

PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT

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Nontraditional Actors

CHINA AND RUSSIA IN AFRICAN PEACE OPERATIONS

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STIMSON

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Executive Summary

This report seeks to analyze the contributions China and Russia make to peace operations in Africa. Recognizing the role of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council in setting the agenda for U.N. peace operations, the report uses meeting records of U.N. resolution deliberations and debates since 1989, as well as interviews with stakeholders, to analyze China's and Russia's voting decisions with regard to U.N. peace operations in Africa. The report finds the following:

- Global geopolitical considerations extend into Security Council deliberations. These considerations are determined by ideological preferences and serve to project preferred norms. While it is generally correct to say that these ideological differences pit the P3 countries (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) against the P2 countries (China and Russia), this report finds that voting decisions vary by context.
- According to their official statements and voting decisions, China and Russia appear aligned in their preferences regarding the Security Council. Yet both states pursue different strategic agendas regarding peace operations in Africa.
- China and Russia have mostly taken reactive positions on issues before the Security Council pertaining to peace and security in Africa. Consequently, this restricts their ability to set the council's agenda or raise new issues for debate. However, it compels other states to preemptively consider the positions of China and Russia in order to ensure the smooth passage of any resolution. Although both China and Russia are still able to shape the content of resolutions, the reactive posture prevents them from wielding more influence on resolutions.
- The voting behavior of both states is determined by a complex structure of loose interest-based coalitions. As a result, China's and Russia's rhetorical advocacy for the inclusion of African positions in council debates and resolutions, especially those of the African Union, does not always translate to substantive support.
- Given the strong rhetorical support for African causes in the Security Council, as well as the increasingly aligned economic and strategic interests between the P2 and the continent, there is a substantive opportunity for future cooperation in a systematic and predictable way at both the U.N. and the regional levels.

List of Abbreviations

A3	The three African countries represented on the Security Council
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
A.U.	African Union
BINUB	U.N. Integrated Office in Burundi
BNUB	U.N. Office in Burundi
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EAC	East African Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
E.U.	European Union
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
HIPPO	U.N. High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MENUB	U.N. Observation Mission in Burundi
MINUSMA	U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUSCO	U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MSDF	Malian Defense and Security Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUB	U.N. Operation in Burundi
ONUC	U.N. Mission in the Congo
P2	China and Russia
P3	France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America

P5	Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
SPMs	Special Political Missions
TCC	Troop-Contributing Country
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
U.N.	United Nations
UNAMID	A.U.-U.N. Mission in Darfur
UNAMIS	U.N. Advance Mission in the Sudan
UNMIS	U.N. Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	U.N. Mission in South Sudan
UNSMIL	U.N. Support Mission in Libya
UNTSO	U.N. Truce Supervision Organization

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Introduction

As the main playing field of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping and political missions, Africa remains a major focus of the U.N.'s global peace and security agenda. Today, seven out of 13 field-based special political missions and nine out of 16 peacekeeping missions are taking place on the African continent.¹ In 2016, 82,485 uniformed personnel were deployed to peacekeeping missions in Africa, making up more than 80 percent of all U.N. police, mission military expert, and troop contributions for the year.²

Consequently, Africa has been at the center of the transformations in U.N. peace operations in the post-Cold-War era. Although a generally optimistic 1992 assessment of U.N. missions by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted that the increasingly complex international security landscape meant that peacekeeping operations would likely face new challenges, it was not until the significant failures of the U.N. Operation in Somalia II and the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda in the mid-1990s that the necessity of a new round of reforms became evident to all. In all subsequent reform processes, the complex nature of conflicts has been the premise of the reform agenda, the most recent being the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report. One of the key recommendations of the HIPPO report was a call for stronger global-regional cooperation in peace operations, wherein regional partners and the U.N. could “combine their respective comparative advantages” to fill the security gaps created by the growth of intrastate conflict (particularly in Africa).³

Recognizing the centrality of the Security Council in shaping the U.N.'s peace agenda, this report from the Stimson Center seeks to analyze how China and Russia, as permanent members of the council with veto powers, have engaged with peace operations in Africa. The report looks at council decision-making processes for individual U.N. missions, as well as council engagement with and reform of peace operations in Africa. The report analyzes Security Council meeting records since 1989 to pull out themes and patterns in the actions of both states.⁴ As permanent members of the Council, China and Russia (known as the P2) are often regarded as nontraditional partners with Africa on peace operations, differentiated from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (the P3).⁵ China and Russia have offered rhetorical support for “African solutions to African problems,” a position drawn from their broader advocacy for the norms of nonintervention and the primacy of state sovereignty, while playing a primarily reactive role in African security affairs addressed by the council.

The report begins with an overview of the role of the Security Council in setting the global agenda for peace operations. In the second section, it examines China's and Russia's involvement in peace operations in Africa. The third section analyzes the decision-making processes of council members using minutes of Security Council meetings and other relevant documents. It focuses on agenda-setting, interest alliances, and voting behavior by China and Russia regarding peace operations in five states in Africa: Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Mali, and Libya. The final section provides a summary of the research findings.



The Peace Agenda

Overview

The U.N.'s ambitious global peace and security agenda is conducted in the field using two main tools: special political missions (SPMs) and peacekeeping operations. These tools cover the entire breadth of the conflict cycle starting from conflict prevention through to building peace at the end of violent conflicts. SPMs are civilian missions in the pre-violence and post-violence phases of conflicts,⁶ usually involving special envoys, sanctions panels and monitoring groups, and field missions.⁷ In the post-Cold-War era, these diplomatic missions have largely been used for electoral support, the expansion of rule of law, and mediation.⁸ The U.N. currently has 13 field-based SPMs across the world.⁹

Peacekeeping operations, by contrast, typically contain military, police, and civilian personnel.¹⁰ Owing to different contexts in which peacekeeping operations are conducted, this instrument straddles non-violent and violent environments, with mandates often including support for political processes, like election monitoring or supervision of cease-fires; support for state-building processes, like the rule of law or security sector reform; and robust measures to defend the missions' mandates.¹¹ Despite the fact that peacekeeping operations are ostensibly deployed only with the consent of the parties to the conflict, in some instances some of the parties (including the host-state government) have displayed hostility toward and attempted to restrict the actions of some of the U.N.'s 16 peacekeeping missions currently deployed.

Initiatives to reform U.N. peace operations date back to the early 1990s, as the inadequacies of traditional peacekeeping became apparent.¹² These reform initiatives resulted in a number of major reports, including "An Agenda for Peace" in 1992; the "Supplement to the Agenda" in 1997; the Millennium report in 2000; the Brahimi report in 2000; and most recently, the HIPPO report in 2015.¹³ The HIPPO report emphasized the need to place political solutions to conflict at the center of peace operations; make full and flexible use of the range of intervention tools available to the U.N.; place greater focus on the people affected by the conflict and enable field missions to serve them more effectively; and strengthen the U.N.'s cooperation with regional organizations.¹⁴

Setting the Agenda: Security Council Interests and Coalitions

As the designated U.N. organ entrusted with the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,"¹⁵ the Security Council's role is two-pronged. First, it sets the U.N.'s agenda for global peace and security. It determines global security needs, establishes and oversees all U.N. peace missions, and works with the U.N. Secretariat and the Secretary-General to improve the U.N.'s responses to insecurity.¹⁶ For instance, in 1992, the Security Council highlighted the need for more robust conflict-prevention tools, leading to the creation of a Department for Political Affairs charged with managing the U.N.'s political missions.¹⁷ In 2001, the Security Council established the Working Group on U.N. Peacekeeping Operations to, among other things, "address both generic peacekeeping issues ... and technical aspects of individual peacekeeping operations."¹⁸ Using such subgroups, the Security Council is able to influence the U.N.'s management of global security gaps.

Key actors within the Security Council individually and collectively set the agenda for U.N. missions and determine their trajectories. Member states can use their positions on the council to promote their national interests and norms. Members gain prestige and opportunities to partake in decision-making. Yet the veto power of the five permanent members (known as the P5) gives them far greater power to pursue their interests within the U.N. system. This inequitable distribution of power remains a sore point for some states, which criticize it as being “(e)urocentric and rooted in an outdated 1945 balance of power,” but states are compelled to continue to work within the institution even when they believe it does not meet its own aims of “representativeness, legitimacy, authority, and effectiveness.”¹⁹

The second role of the Security Council has to do with its influence over regional institutions. Chapter VIII, Article 53(1) of the U.N. Charter mandates that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.”²⁰ This ensures that the council contributes to agenda-setting on the regional level as well.

Council members join in formal and informal coalitions to pursue shared interests. Coalition structures in the Security Council are often described through the dichotomous narrative of P3 versus P2 countries. In this view, the P3 represent the developed Global North, which emphasizes the principles of rule of law and human rights, whereas the P2 represent the developing Global South, which emphasizes the principles of sovereignty, independence, and noninterference.²¹ Very often, these principles are cited to provide legitimacy to voting decisions. In reality, decision-making by the permanent members of the council is often much more complex. The voting behavior and interest coalitions of the Security Council can be more accurately understood as a fluid continuum rather than a rigid dichotomy. Member states do not necessarily use the same guiding principles across the board and in all contexts, with both the domestic politics of member states and their wide-ranging foreign policy interests causing deviations.²² O’Neill argues, for example, that “both France and Russia are between the extremes of the North/South dimension.”²³ Understanding the coalition structure of the Security Council provides necessary context for an examination of China’s and Russia’s roles in African peace and security.

One way these coalitions come into play is via the penholding process. The informal penholding system established by the U.N., “whereby one or more Council members (as ‘penholder[s]’) initiate and chair the informal drafting process,” was designed to facilitate the process of drafting Security Council resolutions, and is, in theory, open to all council members.²⁴ Functions include drafting the resolution, leading the negotiations on the resolution with other council members, and submitting the final copy of the draft before it is put to the vote. Interested states can also pool resources together to co-draft a resolution.²⁵ This has two implications: first, the initiator of the draft gets to set the agenda on the issue, leaving other states to react to the prepared text.²⁶ Second, a given draft is susceptible to being framed to meet the interests of the penholder, in spite of the fact that the draft is subject to negotiation. (A final draft does not always meet the preferences of the contributors.) This is seen in many instances in the cases under review. While the textual provisions of drafts are not often a point of contention for the P3 since one of the P3 frequently holds the pen, the P2 and nonpermanent members have complained about noninclusivity of their contributions in final drafts.²⁷ In some cases, discontent with the content or language of the draft has been used as an excuse for a voting decision.²⁸

China And Russia In African Peace Operations

Overview of U.N. and A.U. Peace Operations in Africa

The African continent has been characterized by persistent violence and conflict for the past several decades.²⁹ Since the turn of the 21st century, more than 70 percent of the states in Africa have been involved in violent conflicts,³⁰ and Africa recorded over 20 million members of “populations of concern” in 2015 alone.³¹ In response to violence in the region, the U.N. has launched 31 peacekeeping operations³² and 23 field-based special political missions on the continent.³³

The first complex/multidimensional U.N. peacekeeping operation deployed in Africa was the U.N. Mission in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. By the time ONUC wound down in 1964, it had cost the U.N. 250 fatalities and more than \$400 million.³⁴ In 2016, Africa dominated Security Council resolutions and meetings, accounting for over 50 percent of the country-specific meetings.³⁵ Today, seven out of 13 field-based SPMs and nine out of 16 peacekeeping missions are taking place on the African continent, with more than 80 percent of all U.N. police, military experts on mission, and troops deployed in peacekeeping missions in the region.³⁶

Although the U.N. has been the primary player in peace operations on the continent, the African Union (A.U.) has also increasingly carved out roles for itself. The A.U. emerged in 2002 as a transformed version of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It was designed to provide a more robust mandate pertaining to political cooperation and economic integration than was previously provided by the OAU.³⁷ In line with these ambitions, the A.U. Constitutive Act legitimizes intervention in member states in situations of “war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.”³⁸ The A.U.’s principle of nonindifference in crisis situations in Africa provides the basis for all A.U. peace operations.³⁹

Since 2003, the A.U. has mandated, authorized, or supported the establishment of 12 missions on the continent,⁴⁰ showing more willingness than the U.N. to deploy to high-intensity operations.⁴¹ Despite some of the technical, accountability, and financial challenges, as well as mixed results associated with these deployments, the organization is increasingly recognized as a key actor in the maintenance of Africa’s peace and security.⁴²

China’s Support for Peace Operations in Africa

Sino-African engagement has a long history, but China’s increased pursuit of global economic opportunities since the turn of the 21st century has resulted in a significantly expanded relationship with the African continent.⁴³

China engages with African states in four main areas: ideology, economy, politics, and security.⁴⁴ In 2000, China held the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a key institution to fostering economic cooperation with the continent, where it laid out a statement of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” to guide its African relations, with the central tenets being noninterference and respect for state sovereignty.⁴⁵ This rhetoric envisions “win-win,” “friendly and respectful political linkages” with Africa untainted by the Western historical baggage of colonialism.⁴⁶ Beneath this rhetoric, however, China’s entry into resource-rich African states is designed to fulfill China’s expanding

security and economic interests, with Africa seen as integral to Beijing's "new security concept" and, thus, China's rise as a global power.⁴⁷

In real numbers, in 2015 China's exports to and imports from sub-Saharan Africa stood at 15 percent and 20 percent of Chinese global trade estimates, respectively.⁴⁸ China also remains Africa's largest investor, with primary interests in mining and oil.⁴⁹ Although the Sino-African economic relationship remains relatively small compared to China's dealings with top trading partners like the U.S., the European Union (E.U.), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,⁵⁰ this rising investment has increasingly drawn China into African security issues, especially through the U.N.'s peace operations.⁵¹

China in African Peace Operations

China has come a long way from sitting on the fence on peacekeeping issues in 1971, when it replaced Taiwan on the Security Council. In 2016, China contributed thousands of troops, making it the highest troop-contributing country (TCC) among the permanent members of the Security Council.⁵² In the early days of its engagement with U.N. peacekeeping between 1971 and 1980, China abstained from voting on peacekeeping resolutions and refrained from contributing funds or personnel to missions.⁵³ It sought to present a strict image of neutrality, a stance that "was characterised by inactivity if not outright hostility" to U.N. peace operations.⁵⁴ China's justifications for this stance were drawn both from a narrow interpretation of the U.N. Charter's premise of the primacy of state sovereignty and China's broader noninterference principles.⁵⁵

The past four decades have brought two significant changes to this stance. First, China has become much more directly involved in peacekeeping by contributing greater numbers of personnel in more active positions. China's thawing relationship with U.N. peacekeeping began in 1982 when it started to contribute to the U.N.'s assessed funds.⁵⁶ In 1988, it joined the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.⁵⁷ Its first direct peacekeeping involvement came in 1989 with the deployment of election observers to Namibia. In 1990, China deployed five military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East, and in 1992 the deployment of 400 experts on mission and 49 military observers to the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia marked a further significant upturn in China's involvement.⁵⁸ Beginning in 2000, China has increasingly deployed enabler units such as engineering, logistics, and medical personnel.⁵⁹ In 2013, China deployed a force protection unit for the first time to the U.N. mission in Mali.⁶⁰

Second, China has been increasingly flexible regarding its previously strict stance on state sovereignty, leading it to be more tolerant of robust U.N. peacekeeping. For instance, although initially resistant to it, China endorsed the U.N.'s Responsibility to Protect principle in 2005.⁶¹ In 2008, China officially adopted a policy of multilateral engagement when the concept of strategic involvement in military operations other than war (MOOTW) was incorporated into its national defense white paper and other top-level military guidance.⁶² China currently appears to selectively uphold or ignore its stated principle of noninterference on a case-by-case basis.

In general, China's position on the U.N.'s special political missions is in line with its preference for political solutions and emphasis on local ownership. China recognizes the central role played by regional organizations, especially in preventive diplomacy and in the post-conflict reconstruction phases of conflict management in Africa.⁶³ Similarly, China advocated for a greater involvement of regional organizations in this regard, speaking in support of the A.U.'s peacebuilding initiatives like the Policy on

Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.⁶⁴ At the U.N., China has, for the most part, supported Security Council resolutions on political missions. However, it remains wary of the more intrusive aspects of such missions. In some instances, political missions have incorporated preventive mandates like the protection of civilians.⁶⁵ Typically, China takes a cautious stance in the Security Council when the expansion of political missions is debated. For example, in 2016 China abstained from voting on Resolution 2303, which authorized the creation of a police component without a Chapter VII mandate to monitor the security situation and human rights violations.⁶⁶ China argued that Resolution 2303 did not meet the principles of the respect for sovereignty and independence and did not include a “Burundi-led settlement.”⁶⁷

China’s peacekeeping engagement is largely concentrated in Africa. Today, 83 percent of China’s peacekeepers serve in seven U.N. missions on the continent. In addition to its financial contributions to the U.N., China has supported regional African peacekeeping on an ad hoc basis. For instance, between 2006 and 2009 China supported A.U. forces in Sudan and Somalia with about \$6.3 million at various stages of the missions, and in 2012 it presented a \$200 million headquarters building to the A.U.⁶⁸ China also provides bilateral support for individual states that participate in missions on the continent.⁶⁹ In 2015 China made a \$100 million pledge to the A.U. Standby Force, a strong indication of its commitment to enhance regional-level peacekeeping.⁷⁰

Four main factors motivate China’s current engagement with African peacekeeping. First, China’s renewed engagement has been a training opportunity for its troops. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has limited international experience with nontraining kinetic operations since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, and peacekeeping engagement abroad has the potential to provide wider operational knowledge.⁷¹ Second, China’s need to protect its economic interests abroad may influence its peacekeeping engagement. Unable to ignore the security challenges resulting from its economic exposure in fragile states, China’s increasing involvement in peacekeeping in African states may pay dividends in the form of a safer investment space for its sizeable diaspora population,⁷² serving the interests of both private Chinese businesses and state-owned enterprises.⁷³ Third, China’s growing participation in peace and security issues in Africa helps China distinguish itself as a leader of the developing world and a champion of South-South cooperation.⁷⁴ China wishes to position itself in the global system as not merely a “norm-taker” but a “norm-setter.”⁷⁵ China also uses its engagement with Africa to repudiate its previous image in the eyes of many as a geopolitical free rider, and to portray itself as a responsible power and a legitimate partner in African development and security.⁷⁶ Finally, China’s extensive participation as a TCC provides it with a legitimate claim to assert its support for peacekeeping in general, and in Africa in particular.⁷⁷ Unlike other P5 members whose support for peacekeeping is mostly financial or technical, China currently contributes 2,630 peacekeeping personnel to U.N. missions, with France a distant second with 872 personnel and the U.S. in the rear with 72 personnel.⁷⁸ As a veto-wielding member of the council, China’s demonstrated commitment to African peace and security further gives it a voice in issues relating to the continent.⁷⁹

Russia's Support for Peace Operations in Africa

Russia had strong engagement with Africa during the Cold War era, which coincided with African anti-colonialist movements starting in the late 1950s.⁸⁰ In this period, the Communist Party institutionalized a policy toward Africa to help in the “irreconcilable struggle against colonialism.”⁸¹ Prior to the start of the Cold War, Russia’s engagement had involved three African states: Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Africa. By the end of the Cold War era, Russia had trade agreements and technical and economic assistance agreements with at least 42 states in Africa.⁸² It also engaged in vast cultural exchanges and scholarships, especially in science and medicine (which were distinct from the communist indoctrination scholarships of the 1930s), and African students participating in these programs gained prominence and leadership positions in the post-colonial years.⁸³ When Russia de-prioritized Africa in its foreign policy, it shut down embassies, consulates, trade missions, and cultural centers across the continent, in line with the observation that Russia was “declining at home and retreating abroad” as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁸⁴

Today, unlike China, Russia’s trade engagement with Africa is near negligible. Whereas Chinese exports to sub-Saharan Africa in 2015 were estimated at 15 percent of Chinese global estimates, comparable figures from Russia stood at just under 0.6 percent.⁸⁵ In the years following the end of the Cold War, China’s “going out” strategy caused it to seek access to global markets, including Africa.⁸⁶ By contrast, Russia spent the 1990s and early 2000s grappling with the economic and political decline brought on by the unraveling of the Soviet Union.⁸⁷ The collapse of the Soviet Union also sparked an “inward turn” approach, a negative trend in Russian foreign policy in which it “largely abandoned the global south in general and Africa in particular.”⁸⁸ Hence, the post-Cold-War era marked different pathways for the two countries, with China broadening its engagement with Africa and Russia withdrawing from the continent.

Russia’s interests and involvement in Africa have since grown, with the main sectors of cooperation being natural resources, telecommunications, infrastructure, and arms trade.⁸⁹ Between 2011 and 2015, Africa took up 11 percent of Russia’s arms exports.⁹⁰ On the strategic level, Russia’s national security strategy focuses on its relations with the G8 and G20 countries, and Brazil, India, and China, rather than Africa.⁹¹ Nonetheless, given the expanding involvement of global contenders like the U.S. and China on the continent, Russia sought a re-engagement with Africa beginning in the early 2000s.⁹² This re-engagement has been premised by a reference to Russia’s role in Africa’s anti-colonial movement,⁹³ but is largely calculated as economically and politically favorable, given Russia’s foreign policy interests, for a larger role on the global level.⁹⁴

Russia in African Peace Operations

Russia’s domestic policy on the use of its mobile forces, which prioritizes “intervention in the near abroad and internal security,” determines its participation in global peacekeeping and its involvement in peace and security in Africa.⁹⁵ Therefore, Russia’s primary interest in the use of its military forces abroad focuses on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or activity “in connection with the elimination of conflicts first and foremost in the territory of the former USSR, that is the vicinity of Russia’s borders.”⁹⁶ This focus on Russia’s periphery began in the 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union that left more than 25 million ethnic Russians in the new post-Soviet states.⁹⁷

Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its participation in U.N. peacekeeping was negligible.⁹⁸ In 1973, for the first time, the Soviet Union deployed military observers to the UNTSO in Egypt, Israel,

Jordan, Lebanon, and the Syrian Arab Republic.⁹⁹ It also supplied minimal logistical support for U.N. missions in 1960 and 1973.¹⁰⁰ Between 1988 and 1991 Russia's U.N. peacekeeping personnel consisted mostly of mission observers, a practice that it carried on through the post-Cold-War period but expanded to include logistical support like helicopters and transportation units.¹⁰¹

During this era, Russia engaged in two main types of multinational engagements. First, Russia crafted a distinct form of peacekeeping, deploying mostly to the CIS.¹⁰² These Russian-led peacekeeping missions involved the use of Russia's armed forces as "a third party during conflicts on the territory of another country based on a bilateral agreement with that country and without a mandate from the U.N."¹⁰³ Second, Russia participated in special operations in collaboration with NATO in the Balkans, particularly after joining the Partnership for Peace program, which allows member states to prioritize the basis for cooperation, in 1995.¹⁰⁴ The tensions over the Russia-NATO relationship in 1999 contributed to Russian distrust of multinational peacekeeping, especially with Western states, a factor that continues to affect its engagement in U.N. peacekeeping today.¹⁰⁵ Currently Russia has 105 peacekeeping personnel deployed across nine U.N. missions.¹⁰⁶ As with the structure in the 1990s, the teams are very thin in troop composition (with 59 experts on mission, 41 police officers, and five troops).¹⁰⁷ In spite of Russia's minimal troop engagement in U.N. multinational peacekeeping, its substantive logistical engagement has yielded economic benefits for the country, with the U.N. paying for its specialist logistical support for U.N. missions. For example, between 2012 and 2016 Russian contractors earned up to \$927 million from U.N. Headquarters contracts, mostly for air transportation services.¹⁰⁸ In comparison, Chinese contractors earned about \$94 million in the same period, mostly for transportation services and other administrative services such as translation.¹⁰⁹ In general, China's economic motivation in peacekeeping participation is more usefully explained in terms of its interests in ensuring a secure working environment for Chinese citizens in the diaspora and for Chinese companies abroad.¹¹⁰ With Russia, the economic motivations include the maintenance of these substantive U.N. contracts, which have placed Russia as the "second largest supplier of contractor services to U.N. peacekeeping operations and the main supplier of air transportation services."¹¹¹

Russia's relative personnel contributions to peacekeeping in Africa are minimal. For instance, Russia's personnel contribution to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the highest concentration of Russian personnel in any U.N. mission, still makes up less than 0.2 percent of the mission's peacekeeping personnel.¹¹²

As with China, Russia advocates "politico-diplomatic methods" and a central role of African states and institutions as viable conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches for the resolution of conflicts on the continent.¹¹³ This 2007 statement remains part of Russia's rhetoric in the Security Council to date. In 2011, Russia further registered its full support for the U.N.'s preventive diplomacy efforts, especially the establishment of regional field offices, making the argument that "modern conflicts have no military solutions."¹¹⁴ In general, Russia has supported all U.N. political missions on the continent, and, unlike China, did not object to the 2016 resolution authorizing a police component in Burundi.¹¹⁵


In spite of its minimal participation in peacekeeping, Russia brings its P5 membership privilege to bear in Security Council deliberations on peace operations in Africa. Like China, its ideological stance on the primacy of state sovereignty is used to legitimize much of its behavior on the council. In general, Russia has been very vocal in its support for African states and institutions in the resolution of conflicts on the continent, often siding with China. In May 2016, the Permanent Representative of Russia to the U.N. supported stronger U.N.-A.U. partnership, saying: "It is clear that regional and subregional organizations in Africa

know the situation there better than anyone else and have conflict prevention and settlement mechanisms that are better adjusted to local situations. We therefore support the principle of African solutions for African problems.”¹¹⁶ Russia also expresses its special interest in Africa through its special programs, allocating 800 Russian state scholarships to train African peacekeeping personnel and specialists.¹¹⁷

China and Russia in African Peacekeeping Reforms

The 2015 HIPPO report marked the latest of the U.N.’s many efforts to reform peace operations. One of the four key recommendations, a call for stronger global-regional cooperation, focused on the U.N.’s most important regional partner, the A.U.¹¹⁸ The A.U. was designed to provide a more robust mandate pertaining to political cooperation and economic integration than was previously provided by its predecessor, the OAU, which was mainly focused on supporting the anti-colonial movements and fostering a united Africa.¹¹⁹ As Figure 1 shows, the A.U. is increasingly initiating peace operations on the continent. As mandating authorities, the U.N. at the global level or the A.U. or other regional economic communities (RECs) at the regional level take the lead in resource mobilization and managing the mission. Unlike the U.N., which has a formulaic process for creating mandates and determining personnel strengths, the A.U. is more flexible.¹²⁰ Figure 1 also shows that the U.N. and A.U. are increasingly working together on missions. These U.N.-A.U. missions include hybrid missions (e.g., in Darfur), missions with specific U.N. or A.U. components (e.g., Abyei, with an exclusively African military contingent), or A.U. missions that have been “re-hatted” by the U.N. (e.g., in Central African Republic and Mali).¹²¹ However, the A.U.’s deployment of peacekeepers into high-intensity conflict zones has brought the capacity and resource inadequacies of the organization to the fore.¹²² The resource inadequacies have also led to calls for “equitable burden sharing

FIGURE 1: Mandating Authorities in Peace Operations in Africa



between the U.N. and A.U.” on peace operations in Africa.¹²³ Arguing that the A.U. takes on a share of the U.N.’s global peace and security responsibilities, the A.U. has pushed for a “flexible, predictable, and sustainable” funding arrangement for African-led peace operations.¹²⁴ However, the A.U.’s capacity to manage peace operations through systematic mechanisms has been called into question in some areas, including systematic financial accountability; operational readiness with regard to troop preparation and equipment certification; international human rights and humanitarian law compliance; and personnel conduct with regard to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.¹²⁵

A key priority of the A.U.’s reform agenda is to establish an institutionalized strategic partnership with the U.N. on peace operations, to replace the current ad hoc arrangement.¹²⁶ The A.U. has three comparative advantages. First, it is nearer to the conflict zones given that more than 80 percent of U.N. peacekeeping personnel are deployed to the continent.¹²⁷ Second, the A.U. can more easily intervene in the early stages of conflict, i.e., the prevention stage.¹²⁸ The A.U.’s unique advantage in this stage is local ownership of the mediation process.¹²⁹ For example, the A.U. has developed, as part of the African peace and security architecture, the Continental Early Warning System and the Panel of the Wise, a high-level mediation panel made up of serving and former heads of state.¹³⁰ Third, the A.U.’s principle of nonindifference, which mandates it to intervene in member states in crisis situations, provides a normative framework for intervention that exceeds the U.N.’s typical peacekeeping doctrine.¹³¹ This framework has provided the A.U. with the needed authorization for enforcement operations, which are in demand on the continent.¹³² Reform of peace operations in Africa, however, remains a cogent subject in the U.N. and forms a key part of Security Council debates today.

The first key U.N. resolution on U.N.-A.U. partnership was a 2005 General Assembly resolution, which led to the 10-Year Capacity Building Program for the A.U.¹³³ Subsequently, the Security Council held some debates on the issue. These debates, held between 2009 and 2011, provide insight into the emerging thoughts of the council members, especially China and Russia. (Both states expressed enthusiasm for the partnership.)¹³⁴ In 2012, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2033 to establish a more effective U.N.-A.U. partnership. The council’s latest push for reforms in this partnership was in 2016 with Resolution 2320, with Senegal and the U.S. as penholders. Although the council unanimously adopted the resolution, member states’ concerns were well enunciated. Four key themes may be deduced from China’s and Russia’s reactions.

- Support for the involvement of key African actors in peace operations. In endorsing Resolution 2320, China expressed effusive support for U.N.-A.U. cooperation, and Russia also acknowledged the role of the regional body in addressing conflict on the continent, with both states emphasizing the strength of the A.U. in proffering political solutions.¹³⁵
- Support for political and diplomatic solutions to conflicts. China and Russia emphasized the centrality of African involvement in dealing with conflict prevention and mediation, with Russia pointing to the need for cooperation on new conflict themes such as “international terrorism, transnational organized crime, piracy and illegal trafficking in weapons and narcotics.”¹³⁶
- The challenges of creating a predictable funding structure for U.N.-A.U. cooperation on peace and security. Egypt expressed reservations on the resolution insofar as it had not established an agreement on a cost-sharing structure, especially regarding the A.U.’s proposal to finance 25 percent of peace operations from 2020.¹³⁷ This point was reiterated by Russia, which further emphasized the nonunited front of the African representatives on the Security Council, known as the A3.

- The discrepancy between A.U. and U.N. peacekeeping doctrines. In what appeared to be a reference to the A.U.'s doctrine of nonindifference, which may be interpreted to be at odds with U.N. peacekeeping requirements of host-state consent, Russia expressed concerns with the implication of the resolution's text regarding the peacekeeping requirements of impartiality and host-state consent.¹³⁸



African Peace Operations: China and Russia on the Security Council

Actions on the Security Council

This section examines the factors that affect China's and Russia's actions on the Security Council with respect to peace operations. The formulation of, deliberations on, and adoption of Security Council resolutions are a consequence of the alignment of the different interests of the relevant parties. Given these interests, the P5 can behave in three ways with regard to a resolution on a peace operation: vote yes, abstain, or vote no. In most cases, member states' voting behavior is accompanied by official statements that provide insight into voting decisions. A yes vote or an abstention does not always imply an embrace of the entire content of the resolution, and statements provide important context about reservations or concerns. When the P5 use their veto, they can use statements to explain their decision and emphasize their position on the issue. This section therefore looks at China's and Russia's actions on the Security Council using both voting decisions and statements.

The P2's **voting decisions** on peace operations are made taking into consideration the interests of and coalitions among host states, the P3, the A3, and relevant regional organizations. China's and Russia's **official statements** provide another perspective through which we can analyze Security Council behavior. Statements provide an opportunity to state a position for historical records or to frame the discourse following the P2's voting decisions, especially in controversial resolutions. In the U.N. missions analyzed in this section, China and Russia have been very vocal in expressing their discontent with specific provisions or the entirety of resolutions.

This report analyzes the voting behavior and official statements of the P2 in U.N. peace operations in five states in Africa: Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Mali, and Libya. The primary sources of data are Security Council meeting records and interviews.

Sudan

Security Council Resolutions and Votes on Sudan

U.N. Resolution	Security Council (S.C.) Issue/Controversy	Votes			
		A3	China	Russia	P3
Res. 1044 (1996)	First S.C. meeting over Sudan; S.C. calls for Sudan to extradite Egyptian criminals	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 1054 (1996)	S.C. threatens sanctions on Sudan	YYY	A	A	YYY
Res. 1547 (2004)	S.C. endorses advance team for U.N. peace operation in Sudan	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 1556 (2004)	S.C. endorses A.U. protection force in Darfur	YYY	A	Y	YYY
Res. 1564 (2004)	S.C. establishes commission of inquiry on genocide, threatens more sanctions	AYY	A	A	YYY
Res. 1590 (2005)	S.C. establishes U.N. mission (UNMIS)	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 1591 (2005)	S.C. imposes travel bans/assets freeze	AYY	A	A	YYY
Res. 1593 (2005)	S.C. refers situation to the ICC	AYY	A	Y	AYY
Res. 1672 (2006)	S.C. imposes sanctions (travel/economic) on Sudanese officials	YYY	A	A	YYY
Res. 1706 (2006)	S.C. expands UNMIS mandate to include Darfur	YYY	A	A	YYY
Res. 1769 (2007)	S.C. creates hybrid mission	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2035 (2012)	More targeted sanctions	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2296 (2016)	UNAMID exit strategy	YYY	Y	Y	YYY

Key Resolutions and Votes¹³⁹

The U.N.'s entry into Sudan began when Ethiopia sought the extradition of Egyptian citizens accused of an assassination attempt on the Egyptian president. In 1996, the A3 (Botswana, Egypt, and Guinea-Bissau) joined other states to sponsor Resolution 1044, which called on Sudan to extradite the accused people who had taken refuge there.¹⁴⁰ This resolution passed unanimously.¹⁴¹ In addition to the A3's front-row role, the OAU (which would later be transformed to the A.U.) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led the mediation process to urge the Sudanese government to cooperate with their Egyptian counterparts.¹⁴² The involvement of key African actors via the A3, the IGAD, and the OAU gave much legitimacy to this first resolution. In spite of its successful outcome, the P2 resisted the second resolution on Sudan, Resolution 1054, which threatened sanctions on the government of Sudan for reneging on previous agreements. This voting pattern by the P2 in peacetime set the tone for their subsequent behaviors when the conflict in Sudan erupted, leading to the establishment of multiple U.N. peace operations.

In January 2002, following a series of negotiations, the IGAD, the A.U., and the U.S. facilitated a ceasefire between the Sudanese government and the southern rebel group, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).¹⁴³ The negotiations culminated in a 2005 comprehensive peace agreement and the first U.N. peace mission, the Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), which was endorsed in 2004 in anticipation of the peace accord.¹⁴⁴ China and Russia both endorsed UNAMIS in 2004 and UNMIS in 2005.¹⁴⁵ Sudan's complex conflict layers extended beyond the conflict between the government in

Khartoum and the southern rebels, which had its roots in political contestations. In western Sudan, the conflict between nomads and farmers provided the context within which the Sudanese government engaged the help of local militias, known as Janjaweed, to fight new rebel groups in Darfur.¹⁴⁶ This conflict grew into a full-fledged civil war between 2003 and 2004, leaving more than 80,000 people dead and leading to accusations of genocide leveled against the government of Sudan.¹⁴⁷ The U.N. described the conflict, with 4 million people displaced, as “the worst worldwide.”¹⁴⁸ In response, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in 2004 and was subsumed by a hybrid mission, the A.U.–U.N. hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007.¹⁴⁹

Security Council resolutions were acrimonious between 2004 and 2006 as the council sought to manage the two streams of conflict in Sudan. The P2 abstained from voting in seven instances between 1996 and 2006. In general, these voting behaviors hinged on the council’s decision or threat to impose targeted sanctions and, in one instance, a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC).¹⁵⁰ Unlike the earlier days, however, the P2’s stance on sanctions took a different turn with Resolution 2035, which placed more sanctions on the Sudanese government in 2012. Why did China and Russia vote in favor of sanctions in 2012 but not in 1996, 2004, 2005, or 2006?

The P2’s voting behaviors in Sudan from 1996 to date reflect both their historical engagement with Sudan and their evolving engagement with U.N. peace operations. In the early days, both states expanded their economic engagements with Sudan following the vacuum created by the comprehensive sanctions imposed by some Western states.¹⁵¹ This is the backdrop against which Chinese investments in Sudan expanded, especially from the late 1990s.¹⁵² Congruently, the 1996 abstentions on Resolution 1054 reflect the P2’s default positions on sanctions. Based on the shared principles of the primacy of state sovereignty and noninterference, both states protested the punitive measures and urged for diplomatic approaches, with Russia protesting what it alleged to be an attempt to isolate Sudan internationally.¹⁵³ The P2 offered similar excuses when it abstained from voting on Resolution 1564 in 2004, insisting on diplomatic approaches.¹⁵⁴ However, the P2’s positions on sanctions took a significant turn from the late 2000s. Both states endorsed the creation of a peacekeeping mission, moving away from their insistence on a diplomatic solution. A stronger reflection of this change in position is seen in the P2’s 2012 accession to targeted sanctions on Sudan. The P2’s Security Council behavior in Sudan may be seen within the given contexts under which the voting decision was made. Four main dynamics help explain these voting decisions between 1996 and 2012.

First, the P2’s diplomatic and economic interests in Sudan can explain why their early voting behaviors appeared to support Sudan. Diplomatic ties between Russia and Sudan go back to the Cold War era, with Sudan as a member of the Casablanca Bloc formed in 1962.¹⁵⁵ Similarly, China and Sudan celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations in 2009.¹⁵⁶ Both states maintained relations with Sudan after the coup d’état by Omar al-Bashir’s National Islamic Front in 1989. In addition, China’s and Russia’s economic ties with Sudan follow from the existing diplomatic relations. The arms trade between Russia and Sudan, which began in the Cold War era, spiked between 2001 and 2004, peaking at \$277 million in 2004.¹⁵⁷ The heightened sales coincided with the civil war between 2003 and 2004. China’s arms trade with Sudan between 1990 and 2015 is estimated at \$492 million, and, as in Russia, these sales spiked between 2001 and 2004.¹⁵⁸ More significantly, China and Russia are the only P5 members who have sold arms to Khartoum since 1989.¹⁵⁹ China holds significant investments in Sudan’s oil section. Based on a projected production of 10 million tons of oil per year, a Chinese state-owned company constructed a 992-mile pipeline, a refinery, and two oil wells in Sudan in 1999.¹⁶⁰ Other economic

considerations include investments by China in Sudan, estimated at \$100 million in 2005 but currently estimated at \$7.52 billion.¹⁶¹

Second, external geopolitical factors helped constrain the P2's actions on Sudan. Eager to protect their dwindling reputations in the face of growing international condemnation that followed their support for Khartoum during the 2003-2004 conflicts, China and Russia reconsidered their rigid stances on state sovereignty. For China, this was pertinent because negative international public opinion could have marred the 2008 Beijing Olympics.¹⁶² In addition, China found it could no longer ignore the domestic crisis in Sudan as Chinese citizens working in the African state became targets.¹⁶³ By November 2006, China became a broker in the crisis, facilitating Sudan's consent to expand the existing A.U. mission into an A.U.–U.N. collaboration with an expanded mandate and the subsequent emergence of a peace agreement.¹⁶⁴

Third, the P2's principles of noninterference and state sovereignty are often cited as the bases for voting decisions. It is logical to expect that matters of national interest – for example, economic or strategic interests – are factored into voting behaviors on the Security Council. However, official statements of the P2, as well as the P5, following Security Council votes do not name interest calculations as reasons for specific decisions. Rather, drawing from these principles, the P2 advocate for state consent and a central role for relevant regional arrangements. In Sudan, one deduction that can be made from the official statements of the P2 points to the central role played by the OAU, and later the A.U., in shaping the trajectories of the resolutions and the P2's voting behaviors. Between 2004 and 2011 the A.U. and U.N. created five peace operations in Sudan,¹⁶⁵ in response to complex layers of conflicts in the northern, western, and southern regions of the state. In spite of the failures of the A.U.'s mediation process, which necessitated the creation and expansion of AMIS,¹⁶⁶ China and Russia cited the existence of the A.U. mission to explain why they abstained from voting on the Security Council inquiry into the alleged genocide in 2004 and proposed sanctions in 2005.¹⁶⁷ The relevance of the A.U. also informed the P2's enthusiastic assent to Resolution 1769 to create the hybrid mission UNAMID.¹⁶⁸

Fourth, the Security Council deliberations on Sudan also revealed the contention within the P5, notably the P2's resentments over the privileged position of the lead states that draft council resolutions, i.e., the penholders. The U.K. and the U.S. are the official penholders for Sudan.¹⁶⁹ In spite of the negotiation process that ensures that other council members contribute to every draft resolution, the P2 frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the final drafts of certain resolutions. In explaining its first abstention in 1996, Russia said it opposed the sanctions proposed by Resolution 1054 and attempts to “punish certain régimes or in order to attain other political goals of one or more Member States.”¹⁷⁰ In 2015, Russia accused the penholder, the U.S., of ignoring the concerns of other council members when it presented a final draft of Resolution 1591.¹⁷¹ According to the official statements of both states, the dissatisfaction with the textual provisions of the draft resolutions contributed, in some instances, to their voting decisions.¹⁷²

South Sudan

Security Council Resolutions and Votes on South Sudan

U.N. Resolution	Security Council (S.C.) Issue/Controversy	Votes			
		A3	China	Russia	P3
Res. 1996 (2011)	S.C. establishes mission	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2206 (2015)	S.C. creates system for sanctions	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2241 (2015)	S.C. extends mission mandate; text provisions; use of UAVs; hybrid court	YYY	Y	A	YYY
Res. 2252 (2015)	S.C. increases troops/police; sanctions; UAVs	YYY	Y	A	YYY
Res. 2302 (2016)	S.C. extends mission mandate	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2304 (2016)	S.C. adds regional protection force; expands POC mandate; sanctions	YYA	A	A	YYY
S/2016/1085 (failed)	S.C. proposed targeted sanctions/arms embargo	AAA	A	A	YYY

Key Resolutions and Votes

South Sudan was created in 2011 following a 2005 peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the SPLM. The Security Council created the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) even before formally admitting the new state into the U.N.¹⁷³ The fragile peace in South Sudan was not to last, however, with the resurgence of violence in 2013. In December 2013, Resolution 2132 expanded the military component of UNMISS.¹⁷⁴

As with Sudan, the P2's voting behavior in South Sudan exhibits familiar Security Council dynamics, with China and Russia generally voting in the same pattern. The voting behavior is also a reflection, especially on the part of China, of growing sophistication and pragmatism in international engagement. China's initial behavior was minimally more congenial than Russia's, but it voted alongside Russia with two abstentions on proposed sanctions in 2016. However, China has demonstrated far more engagement than Russia in both global and regional level peace processes in South Sudan. China's commitment as a TCC is exemplified in South Sudan, where, as of this writing, it deploys 1,068 personnel, its highest number in any U.N. peace operation.¹⁷⁵ On the regional level, China has also been highly involved in regional mediation efforts with the government of South Sudan, led by the IGAD and the A.U. In addition to the financial support it has lent to the mediation effort, China has also been involved in mediation processes to halt violence in South Sudan.¹⁷⁶

As it does in Sudan, China has considerable diplomatic and economic interests in South Sudan. In 2014, China attributed its involvement in mediation in South Sudan to its interests in the African country.¹⁷⁷ At the time of South Sudanese independence in 2011, China held 75 percent of the new state's oil fields, with investments valued at more than \$20 billion.¹⁷⁸ China's National Petroleum Company currently holds a 40 percent stake in South Sudan's oil fields, with many private Chinese businesses established in the country.¹⁷⁹ In 2014, unconfirmed reports alleged that China had sought to deploy U.N. peacekeepers to protect its oil installments in South Sudan.¹⁸⁰ Although less invested than China, Russia's interests in South Sudan are noteworthy. As it does in Sudan, Russia has a stake in South Sudanese arms trade.¹⁸¹ At the end of 2016, Russia had 34 peacekeeping personnel, including four troops with

UNMISS.¹⁸² (As noted earlier, Russia’s primary focus in peacekeeping is in areas close to its periphery.) In spite of personal losses by the P2 in South Sudan, both states continue to support the mission with their peacekeepers. In 2012, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army shot down a Russian helicopter, leading to the deaths of four Russians.¹⁸³ Following the tragic loss of two peacekeepers in 2016, China reaffirmed its commitment to international peacekeeping.¹⁸⁴

China’s and Russia’s official statements on Security Council votes in South Sudan reflect three main themes. First, the votes show the P2’s preferences for domestic consent and the involvement of regional actors. In abstaining from voting on Resolution 2304, China and Russia lauded the involvement of the A.U. and IGAD and, pointing to Juba’s discontent with the existing mandate, urged the Security Council to pursue political solutions.¹⁸⁵ A similar position was taken when the P2 abstained from voting on the failed December 23, 2016, resolution.¹⁸⁶ In addition, Russia abstained from voting on Resolution 2241, citing the South Sudanese government’s objections to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).¹⁸⁷ Second, the P2’s votes in South Sudan reflect their wariness over sanctions. The P2 and many non-permanent members of the council, including the A3, rejected the December 23 resolution, which proposed further sanctions.¹⁸⁸ Although the penholder, the U.S., said the resolution was necessitated given worsening conditions that had resulted in a mass migration from South Sudan to neighboring Uganda at an average of 3,000 people daily, the P2 insisted that regional efforts be carried through.¹⁸⁹ China further stated that it opposed the use of “sanctions on developing countries.”¹⁹⁰ Third, the P2’s votes also reflect their discontent with the distribution of penholding privileges within the council. The P2 continued to show their discontent with the textual provisions of the Security Council resolutions and alleged the misuse of penholding privilege. On resolutions 2241 and 2252, both drafted by the U.S., Russia said the penholder had ignored the concerns of other council member states in pursuit of its national interests.¹⁹¹ China voted in the affirmative in both instances but complained about the textual provisions in Resolution 2252.¹⁹² In abstaining from voting on Resolution 2304, China also cited the noninclusion of its concerns and that of other regional actors, among other factors.¹⁹³



Burundi

Security Council Resolutions and Votes on Burundi

U.N. Resolution	Security Council (S.C.) Issue/Controversy	Votes			
		A3	China	Russia	P3
Res. 2137 (2014)	S.C. ends old mission (BNUB), establishes new mission (MENUB)	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2248 (2015)	S.C. condemns violence, considers “additional measures”	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2279 (2016)	S.C. proposes police presence to support A.U./EAC efforts	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2303 (2016)	Secretary General requests police component	AAY	A	Y	YYY

Key Resolutions and Votes

Long-standing tensions between Hutu and Tutsi communities contributed to the establishment of the U.N. Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004, deployed to support the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.¹⁹⁴ The mission was replaced by a political mission, the U.N. Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), at the end of 2006.¹⁹⁵ Another political mission, the U.N. Office in Burundi (BNUB), replaced BINUB at the end of 2010.¹⁹⁶ Finally, Resolution 2137 (2014) wound down BNUB and established a new mission, the U.N. Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB).¹⁹⁷

The resolution to create the new election observation mission was drafted by France and Nigeria, and was unanimously adopted with no complaints or concerns by members of the council.¹⁹⁸ A subsequent Resolution 2248 (2015), drafted by France, to consider “additional measures” in the face of rising violence, was also unanimously adopted,¹⁹⁹ as was Resolution 2279, which sought options for police presence to support the efforts of regional actors.²⁰⁰ Members of the A3, Egypt and Senegal, lauded the resolution as a support for the mediation roles played by the A.U. and the East African Commission (EAC).²⁰¹ Resolution 2303, to deploy U.N. police observers to monitor the situation, was adopted but not unanimously accepted. China abstained from voting, as did two members of the A3, Angola and Egypt.²⁰²

China and Russia appear to be interested in building long-term diplomatic relations with Burundi. In the case of China, both states have exchanged high-level visits since 2004, according to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The earliest records show that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met with the vice president of Burundi in 2004, and in 2014, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in China.²⁰³ China and Russia also sent high-level officials to the swearing-in ceremony of President Nkurunziza as he began a controversial third term in office in August 2015, despite international condemnation of the violent elections.²⁰⁴ Although foreign direct investment in Burundi was “non-existent in 2007,” 2015 figures show a great improvement at \$70.2 million, with Russia as one of the country’s major investors.²⁰⁵ Although China and Burundi are trade partners, the enduring conflict has limited China’s economic involvement in the African state.²⁰⁶

Notwithstanding these interests, as the official statements of the council members show, three main reasons were proffered for China’s abstention: the principles of state sovereignty, a preference for

regional-level involvement, and the problem of textual provisions and the overreach of penholders. China can make a valid argument that its position aligned with the actions of the A.U., which backed down after threatening sanctions against the Burundian government, and the A3, whose members abstained from voting on Resolution 2303.²⁰⁷ Although the penholder, the U.S., argued that police presence in Burundi was a preventive measure, China focused on the need for state consent, arguing that “political missions should be deployed on the basis of full consultation with the country concerned and follow the principle of the consent of the host country,” a point supported by Russia, which nonetheless voted in the affirmative.²⁰⁸ Two of the A3 member states abstained on the basis of the noninclusion of their concerns in the final draft of the resolution.²⁰⁹

Mali

Security Council Resolutions and Votes on Mali

U.N. Resolution	Security Council (S.C.) Issue/Controversy	Votes			
		A3	China	Russia	P3
Res. 2056 (2012)	S.C. establishes support for ECOWAS/A.U. action	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2071 (2012)	U.N. to give military support to ECOWAS/A.U.	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2085 (2012)	S.C. authorizes African-led mission (AFISMA)	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2100 (2013)	S.C. votes for U.N. mission (MINUSMA) to subsume AFISMA	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2295 (2016)	Mandate to adopt more robust posture	YYY	Y	Y	YYY

Key Resolutions and Votes

The impetus for a peacekeeping mission in Mali began as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Mali sought a military plan to tackle the complex security crisis in Mali.²¹⁰ The ECOWAS plan, which began with political negotiations in March 2012, was subsumed by the A.U.’s plan in June 2015.²¹¹ Security Council Resolution 2071 called on states to provide international assistance, and Resolution 2085 authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), with a mandate to support the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MSDF).²¹² The draft proposals prepared by several countries including Colombia, France, Germany, India, Luxembourg, Morocco, Portugal, South Africa, Togo, the U.K., and the U.S., were both unanimously adopted with no registrations of concern with the content of the resolutions.²¹³

The situation in Mali took a twist with the January 2013 deployment of Operation Serval, a French-led military operation to support the MSDF against terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the face of the A.U.’s fledgling peace enforcement mission.²¹⁴ The operation lasted for just about three months, but helped stop the advancement of the terrorist group into Bamako.²¹⁵

One month after obtaining the Security Council’s consent, the A.U. conducted a funding drive to support AFISMA.²¹⁶ It is not clear whether Russia made any financial or logistical pledges to support the drive, and compared to commitments by the U.S. (\$96 million) and France (\$63 million), China made a modest \$1 million pledge.²¹⁷ Although African states and the A.U. in total contributed just 16

percent of the total \$460 million raised for AFISMA, certain states, such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, made comparatively substantial pledges, and many African states also pledged troop support to the mission.²¹⁸ In July 2013, the Security Council passed Resolution 2100 to establish the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which subsumed AFISMA.²¹⁹

Although the P2's voting decisions on Mali do not vary compared to other permanent members of the Security Council, Mali provides a good example of how geopolitical considerations can constrain or influence the actions of the P2 in the Security Council. It also gives a good example of the changing security dynamics in contemporary peacekeeping and how the P2 have responded to these dynamics. In Mali, two main themes feature in the P2's support for the U.N. resolutions. First, the P2's preference for host-state consent and local ownership of the peace process was largely satisfied. The Malian government welcomed the Security Council authorization of AFISMA.²²⁰ In addition, the French-led military operation in Mali was in response to a direct request from Mali.²²¹ Furthermore, relevant regional actors (ECOWAS and the A.U.) were central in the move to establish the regional mission, which was later subsumed by the U.N. mission. Following the vote to establish MINUSMA, Russia attributed its assenting vote to the gravity of the complex situation, the consent of the host state, and the involvement of relevant regional organizations.²²²

Second, Mali provides an example of multinational cooperation on international terrorism in the post-9/11 world, and speaks to one of the contexts in which U.N. resolutions are likely to draw consensus within the Security Council, especially on the part of the P2. The 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., have helped forge a more united front between the P2 and P3 in peace operations on the continent, especially when the conflict has elements of international terrorism.²²³ The complex security crisis in Mali resulted from a combination of international terrorism, a coup d'état, and general failure of governance.²²⁴ The French-led operation was also in immediate response to the threats posed by three terrorist groups: Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar Dine, and AQIM.²²⁵ Given this context, the P2 consented to all council resolutions, rarely making statements or commenting on textual preferences.²²⁶ This broader context may also explain why the P2 raised no tangible objections in the Security Council over the untidy re-hatting of A.U. peacekeepers with the establishment of MINUSMA. The timing and process of the handover from the A.U. to the U.N. in Mali was not generally acceptable to the regional body, and the process exposed gaps that endangered the U.N.'s peacekeepers.²²⁷ This constraint posed by asymmetric conflicts on U.N. mandates was noted by Russia in 2013 and 2016 even as it assented to both resolutions.²²⁸

Russia's concerns did not result in an abstention or a veto. Moreover, even though it is argued that China was not enthusiastic about the French-led mission,²²⁹ China's support for MINUSMA shows its endorsement for the mission with no objections to the Chapter VII mandate and no rhetoric urging political solutions, which have come to be expected from China. And while Russia has no peacekeeping personnel in Mali, in 2013 China deployed combat troops, which it called "protection units," for the first time to a U.N. mission, and still had 401 troops deployed with MINUSMA at the end of 2016.²³⁰ This move indicates a more tolerant stance to interventionist processes, at least in Mali, and also provides an opportunity for Chinese peacekeepers to gain field experience in counterterrorism military operations in Africa.²³¹

Libya

Security Council Resolutions and Votes on Libya

U.N. Resolution	Security Council (S.C.) Issue/Controversy	Votes			
		A3	China	Russia	P3
Res. 1970 (2011)	S.C. imposes sanctions on Libya; calls for humanitarian aid; refers case to the ICC	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 1973 (2011)	S.C. establishes no-fly zone; more sanctions	YYY	A	A	YYY
Res. 2009 (2011)	S.C. establishes U.N. mission (UNSMIL)	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2017 (2011)	S.C. acts to stop proliferation of portable surface-to-air missiles, other arms	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2146 (2014)	S.C. bans illicit export of crude oil from Libya	YYY	Y	Y	YYY
Res. 2298 (2016)	S.C. authorizes member states to destroy Libya's chemical weapons	YYY	Y	Y	YYY

Key Resolutions and Votes

The conflict in Libya, which had its roots in the so-called Arab Spring that swept through neighboring North African states Tunisia and Egypt, led to the deployment of a NATO-led intervention in 2011.²³² Driven by the heavy-handed crackdown on civilian protesters by the authoritarian regime of Muammar Gaddafi, the Security Council passed Resolution 1970, which effected a travel ban and assets freeze on the dictator’s family and close officials, citing “the gross and systematic violation of human rights” by the regime.²³³ The resolution was unanimously adopted, and framed in language aimed at the protection of civilians.²³⁴ Less than one month later, consensus on Resolution 1973 proved more difficult to obtain. The P2 and three other states abstained from voting on the resolution, which established a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized member states to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians.”²³⁵ Subsequent resolutions on Libya, including Resolution 2009, which established a political mission – the U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) – were unanimously adopted.²³⁶

In Libya, the Security Council dynamics that led up to the establishment of UNSMIL show more variation and difference in opinion between the P2 and the P3 than resolutions to adjust the mission’s mandates in subsequent years. The P2 abstained from voting just once in 2011. Nevertheless, resolutions 1970 and 1973 are succinct examples of the dynamics and contradictions inherent in Security Council resolutions, which make behavior of the P2 often unpredictable. By abstaining on Resolution 1973, the P2 followed their principles of noninterference and local ownership. Acceding on Resolution 1970, however, was less clear. The P2 embraced the Responsibility to Protect agenda of the draft resolution and did not oppose the proposed sanctions or the invocation of an ICC referral, as they had regarding Sudan and South Sudan (discussed earlier in this paper).

One factor that may provide insight into the P2’s voting decisions on both resolutions has to do with the particular interests of both states at specific stages of the conflict. Despite Libya’s difficult history with the West, it maintained diplomatic and economic relations with China and Russia. By 2011, Chinese companies had investments in Libya valued at \$18 billion, with about 36,000 Chinese workers.²³⁷ Like China, Russia also had considerable investments in Libya, and lost up to \$4 billion as a result of canceled arms deals and a postponed railway project following the crisis.²³⁸ In supporting Resolution

1970, China's concern for its citizens and assets was a key factor, and it argued that "safety and interests of foreign nationals in Libya must be assured."²³⁹ An affirmative vote, therefore, was in line with its interests to prevent possible harm to its citizens by the Libyan government. By March 17, 2011, however, when resolution 1973 was put to vote, China had completed "the largest and the most complicated overseas evacuation ever conducted by the Chinese government since the People's Republic of China was founded," removing 35,860 Chinese nationals from Libya.²⁴⁰ Russia had also evacuated its citizens, who numbered fewer than 2,000.²⁴¹ Two years after this, China adopted a formal policy influenced by this experience. In its 2013 defense white paper, China institutionalized the use of MOOTWs to "strengthen overseas operational capabilities such as emergency response and rescue, merchant vessel protection at sea and evacuation of Chinese nationals, and provide reliable security support for China's interests overseas."²⁴²

China's and Russia's attitudes toward the roles of regional organizations changed as the Libya intervention was debated in the council. Early on in Libya's crisis, both Russia and China advocated policies of support to regional organizations, consistent with their usual rhetoric.²⁴³ These policies were first challenged during the negotiation of Resolution 1973 in March 2011, when Russia viewed the Arab League's plan to establish a no-fly zone over Libya and subsequent request for Security Council assistance as having been coopted by the P3.²⁴⁴ Russia's statement explaining its abstention from Resolution 1973 expressed concern that the "initial concept as stated by the League of Arab States" had been transformed into a quite different kind of intervention.²⁴⁵ Russia submitted its own draft resolution to the Security Council that "would have backed relevant efforts by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, the Human Rights Council and the African Union."²⁴⁶ China also "attached great importance" to the position of the A.U. when it abstained from Resolution 1973.²⁴⁷

However, by May 2011, the A.U.'s efforts had proved ineffective and lost credibility among the relevant stakeholders.²⁴⁸ This was due to several factors, including divisions between A.U. member states and a lack of political and financial support from NATO countries.²⁴⁹ By the time the establishment of UNSMIL was introduced in Resolution 2009, options for addressing the crisis by regional organizations had been exhausted. In this geopolitical context, Russia shifted its approach away from support to regional organizations and sought to address the crisis "exclusively under the auspices of the United Nations and the Security Council."²⁵⁰ China too expressed a desire that "the United Nations and the Security Council should play a leading role" in assisting Libyan reconstruction.²⁵¹

UNSMIL's facilitation efforts resulted in the Libyan Political Agreement in December 2015.²⁵² Russia expressed support for these efforts and called on all Libyan political parties to support the agreement.²⁵³ Despite this rhetoric, Russian actions have at times undermined the mission's political progress. Most importantly, Russia has provided political, financial, and military support to Khalifa Haftar, a high-profile militia leader who currently threatens the authority of the Government of National Accord – the government supported by UNSMIL and formed as a result of the political process facilitated by the mission. Analysts have speculated that Russia's support for Haftar may be motivated by several national interest considerations such as a desire to increase Russian influence and presence in the Middle East; a global objective to support the installation of governments that are authoritarian in character; and the prospect of forming new weapons and oil deals with Haftar to replace previous lucrative deals with the Gaddafi government.²⁵⁴

China's actions with regard to Libya in recent years have also sometimes conflicted with its stated support for UNSMIL. While China continues to support UNSMIL's political process and the Libyan

Political Agreement rhetorically,²⁵⁵ ties between China and Tobruk, the stronghold of Haftar’s rival government, are apparent. Chinese companies have been in negotiations with the Tobruk government for infrastructure projects and contracts,²⁵⁶ and the Tobruk government even welcomed the prospect of Chinese military assistance in fighting extremists.²⁵⁷ In October 2016, a Chinese consortium announced a plan to invest \$36 billion in infrastructure projects in Tobruk.²⁵⁸

Libya also provides the only case under review where a member of the P2 initiated a Security Council resolution. Concerned with the possibility of arms from Libya “falling into the hands of terrorist groups,” Russia drafted Resolution 2017 to stem arms proliferation in Libya.²⁵⁹ This move came after Russia had accused other contributors of distorting the original text drafted by Lebanon, the primary penholder for Resolution 1973 – a position it continues to hold on this issue.²⁶⁰ The P2’s concerns about the proliferation of arms (in particular, chemical weapons) and their possible transfer to international terrorists influenced their support for Resolution 2298.²⁶¹

China and Russia in African Peace Operations: A Summary

Personnel Contributions to Select U.N. Missions

U.N. Mission	Police		Military Experts On Mission		Troops	
	China	Russia	China	Russia	China	Russia
UNAMID	0	0	0	0	231	0
UNMISS	2	27	3	3	1,050	4
MINUSMA	0	0	0	0	401	0

Military and Police Contributions to Select Missions²⁶²

China and Russia are regarded as Africa’s nontraditional security partners.²⁶³ In some instances their behaviors on the Security Council align, but they have different economic, strategic, and cultural interests on the continent. Each country’s voting decisions are based on a complex calculation of domestic interests, which are expected to continue to change with time. The cases reviewed in this report show that the voting decisions and the official statements of the P2 can help map the decision-making process within the Security Council. While these cases are not necessarily predictive, they provide a broad perspective on patterns that we can expect from the P2 on the Security Council going forward.

For instance, their differing strategic interests may be deduced from the table above. Russia continues to limit the use of its mobile forces to its region’s periphery, whereas China is increasingly softening its stance on noninterference and broadening its strategic engagements on the African continent.²⁶⁴ As seen in the distribution of peacekeeping personnel and their voting behaviors and official statements in the more recent peace operations in Mali and Burundi, China and Russia may take similar positions with the Security Council but pursue distinct agendas in Africa. For instance, China’s large troop presence in Mali allows the PLA to gain combat experience in a conflict with elements of international terrorism. Russia, on the other hand, clearly does not see African conflicts as an opportunity for gaining combat experience given its primary focus on its own region. This report has also highlighted China’s impetus for evolving strategic interests in Africa, which is more targeted at protecting its economic interests on the continent,


as well as ensuring safety for its growing diaspora doing business in Africa; this is distinct from Russia's interest in providing specialized logistical support for peace operations in Africa.²⁶⁵

Nevertheless, the P2's foreign policy agendas align in certain dimensions. Both states share a preference for a multipolar global order and a repudiation of perceived Western norms.²⁶⁶ The Security Council, therefore, provides both states with a platform for assertion and an opportunity to push for their preferred norms of nonintervention and the primacy of state sovereignty, even though China appears increasingly more flexible in its stance.²⁶⁷ This united front provides a window into possible opportunities to enhance or align the P2's support for local ownership of peace processes in Africa.

This report identifies the following themes that are common to the P2's decision-making processes on the Security Council. In general, these factors contributed to or determined the voting decisions of the P2 on peace operations in Africa.

1. China and Russia hinged their voting decisions on the principles of noninterference, support for host-state consent, and a preference for local ownership or the involvement of relevant regional bodies in peace processes on the continent. Even when there are interest calculations, which contribute to the decision-making yet are not generally acknowledged, these principles serve to legitimize the P2's behavior on the Security Council. In all the instances under review, China and Russia made a case for local ownership and placed emphases on the importance of host-state consent. While a negative vote represents a more definite repudiation of a given resolution, an abstention withholds legitimacy from

FIGURE 2: Factors that Contribute to the P2's Security Council Voting Behaviors



the resolution and presents a nonunited image of the Security Council.²⁶⁸ In the cases of Sudan, South Sudan, and Burundi, the P2 framed their abstentions as consequences of the nonconsenting host state. Furthermore, the P2's resistance to sanctions stems from this principle of noninterference and a preference for political solutions. For instance, Russia abstained on Resolution 2241 in South Sudan, saying that council resolutions should not seek "to frighten the parties with the 'club' of sanctions."²⁶⁹

This stance is often narrow, and, in some instances, fails to acknowledge the delicate balance between the U.N.'s provisions for pacific settlement of disputes and the use of sanctions or force. A blanket opposition to the use of sanctions may inadvertently grant support to a host state, even when its actions do not support the peace mission.²⁷⁰ The support for political solutions, particularly the support for regional institutions, has, in some instances, failed to take into account the success or failures of those mediation processes.²⁷¹

2. Notwithstanding the official statements, voting behaviors serve to fulfill domestic interests of the P2. When the principles of noninterference clash with domestic interests, China and Russia are likely to lay aside the principles and make voting decisions to help meet domestic needs. This is observable in Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya.

3. China and Russia have refrained from initiating draft resolutions on peace operations in Africa. There are two factors here: first, common domestic interests within the council provide an opportunity for formal and informal coalitions on specific issues. Hence, it is not uncommon to see the P3 taking a common position on particular issues, as the P2 does. A common theme with the P2's Security Council behavior is derived from a preference for multipolarity and an assertion of their "great power" status.²⁷² Yet the common goal of asserting this position has often pitched the P2 against Western powers or the P3 within the Security Council. Hence the repudiation of Western influence is often seen in expressions of discontent with council resolutions, which are mostly drafted by the P3.

Second, penholding is a source of contention for the P2 and nonpermanent members of the Security Council. This contention arises from both the resolution-drafting process and the textual provisions of the draft resolution. In many instances, China and Russia have cited discontent with textual provisions of the resolution as the reason for a vote abstention. Similarly, both states have attributed voting decisions to a noninclusive negotiation process or a draft that ignores the common position of relevant regional actors like the A3. The P2 is at liberty to initiate a draft resolution, and it is unclear why China and Russia refrain from doing so, especially given the multiple times that both states complain about the noninclusion of their contributions to final drafts. In Resolution 2017 on Libya, Russia was able to co-opt the P3 as co-drafters, resulting in less acrimony within the Security Council.

4. Prevailing geopolitical constraints contribute to the P2's decision-making. These constraints mainly refer to exogenous factors that give contexts to P2 behaviors. Some examples are domestic or international public opinion, as in the case with China in the months leading up to the Beijing Olympics; and global incidents that cause change in security calculations, such as the impact of 9/11 on P5 attitudes to international terrorism or the wider Arab Spring, which impacted the particular trajectory of the Libyan crisis. In general, the P2 has shown flexibility and cooperation in dealing with terrorism and other transnational organized crime in Africa.²⁷³ When international terrorism is a primary factor in a conflict, as in Sudan (in the early days), Mali, and Libya, the P2 has shown a tendency for consensus in Security Council votes.

Conclusions

This report analyzed formal Security Council debates and votes on U.N. missions in five states in Africa: Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Mali, and Libya. It also built on interviews with key players and considered meeting records on general issues pertaining to peace operations reforms in Africa. It sought to extract themes from these documents to understand the informal or formal coalition structures and factors that contribute to voting decisions in the Security Council.

The rationale for this approach was to find out how two Security Council members, China and Russia, frame and act with regard to supporting peace operations in Africa. While not attempting to use these to predict future behavior, the aim was to examine patterns of behavior that can provide a general framework of how both states have acted in the past with a view to understanding future possibilities. The analysis has led to the following conclusions:

- Going by their official statements and voting decisions, China and Russia appear to be aligned in their preferences on the Security Council. Yet both states pursue different strategic agendas regarding peace operations in Africa. For instance, China's troop contributions point to its need to gain combat experience; whereas Russia earned \$927 million from U.N. peacekeeping logistical services, especially air transportation, between 2012 and 2016, although it prefers to keep its troops in regions nearer to its periphery.
- Global power divisions are extended into Security Council deliberations. These divisions, determined by ideological preferences, shape agendas, determine the trajectories of, and inform support for Security Council resolutions. While it is generally correct to say that these ideological differences pit the P3 against the P2, this report finds that voting decisions vary by context.
- In Security Council agenda-setting, China and Russia have mostly chosen to be reactive, contributing to agendas set by the P3 through the Security Council's penholding system.
- The P2's rhetorical support for African peace operations is consistently framed in terms of support for political solutions and as an extension of their noninterference principle. This position also plays a crucial role, often elevating the positions of key African actors, especially the A.U. and African members of the Security Council, to council-level debates.
- Notwithstanding this rhetorical support, actual voting behavior is often determined by domestic interests and bilateral relationships.

Given the strong rhetorical support for African causes in the Security Council, and given the increasingly aligned economic and strategic interests of the P2 and the continent, there is a substantive opportunity for future cooperation in a systematic and predictable way both within the council and on the regional level. China and Russia could better serve their interests and those of their African partners by taking a more proactive role on the Security Council, especially with regard to penholding as an opportunity to set council agendas.

Endnotes

1. United Nations Department of Field Support, “Special Political Missions 2016,” Map No. 4561, October 2016, <http://www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org.undpa/files/DPA%20USG%204561%20Oct%202016.pdf>; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Current Peacekeeping Operations,” accessed March 8, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml>.
2. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “U.N. Mission’s Contributions by Country,” December 31, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/dec16_5.pdf.
3. United Nations High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), “Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People,” U.N. Doc. S/2015/446, June 17, 2015, 9-10, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/446.
4. The author of this paper also conducted interviews with relevant actors for this report.
5. This concept of traditional vs. nontraditional partners comes from the development assistance literature and refers to the growing “South-South cooperation,” especially from BRICS states to other developing states, and the differences in development aid emanating from the so-called Global South vs. the North. For more on this subject, see Paulo Esteves and Manaíra Assunção, “South-South Cooperation and the International Development Battlefield: Between the OECD and the U.N.,” *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 10 (December 13, 2014): 1775-1790; Rebecca Schaaf, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Partnerships for International Development,” *Geography Compass* 9, no. 2 (2015): 68-80; and Thomas G. Weiss and Adriana Erthal Abdenur, “Introduction: Emerging Powers and the U.N. – What Kind of Development Partnership?” *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 10 (December 13, 2014): 1749-1758.
6. In some instances, SPMs have been established during ongoing violence. For example, Resolution 2102 established the U.N. Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to perform “good offices” functions alongside the A.U. peacekeeping mission, AMISOM. See U.N. Security Council, Resolution 2101, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2101, April 25, 2013.
7. U.N. Secretary-General, “Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions,” U.N. Doc. A/68/223, July 29, 2013, para. 4.
8. *Ibid.*, para 13. For more on conflict phases, see Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Third Edition* (Polity Publishers, April 11, 2011), 25 -26.
9. This refers only to field-based missions. For all political missions (field-based missions, special envoys, and sanctions panels and monitoring groups), see U.N. Department of Field Support, “Special Political Missions 2016,” Map No. 4561.
10. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” January 18, 2008, 22.
11. *Ibid.*, 17-23.
12. Durch & Blechman define traditional peacekeeping by the U.N. as interstate conflict containment based on local consent (William J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order*, report no. 2 [Washington, DC: Stimson Center, March 1992], ii). In 1997, pointing to the changing contexts of violent conflicts, especially in Africa, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan bemoaned the fundamental capacity gap in a U.N. that was “designed to deal with inter-State warfare but is being required more and more often to respond to intra-State instability and conflict” (U.N. Secretary-General, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,” U.N. Doc. A/52/871, April 13, 1998, paras. 3-11).
13. U.N. General Assembly, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy and Related Matters,” U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/120, December 18, 1992; U.N. General Assembly, “Supplement to the Agenda for Peace,” U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/242, September 26, 1997; U.N. General Assembly, “Millennium Forum,” U.N. Doc. A/54/959, August 8, 2000; Lakhdar Brahimi, et al., “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” U.N. Doc. A/55/305, August 21, 2000; HIPPO, “Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People.”
14. HIPPO, “Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People.”
15. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945, art. 24, para. 1.

16. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," 47- 49.
17. U.N. Secretary-General, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations," U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, January 3, 1995, para. 26.
18. U.N. Security Council, "Statement by the President of the Security Council," S/PRST/2001/3, January 31, 2001, 2.
19. David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond, *International Organisation in World Politics*, 3rd ed., in *The Making of the Twentieth Century* series (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 119- 120.
20. This provision exempts regional "measures against any enemy state." (United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, art. 53, para. 1.)
21. This categorization draws from the Cold-War-era East/West cleavages and the socioeconomic differences between the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and nonmembers, with Russia sometimes categorized as the "poor North." Ferdinand analyzes the voting convergence between the P2 as an extension of the BRIC coalition and their more insistent push for influence at the global level. For more on the subject, see Peter Ferdinand, "Rising Powers at the U.N.: An Analysis of the Voting Behaviour of BRICS in the General Assembly," *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (2014): 376-391; Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, "The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly," *International Organization* 50, no. 4 (Autumn 1996): 633-640; and Caroline Levander and Walter Mignolo, "Introduction: The Global South and World Dis/Order," *The Global South* 5, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 3-5.
22. David Shinn, interview by author, Washington, D.C., October 26, 2016.
23. Barry O'Neill, "Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 2 (June 1996): 230.
24. U.N. Security Council, "Note by the President of the Security Council," U.N. Doc. S/2014/268, April 14, 2014.
25. The P3 often work together to produce drafts. The "Group of Friends" are informal groups of nonpermanent members with special interests who also come together to sponsor resolution drafts. (U.N. Security Council, "Penholders and Chairs," January 29, 2016, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/pen-holders-and-chairs.php>.)
26. Ren argues that although China is not primarily an agenda-setter on the Security Council, its reactions are not usually to hinder the resolutions (Mu Ren, "China's Non-Intervention Policy in UNSC Sanctions in the 21st Century: The Cases of Libya, North Korea, and Zimbabwe," *Ritsumeikan International Affairs* 12 [2014]: 101-134).
27. In 2016, the P3 served as penholders in all but one "situation-specific or thematic matter"; for instance, in Burundi (France), Mali (France), Liberia (U.S.), Somalia (U.S., U.K.), Sudan and South Sudan (U.S. or U.K.), though Senegal served as the penholder on Guinea-Bissau. (U.N. Security Council, "Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies and Penholders for 2016," <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Penholders%20and%20Chairs.pdf>.)
28. For example, on Sudan, Algeria did not vote in favor of Resolution 1591, saying it regretted "the fact that the sponsors of the draft, against all expectations, decided to keep the text as it was and made no effort to iron out the disagreements and to promote a consensus" (U.N. Security Council 5153rd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5153, March 29, 2005, 3). On Libya, China abstained from voting on Resolution 1973, saying that "in the Security Council's consultations ... we and other Council members asked specific questions. However, regrettably, many of those questions failed to be clarified or answered. China has serious difficulty with parts of the resolution" (U.N. Security Council 6498th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011). On South Sudan, Russia refrained from voting in favor of Resolution 2241 because it failed to "take into account a number of serious concerns on the part of the Russian Federation and some other Council delegations," and expressed "serious questions with regard to the working methods used by some of our colleagues in the Security Council, who abuse the practice of penholding by inconsiderately pushing through their national priorities and neglecting the red lines drawn by other delegations" (U.N. Security Council 7581st Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7581, December 15, 2015, 2-3). In Burundi, Egypt abstained from voting on Resolution 2303 because the "current language [did] not take our concerns into account and [did] not fully represent the views of all members of the Council" (U.N. Security Council 7752nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7752, July 29, 2016, 3).
29. Eghosa Osaghae and Gillian Robinson, "Introduction," in *Researching Conflict in Africa: Insights and Experiences*, eds. Elisabeth Porter, Gillian Robinson, Marie Smyth, Albrecht Schnabel, and Eghosa Osaghae (United Nations University Press, 2005), 1.
30. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/encyclopedia>. For more on the data, see: Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Havard

- Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5, 2002, 615–637; Erik Melander, Thérèse Petersson and Lotta Themnér, "Organized violence, 1989–2015," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 5, September 2016, 727–742.
31. The UNHCR's "populations of concern" include refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, returnees, stateless persons, and others (U.N. High Commission for Refugees, "UNHCR Statistics – The World in Numbers," <http://popstats.unhcr.org/dataviz/index.html>).
32. This figure includes 22 past missions (U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Past Peacekeeping Operations," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml>) and 9 current missions (U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Current Peacekeeping Operations," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml>).
33. This figure includes 16 past field-based missions (U.N. Department of Political Affairs, "Past Political Missions," <http://www.un.org/undpa/en/past-political-missions>) and 7 current field-based missions (Department of Field Support, "Special Political Missions 2016," Map No. 4561).
34. U.N. Department of Public Information, "Republic of Congo – ONUC Facts and Figures," September 18, 2001, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucF.html>.
35. U.N. Department of Political Affairs and Office of Information and Communication Technology, "Highlights of Security Council Practice 2016," <https://unite.un.org/sites/unite.un.org/files/app-schighlights/index.html>.
36. Of 100,376 U.N. personnel, 82,485 served in peace operations in Africa at the end of 2016 (U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "U.N. Mission's Contributions by Country").
37. Konstantinos D. Magliveras and Gino J. Naldi, "The African Union: A New Dawn for Africa?" *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 51, no. 2 (April 2002): 415.
38. African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, art. 4(h).
39. Jide Martyns Okeke, "United in Challenges? The African Standby Force and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis," in *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram*, eds. Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and Joh Karlsrud (London: Zed Books, 2016), 92.
40. United Nations and African Union, "Report of the Joint African Union-United Nations Review of Available Mechanisms to Finance and Support African Union Peace Support Operations Authorized by the United Nations Security Council," U.N. Doc. S/2016/809, September 28, 2016, para. 14.
41. The A.U. has deployed personnel to missions in Burundi, Sudan, Comoros, Somalia, Mali, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Uganda, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon (U.N. and A.U., "Report of the Joint African Union-United Nations Review of Available Mechanisms to Finance and Support African Union Peace Support Operations Authorized by the United Nations Security Council," paras. 14–16). In some instances (Burundi, Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic), A.U. missions have been subsumed by the U.N. The re-hatting by the U.N. often follows an establishment of a comprehensive cease-fire agreement, following the A.U.'s stabilization effort. This is because, in theory, U.N. peacekeeping principles require that there should be a "peace to keep" before mission deployment. For more on the subject, see Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, *Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships* (International Peace Institute, April 2013), 9–15; Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe and Alex de Waal, *African Politics, African Peace: Report on the Future of Peace Missions in Africa* (World Peace Foundation, 2016), paras. 94–95.
42. Thomas G. Weiss and Martin Welz, "The U.N. and the African Union in Mali and Beyond: A Shotgun Wedding?" *International Affairs* 90, no. 4 (2014): 900.
43. Chinese Foreign Ministry, "China-African Relations," January 1, 2004, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceza/eng/zghfz/zfgx/t165329.htm>.
44. David Hamilton Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), ix; Yun Sun, *Africa in China's Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution, 2014), 3.
45. Jiang Zemin, "China and Africa – Usher in the New Century Together," speech at the opening ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Ministerial Conference, Beijing 2000, October 10, 2000, <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dyjbzjhy/SP12009/t606804.htm>. For more on FOCAC I, see Ian Taylor, *The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)* (London: Routledge, 2012), 38–41.
46. Dominik Kopinski, Andrzej Polus, and Ian Taylor, "Contextualising Chinese Engagement in Africa," *Journal Of Contemporary African Studies* 29, no. 2 (April 2011): 131; Bates Gill, Chin-Hao Huang, and J. Stephen Morrison, "Assessing

China's Growing Influence in Africa," *China Security* 3, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 7.

47. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the new security concept seeks "common security through mutually beneficial cooperation" (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept," July 31, 2002, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zjzg_663340/gjs_665170/gjzzyhy_665174/2612_665212/2614_665216/t15319.shtml). Also see Ian Taylor, "China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa," *International Affairs* 82, no. 5 (2006): 940-941; and Gill, Huang, and Morrison, "Assessing China's Growing Influence in Africa," 8.

48. Valentina Romei, "China and Africa: Trade Relationship Evolves," *Financial Times*, December 3, 2015, <https://www.ft.com/content/c53e7f68-9844-11e5-9228-87e603d47bdc>.

49. Ibid.

50. Sun, *Africa in China's Foreign Policy*, 14.

51. Chris Alden, *Seeking Security in Africa: China's Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Architecture* (Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, March 2014), 3-6.

52. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to U.N. Operations," December 31, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/dec16_2.pdf.

53. Starting from 1980, China's Security Council began to change in line with Deng Xiaoping's open policy toward the West. (Marissa Mastroianni, "Growing Numbers of Chinese Blue Helmets: China's Changing Role Within the Security Council," *Florida Journal of International Law* 27, no. 1 (April 2015): 128-129; Courtney J. Fung, "China's Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping," Peace Brief 212, U.S. Institute of Peace, July 2016, 1.

54. Zhengyu Wu and Ian Taylor, "From Refusal to Engagement: Chinese Contributions to Peacekeeping in Africa," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29, no. 2 (April 2011): 137-154.

55. Chin-Hao Huang, "Principles and Praxis of China's Peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 3 (June 15, 2011): 258.

56. Fung, "China's Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping," 1.

57. Huang, "Principles and Praxis of China's Peacekeeping."

58. Ibid.; Wu and Taylor, "From Refusal to Engagement: Chinese Contributions to Peacekeeping in Africa."

59. Courtney Richardson, "A Responsible Power? China and the U.N. Peacekeeping Regime," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 3 (June 2011): 288; Miwa Hirono and Marc Lanteigne, "Introduction: China and U.N. Peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping*, 18, no. 3 (June 15, 2011): 245.

60. Fung, "China's Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping," 2.

61. Sarah Teitt, "The Responsibility to Protect and China's Peacekeeping Policy," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 3 (2011): 298.

62. Hirono and Lanteigne, "Introduction: China and U.N. Peacekeeping," 250.

63. China has consistently asserted its support for African approaches to conflict resolution in its official statements in the Security Council. During a debate on peacebuilding in Africa in 2016, Liu Jieyi, Chinese representative at the U.N., said "an African approach is the more effective and feasible way of resolving African problems. Peacebuilding in Africa should abide by the principles of national ownership" (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the U.N., "Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi at the Security Council Debate on Peacebuilding in Africa," July 28, 2016, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/gdxw/t1388863.htm>).

64. Ibid.

65. The U.N. Protection of Civilians operations are implemented along four operational phases: (i) prevention, (ii) preemption, (iii) response and (iv) consolidation. (U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, "The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping," April 1, 2015.) An example of a political mission with protection of civilian mandates is the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, "Field Missions Mandate table," <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/data.shtml>).

66. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2303, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2303, July 29, 2016, para. 13.

67. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the U.N., "Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi after Voting on the Draft Resolution on Burundi," July 29, 2016, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/gdxw/t1386675.htm>.

68. Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, eds., *African Perspectives on China in Africa* (Oxford: Fahamu, 2007), 3; Shinn and Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*, 186; Alden, "Seeking Security in Africa: China's Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Architecture," 6.
69. In 2011, China gave Burundi and Uganda ¥5 million each to support their participation in AMISOM. (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the U.N., "Statement by Ambassador Wang Min, Head of the Chinese Delegation and Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia," November 17, 2011, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regional-hotspots/africa/t878505.htm>.)
70. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the U.N., "Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi at the Security Council Debate on Peacebuilding in Africa."
71. For more on the subject, see Richardson, "A Responsible Power? China and the U.N. Peacekeeping Regime," 291; and Huang, "Principles and Praxis of China's Peacekeeping," 261.
72. The China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) conservatively estimates a Chinese diaspora population of 252,000 in Africa (China Africa Research Initiative, "Data: Chinese Contracts and Workers in Africa," <http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-workers-in-africa>).
73. For a brief overview of China's increasing strategic engagement on the continent following its initial economic entry, see Alden, "Seeking Security in Africa: China's Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Architecture," 3-5; and Richardson, "A Responsible Power? China and the U.N. Peacekeeping Regime," 291.
74. See Hirono and Lanteigne, "Introduction: China and U.N. Peacekeeping," 248; Esteves and Assunção, "South-South Cooperation and the International Development Battlefield: Between the OECD and the U.N.," 1775-1790; Schaaf, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Partnerships for International Development," 68-80; and Weiss and Abdenur, "Introduction: Emerging Powers and the U.N. – What Kind of Development Partnership?," 1749-758.
75. This idea of norm-setting and norm-taking has to do with the ability of powerful states to export (set) or imbibe (take) preferred state behavior, based on its preferred principles. For instance, P3 states are said to propagate democratic norms of human rights and rule of law, whereas P2 states are more emphatic on principles of state sovereignty. See Hirono and Lanteigne, "Introduction: China and U.N. Peacekeeping," 243-256; and Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, "The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly," *International Organization* 50, no. 4 (Autumn 1996): 633-640.
76. Richardson, "A Responsible Power? China and the U.N. Peacekeeping Regime," 287-289; Wu and Taylor, "From Refusal to Engagement: Chinese Contributions to Peacekeeping in Africa".
77. Hirono and Lanteigne, "Introduction: China and U.N. Peacekeeping," 248-252; Richardson, "A Responsible Power? China and the U.N. Peacekeeping Regime," 286-287.
78. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "U.N. Mission's Summary Detailed by Country," December 31, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/dec16_3.pdf.
79. David Shinn, interview by author, Washington, D.C., October 26, 2016
80. Ali Mazrui and Christophe Wondji, eds., *Africa Since 1935* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1993), 844; Alexandra Arkhangelskaya and Vladimir Shubin, "Is Russia Back? Realities of Russian Engagement in Africa," *Emerging Powers in Africa* 16, LSE Ideas Report (2013): 19-20.
81. Arkhangelskaya and Shubin, "Is Russia Back? Realities of Russian Engagement in Africa," 19.
82. *Ibid.*, 19-21.
83. *Ibid.*; Keir Giles, *Russian Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College Press, July 2013), 4-5; Irina Filatova, "Indoctrination or Scholarship? Education of Africans at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in the Soviet Union, 1923-1937," *Paedagogica Historica* 35, no. 1 (1999): 59-61.
84. Allen Lynch, *Vladimir Putin and Russian Statecraft* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2011), 65.
85. During the 2016 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, experts bemoaned the low trade flow between Russia and the African continent. Of the total \$430 billion import of manufactured goods into sub-Saharan Africa, Russian goods were valued at a paltry \$2.5 billion ("Russia-Africa: Advancing New Frontiers," Programme of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, to be held June 16, 2017, <https://www.forumspb.com/en/2016/sections/62/materials/309/sessions/1502>).

86. China's "going out" strategy officially began in 1996. (Sun, *Africa in China's Foreign Policy*, 6.
87. Lynch, *Vladimir Putin and Russian Statecraft*, 65.
88. Arkhangelskaya and Shubin, "Is Russia Back? Realities of Russian Engagement in Africa," 21; S. Neil MacFarlane and Albrecht Schnabel, "Russia's Approach to Peacekeeping," *International Journal* 50, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 299.
89. Arkhangelskaya and Shubin, "Is Russia Back? Realities of Russian Engagement in Africa," 25; J. Peter Pham, *Russia's Return to Africa* (The Atlantic Council, March 13, 2014).
90. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2015," SIPRI fact sheet, February 2016.
91. Arkhangelskaya and Shubin, "Is Russia Back? Realities of Russian Engagement in Africa," 20-26.
92. Giles, *Russian Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 10.
93. Ibid.
94. Giles argues that one political benefit for Russia's re-engagement with the continent can play out in harnessing large support from African states in the U.N. General Assembly, as exemplified in Russia's 2012 campaign in African states (Ethiopia, Liberia, Madagascar, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) to seek support for its position on Syria (Ibid., 12-13).
95. Andrei Raevsky and I. N. Vorob'ev, *Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations*, research paper no. 28 (U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research, November 1994) 17; Alexander Nikitin, "The Russian Federation," in *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 173-174.
96. Raevsky and Vorob'ev, *Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations*, 9-17; Nikitin, "The Russian Federation," 173-174.
97. MacFarlane and Schnabel, "Russia's Approach to Peacekeeping," 299-300; Ted Hopf, "Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force: Russia's Great Power Identities and Military Intervention in Abkhazia," *Review of International Studies* 31 (December 2005): 234.
98. See overview of Soviet Union participation in U.N. peacekeeping in Anthony Kellet, "Soviet and Russian Peacekeeping 1948-1998: Historical Overview and Assessment," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 12, no. 2 (June 1999): 2-4; Olga Abilova, "Peacekeeping Contribution Profile: Russia," International Peace Institute, New York, NY, October 31, 2016, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2016/10/31/peacekeeping-contribution-profile-russia/>.
99. Abilova, "Peacekeeping Contribution Profile: Russia."
100. See overview of Soviet Union participation in U.N. peacekeeping in Kellet, "Soviet and Russian Peacekeeping 1948-1998: Historical Overview and Assessment," 3.
101. Ibid.
102. MacFarlane and Schnabel, "Russia's Approach to Peacekeeping," 308.
103. Nikitin, "The Russian Federation," 43. More recently, Russia-styled peacekeeping has involved personnel from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) made up of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia. (Olga Abilova, "Peacekeeping Contribution Profile: Russia.")
104. NATO, "Partnership for Peace Programme," April 7, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm.
105. Abilova, "Peacekeeping Contribution Profile: Russia"; Sharyl Cross, "Russia and NATO toward the 21st Century: Conflicts and Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo," NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Award Final Report, August 2001, 2, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/cross.pdf>.
106. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "U.N. Mission's Summary Detailed by Country."
107. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping, "Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," December 31, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/dec16_1.pdf.
108. United Nations Procurement Division, "HQ Contracts," <https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/contract-awards/343>.
109. Ibid.

110. Richardson, "A Responsible Power? China and the U.N. Peacekeeping Regime," 291-292.
111. Abilova, "Peacekeeping Contribution Profile: Russia."
112. Russia, however, contributes 6 percent of MONUSCO's experts on mission personnel, a valuable contribution since this set of personnel is lower in supply across all U.N. missions. (U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "U.N. Missions Summary of Military and Police," August 31, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/aug16_6.pdf).
113. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, "Statement by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the UNSC Meeting on the Agenda Item 'Peace and Security in Africa,' New York, September 25, 2007," September 26, 2007, <http://russiaun.ru/en/news/200709265993>.
114. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, "Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations H.E. Vitaly Churkin at the U.N. Security Council Meeting on Conflict Prevention," September 22, 2011, http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_preventive_diplomacy.
115. U.N. Security Council 7752nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7752, July 29, 2016.
116. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, "Statement by Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, during the Security Council Meeting on Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional and Subregional Organizations," May 24, 2016, http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_aun.
117. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, "Statement by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the UNSC Meeting on the Agenda Item 'Peace and Security in Africa,' New York, September 25, 2007."
118. HIPPO, "Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People."
119. Roberta Cohen and William G. O'Neill, "Last Stand in Sudan?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (March/April 2006): 51-58; Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond, *International Organisation in World Politics, Third Edition*.
120. Berhe and de Waal, *African Politics, African Peace: Report on the Future of Peace Missions in Africa*, para. 98.
121. *Ibid.*, para. 91.
122. United Nations and African Union, "Report of the Joint African Union-United Nations Review of Available Mechanisms to Finance and Support African Union Peace Support Operations Authorized by the United Nations Security Council," para. 96.
123. African Union Peace and Security Council, "Common African Position on the U.N. Review of Peace Operations," A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/2(DII), April 29, 2015, para. 24.
124. *Ibid.*, paras 6(i) and 24.
125. This joint U.N.-A.U. report highlights that some of these challenges exist in both institutions in some instances, but more so in the A.U. (United Nations and African Union, "Report of the Joint African Union-United Nations Review of Available Mechanisms to Finance and Support African Union Peace Support Operations Authorized by the United Nations Security Council," paras. 77-85).
126. A.U. Peace and Security Council, "Common African Position on the U.N. Review of Peace Operations."
127. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "U.N. Mission's Contributions by Country." The A.U. also makes a compelling argument on its comparative strengths in its position on the U.N. Review of Peace Operations (A.U. Peace and Security Council, "Common African Position on the U.N. Review of Peace Operations").
128. Berhe and de Waal, *African Politics, African Peace: Report on the Future of Peace Missions in Africa*, para. 19.
129. A.U. Peace and Security Council, "Common African Position on the U.N. Review of Peace Operations," para. 14.
130. Berhe and de Waal, *African Politics, African Peace: Report on the Future of Peace Missions in Africa*.
131. The A.U.'s Constitutive Act legitimizes intervention in member states in situations of "war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity" (Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, art. 4(h)). For more on U.N. vs. A.U. peacekeeping doctrines, see U.N. and A.U., "Report of the Joint African Union-United Nations Review of Available Mechanisms to Finance and Support African Union Peace Support Operations Authorized by the United Nations Security Council," paras. 63-66.

132. U.N. and A.U., “Report of the Joint African Union-United Nations Review of Available Mechanisms to Finance and Support African Union Peace Support Operations Authorized by the United Nations Security Council,” paras. 63-66; Berhe and de Waal, *African Politics, African Peace: Report on the Future of Peace Missions in Africa*, paras. 19-22.
133. U.N. General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, October 24, 2005; Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, “Enhancing U.N.-A.U. Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union,” U.N. Doc. A/61/630, December 12, 2006.
134. U.N. Security Council 6092nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6092, March 18, 2009; U.N. Security Council 6206th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6206, October 26, 2009; U.N. Security Council 6257th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6257, January 13, 2010.
135. U.N. Security Council 7816th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7816, November 18, 2016.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.; Senegalese Mission representative, interview by author, New York, November 17, 2016.
138. U.N. Security Council 7816th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7816, November 18, 2016, 31.
139. Significant decisions were drawn from meeting records of all Security Council resolutions leading up to the establishment of the mission as well as through the course of the mission. Selected resolutions are chosen for relevance in terms of exchanges between the P5, especially China and Russia.
140. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1044, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1044, January 31, 1996, para. 4.
141. U.N. Security Council 3627th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3627, January 31, 1996.
142. U.N. Security Council 3660th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3660, April 26, 1996, 2-3.
143. Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*, independent study jointly commissioned by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, November 2009, 315-316; World Peace Foundation, “U.N. and A.U. Missions in Sudan,” case study, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/African-Peace-Missions/Research/Case-Studies/Sudan>.
144. Holt and Taylor with Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*, 315-316; U.N. Security Council 4988th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4988, June 11, 2004.
145. U.N. Security Council 4988th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4988, June 11, 2004; U.N. Security Council 5151st Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5151, March 24, 2005.
146. Holt and Taylor with Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*, 337-339.
147. Ibid., 337; David Hamilton Shinn, “China and the Conflict in Darfur,” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 16, no. 1 (2009): 86; World Peace Foundation, “U.N. and A.U. Missions in Sudan.”
148. U.N. News Centre, “Humanitarian and Security Situations in Western Sudan Reach New Lows, U.N. Agency Says,” December 5, 2003, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=9094#WHVatLGZN-U>.
149. Holt and Taylor with Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*, 337.
150. U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593, March 31, 2005, para. 1
151. For instance, the E.U. imposed an arms embargo against Sudan in 1994. Similarly, the U.S. imposed comprehensive sanctions (economic, trade, and financial) on Sudan in 1997. (U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Sudan,” Bureau of African Affairs fact sheet, November 3, 2015; SIPRI, “E.U. Arms Embargo on Sudan,” November 23, 2012, https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/sudan.)
152. Alden argues that China was able to seize the opportunity created when traditional Western states refrained from investing in Sudan (Alden, *Seeking Security in Africa: China’s Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Architecture*, 3).
153. U.N. Security Council 3660th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3660, April 26, 1996, 14.
154. U.N. Security Council, 5040th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004, 4-5.

155. The Casablanca Bloc was a leftist group of African states with Soviet ties. Sudan was originally part of the movement but eventually dropped out when the group became more oriented toward West Africa. (Norman J. Padeleford and Rupert Emerson, eds., "Casablanca Powers," *International Organization* 16, no. 2 (Spring 1962): 437; Giles, *Russian Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 3.
156. Daniel Large, "China's Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories in Peace and War," *The China Quarterly* 199 (September 2009): 610.
157. SIPRI, "SIPRI Arms Transfer Database," <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. The Sudan Project was estimated to be China's biggest overseas project at the time. (Ian Johnson, "China Takes Long View in Overseas Oil Projects," *Wall Street Journal*, December 16, 1999, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB945285475375546693>; Jemera Rone, "Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights," Human Rights Watch, 2003, 458-459).
161. American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker, "Chinese Investments and Contracts in Sudan (2005-2016)," <https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>.
162. Large, "China's Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories in Peace and War," 611.
163. Ibid., 618.
164. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, "China, the Unlikely Human Rights Champion," *Policy Innovations*, The Carnegie Council, February 14, 2007, [http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/HumanRightsChampion; WorldPeaceFoundation, "U.N. and A.U. Missions in Sudan."](http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/HumanRightsChampion; WorldPeaceFoundation, 'U.N. and A.U. Missions in Sudan.')
165. The A.U. created the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. The U.N. created the U.N. Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) in 2004, the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2006, and the U.N. Interim Security Force in Abyei in 2011. In 2008 the A.U. and the U.N. established a hybrid mission, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). (World Peace Foundation, "U.N. and A.U. Missions in Sudan.")
166. AMIS had an initial mandate to monitor compliance with a 2003 cease-fire agreement. Its limited civilian protection was significantly expanded within a few months. The limited success of AMIS in reducing violence, however, was crippled by budget deficiencies (Ibid.).
167. In 2004 the P2 commended the progress in the A.U./Khartoum talks and urged the council to support the state rather than impose sanctions. In 2005 Russia insisted that "diplomatic measures" had not been exhausted, while China said the council should support the work of the A.U. (U.N. Security Council 5040th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004; U.N. Security Council 5153rd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 5153, March 29, 2005.)
168. The P2 viewed the creation of the mission as a successful collaboration of the U.N., the A.U., and the government of Sudan (U.N. Security Council 5727th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 5727, July 31, 2007.)
169. Post-2011, the U.K. has taken the lead on Darfur while the U.S. has taken the lead on South Sudan. (U.N. Security Council, "Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies and Penholders for 2016," <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Penholders%20and%20Chairs.pdf>)
170. U.N. Security Council 3660th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3660, April 26, 1996, 15.
171. On Resolution 1564, Russia again said the sponsors of the resolution ignored Russia's preferences after the negotiation process (U.N. Security Council 5040th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004). On Resolution 1591, China said its "suggestion did not receive a positive response" following the negotiations (U.N. Security Council 5153rd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5153, March 29, 2005). On Resolution 1706, China again complained that its contributions to the draft resolution were ignored by the penholder (U.N. Security Council 5519th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5519, August 31, 2006).
172. This was the case with China in Resolution 1556 (U.N. Security Council 5015th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5015, July 30, 2004, 3) and Russia in Resolution 1564 (U.N. Security Council, 5040th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004, 4).
173. UNMISS was created on July 8, 2011, and South Sudan was formally admitted into the U.N. on July 13, 2011. (U.N. Security Council 6576th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6576, July 8, 2011; U.N. Security Council 6582nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6582, July 13, 2011.)

174. U.N. Security Council, “Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2132 (2013), Security Council Increases United Nations Mission’s Military Presence in South Sudan,” U.N. Doc. SC/11230, December 24, 2013.
175. In 2016 China deployed 1,068 personnel, compared to Russia’s 29, to UNMISS. For full data, see U.N. peacekeeping by country and mission at the end of November 2016, in United Nations, “Summary of Contributions to Peacekeeping by Country and Mission Detail,” November 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/Nov16_3.pdf.
176. In 2014, China donated more than \$1 million to the IGAD to help implement a cease-fire deal. China has also sent high-level officials to South Sudan for mediation. (Drajen Jorgic, “China Takes More Assertive Line in South Sudan Diplomacy,” *Reuters*, June 05, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-china-insight-idUSKBN0EG00320140605>; U.N. Security Council 7850th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7850, December 23, 2016, 6.)
177. Ma Qiang, Chinese ambassador to South Sudan, has said, “We have huge interests in South Sudan so we have to make a greater effort to persuade the two sides to stop fighting and agree to a ceasefire.” (Jorgic, “China Takes More Assertive Line in South Sudan Diplomacy.”)
178. Jacey Fortin, “China In The Middle: South Sudan’s Biggest Oil Importer Learns To Wield Its Clout,” *International Business Times*, April 9, 2014, <http://www.ibtimes.com/china-middle-south-sudans-biggest-oil-importer-learns-wield-its-clout-1568133>; S&P Global Platts News & Analysis, “China to Increase Investment in Sudan’s Oil Industry: Ambassador,” July 8, 2015, <http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/juba/china-to-increase-investment-in-sudans-oil-industry-26143009>.
179. Lily Kuo and Echo Huang, “China Reacts to the Death of Two Peacekeepers in South Sudan with Grief and Rage,” *Quartz Africa*, July 11, 2016, <http://qz.com/728566/china-reacts-to-the-death-of-two-peacekeepers-in-south-sudan-with-grief-and-rage/>; Abigaël Vasselier, “Chinese Foreign Policy in South Sudan: The View from the Ground,” *China Brief*, August 22, 2016, accessed January 2, 2017, <https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-foreign-policy-in-south-sudan-the-view-from-the-ground/>.
180. For more on this story, see reports in *Foreign Policy*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and *Reuters* (Colum Lynch, “U.N. Peacekeepers to Protect China’s Oil Interests in South Sudan,” *Foreign Policy*, June 16, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/16/u-n-peacekeepers-to-protect-chinas-oil-interests-in-south-sudan/>; Nicholas Bariyo, “China Deploys Troops in South Sudan to Defend Oil Fields, Workers,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 9, 2014, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-deploys-troops-in-south-sudan-to-defend-oil-fields-workers-1410275041>; “U.N. Says China Not Yet Deploying Peacekeepers in South Sudan,” *Reuters*, September 10, 2014, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-sudan-idUKKBN0H502U20140910>).
181. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Russia exported arms worth \$79 million to South Sudan between 2011 and 2015 (SIPRI, “SIPRI Arms Transfer Database,” <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>).
182. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “U.N. Mission’s Summary Detailed by Country.”
183. U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Press Statement on Accident of Helicopter Employed by United Nations Mission in South Sudan,” U.N. Doc. SC/10873-AFR/2494, December 12, 2012; U.N. Security Council 6903rd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6903, January 21, 2013, 18.
184. U.N. Security Council 7751st Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7751, July 29, 2016.
185. U.N. Security Council 7754th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7754, August 12, 2016, 4-5.
186. U.N. Security Council, 7850th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7850, December 23, 2016, 5-6.
187. Russia also argued that the creation of a hybrid court should be carried out by the African Union (U.N. Security Council 7532nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7532, October 9, 2015, 2).
188. Russia said the sanctions would undermine the progress made (U.N. Security Council 7850th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7850, December 23, 2016, 6).
189. *Ibid.*, 2, 5-6.
190. *Ibid.*, 5.
191. The Russian representative said the U.S. had abused “the practice of penholding by inconsiderately pushing through their national priorities and neglecting the red lines drawn by other delegations” (U.N. Security Council 7581st Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7581, December 15, 2015).
192. U.N. Security Council 7532nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7532, October 9, 2015, 3.
193. China complained that the penholders ignored “revisions that China and some of the African members proposed” (U.N.

Security Council 7754th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7754, August 12, 2016, 5).

194. U.N. Department of Public Information, “Burundi – ONUB – Background,” 2006, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/background.html>; U.N. Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi,” U.N. Doc. S/2004/210, March 16, 2004, paras. 4, 39.

195. U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Establishes Integrated United Nations Office in Burundi to Assist Country in Efforts Towards Long-Term Peace, Stability,” U.N. Doc. SC/8857, October 25, 2006.

196. United Nations Operation in Burundi, “Background,” <https://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2963&language=en-US>.

197. U.N. Security Council, “Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2137 (2014), Security Council Maintains U.N. Office in Burundi until Year’s End Ahead of Transition to U.N. Country Team,” U.N. Doc. SC/11275, February 13, 2014; MENEUB overview available at U.N. Department of Political Affairs, “Burundi,” 2014, <http://www.un.org/undpa/en/africa/burundi>.

198. U.N. Security Council 7110th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7110, February 13, 2014.

199. U.N. Security Council, “Condemning Increasing Violence in Burundi, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2248 (2015), States Intention to Consider ‘Additional Measures,’” U.N. Doc. SC/12117, November 12, 2015; U.N. Security Council 7557th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7557, November 12, 2015.

200. U.N. Security Council 7664th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7664, April 1, 2016.

201. *Ibid.*, 3.

202. U.N. Security Council 7752nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7752, July 29, 2016.

203. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Burundi – Activities,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/fzs_663828/gjlb_663832/2929_663864/2931_663868/.

204. Cara Jones and Orion Donovan-Smith, “How the West Lost Burundi,” *Foreign Policy*, August 28, 2015 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/28/how-the-west-lost-burundi/>.

205. Santander Trade Portal, “Burundi: Foreign Investment,” November 2016, <https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/burundi/investing-3>.

206. Shinn and Eisenman, “*China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*,” 295.

207. After threatening to deploy a 5,000-strong force to Burundi in December 2015, the A.U. backed down and sent a high-level delegation in February 2016 instead. In the end, the A.U. executed no sanctions against Burundi. (African Union, “Communiqué of the 565th Meeting of the PSC on the Situation in Burundi,” A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/COMM [DLXV], December 17, 2015; African Union, “Communiqué of the Visit of the African Union High-Level Delegation to Burundi,” February 29, 2016).

208. U.N. Security Council 7752nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7752, July 29, 2016, 4, 9-10.

209. *Ibid.*, 3-4.

210. World Peace Foundation, “Mali Mission Brief,” <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/African-Peace-Missions/Research/Case-Studies/Mali>; Simone Haysom, “Security and Humanitarian Crisis in Mali: The Role of Regional Organisations,” Humanitarian Policy Group working paper, March 2014, 4; Lori-Anne Thérroux-Bénoni, “The Lack of Credible and Timely Alternatives to France’s Operation Serval in Mali Has Highlighted the Shortcomings of ECOWAS, the A.U. and the U.N.,” Institute for Security Studies, April 15, 2013, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lessons-from-the-malian-crisis-for-the-international-security-architecture>. Maru also gives a brief overview of the disorganized start of what would eventually become MINUSMA (Mehari T. Maru, “African-Led International Support Mission in Mali [AFISMA]: Military Ahead of Politics,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, February 14, 2013, 1-5).

211. Thérroux-Bénoni, “The Lack of Credible and Timely Alternatives to France’s Operation Serval in Mali Has Highlighted the Shortcomings of ECOWAS, the A.U. and the U.N.”

212. U.N. Security Council, “Adopting Resolution 2071 (2012), Security Council Demands that Armed Groups Cease Human Rights Abuses, Humanitarian Violations in Northern Mali,” U.N. Doc. SC/10789, October 12, 2012; U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Authorizes Deployment of African-Led International Support Mission in Mali for Initial Year-Long Period,” U.N. Doc. SC/10870, December 20, 2012.

213. U.N. Security Council 6846th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 6846, October 12, 2012; U.N. Security Council 6898th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 6898, December 20, 2012.

214. Arthur Boutellis, "Can the U.N. Stabilize Mali? Towards a U.N. Stabilization Doctrine?" *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 4, no. 1 (June 25, 2015): 3-4, <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.fz/>; Sergei Boeke and Bart Schuurman, "Operation 'Serval': A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, no. 6 (July 24, 2015): 813-814.
215. Boeke and Schuurman, "Operation 'Serval': A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014," 801-802.
216. The Counsel consent was granted on December 20, 2012. The fund drive was held on January 29, 2013. (U.N. Security Council, "Security Council Authorizes Deployment of African-Led International Support Mission in Mali for Initial Year-Long Period"; Maru, "African-Led International Support Mission in Mali [AFISMA]: Military Ahead of Politics," 2).
217. Maru, "African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA): Military Ahead of Politics," 2-3.
218. Ibid.
219. U.N. Security Council, "Security Council Establishes Peacekeeping Force for Mali Effective 1 July, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2100 (2013)," U.N. Doc. SC/10987, April 25, 2013.
220. The Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation said the adoption of the Resolution was to "the great happiness of all of Mali's people." (U.N. Doc. S/PV.6898, December 20, 2012, 3).
221. Boeke and Schuurman, "Operation 'Serval': A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014," 811-812.
222. U.N. Security Council 6952nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6952, April 25, 2013, 2.
223. For more on the subject, see Joel Wuthnow, *Chinese Diplomacy and the U.N. Security Council: Beyond the Veto* (London: Routledge, 2015), 52; and Edward C. Luck, *U.N. Security Council: Practice and Promise* (London: Routledge, 2006), 101-110. China and Russia have held strong positions on international terrorism. Some recent official statements: In 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized Russia's stance against terrorism at the U.N. General Assembly (U.N. General Assembly, "Russian Federation H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin, President, Statement Summary," September 28, 2015, <https://gadebate.un.org/en/70/russian-federation>); in 2016, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi spoke of China's commitment to helping the continent tackle terrorism (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, "Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi at the Security Council Debate on Peacebuilding in Africa," July 28, 2016, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/sm-hwj/2016doc/t1388863.htm>).
224. See World Peace Foundation, "Mali Mission Brief."
225. Boeke and Schuurman, "Operation 'Serval': A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014," 810-812.
226. Russia made official statements twice. In 2016, Russia opposed the introduction of "ambiguous language" in the expanded mandate. (U.N. Security Council 7727th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7727, June 29, 2016, 3.)
227. Berhe and de Waal, *African Politics, African Peace: Report on the Future of Peace Missions in Africa*, para. 95; Haysom, "Security and Humanitarian Crisis in Mali: The Role of Regional Organisations," 10.
228. U.N. Security Council 6952nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6952, April 25, 2013, 2; U.N. Doc. S/PV.7727, June 29, 2016, 3.
229. Sun provides a brief analysis of China's position on the French-led military intervention (Yun Sun, "How China Views France's Intervention in Mali: An Analysis," Brookings Institution, January 23, 2013, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-china-views-frances-intervention-in-mali-an-analysis/>).
230. Fung, "China's Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping," 2; Jorgic, "China Takes More Assertive Line in South Sudan Diplomacy"; U.N. Department of Peacekeeping, "U.N. Mission's Summary Detailed by Country."
231. Li argues that China has increasingly become more flexible regarding its noninterference principle as it has signed up for more international anti-terrorism conventions (Li Li, "Current Criticisms and Reframing of the Noninterference Principle of China," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 28, no. 4 (December 2016): 566-569). Thrall argues that China may need to build counterterrorism capacities by engaging in such missions in Africa (Lloyd Thrall, *China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security* [Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2015], 53).
232. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The New Politics of Protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," *International Affairs* 87, no. 4 (2011): 838; Alan J. Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign," *International Security* 38, no. 1 (Summer 2013): 107-108.
233. Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign," 107-108; U.N. Security Council,

“In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters,” U.N. Doc. SC/10187, February 26, 2011.

234. U.N. Security Council, “In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters”; Bellamy and Williams, “The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” 839.

235. U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” U.N. Doc. SC/10200, March 17, 2011.

236. U.N. Security Council 6620th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6620, September 16, 2011; U.N. Security Council 6644th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6644, October 31, 2011; U.N. Security Council 7142nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7142, March 19, 2014, and U.N. Security Council 7743rd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7743, July 22, 2016.

237. Shinn and Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*, 240.

238. Federica Saini Fasanotti, “Russia and Libya: A Brief History of an On-Again-Off-Again Friendship,” Brookings Institution, September 1, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/09/01/russia-and-libya-a-brief-history-of-an-on-again-off-again-friendship/>.

239. U.N. Security Council 6491st Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6491, February 26, 2011, 4.

240. For a news report on the evacuation, which was conducted within 10 days by air, land, and sea, with transportation and temporary shelter support from Greece, Malta, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, and Jordan, see Jingya Zhang, ed., “35,860 Chinese Nationals in Libya Evacuated: FM,” *CCTV News*, March 3, 2011, <http://english.cntv.cn/20110303/103938.shtml>.

241. *RT International*, “Russians Regret Leaving Libya, Hope to Return,” February 28, 2011, <https://www.rt.com/news/libya-return-people-tripoli/>.

242. Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” April 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm.

243. U.N. Security Council 6491st Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6491, February 26, 2011, 4.

244. U.N. Security Council 6498th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011, 8.

245. *Ibid.*

246. *Ibid.*

247. *Ibid.*, 10.

248. Alex de Waal, “The African Union and the Libya Conflict of 2011,” (World Peace Foundation, December 19, 2012), <https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/19/the-african-union-and-the-libya-conflict-of-2011/>.

249. *Ibid.*

250. U.N. Security Council 6620th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6620, September 16, 2011, 3.

251. *Ibid.*, 4-5.

252. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2259, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2259, December 23, 2015, 1.

253. U.N. Security Council 7598th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7598, December 23, 2015, 3; Libya Herald Staff, “Moscow Tones Down Criticism of US Strikes in Sirte, Calls for Anti-terror Coordination,” *Libya Herald*, August 2, 2016, <https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/08/02/moscow-tones-down-criticism-of-us-strikes-in-sirte-calls-for-anti-terror-coordination/>.

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255. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Expounds China’s Three Basic Principles on Resolving the Libyan Issue,” September 4, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1294314.shtml; U.N. Security Council 7598th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7598, December 23, 2015, 5.

256. Abdullah Ben Ibrahim, “Tobruk Government Reaches Out to China to Transmit Solar Power to EU,” *The Libya Observer*,

- October 26, 2016, <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/tobruk-government-reaches-out-china-transmit-solar-power-eu>; David Rogers, "Chinese Consortium to Invest \$36bn in Libyan Infrastructure Bonanza," *Global Construction Review*, October 26, 2016, <http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/chinese-consortium-inv7est-36bn-liby7an/>.
257. Abdullah Ben Ibrahim, "Tobruk Government Drops Public Go-ahead for Russia and China to Intervene Militarily in Libya," *The Libya Observer*, December 04, 2015, <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/tobruk-government-drops-public-go-ahead-russia-and-china-intervene-militarily-libya>.
258. David Rogers, "Chinese Consortium to Invest \$36bn in Libyan Infrastructure Bonanza."
259. U.N. Security Council, "Security Council Acts to Stem Arms Proliferation from Libya," U.N. Doc. SC/10429, October 31, 2011; U.N. Security Council 6644th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6644, October 31, 2011, 3.
260. On Resolution 1973, Russia said: "The draft was morphing before our very eyes, transcending the initial concept as stated by the League of Arab States" (U.N. Security Council 6498th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011, 8). Russia continues to hold that the NATO action was a misinterpretation of Resolution 1973, hence its emphasis on the need for clarity of the textual provisions of resolutions. (Official representatives of the Russian and Chinese Permanent Missions to the United Nations, interviews by author, New York, November 16, 2016.)
261. U.N. Security Council 7743rd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7743, July 22, 2016, 3-4.
262. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "U.N. Mission's Summary Detailed by Country."
263. See Section II of this report.
264. Huang makes a compelling argument about China's growing engagement with peacekeeping (Huang, "Principles and Praxis of China's Peacekeeping," 258-260).
265. Poston & Wong estimate the annual population growth rate of Chinese in Africa at 6.1 percent (Dudley L. Poston Jr., and Juyin Helen Wong, "The Chinese Diaspora: The Current Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Population," *Chinese Journal of Sociology* 2, no. 3 [July 2016]: 366).
266. Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, March 2009), 182-183.
267. *Ibid.*, 273.
268. Mastroianni, "Growing Numbers of Chinese Blue Helmets: China's Changing Role Within the Security Council," 129-130.
269. U.N. Security Council 7532nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7532, October 9, 2015, 2.
270. An example of this situation is seen in Sudan and Burundi.
271. In Burundi the A.U.'s mediation faltered in its ability to prevent human rights abuses by the government. The government also denied access to A.U. observers, a point noted by the U.S. when Resolution 2303 was put to vote (U.N. Security Council 7752nd Meeting, U.N. Security Council 3627th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3627, January 31, 1996. U.N. Doc. S/PV.7752, July 29, 2016, 7).
272. For Russia, the achievement of this status is linked with a general national interest agenda, and for China, the pursuit or attainment of this status is framed in terms of benignity (Aglaya Snetkov, *Russia's Security Policy Under Putin: A Critical Perspective* [New York: Routledge, 2015], 40-42; Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 [September/October 2005]: 18-24, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-09-01/chinas-peaceful-rise-great-power-status>).
273. According to Li, China has signed on to more than 20 international counterterrorism conventions (Li, "Current Criticisms and Reframing of the Noninterference Principle of China," 566-567). Both states have also deployed naval ships to the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy missions in the Horn of Africa (Sun, "Africa in China's Foreign Policy," 11; Freedom Onuoha, "Sea Piracy and Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Coast and Gulf of Aden in Perspective," *African Security Review* 18, no. 3 [2009]: 40).

PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT

Nontraditional Actors

CHINA AND RUSSIA IN AFRICAN PEACE OPERATIONS

As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China and Russia have presented themselves as supporters of the principle of “African solutions to African problems.” Yet their voting behavior at the Security Council, and their support for U.N. peace operations in Africa, have not always been consistent with this rhetoric.

This report analyzes how these two nontraditional actors have engaged with peace operations in Africa. It examines how China and Russia have responded to controversial U.N. missions in five African states: Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Mali, and Libya. It uses meeting records of U.N. resolution deliberations and debates since 1989, as well as interviews with stakeholders, to characterize how both states have behaved in the past, with a view to understanding how they may engage on peace operations in the future.

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