Wales: Violent Crime and Sexual Offences', *The Guardian*, 7 February 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/feb/07/crime-statistics-england-wales-violent-sexual-offences, accessed on 12 December 2017.

[169] Feuerschütz, S., 'Gender and Urban (In)Security in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States', Research Report, *The North-South Institute* (2013): 29, http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Gender-and-Urban-Insecurity-in-FCAS-v111.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2017.

of this type of humiliation for men is direct sexual violence, either through penetration, sexual mutilation or forced rape. This has been documented in many conflicts and prisons.[170]

Urbanisation trends have also included a so-called "feminisation of the labour force", which is resulting in an increase in the proportion of female-headed households. This is an essential factor to consider when addressing SSG and SSR processes at the urban level, as the involvement of women as stakeholders in SSR processes is particularly compelling in these contexts. However, it is important to stress that women and girls can also be perpetrators of violence and insecurity and that men and boys can also be victims. Moreover, women and girls can be security providers, with men and boys among the recipients.

Finally, the above-mentioned gender security and insecurity aspects interact with other socio-economic and societal aspects, from which they should not be disconnected. These aspects include class, income, ethnicity, religion/belief, gender identity (including e.g. transgender persons), sexuality/sexual orientation, profession, age, disability, or whether someone has children (or is pregnant).[171]

2.4 Security provision in urban contexts

Urban spaces around the world share common characteristics, making this attempt to study the urban dimension of the security sector a worthwhile endeavour. However, in the same vein as national SSG/R measures and programmes cannot be adapted according to a one-size-fits-all approach, the nature of security provision as well as potential reforms of the urban security sector depend heavily on local specificities.

After looking at a range of aspects pertaining to urban security challenges, this section will be reviewing some of the dimensions of security provision in urban contexts that are most recurrent across the literature and in contemporary policy debates on the topic.

Unreliable security provision and informal urban governance

One of the most recurrent aspects of security provision in urban contexts is a deep seated mistrust of certain traditional security actors – such as the police – and their "dual nature" in both urban governance and security provision. For instance, in Brazil the police are regularly portrayed as violent, corrupt and incompetent, the judiciary is seen as untrustworthy and the penal system is perceived to be unfair and unjust. Such negative perceptions of key institutions that are meant to be central to urban governance creates a governance vacuum, leading informal and illegal actors such as gangs to present themselves as and eventually be

[170] The authors would like to thank DCAF's Callum Watson for pointing out these aspects.

[171] For further literature looking at gender dimensions in an urban context, please see: Tandon Mehrotra, Surabhi, *A Handbook on Women's Safety Audits in Low-Income Urban Neighbourhoods: A Focus on Essential Services*, New Delhi: Jagori, 2010; O'Leary, Renagh and Kalpana Viswanath, *Building Safe Inclusive Cities for Women: A Practical Guide*, New Delhi: Jagori, 2011; United Nations Human Settlements Programme, *The Global Assessment on Women's Safety*, Nairobi: UN-HABITAT, 2008.

seen as legitimate governance actors and security providers.[172]

In effect, absent or malfunctioning urban governance structures reveal the state's incapacity to assert its authority over the totality of its territory, thus giving way to informal governance structures in certain regions of the country, or neighbourhoods or districts in cities. In certain cases, informal governance and security providing structures are drawn from community initiatives and traditional organisational cultures such as local and tribal leadership. For instance, some communities in Nigeria have organised self-governed "vigilante groups" whose role consists of patrolling the streets and acting as a deterrent to crime, as they cannot rely on the protection of traditional urban security providers, such as the police, due to their untrustworthiness or absence.

On the other hand, informal governance and security structures can take the form of an armed group imposing itself as an urban governance actor, asserting its authority among the local population both through force and the provision of social services.[173] These groups are typically "transnational criminal syndicates, local gangs, drug cartels, insurgent groups […]."[174]

Lacking effective state intervention and initiatives to combat violence and insecurity, the phenomenon of informal urban governance seems to also be self-nurturing. In fact, the financial sustainability of many of the aforementioned criminal groups is highly reliant on illegal trafficking, the monetary gains of which "serve to corrupt officials, the police in particular, in order to protect the supply chain."[175] Therefore, corrupt behaviours amongst traditional urban security providers such as the police – and the state by extension – contribute to reinforcing urban insecurity. This happens either as a result of their lack of action in addressing the development of informal urban governance structures – as is reported in Nairobi – or due to their complicity in corruption, as observed in several countries of Latin America, where drug cartels have enjoyed significant influence over political authorities.[176]

Notably, both state and federal initiatives to address this issue have been largely unsuccessful. Explanations for this lack of effectiveness are not always obvious. In fact, it has been reported that the increased presence of the police in neighbourhoods that are governed informally has tended to reinforce the status quo of the informal order. The police are said to "accommodate" informal leaders and sometimes end up in competition with them "[o]ver who would control local protection rackets."[177] This phenomenon echoes the above-mentioned "dual nature" of certain traditional urban security actors, which is a

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[172] Luis Bitencourt, 'Brazil's Growing Urban Insecurity: Is It a Threat to Brazilian Democracy?', *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)* (2003): 1, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/pp03bitencourt%5B1%5D.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2017.

[173] Hazen, 'Understanding Gangs as Armed Groups', 380.

[174] Davis, E.D., *A Toolkit for Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence*, derived from the report, *Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence*, MIT's Center for International Studies (CIS) (2012): 4, http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ccdp/shared/Docs/Projects/urban_resilience_toolkit-1.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2017.

[175] Ibid.

[176] Ibid.: 10.

[177] Ibid.

central challenge for wider urban security governance.

Failures in urban governance and state responses

Urban violence is said to result in part from the "inability of state institutions to regulate and ultimately manage the legitimate use of force."[178] As mentioned above, urban dwellers in certain cities perceive the state institutions responsible for ensuring law and order as illegitimate and dysfunctional. This perception tends to be directly linked and reinforced by the fact that traditional security providers such as the police are often seen as contributing to urban violence. Corruption is indeed central to failures in urban governance, as some cities are largely affected by informal and coercive systems of "mobilization and rent extraction."[179] The vacuums created by decaying state authority over certain parts of a given city are often quickly filled by emerging so-called "violence entrepreneurs," as evidenced through influential patronage networks in Caribbean cities such as Port of Spain and Kingston, but also in the cities of countries like Cambodia, Indonesia and Timor-Leste.[180]

In certain cases, such as Liberia, urban governance failures result from a low number of security providers. According to a review of SSR activities in Liberia, in particular with regard to the Liberia National Police (LNP), it was found that training had not delivered the initially expected outcomes.[181] LNP personnel have mainly been concentrated in urban centres and on important roads, thus creating gaps in coverage for more remote areas. Indeed, it is observed that, "[i]n a population of three million people, 3,500 police are insufficient to uphold laws, provide security, perform duties such as investigations, and mediate grievances through community policing initiatives…".[182] The effectiveness of urban governance and security provision therefore has an important qualitative dimension, depending also on the kind and extent of collaboration existing among different urban stakeholders. This specifically concerns collaboration between municipal and national police forces, which may result in greater efficiency in terms of collaboration and knowledge sharing. It can however also result in making the "[b]oundaries between policing and military force...more indistinct."[183] One potentially negative aspect of this is the militarisation of police actions in cities, exemplified by the highly disputed pacification policies employed in cities of Brazil.

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[178] Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence'.

[179] Clunan, A.L. and Trinkunas H.A. (eds.), *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty* (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2010); Renders, M. and Terlinden U., 'Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order: The Case of Somaliland', *Development and Change*, vol. 41, no. 4 (2010): 723–746; Desmond Arias, E., 'Faith in Our Neighbors: Networks and Social Order in Three Brazilian Favelas', *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol. 46, no. 1 (2004): 1–38, cites in Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence', 10.

[180] Townsend, D., 'No Other Life: Gangs, Guns, and Governance in Trinidad and Tobago', *Small Arms Survey*, Working Papers (December 2009): 1–55; Glaister, L., 'Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica', *Small Arms Survey*, Working Papers (September 2010): 1–90; Muggah, R., 'Urban Violence in an Urban Village: A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste', *Geneva Declaration Secretariat* (2010): 1–80, cited in Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence', 10.

[181] Meharg, S.J., Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and Army War College (U.S.), *Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building*, PKSOI Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010): 73.

[182] Ibid.: 73.

[183] Abrahamsen et al., 'Guest Editors' Introduction', 364.

A final important aspect to consider for the effectiveness of urban governance and state responses is institutional adaptation and reform. In fact, institutional change is often considered to be among the crucial drivers of the so-called "metropolitan miracle" in the formerly highly insecure Colombian cities of Bogota and Medellin. In the context of Colombia, the institutional context is said to have changed dramatically from the mid-1980s and mid-1990s.[184] Chief among these institutional changes is the popular election of mayors. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín et al. captured the "old" institutional context of Colombian urban governance prior to the shift that occurred at the institutional level and what it meant for the power of mayors:

> "In the old institutional world, mayors were members of a chain of command headed by the president. In a country that has suffered from chronic political violence, stability is a major concern. Thus, perhaps the main role of the mayors was to guarantee peace by coordinating the interests of local political parties and pressure groups. Each of the two main parties was highly factionalised and mayors had to ensure that every Liberal and Conservative on the spectrum had proper representation in the urban administration and in the policies adopted in order to avoid discord. The mayors were appointed to maintain stability and any sign that they had failed to do so could prompt their downfall. However, the municipal councils had the real political power. They could block policies, decide the salary of municipal officials, and had seats on the management boards of public utilities. Unlike mayors, councillors were endowed with a legitimacy that came from being elected and thus were able to prove that they had real popular support. This did not necessarily mean that mayors were decorative figures. Many of them were able to accumulate overwhelming power, for example through patronage, and occasionally launched real processes of modernization which profited from specific international conjunctures. However, they could only support themselves using traditional party coalitions; any other form of coalition building was not viable."[185]

Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín et al. highlight that while Colombian urban governance evolved significantly during the last three decades, some newly elected mayors strongly opposed adaptation and reform processes.

Urban operations and policy

Another important dimension of security provision in urban contexts is the conduct of urban operations and actual policy implementation. Urban areas present particular difficulties for waging military or police interventions. Indeed the terrain of urban contexts presents specificities that are dramatically different from open country or mountainous contexts. Importantly, the sheer size and surface area of a given city will have a direct impact on the number of troops, police or personnel needed for an urban operation. Research shows that

[184] Gutiérrez Sanín, F., Pinto, M.T., Arenas, J.C., Gúzman, T., Gutiérrez, M.T., 'Politics and Security in Three Colombian Cities', *Working Paper 44 - Cities and Fragile States* (2009): 1-29.
[185] Ibid.: 7–8.

a combat formation of between 1,000 and 1,500 troops is generally expected to be able to guard or defend a town with 100,000 inhabitants.[186]

An offensive in an urban area "require[s] a detailed analysis of the terrain, precise intelligence on military positions, and superiority for the attacker of at least five to one. This number is twice as high as the ratio generally agreed upon for an attack in open country."[187] Indeed, so-called "Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)" have become preponderant in today's nature of warfare, thus becoming a primary concern for military planners, who have seen their operations and enemies operating in urban environments requiring adaptable and flexible troops, in direct contrast of the long-dominant conventional militaries operating in open battlefields.[188]

In addition to actual military operations in conflict zones, contemporary security provision in urban contexts have included punctual urban operations and policy designed to address and combat crime. However, the type of responses and fashion in which they are conducted has varied across countries and regions. In Latin and Central America, urban operations and policy have included so-called "Mano dura" (iron-fist) approaches, which among other policies have included the criminalisation of youth gang membership and systematic imprisonment (cf. *infra* 3.5c). It has also led to the use of "[h]eavily-armed police or military forces to retake territories…". As mentioned earlier, this often results from urban governance failures, with the state's presence in certain urban areas and its capacity to assert its authority vis-à-vis criminal groups shrinking, such as in the case of Brazil, or towards insurgent groups, such as the FARC in Colombia.[189]

In the case of Brazil, security provision in urban contexts has largely been framed within the context of Brazil's organisation of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. Brazil's urban policy in light of these major world sporting events has been largely criticised for its highly militarised nature and largely negative impact on local people. In particular, the poorest segments of several cities were uprooted from their neighbourhood to make way for infrastructure for the events. Brazil's urban policy has also been central to the political discourse on the government's attempts to change the reputation of its infamous favelas by renaming them "communities".

The shift in Brazil's governance of the urban security sector began with the allocation of the 2016 Olympic Games. In fact, financial and operational authority over security for the Olympic Games lay with the Brazilian Federal Government and its Ministry of Justice. Brazil had pledged significant investments aimed at improving security in Brazilian cities of concern over a four-year period (2012-16). Rio de Janeiro Governor Sergio Cabral promised significant improvements in security during his presentation to the International Olympic

[186] Vautravers, A., 'Military Operations in Urban Areas', *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 92, no. 878 (2010): 437–452, 440-441, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-878-vautravers.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2017.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Abrahamsen et al., 'Guest Editors' Introduction', 370.
[189] Bitencourt, 'Brazil's Growing Urban Insecurity: Is It a Threat to Brazilian Democracy?'.

Committee (IOC) in October 2009 in Copenhagen.[190] As a result, the Brazilian Ministry of Justice's National Public Secretariat (SENASP) was provided with a budget of USD 3.5 billion over four years in order to coordinate efforts among city, state and federal agencies for the improvement of urban security. Moreover, Brazil also received financial assistance from the World Bank, which pledged USD 485 billion to address security in the favelas, as well as improve transportation infrastructure and more general security concerns.[191]

Considerable commentary has been written about the consequences of such funding and the targeted urban policy surrounding Brazil's organisation of these two major sporting events. In effect, urban policy and operations have included policing operations mainly aimed at pacifying or securing particularly problematic favelas, fostering urban infrastructure development and renewal, as well as focusing on problematic youth, who are commonly attracted to join gangs. Although Brazil has been criticised for its sometimes heavy-handed pacification policies, research shows that urban security policy is most effective and sustainable when it combines both hard and soft strategies. This also includes the promotion of local leadership and community development. Regular reassessments of urban policy are also important.[192]

Urban operations and policy need to be adapted to the context at hand. In highly conflictual or non-permissive environments, there needs to be operational collaboration among state security actors, such as the military and the national police in order for urban policy to be effective and sustainable. For instance, in Haiti it was shown that conducting police training aimed to reconstitute the Haitian National Police (HNP) was not sufficient. In non-permissive environments, military support is therefore sometimes needed for an urban security provider like a national police force to gradually assert its authority as a legitimate urban governance actor.[193]

2.5 The 'generic' urban security sector

Gangs and informal institutions: urban security providers

An important component of the urban security sector is the role played by informal actors and institutions, such as the ways criminal organizations and gangs challenge or replace the state's authority at the urban level.

Gangs have been referred to as key players in the manifestation of urban violence. The sheer number and influence of gangs have arguably increased with growing urbanisation. Today there are thousands of gangs spread across cities worldwide, with their activities directly challenging the state's policies in neighbourhoods and cities. At the same time they pose

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[190] '2016 Olympic Bid Timeline - How We Got Here', *GamesBids*, 1 October 2009, https://gamesbids.com/eng/summer-olympic-bids/2016-olympic-bid-news/2016-olympic-bid-timeline-how-we-got-here/, accessed on 13 December 2017.

[191] Bitencourt, L., 'The Security Challenges for the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games', *Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center* (2011): 13.

[192] Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence', 11.

[193] Meharg, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and Army War College (U.S.), *Security Sector Reform*: *A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building*, 94.

significant security challenges to urban dwellers and their political representatives, who may have to please and appease gangs in order to pursue their professional activities. Striking examples are the cases of humanitarian workers in the fields of health, education and refugee protection. In these cases, gangs' authority and corrupt activities may need to be tolerated in order to allow the proper delivery of protection and humanitarian services.[194]

As evidenced by the results of over a hundred years of research across disciplines such as sociology, anthropology and criminology, gangs are difficult to define. The term "gang" has commonly referred to a range of groups and phenomena. This has included "groups of adolescent youth who get together on street corners, and who fight each other irregularly, engage in petty vandalism, or even just hang out, to groups of youth who participate regularly in delinquent activities, to organized crime syndicates, to prison-based gangs, and even to political parties…".[195] Dennis Rodgers has defined a gang as "more or less recognized as an institutionalized collective unit by wider society, and where the core membership of the group is regularly involved in violence." "[T]he core of the group has to be relatively constant over a certain lapse of time, although the broader membership of the group will fluctuate over time."[196] The age of gang members is also a debated issue, though most gang members tend to be under 25.

Gangs are typically characterised as highly volatile groups or "social forms", as "[t]oday's youth gangs can become tomorrow's drug cartels, which can become the day after tomorrow's ethnic militia."[197] Indeed, gangs reflect societal trends, issues and challenges at various social, political and economic levels. The formation of a gang often comes about as a result of identified security concerns, which then continue to feed into the *raison d'être* of the gang. Gangs are essentially groups of individuals who address commonly faced difficulties and threats as a group rather than as individuals. When threats persist or are exacerbated, gang recruitment soars. Indeed, gangs seem to be most successful and self-sustaining in areas of "[h]igh poverty, discrimination and marginalization."[198] Gangs may attract marginalised individuals through a range of provisions, including social services that might not otherwise be accessible or normally provided by the state, a group identity, as well as a sense of security. Ultimately, gangs become a type of (informal) social institution, thus directly challenging the state and easing its failings.[199]

Violence related to the presence of gangs in cities thereby originates from deep-rooted socio-economic problems and a lack of opportunities. In urban communities affected by high poverty and marginalisation, individuals are often seen as fighting for their own survival in a "ruthless Darwinian competition", whereby they compete for scarce economic resources, often at the expense of others. The nature of cities and evolving urban policy also seem to reinforce that phenomenon, as "urban renewal and design" tend to worsen processes of

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[194] Bangerter, O. 'Territorial Gangs and Their Consequences for Humanitarian Players', *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 92, no. 878 (2010): 387-406, 388.

[195] Rodgers, D., 'Interview with Dennis Rodgers', *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 92, no. 878 (2010): 313–328, 318.

[196] Ibid.

[197] Hagedorn, J., *A World of Gangs* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2008): 65–83 cited in Rodgers, 'Interview with Dennis Rodgers', 398.

[198] Hazen, 'Understanding Gangs as Armed Groups', 385.

[199] Ibid.

segregation. The creation of further separated, often gated, communities and closed condominiums, as well as the fortification of urban transport networks contribute to this phenomenon. These trends also tend to reinforce inequalities in municipal or urban governance, whereby the police mainly patrols (and thereby provides security) the wealthiest neighbourhoods and public transport routes sometimes stop servicing the poorest neighbourhoods for security reasons. These divisions are further manifested in the raids of security forces in slums and poorer areas, as was seen in some of the pacification operations in Brazil.[200]

Illegal security actors or necessary informal providers?

As previously discussed, an important aspect of the urban security sector lies within the dual nature of certain informal security providers, such as gangs. In cities experiencing high levels of violence, informal actors and institutions play a key role in providing (often welcomed) social services that are not being delivered by the state. Therefore in cities like Rio de Janeiro, Port-au-Prince, Beirut, Kingston and Johannesburg, participation in gang-relating activities, be that as an active member or as a service consumer, is perceived to be a coping strategy for survival in highly hostile and insecure environments.[201]

The latter may explain why, despite the fact that gangs largely contribute to urban violence and insecurity in Brazilian favelas, attitudes towards them on the part of urban dwellers vary tremendously. Indeed, it is reported that interviews in gang-affected communities revealed that residents recognise the role played by gangs in arbitrating conflicts, fostering community spirit and considering the welfare of their fellow residents. Although their criminal activities are well known, certain groups function as key providers of security by default. They are thus seen as “[r]egulating theft, robberies, extortions, rapes and murders and dispensing their rules and punishments for transgressions…”.[202] The suppression of gangs can therefore actually lead to an increase of urban crimes, further delegitimising the state and reinforcing popular trust in informal security providers. This phenomenon is exemplified by the Colombian city of Medellin, post-Don Berna and certain favelas in Rio following pacification operations.[203] Moreover, attitudes towards the police tend to be extremely negative, as the police are viewed as aggressive, corrupt, abusive and unfair.[204] Such attitudes epitomise urban governance failures given that the presence of the police in neighbourhoods symbolises the state’s action. The unpopularity of the national police therefore signifies the state’s lack of authority and legitimacy.

The above discussion suggests that the potential for SSG and SSR at the urban level need to take into account the role, activity and popularity of informal non-state actors and institutions operating and providing services in cities. SSR programming should therefore recognise, map and engage with non-state urban security providers, as they constitute a

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[200] Jütersonke, O., Muggah R., and Rodgers D., ‘Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America’, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 40, no. 4-5 (2009): 373-397, 381.
[201] Brender, ‘Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence’, 10.
[202] Felbab-Brown, *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America. Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers*, 17.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Wilding, ‘“New Violence”: Silencing Women’s Experiences in the "Favelas" of Brazil’, 731.

large and important part of the urban security sector.[205]

2.6 Defining SSG and SSR: from national to urban contexts

Analysing and learning from instances of urban security sector reform

Before delving further into the urban threats and security institutions that constitute the urban SSG/R context, it is important to highlight some of the aspects that define SSG and SSR across national and urban contexts.

The distinction between security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) in national and urban contexts is best approached through concrete case studies that indicate the links and possible shifts that have operated among a range of governance actors. For instance, the significant improvement of security in key Colombian cities, now referred to as the "metropolitan miracle", is directly attributed to a shift in so-called "urban ideology" towards better urban policies. As mentioned, a key SSR measure in the case of Colombia was to introduce the popular election of mayors. This entailed considerable devolution of power by providing urban security actors with the authority, legitimacy and autonomy to address local security challenges relatively independently from the federal or central government.[206]

This urban ideology echoes "the urban security vision" proposed in this study. It also stresses the importance of the sometimes forgotten role played by "[n]orms, culture, and spatiality in urban governance in contrast to theories that emphasise the role of repression or social reform, or a combination of both – theories that had previously been largely dominant…"[207] The experience of Colombia therefore shows how cultural engineering and the push for an urban-citizen culture can have positive effects on security. Both the deterioration of public space and the alienation of urban dwellers from security issues directly concerning them tend to allow urban violence to spread. By adopting an effective urban security vision, modifying the urban landscape and gradually changing the "[n]orms and perceptions of the citizens…", Colombian urban governance actors have succeeded in improving the general urban environment in which they operate. In order to do so, mayors from the three main Colombian cities of Bogota, Medellin and Cali invested considerable amounts of political and financial capital in attempting to reverse urban insecurity trends. They worked towards developing indicators of violence, which were subsequently used to develop strategies and policies that addressed and replaced negative trends, while gradually altering the urban landscape.[208]

Much can be learned by looking at the case of Colombia. The so-called "metropolitan miracle" indicates a range of considerations for the urban dimensions of SSG, as well as best practices and scope conditions under which security sector reforms may be most effective at the urban level. For instance, it is reported that although security improved and crime

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[205] Lawrence, M., 'Towards a Non-State Security Sector Reform Strategy', *The Centre for International Governance Innovation*, SSR Issue Papers no. 8 (2012): 1–39.
[206] Gutiérrez Sanín et al., 'Politics and Security in Three Colombian Cities', 3.
[207] Ibid.: 2.
[208] Ibid.: 3.

dropped significantly in Bogota and Medellin, Cali and smaller Colombian cities tell a different story. One explanation for this puzzle is that unlike in Europe, where smaller cities tend to be more prosperous, in Colombia and Latin America the middle class generally tends to be located in large cities. This creates a clear-cut division in terms of prosperity between large and small cities. Furthermore, larger Colombian cities like Bogota and Medellin seem to have been more responsive to urban security sector reforms. The presence of state bureaucracies and strong media contributed to the impact of the reforms.[209]

Political and constitutional changes were also at the heart of the reforms that occurred in Colombia's urban security sector. The 1991 Constitution (often referred to as C91) strove to send Colombia on the path of modernity and rejected traditional politics. It allowed for increased political inclusion, leading to the entry of new political actors and to the rise in the participation of citizens and civil society groups. Most central to our study, the 1991 Constitution was particularly innovative and visionary in terms of security. As mentioned, the power of mayors was increased, but the notion of *citizen security* was also introduced, constituting a crucial shift away from the long preponderant culture and practice of *national security*.[210]

The 1991 Constitution (C91) inspired a generation of political leaders who would soon implement a range of measures that contributed to the improvement of urban security in Colombia. Gutiérrez Sanín et al. argue that the coalition that came into power in Colombia in the early 1990s thus "[d]evised a series of ideas and policies that solved problems of collective action and brought the functioning of the state closer to the frontier of optimality with huge citizen support and large national and international impact. Where material and organisational conditions for the formation and functioning of such a coalition were absent, processes developed in another direction."[211] Nonetheless, it is important to note that although the C91 ultimately produced the metropolitan miracles in Colombia, this only occurred when a range of conditions were present, as evidenced by Cali's relatively slow start and lesser success in improving security.[212]

From national security governance to urban security governance

This section has shown how non-state actors have replaced the state in the governance of certain cities or certain neighbourhoods. Indeed, rather than having a planned devolution of power originating from the state and empowering local urban (state) security actors, national governments tend to lack a comprehensive vision of urban security. In particular, the role that informal actors play in filling the vacuums left by inefficient states in urban contexts is not always fully understood.

In the case of Colombia discussed above, the Federal César Gaviria Government (1990-1994) implemented its 'National Strategy Against Violence', which was driven by the Presidencia de la República 1991 and the new constitution. Despite the positive impact it has had on the reform of the security sector at the urban level, much still remains to be done to ensure

[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid.: 9.
[211] Ibid.: 16.
[212] Ibid.: 15.

sustainability. In fact, even though the reforms strengthened the rights and responsibilities of mayors over security, the president has remained in charge overall of security. Moreover, when governors and mayors take action, they are still acting as agents of the central government. The position and autonomy of mayors has improved, as they effectively became chiefs of police at the urban level, but according to the traditional chain of command, they are still required to report to their national superiors.[213]

[213] Ibid.: 9.

3 The Urban SSG/R Context: Urban Threats and Urban Security Institutions

As mentioned previously, the notion that "the majority of the world's population is now living in cities" is one of the most recurrent catchphrases in a diverse body of academic scholarship and various policy reports on the study of urban environments. These include research on cities and megacities, literature on migration and urbanisation, but also studies on violence and security more broadly. Furthermore, the concept of urban warfare has become prominent, as both state and non-state actors are seen as claiming urban environments as strategic battlefields. However, the fashionable and contemporary habit of underscoring the magnitude of increasing urbanisation seems of lesser importance than the qualitative impact of such a trend on life and governance in a city, including aspects of security sector governance and possible reforms.

Contemporary security challenges are diverse and complex. They include the threat of terrorism and organised crime, political unrest and economic struggles, as well as issues regarding critical infrastructures, energy security and the consequences of climate change.[214] The identification of the city as a unit of analysis calls for the examination of certain threats and security institutions specific to urban environments. Nonetheless, existing scholarship on SSG and SSR has largely neglected to approach urban environments as distinct SSG/R contexts.

Building upon the introductory aspects and definitions of urbanisation and the urban context, as well as of SSG and SSR in the second part of this report, we will subsequently show how the urban SSG/R context may be regarded as a microcosm of national SSG/R contexts. We highlight limits and conditions that may suggest that the distinction between national and urban security sectors is not always as clear-cut as it seems. This includes the distinction between capital and non-capital cities, as well as the difference between stable, peaceful urban contexts and unstable, war-torn or post-conflict ones.

This part of the report subsequently reviews and reflects upon the prioritised themes addressed in existing scholarship, while examining the apparent neglect of the security sector in urban contexts. This will be followed by an analysis of those threats that are prevalent or to some extent unique to the urban context, as well as a brief overview of key security and oversight institutions that constitute the urban security sector. Finally, the chapter will conclude by providing an overview of the possible characteristics, triggers and agents of responses to urban security threats, as well as drivers and agents of reform of the urban security sector. Ultimately, this chapter's analyses will shed light on the urban security sector's position within or vis-à-vis the national security sector.

3.1 The urban SSG/R context: a microcosm of national SSG/R contexts

The urban SSG/R context: A mirror of national security challenges

Although it is seldom conceptualised and approached in such a way, the urban SSG/R context may be regarded as a microcosm of national SSG/R contexts, presenting specific and

[214] Cook, 'New Challenges in Urban Security'.

unique threats and requiring context-specific institutional and oversight mechanisms deployed by adequate urban actors. Urban violence is commonly addressed through a range of policy initiatives, often originating from urban-specific national or regional programmes, although, most of the time they are excluded from overarching visions of urban security policy.[215] However, literature on urban insecurity seems to be gradually finding an audience in policy circles. For instance, this can occur through gender scholarship, which is acknowledged in the literature on human security, security sector reform and international relations and security as a central aspect of analysing how insecurity is experienced at the urban level. Similarly, contemporary scholarship questions the effectiveness of top-down approaches to security. These forms of research are useful for understanding the urban SSG/R context, as they help clarify individual and collective security perspectives, needs and challenges, as well as the range of responses that operate at both urban and national levels.[216]

Similar to national security, in order to address both internal and external threats, urban security requires holistic approaches that are inclusive of the police, the judiciary and other relevant actors. Contemporary challenges to the national security apparatus, such as the impact of new technologies and dilemmas concerning the line between security guarantees and citizens' privacy are particularly prominent in urban contexts. Moreover, as with national contexts, urban security providers have to take into account *a priori,* non-security-related societal aspects, such as economic development and illegal economic production within wider strategies and measurements of SSG and SSR.

Therefore, providing security and conducting SSG and SSR programmes in urban environments may involve going beyond the sole focus of the provision of security and rule of law. Hence it might also involve addressing wider socio-economic issues, which may include ensuring that "stable property rights be established, access to microcredit developed, access to education and health care expanded, and crucial infrastructure deficiencies redressed."[217] This section examines the urban SSG/R context and the extent to which it is a mirror of national-level security challenges.

Cross-cutting issues at the urban and national levels

As introduced throughout part 2 of this study, much has been written on the considerable improvements made to security in the key cities of Columbia, such as Bogota and Medellin. However, the extent of the so-called miracle has been questioned. Despite the observed improvements in security, it seems that underlying structural issues threatening Colombian society, such as inequality and the narco-economy, are still ever-present.[218] This reflects the experiences of the city of Cali, which did not improve security as well as Medellin and

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[215] Helly, D., 'Urban Violence: State of Play, Operational and Legal Challenges - Towards an EU Approach to the Issue of Urban Violence?', *Urban Violence and Humanitarian Challenges: Joint Report*, EUISS-ICRC Colloquium, Brussels, 19 January 2012, 37–43, https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/urban-violence-and-humanitarian-challenges.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2017. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Urban_violence_and_humanitarian_challenges.pdf.

[216] Wilding, '"New Violence": Silencing Women's Experiences in the "Favelas" of Brazil', 723.

[217] Felbab-Brown, *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America. Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers*, vii.

[218] Gutiérrez Sanín et al., 'Politics and Security in Three Colombian Cities'.

Bogota, and which tempers this idea of a "metropolitan miracle" across Colombia. Although crime rates may have dropped significantly, Colombian cities still share wider Colombian socio-economic trends and issues.

This is not unlike Kinshasa, the capital city of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which is said to mirror the DRC's many paradoxes. While the country is among the wealthiest African states in regards to sheer natural resources, it presents one of the world's lowest per capita incomes.[219] Kinshasa reflects some of the country's most deep-seated structural problems, which stem from the legacy of the Belgian colonial past and the turmoil that followed independence. These include "the disastrous indigenization of the economy, the decline of world market prices for the primary commodities that are the country's primary exports, and the nature of the new dominant class."[220]

Therefore, important cross-cutting issues are present at the urban and national levels. Research shows that peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction schemes put in motion at national levels need to take into account their potential externalities on cities and urban dwellers. The recurrence of conflict in a given city may have a rapid spillover effect on other cities and neighbouring countries. Moreover, violence and insecurity at the city level can generate inter-governmental conflict, leading city-level governance actors to be increasingly disconnected from central authorities. As research shows, "[r]egardless of the depth of devolution of state powers, attention needs to be paid to the interaction between tiers of government – how it is preserved, fostered and reconfigured in both conflict and post-conflict situations."[221]

On the other hand, research also shows that political processes taking place at the city-level may lead to broader political coalitions and public debates at the national level.[222] Indeed, because crime takes place locally and at the city-level, urban security policies need to be defined and implemented at that level as well, with support from regional and central authorities. In the case of the European Union, member states have made attempts to develop effective crime prevention schemes, with the success of such policies being highly dependent on the level of national political commitment and the resources provided to regional and local government actors for crime prevention. On the relationship between local and central governments and the variance observed in terms of the effectiveness of crime prevention policies, Pascal Kapagama and Rachel Waterhouse note that, "[e]ven though a certain number of European states and cities have developed policies with similar objectives with regard to the crime problems they are supposed to address, it is necessary to confront differences in the cultural aspects of approaches applied in Europe. Improved knowledge of administrative, political and cultural contexts in Europe's countries on national, regional and local levels of administration will make it possible to compare crime

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[219] Kapagama, P. and Waterhouse R., 'Portrait of Kinshasa: A City on (the) Edge', *Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2*, Working Paper no. 53, Cities and Fragile States (2009), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b46e5274a31e0000a8a/WP53.2.pdf, accessed on 13 December 2017.

[220] MacGaffey, J., *The Real Economy of Zaire* (London: James Currey, 1991): 26.

[221] Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility', 22.

[222] Ibid.

problems and distinguish practices that could be transferred between crime prevention cultures."[223]

National level actors play an important role in ensuring the effective implementation of security policies at the urban level. One interesting example is the role played by France's Interdepartmental Delegation to the City (DIV), as described during the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS):

> "The work carried out by the DIV is, on the one hand, thematic (crime prevention, social cohesion, job integration – economic development, transformation and urban management), and, on the other hand, territorial, with territorial representatives who cover all the regions and departments in France and ensure the follow-through on urban renewal projects presented in the framework of the national urban renewal agency, created in 2004."[224]

This shows a vision of urban security policy as becoming "[m]ore civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home."[225] However, as mentioned earlier, the relative autonomy of urban security policy is highly dependent on political will on the part of the central government.

While this study has outlined the outstanding progress and improvement of urban security made in Colombia during the 1990s, scholarship and analysts now show that there has been a change of approach during the Uribe government years. President Uribe is reported to have been particularly wary of the autonomy of big cities in handling security. In part as a result, governors of Colombia complained that the central government had not been delivering the resources needed to implement effective crime prevention policies at the local level.

Such tensions arising between the central government and local branches of governance is posing serious issues in terms of urban security and violence prevention. The problem is not limited to Colombian cities, as events in Brazil have suggested the existence and replicability of this phenomenon as well. This may be illustrated through the much discussed event that saw then-governor of Rio de Janeiro, Benedita da Silva, being forced to accept the posting of a federal task force in the capital city of the state. Brazil's federal government justified this course of action as a means to address popular concerns of rising insecurity. Governor da Silva initially opposed the task force, but was then forced to accept it following a series of highly publicised reported crimes and attacks by gang members against public infrastructure.[226] This indicates that even in a federal system, meant to devolve power locally, much of the urban security sector may be ultimately reliant on the decisions of central authorities when it comes to security policy and provision.

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[223] European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS), *Secucities - Urban crime prevention policies in Europe: towards a common culture* (European Forum for Urban Security, 2006), 12, http://efus.eu/files/fileadmin/efus/pdf/gb_pub_justy.pdf, accessed on 13 December 2017.
[224] Ibid.: 50.
[225] Coaffee, O'Hare, and Hawkesworth, 'The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism', 495.
[226] Bitencourt, 'Brazil's Growing Urban Insecurity: Is It a Threat to Brazilian Democracy?', 3.

State-making in the city

The linkages observed between state and city governance stakeholders suggest ways in which processes of state-making develop within cities, particularly in post-conflict settings. Often, state-making emerges from the city and then spreads to the wider national territory, rather than the other way around. Some of the literature on state-making argues that the model of state-building followed since 1999 has been considerably flawed, generating unwanted and adverse scenarios, as evidenced for example by the disintegration of Timor-Leste.[227] State-making involves a lot of work and effort to expand and reform the justice system, especially in areas where courts have not been present. Therefore post-conflict cities which have just experienced significant levels of violence due to combat and "clearing" operations tend to have a justice vacuum that is generally conducive to continued and increased urban crime rates.[228] Recent scholarship has therefore tried to build on existing literature about state-building, yet focusing on the city as "[k]ey site of 'internal integration' central to the fortunes of state formation under conditions of globalisation and crisis."[229] This also echoes work on *state consolidation* and *state transformation*, which are linked to the concepts of state "resilience" and "development". In fact, a "[d]evelopmental state is one that delivers growth and welfare alongside security, whereas a state delivering security alone is resilient and perhaps consolidated, but not developmental."[230]

Governance failures, law and order and SSR needs in cities

As raised earlier, one of the main drivers of urban insecurity lies in poorly functioning state institutions and their incapacity to manage the legitimate use of force. Governance failures in some cities therefore take the form of crumbling systems of law and order, which lack popular legitimacy. Security and governance actors such as the national or municipal police are sometimes perceived to be the worst source of insecurity. This leads to high levels of corruption and the emergence of so-called "violence entrepreneurs", mentioned earlier. These individuals and/or informal networks thrive as a result of the considerable power and governance vacuums left by ineffective and poorly governed state structures. This leads to the kind of powerful and well-established illegal patronage networks known in cities such as Port of Spain or Kingston, as well as in cities in Cambodia, Indonesia and Timor-Leste.[231]

> "Even an effective extension of law enforcement to areas previously controlled by non-state actors amounts to an incomplete extension of the rule of law as long as local populations in the urban spaces continue to lack access to officially-sanctioned, speedy, and legitimate justice. Expanding the justice system to cover areas where previously no courts were present, however, often takes considerable time. Rarely is the planning on how to accomplish such an

[227] Moxham, B., 'State-Making and the Post-Conflict City: Integration in Dili, Disintegration in Timor-Leste', *Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2*, Working Paper no. 32, Cities and Fragile States (2008), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08bd2e5274a31e0000dc4/wp32.2.pdf, accessed on 13 December 2017.

[228] Felbab-Brown, *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America. Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers*, vi.

[229] Moxham, 'State-Making and the Post-Conflict City: Integration in Dili, Disintegration in Timor-Leste'.

[230] Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility', p. 17.

[231] Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence', 10.

extension of the official justice system or other officially-sanctioned dispute resolution mechanisms an early part of the planning for the law enforcement actions to retake the slums."[232]

State-centred SSR has had modest results over the last decade. International expectations have not been met in conflict-stricken areas such as Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and the Sudan. Results have fallen short because state-centred SSR tends to aspire to an idealist notion that does not consider internal peculiarities, within time frames that are unsuitable for radical change. Existing practice cannot reflect these political, historical and contextual sensitivities. Consequently those people trying to pursue and implement grand designs are left to implement SSR in an environment that cannot absorb such wholesale change. In response, many scholars and SSR specialists are focusing on whether the basic assumptions of SSR remain valid and are considering alternatives for more practical, pragmatic and effective approaches to SSR.[233]

Alternatives include shifting the agenda towards reforms aimed at the specific security sector of the target country by incorporating a range of security structures and practices outside of the central government apparatus. Such SSR programmes consider a wider perspective, including a larger number of interested stakeholders, and provide donor assistance to both state and non-state organizations. As Lawrence argues, this might prove to be more effective in both the short and long term in the delivery of services.[234]

A lack of cohesive security strategy in Mexico is exhibited in shifting responsibilities and instability in the country's security sector. There is evidence of overlapping security responsibilities because of a lack of clarity and definition within the security structure of a number of agencies, and a gap among federal, state and local security actors. At each of these levels of government, communication has been reduced in quality, and relationships have become more fragmented, leading to increased uncertainty among stakeholders, as they are unsure of their responsibilities.[235]

This approach is being used in Haiti, where a nation-specific model includes developing capacity in government ministries and also among local government officials. To achieve this, external bodies directly and indirectly support policing activities in Haiti. However, for this to continue to work, it is important that political and contextual sensitivities continue to be monitored on an ongoing basis. Haitian policing will have to change over time, and SSR planning should continue to evolve to meet changing responsibilities and to provide greater Haitian autonomy. HNP effectiveness could be reassessed during the SSR programme, with a

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[232] Felbab-Brown, *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America. Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers*, 20.
[233] Lawrence, 'Towards a Non-State Security Sector Reform Strategy', 3.
[234] Ibid.
[235] Paul, C., Schaefer A.G., and Clarke C., *The Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations: An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on Existing RAND Research on Urban Unrest, Insurgency, and Defense-Sector Reform* (National Defense Research Institute, 2011): 11, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1125.html, accessed on 13 December 2017.

critical success factor being the degree to which local communities rely on the police instead of militias, external forces or private security firms.[236]

3.2 The urban environment: priority research themes and identified gaps

Priority research themes in the study of the urban security issues

Existing research on urban security issues tends to focus on conflict, violence, post-conflict issues and terrorism.

Issues of urban security are a new field for security scholars who have traditionally focused on (inter)national level security analyses, with a focus on politics "inside" and "outside" the state, crime and war, and the police and the military.[237] Nonetheless, a considerable amount of research has been conducted, with much of it centring on urban violence. These studies have concluded that the causes of urban violence are multi-faceted. Important contributing factors are psycho-social socialisation patterns or economic inequality and poverty.[238] Other work on urban security has sought to investigate the implications of the city context on humanitarian intervention, calling for experience sharing and fostering of reflection and innovation.[239] Some authors have explored the "tipping point", the moment at which urban conflict tips over into violence.[240] Yet others have researched adolescent firearm use in specific urban social contexts.[241]

Another prominent research theme is the "urban dilemma". This term refers to the double-edged nature of 21st century urbanisation: while it is a pro-poor development, it also creates the risk of insecurity amongst the poor. Efforts to research the dilemma have repeatedly been hampered by their segmented and discipline-specific approaches focusing either on urbanisation, urban poverty, or urban violence but not accounting for the relationship between them. On top of that, research has faced the fundamental challenge of lacking data, especially in the context of the Global South.[242]

Research on urban security should directly involve SSG/R. Decentralising core functions to local governments has generated important security dividends in cities with strong

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[236] Meharg, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and Army War College (U.S.), *Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building*, 95.
[237] Abrahamsen et al., 'Guest Editors' Introduction'.
[238] McIlwaine, C., 'Urban Violence: State of Play, Operational and Legal Challenges - Causes and Actors of Urban Violence', *Urban Violence and Humanitarian Challenges: Joint Report*, EUISS-ICRC Colloquium, Brussels, 19 January 2012, 19–24, https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/urban-violence-and-humanitarian-challenges.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2017.
[239] See i.e. Lucchi, E., 'Urban Violence: State of Play, Operational and Legal Challenges - Humanitarian Consequences of Urban Violence and Challenges of Intervention', *Urban Violence and Humanitarian Challenges: Joint Report*, EUISS-ICRC Colloquium, Brussels, 19 January 2012, 27-31, https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/urban-violence-and-humanitarian-challenges.pdf, accessed on 12 December.
[240] See i.e. Moser and Rodgers, *Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: Global Policy Report,* 2.
[241] Fagan, J. and Wilkinson D.L., 'Guns, Youth Violence, and Social Identity in Inner Cities', *Crime and Justice,* vol. 24 (1998): 105-188, 129.
[242] Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence', 4.

institutions, as shown in Bogota, Medellin and Rio de Janeiro. A key tenet of urban governance is promoting the interaction of local residents and associations with public institutions. This is important for ensuring local buy-in to action plans and the long-term success of interventions. Where such interaction is lacking, security-focused interventions can incite new violent outbursts due to poorly articulated strategies, badly managed interventions and unfulfilled expectations."[243] SSG/R plays a particularly significant role in post-conflict reconstruction situations. Oftentimes cities are merely viewed as a central node for the rebuilding of national infrastructure. This approach, however, fails to account for the profound socio-economic changes brought upon the city during the conflict.[244]

Another strand of the literature employs a different meaning of security. Instead of conceiving strategies to reduce urban violence, these authors consider the manifold ways in which low-income urban dwellers manage to survive and endure hardship. An example of such resilience was the fight put up by Brazilian favela residents whose slums were planned to be evicted to make room for sports infrastructure. [245]

Gaps in existing research of the study of urban security issues

There is still a dearth of applied research across most low-income settings in developing countries. Moderate engagement with the issues of urbanisation, urban poverty and urban violence is ongoing in Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. However, scholarly assessments tend to be confined within particular disciplines, and sustained funding for long-term investigation is limited.

The recent focus on fiscal sustainability within the SSR literature also provides a potential area for further research on the challenges and strategy proposed by this report. A key imperative for security sector reform is to design actions that governments can maintain in the long-term and that have a sustainable impact. To some extent, a strategy of 'bringing the state to the slum' may simply restate the problem: slum areas, even when 'secure', are unlikely to generate the tax revenues or hold the political interest necessary to sustain pervasive, effective and responsive security and justice services or the long-term development plans necessary to build communities' allegiances and address the structural drivers of criminality. The underlying problem in many Latin American societies is that the state simply does not have the resources to provide security, justice and welfare to many segments of the population. These groups may then turn to informal and criminal means of livelihood and the alternative authorities that facilitate and tax such practices.

Such a political-economy perspective in an era of fiscal austerity offers a potential next step for research on the growing security threat of violent criminality. Two important questions stand out: If the state is incapable of providing development, and communities do turn to criminality instead, what are the security forces to do? If militarised approaches only

[243] Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence', 14.
[244] Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility', 23.
[245] Simone, A.M., 'Urban Security and the "Tricks" of Endurance', *Open Democracy*, 14 February 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/abdou-maliq-simone/urban-security-and-tricks-of-endurance, accessed on 13 December 2017.

escalate insecurity, or temporarily restore state rule before political attention and state resources are focused elsewhere, is this a worthwhile strategy?[246]

3.3 Excursus: The emergence of a European crime prevention policy

The European Urban Charter 6, proclaimed in 1992 and which brings together a series of principles on proper urban management, is a precursory document. Indeed, it constitutes a major effort in the elaboration of a body of action principles concerning crime prevention meant to transcend national policies by basing itself on the pertinence of this policy at the city level.

European Urban Charter [Excerpts]
Theme 6. Urban Safety and crime prevention
PRINCIPLES
1. A coherent Safety and crime prevention policy must be based on prevention, law enforcement and mutual support.
2. A local Safety policy must be based on up-to-date comprehensive statistics and information.
3. Crime prevention involves every member of the community.
4. An effective urban Safety policy depends on close co-operation between the police and the local community.
5. A local anti-drug policy must be defined and applied.
6. Programmes for preventing relapse and developing alternatives to incarceration are essential.
7. Support for victims is a key component of any local urban Safety policy.

Concerning the European Union, the development of a crime prevention model came later. While the Stockholm Conference (1996) examined the link between crime prevention and social exclusion, it was the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) that marked an important step in the area of crime prevention at the European Union level. Indeed, in its Article 29 it mentions crime prevention amongst the policies of the European Union working towards an area of freedom, security and justice.

Treaty of Amsterdam [Excerpts]
Article 29
Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of protection within an area of freedom, security and justice, by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia.
That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organized or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug

[246] Lawrence, M., 'New Report on Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America - Publication Summary', *Centre for Security Governance*, 3 January 2012, http://secgovcentre.org/2012/01/new-report-on-organized-crime-and-urban-violence-in-latin-america/, accessed on 13 December 2017.

trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud [...].Subsequently, the European Council of Tampere (1999) stressed the importance of this objective in its conclusions, calling for the integration of crime prevention in the strategies for combating crime and setting study priorities.

Subsequently, the European Council of Tampere (1999) stressed the importance of this objective in its conclusions, calling for the integration of crime prevention in the strategies for combating crime and setting study priorities.

European Council of Tampere [Excerpts]
VIII. Preventing crime at the level of the Union
41. The European Council calls for the integration of crime prevention aspects into actions against crime as well as for the further development of national crime prevention programmes. Common priorities should be developed and identified in crime prevention, in the external and internal policy of the Union, and be taken into account when preparing new legislation.
42. The exchange of best practices should be developed, the project of competent national authorities for crime prevention and co-operation between national crime prevention organizations should be strengthened, and the possibility of a Community-funded programme should be explored for these purposes. The first priorities for this co-operation could be juvenile, urban and drug-related crime.

In 2001, the Council of the European Union set up a **European Union Crime Prevention Network**, grouping institutional representatives (from the ministries of Justice and the Interior) and researchers, as well as representative associations of each of the Union's member countries. An importance was placed on the identification of types of crimes, good practices inventory, methodology development for further crime prevention project facilitation, monitoring and evaluation of national policies and the adjustment to statistical procedures to make them comparable on the international level. In the Council Decision, all bodies and levels involved in the prevention of crime are discussed, and it is explicitly stated that local authorities are also involved as an important authority.

Society as a whole must be involved in the development of a partnership between national, local and regional public authorities, non-governmental organizations, the private sector and citizens. The causes of crime are multiple, intersect and must therefore be dealt with by measures at different levels, by different groups in society, and in partnership with players involved who have different powers and experience, including civil society. This network shall contribute to developing the various aspects of crime prevention at Union level and supports crime prevention activities at local and national levels. The launching of a budgetary line the same year by the Justice and Home Affairs directorate of the European Commission aimed at supporting initiatives in the specific area of crime prevention.

In its 2004 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, the Commission proposed to use the definition of crime prevention presented in the Council Decision of May 2001 establishing the European Union Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN). According to that definition, "... crime prevention shall cover all measures that are intended to reduce or otherwise contribute to reducing crime and citizens' feeling

of insecurity, both quantitatively and qualitatively, either through directly deterring criminal activities or through policies and interventions designed to reduce the potential for crime and the causes of crime. It includes work by government, competent authorities, criminal justice agencies**, local authorities**, specialist associations, the private and voluntary sectors, researchers and the public, supported by the media".

In November 2004, the European Council adopted **the Hague Programme**, which set the objectives to be implemented in the area of freedom, security and justice in the period 2005-2010.

The Commission presented in May 2005 an action plan with a set of detailed measures and a calendar to implement the programme adopted in The Hague, which was approved and serves as a frame of reference for Commission and Council work over the following five years.

This Action Plan identifies 10 key areas for priority action :
1. Fundamental Rights and citizenship
2. The fight against terrorism
3. Migration management
4. Internal borders, external borders and visas
5. A common asylum area
6. Integration: the positive impact of migration on our society and economy
7. Privacy and security in sharing information
8. The fight against organised crime
9. Civil and criminal justice
10. Freedom, security and Justice: sharing responsibility and solidarity

To establish a connection between the Hague Programme and adequate financial resources, the Commission proposed three *Framework Programmes***,** coinciding with the new Financial Perspectives (2007-2013). These are:

- Solidarity and Management of Migration flows;
- Security and Safeguarding Liberties;
- Fundamental rights and Justice.

In conclusion, objectives and priorities in the field of crime prevention should be according to the European Union:

- Reducing the opportunities that facilitate crime;
- Attenuating the factors that facilitate entering into crime as well as relapse;
- Avoiding victimisation;
- Reducing the feeling of insecurity;
- Promoting a culture of legality;
- Preventing the infiltration of economic structures by criminal elements.

Priority areas emerging from the Tampere council (1999, quoted above) have remained pertinent today, as they define the scope of the European Union Crime Prevention Network's mandate. They are:

- **Juvenile delinquency**
    - The risk factors: alcohol, drugs, limited economic and social resources;
    - The impact of programmes aimed at behaviour modification;
    - Judicial and reparative practices;
    - The partnership between the police and social services for preventing juvenile delinquency.

- **Urban crime**

  Here, the Commission mentions 'the events that affect life at the local level', particularly: burglaries, criminal acts against automobiles and persons as well as graffiti and vandalism. Priority measures will concern social mediation (resolution of conflicts), the reduction of crime through urban renewal and architecture plans.

- **Drug-related crime**
    - Law-enforcement and prevention measures;
    - Prevention through health and social policies.

  Based on the assessment of crime prevention policies undertaken in the Member States European institutions encourage:

    - The development of an interdisciplinary approach;
    - The articulation of safety and accompaniment policies (social and educational policies, etc.);
    - The development of the partnership between prevention players with the motive that prevention is effective only if based on all components of society (notion of co-production);
    - The development of approaches that favour proximity to citizens (plans of community policing and justice).[247]

The principle that the European Commission supports is that **crime prevention is a matter that must be first addressed at the local level**. The principle of subsidiarity has to be applied. Yet, there are sufficient common areas between national criminal issues to draw up a common approach to the problem. Cooperation at the EU level can provide an important facilitation and supportive role, without, however, substituting the national policies of Member States.[248]

[247] European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS), *Secucities - Urban crime prevention policies in Europe: towards a common culture*, 19-23.
[248] Ibid.: 23-24. The report goes on analysing the different approaches to crime prevention in the following countries: France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany and Hungary.

3.4 Threats prevalent and/or unique to the urban context – and institutions involved in threat mitigation

The urban context is set apart from the rural context by a number of specific threats. These are largely a reflection of the demographic, political and socio-economic makeup of cities.

Some cities, particularly those in developing countries, have been typecast as "densely populated centres of unemployed young men."[249] In Africa, no less than 40 percent of the population is below the age of 15. This demographic condition combined with lacking economic perspectives provides fertile soil for crime and gang activity.

Other threats specific to urban centres arise from the political role of many cities as seats of government. As such, cities are where the competition for political power and resources is contested. This is aggravated in highly diverse societies with multiple divisions along, for instance, ethnic or religious lines. Moreover, as a result of their high population density, cities facilitate political mobilisation and challenges to national power. The resulting political unrest poses a direct threat to the stability of the state.[250] The city population's security might also be jeopardised by local and national elites,[251] engaging in "elite bargains"[252] and "urban regimes".[253] These informal, undemocratic forms of governance are established by economic and political elites to further their own interests and undermine official institutions.

The dynamics of city planning must also be considered: against the backdrop of mounting immigration from rural areas into cities the emergence of unplanned slums is inevitable. These are, even more so than other parts of the city, exposed to pollution, poor sanitation and water shortages as governments – faced with the financial cost of expanding public services to such areas – are reluctant to bestow them with legal rights. Politicians, meanwhile, gain limited political benefit from assisting slum dwellers. Municipal administrations prefer to direct their funding toward "tangible" and politically visible infrastructure projects and investments outside of slum areas.[254]

In contrast to rural populations that have the option of self-sustenance more readily available, city dwellers depend on cash income to ensure their basic nutritional needs. As food is traded globally, they are exposed to international market forces, such as price hikes

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[249] Commins, 'Urban Fragility and Security in Africa', 1.
[250] Ibid.: 1-2.
[251] Ibid.: 2.
[252] See for example Lindemann, S., 'Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Crisis States Discussion Papers*, Discussion Paper 15, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science (2008), 33-64, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08ba6ed915d3cfd000e60/dp15.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2017; Putzel, J. and Di John J., 'Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States', *Crisis States Research Centre Report,* London School of Economics and Political Science (2007), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/45936/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_Putzel%2C%20J_Meeting%20the%20challenges%20of%20crisis%20states_Meeting%20the%20challenges%20of%20crisis%20states%20%28LSE%20RO%29.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2017.
[253] See for example Stone, C., *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989).
[254] Commins, 'Urban Fragility and Security in Africa', 4.

and supply disruptions. This vulnerability is aggravated in urban areas by the shift from staple foods such as sorghum, millet, maize and root crops to more widely traded varieties such as rice and wheat.[255] The last two have higher trade volumes as they face larger global demand. On top of that, a greater percentage of women work outside of their homes in urban settings and thus spend less time preparing food for their families, leading to more widespread demand for processed and fast food. This further increases the dependence on cash income for food and exposure to world markets.

Vulnerability in urban areas is further exacerbated by higher rates of violence and generally weaker community ties. For children and youth living in cities, educational programmes are frequently underfinanced, which may limit opportunities for learning and gaining the skills needed for long-term employment. In addition, personal insecurity in urban areas inhibits some families from consistently sending their children to school.

3.5 The urban security sector: key security, management and oversight institutions

The demand for knowledge and expertise to address the issues of security and crime prevention in cities is vast. Strengthening security in urban contexts cannot be limited to merely the adoption of physical security measures or instruments to search for and detect criminal behaviours. It requires the consideration of a wide range of possible options, and the promotion of multi-sector and locally focused approaches to the design and implementation of urban safety policies that consider issues such as urban planning, education, employment, health, housing and shelter, or migrant integration. Moreover, as local authorities and residents often have extensive experience incorporating threat mitigation into their daily lives and policies, seeking their input and guidance can lead to more adaptive solutions.

Existing and potential partnerships in crime prevention

Local authorities cooperate with a wide range of actors in the area of crime prevention. On the local level particular importance is attached to the role of the mayor, who acts as a local coordinator and facilitates collaboration between various stakeholders within the city. A successful mayor can efficiently organise cooperation with different actors in the city itself (e.g. the police), around the city (e.g. universities) and outside the city (e.g. organizations and institutions on the national and international level). **The Police** is a crucial partner, but cannot be the only one for the execution of crime prevention tasks. The concept of community policing brings policing closer to the people. It has given new dimensions to the ways in which the role of the police is viewed and analysed in today's society. Community policing is associated with a police force that is locally based, has local responsibilities, performs a variety of roles, possesses deep local knowledge and can act in partnership with all those involved in ensuring safety and security. Its aims are anticipation, getting to know the local situation and taking account of people's day-to-day expectations. A close relationship with local people is at the very heart of community policing.

[255] Teng and Escaler, 'Food (In)Security in Urban Populations', 3.

The **judicial system** is a key partner in the context of crime prevention, although joint cooperation is limited due to the independence of justice, as well as the limits imposed on information and data sharing. **Universities** as well as **public and private research centres** provide expertise on which to build crime prevention. **Private security companies** often work in cooperation with local police forces in the areas of entrepreneurship, public transport and industry. **Non-governmental organizations** can act as service providers and contribute to the resolution of safety-related problems. **Primary and secondary education systems** can be involved in crime prevention work in many different ways e.g. via improving students' educational attainment, attendance, behaviour and well-being. **Citizens** can be consulted and involved in local safety tasks or precisely defined volunteer work. **Other public service providers** – hospitals, private entrepreneurs, social workers, social housing providers, fire services, transport and insurance companies, telecommunication operators, postal service and others can contribute to daily crime prevention work by being involved with activities in partnership with the police and/or local authorities. **Private companies** can play a significant role in the community by offering employment and thus contributing to greater social cohesion and crime prevention.

Under corporate responsibility policies, the **business sector** can be persuaded to invest in a range of projects, usually provided these are somehow business-related. An example is the case of the British Prudential Insurance Company, which holds large shares of shopping centres, and which runs youth action programmes designed to involve young people in taking steps to reduce crime in the community. Another company, Norwich Union, developed a community safety apprenticeship scheme designed to train residents in disadvantaged neighbourhoods as local community safety workers. A number of companies have also invested in the recruitment of volunteers. Finally, the **media** is encouraged to report not only on violence and crime, but, in the context of responsible journalism and as an active provider of objective information, also share positive examples of successful crime prevention activities.[256]

While these actors naturally play different roles in each context, they all have their relative strengths and weaknesses. However, it is clear that a combined approach is necessary for effective reduction of insecurity.[257] Mainstream debates on urban security tend to focus on the police who, while playing a crucial role, are not in a position to guarantee protection from all types of threats. Particular emphasis has been placed on urban planning measures, which are considered a crucial pillar of the UN-HABITAT's Safer Cities Programme. Effective city planning can counteract insecurity as inadequate infrastructure is attributed to crime and violence.[258] The following examples taken from Brazil, Uganda, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Egypt reflect how different roles interact through these processes.

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[256] European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS), *Secucities - Urban crime prevention policies in Europe: towards a common culture*, 52–59.

[257] Samper, J., 'Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence: Case Study of Medellín, Colombia', Cambridge, MA, MIT's Center for International Studies (CIS), (2012): 1, http://www.academia.edu/2648526/Urban_Resilience_in_Situations_of_Chronic_Violence_Case_Study_of_Medellin_Colombia, accessed on 15 December 2017.

[258] Boisteau, C., *Building Communities: Urban Planning and Security Policies*, Switzerland, EPFL (2006), http://cooperation.epfl.ch/webdav/site/cooperation/shared/publications/cahiers/publi-unitar-final-eng-couv.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2017.

Country examples

Brazil: The security sector in Brazil is characterised by the country's federal structure, with distinct actors on municipal, state and federal levels. Interestingly, security sector actors on the municipal level are limited to the municipal guard: a preventive police without investigative powers. On the federal level, specialised police forces hold certain enforcement responsibilities. Two of them, the Federal Highway Police and the Federal Railway Police, are active in the field of transportation. They patrol their respective transportation systems but lack investigative powers. Aside from that, the Federal Police's tasks include investigations into crimes against federal government agencies, fighting international drug trafficking and terrorism, as well as immigration and border control. The majority of security sector actors are found on the state level, where the Civilian Police and the Military Police complement each other. The former holds the power to investigate criminal law violations. However, they do not patrol and are not uniformed, setting them apart from the latter – the main enforcement agency. As auxiliary forces and as the army reserve, they are based on a military hierarchy alongside the Military Fire Brigade.[259] As part of the Military Police, the Military Police Battalion for Special Operations (BOPE) is specifically designed for counterterrorism operations, hostage rescue and bomb threat evacuation procedures. On top of the two aforementioned traditional police forces (the Civilian Police and the Military Police) is the National Public Security Force, which receives special training and equipment. This third force was created in response to rampant crime rates in Brazilian cities and is capable of rapid emergency deployments. Next to the police services there is Brazil's long-standing National Intelligence Service (INS). The service's current doctrine is still heavily influenced by its functions during the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. The main feature of this organization was a tightly-knit network spanning across nearly all government branches, including security sector actors. While the INS no longer strives to sustain an authoritarian regime, its extraordinary network can still be leveraged for gathering information. [260]

Uganda: In Uganda, a lack of sufficient resources and local control over them is an obstacle for effective security sector institutions. However, a bigger challenge stems from overlapping political responsibilities: every district has a District Chairperson (e.g. a mayor), a Chief Administrative Officer (e.g. a town clerk) and a Resident District Commissioner. The first two are responsible for representing the government in the district. Yet, as the Chairperson is elected by the people while the Resident District Commissioner is appointed by the President, frictions are commonplace.[261]

Lebanon: Politics in the Lebanese capital of Beirut are marked by the wider, national political power game. Actors that are physically present in the city and able to wield influence are therefore in a position to shape the rest of the country, including within governance of the security sector.[262]

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[259] Bitencourt, 'Brazil's Growing Urban Insecurity: Is It a Threat to Brazilian Democracy?', 4.
[260] Ibid.: 13-15.
[261] Goodfellow, 'The Bastard Child of Nobody?: Anti-Planning and the Institutional Crisis in Contemporary Kampala'.
[262] Höckel, K., 'Beyond Beirut: Why Reconstruction in Lebanon Did Not Contribute to State Making and Stability', *Occasional Papers*, Occasional paper no. 4, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of

Nigeria: In Nigeria's largest city, Lagos, the combination of dysfunctional governance, demographic explosion and growing commerce has led to shifting forms of urban insecurity the emergence of alternative systems of social interaction and security provision. As youth create informal structures, urban Lagos embodies multiple, competing and paradoxical forms of order.[263]

Egypt: As the example of Cairo shows, formal and informal forms of urban governance can complement and reinforce each other. While the *ashwa'iyyat* (slum-like informal housing) are oftentimes portrayed as in conflict with the state, in reality they have been tolerated and at times even quietly encouraged by the government. The reason for the latter is rooted deep in Egyptian political culture. The informality of the *ashwa'iyyat* serves the country's ruling elite as it prevents slum-dwellers from demanding public housing and state services. It is for this reason that the *ashwa'iyyat* can be considered as oblique reflections of the state and the political order.[264] On the formal side, governance over Cairo is fragmented in multiple ways. First of all, the metropolitan area is split into the three separate autonomous governorates Giza, Cairo and Qalyubia. All three are ruled by presidentially-appointed governors, who are mostly former members of the security forces. The powerful position of the security apparatus is symbolised by the approximately 40 police stations in the Cairo governorate, which in many areas are the most visible state institution. It is not surprising that a bewildering array of security sector actors are active on the Nile, ranging from regular police and Central Security Forces (such as the "Anm Markazi", responsible for riot control and the demolition of informal areas) to the Utilities Police Forces, who also known as the "Shurtat al-Marafiq" and focus on building demolition and the clearing of informal markets.

Unique 'institutions' of the urban security sector: Gangs[265], guerrillas and non-state actors

Gangs are found within societies throughout the world. They mainly flourish in disadvantaged and marginalised neighbourhoods of large cities, where the police provide little security and where state services are not very effective.[266] In this vacuum, gangs provide an alternative, parallel order including governance, dispute resolution and security. By offering these "services", gangs further entrench themselves in a society and erode government capacity in affected areas. Despite encroaching upon government turf, they only rarely pose a direct challenge to state rule. Rather, they limit their aspirations of control to certain economic and social aspects. This is the main difference between gangs and armed non-state actors in civil wars. Gang activities therefore do not threaten the state, so much as present an alternative for certain government functions, locally undermining state sovereignty and law and order.[267]

Economics and Political Science (2007), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/56376/OP4.%20Hoeckel.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2017.

[263] Ismail, 'The Dialectic of "Junctions" and "Bases": Youth, "Securo-Commerce" and the Crisis of Order in Downtown Lagos', 463-487.

[264] Dorman, 'Informal Cairo: Between Islamist Insurgency and the Neglectful State?'.

[265] Cf. *supra* 2.5: Gangs and informal institutions: urban security providers.

[266] Bangerter, 'Territorial Gangs and Their Consequences for Humanitarian Players', 392.

[267] Hazen, 'Understanding Gangs as Armed Groups', 381.

According to Bangerter, an armed group is at its most basic level "an organized group with a clear structure, membership, and the capacity to use violence in the pursuit of its goals". [268] This broad definition also applies to government forces, such as the police, military and government-affiliated security actors, such as paramilitaries and militias. However, state-controlled or state-sponsored forces are considered legitimate bearers and users of arms. Therefore, many definitions focus exclusively on those groups that are neither direct state security forces nor state-sponsored security forces. These "non-state armed groups" include militias, rebels, insurgents, terrorists, gangs and criminal organizations. [269]

Contested urban areas where police forces and special police units try to restore the rule of law are prone to develop into guerrilla and paramilitary conflicts. Acts of violence often involve political assassinations and have roots in economic and institutional crime for the pursuit of economic gains. Duijsens cites Colombia as an example for where political struggle had been exacerbated by violence linked to the illegal drug trade and local criminality. The country's instability is reflected on the local level, also causing cities to become unstable. The cities' architecture and infrastructure forces military units "to engage in door-to-door combat" which often results in fatal casualties.[270]

Local communities and private security companies

A number of methods exist in which local communities can contribute to their own security needs. Neighbourhood watch and self-defence programmes are very simple programmes that can build trust and confidence between residents and the police. Another community action is volunteering in police reserve corps, as is widely practiced in Los Angeles. Additionally, it is possible for police forces to enter into partnerships with private security contractors. This type of cooperation can prove more effective and efficient in situations where police lack manpower or in personnel-intensive situations: for example the protection of public transport infrastructure or sports venues. Furthermore, certain functions, such as police training, can be outsourced to specialised private companies, resulting in reduced costs and improved efficiency. [271]

Governmental 'quasi-criminal' organizations

An example of a city that was "governed" in large parts by quasi-criminal organizations was Beirut. Militia leaders acted – unlike gang leaders – with a high degree of territorial control. They collected taxes and provided a substantial level of government-like services. The revenues for minimal welfare provision to the population were generated through the collection of protection money and custom duties from imports through illegal ports.[272]

[268] Ibid.: 373.
[269] Ibid.: 373.
[270] Duijsens, 'Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization', 361.
[271] Cook, 'New Challenges in Urban Security'.
[272] Höckel, 'Beyond Beirut: Why Reconstruction in Lebanon Did Not Contribute to State Making and Stability'.

3.6 Drivers and triggers of responses to urban security threats

3.6.1 Situations that have triggered responses

Post-conflict reconstruction

An important trigger of measures against urban security threats is post-conflict reconstruction. Oftentimes, these efforts are concentrated on large cities and the capital in particular due to symbolic reasons. This is, however, not without perils. As the example of Beirut demonstrated: reconstruction efforts neglected the periphery and the rural hinterlands, leading to a stark contrast in how these areas developed as opposed to the capital. Ultimately, the disparity reached a level that rendered the periphery and countryside significantly more vulnerable to extremist takeover. A similar development was observed in Nicaragua, where the economic domination of the capital city of Managua fostered conflict between rival factions. [273]

The fragile environment of post-conflict reconstruction is a fertile soil for the competition for power. Lessons learned from Afghanistan point to the ineffectiveness of market-driven approaches, as these tend to entrench exclusive structures and patterns while simultaneously empowering anti-government forces. It has also been shown that accommodating local politics and adjusting local institutions is of utmost importance.[274]

Crowd control

In contrast to rural areas, cities host numerous mass events due to their role as hubs of culture, politics and economy. Whether Olympic Games, G20 summits or an anti-globalisation demonstration, such events call for enormous security precautions. Graham claims that riot control measures at public demonstrations in European and American cities were heavily inspired by the ones used by the Israeli military in Palestinian territories.[275] In the absence of a particular occasion, strategic city centres of, for instance, London or New York had been protected by a security zone reminiscent of Baghdad's Green Zone, Graham suggests. These business opportunities were increasingly seized by private security contractors boasting "combat-proven security solutions" from the world's battlefields.[276]

Political participation

The degree to which a city's population has the right to participate in its politics is a key determinant of security. Where sufficient avenues for non-violent political discourse are lacking, civic conflict often ensues. [277]

[273] Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility'.
[274] Esser, 'Who Governs Kabul? Explaining Urban Politics in a Post-War Capital City', 19.
[275] Graham, S., 'Foucault's Boomerang: The New Military Urbanism', *Open Democracy*, 14 February 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/stephen-graham/foucault%E2%80%99s-boomerang-new-military-urbanism, accessed on 15 December 2017.
[276] Graham, 'Foucault's Boomerang: The New Military Urbanism'.
[277] Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility'.

3.6.2 Characteristics of the responses

A number of different strategies exist to combat urban violence. These strategies centre on the structural causes of violence and crime, the economic and social conditions, and on governance reform.[278] These strategies will be considered in detail over the following paragraphs.

Tackling structural causes

Policies aimed at reducing urban violence will inevitably have to account for local societal and economic dynamics. Such efforts can include increasing employment opportunities, providing assistance for the socially excluded, resolving cultural and intergenerational conflicts, integrating immigrants, and offering crime deterrence programmes. In order to reduce drug-related violence, it is advisable to implement intervention programmes that deter narcotics use and consumption and mitigate the effects for dependent drug users. Absence from school has also been cited as a source of juvenile delinquency.[279] Furthermore, young people are most vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse, which often takes place in the school environment.[280]

In the example of Central America, gang violence can be interpreted as a reflection of the "deeply entrenched oligarchic nature of the societies in the region", according to Jütersonke et al. In this view, urban violence is more of a symptom rather than a cause. This is aggravated by governments that use gangs as convenient scapegoats to detract from more substantial societal issues.[281]

Social and economic integration

Various efforts have been made to reintroduce state legitimacy to informal sectors, which are often devoid of public services. First and foremost among these are land titling programs aimed at legalising slum dwellings. Other measures are targeted at the economic conditions in underprivileged areas, such as government-run financial institutions. These provide loans and micro-credits at acceptable interest rates to people who would otherwise have to turn to an informal loan shark.[282] There have also been attempts to strengthen civil society and active citizenship.[283]

Local governance

Probably the most important contributor to urban security is good, local governance. A leadership that is committed to the vision of a democratic and equitable society requires a

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[278] Davis, *A Toolkit for Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence*, 5.
[279] European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS), *Secucities - Urban crime prevention policies in Europe: towards a common culture*, 40.
[280] Ibid.: 45.
[281] Jütersonke et al., 'Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America'.
[282] Fagan, C., 'Perspectives on Urban Poverty in Latin America', *Comparative Urban Studies Project Policy Brief*, no. 4, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2004): 3-4, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/urbanbrief04.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2017.
[283] Samper, 'Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence: Case Study of Medellín, Colombia', 14.

degree of decentralisation of power and resources to the municipal level. Simultaneously, it is crucial to build civil society capacities and foster civic engagement, as decentralisation on its own cannot guarantee good governance.

3.6.3 Strengthening of law enforcement operations

Mano dura & Mano amiga policies

Rodgers stresses that repression as a measure to reduce gang violence had failed in the past. Repressive policies in Central America actually led to an increase of violence. According to Rodgers, repression occurs in two main ways: one way is by "specifically targeting individuals", for example gang members; the other is by targeting communities associated with violence, namely the poor. The first strategy led in some instances in Central America to disproportionate responses contravening international human rights law. The second strategy was a "quasi-return to classical warfare" except that it was "directed internally", i.e. targeting domestic communities, Rodgers claims.[284]

Jütersonke et al. observe a shift from "first" to "second generation" strategies of containing urban gang violence in several instances in Central America. First generation policies, such as "Mano dura" (cf. *supra* 2.4) give primacy to security and enforcement. They combine, according to Jütersonke et al., "aggressive, militarised crackdown operations […] to deter gang membership".[285] These interventions are implemented by state security agents and often go hand in hand with a toughening of the judicial and penal processes. However, first generation policies often have counterproductive effects. Instead of reintegrating gang members into society, these measures tend to contribute to or exacerbate the stigmatisation of affected individuals. Due to these paradoxical consequences and mounting criticism from academia as well as state agents themselves, first generation policies are increasingly complemented with second generation policies. The latter, also known as "Mano amiga" (lit. "helping hand") or "Mano extendida" (lit. "reached out hand") try to address root causes and risks of gang violence rather than providing band aid solutions centred exclusively on tackling the symptoms.[286] In general, these second generation strategies are 'optional' and aim at generating compliance through incentives and rewards instead of sanctions.[287]

According to the literature, many initiatives have been designed to tackle urban violence, especially in neighbourhoods characterised by low- and middle-income neighbourhoods.[288] Brender divides them loosely into "hard", i.e. coercive, and soft, i.e. voluntary, interventions. The interventions can either be undertaken by formal actors (public institutions) or informal

[284] Rodgers, 'Interview with Dennis Rodgers', 325-326.
[285] Jütersonke et al., 'Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America', 384.
[286] Wolf, S., 'Mano Dura: Gang Suppression in El Salvador', *Sustainable Security* (2011), https://sustainablesecurity.org/2011/03/01/mano-dura-gang-suppression-in-el-salvador/, accessed on 15 December 2017.
[287] Jütersonke et al., 'Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America', 384.
[288] Willman, A., 'Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence in Urban Areas: Programming Note', *OECD Background Paper* (Paris: OECD, 2010), https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/47942084.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2017.

civil society actors. However, many interventions are of a hybrid nature. [289] There is not enough evidence to induct what works and what does not. Brender criticises that while many interventions were "laden with theoretical assumptions about the relationships between urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence", they yet had to be rigorously tested. Apart from a thin base of evidence regarding time-series data, it is the absence of local analysis capacities that impedes a meaningful evaluation of an intervention's outcomes. Nevertheless, Brender argues that a review of the limited time-series data found that forms of pacification and slum upgrading interventions had yielded positive outcomes. She claims that "more narrowly constructed law and order actions and employment schemes produce less certain outcomes".[290] The figure below is an overview of some "successful" interventions, i.e. best-practices that appear to have been effective in improving safety, development and urban security.

Table 3: *Moving from theory to practice - a review of selected examples*[291]

Approaches	Assumptions	Applications	Actions*
Social disorganisation	A sociological theory posits that economic disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity and residential instability contribute to community disorganisation and ultimately violence	• Urban renewal and regeneration • Urban gentrification • Safer-cities • Slum upgrading	• Urban Partnerships for Poverty Reduction (Dhaka) • Kenya Slum Upgrading Program (Nairobi) • Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading Program (Cape Town) • Medellin Urban Integrated Project • Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda (Buenos Aires) • Favela Bairro (Rio de Janeiro)
Broken window	A criminological theory that posits that norm signalling and symbolic effects of urban disorder can contribute to more crime and associated violence	• Pacification • Community and problem-oriented policing • Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)	• Zero tolerance (New York 1993) • Safe Streets Program (various US cities) • Operation Ceasefire (Boston Pacification Police Units (UPP) (Rio de Janeiro 2008-2014)
Ecological model	A public health approach that considers the interactions between individual, relationship, community and societal risk factors to prevent violence	• Early childhood visitations • Intimate partner violence interventions • Firearm legislation and regulation • Temporary alcohol and drug prohibitions	• Early Head Start (US 1990s) • Alcohol regulation and rationing (Australia, US and Colombia) • Mayors Against Illegal Guns (600 US cities)
Social capital and social cohesion	A behavioural and Institutional	• Participatory citizen planning and exchanges	• Social capital for violence prevention (Metropolitan Area

[289] Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence', 11.
[290] Ibid.
[291] The following table has been retrieved from Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence', 73-74.

	economic perspective that assumes that interpersonal trust formation and binding capital are critical determinants for reducing violence	with public sector • Public spaces for co-existence • Local-level justice provision • Leadership training, education and support • Micro-enterprise development	of San Salvador) • DESEPAZ (Cali 1992-1994) • HOPE VI and HOPE SF (US 2000s) • UNDP community security and social cohesion projects (more than 13 countries)
Youth empowerment and employment	A sociological and psychological approach that supports targeted interventions for at risk (and principally male) youth to prevent them from resorting to predatory or anti-social behaviour	• Parent and family support and home visits • Social and conflict resolution skills • Mentoring and peer-to-peer networks • School and after school interventions • Interventions to stimulate training and apprenticeships for former gang members and child soldiers	• Kenya Youth Empowerment and Employment Initiative (Nairobi) • Youth empowerment and employment project (Honiara) • Youth employment and empowerment (Freetown and Monrovia) • Youth empowerment programs in Nigeria • Safer Cities International Youth-led Urban Development Platform (DARUA)

* It should be noted that most urban violence prevention efforts tend to integrate a range of "approaches" consciously or unconsciously borrowing from theoretical approaches noted above. Moreover, the selected cases included here are for illustrative purposes only. They have not all been subjected to rigorous evaluations.

New technology and methods of warfare

As military technology evolves and enables new methods of warfare, the same equipment trickles down to the civilian security sector. Examples include robotised remote-control systems, i.e. for bomb disposal, or unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence gathering.[292] However, Cook believes that local authorities are often overwhelmed by the different technological possibilities. Accordingly, it is therefore crucial, to follow an integrated approach to technology. Also, these advancements in technology do not lessen the need for thorough training of users.[293]

Pacification/clearing operations

Starting in the 1990s several Latin American and Caribbean countries[294] "resorted to using heavily-armed police or military units to physically retake territories controlled *de facto* by criminal or insurgent groups", Felbab-Brown suggests.[295] After the state had resumed control of the neighbourhoods, law enforcement functions were handed over from the military units to regular police forces. In these contexts the state must (re)establish its physical presence in the territory and regain the population's trust. During these clearing operations the following critical questions need to be addressed: Should the force insertion be announced in advance? How can local intelligence be

[292] Vautravers, 'Military Operations in Urban Areas', 449.
[293] Cook, 'New Challenges in Urban Security'.
[294] Felbab Brown mentions specifically Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Jamaica.
[295] Felbab-Brown, *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America. Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers*, vi.

generated? When is the right time to proceed to law enforcement handover from military units to regular or community police forces? With regards to announcing the force insertion, a trade-off has to be made between the element of surprise (which implies a higher probability of capturing key leaders of criminal organizations) against the possibility to prevent, or at least minimise, civilian casualties. Announcing a clearing operation risks the disadvantage of criminals hiding and escaping capture. Governments are therefore obliged to decide whether they seek to displace criminal organizations or maximise the number of criminals captured. With respect to the generation of intelligence, Felbab-Brown believes that the population is rarely a source of intelligence flows. Rival criminal groups tend to be the best informants. However, the risk of a too close collaboration between the state and such groups is that "the rule-of-law integrity" of the former could be jeopardised.[296] At times, sustaining security after the force insertion might be more challenging than the clearing operation itself. Despite the fact that community or regular police forces have the capability to develop trust by the community, the process of becoming ultimately a crime preventer can take a long time. In order to build a relationship based on trust, frequent on-foot patrols, intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population, and a minimisation of the use of force is of paramount importance. Trust-building between the community and law enforcement would be favoured if the police developed not only local forces, but as well community-based and problem-oriented forces. Furthermore, the establishment of oversight mechanisms, such as joint police-citizen boards, contribute to enhance transparency and facilitate building community trust in the police.

Once the established criminal order has been disrupted, street crime tends to rise significantly due to the perceived power vacuum. Thus, anticipating and addressing these developments is critical. Implementing policies that effectively address street crime through problem-oriented policing approaches tends to be relatively inexpensive and simple, according to Felbab-Brown. Nevertheless, the initial vulnerability of community police units to efforts of displaced gang-members to reoccupy their lost territories should not be underestimated. Abandoning territories that before had been regained from criminal groups is extremely costly: community trust in the police would be lost and attempts to reclaim the territories subsequently would become more challenging. Therefore, Felbab-Brown suggests avoiding operating on predetermined handover schedules. The handover from military units to regular or community police forces should rather be based on a careful assessment of the relative strength of the communal police and the criminal gangs.

In addition to a possible rise of street crime, there are other forms of crime that might threaten the peace dividend of the cleared territories. Appreciation of land property as well as the availability of previously inaccessible resources can lead to land and real estate speculation, forced displacement, and new forms of crime. The problem of these new breaches of law is that they are frequently "linked to legal business outside of their area of operation".[297] Felbab-Brown warns that if community police forces fail to provide an effective response to these new forms of crime, they compromise the public safety gains from the clearing operations. As a consequence, government intervention might only result in a displacement and an alteration of the form of criminality.

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[296] Ibid.: v.
[297] Ibid.: vi.

Due to the fact that the (re)establishment of a functional justice system in cleared territories can take a considerable amount of time, dispute resolution processes are still insufficient in the post-clearing phase. The absence of dispute resolution processes and consequently of effective enforcement is a further reason for the rise of crime and disorder.

Another question that must be answered in the course of a clearing operation is how to deal with the illegal economies. Should they be suppressed? If the answer is yes, how and in what form should they be suppressed? There are several arguments in favour of a suppression of the illegal economy: i) the profitability of the illegal economy might dissuade residents from entering the legal economy; ii) the illegal economy in one neighbourhood usually implies illicit flows to other neighbourhoods; iii) the persistence of illegal economies might attract criminal gangs and perpetuate illegal behaviour. However, suppressing the illegal economy comes with costs: i) household income of slum residents is expected to drop; ii) residents might feel alienated from the state; iii) the law enforcement focus might suffer from dissipation. On top of that, the illegal economy cannot be abolished without providing a viable alternative to generate legal livelihoods. This requires the adoption of an "economic development strategy" that addresses the key drivers of the illegal economy.[298] Apart from the provision of security and the (re)establishment of the rule of law, government should account for stable property rights, access to microcredits, access to education and health care as well as the maintenance and/or provision of crucial infrastructure, according to Felbab-Brown. These are crucial building blocks for addressing the most challenging problem regarding economic development, i.e. generating sustainable licit jobs.

Felbab-Brown adverts that "limited, isolated, discreet interventions" are ineffective in changing socioeconomic habits of the residents of a recently cleared territory.[299] Such interventions neither have the capacity to alter behaviour nor to generate jobs. Depending on their implementation they might be counterproductive and lead to a crime-pays mentality. Similar negative consequences have been observed in the cases where areas were saturated with money in order to "buy the political allegiance of the population".[300] These types of cash outflows bear the risk of distorting the local economy, undermining the local administration, fuelling corruption and leading to moral hazard.

Efforts to economically develop marginalised urban areas are often politically motivated. Given its character of a zero-sum game, the strengthening of marginalised communities weakens the role of established powerbrokers. These powerbrokers, who are often half-way between the crime world and the official political world, have a strong interest in hampering such development efforts.[301]

In Brazil, pacification operations in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo resulted in the construction of walls around gang-controlled favelas. Special Forces then conducted highly repressive and violent raids to re-establish state authority. Similarly, Mexico has gathered experience in utilising its military forces against areas controlled by drug trafficking groups. This radical measure was regarded as necessary since regular police were deemed too corrupt and

[298] Ibid.: vi.
[299] Ibid.: vi.
[300] Ibid.: vi.
[301] Ibid.: vii.

hollowed out. After the military cleared the area, regular policing could be resumed. Tactics in the same fashion have also proved effective in Kingston, Jamaica and Medellin, Colombia.[302]

What clearing means: displacement of criminals?

Displacing criminal gangs to other territories is also costly. If, due to budget constraints, the government fails to deploy sufficient law enforcement forces to all the areas concerned, violent criminality might simply move to other areas where state presence is weaker.[303] Felbab-Brown mentions the occurrence of such displacement in the case of Rio de Janeiro: pressured by interventions of Rio's Pacification Policy violent gangs and criminal enterprises relocated from the favelas close to the city centre to the outskirts of the city.[304]

For a government it may be preferable to simply relocate criminal gangs – especially if the clearing operations take place in strategic areas, for instance city centres. Given the city centres' financial and administrative functions, the government may legitimately prioritise these areas, according to Felbab-Brown.[305] Otherwise the urban businesswomen and businessmen could move away, just as it happened in Acapulco, Mexico, where it ultimately led to a brain drain and capital flight.

Powerful businesswomen and businessmen who fear insecurity may effectively advocate for "Mano dura" approaches (cf. *supra*). If the government fails to provide for these persons' security needs, these business elites may be tempted to sponsor illegal militias that go beyond PSCs. In the absence of legislation, such contractors weaken the state in the long run and undermine indirectly the citizens' security.[306] Due to this reason, enhancing public safety in the city centre might be an appropriate priority, according to Felbab-Brown. Nevertheless, if the provision of public safety is not expanded to other areas, the progress achieved will not be sustainable.

3.6.4 Creating new police institutions or training police specialised in urban environments

Community-based policing approaches have gained in importance over the last decades. In New York, for example, the Citizens' Police Academy trains community members in mediating and communicating between citizens and the police forces.[307] In some instances in Colombia, the police have managed to significantly reduce the homicide rate by actively involving the community. However, it is important to differentiate community-oriented policing from simple vigilantism. Vigilantism is an umbrella term that includes community militias and "watch groups" usually operating in extra-legal circumstances.

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[302] Ibid.: 2-4.
[303] Ibid.: 11.
[304] Ibid.: 2.
[305] Ibid.: 11.
[306] Ibid.: 12.
[307] Chesluk, B.,'"Visible Signs of a City Out of Control": Community Policing in New York City', *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2004): 263–264.

Regarding police training, it is important to highlight that it is a long-term endeavour. The effective implementation of fundamental police reform can take up to 10 years.[308]

With respects to police public relations, there is much to be gained from a positive image. The police forces in Brazil have shown that through contributions to sports and music as well as through community mobilisation, it was possible to improve their reputation in the favelas and regain their lost credibility. As a positive side effect, these projects also enhance the information flow to the police thanks to the increased amount of feedback provided by the population.

3.6.5 Engaging with the civil society/local communities

Engaging with civil society and the local community allows for the promotion of the rule of law and heightened accountability measures.[309] In the Columbian city of Medellin, the community organization "Mesa de Derechos Humanos" (Human Rights Board) offers a social space to discuss abuses perpetrated by armed actors in the neighbourhood. Such projects are mutually beneficial for both the government and affected communities.[310]

3.6.6 The mitigating role of international organizations

A recent development is the involvement of international humanitarian organizations in tackling the issue of urban insecurity. Recognising that certain parts of urban society are subject to a "permanent vulnerability", organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have become more engaged.[311] However, this development poses several challenges as the "permanent" nature of urban threats calls for "permanent responses". However, humanitarian organizations interventions are by definition short-term, according to Duijsens.[312] Moreover, given the complex settings under which urban violence takes place, it may be hard for humanitarian actors to maintain their core principles of neutrality and impartiality in undertaking this work, i.e. if they are required to pay bribes to gangs to act in certain areas or are restricted from accessing certain groups. Actors may be wary of taking on projects that could risk their ability to act under these principles.

3.6.7 Privatisation of security

A key driver of urban security measures is the already mentioned trend of privatisation. Increasingly, private contractors provide for the security needs of a city's population. These companies honed their skills supporting the military in war-zones, i.e. in recent conflicts in Iraq or Afghanistan, and seek to employ their expertise in Western, "homeland" cities. Their

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[308] Ibid.: 16.
[309] Felbab-Brown, *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America. Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers*, 26.
[310] Samper, 'Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence: Case Study of Medellín, Colombia', 6.
[311] Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War (HASOW), 'Urban Violence: Patterns and Trends - Findings from an International Workshop', *HASOW Ação Humanitária Em Situações de Não Guerra*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, BRICS Policy Center (2011): 1, https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/1868910362.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2017.
[312] Duijsens, 'Humanitarian Challenges of Urbanization'.

mandates can vary over a broad range of tasks, including prison security, asylum detention centres, and the protection of energy infrastructure, VIPs, embassies, transport infrastructure, etc.[313]

3.6.8 Gated communities

Gated communities are the result of a perceived failure of the state to provide security. Wealthy residents resort to private providers for their security needs. These often extend beyond mere physical protection provided by walls, gates and guards. On top of that, gated communities offer a certain degree of independence from a perceived inefficient state. There has been a heated debate on the effects of gated communities. Proponents view them as an effective measure to plug existing holes in the services offered by the government and the market. Critics point to a heightened threat of segregation as they see such residential areas as a threat to public space. This is supported by research that hints at more intra-gate interaction, less inter-neighbourhood interaction, less participation of the residents in the public space, and therefore less participation in the civic realm in general. Álvarez-Rivadulla summarises these findings as follows: "[T]he natural consequences of gated communities are both increasing residential and social segregation."[314]

3.7 Drivers and triggers of reforms of the urban security sector

3.7.1 Situations that have triggered/initiated reforms in the security sector

Social relations in cities are always contested. How this can translate this into constructive civic engagement rather than violent civic conflict is a core question. Simply suppressing conflict can be counterproductive in the medium and long term and lead to a lack of local ownership and input. There are four different ways to manage urban social tensions and antagonisms:

Table 4: *Approaches to managing urban conflict*[315]

Approach to managing urban civic conflict	Potential effect on state fragility	City examples
Manipulation into conflict	Erosion	Ahmedabad Karachi
Deferral/suppression	Transformation without consolidation	Kigali Maputo
Clientelistic co-optation	Consolidation without transformation	Dar Es Salaam Kampala 1986-2009 Kinshasa 1965-1991
Generative engagement	Consolidation with transformation	Bogota Medellin Durban

[313] Graham, 'Foucault's Boomerang: The New Military Urbanism'.
[314] Álvarez-Rivadulla, M.J., 'Golden Ghettos: Gated Communities and Class Residential Segregation in Montevideo, Uruguay', *Environment and Planning A*39, no. 1 (2007): 47–63, http://ucu.edu.uy/sites/default/files/facultad/dcsp/golden_ghettoes.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2017.
[315] The following table has been retrieved from Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility', 21.

According to the literature, only the last approach to managing urban conflict, "generative engagement", can effectively minimise violence in the short and long term, while simultaneously allowing for sustainable development and state transformation. The successful examples of Bogota, Medellin and Durban demonstrate the need for "good politics", as opposed to merely good governance.[316]

Vacant security spaces

Due to limited capacities and a lack of understanding of security needs, some states have increasingly withdrawn from some urban areas. Over time these areas have turned into vacant security spaces. Various private, informal actors have filled this vacuum and continue to generate self-reproducing dynamics. It is therefore not irrational to claim that the state has effectively been de-territorialised from these spaces, for instance in some African urban areas. This development has serious consequences for the design and implementation of SSR efforts. Therefore, approaches centred on the victims of insecurity may be needed.[317]

Heterogeneous societal coalitions (generative engagement)

In general, crime is significantly more concentrated in urban areas of a given country compared to the country-wide average. Urban dwellers thus carry the burden of dealing with the bulk of criminality.[318] High levels of violence can provide the necessary stimulus for wide-ranging, heterogeneous coalition building to tackle this issue. A notable example is provided by Bogota and Medellin, where a broad middle class realised that – despite opposing political views – reducing violence is a common interest. These cases also suggest that a substantial and vocal middle class is critical for successful, generative engagement.[319]

Decline in violent crime

Conducting police reforms in times of rampant crime tends to be problematic. Conversely, a decline in violent crime opens a window of opportunity for reform attempts. Felbab-Brown urges that opportunities provided by instances of ebbing violence should not be missed.[320]

Civic conflict

Civic conflict can trigger urban SSR attempts, as with the example of Dili, Timor-Leste. Seeking perceived economic opportunities, villagers on a large scale migrated to the city. Dili, still recovering from a devastating civil war, lacked the necessary infrastructure to manage such an influx, whereupon civic conflict ensued.[321]

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[316] Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility', 19-20.
[317] Ismail, 'The Dialectic of "Junctions" and "Bases": Youth, "Securo-Commerce" and the Crisis of Order in Downtown Lagos', 484.
[318] European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS), *Secucities - Urban crime prevention policies in Europe: towards a common culture*, 11.
[319] Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility', 14.
[320] Felbab-Brown, *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America. Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers*, 16-17.
[321] Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 'Cities, Conflict and State Fragility', 12.

Riots

Riots can be both a manifestation of urban violence, as well as a reflection of social unrest at the prevalence of urban violence and lacking security apparatuses. These events can provide critical junctures for re-examining the security sector, in addition to how security forces deal with large scale uprisings of violence in the streets. For example, the 2005 youth riots in France drew renewed interest in understanding urban violence in Europe.[322]

When riots are carried out by specific groups of people, perhaps based on race or religious affiliation, they can indicate underlying social tensions and where security frameworks may be lacking for these specific sub-groups of the population.

Monitoring and evaluations

Designing an SSR programme requires a thorough analysis of the security situation in a given area. For this reason, crime prevention priorities and activities are based on monitoring and evaluation data. In Germany, for instance, cities conduct public surveys to understand crime, fear of crime, victimisation or feelings of insecurity. The UK employs audits to measure crime and disorder and every neighbourhood is obliged to conceive a "violence reduction strategy" every three years.[323]

Sporting events

Major sporting events pose security threats on two distinct levels. First, the usual level of crime and violence is likely to spike before and after the event. Thieves, drug dealers and other criminals will view the influx of tourists as a golden opportunity. To counteract, increased police presence is key. Second, events of the scale of Olympic Games or the Football World Cup pose a risk of terrorist attacks (cf. *infra*).[324] Increased security protocols and personnel presence are needed to curb the likelihood of these types of attacks from occurring. In addition, the police, as well as other relevant security personnel or volunteers, need to be adequately trained in crowd control.

3.7.2 Characteristics of urban SSR

Decentralisation of governance to local authorities

Decentralisation, the handing over of core responsibilities to local governments, is a crucial mechanism in the creation of good governance structures, according to Brender. However, this requires strong local municipal level institutions. Decentralisation fosters local buy-in, as

[322] Helly, 'Urban Violence: State of Play, Operational and Legal Challenges - Towards an EU Approach to the Issue of Urban Violence?', 37.
[323] European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS), *Secucities - Urban crime prevention policies in Europe: towards a common culture*, 41.
[324] Bitencourt, 'The Security Challenges for the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games', 3.

it enables urban residents to interact with the public institutions governing their community (cf. *supra* 3.2).[325]

National unification of public security

An SSR programme in Brazil advocated for a unified public security system which included a ministry for public safety. Furthermore, the project aimed at an inclusive approach by inviting the public to participate in a pact to support the national public safety plan. Consequently, actions were proposed at the federal, state and municipal levels.[326]

3.8 The urban security sector's position within / vis-à-vis the national security sector

The historical relationship between a state's capital and national state-making is twofold. On the one hand, there is an assumption that a capital and/or major cities are often constitutive of state formation. Therefore, investing in the security of large scale or otherwise significant cities can provide a security dividend for the country as a whole. On the other hand, Höckler's example of Beirut shows that efforts to reform the capital were not sufficient to rehabilitate state institutions.[327]

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[325] Brender, 'Summary - Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence', 14.
[326] Ibid.: 14.
[327] Höckel, 'Beyond Beirut: Why Reconstruction in Lebanon Did Not Contribute to State Making and Stability', 1.

4 Mapping the Urban Security Sector

In order to help understand the context, challenges and nature of the urban security sector, the following extensive mapping study provides insights in the evolving and complex sets of challenges that are possibly unique to urban environments, the institutions involved in the mitigation of urban threats and the needs for an urban approach to SSG and SSR. This chapter presents the methodology of the mapping study, focusing on the set of questions and the matrix approach to data collection.

The chapter begins with a description of the main questions and definitions underlying this mapping study. Second, the study's framework of analysis and mapping methodology are explained. The third section explains the selection of cities which were chosen for the mapping study.

4.1 Key questions and definitions

Key questions

The large-N mapping study functions as an attempt to test the research questions presented in section 1 of this report and aims at providing answers. As a reminder, the underlying research questions are the following:

- Do urban communities experience unique 'urban threats', unique requirements for response measures, as well as unique structures and processes characterising their security sector?

- Does this unique urban security sector context call for a differentiated understanding of and approach to security sector governance and security sector reform, with structures and processes that differ from national-level SSG and SSR?

- Which lessons, good and bad, if at all, can one learn from studying and comparing urban SSG/R contexts across different countries and regions?

- What are effects of weak or inadequate security sector performance and governance on urban security?

- To what degree are national SSR efforts undertaken with an urban focus? Even if there are no specific urban SSR practices, are there specific priorities that should guide urban SSR/G, drawing on global, regional, national and city-specific lessons and perspectives?

In order to be able to draw initial results mapping study, these research questions were translated into a set of questions that would form the basis of the large-N mapping study. The mapping study was designed to be a mere desk study, which would ideally be supplemented by more detailed qualitative case studies carried out in the field by experts with extensive knowledge and research records on a particular city. Such studies would

require more profound knowledge and would look into additional information that could not be gathered with a desk study. Thus, some additional questions were added, which could serve as the basis of subsequent field-based case studies.

Based on the extensive background research carried out at the onset of the research project, a series of questions, divided into nine clusters, were formulated (see Table 5). Not all of these questions were covered by the large-N mapping, as the degree of detail required in answering them exceeded the scope of this desk-study mapping exercise and/or should be addressed by supplementary qualitative case studies, which could not be undertaken in the context of this particular study. For the full set of the collected data, please refer to the Excel Workbook entitled "Large-N Study".

The questions are divided into nine individual clusters of questions, which are meant to guide both small-N case studies and large-N mapping exercises. However, it should be mentioned at the outset that many of these questions require answers which detail and complexity reaches far beyond the capacity of a mapping exercise and would only be satisfactorily answered in thorough qualitative case studies, which are much beyond the scope of this study. In fact, each of the following clusters would warrant a stand-alone mapping exercise, if feasible in the context of a project's scope and size.

Cluster 1 covers the geographical and political context of each city, including: the name of the city; its location in the global North or South; the continent on which it is located; if it is the nation's capital city; the population; demographic density; the size of the territory; the form of government; the political, economic and social context of the country (situations of on-going conflict, post-conflict, development, political transition/democratisation, post-natural disaster and ongoing peace process); degree of direct and structural violence; and national-local government budget flows.

Cluster 2 examines urbanisation trends, including the territorial classification of the city; its classification as a megacity, megalopolis or metropolis; push and pull factors of urban in- and outmigration; potential "gentrification" processes; and evidence of positive and negative impacts of urbanisation.

Cluster 3 allows for a thorough threat analysis: What is the threat, who is threatened, by whom and when? How serious is the threat to peoples' survival, what is its magnitude in terms of numbers of people affected, is it an existing or potential threat, which are identifiable triggers, symptoms and root causes of the threat? What are the consequences of success and failure in addressing the threat?[328]

Cluster 4 analyses the institutions and actors that are involved in threat mitigation: statutory institutions that provide security in the city; executive authorities that manage security providers and are otherwise involved in the city's security; legislative bodies that oversee the

[328] For the threat analysis methodology applied here, please see Albrecht Schnabel, *Operationalizing Human Security: Tools for Human Security-Based Threat and Mitigation Assessments*, Cahier du LaSUR 21, Lausanne: EPFL-LaSUR, 2014; and Albrecht Schnabel and Yves Peddrazini, eds., *Operationalizing Human Security: Concept, Analysis, Application*, Cahier du LaSUR 20, Lausanne: EPFL-LaSUR, 2014.

activities of the security providers, approve their budgets and develop relevant legislation, among others; and judicial institutions that interpret and uphold the constitution and the laws of the land. It further examines civil society actors that monitor the activities of the security institutions and of those that manage and oversee them, support the development of government policy relevant to the security sector, and inform the public and conduct training activities; non-statutory armed groups and formations who have the capacity to use force but do not have a state mandate to do so; independent oversight agencies – ombudspersons, human rights commissions, auditing boards, and so forth – which, while financed by the government are not part of its executive, judicial or legislative branches, and usually only report to parliament; and external actors that exercise, or assist in exercising, one or more of the above functions in the city. For each of these categories, the following information is relevant: The type of security services provided; the composition of security personnel, according to gender, age, skin colour, religion or ethnic origin and age; involvement in illegal activities, if any, such as corruption or human rights violations; the record of security provision (effectiveness); specific threats an institution was created to address; the effectiveness of counter-measures; and the indicators used to measure such effectiveness.

The information provided in this cluster should offer initial answers as to the degree to which the record of security institutions' responses might point to the need to change, improve and reform the security sector at the urban level. It would also be interesting to see if the urban context can be considered a microcosm of SSG and SSR discussions that usually take place at the national level – with all its challenges and opportunities, practices and lessons. Moreover, a holistic approach towards all security institutions and organizations that operate at the urban level should contribute to a better understanding of the urban security sector as such.

Cluster 5 examines triggers, initiators, drivers and agents of efforts to reform the urban security sector. For each threat, information is collected on measures that have been taken to mitigate and/or address the threat; specific events that might have triggered the response; the mitigation measures that have been put in place; the feasibility of these measures; and the measures' effectiveness.

Cluster 6 established if past or current SSR activities in cities where security sector reform processes have taken place or are taking place. Under **Cluster 7**, information is collected on: Specific security measures implemented in the city to trigger SSR activities; SSR activities triggered, encouraged or initiated by an actor external to the city or country (such as an international organization); information on the level at which SSR activities took place – at the national and/or city level; detailed information on the SSR activity or programme; involved donors; duration of activity; the current status, anticipated duration and budget volume of the activity; the security institutions targeted for/benefitting from reform efforts; information on who initiated, and who implemented the reform; which local partners join the reform efforts; and if the planning of the reform had been an inclusive process.

Furthermore, **Cluster 8** examines the context of urban SSR efforts: ranging from post-conflict contexts to those of on-going conflicts; or conditions marked by rapid development, political transition and democratisation, following a natural disaster; characterised by high levels of

structural and direct violence; or as part of or following a peace process, a peace agreement or as part of a longer-term SSR programme. Information is also collected on the number of security institutions involved in a given reform activity; the degree to which the governance dimension is included; if the reform activity has been embedded or connected with a larger development plan or strategy; and if SSR mandates refer to or are grounded in specific "larger" objectives of SSR mentioned, such as "development", "democratization", "DDR", "gender", "human right" or other larger human development goals.

Under **Cluster 9** information is collected on evaluations or other analyses that have been written about particular SSR activities. The questions in Table 5 range from quantitative to qualitative, from the simple to the detailed and from closed to open questions. While the answers to the simple, closed questions are easier to code for an eventual quantitative analysis, the open questions may lead the research team to new insights, both methodologically and in terms of content. This is crucial in respect to at least partially closing the research gap that still exists considering the intersection between urban violence, stability and institutions addressing security and justice aspects. Besides the fact that the answers to open questions might be more difficult to apply to quantitative analysis, they might help re-structure further, context-specific, questions for the small-N case studies.

Table 5: *Questions for large-N mapping – and additional questions for small-N case studies*

QUESTIONS FOR THE MAPPING (AND CASE-) STUDIES	
1. GENERAL CONTEXT	
1.01	Name of the city
1.02	Global North / South
1.03	Continent
1.04	Is it the capital of the nation?
1.05	Population (gender, skin colour, religion or ethnic origin and age)
1.06	Demographic density
1.07	Size of the territory (in km^2)
1.08	Form of government (federal, parliamentary, etc.)
1.09	On-going conflict?
1.10	Post-conflict context?
1.11	Development context?
1.12	Political transition/democratisation context?
1.13	Post-natural disaster context?
1.14	On-going peace process context?
1.15	High degree of violence ('structural and direct violence')?
1.16	Is there budget flowing from national to local government? If so, what is the percentage of the national budget dedicated to local government?
2. URBANISATION	
2.01	How is the city as a territorial unit classified/divided (name of administrative units)?
2.02	Is the city considered a Megacity, Megalopolis and/or Metropolis?[329]
2.03	List trends (push and pull factors) in urban in- and outmigration in the city.
2.04	Is there a known 'gentrification' process in the city? If so, in which areas? [330]
2.05	Name negative impacts of urbanisation (use graphs, statistics, disaggregate data by gender).
2.06	Name positive impacts of urbanisation (graphs, statistics, disaggregate data by gender).

[329] See definitions in Table 1, p. 14.
[330] See definitions in Table 1, p. 14.

3. URBAN THREATS AND TRIGGERS
At a minimum, name key threats currently experienced in the city. Ideally, analyse each threat according to the following criteria: 3.01 What is the threat? (Name of the threat) 3.02 Who is threatened? (Section of society) 3.03 By whom? (Source/perpetrator) 3.04 When? (Time duration) 3.05 How serious is the threat? (Threat to survival of individuals?) 3.06 What is the magnitude of the threat? (How many victims? Numbers, estimates, levels) 3.07 Is it a potential future threat or is the threat already being felt? 3.08 Are there triggers that have or might help escalate the threat? 3.09 What are recognisable symptoms? 3.10 What are identifiable causes and root causes? 3.11 If the threat is addressed, what will be the likely outcome? 3.12 If the threat is not assessed, what will be the likely outcome?
4. SECURITY INSTITUTIONS ADDRESSING URBAN THREATS (ROLES AND TASKS)
Please analyse all security sector institutions at the city level (refer to the attached security sector mapping of the attached sample). 4.01 List all statutory institutions that provide security in the city. 4.02 List all executive authorities that manage security providers and are otherwise involved in the city's security. 4.03 List legislative bodies that oversee the activities of the security providers, approve their budgets and develop relevant legislation, among others. 4.04 List judicial institutions that interpret and uphold the constitution and the laws of the land. 4.05 List civil society actors that monitor the activities of the security institutions and of those that manage and oversee them, support the development of government policy relevant to the security sector, inform the public and conduct training activities, among others. 4.06 List non-statutory armed groups and formations: those who have the capacity to use force but do not have a state mandate to do so. 4.07 List independent oversight agencies – ombudspersons, human rights commissions, auditing boards, and so forth – which, while financed by the government are not part of its executive, judicial or legislative branches, and usually only report to parliament. 4.08 List external actors that exercise, or assist in exercising, one or more of the above functions in the city. For each of these categories, please collect the following information: What kind of services does the relevant actor provide? • What is the composition of its personnel, according to gender, age, skin colour, religion or ethnic origin and age? (Personnel composition) • Which instances of illegal activity, if any, has the security institution been involved in (such as corruption, human rights violations, etc.)? • How would you rate its record of security provision? (Effectiveness) • Was the institution specifically created to address a specific threat? Which one? • How effective has the measure been / will the measure likely be in addressing the threat? • Which indicators have been used / could be used to measure the effectiveness of the mitigation measure?
5. SPECIFIC RESPONSES AND TRIGGERS OF THE SECURITY SECTOR'S RESPONSE TO THREATS
At a minimum, name key responses by security sector actors in response to the key threats mentioned above. Ideally, please answer the following questions: 5.01 Name of the threat 5.02 What has been done to mitigate and / or address each threat? 5.03 Was there a specific event triggering the response? If so, who triggered the event? Which mitigation measure has been put in place, by whom and directed at whom?

5.04	How feasible or realistic has the measure been / will the measure likely be?
5.05	How effective has the measure been / will the measure likely be in addressing the threat?
5.06	Which indicators have been used / could be used to measure the effectiveness of the mitigation measure?
6. HAS THE CITY'S SECURITY SECTOR BEEN SUBJECT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ACTIVITIES?	
6.01	If no, please skip the following section.
6.02	If yes, please address the following section.
7. REFORM OF THE SECURITY SECTOR AND TRIGGER	
Triggers/Context:	
7.01	Which specific security measures implemented in the city have triggered SSR activities?
7.02	Were SSR activities triggered/encouraged/initiated by an actor external to the city or country (such as an international organization)?
7.03	Did SSR activities take place at the national level, the city level, or both?
7.04	Name and describe the SSR activity or programme (size, duration, actors involved, budget, task, nature, scope)
7.04.1	Donor(s) involved
7.04.2	Years of activity
7.04.3	Current status
7.04.4	Planned years of activity
7.04.5	Budget size of the activity
7.04.6	Security Institution(s) subject to reform
7.04.7	Who initiated the activity? Residents? (Elites? Marginalised groups? Vulnerable groups? CSOs? National actors? International actors?) For example, did the UN initiate the action? Whose idea was it in the first place (local ownership, etc.)
7.04.8	Who carried out the activity (who implements)?
7.04.9	Who are local partners?
7.04.10	Has there been inclusive planning?
8. SSR CONTEXT	
8.01	Did the SSR activity take place in a post-conflict context?
8.02	Did the SSR activity take place in the context of an on-going conflict?
8.03	Did the SSR activity take place in a development context?
8.04	Did the SSR activity take place in a political transition/democratisation context?
8.05	Did the SSR activity take place in a post-natural disaster context?
8.06	High degree of violence ('structural and direct violence')?
8.07	Did the SSR activity take place as a result or in the context of a peace process?
8.08	Is the SSR activity a result of a peace agreement?
8.09	Is the SSR activity part of a specifically designed SSR programme?
8.10	Are other "related" SSR activities taking place in country?
8.11	Is the SSR activity part of a larger SSR programme?
8.12	Does the SSR activity involve more than one security institution?
8.13	Does the SSR activity encompass a governance dimension?
8.14	Is the SSR activity embedded or connected with a larger development plan or strategy?
8.15	In SSR mandates, are specific "larger" objectives of SSR mentioned, such as "development", "democratization", "DDR", "gender", "human right" or other larger human development goals?
9. SSR CONTACTS	
Name of the threat	
9.01	Has the activity been evaluated? What is the evaluation's findings and "verdict"?
9.02	Has the activity been written about (not as part of an evaluation)
9.03	Has DCAF written on it (if so, who)?
9.04	Has DCAF engaged in operations (if so, who?)
9.05	List of key individuals involved in design, setting up, implementation, review

Definitions

In order to accommodate the different disciplinary and cross-/transdisciplinary understandings of key terms, the definitions in Table 1were used to guide the research team through the process of data collection.[331]

4.2 Framework of analysis: towards a mapping methodology

As a tool for data collection, a matrix table was used. The gathered information was collected in an Excel workbook. This has two advantages: First, this approach offers an overview of all collected data. Secondly, using Excel allows for the data to be coded, quantitatively evaluated, and finally edited for diagram-style presentations.

Please see Table 6 for a simplified example of the matrix used for the study. Each column was used to answer one question, whereas in the rows the same order of cities was used for each sheet. In the case of question sets 3 and 4, an extra column of topics, in this case urban security institutions, was added.

Table 6: *Matrix*

City	Urban security institutions	Question 1	Question 2	Question 3	Question 4
City 1	Statutory security institutions				
	Executive authorities				
	Legislative authorities				
City 2	Statutory security institutions				
	Executive authorities				
	Legislative authorities				

The sources of all information included in the mapping are listed in Appendix 2 (Bibliography/Large-N Mapping). Whenever sources could not be found, but information seemed too valuable not to be included, such information was added to the table without citations nonetheless. This approach assures that no information found would be lost, even if some of it cannot be easily verified and thus cannot be used at a later stage of analysis. Whenever information was searched for, but could not be found, the corresponding cell was marked with a minus sign (-) in order to distinguish it from the boxes that had not been worked on yet.

[331] See Table 1, p. 14.

As both a trial and "best case" example (as considerably more time and effort was invested than with for other cities), the city of São Paulo was mapped. As mentioned in the introduction, the member of the research team to carry out this research was a Brazilian with previous experience in working on urban security issues in São Paulo, and the ability to access data and sources that a regular desk researcher without local contacts or knowledge would not be able to access. The project team member attempted to answer as many mapping questions as possible in order to estimate the effort required to carry out the mapping for a city as comprehensive as possible. This trial case was important and revealed that even under the best of circumstances – a national, speaking the local language, with local contacts and relevant subject-matter expertise, access to ample information and data, and as much research time as was required – the task turned out to be significant. This experience made it abundantly clear to the research team that the large-N mapping would require much greater capacity in terms of background knowledge, time – and subsequently resources in terms of staff and funding – than was available for the project.

As a consequence, alternative research approaches were discussed within the research team, including reducing the number of cases or categories initially targeted for inclusion in the mapping exercise. As a consequence, the mapping was restricted to the questions marked in dark font in Table 5.

For the trial mapping of São Paulo an extensive amount of data was gathered, covering detailed information about security institutions, particularly statutory security providers and executive authorities (see Table 9). As much as possible, the information gathered was transferred to the table in the form of direct quotations. In a second step, cells were color-coded: green colour coding indicated that the information gathered was considered suitable for mapping and further analysis; while red colour coding of cells indicated that the gathered information could not be used for further analysis, mainly because of lacking data, low data quality or missing references. Information in purple cells can be used for further analysis, yet only with caution as proper citations are missing. The exact process of editing and preparation of data for further analysis will be explained below in section 4.4 of this report.

The example of São Paulo also points to those questions that are more and those that are less suitable for a large-N mapping: While it was possible to gather an extensive amount of information about the various actors that govern and potentially influence threat mitigation in cities, including the specific services they provide, it was difficult to find sufficient data on the composition of security personnel, especially in terms of their gender and ethnicity. In order to gather enough information to answer as many questions as possible, a combination of diverse **publications** was utilised (see Table 7), drawing on information collection and analysis by a wide variety of **sources** (see Table 8).

Table 7: *Publications used for mapping São Paulo (see bibliographies for other cities in Appendix 2 (Bibliography/Large-N Mapping)*

Publications used for mapping São Paulo
1. IBGE, Census2010 (http://www.ibge.gov.br/cidadesat/xtras/temas.php?codmun=355030&idtema=71&search=sao-paulo|sao-paulo|financas-publicas-2009). *See* also SEADE, Retratos de São Paulo (http://www.seade.gov.br/produtos/retratosdesp/view/index.php?temaId=1&indId=5&locId=3550308&busca=). The Metropolitan Expanded Complex includes the metropolitan regions of the Santos Lowlands and Campinas, as well as nearby cities such as São José dos Campos, Sorocaba, and Jundiaí, among others (Silva, Geraldo, Klink, Jeroen and Fonseca, Maria de Lourdes. *Centrality, Governance and Globalization. The challenges of constituting the São Paulo macrometropolis*, available at: http://rec.brookes.ac.uk/research/relp/network/resources/Centrality%20and%20governance%20in%20Sao%20Paulo.pdf, pg. 1).
2. Governo Federal Portal da Transparência, available at: http://www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br/manual/.
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Table 8: *São Paulo security sector mapping*

São Paulo: Composition of sources			
Source category	Details	Number of cases	Source number (see Table 4)
Governmental sources	From Brazil	8	1, 2, 19, 23, 28, 37, 40, 41
	From other countries	2	1, 12
	Brazilian governmental companies	1	7
NGOs / other CSOs	NGOs from Brazil	4	3, 31, 33, 35
	Other CSOs from Brazil	2	4,22
	International NGOs	2	32, 33
Media	News portals from Brazil	4	5, 10, 16, 29
	News portals from other countries	2	12, 30
	Brazilian newspapers, magazines and scientific papers	3	9, 15, 6
International organizations	UN (UN Women; International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth)	2	8, 14
Political bodies	São Paulo State Legislative Assembly	1	13
Educational bodies	Websites and blogs by universities	2	17, 21
Others[332]		10	11, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 36, 38, 39, 42

[332] Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC); Convention on Biological Diversity; Mapa da Violencia (studies about (urban) violence in Brazil; private company initiatives, such as Instituto Avon; Ficha Limpa (Supplementary Law no. 135 of 2010 to the Conditions of the Ineligibility Act of no.64 of 1990); Sesvesp, a union of private security companies, Electronic Security and courses of São Paulo State Education; and Gringoes, an expat network.

Table 9: *Security sector mapping for São Paulo*

São Paulo	Institution (by level)	Service Provided	Personnel Composition	Illegal/HR violation	Specific to Threat? Which one?	Effecti ?
Statutory Security Institutions	National: (i) Federal Police, (ii) Federal Highway Police (i) Federal Railway Police	(i) Crime investigation (against the Union and its public enterprises), Drug enforcement and trafficking; suppress drug trafficking and smuggling at the national and fulfill the role of official agent in airports and port the country. Highway Police: Law enforcement - overseeing (prevent and punish any traffic violations) more than 61,000 km of federal highways and roads following the tasks set by the Brazilian Traffic Code (Decree 1.655/95).	_	Yes - violent repression during the May 2013 demonstrations,[31] excessive use of force, extrajudicial killings, registration of killings as "acts of violence followed by death", corruption.[32]	_	_
	Provincial (subordinated to the Governor): (i) Civil Police, (ii) Military Police; (iii) Firefighters	(i) Public order, Crime investigation (people and property); (ii) Law enforcement, Public order	_		_	_
	Local: Metropolitan Civil Guard of São Paulo	Training, Protection of Schools, Protection of Public Property, Environmental protection, (Art. 114 para. 8 Federal Constitution)				
	Special Forces (only in São Paulo): Grupo de Acões Táticas Especiais (Special Actions and Tactics Group - GATE) - subordinated to the Military Police, Grupo Armado de Repressão a Roubos e Assaltos (Group of Armed Robbery and Assault Repression - GARRA) - subordinated to the Civil Police	GATE: high-risk situations, such as hostage rescue, forays into high-risk locations and bomb disposal. GARRA: Crime investigation.		_	Yes, assault/criminality.	
Executive Authorities	Mayor	Manage local public services, decide which will apply the proceeds of taxes and transfers from the State and the Union, which works must be performed and programs to be implemented. Is also a function of the mayor punish and repeal laws, vetoing proposals that are unconstitutional or not meet the public interest.	Male (Fernando Haddad)	_	_	
	Deputy Mayor	Second in command of the municipal executive. If the mayor need to be absent due to travel or license, or has revoked the mandate, he assumes the duties of the holder. While the mayor is acting deputy shall assist in the administration, and defining together discussing improvements to the municipality.	Female (Nádia Campeão)	_	_	
	Sub-mayors (31 Sub-City Hall)	Coordinate the Regional Plan and Plan of Subdivision, District or equivalent, in accordance with the guidelines established by the Strategic Plan of the City; together with neighbours Subprefectures, intermediate types of planning and management, where the theme or service in question, require treatment beyond their territorial limits; establish articulated forms of action, planning and management Subprefectures with neighbouring municipalities and from the governmental guidelines for municipal political relations metropolitan; act as agents of local development by implementing policies from regional vocations and interests manifested by population; increase the range, speed and improve the quality of local services, from central guidelines; facilitate access and print transparency to public services, making them closer to citizens and intersectoral coordination of the various segments of the Municipal Administration	6 women and 25 men.	_	Yes.	

		and services operating in the region.(Law 13.399 de 2002)				
Legislative Bodies	Vereadores (55 Town Hall (Councillors) - Câmara Municipal)	To elaborate municipal laws and supervise the performance of the Executive, propose, discuss and approve the laws to be applied in the municipality (incl. budget law), monitor the actions of the executive, making sure that the goals are being met and if the government are being met legal standards.	4 women and 51 men.	_		
Judicial Institutions	Tribunal of Justice of São Paulo (Tribunal de Justica de São Paulo)	Civil and Criminal Justice	360 Judges (Desembargadore s)	_		
	Tribunal of Military Justice of São Paulo (Tribunal de Justica Militar de São Paulo)	Criminal procedure for military personnel only.	7 judges (all male)	_		
Civil Society	Local media: Folha de São Paulo, Estado de São Paulo (written), Globo, SBT, Record (TV);	Information.	_	_		
	Universities: Universidade de São Paulo, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, Mackenzie,	Education.	_	_		
	Local NGOs: Instituto Sou da Paz, Justica Global, Conectas Direitos Humanos, Ficha Limpa, Transparência Brasil, Observatório da Corrupcão.	Instituto Sou da Paz: prevention of violence, attempt to influence public policies.[33] Justica Global: strenghten civil society and democracy and HR.[34] Conectas Direitos Humanos: promote HR and consolidate the rule of law.[35] Ficha Limpa: combat against corruption.[36]	_	_	_	_
Non-Statutory Armed Groups	First Command of the Capital (Primeiro Comando da Capital - PCC)	Pressure for improved prison conditions (after 'Carandiru massacre', where 111 prisoners of the Carandiru Penitentiary in São Paulo were killed on 2 October 1992 - 102 shot by the police and 9 killed by other inmates).	Biggest criminal organization in Brazil with 130.000 members.[12]	Homicides; drug dealings; extortions.	Burning buses, targeting police officers.	Attack organi means phone heads organi from h securi prison
	Private Security Companies	In the "Estate" of São Paulo: 1. Condominium (residential and commercial): 8%; 2. Public Administration: 29%; 3. Industries: 29%; 4. Banks: 23%; 5. Service Sector: 8%; 6. Others: 3%.[39]	94.98% male; 5.02% female.[38]	_	_	_
Independent Oversight Agencies	Special Task Force on Police Control (Grupo de Atuação Especial de Controle Externo da Atividade Policial, or GECEP)	Investigating complaints of abuses committed by military police officers and closely tracking cases of police killings to identify patterns of abuse.	Prosecutors, civil police and military police (SESP - State Secretariat of Public Security of the State of Paraná) and Treasury Department, designed and integrated into the Group.	_	Criminal organizations.[37]	
	1. General Magistrat of the Civil and Metropolitan Police (Corregedoria Geral da Guarda Civil Metropolitana); 2. Municipal Audit Office of São Paulo (Tribunal de Contas do Município de São Paulo)	1. Disciplinary infractions attributed to members of the Board for Professional Metropolitan Civil Guard; conducting inspection visits and Corrections extraordinary in any unit of the Guard; consideration of the representations, and the investigation of complaints ethical behavior, social and functional candidates and who already hold positions in the Corporation either by other members or the public,	_	_	_	

		breaking with authoritarian practices as required in the rule of law.[40] 2. Supervision and control of the Revenue and Expenditure of the Municipality of São Paulo.[41]				
External Actors	[IADP, international NGOs, ...]	_	_	_	_	_

4.3 Selection of the mapping sample

With São Paulo mapped, information about 90 additional cities was gathered over a period of two years, drawing on the assistance of several research assistants. Given the resources available left within the project budget at that point, researchers were advised to invest a maximum of two to three hours of time per city to gather information and transfer it to the mapping table, in order to test how much data could be collected within the limits of this study. At a later stage, and once a sufficient number of cities had been covered, additional research assistants would return to the mapping samples and search for supplementary information.

The cases were selected based on the following rationale: Africa, Northern America, South America, Asia and Europe would be equally represented; two thirds of the overall sample would consist of cities from the global "South", and one third from the global "North". The research team also chose cities with specific urban features, such as a high number of inhabitants and the presence of security sector institutions at the city level, such as police, governments, parliaments or courts. These were minimal features for a city to be included in the comparative mapping exercise. The exercise was concluded after 91 cities had been mapped (see Table 10). However, several rounds of supplementary mapping assured that a minimum of information could be gathered for as many samples as possible.

As Table 10 shows, the intended equal geographic distribution was largely met, with 17 cities from Africa, 23 from the Americas, 30 from Asia and 21 from Europe. As there a disproportionately large number of large cities with particular urban characteristics can be found in Asia and America, this is also reflected in the sample. The cities that were identified as potentially ideal candidates for a set of small-N case studies are marked in Table 10 with an asterisk.

Table 10: *Cities included in the sample*

Sample large-N mapping study			
Africa	America	Asia	Europe
Abidjan	Bogotá*	Almaty*	Amsterdam
Accra	Buenos Aires	Baghdad	Athens
Cairo	Caracas	Baku	Barcelona
Cape Town	Chicago	Bangkok*	Berlin
Casablanca	Guatemala City*	Beijing	Budapest
Dakar	Lima	Beirut	Copenhagen
Johannesburg*	Los Angeles	Calcutta	Dublin
Juba	Managua	Damascus	Hamburg
Kampala	Medellín*	Delhi	Kiev
Kigali*	Mexico City*	Dhaka	Lisbon
Kinshasa*	Montreal	Dili*	London*
Lagos	New York	Hong Kong	Madrid
Luanda	Port-au-Prince	Istanbul	Moscow
Mogadishu	Rio de Janeiro*	Jakarta	Paris
Nairobi	San Francisco	Kabul*	Prague
Tripoli	San Salvador	Karachi*	Rhine-Ruhr
Tunis	Santiago de Calí*	Manila	Rome
	Santiago de Chile	Mumbai*	St. Petersburg
	São Paulo*	Patna	Stockholm
	Tijuana	Ramallah*	Vienna
	Toronto	Riyadh	Zurich
	Vancouver	Seoul	
	Washington	Shanghai	
		Shenzhen	
		Singapore	
		Taipei	
		Tehran	
		Tokyo	
		Ulaanbaatar	
		Yangon	

Table 11: *Regional distribution of cities included in the sample*

Based on regional classifications used by the United Nations Statistics Division UNSTAT (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm), the cities covered by the mapping exercise are spread across the following regions.

Africa	17
Eastern Africa	**5**
Juba	
Kampala	
Kigali	
Mogadishu	
Nairobi	
Middle Africa	**2**
Kinshasa	
Luanda	
Northern Africa	**4**
Cairo	
Casablanca	
Tripoli	
Tunis	
Southern Africa	**2**
Cape Town	
Johannesburg	
Western Africa	**4**
Abidjan	
Accra	
Dakar	
Lagos	
Americas	23
Caribbean	**1**
Port-au-Prince	
Central America	**5**
Guatemala City	
Managua	
Mexico City	
San Salvador	
Tijuana	
Northern America	**8**
Chicago	
Los Angeles	
Montreal	
New York	
San Francisco	
Toronto	
Vancouver	
Washington	
South America	**9**
Bogotá	
Buenos Aires	
Caracas	
Lima	
Medellin	
Rio de Janeiro	
Santiago de Cali	
Santiago de Chile	
São Paulo	
Asia	30
Central Asia	**1**
Almaty	
Eastern Asia	**8**
Beijing	
Hong Kong	
Shenzhen	
Seoul	
Shanghai	
Taipei	
Tokyo	
Ulaan Baatar	
South-Eastern Asia	**6**
Bangkok	
Dili	
Jakarta	
Manila	
Singapore	
Yangon	
Southern Asia	**8**
Calcutta	
Dehli	
Dhaka	
Kabul	
Karachi	
Mumbai	
Patna	
Tehran	
Western Asia	**7**
Baghdad	
Baku	
Beirut	
Damascus	
Istanbul	
Ramallah	
Riyadh	
Europe	21
Eastern Europe	**5**
Budapest	
Kiev	
Moscow	
Prague	
St. Petersburg	
Northern Europe	**4**
Copenhagen	
Dublin	
London	
Stockholm	
Southern Europe	**4**
Athens	
Lisbon	
Madrid	
Rome	
Western Europe	**8**
Amsterdam	
Barcelona	
Berlin	
Hamburg	
Paris	
Rhine-Ruhr	
Vienna	
Zurich	
Grand Total	**91**

All data referred to in this report is based on the data collected in the excel workbook, a separate document to this report, entitled “Large-N Study”. This contains all selected data, including coded data and calculations. For the sources used in the mapping, please refer to Appendix 2 (Bibliography/Large-N Mapping).

4.4 Preparation of data for analysis

At the onset of the mapping exercise it was not known which type of data could be collected; and which data would be suitable for further analysis, including coding. Without a pre-defined methodology of data analysis, the parameters for further analysis were defined after all information had been collected. Follow-up research could benefit from the lessons learned during this mapping exercise in order to allowa more structured approach to data gathering, generating information that can be coded as soon as it has been collected.

However, the approach chosen for this initial mapping exercise of simply gathering as much information from quality sources as possible allowed the assembly of a relatively extensive data set, allowing the inclusion of further context-relevant information for each entry. Once the mapping exercise was completed, a methodology suitable to an initial attempt to work with the data was developed.

As mentioned in section 4.2 above, the collected data was colour-coded in green (referenced information), red (information not referenced or of poor quality and thus with limited value for further analysis) and purple (information poorly referenced and thus of limited validity) in order to visualise which part of the data could be used for further analysis.

In a second step, it was important to harmonise and code the data so that it could be processed, calculated and visualised. The data gathered in sections 1 and 2 (see Chapter 4.1, Table 5) contained numerous questions that could be answered with a simple yes, no, or a figure. However, the data coding of sections 3 and up was much more difficult, mainly because these were largely open questions. Please note that, although the set of questions concerning the threat analysis in cities were designed to be considered by small-N qualitative case studies only, they were nevertheless addressed in the large-N mapping to the degree possible in the Excel spreadsheet, with subsequent analysis in cases where specific patterns could be observed.

5 Analysis of the Urban Security Sector: Conclusions from the Large-N Mapping

This section includes the data generated by the mapping, as well as observations from the large-N mapping exercise, both by cluster (or question) and across clusters. For each cluster, main lessons learned from the process of data collection and analysis itself shall be discussed, particularly as they might be helpful in follow-up research along similar lines. If possible, observations of regional patterns will be highlighted.

In the entire Excel mapping, each piece of information was briefly assessed for its measurability. Data gaps, outdated information, failure to provide adequate sources or any sources at all, or information that consisted of large amounts of continuous text, were reasons for not further processing and analysing information.

5.1 Data

The amount and quality of data collected varied greatly across the sample. Clusters 1 and 2 cover relatively easily accessible English-language international statistics, while information on threats (Cluster 3) and security institutions (Cluster 4) differs strongly in volume and quality. For Clusters 5 to 8 less information was available. Table 12 offers an overview of the data that could be used across the sample. In Cluster 3, consideration was given to the extent to which a threat was named at all, while no specifics about the threat in question were required. In Cluster 4, only the question whether or not the institution or actor concerned exists in the city, and the gender identities of the personnel were considered for the evaluation. As Clusters 5 and 6 exceeded the scope of the mapping (as discussed in section 4.1 of this report), they are not reflected in Table 12. For the purpose of the large-N mapping, data was not gathered for Cluster 9.

Table 12: *Reliability of data according to clusters*



5.2 Observations on data coding and suggestions for further research

As mentioned in section 4.1, the questions displayed in dark font (Clusters 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8) are covered by the large-N mapping exercise. Not all of the information collected was considered to be "codable" for the purpose of further analysis and comparisons across the entire sample of the study. The following sections briefly explain for each question and cluster (a) the challenges and opportunities for gathering information on a particular question in the context of a large-N mapping study of rather modest scope; (b) which information could nevertheless be collected and used to offer a taste of the utility of some cross-sample analyses; and (c) results of some attempts to draw conclusions from the overall mapping exercise.

5.2.1 General context

Question 1.01: Name of the city

In order to have each continent represented with an equal number of cities, in some cases several cities from the same country were included. For example, Colombia is represented by Bogotá, Santiago de Calí and Medellín. However, analysing several cities from one country can also be an advantage in the context of quasi-experimental designs.

Analysing several cities (especially if they are from the same country) with comparable urban threats allows comparative analyses of specific policy responses that have been carried out in one city, but not in another. The comparison needs to include variables that reflect the security sector's contribution to threat mitigation in the cities compared. Particularly as national security sectors tend to have a strong influence on urban security provision, comparing different cities within the same country might point to unique characteristics of urban security sector provision, possibly pointing to differences – and good and bad, or 'better' or 'worse' practises – in urban security sector governance.

While in some cases several cities from the same country were included, as the sample of the continent in question was relatively small, for other continents (or territorial regions) some well-known and potentially interesting large cities did not make the list, as enough large cities had already been included from that continent or region. Thus, Hanoi (Vietnam) or Phnom Penh (Cambodia) were not included in the sample as large cities in South and Southeast Asia were already more than adequately represented in the sample, compared to other continents. However, a much larger sample would make it easier to be less particular about the decision to include or exclude certain cities. Ideally, as many cities as possible should be included, while decisions on balancing the sample can be taken once data is extracted for comparative analysis of specific questions, which might then focus on much larger samples of, for instance, large cities, cities within one country, cities within one continent, cities in the global North or South, to name but a few potential sample characteristics. A much larger overall sample would also allow one to include, for instance,

cities from Australia and New Zealand, which did not make the list of cities included in the current study.

Question 1.02: Global North / South

Picking – and balancing – cities from the global North and the global South is a challenge, partly because the difficulty in making a workable geographic, political or economic distinction North and South. In addition, and despite the UNSTAT regional classification mentioned earlier in this report, the concept of a "north/south divide" and the implication that a division between clearly distinguishable features of cities and countries can be made, might be considered inappropriate and outdated.

Nevertheless, across the sample, 35 cities could be considered to be located within the global North, and 56 cities within the global South. Whereas all cities in Europe and Northern America were attributed to the global North, only the East Asian cities of Beijing, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen, as well as the West Asian cities of Baku and Istanbul were considered to belong to this group. All cities in Africa, Central and South America, as well as most Asian cities were considered to be within the global South, which is in line with the UNSTAT regional classification.

Question 1.03: Continent

The four continents were later subdivided into sub-continents: Africa (Eastern Africa, Central Africa, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Western Africa); America (Caribbean, Central America, North America, South America); Asia (Central Asia, East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, West Asia) and Europe (Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe). Please refer to Table 11.

Question 1.04: Is it the capital of the nation?

61 out of the mapped 91 cities are capital cities. In capital cities, the probability is high that important institutions, such as governments and courts of all government levels are present. In extension, this also applies to other security sector institutions, such as independent oversight bodies, civil society organizations or non-statutory armed groups.

Question 1.05: Population (gender, skin colour, religion or ethnic origin and age) / 1.06: Demographic density / 1.07: Size of territory

The only aspect included in the analysis for all cities sampled is population size. For other criteria the data was inconclusive or incomplete. However, a particular and initially unforeseen measuring problem occurred: A clear distinction between the population of the city itself and the greater metropolitan area was not carried out in every case. Statistical data consulted does not always reveal such distinctions. This lacking distinction also affects the results regarding demographic density (inhabitants per square kilometre) and size of territory (in square kilometres).

A further obstacle was the availability of only outdated information. While most data ranged from 2009 to 2013, the most recent data for Calcutta, for instance, was from 2001. Moreover, in some cases no information could be found at all. In order to be able to use population data for analysis, the year 2005 was set as a threshold, with older data being excluded from further analysis.

As well, researchers involved in the study at various stages applied – or reported on information at – different levels of precision (for instance, 193'563 vs. 500'000 vs. 4 to 5 million inhabitants). Estimates that were too imprecise were excluded from further analysis.

The data also did not reveal population growth or change rates. However, recording those dynamics would assist greatly in understanding development patterns of urban populations over time.

The amount, reliability and timeliness of data would be greater if one reliable source for all three variables could be used, instead of gathering data from different sources. This would also help avoid measurement errors, especially with regard to blurred and poorly defined borders between the city and its greater metropolitan area, eventually producing more reliable and comparable data. In order to guarantee the highest possible quality of mapping results, quantitative data should be gathered from established international statistics. Such sources could be identified for this study, yet they might emerge in the context of much renewed interest in urban safety issues, as a result of the popularity and attention created by the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11 on safer cities. However, even taking into consideration the limited data quality, it is still interesting to analyse the data collected to produce a rough overview of regional patterns in terms of population and demographic density in order to show the potential usefulness of discussing urban security sector patterns in the context of growing population dynamics.

The population size in each city is shown in Table 13 below. It is striking that East Asian cities feature the largest population, with an average of 13.6 million inhabitants, followed by South Asian cities with about 8.3 million inhabitants, and South American cities with an average of 6.9 million inhabitants. When adding the average demographic density, the situation changes slightly. As can be seen in Table 13, the average demographic density is highest in South Asia (19'292 persons/sqkm), followed by Southeast Asia (17'200 persons/sqkm). Interestingly, South American cities, despite their population sizes, are not among the most densely populated cites (with an average of 7'181 persons/sqkm). At the same time, cities of Central-, North- and West Africa, although not among the most highly populated cities, have high rates of population density. The only Caribbean city in the sample is Port-au-Prince, for which no information on population density could be found. Still, and this is relevant for urban threat and mitigation strategies, highly populated cities also tend to feature high population densities.

For future research, it would be useful to collect data on individual areas and neighbourhoods of each city, thus paying more focused attention on patterns of different

population densities in different neighbourhoods, particular threat dynamics and security sector responses. This applies especially in cases when, for instance, cities are subdivided into different regions or districts with their own police departments and city administrations.

Table 13: *Average demographic density by sub-continent*



Question 1.08: Form of government (federal, parliamentary, etc.)

The mapping entries for this question were particularly difficult to analyse because a great range of forms of government was recorded, reflecting a mixture of government systems and voting systems. Distinctions between a republic and a democracy seemed particularly challenging. Many countries covered by the mapping have a republican state system with authoritarian features, others with a well-functioning democracy system. Further, most European monarchies have been complemented with a well-functioning democratic system. Moreover, many countries' political systems are in transition. For future research this category requires further guidance for those collecting information for this mapping exercise.

Question 1.09: On-going conflict / 1.10: Post-conflict context / 1.11 Development context / 1.10 Political transition – democratisation context / 1.13 Post-natural disaster context / 1.14 On-going peace process context

Questions 1.09 to 1.14 are often difficult to answer, as they require the researcher to judge the situation of the country, for which he/she collects information and makes an educated

guess as to the particular, most relevant, context. As a result, sources for those entries are often missing, putting additional emphasis on the judgement of the person collecting the information entered during the mapping exercise. Detailed, field-based qualitative case studies would allow more space and analysis to describe more accurately the particular contextual environments affecting both threat and mitigation environments affecting the security sector's role and performance in a given city.

Moreover, and with particular relevance for the work of the security sector, individual contexts might need to be further qualified: A useful subcategory for the development context might be a subcategory of newly industrialising countries, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa); or within in the post-conflict context, a differentiation should be made between those countries emerging interstate conflict and those emerging intrastate conflict.

Table 14 shows the number and regional location of cities for each context mapped for the purpose of this exercise.

Table 14: *Selected cities by context*

Row Labels	Sum of On-going conflict?	Sum of Post-conflict?	Sum of Development context?	Sum of Political transition?	Sum of Post-natural disaster?	Sum of On-going peace process?
Africa (17)	9	2	17	12	0	3
Eastern Africa (5)	4	1	5	5	0	1
Middle Africa (2)	1	0	2	1	0	0
Northern Africa (4)	3	0	4	3	0	0
Southern Africa (2)	0	0	2	1	0	0
Western Africa (4)	1	1	4	2	0	2
America (23)	4	2	15	2	1	4
Caribbean (1)	0	1	1	1	1	0
Central America (5)	1	1	5	1	0	1
Northern America (8)	0	0	0	0	0	0
South America (9)	3	0	9	0	0	3
Asia (30)	11	4	24	12	3	5
Central Asia (1)	0	0	1	0	0	0
Eastern Asia (8)	0	0	5	0	1	0
South-Eastern Asia (6)	3	2	6	4	1	1
Southern Asia (8)	3	1	7	3	1	1
Western Asia (7)	5	1	5	5	0	3
Europe (21)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eastern Europe (5)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern Europe (4)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Southern Europe (4)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Western Europe (8)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand Total	**24**	**8**	**56**	**26**	**4**	**12**

Question 1.15: High degree of structural and direct violence?

Similar to the previous categories, qualitative case studies would be better suited to describe a city's exposure to direct and structural violence. In this mapping exercise, entries on structural and direct violence were not (or could not) be substantiated with clear evidence and relevant sources. As the topic of structural violence in particular bears a high degree of complexity, including a potentially large amount of sub-variables that would need to be considered, this question was eventually not included in the overall analysis of the mapping exercise. Issues such as structural violence would be more adequately addressed through in-depth case studies. Even there, defining baseline criteria and thresholds, possibly applicable across a number of case studies, would be important.

5.2.2 Urbanisation

Question 2.01: How is the city as a territorial unit classified/divided (name of administrative units)?

While this (and many other more descriptive elements of the mapping), is important when using the mapping exercise as a depository of descriptive information on urban security sectors and their contextual characteristics, the question does not lend itself to comparisons across the sample. For qualitative case studies, additional characteristics could be examined, such as information of how cities and their various districts are organised, if there are differences across these administrative units as to demographic characteristics such as ethnicity, age, occupation, population density or threat and mitigation records.

Question 2.02: Is the city considered a megacity, megalopolis and/or metropolis?

It is not clear, nor are there authoritative definitions, of these terms. Some cities seem to qualify as a megacity, a metropolis and a megalopolis, for example Tokyo. Whereas there seems to be agreement that a megacity counts more than 10 million inhabitants, the function of the other distinctions seems less clear. It would be helpful for future research to differentiate these terms with more accuracy, particularly as the differences between them relate to differences in the structure and organisation of urban security sectors and their individual institutions.

Question 2.03: List trends (push and pull factors) in urban in- and outmigration in the city

While main trends of in- and outmigration can be observed and noted, these are subject to a high degree of interpretation. Qualitative case studies might be able to go in more detail into the dynamics of in- and outmigration, while these cannot be reflected in a large-N mapping exercise. Here trends, mostly un-sourced, can be included, with some informational but little analytical value. Particularly the role of the security sector in driving out-migration (possibly a push factor by creating or failing to mitigate insecurity) or in-migration (possibly a pull-factor if basic security can be provided) would be important to observe.

Question 2.04: Is there a known 'gentrification' process in the city? If so, in which areas?

Although this question was part of the Cluster which was not included in the analysis of the mapping results, much information was nevertheless found and included for information's sake. If one would want to work in this issue, particularly its link to security sector performance, such information should be up-to-date, in order to allow observation and analysis of contemporary developments, such as dynamics of shifting gentrification due to security sector performance, among other factors.

5.2.3 Urban threats and triggers

The threat analysis was originally included in order to inform the terms of urban security policy analysis. Which are the main threats faced by urban inhabitants, and which role does the security sector play in mitigating these threats? However, after mapping the city of São Paulo, it proved to be unfeasible – although highly interesting – to cover this cluster of questions by the large-N mapping exercise.

Nevertheless, for informational purposes, but not subsequent analysis, those involved in collecting information for the mapping exercise were encouraged to include information nevertheless in case they came across while searching for information for the remaining clusters. This would help to assess the type of data and degree of effort required to pursue such a threat analysis. It became obvious that, the more specific the questions became, the more difficult it was to do justice to a thorough and true account of a city's threat environment. Thus, most entries reflect superficial and oversimplified accounts, without references to reliable statistical evidence, thus showing that a large-N mapping is not suitable for recording information that requires much deeper and sophisticated understanding and reporting. Entries thus reflect intuitive impressions of the involved researchers and would require much further reporting and analysis. While a considerable amount of information could be gathered for question 3.02 ("Who is threatened?"), pointing to the usefulness of this category as such, much of the collected information was not specific enough for further analysis. Eventually only entries to questions 3.01 (name of the threat) and 3.03 (source/perpetrator) were considered for closer cross-sample analysis.

The purpose of this mapping study is to show the potential for gathering information that would allow more meaningful analyses of the structure, role, environment and performance of urban security sectors. Some limited information could be gathered about urban threats. However, in order to carry out comparative analyses across the sample, much greater detail and specificity would need to be added. In fact, a thorough threat analysis, as was determined already very early in the project after the first trial mapping of Sao Paulo, would require either a stand-alone mapping exercise and/or would need to be carried out in the context of individual qualitative case study research. For some discussion on alternative threat analyses and an attempt to apply this to the preliminary information collected by this mapping study, please refer to Appendix 1 (Alternative Threat Analysis).

5.2.4 Security institutions addressing urban threats (roles and tasks)

Most of the questions included in the mapping exercise were deemed to be important factors for a thorough analysis of the context in which security sectors operate within an urban environment, and thus were considered worth including in this exercise in order to test the availability and utility of available information for large-N analyses. However, early recognition on the limit to which comprehensive and reliable, yet codable information could be collected in the context of this study, became clear. However, it was hoped that an even superficial screening of descriptive information on security sector structures and roles across large samples of cities would offer some hitherto unknown insights.

Being treated as – potentially – the core contribution of the mapping; special emphasis was placed on gathering information about security sector institutions, especially security providers, which potentially address urban threats. Despite some gaps, most of the primary security sector-related questions designed for the large-N mapping were answered. In addition, the members of the research team also tried to answer additional questions initially designed for the small-N case studies which were to be carried out at a later stage. However, due to resource constraints, small-N case studies were not conducted.

The first questions covered the composition of security institutions' personnel, their gender, age, skin colour, religion or ethnic origin and age (personnel composition). After answering this question in detail for São Paulo, the focus across all other samples was mainly put on the gender dimension. Thus, in the following discussion, wherever possible the gender dimension shall be considered.

The excel datasheet was colour-coded in preparation for the evaluation, in order to distinguish potentially useful information. Reliable data was highlighted in green, whereas information with low data reliability was coded in red. Most information was found in the sections that had from the outset been designed for the large-N mapping study.

One particular question asked for the identification of illegal activity, if any, by the security institution concerned, such as human rights violations or corruption. This question turned out to be difficult to answer, particularly as many human rights violations mentioned in reports of international organizations or blogs by human rights activist are not "illegal" as such, partly because security institutions in certain contexts have tasks, roles and prerogatives that would elsewhere be considered illegal. Thus the question how the record of security provision (effectiveness) by the institution concerned should be rated cannot be addressed by a limited mapping exercise, and thus are extremely difficult to answer outside thorough case studies. Thus, throughout the mapping exercise, many gaps remained.

Further questions asked whether an institution was specifically created to address a specific threat, and how effective the measure has been or will be likely be in the future to address a particular threat. Eventually, the question which indicators have been used to measure the effectiveness of threat mitigation was asked, but failed to provide answers. In an attempt to visualise the potential usefulness of the mapping exercise, the research team attempted to

provide answers as much as possible, even for questions primarily designed for the small-N case studies. In general, given that the questions prioritised mere listings of security sector actors, a decent amount of information could be collected here.

The following sections of this text comment on the main information collected about actors relevant for a possible urban security sector, which have been coded and turned into diagrams that show the distribution of the data found on each actor. Reporting on security institutions has been done in the context of subcontinents, should any regional patterns be identified.

The diagrams were generated through so-called pivot tables, which allow one to structure data collected in Excel worksheets and experiment with different ways of presenting the data. Each pivot table used as the basis for the following diagrams can still be found and experimented with in the Excel workbook "Large-N Study" that accompanies this report. Thus, there is also the possibility to experiment with alternative ways of preparing data. The following sections highlight some results of the mapping, as well as some obstacles encountered and lessons learned.

In the mapping a clear distinction between institutions and authorities on the national and urban – and as far as possible – the provincial levels was made. This conceptual delineation is important in order to identify and discuss the urban security sector. It is important to understand the vertical and horizontal separations of power at play in each city in order to understand who is involved in the governance of the security sector. For executive, legislative and judicial bodies, a gender component was added by trying to identify information about the gender ratio in different institutions, and at each level (national, provincial and local). The following paragraphs will offer more detail. For more detailed information please refer to the Excel Spreadsheet on 'Checks and Balances' in the Large-N Study Excel Workbook.

Question 4.01: List all statutory institutions that provide security in the city

Although the question specifically addresses the statutory security institutions at the city level, the national and provincial levels were included as well, mainly in order to gain a more complete understanding of the security sector, including the relationships between these different levels. Table 15 shows that in 81 (columns in blue) out of 91 (columns in red) cases, the mapping showed that there is an army at the national level. In nine more cases, no information was found; and in one case, namely the city of Tripoli in Libya, no national army was in place at the time the mapping was carried out, given that the political system was in transition. With a few exceptions, nearly every country in the world has a security institution at the national level, which is mostly a national army, complemented in some cases by a military or federal police. Please see Table 15.

Table 15: *Statutory security institutions at the national level*



In most cases, less information was available for the provincial level. This can be seen in Table 16. In 27 (blue font) out of the 91 (red font) cases, statutory security institutions could be found at the provincial level. However, few states are federations, and thus do not have state institutions at a provincial level in general. Furthermore, the information on state institutions beyond the national level was scarce. Thus, it is often not clear if the lack of a security institution at a provincial level owes to the fact there either are in fact none, that there are no provincial-level state institutions in general. Closer analysis would likely shed light on this question. Please see Table 16.

Table 16: *Statutory security institutions at the provincial level*



At the local level, in 54 out of the 91 cases, statutory security institutions were found, which are in most cases municipal police departments, often also called metropolitan police. The number of 54 cities with local security institutions does not mean that other cities do not have a metropolitan police – it is also possible that no relevant data could be found. Please see Table 17.

Table 17: *Statutory security institutions at the local level*



In a fourth step, special operation forces were added. These encompass, among others, tactical units specialised in high risk situations such as hostage rescue or bomb attacks, units which tend to be located at the urban level. This category also encompasses intelligence agencies, which tend to be located at the national level, but whose influence often reaches into the urban security sector. Overall, the number of cases with Special Forces at the local level (13 cases) was so low that no regional patterns can be observed. Please see Table 18.

Table 18: *Special forces at the local level*



Question 4.02: List all executive authorities that manage security providers and are otherwise involved in the city's security

In almost all cases (except for three) information could be found on the national executive authority. In 81 cases information on the head of state was available. For the cases where such information was available, 73 heads of state were identified, whereas seven were female (Brazil (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), Argentina, Germany (Berlin and Hamburg), Korea and Denmark). As can be seen, there are certain overlaps because some cities are concerned twice. In the same fashion, this should also be considered in the case of male-headed countries that are represented by several cities, such as the United States with New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Washington. Please see Table 19.

Table 19: *Executive authorities at the national level*



On the provincial level, less information on executive authorities could be found (only in 20 cases), with even less information about the gender proportions. Please see Table 20.

Table 20: *Executive authorities at the provincial level*



More information could be found about executive authorities at the local level: Of 69 mayors mapped, six are women (Cape Town, Madrid, Zurich, Santiago de Chile, Lima and Managua). Stockholm seems to be the only case in the sample with not one single mayor, but a group of individuals appointed to the executive office at the local level, called the "city executive board" and considered to be Stockholm's government. Please see Table 21.

Table 21: *Executive authorities at the local level*



Question 4.03: List legislative bodies that oversee the activities of the security providers, approve their budgets and develop relevant legislation, among others

With the exception of only five cases, in which no information could be found, a legislative authority at the national level could be identified for all cases across the sample. In most cases, national parliaments are in place, irrespective of the forms of governments. Single cases would be able to describe how the national parliament and local city councils, for instance, provide external management and oversight over the security sector. Please see Table 22.

Table 22: *Legislative authorities at the national level*



In contrast to the national level, only limited data was available about legislative authorities at the provincial level. Given that no case was found that explicitly showed that there is no legislative authority at the provincial level, there is mainly a data gap. Please see Table 23.

Table 23: *Legislative authorities at the provincial level*



At look at legislative authorities at a local level shows that most cities across the sample have a legislative body at the city level, often called a municipal council or assembly. Please see Table 24.

Table 24: *Legislative authorities at the local level*



Question 4.04: List judicial institutions that interpret and uphold the constitution and the laws of the land

Except in five cases, each country represented in the sample has a national judicial institution. Out of the five cases not listed, four can be explained by data gaps, while Tripoli, a state in transition, did not have a judicial authority at the national level at the time the mapping was carried out. Please see Table 25.

Table 25: *Judicial institutions at the national level*



In contrast to the data gaps about both executive and legislative bodies at the provincial level, much more could be found about judicial institutions at the provincial level. Please see Table 26.

Table 26: *Judicial institutions at the provincial level*



In a similar fashion, in 47 cases a judicial institution at the local level could be identified. With reservations, the observation could be made that whereas executive bodies and legislative bodies often seem to be missing on the provincial level, they are in many cases listed on all three vertical levels of power. However, with little horizontal separation of power, there might be a tendency that higher-level authorities also govern other actors at the urban level. Please see Table 27.

***Table 27**: Judicial institutions at the local level*



Question 4.05: List civil society actors that monitor the activities of the security institutions and of those that manage and oversee them, support the development of government policy relevant to the security sector, inform the public and conduct training activities, among others.

Table 28: *Civil society organizations at the local level*



Question 4.06: List non-statutory armed groups and formations: those who have the capacity to use force but do not have a state mandate to do so.

Although the evaluation of question 4.06 was also separated vertically, it should be mentioned that some of the non-statutory security actors often operate in more than only one urban area at the same time and are thus sometimes difficult to clearly allocate to either the national, provincial or local level. Please see Tables 29-31.

Table 29: *Non-statutory security providers at the national level*



Table 30: *Non-statutory security providers at the provincial level*



Table 31: *Non-statutory security providers at the local level*



Question 4.07: List independent oversight agencies – ombudspersons, human rights commissions, auditing boards, and so forth – which, while financed by the government are not part of its executive, judicial or legislative branches, and usually only report to parliament.

While a large majority of American and European cities have an independent oversight body, mostly an ombuds institution, this only applies to about half of the Asian and African cities included in the mapping. An ombuds institution usually holds responsibility on a national level and is only located in the capital or another large city for practical reasons. Therefore, independent oversight bodies cannot as such be considered to be a generically urban institution. Please see Table 32.

Table 32: *Independent oversight body*



Question 4.08: List external actors that exercise, or assist in exercising, one or more of the above functions in the city

The external actors mentioned most often included Interpol, Europol and NATO offices. These are usually located in capital cities. Similar to independent oversight agencies, the external actors identified here are not per se part of the generic urban security sector only because they are mostly located in capital or other important cities. Please see Table 33.

Table 33: *External actors*



Cross-cutting sections on the service each actor provides

From the cross-cutting questions only the composition of personnel in terms of gender was drawn into the quantitative evaluation sheet. Thus, for executive, legislative and judicial bodies of all the national, provincial and urban level, the ratio of women in each institution was calculated.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Findings

Despite rapidly increasing rates of urbanisation, existing research has largely overlooked the urban environment as a unique setting for SSG/R. Since the adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, there is a specific Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) to address "Sustainable Cities and Communities"[333]. In the framework of this SDG number 11 the UN's 193 Member States aspire to "[m]ake cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable". Therefore it appears to be more than timely to take urban issues of SSG/R into account. This study first examined the literature on SSG/R in the urban contexts. As has been highlighted earlier on in the text, considerable research gaps remain. With regards to geographical coverage, most research has been conducted in Brazil and Colombia, especially on the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Bogota, Cali and Medellin. More generally, the major contributions to the literature stem from cities located in Latin and Central America and Africa, while little has been done on cities located in Central Asia, East Asia and South Asia (except for Afghanistan).

The literature highlighted that urban communities do experience unique urban threats, thereby leading to unique requirements for response measures, and unique structures and processes that characterise the security sector in urban areas. The uncontrolled population growth of cities is seen as a root cause for unique urban threats. Some authors, such as Cardia, argue that there is a *direct* relationship between urbanisation and urban violence, whereas others, such as Commins, only allow for a *weak* relationship. Newer literature focuses on an urban threat environment and particular challenges that both directly and indirectly affect the urban security landscape. The precarious living conditions of many urban dwellers, including young people, have been identified as an urban-specific challenge. Murder, assault, rape, fighting between gangs, conflicts linked to drug trafficking and exposure to natural disasters are some of the threats individuals might face if they live in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro or Caracas. The poor living standards, a lack of opportunities and economic perspectives, as well as processes of segregation often lead to urban alienation, "ruthless Darwinian competition" and insecurity among inhabitants of these areas.

The Urban Tipping Point (UTP) project challenged the assumption that poverty is causally linked to violence. The project suggests that the link between poverty and violence is directly related to the extent to which the "non-poor perceive the poor as a problem".[334] Case studies for the city of Nairobi and Dili conducted by the UTP project found that instrumentalisation of youth groups by the urban elite was linked to urban violence. The project's findings also suggest that there is no causal correlation between the emergence of large youth groups and urban violence. Given that there is no "direct link between urban poverty, increased socio-economic inequality and rising violence"[335], explaining

[333] Cf. United Nations, United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/.
[334] Moser and Rodgers, *Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: Global Policy Report*, 11.
[335] Abrahamsen et al., 'Guest Editors' Introduction', 367-368.

contemporary urban violence requires considering a range of parameters, such as socio-economic features, the state's security expenditure, and the nature of the justice system.

Terrorism was found to be an urban security threat that is not limited to specific geographic regions. A city's economic, political and symbolic importance within the national context may make its population and significant locations vulnerable targets to terrorist attacks. Political unrest, issues regarding critical infrastructures, energy security and the consequences of climate change can be found in the literature on contemporary urban security challenges.[336] Other threats specific to urban contexts result from many cities' political role as seats of government, particularly capitals. As such, cities are where the competition for political power and resources is contested. It has been found that when specific urban security threats are disaggregated according to gender, women are more prone to be victimised in the private sphere, by attackers known to them whereas men are more vulnerable to violent attacks in the public sphere, by perpetrators unknown to them. While the former are generally more prone to suffer from non-fatal forms of violence, the latter are more likely to die violently.

As urban-specific challenges are of a diverse nature, so are the requirements for response measures. Nevertheless, one general observation seems to apply: the terrain of urban contexts presents specificities that are dramatically different from open country contexts. A city's complex architecture will have a direct impact on the number of personnel, police or troops needed for an urban operation. An urban offensive generally needs twice the number of personnel agreed upon for an attack in open country. Furthermore, research shows that urban security policy is most effective and sustainable when it combines both hard strategies (Mano dura) and soft strategies (Mano amiga). In some instances, military support has been needed in order for an urban security provider to assert its authority as a legitimate urban governance actor. One such example can be pulled from the experience of the Haitian National Police in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

Due to failures in urban governance and state responses, urban security sectors in Caribbean cities such as Port of Spain and Kingston are characterised by "violence entrepreneurs" who fill the vacuum of decaying state authority. In other cases, e.g. several cities in Liberia, the inability of state institutions to manage the use of force results from the low number of security providers. At times, informal security providers may be required to provide security in instances where the state does not. A range of informal actors and institutions play an important (dual) role in the management and provision of security in urban contexts. Their role must be taken into account in the design of response measures to unique urban threats. SSR programming should therefore recognize, map and engage with non-state urban security providers, given their constitutive part of the sector.[337]

In general, the distinction between SSG/R in national and urban contexts is best approached through concrete cases. In the case of Colombia, addressing urban security issues in the

[336] Cook, 'New Challenges in Urban Security'.
[337] Lawrence, 'Towards a Non-State Security Sector Reform Strategy', 1–39.

cities of Cali and Medellin entailed the devolution of power from the central government in Bogota. The government's 'National Strategy Against Violence' had a positive impact on the reform of the security sector at the urban level. However, with respect to the chain of command, police chiefs at the urban level have hardly any autonomy when it comes to the implementation of SSG/R. Research has shown that when national governments lack a clear vision of urban security and do not allow for sub-national officials' autonomy, informal actors fill the vacuum. It has been argued that the urban SSG/R context might be regarded as a microcosm or a mirror of national SSG/R contexts. Indeed, the distinction between national and urban security sectors is not always as clear-cut as it seems. Urban security requires holistic approaches that are inclusive of the police and the judiciary, as well as other relevant actors. The impact of new technologies and the conflict between citizens' privacy and the primacy of security are challenges that need to be addressed on both state and city levels.

The large-N mapping included 91 cities across four continents, sub-divided into sub-continents, across the Global North and the Global South. The mapping first analysed the context of the cities. It aimed to map threats in order to generate an understanding of how certain threats are particular urban in nature. It was found that drawing only on crime statistics was not a sufficiently holistic approach, and it therefore drew on data and reports published by human rights organizations, international organizations, environmental organizations and civil society actors. It intended to conduct a full threat analysis for each city. However after doing so for Sao Paulo, the research team realised that this could not be done within the scope of this study, and must instead be a stand-alone mapping exercise or be covered by in-depth qualitative case studies. Only limited information was gathered regarding threats in urban environments; and ultimately only threats in 52 cities out of the 91 cities in the large-N mapping were mapped. Across these cities, it was found that violent crimes against individuals and property crimes were most widely reported across the globe. The study then focused on mapping the urban security sectors, in particular their structure, role, environment and performance. It placed particular emphasis on security institutions, such as security providers, which may address urban threats. The mapping successfully gathered data on most questions, however some gaps remain. Indeed, it was found that the effectiveness of the security provision of the security institutions was difficult to address in such a limited mapping exercise.

The mapping showed that 81 out of the 91 cities had an army at the national level. Data was unavailable for nine cities, and in one instance (Tripoli, Libya) no national army was in place at the time of the mapping due to an occurring political transition. Almost every country globally has a security institution, in most cases a national army, at the national level. In some cases, this is reinforced by a military or federal police. The mapping highlighted that 54 cities have statutory security institutions, in most cases municipal police departments. In contrast, only 13 cities had Special Forces in place at the local level. This number is low, and does not lend itself to generating regional patterns. In almost all cities, the mapping found information on the national executive authority.

The large-N mapping further determined the presence of a legislative authority at the national level in all except five cases. However, only limited data was available on legislative authorities at the provincial level. National judicial institutions were found in each country, except for five cases. Four of these are attributable to a data gap, while Libya did not have a judicial authority in place at the national level due to the political transition it was undergoing at the time. The mapping highlighted 47 judicial institutions at the local level. In addition, the vast majority of cities in Europe and the US were found to have independent oversight bodies, such as ombuds institutions. In contrast, only half of the cities in Africa and Asia examined in this mapping had independent oversight institutions in place.

Recent scholarship shows that peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction schemes put in motion at national levels have to take into account the potential externalities for cities and urban dwellers. On the other hand, political processes that take place at the city-level may lead to broader political coalitions and public debates at the national level. Furthermore, recent research suggests that processes of state-making may emerge from within the city (particularly in post-conflict settings) and then spread to the wider national territory. The city is therefore seen as a "[k]ey site of 'internal integration' central to the fortunes of state formation under conditions of globalisation and crisis."[338] For urban areas like Kinshasa in the DRC, which is said to mirror the country's many paradoxes, considerations should be made as to how national and city level processes intersect and how experiences relating to the security sector and reconstruction processes can inform future policymaking.

6.2 Suggestions for future research

The information collected in this mapping exercise has thus far only been assessed for each question or variable, but not across variables. Moreover, the comments presented above are mostly of a technical and procedural nature, thus focusing primarily on the methodology of this mapping study, and not necessarily on the knowledge that can be drawn from cross-comparisons of different variables. This therefore presents an opportunity for future research, which can draw on the extensive amounts of information and data gathered and presented in the template. This further highlights which information was relatively easy to obtain through a desk-study, and which information will likely have to be generated through on-the-ground research.

The current mapping approach is useful in order to collect basic information and linking the information to sources that can be consulted if more in-depth knowledge is required. In order to code and analyse the collected information in search of regional or cross-regional patterns, the sample needs to be larger and the data entries need to be reliable and relevant for large-N analyses. The larger the sample, the more relevant small nuances might be when, for instance, comparing cities of a certain size in a particular country or subregion; or when comparing capital cities with non-capital cities; or when comparing urban security sectors in

[338] Moxham, 'State-Making and the Post-Conflict City: Integration in Dili, Disintegration in Timor-Leste'.

post-conflict countries with cities in countries with ongoing internal armed violence, or with cities in countries characterised by consolidated democracies. For each and every city in-depth analyses are warranted as to the degree to which security institutions respond to prevailing threat situations. While the study did well in mapping security institutions and which services they provide, gaps remain in regards to which security institution is specific to which type of threat, how effective they are, and what the relevant indicators are. Further gaps are evident with regard to mapping whether these institutions had engaged in any illegal activities or committed human rights violations. Insights into responses to past mitigation efforts were further limited, as was information on past SSR activities in the countries.

It became evident that the effort invested in collecting a small amount of information for a large number of variables uncovers a relatively modest amount of information, certainly not at the level of detail that could be generated by an in-depth qualitative case study. Only if the sample is greatly enlarged to include much larger numbers of cities for each country and sub-region, will subtle differences – possibly coded to ease analysis – point to significant differences in the characteristics of urban security sectors, their structures, roles and abilities to respond to context-specific threat environments. While such mapping exercises manage to collect large amounts of information, in this current form they do not contribute significant knowledge to our understanding of urban security sectors. They do not provide a suitable way to test the research questions initially formulated. However, they do help in fine-tuning the variables that are hypothesised to help in explaining urban security sectors. The questions already included in the study – and those deemed too complex for inclusion in the current mapping study – point to the potentially much larger amount of variables that would need to be taken into consideration when researching a case in detail. At the same time, most questions across the mapping that were only designed for the mapping study could be answered more easily. Therefore, the small-N case studies that were initially designed to be included in this study, could in future supplement the more general information found through the large-N mapping and yield more detailed insights into urban security sectors.

In addition, more advanced and sophisticated means of data collection and analysis would need to be applied. The matrix approach allows for systematic data collection, but for such a large amount of data as ended up being collected for this project, this approach is inadequate. An Excel workbook is not the most useful programme for carrying out a text-intensive study. For a future project on a larger scale a more suitable database could be created in order to structure and evaluate such a large amount of data. In the evaluation of the mapping, the data was coded so that simple simulations could be run with pivot tables. While interesting and showing some of the potential of this matrix approach, it only yields limited results. A similar exercise might be carried out with a database that provides tools that allow for generating scenarios that can also be put into expressive graphs.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Alternative Threat Analysis

In the mapping exercise of this study, any threats that occur in a city were listed. In order to provide some context of each threat evaluated, the source/perpetrator was incorporated in the evaluation whenever possible.

Without a standard set of threat categories, there were many unclear terms and overlaps between different threats, such as theft, robbery or property-related crime. Some of the threats were formulated in a positive way (e.g. road safety) and others in a negative way (e.g. homicide). Additionally, different levels of specification were applied in describing threats. In some cases, a threat was called 'burglary' or 'aggravated robbery', whereas in other cases the same threat was simply labelled as a 'crime' (e.g. Cape Town). In some cases, the problem of differing definitions was a result of diverse uses of terms in police or government statistics. Whereas one police record would differentiate between sexual harassment and rape, another would subsume both into one term. Most often, only sexual assault against women was listed as a gender-based crime, whereas gender-based violence against girls, boys and men did not appear in the mapping. Examples of a closer examination are rare, especially as to whether perpetrators of gender-based violence are not in every case simply "men", but that a pattern of structural violence is at play (which would involve additional or entirely different actors). Although this makes working with a specific yet holistic approach to threat wording difficult, it creates awareness of different classification schemes in raising crime statistics in different cities around the world.

An alternative approach to structuring the threat analysis, the 'International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes' (ICCS) by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)' could prove helpful. Although there might be other options of classifying threats in a city, the ICCS offers an alternative template for a threat evaluation. The document is "a classification of criminal offences which is based on internationally agreed concepts, definitions and principles in order to enhance the consistency and international comparability of crime statistics, and improve analytical capabilities at both the national and international levels" (Bisogno, Dawson-Faber and Jandl, 2015, p. 7).

The ICCS provides an exhaustive framework for crime statistics, but not a holistic approach that encompasses the entire spectrum of threats that occur in urban spaces. Thus, the ICCS cannot be considered a stand-alone approach to evaluate the large-N mapping carried out for this project. The premise of using the full potential of the ICCS would be to gain access to local, provincial and national level crime statistics in each case, which is not the purpose of the large-N mapping.

Again, the main research question of the large-N mapping study regarding threats aims at understanding how certain threats are particularly urban in nature. Thus, the approach of an almost entirely random collection of data, although at the expense of comparability of data, potentially leads to new insights and important aspects of a holistic threat analysis that goes beyond the mere content of crime statistics. Collecting not only data from crime statistics, but also from international organizations such as human rights organizations and

environmental organizations, or studies carried out by local civil society organizations, allows for a potentially more holistic picture than that provided by the ICCS. This nonetheless serves as an example of how crime classification could be approached. For a future research project, statisticians should be consulted in order to identify codable variables and evaluation methods that are tailor-made for such an endeavour.

In order to measure changes in crime levels, monitor state responses to crime, evaluate policies in different contexts, and ultimately compare crime statistics over time and across countries, reliable crime statistics would be required. Changes in legislation, differences in legal provisions, and the fact that certain acts pose a criminal offence in some countries but not in others, further hamper comparability. Given these obstacles, the ICCS is based on behavioural descriptions instead of legal codes drawn from criminal laws (Bisogno et al., pp. 7-9).

After establishing a total of 11 categories, which are also called level 1 categories or sections, the ICCS then aggregates further categories at levels 2 (divisions), 3 (groups) and 4 (classes), depending on the degree of more detailed description (Bisogno et al., pp. 13-14). Allocating all threat-related data collected in the large-N study into level 2, 3 and 4 categories is beyond the feasibility of this brief discussion.

As the large-N mapping study would – apart from crimes committed by humans – also include other threats such as environmental hazards or accidents, the ICCS categories (1.-11.) would need to be complemented by two further categories (12.-13.), as shown in Table 34 as follows:

Table 34*: ICCS categories, plus additional categories for the purpose of this mapping exercise*

Categories of the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS)
1. **Acts leading to death or intending to cause death**
2. **Acts leading to harm or intending to cause harm to the person**
3. **Injurious acts of a sexual nature**
4. **Acts against property involving violence or threat against a person**
5. **Acts against property only**
6. **Acts involving controlled psychoactive substances or other drugs**
7. **Acts involving fraud, deception or corruption**
8. **Acts against public order, authority and provisions of the State**
9. **Acts against public safety and state security**
10. **Acts against the natural environment**
11. **Other criminal acts not elsewhere classified**
Categories added for evaluating section 4 of the mapping study
12. **Threat to road safety**
13. **Environmental hazards**

With this categorisation, it was possible to include all threats from the mapping in the evaluation. The ICCS is based on behavioural observations. However, there are also other

characteristics that should be captured in order to be able to "identify policy-relevant patterns and trends in crime and to conduct comprehensive and detailed analyses". While the ICCS only functions as one example of how a threat analysis could be structured, it helps to highlight the multidimensional nature of criminal incidents, which is also relevant for the underlying research questions of this mapping, especially with regard to tackling threats in a possibly unique urban context. As an example, data can become more valuable by adding disaggregating information such as characteristics of the victims and perpetrators, the type of weapon used to commit the crime or the motive for a certain criminal act. With such disaggregating variables, coding of additional information about a criminal incident can be provided in order to gain preferably complete a picture as possible. (Bisogno et al., p. 15)

***Table 35**:* ICCS list of disaggregating variables (Bisogno et al., p. 21)

EVENT DISAGGREGATIONS	VICTIM DISAGGREGATIONS	PERPETRATOR DISAGGREGATIONS	DATA DESCRIPTIONS/INCLUSIONS
At – Attempted/Completed	**SV** – Sex of victim	**SP** – Sex of perpetrator	**Th** – Threats included
We – Type of weapon used	**AV** – Age of victim	**AP** – Age of perpetrator	**AA** – Aiding/abetting included
SiC – Situational context	**STV** – Age status victim (minor/adult)	**STP** – Age status of perpetrator (minor/adult)	**Ac** – Accessory/accomplice included
Geo – Geographic location	**ViP** – Victim-perpetrator relationship	**ViP** – Victim-perpetrator relationship	**SP** – Conspiracy/planning/preparation included
DaT – Date and time	**Cit** – Citizenship	**Cit** – Citizenship	**In** – Incitement to commit crime included
Lo – Type of location	**LS** – Legal status of victim (natural/legal person)	**LS** – Legal status of perpetrator (natural/legal person)	
Mot – Motive	**Int** – Intoxication status of victim	**Int** – Intoxication status of perpetrator	
Cy – Cybercrime related	**ES** – Economic sector of business victim	**EASt** – Economic activity status of perpetrator	
Rep – Reported by		**Rec** – Recidivist status of perpetrator	

It should be noted that not all disaggregating variables are relevant in every criminal case. The boxes highlighted in green were included in our mapping study in at least some cases. As can be seen, there is much potential to enrich the data collection through adding specific disaggregating variables.

Not only does the amount of threat-related data vary strongly across the sample, so does the level of detail. Many categories of crime were allocated by motive (gender-based violence, hate crime etc.). However, as the table above shows, motive is only one component of a crime. Thus, it would be important to set up a certain hierarchy as to which classification of threats should be made. Given the mix of sources used for the mapping, it

might be interesting to go into detail as to which approach is used by which actor or data source.

To use ICCS terms, the mapping includes an almost completely random selection of data that represents both a mix of level 1 to level 4 data, and of sections and disaggregated variables. For example, many categories of crime were allocated by motive (gender-based violence, hate crime etc.), whereas others were allocated by victim-perpetrator relationships (domestic violence). Fitting all criminal acts included in the mapping into the ICCS structure would mean that, for example, gender-based violence will be divided into several threat sections: Whereas several forms of domestic violence would be allocated to section 2 (acts leading to harm or intending to cause harm to the person), sexual harassment or rape would be allocated to section 3 (injurious acts of a sexual nature). However, if the crime leads to death of the victim, it is also a section 1 crime (acts leading to death or intending to cause death). Nevertheless, this approach seems to make sense because motive is a highly complex subject matter, whereas the observable component of a criminal act can be more easily captured in crime statistics. For example, domestic violence is not necessarily gender-based. In addition to that, in many cases, acts of violence cannot easily be subsumed into a certain category for its underlying root causes. Another problem is that due to differences between legal systems, some sources tend to list certain acts as crimes, which are not considered offences under domestic law. For example, under Indian Law, marital rape is not considered a crime, while domestic civil society organizations and international organizations identify it as a threat to many women in Indian society.

To sum up the introductory remarks to the threat evaluation, it should be noted that the ICCS cannot be considered a stand-alone approach to threat analysis in cities, mainly because it only includes incidents that are not in line with domestic law, and there is no dimension that particularly focuses on urban environments. Also, a holistic threat analysis encompasses threats such as environmental hazards and threats to road safety not classified in criminal law. Classification schemes such as the ICCS nevertheless help reveal strengths and weaknesses in the research design of the large-N mapping study, which is valuable for any future research agenda. Testing the research methods against existing classifications could enhance the learning experience of a study and help further develop the research design.

Alternative threat analysis applied to project's large-N sample

The large-N mapping cannot do justice to a thorough threat analysis. A detailed analysis of threats and their root causes would be more appropriately carried out in the context of small-N case studies.

Out of the 91 cities mapped overall, threats in 52 cities were mapped. Especially towards the end of the mapping phase, the threat analysis of many cities was skipped because of time restrictions. This poses some difficulties to the evaluation, given that for some subcontinents, there are only few cases. Thus, the following preliminary results shall be

treated with even more caution than the results drawn from the sample of 91 cities. Table 36 gives an overview, which threats were most frequently listed.

Table 36: *Frequency of threat*



As can be seen, violent crime against individuals (sections 1-3) and property crime (sections 4-5) are most frequently listed in publicly accessible crime reports and statistics all over the world. Neither acts involving fraud, deception or corruption (section 7) nor acts against the natural environment (section 10) appear in the mapping. In the context of the human security approach of this study, this seems plausible given that neither section 7 nor section 10 threats inherently pose a threat to human life.

In addition to the threat sections, the disaggregating variables on which the mapping provides most information consider the source or perpetrator of certain threats. Just to give an example, the ICCS suggests the following disaggregating variables about perpetrators, as shown in Table 37.

Table 37: *Perpetrator disaggregation*

PERPETRATOR DISAGGREGATION				
Sp – Sex of perpetrator	STP – Age status of perpetrator	Cit – Citizenship	LS – Legal status of perpetrator	Rec – Repeat offender/recidivist
1. Male 2. Female 3. Not applicable 3. Not known	1. Minor 2. Adult 3. Not applicable 4. Not known	1. National citizen 2. Foreign citizen 3. Not applicable 4. Not known	1. Natural person 1a. Private individual 1b. Public official 2. Legal entity 2a. Private entity 2b. Public entity 3. Other entity 4. Not known	1. Recidivist 2. Non-recidivist 3. Non applicable 4. Not known
SP – Age of perpetrator	ViP – Victim-perpetrator relationship		Int – Perpetrator was intoxicated with controlled drugs or	EAST – Economic activity status of perpetrator

			other psychoactive substances	
1. 0-14 2. 15-29 3. 30-44 4. 45-59 5. 60+ 6. Not known	1. Current intimate partner/spouse 2. Former intimate partner/spouse 3. Blood relative 4. Other household member 5. Friend 6. Acquaintance 7. Colleague/work relationship 8. Authority/care relationship (doctor, nurse, police, etc.) 9. Other offender known to victim 10. Offender unknown to victim 11. Relationship not known		1. Alcohol 2. Illicit drugs 3. Both 4. Other 5. Not applicable 6. Not known	1. Dependent employment 2. Self-employment (with no dependent employees) 3. Employer (with dependent employees) 4. Unemployed 5. Student/apprentice 6. Housekeeper 7. Retired/disabled 8. Not known

This gives an idea about the level of detail possible in order to gain full comprehension of certain criminal acts. However, the mapping study often provides simplified information on perpetrators rather than detailed perpetrator profiles. As a consequence, a simpler distinction of perpetrator groups will be suggested for the evaluation. One possibility would be to summarise the results of the mapping into five groups, as the table below shows:

Table 38: *Perpetrator groups*

Group	**Source / perpetrator**	**Examples**
A	Public authorities	Police officers, prison guards
B	Individuals	Acquaintances, family, strangers
C	Armed groups / organizations	Rebel groups, gangs
D	Environmental source	Air pollution, flooding
E	Groups of individuals	United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship

In order to be able to see possible patterns in the large amount of data collected, if there are any, specific threats should be examined separately. In the following, threats shall be analysed by threat section. The following 13 graphs will show the amount of cities per subcontinent where the respective threat occurs in blue font in relation to the amount of cities mapped (as shown above, the sample here is 52) in red font. The cities were summarised into the subcontinents presented in section 5.2.1 of this report. Further details about the data can be found in the excel workbook that accompanies this report.

Section 01: Acts leading to death or intending to cause death

Within the sample of 52 cities, acts leading to death or intending to cause death were listed in 25 cases. Whereas this threat section 1 is present in roughly half of the cities on the African continent and two thirds of the cities on the American continent, its distribution among the European continent counts for only one third. Table 39 shows that section 1 threats do not seem to be an issue on the subcontinents of Central Asia, Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia, or were not identified in the mapping.

Table 39: *Section 1: Acts leading to death or intending to cause death*



In most cases, the section 1 threat is called ‘homicide’ – the terms ‘murder’ and ‘deaths in custody’ were only used once. There is one case with ‘cannibalism’ as section 1 threat. Homicide with a gender-based motive seems to be an issue especially in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan with a mention two cases of so-called “honour killings” of women (Kabul, Karachi), one case of dowry deaths (Delhi), as well as two cases of female feticide (Mumbai, Patna), were added to this section.

Considering the perpetrators, only little can be drawn from the mapping, given that for only 14 of the 25 cities some information could be found about a possible perpetrator. In 3 cases, the perpetrators belong to public authorities (prison and police officers), in 9 cases they are listed to be individuals (mostly people living in the same household as the victim) and in 5 cases members of armed groups (mostly militia, rebel groups and gangs). Given the small sample and the distribution among different geographical regions, no regional patterns can be found here. Here, one important lesson is already emerging: The identification of perpetrators tends to be oversimplified in the study. Good examples are the crime categories attributed to gender-based violence. In the mapping, it is often stated that in

cases such as honour killings, dowry deaths or female feticide (see above), the perpetrators are male individuals. However, in reality, these crimes are often an expression of structural violence that is performed and passed on by an entire social system and, thus, far more complex than shown in the study.

Section 2: Acts leading to harm or intending to cause harm to the person

In 38 out of 52 mapped cities, threat section 2 is stated to be an issue according to the information collected (see Table 40 below). Terrorist acts are not mentioned here; they were allocated to section 9, which deals with acts against public safety and state security.

Table 40: *Section 2: Acts leading to harm or intending to cause harm to the person*



Given that section 2 crimes were found to be a threat in the majority of the cities mapped, no clear geographical pattern can be observed at first sight. Taking a closer look at the different regions allows for some interesting observations as it concerns the role of the security sector.

Some examples of crimes listed on the African continent would be the following:

- Central Africa: police misconduct against street vendors (Luanda)
- Northern Africa: arbitrary detention by police and prison officers (Tripoli)
- Southern Africa: gang violence, hate crime and hijacking (Cape Town)
- Western Africa: forced evictions of the urban poor by the government (Accra) and violent attacks and insurgencies by several armed groups; abduction and kidnapping (Dakar)

On the American Continent, the threats are mainly the following:

- Northern America: violent crime (Toronto); felony (New York), violent crime (Montreal), aggravated battery (Chicago) and aggravated assault (Los Angeles)
- Central America: gang violence and kidnapping by gangs such as Tepito Cartel and La Union, and rival drug cartels (Mexico City)
- South America: kidnapping, threats by phone by gang members in prison (São Paulo); human rights abuses (beatings) by the police (Buenos Aires); informal settlements / street crime / political violence, social cleansing by paramilitaries and police against sexual minorities, drug addicts, homeless people (Bogotá); social cleansing by paramilitaries and police against sexual minorities, drug addicts, homeless people (Santiago de Calí), gang violence by Oficina de Envigado, Escobar's descendent cartel (Medellín); gang violence (Rio de Janeiro)

From the Asian Continent, examples would be:

- Central Asia: detention by prison wardens and police officers (Almaty)
- Eastern Asia: violent crime (Tokyo), xenophobic attacks (Ulaan Baatar)
- South-Eastern Asia: some domestic crime (Singapore)
- Southern Asia: violence against women by men (Calcutta); political violence (Delhi); child and forced marriage, exchange of women to settle disputes, forced isolation of women by men (Kabul)
- Western Asia: arbitrary detention (Baghdad); gunfights by gunmen, pro-Damascus gunmen and their rivals, rival Sunni gunmen, kidnapping for ransom (Beirut); police ill-treatment of citizens, domestic violence, domestic violence against girls and women by men (Istanbul)

Examples from Europe would be:

- Northern Europe: racist, hate and religious crime (London); hate crime by racists and homophobic people (Stockholm); attempts/threats to murder, assaults, harassments and related offences, dangerous or negligent acts, kidnapping (tiger kidnapping) and related offences, hijacking, extortion (Dublin)
- Southern Europe: hate crime by people opposing LGBT rights; in the case of foreigners often by prison officers and Carabinieri; extortion (Rome)
- Western Europe: aggravated assault (Vienna)
- Eastern Europe: hate crime by racists, fascists, neo-Nazis and homophobes (Moscow); hate crime against migrant workers and other foreigners by xenophobes (St.Petersburg)

Table 41 shows the distribution of perpetrator groups across the sample. Interestingly, section 2 crimes conducted by public officials such as police officers and prison guards are most often an issue in African and South American cities, whereas on the American, Asian and European continent, there is a tendency that private persons are the main group of perpetrators. Armed groups or organizations are most often seen responsible for acts

causing harm to a person in South America, Southern Asia and in parts in Southern and Western Africa.

Table 41: *Distribution of perpetrator groups across the sample*



Section 3: Injurious acts of a sexual nature

The distribution of cases of injurious acts of a sexual nature that appear in the mapping is shown in Table 42. In 18 out of the 52 cities, injurious acts of a sexual nature were listed as a threat, which encompasses about half of the African, North American, European, as well as Southern and Western Asian cities. Interestingly, sexual violence was only listed in one South American city, which is Santiago de Chile. The description of criminal acts listed here includes mostly sexual harassment, sexual assault and rape. The only two cases in which injurious acts of a sexual nature were not allocated to male private individuals are Kinshasa (rape by men, especially national army and other armed groups) and Dakar (rape of girls and women by Mai Mai Morgan rebels). Most often, the victims were also here considered to be mainly women.

Table 42: *Section 3: Injurious acts of a sexual nature*



Section 4:

The 17 cases found in section 4 include mainly armed robberies that are committed in most cases by individuals considered to be "robbers". Only in São Paulo, the robberies are often considered to be committed by First Command of the Capital, which is considered to be Brazil's largest criminal organization. No other notable peculiarities were found in this section. Given that it is generally not considered to be life-threatening, this section will not be evaluated in more detail. Please see Table 43.

Table 43: *Section 4: Acts against property involving violence or threat against a person*



No clear regional pattern is evident here as acts against property involving violence or threat against a person seem to occur in most regions of the sample, apart from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Asia.

Section 5: Acts against property only

After section 2 crimes, acts against property only reach the second most mentions, which is 31 in total. Exactly as with section 4 crimes, the perpetrators of property crime are considered individuals acting as private persons with the exception of São Paulo where First Command of the Capital is considered to be responsible for many incidents of property crime. The wording used for the criminal act itself, is mostly petty crime, theft, burglary and pick-pocketing. Please see Table 44.

Table 44: *Section 5: Acts against property only*



Even more evidently than in section 4, no clear regional patterns can be found here. However, acts against property only seem to be a phenomenon that occurs in cities around the globe equally.

Section 6: Acts involving controlled psychoactive substances or other drugs
Here, only 5 cases could be identified in the mapping. The crimes mentioned are mostly drug related crimes by gangs, drug cartels or drug-dealing individuals. In São Paulo, Accra and Mexico City, the perpetrators are considered to be part of criminal groups, whereas in Baku and Zurich drug-dealing seems to be carried out predominantly by persons acting alone. Please see Table 45.

Table 45: *Section 6: Acts involving controlled psychoactive substances or other drugs*



Section 8: Acts against public order, authority and provisions of the State

The cases mentioned were mainly civil unrest by protesters as well as turmoil and violent attacks by organised crime or regel groups. The perpetrators mentioned therefore range from public officials (civil unrest by low/mid class students put down by military police in São Paulo), the "population" (civil unrest by the population including the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship UDD against the government in Bangkok), individuals acting as demonstrators (Cairo, Paris), turmoil by rebel groups, militia and Islamist groups and within the parliament in Tripoli, to violent attacks and insurgencies different armed groups in Dakar. Please see Table 46.

Table 46: *Section 8: Acts against public order, authority and provisions of the State*



In addition to the wide range of different actors involved here, there are only 8 cases across the sample, which is insufficient to extract a pattern as to where section 8 threats most prominently occur. Further, the involvement of a rather high amount of different actors in each case adds complexity.

Section 9:

Here, mostly local, regional and international terrorism of different forms and with different motivational backgrounds are mentioned. In every case mentioned in the mapping, the perpetrators are considered to belong to section C, which is criminal / armed groups. For details, please see the Large-N Study Excel Workbook. Please see Table 47.

Table 47: *Section 9: Acts against public safety and state security*



Section 11: Other (criminal) acts not elsewhere classified

This category only consists of four cases, which are prosecution of human rights defenders and journalists by Angola's attorney-general (Luanda), threats against human rights defenders by armed groups and the national army (Kinshasa), torture by prison wardens (Baghdad) as well as both by prison wardens and police officers (Almaty). All perpetrators listed are members of public authorities. Please see Table 48.

Table 48: *Section 11: Other (criminal) acts not elsewhere classified*



The lack of more cases and also the nature of section 11 as containing the rest of crimes render it not very useful to evaluate this section.

Section 12: Threat to road safety

Threats to road safety are evenly distributed across the sample and are mentioned in about 20 percent of the cities evaluated in this chapter. Without further details, it is, however, difficult to estimate how serious the threat in the concerned cities is. Please see Table 49.

Table 49: *Section 12: Threat to road safety*



No regional pattern whatsoever can be identified here.

Section 13: Environmental hazard

This section contains both threats caused by humans and environmental threats that cannot be influenced by humans. A recurring example of manmade threats would be air pollution by smog. This threat is mainly of concern in megacities such as Mexico City, Mumbai or Shanghai. Also, some environmental hazards might indirectly be caused by humans, for example through emissions that aggravate climate change. Environmental hazards are mentioned rather sporadically in the mapping. Examples form the mapping would be floods, mudslides, earthquakes, storms, heat waves and draughts. Please see Table 50.

Table 50: *Section 13: Environmental hazard*



Threats: Source / Perpetrator table

Threat section	Cases	Source / perpetrator				
		A	B	C	D	E
1. Acts leading to death or intending to cause death	13/25	2	9	5	-	-
2. Acts leading to harm or intending to cause harm to the person	34/38	10	26	14	-	-
3. Injurious acts of a sexual nature	15/18	1	13	2	-	-
4. Acts against property involving violence or threat against a person	14/17	-	31	1	-	-
5. Acts against property only	28/31	-	27	1	-	-
6. Acts involving controlled psychoactive substances or other drugs	5/5	-	6	3	-	-
7. Acts involving fraud, deception or corruption	-	-	-	-	-	-
8. Acts against public order, authority and provisions of the State	7/8	2	3	2	-	1
9. Acts against public safety and state security	12/13	-	-	12	-	-
10. Acts against the natural environment	-	-	-	-	-	-
11. Other criminal acts not elsewhere classified	4/4	4	-	1	-	-
12. Threat to road safety	9/10	-	9	-	-	-
13. Environmental hazards	12/12	-	3	2	10	-
	153/181	19	127	43	10	1

A = Public authorities
B = Individuals
C = Armed groups / organizations
D = Environmental source
E = Groups of individuals

Threats highlighted in yellow font: were re-allocated from section 3 to section 2.
Threats highlighted in blue font: might belong to other threat category, but would need closer examination.

Section 01: Acts leading to death or intending to cause death

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	São Paulo	-	
2	Cape Town	B	Acquaintances, friends, family
3	Santiago de Calí	-	-
4	Delhi	B	Dowry deaths by men
5	Rio de Janeiro	A, B, C	Violent militia, corrupt police officers, interpersonal violence, domestic violence
6	New York	-	-
7	Kinshasa	B, C	Civilians, members of rebel groups
8	Moscow	-	-
9	Baghdad	-	-
10	Kabul	-	-
		B	“Honour killings”; killings of women by family members
11	Santiago de Chile	-	-
12	Mexico City	-	(Mass graves are an issue)
13	Karachi	B	“Honour killings” of women and girls by men
14	Vienna	-	Low homicide rate
15	Montreal	-	
16	Rome	-	Wilful homicide; attempted murder; bodily harm with fatal consequences
17	Tripoli	A	Prison officers, police officers
18	Chicago	C	Gang members
19	Los Angeles	C	Historically: gang members
20	Johannesburg	-	-
21	Mumbai	B	Often individuals living in the same household
22		B	Female feticide
	Patna	-	-
23		B	Female feticide
24	Dublin	-	-
25	Dakar	C	Cannibalism and other killings by Mai Mai Morgan rebels

Section 2: Acts leading to harm or intending to cause harm to the person

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	São Paulo	C	Kidnapping; threats by phone by gang members in prisons
		B	Violence against women, mostly committed by partners
2	Buenos Aires	A	Human rights abuses by the police
3	Cape Town	C	Gang violence, hate crime; hijacking
4	Bogotá	A, B, C	Informal settlements / street crime / political violence; Social cleansing by paramilitaries and police against sexual minorities, drug addicts, homeless people
5	Santiago de Calí	A, C	Social cleansing by paramilitaries and police against sexual minorities, drug addicts, homeless people
6	Medellín	C	Gang violence by Oficina de Envigado, Escobar's descendent cartel
7	Accra	A	Forced evictions of the urban poor by the government (AMA)
8	Calcutta	C	Political violence
		B	Violence against women by men
9	Delhi	C	Political violence
		B	Kidnapping, abduction and molestation of women by men
10	London	B	Racist, hate and religious crime
11	Toronto	B	-
12	Tokyo	B	-
13	Rio de Janeiro	C	Gang violence
14	Luanda	A	Police misconduct towards street vendors
15	New York	B	Felony
16	Moscow	B	Hate crime by racists, fascists, neo-Nazis and homophobes
17	Singapore	B	Some domestic violence
18	Baghdad	A	Arbitrary detention
19	Almaty	A	Arbitrary detention by prison wardens and police officers
20	Beirut	B, C	Gunfights by gunmen, pro-Damascus gunmen and their rivals; rival Sunni gunmen; kidnapping for ransom
		B, C	Human trafficking of women and children by slave traders, night club operators and private households
21	Stockholm	B	Hate crime by racists and homophobic people
22	Kabul	B	Child and forced marriage; exchange of women to settle disputes; forced isolation of women by men
23	Mexico City	-	Gang violence and kidnappings by gangs such as Tepito Cartel and La Union, and rival drug cartels
24	Karachi	B, C	Persecution of religious minorities by militant Islamist groups and Sunni citizens
		B	Domestic violence against women by men; forced marriage by men
25	Istanbul	A	Police ill-treatment of citizens, especially protesters;
		B	Domestic violence, especially beatings "by men"
		B	Domestic violence against girls and women by men
26	Ulaan Baatar	B	Xenophobic attacks by nationalists, protesters against international mining consortia

27	Vienna	B	Aggravated assault
28	Montreal	-	Attempted murders; assaults; criminal harassment; threats; kidnapping; extortion
29	Lisbon	-	-
30	Rome	A, B	Hate crime by people opposing LGBT rights; in the case of foreigners: often prison officers and Carabinieri; extortion
31	Tripoli	A	Arbitrary detention by police and prison officers
32	Chicago	B, C	Gang violence by gang members (of rival gangs), aggravated battery by gang members, intimate partners of the victims, especially in cases of domestic violence
33	Los Angeles	-	Aggravated assault; gang violence by gang members (most often rivalling gangs)
34	Mumbai	B	Beatings of women by husbands; bride buying; kidnapping and abduction of women
35	Patna	C	Gang violence and kidnappings
		B	Beatings of women by husbands; bride buying; kidnapping and abduction of women
36	Dublin	B	Attempts / threats to murder, assaults, harassments and related offences; dangerous or negligent acts; kidnapping (tiger kidnapping) and related offences; hijacking; extortion
37	St. Petersburg	B	Hate crime against migrant workers and other foreigners by xenophobes
38	Dakar	C	Violent attacks and insurgencies by several armed groups (for details see mapping); abduction and kidnapping

Section 3: Injurious acts of a sexual nature

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	Delhi	B	Rape and molestation of women by men
2	London	-	Rape
3	Cairo	B	Sexual harassment by men
4	New York	B	Sexual harassment by men
5	Kinshasa	A, C	Rape by men, especially national army and other armed groups
6	Zurich	B	Sexual assaults by men
7	Baghdad	B	Sexual assaults by men
8	Stockholm	B	Rape by men
9	Santiago de Chile	B	Rape
10	Vienna	B	Assault and offences against sexual integrity and self-determination whereas in 60% of the cases, there is a relationship between the perpetrator and the victim
11	Montreal	-	Sexual assault
12	Rome	B	Sexual violence by men, but occasionally also women
13	Los Angeles	B	Rape by men
14	Johannesburg	B	Sexual offences by men
15	Mumbai	B	Rape; sexual assault; sex trafficking
16	Patna	B	Rape; sexual assault; sex trafficking
17	Dublin	-	Sexual offences against mostly women
18	Dakar	C	Rape of girls and women by Mai Mai Morgan rebels

Notes: wording and focus strongly dependent on source; here the biggest challenge is the ICCS classification of crime. Where does gender-based violence in general belong?
Group of perpetrators as "men": problem that further specification would be needed as to whether or not those men function as members of armed groups or government officials etc.

Section 4: Acts against property involving violence or threat against a person

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	São Paulo	C	Robbery by PCC (First Command of the Capital) or other smaller gangs
2	Buenos Aires	B	Petty criminals, street criminals (robbers, thieves)
3	Cape Town	B	Aggravated robbery by criminals
4	Accra	B	Street crime by robbers
5	London	B	Robberies by criminals
6	Luanda	B	Armed robberies by armed robbers on motorcycles
7	Madrid	B	Robberies by robbers
8	Zurich	B	Robberies by robbers
9	Istanbul	B	Violent crime by burglars
10	Montreal	B	Aggravated theft
11	Rome	-	Robbery
12	Tripoli	B	Armed robbery; carjacking by robbers
13	Chicago	B	Robberies by robbers
14	Johannesburg	-	Home invasion robbery, often accompanied by armed robbery and/or carjacking; robbery (aggravated robbery, common robbery, cash-in-transit robbery)
15	Mumbai	B	Robbery
16	Patna	B	Petty criminals
17	Dublin	-	Robbery; hijacking

Section 5: Acts against property only

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	São Paulo	C	Common theft by PCC (First Command of the Capital) or other smaller groups
2	Buenos Aires	B	Common theft by petty criminals (thieves)
3	Cape Town	B	Burglary by burglars
4	Accra	B	Street crime by burglars
5	Calcutta	B	Theft of personal property by street criminals, thieves
6	Delhi	B	Petty crime, theft of (US) passports by street criminals, thieves
7	Baku	B	Petty crime (rated very low) by petty criminals
8	London	B	Residential burglary by criminals
9	Berlin	B	(Low-medium crime rate, most of them being) thefts by criminals
10	Toronto	B	Property crime
11	Cairo	B	Petty crime by criminals
12	Tokyo	B	Petty crime, thefts by criminals
13	Rio de Janeiro	-	Petty crime
14	Luanda	B	Crimes of opportunity
15	Paris	B	Pick-pocketing, residential break-ins, bicycle theft by criminals
16	Seoul	B	Pick-pocketing and petty theft by petty criminals
17	Kinshasa	B	Pick-pocketing and petty theft
18	Moscow	-	Petty crime (pick-pocketing and theft
19	Madrid	B	Petty crime (theft) by petty criminals, thieves
20	Zurich	B	Petty crime (theft) by petty criminals, thieves
21	Santiago de Chile	B	Petty crime by burglars, thieves, petty criminals
22	Vienna	B	Petty crime by petty criminals
23	Montreal	B	Crimes against property by burglars, petty criminals
24	Lisbon	B	Petty crime, pick-pocketing by petty criminals
25	Rome	B	Petty crime; pick-pocketing by petty criminals
26	Tripoli	B	Petty crime such as burglary by petty criminals, thieves
27	Chicago	B	Burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft by burglars, petty criminals
28	Johannesburg	B	Petty crime (pick-pocketing, theft etc.) by petty criminals
29	Mumbai	B	Petty crime (pick-pocketing, theft etc.) by petty criminals
30	Patna	B	Petty crime (pick-pocketing, theft etc.) by petty criminals
31	Dublin	-	Burglary and related offences; theft and related offences

Section 6: Acts involving controlled psychoactive substances or other drugs

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	São Paulo	C	Drug related crimes by PCC (First Command of the Capital) or others
2	Accra	C	Drug-related crimes by international and national drug cartels
3	Baku	B	Drug-related crimes by drug sellers (assumption that drug sellers act as individuals in this case)
4	Zurich	B	Drug-related crimes by (rival) drug dealers
5	Mexico City	C	Major cartels operating in Mexico

Section 8: Acts against public order, authority and provisions of the State

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	São Paulo	A	Civil unrest by low7mid class students put down by military police
2	Bangkok	E	Civil unrest by the “population” including the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) against the government
3	Cairo	B	Civil unrest by protesters
4	Paris	B	Civil unrest by protesters
5	Kinshasa	-	Civil unrest
6	Ulaan Baatar	B	Vandalism of protesters against international mining consortia
7	Tripoli	A, C	Turmoil by rebel groups, militia, Islamist groups; tensions between the government and rebel groups, as well as within the parliament
8	Dakar	C	Violent attacks and insurgencies by M-23, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Mai Mai Morgan, Raia Mutomboki, URDC, Allied Democratic Forces

Section 9: Acts against public safety and state security

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	São Paulo	C	Local, regional and international terrorism by PCC (First Command of the Capital against police officers (Military Police) and the overall population
2	Bangkok	C	Regional terrorism (indigenous insurgencies) by local separatist and extremist groups against government-related institutions
3	Calcutta	C	Terrorist attacks by Anti-Western terrorist groups are active, including Islamist extremist groups such as Harak at ul-Mujahidin, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and Harkat-up-Jihad-i-Isami / most common threat from Mayalist Maoist movement against Kolkata local police, paramilitary forces and government officials, hence, state authorities in general.
4	Delhi	C	Terrorist attacks by terrorist groups (see Kolkata) against Westerners
5	London	C	Terrorism by IRA (largely against members of the Police Service of Northern Ireland and other security personnel); international terrorism by militant Islamists (especially against armed forces personnel who was engaged in a war against an Arab country)
6	Berlin	C	International religious terrorism by militant Islamists against inhabitants of major cities
7	Cairo	C	Religious terrorist incidents by radical Islamists against Christian Copts, tourists, Egyptians
8	Paris	C	Terrorism by terrorists against residents of Paris and tourists
9	New York	C	Terrorism by Islamist terrorists against people in big (in this case Western) cities
10	Madrid	C	International terrorism by militant Islamists against citizens of Madrid
11	Almaty	-	Terrorist attacks against citizens
12	Stockholm	C	Terrorist attacks by regional or indigenous terrorist groups against citizens of Stockholm
13	Karachi	C	Sectarian killings and bomb attacks by terrorists, mainly militant Islamist groups such as Taliban or Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LEJ), an Al-Qaeda affiliate

Section 11: Other criminal acts not elsewhere classified

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	Luanda	A	Prosecution of Human Rights Defenders and journalists by Angola's attorney-general
2	Kinshasa	A, C	Threats against Human Rights Defenders by armed groups; the national army
3	Baghdad	A	Torture by prison wardens
4	Almaty	A	Torture by prison wardens and police officers

Restriction: In this section, all kinds of crimes that could not be subsumed under any other ICCS section are subsumed

Section 12: Threat to road safety

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	São Paulo	-	[Threat to] road safety
2	Bangkok	B	[Threat to] road safety for pedestrians by vehicles
3	Accra	B	[Threat to] road safety for pedestrians and travellers through aggressive drivers, poorly maintained vehicles and poor streets
4	Baku	B	[Threat to] road safety for pedestrians and travellers through vehicles
5	Cairo	B	[Threat to] traffic and road safety for pedestrians through vehicles
6	Paris	B	[Threat to] road safety for pedestrians by vehicles
7	Seoul	B	[Threat to] road safety for pedestrians by vehicles
8	Kinshasa	B	[Threat to] road safety for pedestrians by vehicles
9	Rome	B	[Threat to] road safety for traffic participants by stronger traffic participants
10	Mumbai	B	[Threat to] road safety for anyone by traffic

Section 13: Environmental hazard

No.	Affected city	Source / perpetrator	Specific information
1	São Paulo	D	Weather, floods, mudslides (especially in low income areas such as Favelas)
2	Accra	D	Periodic floods
3	Delhi	D	Changing and more extreme weather patterns (torrential rainfalls, heavy draughts etc.)
4	Baku	D	Earthquakes
5	Rio de Janeiro	D	Heavy weather; storms; floods (especially at danger are poor people living in unstable houses)
6	Stockholm	D	Heat waves (the elderly are stronger affected)
7	Santiago de Chile	D	Draught and heat (affects citizens, especially elderly)
8	Mexico City	B, D	Air pollution, flooding
9	Istanbul	D	Earthquakes (affects citizens of Istanbul and surroundings)
10	Mumbai	B, C	Air pollution by motor vehicles that affects anyone; deluge that also affects anyone
11	Beijing	D	Flooding and storms
12	Shanghai	B, C	Air pollution by smog; flooding and storms

4. SECURITY INSTITUTIONS ADDRESSING URBAN THREATS (ROLES AND TASKS)				
4.1	List all **statutory** institutions that provide security in the city. **AND:** What kind of services does the relevant actor provide?		Yes	• In most cases, the security sector on the national level is the military / the armed forces. •
4.2	List **independent oversight agencies** –	64% (58/91)	Yes	• Since it is very difficult to identify the degree of independence of such an institution, it might better be called 'oversight body'.
4.3	List all **executive** authorities that manage security providers and are otherwise involved in the city's security. **AND:** What kind of services does the relevant actor provide?	Nat: 97% (88/91); Provincial: 22% (20/91) Local: 76% (69/91)	Yes	Information on women's ratio on different levels: • National level women's ratio: 89% (81/91) • Provincial level women's ratio: 16% (15/91) • Local level women's ratio: 69% (63/91)
4.4	List **legislative** bodies that oversee the activities of the security providers, approve their budgets and develop relevant	Nat: 95% (86/91) ; provincial: 18%	Yes	Information on women's ratio on different levels: • National level women's ratio: 19% (17/91) • Provincial level women's ratio: 10% (9/91) • Local level women's ratio: 11% (10/91)

	legislation, among others. **AND:** What kind of services does the relevant actor provide?	(16/91) ; local: 38% (35/91)		
4.5	List **judicial** institutions that interpret and uphold the constitution and the laws of the land. **AND:** What kind of services does the relevant actor provide?	Nat. 95% (86/91) ; provincial: 56% (51/91) ; local: 52% (47/91)	Yes	Information on women's ratio on different levels: • National level women's ratio: 3% (3/91) • Provincial level women's ratio: 2% (2/91) • Local level women's ratio: 4% (4/91)
4.8	List **external actors** that exercise, or assist in exercising, one or more of the above functions in the city. **AND:** What kind of services does the relevant actor provide?	81% (74/91)	Yes	• Problem: Interpol and NATO offices probably rather count as national level external actors, which are mostly stationed in the capital city of a country. • Others: UN HABITAT, EU offices

1. General Context and Urbanisation

***Table 51:** Average population by subcontinent*



Table 52: Average demographic density by subcontinent



Table 51 shows the average population by subcontinents across the sample, whereas the average demographic density is shown in Table 52. While keeping in mind the limitations to data reliability, especially regarding the distinction between the city itself and the greater metropolitan area (see chapter 2), some comparisons can be drawn. Most striking in Table 51 is that the most populous cities across the sample are located in South America, Eastern Asia and Southern Asia. Whereas in South American cities, there is an average demographic density of 7'181 inhabitants per square kilometre, the highest population densities are found in South-Eastern Asia, with 17'200 people per square kilometre, and Southern Asia with 19'292 people per square kilometre. Given a comparable size of territory, on average one inhabitant of a Southern or South-Eastern Asian city needs to cope with about half the space as one inhabitant of a South American city.

Table 53: Cities with a population of > 10 million (megacities)

Asia	Eastern Asia	Seoul	22'500'000
Asia	Eastern Asia	Beijing	20'693'000
Asia	Eastern Asia	Shanghai	18'885'000
Asia	Southern Asia	Karachi	18'000'000
Asia	Southern Asia	Delhi	16'787'941
Asia	Western Asia	Istanbul	13'854'740
Asia	Eastern Asia	Tokyo	13'189'000

America	South America	Buenos Aires	12'801'364
Europe	Eastern Europe	Moscow	11'503'501
America	South America	São Paulo	11'244'369
Asia	Eastern Asia	Shenzhen	10'357'938

There are 11 cities across the sample with more than 10 million inhabitants, so-called megacities. Table 53 shows that 8 of them are located in Asia, of which 7 are in South or South-Eastern Asia. South America counts two megacities and Europe only one, which is Moscow.

Table 54: *Further context*

Row Labels	Sum of On-going conflict?	Sum of Post-conflict?	Sum of Development context?	Sum of Political transition / democratisation?	Sum of Post-natural disaster?	Sum of On-going peace process?	Sum of High level of structural violence?	Sum of High level of direct violence?	Sum of Gentrification?
Africa	9	2	17	12	-	3	15	14	5
Eastern Africa	4	1	5	5	-	1	5	5	-
Middle Africa	1	-	2	1	-	-	2	2	1
Northern Africa	3	-	4	3	-	-	3	2	2
Southern Africa	-	-	2	1	-	-	2	2	2
Western Africa	1	1	4	2	-	2	3	3	-
America	4	2	15	2	1	4	15	16	12
Caribbean	-	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	-
Central America	1	1	5	1	-	1	5	5	1
Northern America	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	7
South America	3	-	9	-	-	3	9	8	4
Asia	11	4	24	12	3	5	20	15	14
Central Asia	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-
Eastern Asia	-	-	5	-	1	-	-	-	3
South-Eastern Asia	3	2	6	4	1	1	6	3	3
Southern Asia	3	1	7	3	1	1	8	7	4
Western Asia	5	1	5	5	-	3	6	5	4
Europe	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	15
Eastern Europe	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	3
Northern Europe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Southern Europe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Western Europe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Grand Total	**24**	**8**	**56**	**26**	**4**	**12**	**52**	**46**	**46**

Appendix 2: Bibliography/Large-N Mapping

City	Source
São Paulo	***Please note:*** *See Table 7 (pp. 85-87) for* ***publications 1-42*** *used for the mapping of Sâo Paulo*. 43. IBGE, Census2010 (http://www.ibge.gov.br/cidadesat/xtras/temas.php?codmun=355030&idtema=71&search=sao-paulo|sao-paulo|financas-publicas-2009). *See* also SEADE, Retratos de São Paulo (http://www.seade.gov.br/produtos/retratosdesp/view/index.php?temaId=1&indId=5&locId=3550308&busca=). The Metropolitan Expanded Complex includes the metropolitan regions of the Santos Lowlands and Campinas, as well as nearby cities such as São José dos Campos, Sorocaba, and Jundiaí, among others (Silva, Geraldo, Klink, Jeroen and Fonseca, Maria de Lourdes. *Centrality, Governance and Globalization. The challenges of constituting the São Paulo macrometropolis*, available at: http://rec.brookes.ac.uk/research/relp/network/resources/Centrality%20and%20governance%20in%20Sao%20Paulo.pdf, pg. 1). 44. Governo Federal Portal da Transparência, available at: http://www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br/manual/. 45. Janice E. Perlman. *A dual strategy for deliberate social change in cities* (Cities, vol. 7, nr. 1, February 1990), available at: http://www.megacitiesproject.org/pdf/dual_strategies.pdf, pg. 3. 46. Salvadori Dedecca, Cláudio and Pinto da Cunha, José Marcos. *Migração, trabalho e renda nos anos 90: o caso da Região Metropolitana de São Paulo* (R. bras. Est. Pop., Campinas, v. 21, n. 1, p. 49-66, jan./jun. 2 2004), available at: http://www.abep.nepo.unicamp.br/docs/anais/pdf/2002/GT_TRB_ST26_Dedecca_texto.pdf, pg. 2. 47. Veja. *Migração para SP cai e reduz o crescimento da população* (20 April 2011), available at : http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/migracao-para-sp-cai-e-reduz-crescimento-da-populacao. *See* also Estadão de São Paulo, *Grande SP agora mais perde que ganha migrantes* (20 April 2011), available at : (http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,grande-sp-agora-mais-perde-que-ganha-migrantes,708683,0.htm) 48. Alessandri Carlos, Ana Fani. *A metrópole de São Paulo no contexto da urbanização contemporânea* (Estud. av. vol.23 no.66 São Paulo 2009), available at : 49. "EMPLASA – Empresa Paulista de Planejamento Metropolitano SA". July 30, 2007. 50. UN Women, Violence against Women Prevalence Data: Surveys by Country Compiled by UN Women (as of March 2011), available at: http://www.unifem.org/attachments/gender_issues/violence_against_women/vaw-prevalence-matrix-2011.pdf. 51. Jornal do Brasil, *Protestos em SP têm mais de 200 presos e 100 feridos* (14

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APPENDIX 3:
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015

[*without reference to a Main Committee (A/70/L.1)*]

70/1. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

The General Assembly Adopts the following outcome document of the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda:

Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums

11.2 By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons

11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries

11.4 Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world's cultural and natural heritage

11.5 By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations

11.6 By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management

11.7 By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities

11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning

11.b By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop

and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels

11.c Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings utilizing local materials