STIMSON

Peacebuilding and
JAPAN
VIEWS FROM THE NEXT GENERATION

Edited by Yuki Tatsumi and Pamela Kennedy

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MARCH 2017

Contents

Preface

I am delighted to present the latest publication from Stimson's Japan program. *Peacebuilding and Japan* is the fourth volume in our annual *Views from the Next Generation* series. This collection solicits short and current policy analyses by leading and emerging foreign policy experts from Japan. The four authors featured in this volume are scholars who exemplify Stimson's practice of building useful and effective bridges between independent experts and government decision makers.

The topics they cover — expanding Japan's contributions to peacebuilding with both the U.N. and other partners, institution-building for peacebuilding efforts, as well as Japan's peacebuilding activities in Southeast Asia and Africa — all explore aspects of Japan's efforts in peacebuilding that are important and unique in Tokyo's focus on multi-faceted approaches. These efforts often go unrecognized in the international community due to Japan's limitations on its Self-Defense Force, which prevents participation in riskier headline-grabbing missions in the Middle East and Northern Africa. I am confident that this volume will make an important contribution to the public conversation about Japan's evolving approach to peacebuilding, its successes and lessons learned, and its future roles in international peace and stability.

Let me also express my gratitude to Yuki Tatsumi for her leadership of this project. Yuki's non-partisan insights on and analysis of Japan's international cooperation have successfully steered this series over the past four years. This volume speaks to her reputation on both sides of the Pacific as a deeply respected and pragmatic scholar of Asian international relations. Pam Kennedy provided critical research support and project management. Finally, Stimson is deeply grateful for the counsel and support of this effort from our friends at the Embassy of Japan.

Brian Finlay
President and CEO
The Stimson Center

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I am also grateful for the collaboration, support, and encouragement of the Embassy of Japan. Stimson's *Views from Next Generation* series on the issues salient in Japanese foreign policy would not be possible without their support.

I am also grateful for the support from my Stimson colleagues. Brian Finlay, Stimson's president and Chief Executive Officer, has been wonderfully supportive of my program on U.S.-Japan relations, including this project. My gratitude also goes to Stimson's Communications team and our graphic designer Lita Ledesma for their invaluable support. Last but not least, research associate Pamela Kennedy and program intern Peter Wyckoff must be recognized for their roles in taking on the labor-intensive details to prepare this report for publication.

Finally, my gratitude goes to my family, Hideaki and Akiyoshi.

Yuki Tatsumi
Senior Associate, East Asia Program
March 2017

Abbreviations

ARDEC	Africa Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CRF	Central Readiness Force
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
EU	European Union
FUNCINPEC	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia)
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
IMT	International Monitoring Team
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IPCA	International Peace Cooperation Act
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JGSDF	Japan Ground Self Defense Forces
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MILF	Moro Islamiya Liberation Front
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NPA	National Police Agency
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
PKO	Peacekeeping operations
POC	Protection of civilians
R2P	Responsibility to protect
SSR	Security sector reform
TCC	Troop contributing country
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
US	United States
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WW2	World War 2

Introduction

Yuki Tatsumi and Pamela Kennedy

> *It was the hope of the Japanese people to see Japan contribute to global peace and prosperity as a member of the international community that prompted Japan to join the United Nations. Ever since then, Japan has been exerting every effort in fields that constitute the main pillars of the United Nations' activities, including peace, refugees, and development. Japanese personnel dispatched to U.N. peacekeeping operations have worked to maintain peace in various countries and regions including Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan. … In line with the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is resolved to positively contributing even more in the future, in fields such as PKOs and human security.*
>
> —Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, December 19, 2016[1]

Prime Minister Abe's reflection upon Japan's 60th anniversary of accession to the United Nations in December 2016 recognizes the tremendous progress of Japan's postwar international engagement. When Japan joined the U.N. in 1956, it was a country just recovered from the devastation of war, adjusting to a new world order and slowly rebuilding trust with its neighbors in Asia. Japan is now a dedicated promoter of peace and stability around the world. Since the passage of the International Peace Cooperation Act (IPCA) in 1992, Japan has accumulated decades of experience in these complex operations, from the dispatch of electoral observers with a U.N. peacekeeping mission to Angola in 1992 to the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) units deployed since 2011 to the U.N. mission in South Sudan.[2]

Japan engages in peacekeeping efforts with international partners despite its constitutional restrictions on the use of force by the JSDF. Rather than reducing its contributions due to this unique limitation, however, Japan is forging new paths to peace by expanding its work in peacebuilding, the range of strategies and activities that seek to create durable peace without necessarily using military force.[3] In February 2015, the Japanese government revised the Development Cooperation Charter to emphasize economic development as a tool of peacebuilding, and to foster synergy between promotion of peace and development assistance.[4] But Japan has also adjusted the parameters of the JSDF's permissions to ensure that its forces are prepared and able to assist in times of crisis, with the revision of the IPCA in September 2015 to allow *kaketsuke-keigo*, or rescue missions outside JSDF-controlled areas.[5]

With the JSDF allowed more flexibility in emergencies and with increased collaboration between peacekeeping and aid, Japan continues to expand its ability to work with partner countries, including the United States, and with the U.N. to build peace. Prime Minister Abe underscored Japan's efforts to expand its peacekeeping commitments as the co-host of the 2nd Leader's Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, touching on the successful passage of the above legislation, diversification of Japan's international partnerships, and the enhancement of training programs to transfer the expertise of Japanese peacekeepers. By stressing the need for peacekeeping to evolve to improve and meet new challenges, Abe linked the development of peacekeeping to Japan's own endeavors to make meaningful contributions.[6]

Peacebuilding and Japan: Views from the Next Generation presents policy briefs exploring Japan's development of the concept of peacebuilding as well as its practical contributions. As Japan looks for ways to be an active force in spreading peace, it is working to expand the types of non-military contribution to peacebuilding, opening doors for broader Japanese participation and impact, as well as potentially creating options for other countries as well. Such efforts are welcome in a world where new and unexpected challenges require equally innovative responses. Japan is well-positioned to craft and test innovations for peacebuilding, both unilaterally and in partnership with the U.N. and the U.S. The briefs in this volume build upon the examination of Japan's multilateral peacebuilding efforts in the previous volume, *Japan as a Peace Enabler*, in order to explore the nuances of Japan's peacebuilding policies and practice from concept to implementation throughout the world. As with earlier volumes in the series, the briefs are the work of emerging scholars of these issues. The four authors were asked to consider five questions for their policy briefs: (1) What are Japan's national interest and policy goals?; (2) What kind of contributions has Japan made so far?; (3) What challenges has Japan faced, and how can they be overcome?; (4) How can Japan partner with the U.S. most effectively?; and (5) What key policy recommendations should Japan consider?

Kei Koga, Assistant Professor in the Public Policy and Global Affairs Program at Nanyang Technological University, examines the evolution of the concept of peacebuilding and how Japan has developed its peacebuilding methodology within its military constraints. Through his analysis of five Japanese peacebuilding missions in Southeast Asia, Koga assesses the characteristics, both internal and external, necessary for successful peacebuilding efforts. By strengthening its communication lines with host countries, Japan can cultivate the connections and trust necessary to effectively move peacebuilding efforts forward. Koga recommends that Japan further develop its own peacebuilding institutions to better maximize human resources, as well as create more opportunities for collaboration and research on peacebuilding with international partners, especially within the Asia-Pacific region.

Hiromi Nagata Fujishige, Associate Professor in the Department of Global and Interdisciplinary Studies at Hosei University, assesses the cost-effectiveness of Japan's peacekeeping contributions in order to leverage Japan's greatest peacebuilding assets, including the JSDF engineering units, peacekeeping trainers, and rapid deployment capability. With new security legislation in Tokyo permitting the JSDF to come to the aid of partners outside JSDF operating areas, Fujishige sees prime opportunities for Japan to make important and positive impacts on peacebuilding missions, defense reforms, and training other countries' peacebuilders in these best practices as well. Fujishige also emphasizes the importance of improving the readiness of peacebuilders by developing the "All-Japan" approach for domestic collaboration, as well as strengthening partnership with the U.S.

Nobuhiro Aizawa, Associate Professor at Kyushu University, discusses the deep economic and political ties between Japan and Southeast Asia and the importance of Japan's continued relations with the region. By analyzing the economic, political, and social trends that will define the future of Southeast Asia, Aizawa identifies multiple roles for Japan to take in promoting peace and stability in the region. Japan must support not only traditional post-conflict peacebuilding, but also financial and environmental stability. As Southeast Asian nations gauge shifts in regional and global power structures

and institutions, comprehensive ties with Japan will be critical for Asian stability. Aizawa's policy recommendations reflect the need for broad cooperation across the region, including the development of a network-style security alliance structure, reassessing Japan's approach to development assistance, and building local-to-local ties through networks and training.

Finally, Rie Takezawa, Researcher at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, traces the development of Japan's peacebuilding on the African continent, from an initial engagement focused on economic development to a more complex policy that uses sustainable economic development as a tool of peacebuilding. By adhering to principles of "quality growth," which seeks to create local and regional sustainable economic growth, Japan can better target its peacebuilding activities towards the needs of communities in African countries. Takezawa explores the nuances of Japan's efforts given the JSDF restrictions, and highlights successful cooperation between JSDF units and official development assistance projects. She urges Japan to clearly convey Japan's interests in Africa, and to increase Japanese engagement with African countries, from collaborative peacebuilding to business ventures.

These briefs each examine Japan's implementation of peacebuilding over the past few decades. As the international order of the past seventy years comes under increasing scrutiny in regards to the purposes of its institutions and mechanisms, the chapters in this volume show that Japan is a champion for international cooperation in pursuit of peace and stability. With a wealth of experience in post-conflict work and with ongoing practice, Japan is increasing its non-military roles in peacebuilding in ways that will benefit the broader development of peacekeeping expertise and contributions.

It is our hope that these policy briefs will serve as useful points of reference when examining Japan's efforts to expand its work in peacebuilding. We also hope that, by reading these briefs, readers will gain a deeper understanding and appreciation of Japan's activities, its policy evolution, and its earnest efforts to work with the international community to improve the practice of peacebuilding.

Endnotes

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Toward Effective Institution-Building in Peacebuilding:

Conceptual Development, Coordination Mechanism, and Partnership Building

Kei Koga

Policy Objectives

Sharpen and share the concept of human security in peacebuilding

The 2013 Japanese National Security Strategy and the 2015 Cabinet decision on the Development Cooperation Charter discuss the concept of "human security" as the principle that is central to Japan's peacebuilding and development strategy. As a matter of fact, this concept of "human security" — which emphasizes freedom from fear and want — has already been used as a principle of conducting sustainable development and peacekeeping operations, particularly in peacebuilding. However, Japan has not clearly articulated what the concept entails, which invites confusion. The clarification of Japan's human security concept in peacebuilding would serve to better identify Japan's potential role in and contribution to international peacebuilding missions.

Promote an understanding of the conceptual difference between R2P and human security in peacebuilding

The concept of "responsibility to protect" (R2P) has been developed by focusing on one aspect of "human security" — freedom from fear. Because of R2P's principle of conditional intervention, many developing states negatively perceive the concept of human security as a potential justification for major powers to intervene. However, R2P and human security are not identical concepts. In its concept of human security, Japan has traditionally emphasized the aspect of freedom from want to develop and build social and economic infrastructures. Correcting the misperception could not only better promote the notion of human security and provide a policy alternative to those states that need peacebuilding, but also facilitate a better understanding of Japan's peacebuilding practice.

Establish a knowledge base to optimize the international peacebuilding process

Developmental priorities — political, economic, social, or security dimensions — differs among states within peacebuilding missions. As such, it is necessary to recognize that there is no "one size fits all" formula for the success of peacebuilding. However, without any basic guidelines, peacebuilding missions will be uncoordinated, and thus, such guidelines are important for increasing the chance of success. In the past 25 years, Japan has accumulated knowledge through its human security-related peacebuilding experiences in Asia, and creating such guidelines in Asia would serve to standardize peacebuilding operations on the basis of human security.

Context

Historical Development of Peacebuilding: Concept and Practice

The concept of peacebuilding became one of the conflict management tools for the international community in the post-Cold War era, when internal conflicts such as civil wars and ethnic and religious struggles erupted frequently throughout the world. In 1992, the United Nations Security General, Boutrous Boutrous Ghali, issued *An Agenda for Peace*, proposing a phased approach to tackle such conflicts through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, and postwar peacebuilding. He conceptualized peacebuilding as the "construction of a new environment" in the post-conflict phase which "consolidate[s] peace and advance[s] a sense of confidence and well-being among people."[1] In other words, the idea was to lay a rigid foundation of social stability and durable peace through economic and social development in a post-conflict country.

Peace operations are, however, essentially complex. Given that the phases overlap and sometimes coexist, a phased approach was not necessarily applicable to the situation on the ground. In fact, after failures of U.N. peacebuilding missions, including in Angola and Rwanda, political momentum to empower the United Nations to conduct various peacekeeping operations dissipated. The failures eventually forced the international community to reconsider the security objectives raised by *An Agenda for Peace,* as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping operations as a whole.[2]

In 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations issued the *Brahimi Report* on increasing the effectiveness of peacebuilding. The report broadened the definition of peacebuilding to include "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations sometimes that is more than just the absence of war."[3] Emphasizing not only social and economic infrastructure but also the importance of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), the report incorporated security sector reforms and regarded state-building as an important component of peacebuilding. In 2005, to enhance U.N. peacebuilding capacity, the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission was also established.[4]

In 2008, the accumulation of experience in peace operations led the United Nations to issue *The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, the so-called capstone doctrine. The document defines peacebuilding as "a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development" (see Figure 1).[5] Accepting the overlapping elements and phases of peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping, the peacebuilding concept broadens its scope of activities and highlights the necessary coordination of other peace operations. As such, peacebuilding now comprehensively includes social, economic, political, and security aspects of state-building.

Japan as a "Norm Entrepreneur" of Peacebuilding

Given its constitutional and political constraints, Japan has not been able to fully participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). After a long debate, the International Peace Cooperation Act (IPCA) was enacted in 1992, which allowed the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to participate in UNPKO under five basic principles: (1) a ceasefire agreement, (2) consent from concerned parties for the conduct of U.N. peacekeeping operations

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Peacekeeping Operations
[Source] *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (2008), 19.

and Japan's participation, (3) a strict impartiality, (4) a right to suspend the mission or assignment when the above conditions collapse, and (5) the use of weapons within the "limits judged reasonably necessary according to circumstances."[6]

Partly because of the limitation on the JSDF's participation in the UNPKO and partly because of the initial conception of peacebuilding, which did not emphasize the role of force, Japan was inclined to seek an international role in peacebuilding activities. Admittedly, at first Japan did not present any grand scheme for peacebuilding, and it was difficult to differentiate its development assistance from peacebuilding contribution. Yet, over time, Japan gradually began to form its own concept of peacebuilding, with a first attempt in 1992, when Japan began to reconsider the objectives of official development assistance (ODA) and take into account the concept of human security in the context of its international contribution.

Originally, the concept of human security was created in the U.N. Development Programme's *Human Development Report 1994* in order to highlight security for human beings as opposed to state security. It is an "integrative concept" based on the assumption that human beings should be free from fear (e.g. political violence and oppression) and want (e.g. hunger, health), and includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.[7] Its political intention was well received in the international community, and the term has gained political currency despite strong criticism of its vague and expansive concept.[8] However, this conceptual ambiguity also provided room for international actors to flexibly formulate their own normative structure of human security. Japan did so and incorporated its own version of human security into peacebuilding, emphasizing non-military methods and economic and social development.

As opposed to the Canadian concept of human security, which emphasized freedom from fear and created the concept of R2P, Japan emphasized the importance of freedom from want. In 1998, Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi stated the necessity of incorporating human security into economic development in the context of emerging domestic instability in Southeast Asian states during the Asian Financial Crisis. He then made human security one of Japan's diplomatic principles.[9] In the same year, Obuchi made three promises relating to peacebuilding: to provide ODA to the Asian states facing economic and social crisis after 1997; to establish the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security; and to empower non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to play a role in promoting human security. Obuchi's successor, Prime Minister Yoshirō Mori, followed suit. He decided in 2000 to erect human security as one of the pillars of Japanese diplomacy and to provide approximately US$24 million for the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security. He also created the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, in 2001 in order to further articulate the concept.

Prime Minister Jun'ichirō Koizumi then emphasized the importance of Japan's peacebuilding efforts in the international arena and integrated, as pillars of peacebuilding, the principles of empowerment (e.g. capacity-building) and protection (e.g. basic human rights and freedoms), which the Commission on Human Security's report *Human Security Now* illustrated.[10] Koizumi also set up the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace chaired by Yasushi Akashi, whose report emphasized consolidation of peace (e.g. economic and social development, including DDR), and state-building (e.g. constitution building, administrative training, security sector reforms) in peacebuilding activities with the use of ODA.[11] The principles of these two reports resonated with each other, and their conceptual frameworks are embedded in Japan's peacebuilding efforts. Consequently, the Japanese government defines the purpose of peacebuilding as "to prevent the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts, alleviate the various difficulties that people face during and immediately after conflicts, and subsequently achieve long-term stable development."[12]

In this context, Japan has developed its framework of international cooperation. To be sure, development activities concerning human security, peacebuilding, and the related schemes have been conducted and formulated well before the late 1990s by various government agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). However, the initiatives for conceptual development were generally begun by prime ministers because such conceptualization would likely reformulate Japan's existing constitutional and political constraints, which requires high-level political decision-making. In 2006, the Japanese government redefined the primary mission of the JSDF to include its international cooperation activities. The 2013 National Security Strategy indicated the importance of peacebuilding and human security, and the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter emphasized the importance of human security in providing development assistance and the necessity of peacebuilding, as an effort to create a seamless assistance throughout all phases of peacekeeping.[13]

Japanese Peacebuilding Practices

As Japan's concept of peacebuilding has evolved, so has its practice in Asia. Japan has conducted its peacebuilding missions since the 1990s, and the following are the main missions in Cambodia, East Timor, Aceh, Mindanao, and Sri Lanka.[14]

Cambodia

Japan's peacebuilding efforts in Cambodia were considered successful. Under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, Japan contributed to sustaining domestic stability in Cambodia despite the 1997 political crisis caused by military conflicts between political rivals. Japan aimed at strengthening personal ties with leaders in Cambodian political factions, mainly Son San, Hun Sen, and Sihanouk. Engaging these leaders directly and establishing lines of communication, Japan induced their cooperation in the peace process — the phased process under UNPKO supervision. During the military conflicts in 1997 between the royalist party FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen, Japan mediated negotiations between the parties by leveraging its established connection with those leaders, including Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh. After the 1998 general election, Japan contributed ODA to consolidate peace in Cambodia.

East Timor

East Timor witnessed Japan's comprehensive commitment to peacebuilding. After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Indonesian President Jusuf Habibie allowed East Timor to have a referendum on special autonomy or independence, resulting in overwhelming votes (78.5%) for independence. Japan assisted with the referendum setup, provided US$100 million for the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) led by Australia to prevent disruption by militias supported by Indonesia, and facilitated East Timor's state-building through the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). In order to make INTERFET effective, Japan also acted as an interlocutor with Indonesia to resolve the crisis, mitigating the rivalry between Indonesia and Australia. Also, in UNTAET, Kenji Isezaki became a district administrator to Cova Lima while Japan dispatched 1,600 personnel, including 680 JSDF engineering personnel. Japanese NGOs also played a role in cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency to facilitate job creation (e.g. coffee growing). It is true that given the 2006 internal conflicts and the 2008 assassination attempts against President Jose Ramos-Horta, it was not clear whether the peacebuilding efforts of Japan and the international community truly had consolidated peace. However, despite these crises, Japan continuously supported its peacebuilding efforts, including the new dispatch of two JSDF officers from 2010 to 2012 and eight JSDF officers from 2013 to 2014 under the U.N. Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for cease-fire monitoring, and financial assistance of US$284 million between 2010 and 2014.

Aceh

Japan's contribution to Aceh was limited, because Japan respected Indonesia's territorial integrity and sovereignty over Aceh and followed a non-interference principle. Since Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM: the Free Aceh Movement), the main secessionist movement group, was regarded as a terrorist group by the Indonesian government, it was difficult for Japan to take the initiative until the Indonesian government signaled willingness to talk. Therefore, Japan's initial peacebuilding role — a peacemaking role — was confined to financial assistance to the Henri Dunant Centre, a Swiss-based NGO, which successfully resulted in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM in 2002. Despite this agreement, however, both the Indonesian government and GAM accused each other of violating the agreement. The implementation of DDR was delayed and thwarted by the Indonesian government. In this situation, an external shock — the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami — opened a window of opportunity for re-negotiation. According to Lam Peng

Er's analysis, Japan could not take the lead due to its preoccupation with domestic politics, in particular Koizumi's postal privatization, which diverted Japan's efforts from Ache.[15] Instead, Finland seized the opportunity to facilitate an agreement over the memorandum of understanding between the two in 2005, resulting in the stabilization of Aceh. Additionally, Japan was unable to send its JSDF to join the Aceh Monitoring Mission established by the European Union (E.U.) and Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) member states, because Japanese law prohibited JSDF activities outside the UNPKO mandate.

Mindanao

Japan's long-term commitment to Mindanao's peacebuilding contributed to stabilizing the situation. Japan began to consider its contribution to the post-conflict situation in Mindanao after a Final Agreement was concluded between the Filipino government and the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996. In Japan's view, the Filipino government needed to take the lead because the Mindanao issue was domestic, and a non-interference principle should be respected. It was only when President Gloria Arroyo showed a conciliatory posture toward Mindanao, proposing a ceasefire agreement with the Moro Islamiya Liberation Front (MILF), that Japan began to contribute to social and economic development in Mindanao, including the empowerment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), a self-government in Mindanao. The International Monitoring Team (IMT), was set up in 2004 by Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya, to ensure the Filipino government and the MILF kept the 2003 ceasefire agreement. Initially, Japan did not join the IMT because of security concerns, but in 2006, Japan participated through economic assistance and contact with the MILF through the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development, even though the negotiation was ongoing and the IMT was outside the U.N. framework. When these efforts broke down and fell into military conflict, Japan continued to provide assistance and joined the International Contact Group in 2009 to forge a ceasefire agreement between the Filipino government and the MILF. In 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro which abolished the ARMM and established the Bangsamoro Transition Authority for creating the autonomous Bangsamoro Government, was concluded, and Japan promised to contribute to community, human resources, and economic development in Mindanao.

Sri Lanka

Japan's peacebuilding efforts in Sri Lanka clearly illustrate the fact that the success of peacebuilding ultimately depends on the political will of the concerned parties. Sri Lanka's civil war had been fought between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Norway successfully facilitated the 2002 agreement between the two, and Japan began its peace process efforts with Norway to create a durable peace in Sri Lanka. Using its economic leverage through ODA, and assigning Yasushi Akashi as the Special Representative of the Japanese government for peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, Japan organized peace talks. However, unlike the Aceh case, the level of contentions between parties concerned remained high even after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Furthermore, given Sri Lanka's "complex emergencies" situation and its existing JSDF commitment to Aceh, the Japanese government could not dispatch JSDF to Sri Lanka. Despite Japan's strong commitment to the peace process, the Sri Lankan government decided to defeat the LTTE after the 2008 bombing incident that killed ministers D. M. Dassanayake and Jeyaraj Fernandopulle. After killing Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, in 2009, the government declared the end of the civil war.

The basic characteristics of Japan's peacebuilding experiences in Asia have been (1) a non-military approach; (2) orientation towards social and economic development (e.g. institution-building and financial support); and (3) a relatively long-term commitment. Fundamentally, these characteristics are non-threatening to the states that receive peacebuilding activities; therefore, Japan's contributions are generally well-perceived in the host countries. In addition, a separate characteristic is that the Japanese government has been highly cautious about whether its peacebuilding actions would be seen as interventions by the local central authority. As illustrated in the Aceh and Mindanao cases (at the initial phase), the government tended to be hesitant to take the initiative until the central government agreed to hold negotiations. In view of this political posture, the success and failure of peacebuilding efforts largely depends on concerned actors' political will for settlement, and the external actors have only a limited role.

Yet, it is also important to note that the success and failure of Japan's peacebuilding would be also affected by the international and domestic environment of the day. In fact, the international political environment and the domestic political situations of a recipient state significantly matter. For example, Cambodia's case was a relatively ideal political situation because the end of the Cold War reduced external states' intervention; the international community paid sufficient attention to promote settlement; and domestic political struggle was relatively constrained. Aceh's case illustrates the importance of an external shock, as the Indian Ocean tsunami created political momentum both domestically and internationally to induce cooperation from the Indonesian government and GAM. Sri Lanka's case, conversely, shows that without a political environment conducive to negotiation, the 2002 temporal ceasefire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE could not be sustained despite the 2004 tsunami effect.

Given these constraints, it is critically important to create, maintain, and strengthen communication lines with all concerned parties in order to make peacebuilding activities more effective. Throughout its activities in Cambodia and Mindanao, Japan engaged concerned parties, including Son San, Hun Sen, and Sihanouk, and the Moro National Liberation Front and the MILF, which became particularly useful contacts in times of crisis. For Aceh and Sri Lanka, Japan failed to create strong channels of communication with particular actors, including GAM and LTTE. The East Timor case shows that the Japanese government's response was somewhat reactive to the lead played by Australia, yet the strength of communication lines with concerned parties played an important role in several peacebuilding phases, ranging from settling conflicts of political interests to crisis management.

Challenges

Concept vs. Principle

Human security has become an important element for Japan's peace-building policy. However, the concept itself remains vague, and there seems to be a gap between its policy and operationalization. As a result, peacebuilding efforts and human security's objectives of freedom from fear and want often conflict with each other. East Timor, Aceh, and Mindanao are case in point. Without attaining the state's consent, the Japanese government will be hesitant to conduct peacebuilding activities because of a potential violation of the non-interference principle. Yet, if such activities are not conducted in a

timely fashion, human security will not be achieved. In short, a political dilemma between state sovereignty and human security exists.

Rather than using human security as a conceptual framework, practitioners and policymakers could consider the term as a principle.[16] In so doing, human security can be practiced more flexibly in peacebuilding activities. Because each state that requires peacebuilding has its own unique problems and priorities to achieve, the means of assistance must change. Nevertheless, the downside is that such flexibility would not necessarily ensure progress toward human security. At worst, it would be counterproductive. In the Sri Lanka case, the Japanese government attempted to promote economic development first, but its assistance did not necessarily contribute to the peace process. This is because the financial assistance did not flow into areas that were controlled by the LTTE, thus empowering only one actor, the government.[17] Consequently, fulfilling human security in peacebuilding often faces practical dilemmas.

Question of Legitimacy

While peacebuilding activities are supposed to be conducted in the post-conflict phase, this is not necessarily so in reality, as the capstone doctrine indicates. In this regard, peacebuilding activities are often regarded as a tool to empower a particular actor based on a donor's interests. The example of humanitarian intervention or R2P illustrates how international legitimacy might not always correspond to local legitimacy: democratization, human rights protection, and social and economic development are the three important components of human security and peace-building that the international arena often sees as "legitimate." Nevertheless, economic development might empower a particular party, prevent domestic protagonists from achieving a stable ceasefire agreement, and promote prolonged conflicts. In this context, even Japan's emphasis on human security and social and economic development could have the precarious element of furthering political division in a conflict area.

Military-Security Dimension: The Role of the Military

Japan has emphasized a non-military dimension of peacebuilding, which has created the international perception that Japan's activities might not be decisive, but relatively less interventionist and more sensitive to the existing social fabric in a conflict area. The IPCA asserts five basic principles with regard to the dispatch of the JSDF, which sometimes reduces Japan's effectiveness and presence during the peacebuilding process. For example, Japan could not participate in the Aceh peace monitoring with the E.U. and ASEAN in 2005, despite relatively stable security conditions compared to other areas, such as Samawa.[18]

Given the conceptual trade-off between human security and peacebuilding, it would be more beneficial for Japan to strengthen its comparative advantages — long-term commitment to social and economic development — in peacebuilding. As practitioners and policy-makers emphasize, human security should be considered a principle, not an analytical concept, so that it retains flexibility in practice yet emphasizes its particular approach.

To further improve the practice of peacebuilding, two factors also need to be considered: improvement of human resource development and the IPCA. The former aims to educate and train personnel who can cultivate personal ties with protagonists in conflict areas. Although the success of peacebuilding is not completely dependent on personal ties, such lines of communication can help Japan shape a political context conductive to

peacebuilding and diffuse political and military tensions in times of crisis as interlocutor. The latter aims to relax the conditions under which Japan can dispatch the JSDF for peacekeeping operations conducted by non-U.N. entities, as in the case of Aceh. In so doing, Japan's contribution can be more visible and effective in peacebuilding without changing its principles. Thus, non-violence, rather than non-military, should be a new norm for Japan's peacebuilding.

Cooperation with the U.S.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Non-Traditional Security Dimension

U.S. peacebuilding missions are often regarded as security-oriented, particularly after 9/11, given the danger that failing or failed states could become breeding grounds for international terrorists. In this context, the United States tends to focus its peacebuilding objectives on counterterrorism through economic reconstruction, democratic political stability, and the establishment of law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure.[19] In other words, the U.S. emphasis on and objectives of peacebuilding are strongly related to its national security objectives.

Convergence
The strategic focus of the U.S.-Japan alliance has expanded over time, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The 2005, 2007, and 2011 Security Consultative Committee Documents indicate that Japan and the United States agreed to enhance cooperation over peacekeeping operations and capacity-building for other nations' peacekeeping efforts.[20] Admittedly, the U.S. and Japan's operational scopes for peacebuilding differ because their objectives are different. While the United States tends to consider peacebuilding from a national security perspective, Japan does so from an international cooperation perspective. However, preventing states from failing would contribute to international stability, and so their fundamental objectives of peacebuilding align. In this sense, facilitating political cooperation and coordination between the United States and Japan over peacebuilding activities in overlapping areas of interest, particularly governance and capacity-building, can contribute to effectiveness.

Divergence
The divergence between Japan's emphasis on non-military components of peacebuilding and the U.S. emphasis on military dimensions is sometimes helpful in conducting more effective peacebuilding operations. For example, sometimes local protagonists in a peacebuilding mission would not rely on Japan or the United States due to political, historical, or social antagonism or perceptions. For example, in Aceh in the early 2000s the Indonesian government was skeptical of U.S. intentions due to U.S. counterterrorism policy that was often seen as anti-Muslim by the locals. The U.S. approach to Mindanao also created a negative image due to its "search-and-destroy" missions through its "Global War on Terrorism" policy. In this context, Japan's soft approach to peacebuilding would be accepted by locals, and its efforts could contribute to preventing such states from failing.

The divergence in strategic interests between Japan and the United States over peacebuilding does not necessarily produce weaknesses. Various states have different perceptions towards Japan and the United States, and this becomes an important factor when states consider receiving assistance for peacebuilding.[21] The divergence thus enhances the efficiency and

effectiveness of U.S. and Japanese peacebuilding efforts. Framing the peacebuilding program in the U.S.-Japan alliance is not the only option, and this can be also strengthened through information-sharing and policy dialogues between the United States and Japan.

Policy Recommendations

Considering the abovementioned characteristics of Japan's peacebuilding efforts, Japan should aim to implement the following four recommendations:

Engage proactively in a peace-mediating role

It is clear that the political condition is one of the most critical determinants of the success and failure of peacebuilding missions as illustrated by Japan's success in Cambodia and failure in Sri Lanka. While Japan has political and constitutional constraints, Japan can contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of peacebuilding missions if it engages in a proactive peace-mediating role while emphasizing its non-violence principle. To this end, it is imperative to take a "whole-of-society" approach by recognizing and facilitating the comparative advantages of the ministries, government agencies, NGOs, and international organizations, and Japan should conduct domestic and international institution-building as described below.

Enhance the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office

Create a lessons-learned (research and educational) unit that contributes to improving the concept of human security.
The use of human security as a principle of Japan's peacebuilding effort does not necessarily mean to discourage its further conceptualization. In fact, in order to increase operational effectiveness and educate future peacebuilders, it is important to understand the conditions in which and means through which human security can be achieved in peacebuilding missions. To this end, the Japanese government should create and enhance a lessons-learned unit that focuses not only on case studies, but also theoretical perspectives of peacebuilding and human security, potentially within the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office or as a government-affiliated institution.

Create a whole-of-society coordination unit.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes the lead in the implementation of peacekeeping missions, as the mandate is generally given by the U.N. Security Council. However, as its implementation requires a whole-of-society approach due to its broad range of tasks, coordination between ministries, government agencies, and NGOs becomes imperative. In order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of peacebuilding policy and minimize domestic policymaking process stovepiping, creating a coordination unit to facilitate information-sharing and policy coordination should be encouraged.

Conduct research on flexible arrangements of JSDF dispatch for peacebuilding.
The current regulation for JSDF dispatch is restricted to the U.N. authorities. However, other international organizations also make peacebuilding efforts, such as the Aceh

Monitoring Mission. In this sense, research on flexible dispatch of the JSDF under non-U.N. international organizations should be conducted in order to enable Japan to broaden the range of possible peacebuilding activities.

Support the establishment of an Asia-wide research network on peacebuilding

Minister for Foreign Affairs Tarō Asō argued in 2006 that Japan should create *terakoya*, Japanese schools used between the 14th and 19th centuries, to facilitate human resource development for peacebuilding.[22] According to Asō, *terakoya* provide a more relaxed learning environment than school, respecting diversities in terms of age, race, and interests. Given that the current conceptualization of peacebuilding and human security is predominantly Western-led, it is important that states receiving peacebuilding programs have knowledge about alternatives. As a start, a *terakoya*-like research network to train peacebuilders in Asia should be established. In particular, ASEAN has been interested in building its peacekeeping capacities as illustrated by the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network and the Expert Working Group relating to peacekeeping through the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus framework. There are opportunities to facilitate ASEAN's internalization of Japan's peacebuilding norms as a policy alternative relative to R2P. Deepening the understanding of the concept of peacebuilding and Japan's practice would not only facilitate diffusion of knowledge and creation of principles and guidelines, but also open a window of opportunity for Japan to disseminate its sensible practices to Asia and beyond.

Make the most of the functional leverage of the U.S.-Japan alliance and other partners

As mentioned above, Japan's peacebuilding policy is different from that of the U.S. However, this does not mean that Japan and the United States are unable to cooperate. Due to the high level of the U.S.-Japan cooperation, both could share information for situation awareness, even if they do not cooperate operationally. Furthermore, there are also potential collaborations between Japan and other partners, particularly the E.U. and Australia. The 2014 Japan-E.U. summit confirmed a possible collaboration between the E.U.'s Common Security and Defense Policy missions in Africa and Japan's security assistance. Japan has also strengthened bilateral security cooperation with Australia on non-traditional security issues. In these cases, Japan should institutionalize the bilateral dialogue discussing potential areas of cooperation in peacebuilding as well as clarify its limitations with the United States, Australia, and the E.U.

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A New Horizon for Japan's "Armed Peacebuilders"?

The Roles of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Beyond[1]

Hiromi Nagata Fujishige

Policy Objectives

Seek more cost-effective ways of contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO)

In its participation in UNPKO, Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have increasingly played a role close to peacebuilding. In recent years, however, the focus of Japan's defense and security policy has returned rapidly to more traditional national defense. Behind this trend, Tokyo has relatively reduced the priority of its international peace cooperation.[2] Given such constraints, Tokyo has pursued more effective use of human and financial resources in its contribution to U.N. peacekeeping. For example, Tokyo has endeavored to connect its peacekeeping duties (*inter alia*, specialty military engineering) with development assistance, trying to maximize existing assets.

Search for various forms of cooperation with U.N. peacekeeping outside of the field

Reflecting traditional anti-militarism, a strict legal framework has allowed Tokyo to contribute its military personnel only to limited cases (South Sudan alone as of January 2017). It also strictly confines their roles to non-combat duties, particularly engineering works. In 2015, Tokyo somewhat relaxed the legal constraints in order to expand the range of JSDF roles in UNPKO. Yet, it is still hard to increase the number of U.N. missions to which Tokyo can deploy its peacekeepers, especially in the form of an infantry unit. Consequently, Tokyo has sought to find other ways to support U.N. peacekeeping outside of the field, such as by providing training and education to other troop-contributing countries (TCCs).

Take advantage of the merits of JSDF engineering units' participation in UNPKO

Historically, Japan's dispatch of JSDF non-combat units and personnel to UNPKO was a decision made based on the consideration of the JSDF's constraints. Lately, however, Tokyo has begun to leverage the JSDF's participation in non-combat contributions, such as engineering works, as its forte. This is exemplified by the abovementioned training for other TCC's engineers, as well as the development of the first-ever manual for engineering work for UNPKO. Combined with the thrust of peacekeeping operations-official development assistance (PKO-ODA) collaboration, the roles of Japanese peacekeepers have become closer to peacebuilding.

Improve their capability to respond in a time of emergency

Behind the efforts to better connect the roles of peacekeepers to ODA works, Tokyo has also sought to improve their preparedness for emergency situations. Contributing only non-combat (mostly engineering) troops, Tokyo does not expect its contingent to perform a security function. In an unstable situation after a conflict, however, they unexpectedly may have to fulfill security roles beyond the scope of self-defense. For this purpose, Tokyo loosened its legal constraints in 2015, allowing the engineering units to play a limited security function (the *kaketsuke-keigo* [rush-and-rescue] mission). Thus, JSDF troops have now become "armed peacebuilders."

Context

Background

In 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Act (IPCA) was enacted to allow Japan to contribute military personnel to UNPKO. Since then, Tokyo has dispatched the JSDF to the U.N. missions to Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Haiti, and, most recently, South Sudan.[3] From the onset, however, Tokyo has dispatched its peacekeepers only for non-combat duties, such as engineering, transportation, and command staff. Initially, this decision was made because of the lack of other options due to the stringent legal framework for the dispatch of JSDF infantry units, which would have been expected to engage in combat-oriented duties.

In recent years, however, Tokyo has redefined its non-combat contribution, especially its engineering work, as its advantage rather than merely the result of a legal constraint. With a focus on the engineering team, Japan's recent military contribution has become closer to civilian works, bridging the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The Gap between the Japanese Legal Restrictions and the Reality of UNPKO

Reflecting the long-held pacifist tendency in Japan, Tokyo was able to enact the IPCA only with the stringent Five Principles for Participation. They are as follows:[4] First, the existence of a truce among concerned parties to armed conflicts; second, consent for the deployment of U.N. and Japanese personnel from the concerned parties; third, strict impartiality; fourth, immediate withdrawal of JSDF units when the aforementioned guidelines are no longer satisfied; and fifth, minimal use of weapons.[5]

These rigid prescriptions have beleaguered political decision-making at home as well as the operations on the ground. First, it has been very difficult for Tokyo to find an appropriate operation in which Japanese peacekeepers can participate. Most of the recent U.N. peacekeeping missions, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, operate in volatile security situations and hardly satisfy the Five Principles. As a consequence, Tokyo is now (as of January 2017) contributing its troops only to the mission in South Sudan.

Second, the Five Principles have also confined the range of the JSDF's conduct in U.N. missions. Above all, the restriction on the use of weapons has been a thorny problem for Japanese peacekeepers. The Five Principles originally allowed JSDF personnel to use weapons only to the minimum extent of protecting themselves and the ones under their control.[6]

This strict prescription, however, did not meet the U.N.'s common rules of engagement. Based upon Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, in recent years the U.N. Security Council has

often authorized robust peacekeeping, which may accompany military coercive measures not only for self-defense but also for the fulfillment of mandates, especially for the purpose of protection of civilians (POC). The rise of robust peacekeeping thus means that U.N. peacekeepers, particularly infantry units, now may join *de facto* combat missions.

This gap between the domestic constraints and the realities of U.N. missions makes Japan's contribution of an infantry unit to these missions virtually impossible. Full commitment to robust peacekeeping would violate the Five Principles and, eventually, the constitutional ban on the use of force abroad. As a result, Tokyo has strictly limited the range of its troop contributions to non-combat missions.

The Rise of Engineering Works in Japan's Contribution to UNPKO

Despite these strict constraints, Tokyo has recently recharacterized its non-combat contributions, especially its engineering works, in an increasingly positive tone. Along this line, Tokyo places a high value on the close collaboration between Japanese peacekeepers (particularly the engineering force) and ODA. With this direction, the recent style of Japan's military contribution has been approaching peacebuilding.

With high quality technical capability and reliability, the Japanese engineering forces have earned a good reputation from the outset. Yet, it is only since the early 2000s that Tokyo has emphasized the role of the engineering force, particularly its close collaboration with ODA projects.

Tokyo's pursuit of "seamless" aid[7] coincided with a worldwide trend after the 9/11 terrorist attack to connect development aid to security-related purposes. Moreover, the whole-of-government approach, which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) originally advocated in 2006, has become popular among advanced states for their support for fragile states. Intra-government collaboration has gained support mainly in dealing with the complex problems of developing world, but also in pursuing the effective use of resources.

Following this international inclination, Tokyo embarked on an attempt to connect engineering works with ODA activities.[8] From 2002 to 2004, the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) served as the first opportunity for Tokyo to pursue close cooperation between Japanese peacekeepers and ODA enterprises. At first, the Japanese peacekeepers recovered infrastructure in Timor-Leste. Upon the JSDF's withdrawal, their heavy equipment and prefab housing were provided to the Timor-Leste side as ODA.

Iraq served as the second occasion for the JSDF's close partnership with ODA, from 2004 to 2006. Tokyo boosted this cooperation, calling it the "two wheels of a vehicle."[9] Although it was not a U.N. mission but rather a part of the U.S.-led coalition forces, the experience in Iraq further promoted the partnership between the JSDF engineers and the ODA projects. For instance, when the JSDF purified and supplied water, provided medical care, and repaired roads, ODA funded a part of those facilities and equipment.

Their teamwork gained further sophistication with their experience in Haiti from 2010 to 2013. In the wake of a great earthquake at the beginning of 2010, Tokyo immediately dispatched JSDF personnel (mainly for transportation and medical care) as a part of Japan's disaster relief team to the disaster-affected areas and, soon after, also contributed an engineering unit to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Despite a lack of advance preparation, the JSDF engineering unit swiftly began their activity there, in particular their collaboration with the ODA enterprises.

In July 2011, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established at the same time as the independence of South Sudan. The next month, then-U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon requested that the Japanese government dispatch an engineering team there. The following February, Tokyo contributed its corps of engineers to UNMISS to support the state construction of the youngest country in the world. The Japanese engineering unit continues its operations today (as of January 2017).

The Japanese engineers in UNMISS have closely cooperated with Japan's ODA enterprises. When the JSDF constructed a community road in Juba in 2012, for instance, ODA supported their work by funding a hydrological survey, measurement, and design.

The experiences from Timor-Leste to South Sudan helped to institutionalize PKO-ODA collaboration as the formal policy of Japan. In 2013, the National Security Strategy and the revised National Defense Policy Outline stressed how it was important to link ODA to contributions to UNPKO.[10] In 2015, the Development Cooperation Charter also echoed this view.[11] By the mid-2010s, Tokyo thus formally installed PKO-ODA collaboration as one of the pillars of Japan's engagement with war-torn states.

What Do the JSDF's Engineers Do in UNPKO?

As a part of logistics support, engineering works have never been the focal point of UNPKO. In practice, however, the significance of engineering works cannot be ignored. They play a critical role in preparing the environment to assist the reconstitution of conflict-affected states. If there is no camp, for example, an infantry unit cannot embark on their duties in the field. If there are no workable roads or bridges, likewise, aid workers cannot deliver commodities to people in remote areas. In fact, there is a steady increase of attention to engineering work at the U.N. In this regard, we could say that Tokyo has timely focused on the engineering team.

In the field, Japanese engineers are engaged in both mission and non-mission support. The former is a direct assistance to U.N. missions while the latter is provided to non-U.N. organizations. The JSDF's collaboration with ODA is a part of non-mission support.

In addition, the Japanese engineers have also launched activities outside of the field. First, they played a leading role in completing the first-ever manual for U.N. engineering works on behalf of the U.N. Department of Field Support.[12] Second, the Japanese engineers have also provided training for the engineering forces of Africa. With the focus on the corps of engineers, thus, the Japanese contribution to U.N. peacekeeping has become closer to peacebuilding.

Challenges: Implications of New Peace and Security Legislation

Will the Japanese Peacekeepers Take Part in Robust Peacekeeping?

Recently, Tokyo's focus on engineering work has been facing vigorous challenges. The rise of robust peacekeeping became even more problematic for Tokyo when a *de facto* civil war broke out in South Sudan in December 2013. With the rapid deterioration of security there, the mandate for UNMISS was switched from supporting state construction to protecting the civilians. The POC mandate often accompanies the forceful use of weapons beyond the scope of self-defense. This has forced Tokyo to reconsider its military contribution to U.N. peacekeeping.

To cope with this challenge, the Japanese government amended the IPCA in September 2015. The amendment was carried out within a wholesale package of Peace and Security Legislation for to expand the range of JSDF missions. The laws primarily sought to enhance Japan's security ties with the U.S., but also to amend the IPCA.

The revised IPCA added a new duty to Japanese peacekeepers, commonly known as a "rush-to-rescue" (*kaketsuke-keigo)* mission. This new mission is highly controversial in Japan because it would enable Japanese peacekeepers to use weapons beyond the scope of self-defense to protect U.N.-associated personnel outside areas controlled by the JSDF. (If the U.N. staff were already under the JSDF's control, the use of weapons to protect them would be seen as self-defense and, therefore, there would be no risk of breaching the constitutional ban. Protecting the U.N. personnel in a remote place had not been permitted as it was beyond the range of self-defense.) With this amendment, Japanese peacekeepers now are allowed to come "to the aid of geographically distant [U.N.] units or [U.N.] personnel under attack"[13] to accomplish their mandates.

In Japan's political discourse, the addition of *kaketsuke-keigo* duty has stirred a huge controversy. The criticism arises from the fear that the new tasks might allow the JSDF to take part in *de facto* combat, thereby violating the Constitution. This doubt is not entirely off the mark with the recent rise of robust peacekeeping. The concerns have been affirmed as Tokyo has assigned this contentious *kaketsuke-keigo* mission to the JSDF unit in South Sudan since December 2016.

In reality, however, Japanese peacekeepers can perform only a narrow part of robust peacekeeping. With the limited focus on the protection of U.N.-associated personnel, the *kaketsuke-keigo* task has a huge discrepancy with the U.N. principle of POC. The latter usually targets a broader range of civilians, including international personnel (e.g., non-U.N. aid workers) and local residents. To fulfill such an expansive POC mandate, Tokyo would need to contribute an infantry unit.[14] As Prime Minister Shinzō Abe clearly assured at the Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015,[15] however, Japan will only contribute non-combat units, mainly engineering forces, for the foreseeable future.

Moreover, even *kaketsuke-keigo* missions will never occupy a central part in JSDF engineering teams. The corps of engineers are specifically trained and equipped for construction work. They share a baseline capability as a part of the army, such as the use of weapons to a minimum extent, but they are not suited for robust peacekeeping duties. Consequently, Japanese peacekeepers will work principally on construction tasks and may take part in robust peacekeeping only in a time of emergency.

The Implication of Kaketsuke-Keigo Duties for the Japanese Engineers

Under what kind of situations, then, may the Japanese engineers perform *kaketsuke-keigo* tasks? To answer this question, we should remember that the engineering force will never be the first option for security-related duties, even for the limited range of *kaketsuke-keigo* duties. As a principle, the infantry units should fulfill such a function. The JSDF's engineers may therefore execute *kaketsuke-keigo* duties only under very limited conditions when they cannot expect support from U.N. infantry teams.

One of the possible scenarios could be as follows: the Japanese engineering unit would happen to encounter a situation in which U.N.-associated personnel are facing imminent danger; for example, when the JSDF contingents are at their construction site or on their way there and also the infantry forces are unable to rush to the venue immediately. If so,

the Japanese engineering unit may try to save them at that time even if they are remote from the area under the JSDF's control.

Above all, it is more likely that the Japanese engineers would fulfill *kaketsuke-keigo* duties when a crisis situation paralyzes the U.N. command's ability to provide security to civilians. Such an emergency actually happened in Juba in summer 2016. Although the political struggle developed into turmoil there, the UNMISS Force Commander failed to take a leading role to protect civilians, and the violence resulted in many casualties.[16] This bitter experience vividly showed that the JSDF engineers would need to prepare for the execution of *kaketsuke-keigo* tasks after all, even though such combat-oriented duties are not their primary roles.

To sum up, Tokyo will maintain the contribution of non-combat units. In particular, the engineering work, which bridges peacekeeping and peacebuilding, would thus continue to be a major part of the Japanese contribution to U.N. missions. Given security concerns often seen in the recent UNPKO, however, Tokyo has also sought to enhance the security function for their engineering teams. The permissibility of *kaketsuke-keigo* missions reflects this dilemma. As a result, the Japanese engineers have increasingly become "armed peacebuilders."

Cooperation with the U.S.

With the U.S.'s limited military contribution to UNPKO, there is little room for Tokyo to envision bilateral partnership with the U.S. in a U.N. mission. Nonetheless, there remains the possibility for cooperation with the U.S. if the scope expands beyond the U.N. framework.

Intelligence Sharing

Sharing intelligence is one of the most feasible and important elements in U.S.-Japanese partnership for international peace cooperation. With the increase of dangerous operations in UNPKO, effective security information is crucial for any TCCs, but it is particularly so for Japan, as Tokyo has only limited intelligence footholds in Africa where most U.N. missions currently operate. In this regard, it would be useful for the JSDF to develop intelligence cooperation with the United States Africa Command (U.S. AFRICOM). It would be worthwhile also for Tokyo to seek further intelligence cooperation in Djibouti, where both Japan and the U.S. have military bases.

Partnership in Training of Peacekeepers

Another possibility is to enhance cooperation in training peacekeepers from less developed states, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, this has been realized already to some extent with the partnership between African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC), to which Japan has made significant contributions, and the U.S.-led African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership.[17]

Collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

The increase of the JSDF's collaboration with ODA has also expanded opportunities to seek close partnership with USAID. This can be triangular teamwork between JSDF, JICA, and USAID, or a bilateral relationship between JSDF and USAID. U.S. forces may be also

involved in this framework. Their joint work could take the form of not only infrastructure development but also capacity building such as defense reform support.

Cooperation in a Time of Emergency

When the U.N. command does not work properly in a crisis, the risk will be higher for the Japanese peacekeepers executing *kaketsuke-keigo* duties. In such an emergency, however, the security situation may be too dangerous for the Japanese engineers, considering their limited expertise in the use of weapons as well as their equipment. To cope with such difficulties, it will be critical for the Japanese peacekeepers to seek aid from U.S. forces. For this purpose, again, developing a partnership with AFRICOM – for example, by launching joint exercises and developing common operational guidelines – will be of particular importance to Tokyo.

Policy Recommendations

As seen so far, Japan's military contribution to UNPKO will primarily remain engineering units, which bridge the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there is still room to improve Japan's peacekeeping work at the intersection with peacebuilding, both in engineering and non-engineering efforts.

Maintain rapid deployment capability for the JSDF engineering forces

Although it has not attracted much attention, the early deployment of engineering units has a special importance for the smooth commencement of U.N. missions. In reality, however, it is not easy to deploy an engineering team swiftly, especially because they need to carry heavy equipment to the field. In this regard, Tokyo can be proud of the rapid deployment capability of the JSDF engineering team, most notably seen in their speedy start-up in Haiti in 2010.

For this purpose, the Central Readiness Force (CRF), a part of the Japan Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF), has played a critical role. Since its establishment in 2007, the CRF has been the key to improve the JGSDF's rapid deployment ability to UNPKO, for example, with rapid response capability and training of personnel for overseas missions.[18]

Despite its importance, the Japanese government has decided to dissolve the CRF in 2017. With the pressing need for homeland defense in Northeast Asia, a large part of the CRF's budget and manpower will be reallocated to the Ground Central Command thereafter. Even after the dissolution, the basic function of the current CRF will be relocated to other organizations in the JGSDF. It is almost certain, however, that its size and capability will be much more limited.[19] Tokyo should maintain or even develop the current stand-by capability even though the CRF is dissolved.

Develop the All-Japan mechanism

It also will be crucial to develop the so-called "All-Japan" approach further to leverage the JSDF's role in bridging from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Tokyo has eagerly promoted PKO-ODA teamwork, but the scope is currently too narrow to maximize the effective use of resources. For this purpose, Tokyo should fully develop the All-Japan approach, which would include PKO-ODA collaboration at its core, but might also cover a broader

scope of both governmental and non-governmental organizations. Tokyo should develop a mechanism, for example, with an inter-agency organization and common financial pool.

Enhance the provision of training for other TCCs, especially in Africa

Japan also should further enhance its training cooperation for U.N. peacekeepers from other TCCs. Since 2008, Tokyo has contributed a total of 24 JSDF instructors (as of May 2016) to educate peacekeepers from other TCCs, on topics such as POC.[20] Their training was mostly held in peacekeeping training centers in Africa, including Ethiopia, South Africa, and Kenya.[21]

In 2015 and 2016, Tokyo also contributed trainers for a project for ARDEC as mentioned above. They trained African engineering forces in Kenya as a part of a program held by the U.N. Department of Field Support.[22] This effectively utilizes Japan's engineering capability and improves the rapid deployment capability of U.N. peacekeepers even in an indirect manner.

Providing trainers is particularly crucial as it is not easy for Tokyo to contribute its peacekeepers to more U.N. missions. Even after the amendment to the IPCA in 2015, the strict Five Principles remain, still limiting appropriate missions for the dispatch of JSDF personnel. Providing training would be one of the most effective solutions to compensate for this issue. For Tokyo, dispatching a small number of highly qualified trainees would be a very cost-effective and realistic method of international peace cooperation.

Develop a new role in supporting defense reform in war-torn states

Tokyo should also expand the roles of JSDF personnel as mentors in areas other than training, such as assistance with defense reform. Although it has not attracted much attention, the addition of supporting defense reform is one of the most significant achievements from the amendment to IPCA in 2015. Tokyo should promptly prepare for the dispatch of JSDF personnel to support defense reform in post-conflict states.

Recently, reforming the security sector (e.g., armed forces and police) after conflicts, has been installed as one of the central focuses of UNPKO. Security sector reform (SSR) may include technical assistance, but it also requires reforming the security organs into more democratic and reliable ones. For this purpose, the personnel to support SSR should come from advanced states where democratic control of the security sector, including the armed forces, is firmly established. This task would well suit the JSDF, which is one of the most well-disciplined and democratically controlled armed forces in the world. Moreover, as with the provision of training, it would be a very cost-effective method. Unlike troop contribution, it would suffice to dispatch a handful of specialists. Furthermore, these tasks are usually carried out away from the field in a relatively safe environment, with lower risk for fatalities.

At this moment, however, practical preparation has not been started for this activity. To achieve high-quality support, it is indispensable to construct the SSR-related system not only within the JSDF but also more broadly among the relevant ministries and agencies, such as the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Justice. So far, the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters occasionally holds meetings, inviting the related ministries, but has taken few concrete actions. Serious and prompt efforts are required in this field. Together with their roles as trainers, Japanese peacekeepers should work not only as constructers but also as mentors for the future.[23]

Ensure the preparedness of Japanese peacekeepers for a time of crisis

Tokyo has positively redefined the roles of Japanese engineering units, which play a central role in Japan's contribution to U.N. peacekeeping, with close association with peacebuilding-related activities. To maintain the engineering-centered contribution, however, Tokyo is faced with a dilemma in which it needs to enhance the security-functions of the engineering teams. This is a seemingly contradictory situation required to adapt to the reality of U.N. peacekeeping: the Japanese engineers may have to operate in jeopardous situations when the U.N. command may not function appropriately to provide security.

To cope with this challenge, Tokyo has permitted the engineering unit in South Sudan to conduct *kaketsuke-keigo* missions. To ensure preparedness of Japanese engineers, however, Tokyo also needs to fortify its partnership with the U.S., to compensate for the weakness of the JSDF's limited security function on the ground. Such efforts will include, for example, intelligence sharing, developing common operational guidelines, joint exercises, as well as cooperation in transportation.

Endnotes

1. This paper owes much to interviews and correspondence with the Japanese defense specialists, including Mr. Hideshi Tokuchi (Senior Fellow at the GRIPS Alliance, Visiting Fellow at the Sophia Institute of International Relations, and former Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs) and Professor Nozomu Yoshitomi of Nihon University (JGSDF Major General, retired). I am also indebted to active officials of the Japanese government and other public sector individuals although I cannot specify their names here. I sincerely appreciate their cooperation with this work, although the view presented here is my personal perspective.

2. In the usage of the Japanese government, the term "international peace cooperation" denotes activities carried out based on the International Peace Cooperation Act (IPCA). It covers not only U.N. peacekeeping operations but also humanitarian assistance and election operations. They may include both military and civilian personnel. It also covers contribution in kind. This paper, however, confines its scope to the activities of Japanese military personnel in U.N. peacekeeping. For more details of Japan's activities under "international peace cooperation," see: Cabinet Office. "Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters." Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/pko_main_e.html.

3. For the details of Japanese military contribution to U.N. peacekeeping, see: Ministry of Defense of Japan. "International Peace Cooperation Activities." Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/kokusai_heiwa/index.html.

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Japan's contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations." Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pdfs/contribution.pdf. 2. This is the old version of the Five Principles. The 2015 amendment to IPCA added prescription related to the *kaketsuke-keigo* mission.

5. The military use of arms is generally referred to as "the use of force." According to the wording of the Japanese government, however, "the use of force abroad" specifically denotes an aggression against a foreign country, thereby violating Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution. To avoid the confusion, this paper clearly distinguishes "the use of weapons," which is permitted for limited purposes like self-defense, from "the use of force."

6. In addition, the JSDF Law also allows Japanese peacekeepers to use weapons to protect their arms.

7. See, for example: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Opening Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, Special Representative of the Prime Minister of Japan, at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan." January, 21 2002. Tokyo. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/

region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/state0121.html.

8. For the details of PKO-ODA collaboration, see: *Sekai ni muketa o-ru Japan* 世界に向けたオールジャパン　*[The "All Japan" Approach toward the World]*. Edited by Uesugi Yūji 上杉勇司 et al. Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan 内外出版, 2016.

9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "*Gaiko saizensen intabyu-*"「外交最前線インタビュー」[The Interview on the Front Line of Diplomacy]. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/iraq/gaiko_sz.html.

10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "National Security Strategy." Last modified April 6, 2016. Accessed on January 27, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html;
Ministry of Defense of Japan. *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond*. December 17, 2013. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e.pdf.

11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter*. February 10, 2015. 1, 13. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000067701.pdf.

12. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineering Unit Manual*. September 2015.

13. Ministry of Defense of Japan. "Development of Legislation for Peace and Security." Chapter 3 of *Defense of Japan 2009*. Tokyo. 209. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2016/DOJ2016_2-3-1_web.pdf.

14. The 2015 amendment to the IPCA also include the so-called "safety-ensuring" duty that would enable the Japanese infantry forces to execute the full POC functions. At this moment, however, it seems very unlikely that Tokyo will assigned this duty to them.

15. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. "Statement by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe at the 2ⁿᵈ Leader's Summit on Peacekeeping." September 28, 2015. New York. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201509/1212997_9928.html.

16. Patrick Cammaert et al. *Executive Summary of the Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 and UNMISS response*. Annex to "Letter dated 1 November 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," by Ki-moon Ban. S/2016/924. November 1, 2016. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/924. The Force Commander was dismissed to take the blame of this crisis.

17. Michio Suda."New Dimensions for Japan's Contributions to U.N. Blue Helmets." Chapter 5 of *Japan as a Peace Enabler: Views from the Next Generation,* edited by Yuki Tatsumi. Washington, DC: Stimson, 2016. 73.

18. The CRF also deals with domestic emergency situations.

19. We will have more details about these prospects after the dissolution of CRF in April 2014 when the 2017 fiscal year starts in Japan.

20. Ministry of Defense of Japan. *Heisei 28 nenban: nihon no bōei 2016* 『平成２８年版 日本の防衛』 *[Heisei era year 28: Defense of Japan]*. Tokyo, 2016. 349-350.

21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Yōin haken"「要員派遣」 [Dispatch of personnel]. Last modified October 25, 2016. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/fp/unp_a/page22_001264.html.

22. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Support for the UN Project for Africa Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC)." Last modified September 3, 2015. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000842.html.

23. As a matter of fact, Tokyo's focus on engineers, especially with a close collaboration with ODA, accompanies an essential problem. Behind the increase of POC missions, the U.N. Security Council has less frequently provided the UNPKOs with state (re)construction mandates in which peacebuilding occupies an important role. When the POC mandate is given, the security situation is generally too unstable for civilian personnel and, therefore, there is not much room for peacebuilding-related activities. Recently in South Sudan, in fact, the Japanese engineers have mostly engaged in duties supporting the POC mandates (e.g.,

the construction of POC sites). Tokyo is in desperate need of maintaining their contribution to UNMISS because if they withdraw, Japan would have no military contribution to UNPKO at all. For this reason, Tokyo has been determined to give controversial *kaketsuke-keigo* tasks to their engineering contingent deployed to South Sudan. Yet this will never be a favorable choice for Tokyo, and unless more UNPKO are established with state (re)construction mandates, Tokyo will be less likely to contribute its engineering units to other U.N. missions. Given such limitations, Tokyo needs to find a variety of ways of contributing to UNPKO other than the direct dispatch of their military personnel to the field.

Peace and Institution Building: Japan in Southeast Asia

Nobuhiro Aizawa

Policy Objective

Strengthen and broaden ties between Southeast Asia and Japan

From a strategic perspective, Japan needs stronger and friendlier relationships with Southeast Asian countries. Thus governmental, business, and social networks between Japan and Southeast Asia need to be updated and reproduced in a committed way that fits the current needs of both Japan and Southeast Asia. Japanese investment in Southeast Asia, especially after the Plaza Accord in 1985, has cemented the business relationships between the economies. More importantly, the Japanese living in Southeast Asia because of those private investments have cultivated strong friendship and trust over generations among Southeast Asian colleagues and friends, becoming Japan's strongest ties between Japan and Southeast Asia. However, this cannot be taken for granted. As Japanese society ages while some Southeast Asian countries enter their demographic bonus period, the countries need to carefully manage and update the relationships. It is crucial, thus, to broaden the linkages between the two societies. One of the new connections to be cultivated is the rising middle class of major Southeast Asian cities. The growing middle classes in Southeast Asia have much more in common in their standards of life and success, compared to their rural peer nationals. This shared understanding of anxieties about and expectations for their future paths creates opportunities to open new social networks among those who might also share a standard of good governance, at both the municipal and national levels. As countries separately face the challenge of rising nationalism derived from social inequalities and political divisions, it will be critical to establish various channels of communication, not just between prime ministers and presidents, but more broadly between populations in order to make the ties between Southeast Asia and Japan resilient against possible turmoil in the future.

Strengthen Southeast Asia's open and liberal economy and enhance its social and political development

There are three major reasons why the openness and the development of Southeast Asia matters for Japan. First, the region shares common risks. The risk of power politics is rising, especially in the security realm, with almost every country in Asia increasing its defense spending. As the tensions surrounding the South China Sea disputes heighten, competition in enhancing the size and technology of defense capacity will escalate, while the forces of disarmament will lose relative power. Resolution and de-escalation mechanisms for security issues in Southeast Asia are a challenge for Japan, necessitating the maintenance of peace and proactive commitment to peacebuilding in Southeast Asia.

Second, Japan's economic structure, regarding both supply chain and market access, relies upon Southeast Asia as an established partner where Japan's outward foreign direct investment stocks are larger than those of China.[1] Just as Prime Minister Abe described Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the "two engines" of an airplane,[2] the Japanese economy cannot be sustained without a smooth relationship with

Southeast Asia. Therefore, maintaining and strengthening an open and liberal order in the region is of utmost strategic importance for Japan.

Third, the economic gap within every country in the region is widening. This is politically sensitive, as one of the biggest roles that Japan played in Southeast Asia in the past was to promote economic development as the purpose of politics, as opposed to the identity politics and endless revolutionary fights that characterized politics from the 1940s to the 1960s at the expense of economic development. Despite the fact that Southeast Asian countries vary in their political systems from kingdoms to democracies, the common understanding has been that all governments need to work for economic development, and this sets the common standards of governance between Japan and Southeast Asia. A shared standard of governance is the most resilient foundation of any regional architecture; thus the issue of governance in Southeast Asia, which is addressed through issues of social and political development, is a core element in the establishment of a cooperative network in every aspect of governance.

Context

The post-World War II (WW2) U.S. strategy of double containment, drafted by George Kennan, strengthened energy and mineral trade between Japan and Southeast Asia. Kennan planned to cut the ties between Japan and China, which eventually led to Japan's search for a new partner, Southeast Asia. This U.S.-Japan-Southeast Asia triangular relationship was followed by an industrialization spillover and the transformation of Southeast Asia into a production site and market for Japan, with the 1985 Plaza Accord accelerating this trend. Now Southeast Asia has become Japan's biggest private investment destination, and due to the capital flow, more longtime Japanese expatriates live in Southeast Asia than in China. Japan, together with the U.S., was a staunch promoter of development as the purpose of politics. In the context of Cold War period, it was an alternative to identity politics, and combined the experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the U.S. with a model of developmental state governance in Japan. The purpose of politics in Asia after WW2 has shifted from independence and revolution to development, and this shift was well described in the renowned speech on turning "battlefields into marketplaces" delivered by Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan of Thailand in 1988. The postwar peace in Asia was built on this idea of development. Despite of the variety of regimes in Southeast Asia, the spread of development rather than revolution as the standard in Asia was a resounding success for Japanese foreign policy.[3] Even a strong military dictator in the region, like the Suharto regime in Indonesia, considered the success of self-sufficient rice production its biggest achievement. Making development a source of regime legitimacy in Southeast Asia was a fundamental peacebuilding effort that has yet to be fully acknowledged.

Since the start of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's administration, his commitment to visiting Southeast Asian countries and welcoming their leaders to Japan has clearly shown his prioritization of Southeast Asia.[4] This diplomacy sent a message not just to Southeast Asia but also, and maybe more importantly, to the Japanese public. By stressing Southeast Asia in Japan's foreign policymaking, instead of focusing only on the U.S. and China, Abe cultivated strong public acknowledgement of the strategic importance of Southeast Asia for Japan and a more nuanced understanding of the Asia-Pacific region. With this public understanding, the administration made room for more extensive diplomatic options.

Japanese Peacebuilding Efforts in Southeast Asia

Japan's role in the Cambodia peace process, together with the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), was one of the most challenging and unambiguous successes in the history of Japanese peacebuilding. This marked the end of a long period of war in Asia,[5] but at a large political cost that the Miyazawa administration had to pay. However, the Japanese government made the political decision with the understanding that peacebuilding, not just the economic development, as is frequently argued, was critical for the fate of Japan in the region. The way the Japanese committed to the effort by joining the election supervision mission under UNTAC, despite constitutional constraints, was a major step towards finding a way to take the role of proactive peacebuilding in the region. The National Police Agency (NPA) played a key role and has since established its position as an important institution in regional security cooperation, bolstered by its role in East Timor. The NPA also assisted with a pilot project to develop the "*kōban* (civil police) system" in Indonesia. The Indonesian police were separated from the military and transformed into a civilian force during the military reform period, with Japan providing an example of a civilian police force. Efforts by the Japanese police were also seen in Thailand for anti-drug missions and forensic science.

In addition to peacebuilding in a post-conflict setting, Japan has also worked to stabilize Southeast Asia in beyond the security dimension. Japan took the initiative to mitigate financial crises in Southeast Asia at key historical moments. For example, the political decision to change domestic Japanese law to enable debt rescheduling for Indonesia in order to solve hyperinflation in 1966, the final year of the Sukarno period, enabled the incoming Suharto regime to make economic plans and implement development policies. During the 1997-98 economic crisis, Japan led efforts to form regional financial stability mechanisms, including the Asian Monetary Fund – which was eventually rejected – the Miyazawa Plan, and later the Chiang Mai Initiative for currency swaps. The Japanese Ministry of Finance has played a strong role in building key institutions, such as the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (Financial Services Authority) in Indonesia, which was the critical state institution for securing not just economic stability but also recovering from a major social and political crisis in 1998.

Japan and Southeast Asia have also experienced numerous natural disasters, such as earthquakes, typhoons, and floods, which often claim more casualties than regional armed conflicts (e.g., conflicts in Aceh: 15,000 people, Cyclone Nargis: 140,000 people). The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), together with Japanese universities that have trained experts in the field, have pioneered efforts to build monitoring systems for disasters, including the typhoon monitoring center in the Philippines and flood management monitoring control in Thailand. Knowing that natural disasters are often very deadly, such institution building has created a better foundation for stabilizing affected areas after disasters.

Challenges

The Changing Global Order and Challenges to the U.S. Alliance System

Southeast Asian countries are disillusioned by the civil war in Syria, perceiving that the U.N. is losing confidence as a peacekeeping and peacebuilding entity. The U.N. Security

Council, especially, has proven to be the arena of a power game, where no country has prioritized solving the issue in Syria.

In addition, there are divergent perspectives on the effect of the changing power balance in the Asia-Pacific: will power games result in a new set of rules? Or can the current liberal order accommodate emerging powers, with the global system prevailing? The polarization of views on the resiliency of the regional and global liberal order will create challenges in achieving transnational consensus in the policymaking process, proven already by the political difficulty in implementing the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement.

Of direct concern for Southeast Asia, the South China Sea disputes and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in 2016 confirmed that alliances are not enough to maintain regional order. The Chinese campaign to discredit the ruling as "a piece of paper" was successful in silencing calls to comply with international law, with even Russia agreeing to ignore the ruling. The lesson was that the legitimacy of the rules-based order cannot be confined to a particular region. Russia was not particularly concerned with supporting China on the South China Sea issues, but considered the possibility of losing its annexation of Crimea after Ukraine filed a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice,[6] since supporting the Philippines would force Russia to accept the verdict of Ukraine's lawsuit too. This case shows the current weakness of rules-based order enforcement.

There are limits as well to Southeast Asia's bargaining power through ASEAN. As a regional architecture, ASEAN has proven its effectiveness in solving security issues among its member states, such as the Thai-Cambodia border conflict and the Malaysia-Philippines conflict, and in cases of disaster relief, including the devastation of cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and the Irrawaddy Delta region. However, ASEAN has also proven that it is not an organization where members can unite their voices concerning non-Southeast Asian countries on critical political economy issues. Such is the case between China and the Southeast Asian countries, regarding the South China Sea issues and related discussions in ASEAN meetings, demonstrating that one outside country can disrupt the idea of consensus building in Southeast Asia. However, as the strategic importance of Southeast Asia gains attention outside the region, the "pivot to Asia" is not merely a "pivot to China" but more importantly a "pivot to Southeast Asia." This is a period during which Southeast Asian countries should be eager to create a more effective style of consensus building in order to prevent Southeast Asia from becoming an arena for big power competition, which would only lead to large-scale victimization of Southeast Asian people, as experienced throughout the Vietnam War period.

Game Changing in Economic and Development Assistance

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) has lost its effectiveness as the only rule of the game for official development assistance (ODA). Rather than relying on OECD-DAC's guidelines for ODA, the Japanese government has made efforts to reassess and redefine the purpose of its own development assistance.[7] But without consensus on ODA rules among major donor countries, donors are engaging in development "competition," in this case primarily between Japan and China. This situation creates over-politicized projects that nobody, including the Southeast Asian countries, can win in the long-term, resulting in unnecessary losses and missed opportunities

Socioeconomic and Environmental Challenges

Frustration with both economic and political disparity and lack of equality is increasing throughout the region in both Southeast Asian countries and Japan. Taking into account the post-WW2 history of decolonization and independence, nationalism in Southeast Asia, unlike in Europe, is considered to be a positive political force, but it increases the risk of xenophobic nationalistic outbursts. As the 1950s showed, the nationalistic turn of politics can lead easily to demonization of neighboring countries and the global order, which could shake the foundation of the liberal order in Asia. With digitalization, the gap between the information-access parity that Southeast Asian countries have achieved and the comparative economic and political disparity that remains has become obvious. This fuels frustration with the social systems, including the unfair judicial systems, which serve the rich and powerful and leave the public no legitimate tool to claim justice. This situation may lead to strong pressure to change the rules and norms of governance, possibly through violence and terrorism in the worst cases.

In addition, for the first time in Asia's history, the majority of its populations live in urban areas. This social change is a force for new standards of governance and political choice. The power of the growing urban middle class to set the political agenda and demand higher levels of governance skills in local governments will challenge the elite-dominated style of policymaking. The public focus on political issues will shift from ideological concerns to more pragmatic ones, such as traffic jams, land and housing issues, disaster management, child care, and the crime rate. The erosion of ideology as political power could lead to the decline of political institutions such as parties, labor unions, and other social organizations, and the ratio of swing voters could grow. Rule by individuals not attached to strong institutions would increase the magnitude of policy swing in times of power transition, which could be a major source of political instability.

Environmental issues have already been established as security issues in Southeast Asian countries and in the region as a whole. Natural disasters, such as typhoons and cyclones of unprecedented scale, have devastated Southeast Asian countries, including Nargis (Myanmar, 2008) and Yolanda (Philippines, 2013). The humanitarian assistance after these massive natural disasters has led to a new standard of international cooperation in the region. Environmental issues thus have created rare opportunities for fostering new regional cooperation, including military cooperation.

However, mismanagement of environmental issues has a negative impact on the relationships of neighboring countries, such as the Haze on the Sumatra-Malay peninsula and water dam development in the Greater Mekong Subregion. This is leading to a wider scope of security issues, e.g., food, energy, pandemics, fishing, and more. Yet there is limited regional planning and harmonization regarding these cross-border challenges.

Cooperation with the U.S.

The U.S. and Japan's policy and strategic goals toward Southeast Asia are in common: both want a strong, prosperous, stable, and open Southeast Asia. Yet the U.S. and Japan have different approaches to pursuing this shared goal and different national interests in the region. For example, the interest of the U.S. focuses on financial and security matters,

while Japan's main interest lies in production and markets. Southeast Asia for the U.S. is a place to "pivot" for strategic purposes, but for Japan, Southeast Asia is a destination for business and expatriates.

The U.S. and Japan share the most fundamental standards of governance, such as transparency, human rights, democracy, and disaster relief. However, when it comes to institutionalizing those mutual standards into a more credible, reliable system, the countries still lack the commitment and effort. Because of the common strategic goal and the differences in approach, it is clear that both countries need to strengthen their ties, and it is also important now to enhance communication between the two countries so as to complement each other.

Policy Recommendations

The era of U.S.-Japan rivalry in Southeast Asia is in the past. The two allies now need to institutionalize their commitments to realize common goals, rather than competing with each other. Moreover, this cooperation does not have to be exclusive to the U.S. and Japan, but can be open to other neighboring partners as well, such as China, South Korea, India, and Australia. Leveraging their strengths and in support of their common interests, both countries can enhance public goods in the region, including security cooperation in the maritime domain, disaster relief operations for floods and typhoons, infrastructure development of highways and airports, and offering joint good governance education training. Together, Japan and the U.S. should promote the rule of law, not force, in Southeast Asia. Thus, the policy recommendations below focus on the establishment and enhancement of law-sharing and lawmaking mechanisms and networks in key fields of governance for the promotion of peace and stability.

Build stronger cooperation on regional labor issues

Economic disparity and inequality are rising issues and fault lines in Southeast Asian politics. However, recognition of the issues is still very low, and Southeast Asian countries lack the institutional setting necessary to address them fairly. Within the inequality issue, the area of international cooperation that is most urgently needed is a mechanism for resolution of labor issues relating to foreign workers. The issue has two aspects: human trafficking and visas and work permits. First, Japan and Southeast Asian countries, also preferably with the U.S., should enhance coordination by setting common rules to prevent human trafficking and protect labor rights. Coordination with receiving countries is of utmost importance, not only because of ethical grounds and social values, but also because there is agreement that leadership has a responsibility to protect the security of foreign nationals. Thus, security of foreign workers can easily become a national security problem and potentially damage the relations between involved nations. Second, because the rules for visas and work permits frequently change due to economic competition in the region, many workers unwittingly become illegal workers. This illegal immigration then becomes a favorite target of nationalistic politicians calling for protectionist, xenophobic policies. Therefore, the establishment of common rules, with institution building for dispute resolution and information sharing, is urgently needed, and this task should be undertaken in a multilateral arena where Japan and the U.S. can take prominent roles.

Invest in a long-term network style security mechanism for the U.S.-Japan alliance

The prominence of major power politics in Asia in the coming five years will require strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. While the tension rises between the U.S.-led security regime and the China-led economic regime, there are trends that pull toward both the U.S.-led economic regime and a China-centered security regime. Japan is in a critical position for managing the two pull factors. One of the key efforts to be made, especially by Japan and the U.S., is to enhance the relationships among the U.S.'s alliance partners. This will reinforce efforts to upgrade the hub-and-spokes security structure to a network-style model, in which Japan and South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia should enhance the level of security cooperation.

Southeast Asian countries' preference is for multilateral security cooperation. In such a model, the alliance will not have the same meaning as it did in the past, since countries who are U.S. allies could lean towards China and the de facto China allies could shift toward the U.S. Indeed, Southeast Asian countries would welcome more security partners, such as India, Russia, and the European Union. However, by definition, then, an alliance becomes a much less committed agreement, compared to those of the Cold War period. Security alliances would thus be less predictable and less credible. Looking ahead, the U.S.-Japan alliance should consider itself a model in creating a network-style security arrangement.

Form a development assistance strategy focused on consultancy

The intensifying competition for development assistance projects in Southeast Asia needs de-escalation, as major projects now are facing implementation difficulties due to over-bargaining, including high-speed train projects in Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as nuclear power plant projects in Vietnam. In setting the standard for development assistance, countries such as Japan, the U.S., Singapore, and China should be negotiating together with Southeast Asian countries for new ODA rules.

Because economic cooperation agencies such as JICA, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the World Bank are not the banking giants they used to be, it is impossible to win strategic projects in Southeast Asia simply because of financing power. Rather than focusing on a strategy to "win the tender" of these projects, Japan should to influence the planning of projects and play the role of consultant. One example is the comprehensive water management mechanism project in Bangkok after the 2014 flood. The plan was designed by the Japanese, and Chinese and Korean companies handled construction. One way to think of projects in this model is that as long as the planning standards meet U.S. and Japanese standards, the projects are satisfactory. Alternatively, if Japan still intends to win a project, the competition or the bidding should be undertaken by a multinational partner group, not a single nation. Ideally, if Japan and the U.S. can team up with another member of the region, such as with Vietnam for a Thailand project, or with Indonesia for a Philippines project, their development assistance strategy will gain more effectiveness, credibility, and strategic strength.

Ultimately, Japan and the U.S. must create a new standard for infrastructure project creation, as the current structure is on the verge of collapse. In addition, new planning on environmental issues, such as waste management, fisheries, and information and communications technology, should be upgraded.

Enhance the governance capacity through local leader networks and policymaking training

Decentralization is one of the most important governance challenges that will take place in Southeast Asia in the next 10 years. Provincial and municipal local government networks will be increasingly important in setting both the regional order and the shared regional standard of governance. Here lies an opportunity to enhance governance skills for Southeast Asian local leaders and bureaucrats and to network with Japanese and U.S. peers. Local-to-local relationships will increase in importance in the years ahead, and these networks also will serve as critical communication channels in the era of rising nationalism. As in Northeast Asia where the central governments can be at odds while local relationships flourish, Southeast Asia can develop the same structure, with advanced transportation and communication technology combined with government prioritization of local economies in the respective countries.

The U.S. and Japan should also increase cooperation among universities and think tanks for joint training and education programs. The huge intellectual asset that has been accumulated in Southeast Asia can be utilized in enhancing policy-planning capacities, with Japan focusing on issues such as business and welfare, and the U.S. on issues such as energy and defense. Japan and the U.S. have the expertise appropriate to develop a joint training system by combining their areas of specialty.

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3. This could apply even more so for Japan's policy toward China, which supported their development policy for their industrialization, agriculture growth, and so forth.

4. Prime Minister Abe visited all ten Southeast Asian countries within a year after his re-inauguration. He also hosted the Japan-ASEAN summit in December 2014, inviting all ten leaders to Tokyo.

5. The final state war in Asia was in 1979 between China and Vietnam, and since then, Asia has not had a war in the region. However, because the Cambodian civil war was also a proxy war between Vietnam and China, it would be fair to consider 1990 as the end of the war-period in Asia, in a broader sense.

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Japan's Peacebuilding in Africa

Rie Takezawa

Policy Objectives

To contribute more proactively to the peace, stability, and prosperity of Africa by focusing on the principle of "quality growth" that includes the concepts of sustainability, inclusiveness, and resilience

Japan's peacebuilding efforts in Africa have been primarily driven by pursuit of economic growth associated with the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) initiatives. Under the Abe administration, Japan's policy has evolved to emphasize that sustainability, inclusiveness, and resilience are essential for sustainable growth that enables peace in Africa. To this end, Japan is strengthening its focus on human resources development, infrastructure development, and the establishment of regulations and institutions, as well as the growth of the private sector and the expansion of the Japan Self-Defense Forces' (JSDF) role in various peacebuilding efforts.

Context

Focus on "Quality Growth"

Africa continues to be an important continent for international peacebuilding efforts, as a large number of its countries remain in conflict or post-conflict situations. Unfortunately, as is common among post-conflict countries, resolved conflicts have recurred within several years of the conclusion of peace agreements. Therefore, despite the differing definitions of peacebuilding among governments and donors, the idea remains central to this important international task. According to the U.N. Secretary-General's Policy Committee (2007), the conceptual basis is that "peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development."[1] Many actors working on peacebuilding have evolved the concept and strategies, but it may be broadly interpreted as providing seamless support in various phases, from conflict resolution to reconstruction and development, and may involve the military.

Economic development has been a consistent principle in Japan's policy towards both conventional development assistance and peacebuilding support in Africa over the years. Contrary to what has been generally understood as "peacebuilding," however, Japan's approach to peacebuilding to date has been unique in the sense that its contribution has been limited mainly to stable areas during the post-conflict phase or conflict prevention in peacetime, largely due to restrictions on JSDF activities outside Japanese territory. In this sense, working within constraints, Japan has developed a unique peacebuilding policy over time, which differs from that of the U.S. and other countries that play leading roles in peacebuilding.

In essence, the Japanese government emphasized the importance of quality growth in the Development Cooperation Charter, revised in October 2015, stating that "in order to

resolve the poverty issue in a sustainable manner, it is essential to achieve economic growth through human resources development, infrastructure development and establishment of regulations and institutions as well as the growth of the private sector."[2]

Although the policy has not been stated or defined explicitly, Japan's past contributions demonstrate its pursuit of peacebuilding through economic development. Prior to promoting this method of peacebuilding in the 2000s and since increasing official development assistance (ODA) projects in Africa in the late 1970s, Japan has continually focused on the concept and practice of economic development as a strong tool for poverty reduction. However, challenges remain in defining and implementing Japan's policy of peacebuilding in Africa through economic development and sustainable growth.

From economic development to peacebuilding: Japan's peacebuilding policy in Africa

Although Japan's peacebuilding policy in Africa has been centered around economic development associated with TICAD initiatives since the early 1990s, over the years Japan has also increased efforts to expand its contribution to peacebuilding activities by pursuing a more flexible JSDF dispatch under the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). Such an evolution of Japan's peacebuilding is evident in the terminology shift from two Japanese concepts, "consolidation of peace" and "nation-building," to the international term "peacebuilding," which includes military commitment.

In its initial phase, Japan's policy toward Africa focused heavily on fostering economic development. With the hope of bringing global attention back to hunger and poverty in Africa,[3] Japan launched the TICAD in 1993.[4]

The TICAD I (1993) and II (1998) conferences focused on promoting Africa's development by strengthening relations between donors and countries of Africa through multilateral cooperation and advocating the importance of African ownership of development. Although peacebuilding was not explicitly addressed in the first two TICAD conferences, Japan had already recognized the connection between sustainable development – including the integration of Africa into the global economy – and peace and stability in Africa. For instance, *The Tokyo Declaration on African Development towards the 21st Century*, adopted during TICAD I, stated, "We, the participants of TICAD, agree that stability and security are prerequisites to sustainable development."[5] In *The Tokyo Agenda for Action*, adopted at the second TICAD, the primary theme was "Poverty Reduction and Integration into the Global Economy," and it stated that "without development, peace and stability are not durable."[6]

As Japan broadened its approach to Africa to include peacebuilding, the first turning point took place in 2002 when Prime Minister Jun'ichirō Koizumi delivered a policy speech to promote the idea of Japan's contribution to the "consolidation of peace."[7] Following the speech, Japan began promoting its approach to the consolidation of peace[8] and nation-building.[9]

However, although the Koizumi administration actively addressed the consolidation of peace as a policy issue (because peacebuilding was increasingly a matter of international concern), the administration also carefully excluded the military, mainly due to the legislative restrictions regarding military activities outside Japan. In addition, there was strong public opposition to the dispatch of the JSDF to unstable areas, with the risk of casualties. To this end, Japan avoided using the term "peacebuilding," because the broad international definition included the commitment of the military in unstable, conflict-affected regions.

"Consolidation of peace" became one of the three pillars of Japan's initiative for assistance

to Africa, along with "human-centered development" and "poverty reduction through economic growth," as stated in the *TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration* adopted at TICAD III (2003).[10] Here, peacebuilding clearly became one of the central tenets of Japan's policy toward Africa. The revised ODA Charter (2003) also stipulated peacebuilding as one of its main pillars, along with a stronger emphasis on the African continent.[11]

Japan's peacebuilding initiative in Africa accelerated when Prime Minister Koizumi made an announcement at the G8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005 that Japan was willing to increase its support for the consolidation of peace in Africa. He stated, "Japan will provide assistance to the field that is most needed by African countries" so that they "can stand on their own feet."[12] In the following years, the *TICAD Conference on Consolidation of Peace* in Addis Ababa (2006), TICAD IV (2008), and TICAD V (2013) took place under Japan's continued initiative. Beyond TICAD III, consolidation of peace has remained an important pillar of Japan's policy toward Africa, but attention to the business sector has increased in tandem with the continent's rapid economic growth.[13] The roles of the private sector and foreign investment have become prominent foci of the policy toward Africa. However, considering that "peace and stability" continues to be one of the main pillars under the primary objective to "strengthen the economic bases of development through infrastructure and human resources development, economic diversification, and promoting broad-based and private sector-led growth while pursuing equity and inclusiveness,"[14] Japan evidently is pursuing economic development to contribute to peacebuilding in Africa.

Japan's peacebuilding policy toward Africa most recently experienced a second critical turning point under the Abe administration when the Japanese government revised its Development Cooperation Charter for the first time in twelve years in February 2015, as part of the Abe administration's "proactive contribution to peace" initiative. It is significant precisely because the term "peacebuilding" is used in the charter, rather than previously used terminology such as "consolidation for peace" and "nation-building." The terminology change is in line with the Abe administration's policy of pursuing a more flexible JSDF dispatch for peacebuilding efforts. To this end, the Abe administration also revised the title of the charter from the ODA Charter – where the scope of support was mainly focused on economic development assistance – to the Development Cooperation Charter, which also includes the role of Japan's JSDF commitment to various development cooperation and peacebuilding activities.

In order to open new opportunities for the JSDF's role in peacebuilding, the Abe administration pushed forward with legal reforms, and the Legislation for Peace and Security was implemented on March 29, 2016.[15] The legislation enables the expansion of the JSDF's role in UNPKO, such as the dispatch of Self-Defense officials as commanders of UNPKO and the addition to the mission description for Japanese troops participating in UNPKO of *kaketsuke-keigo* (coming to the aid of a geographically distant unit or personnel under attack). The legislation has also yielded a new possibility for the JSDF to contribute to security sector reform (SSR) operations, the work of reshaping military and security apparatuses.[16] A qualitative expansion of JSDF initiatives, which were previously limited to mainly logistics support, may be realized.

In the most recent TICAD held in Nairobi in August 2016, Japan discussed strengthening its commitment to capacity building, including human resources development, in its approach to peacebuilding in Africa. The Japanese government will collaborate with Japanese private sector companies on innovative technologies to provide support for

effective border and security controls. Japan also committed to support the augmentation of national and local governments' capacities, as well as international and African institutions, for coordinated border management and PKO.[17] Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida stressed "the importance of human resource development as one of the key factors for the future of peacebuilding in Africa."[18]

Although the Abe administration has made efforts to expand Japan's role in peacebuilding measures including UNPKO, Japan also continues to emphasize economic growth to achieve peace. Japan aims to contribute more proactively to the peace, stability, and prosperity in Africa through quality growth. Although new provisions, such as operations allowing aid to foreign troops (limited to nonmilitary operations, such as disaster relief), garner much national attention, the greater part of the new Development Cooperation Charter focuses on quality growth principles, such as sustainability, inclusiveness, and resilience.[19] Japan will take advantage of its own experience, expertise, and technology to provide assistance to develop foundations of economic growth and realize quality growth. By promoting quality growth principles, Japan acknowledges the various risks and potential shortcomings of accelerating economic growth, such as economic disparity and environmental issues, and has placed a stronger emphasis on utilizing the resources of Japan's private sector and local governments to transfer their technology and skills.

The Abe administration is expanding Japan's commitment toward peacebuilding in Africa through UNPKO and other security measures, development assistance including capacity building, and increasing cooperation with the Japanese private sector. However, the broadness of the range of the fields that are subject to the label of peacebuilding poses a challenge, as Japan's focus or area of specialty is still vague.

Implementation strategy

Although Japan has been promoting economic development and quality growth principles in its peacebuilding efforts, the range of sectors that are subject to peacebuilding remains very broad. Japan has repeatedly mentioned in its policy that it is carrying out a diverse array of efforts, but the reality is that at the implementation level, a very large number of ODA projects fall under the peacebuilding category.

The implementation strategy for peacebuilding in Africa of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which coordinates and implements the ODA for the Japanese government, shares the same objective as that of conventional development assistance, with almost identical sectors of assistance. For example, in 2007, Sadako Ogata, then president of JICA, revealed:

> Japan's assistance to Africa has followed the international consensus to focus on poverty reduction through promoting projects, covering education, healthcare, water, and agriculture. While remaining active in these fields we are, however, beginning to look more and more to accelerating overall economic growth.[20]

Thus, even after Prime Minister Koizumi announced at the G8 Gleneagles Summit that Japan was willing to increase its support for consolidation of peace in Africa, JICA preferred to focus on economic growth.

In February 2011, JICA reviewed its *Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding.* JICA cited its

"experience and lessons learned from the provision of increasingly demanded peacebuilding assistance to Africa and other conflict-affected countries and areas" as its reasons for the review.[21] One of the key revisions reflecting JICA's strategy in Africa is as follows:

> Assistance for peacebuilding shares the same objective with conventional development assistance, which is to contribute to development. Thus, sectors of assistance for peacebuilding are almost common with other development assistance, such as infrastructure, education, health, agriculture, etc. However, there are some particular issues and needs for conflict-affected countries, which non-conflict-affected countries do not hold, such as reconstruction of state system[s] and functions, landmines, UXO [unexploded ordnance] and small arms proliferation, reintegration of ex-combatants and returnees, reconciliation and co-existence, etc.[22]

Especially in regards to Africa, JICA aims to achieve peace through sustainable development. In collaboration with JICA, the Japanese government is pursuing peacebuilding through economic growth.

However, Japan has also carried out peacebuilding efforts besides those aiming at long-term economic development and sharing the same goals as conventional development. Some examples include capacity-building initiatives for peacekeeping, such as the dispatch of Japanese instructors to the PKO Center in Ghana in November 2008. Officials from post-conflict states have also been invited to attend capacity-building technical training in Japan regarding the governance sector under a technical cooperation scheme. Japan has also contributed to conflict prevention measures through governance sector capacity building and has made donations for emergency humanitarian aid through the U.N.

South Sudan: the test case for a more integrated approach to peacebuilding in Africa

South Sudan is the most recent case of Japan's unique peacebuilding efforts in Africa, where Japan has contributed through both its contribution to the UNPKO and ODA projects. To respond efficiently and effectively to South Sudan's enormous peacebuilding needs, various peacebuilding-related actors, such as the JSDF and JICA, have collaborated on implementing projects, but collaboration is still limited.

Within the JSDF dispatch to South Sudan, the engineering unit has mainly been engaged in road construction and other infrastructure projects in and around Juba since January 2012. After the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2155 in May 2014, the primary mandate of the U.N. Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) became the protection of civilians during nation building.[23] Therefore, the engineering unit has been engaged in tasks that prioritize civilian protection. Given the restrictions in the JSDF's military activities, it is contributing to the protection of civilians' activities through tasks such as road and other construction site preparations.

As for Japan's ODA contributions, JICA engaged in bilateral cooperation with the government of South Sudan after its independence in 2011, with the aim of contributing to the consolidation of peace in the country. However, strategically, JICA's support mainly focuses on contributing to the country's long-term development. Particularly, JICA's assistance emphasizes the development of social and economic infrastructure, the diversification of industries, the improvement of basic services, governance building, and security.[24]

The JSDF engineering unit has collaborated with Japan's ODA through JICA on some projects. For example, after consulting with the UNMISS under which the JSDF engineering unit operates, the unit demolished a dilapidated building in a purification plant, and JICA enhanced the plant's capacity. Nonetheless, collaborative projects remain few in number, and further cooperation is necessary in order to enhance Japan's contributions.

To address the surge in violence and the increase in armed conflicts in South Sudan since July 2016, the JSDF serving UNPKO has remained in Juba and will continue its service according to its mandate. The so-called "rush-to-rescue (*kaketsuke-keigo*)",[25] which was added to the JSDF's mission, has recently gained attention in Japan. However, this does not enable the protection of civilians and therefore does not constitute a major change in Japan's role in the UNPKO in South Sudan.

Challenges

Difficulty in balancing Japan's unique peacebuilding style with contribution to the full spectrum of peacebuilding efforts, including the conflict phase

Japan is currently pursuing its unique style of peacebuilding in Africa by emphasizing economic development and quality growth. Historically, economic development has been a key concept in Japan's ODA, based on its own experience of postwar recovery and reconstruction as a strong tool for poverty reduction and sustainable growth. Given that Japan's contribution to peacebuilding is limited to the post-conflict phase and stable regions, economic development is an area that fits Japan's experience and specialty. Although many donors today acknowledge the importance of economic development, disagreement remains between Japan and other donors that focus on social sector development. Over the years, Japan has continually faced pressure from the international community to coordinate its peacebuilding policy with other governments and aid agencies, including demands for a more proactive security commitment.

On the other hand, Japan's security commitments in Africa have gradually increased in recent years. Japan maintains its JSDF base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa in order to contribute to international anti-piracy efforts in the Indian Ocean. Though the frequency of piracy has declined due to such operations, Japan plans to expand personnel and aircraft in Djibouti for the purpose of evacuating Japanese citizens from nearby spots of increased violence or areas hit by natural disasters.[26] Such efforts can be viewed as preparation for Japan's further commitment to Africa. During Prime Minister Abe's visit to Africa in August 2016, he held bilateral meetings with officials from the Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Mozambique, and gained informal support for Japan's 2015 security legislation reforms to loosen the restrictions on Japan's involvement in overseas peacekeeping and security missions.[27]

Policy and implementation strategy are too vague and broad

Japan's current policy is too comprehensive and its implementation strategy is too broad. A stronger and more focused policy and objective are essential to further develop its peacebuilding measures. Currently there is a wide range of sectors that are subject to peacebuilding support, and a large number of the sectors overlap with conventional development assistance. However, there is another significant issue: when revising its

peacebuilding policy and implementation strategy, Japan must consider how to satisfy or meet the demands of the international community on Japan's security commitment in international peacebuilding efforts.

Interests and overall strategy remain unclear

According to Japan's National Security Strategy (NSS) guiding principles (2013), ODA should be used "strategically" to pursue national interests and objectives.[28] However, compared to Japan's interest in the Asian region, Japan's interest in Africa is still low – for example, Japan's recent ODA commitment in Africa is approximately 10% of Japan's total ODA commitment worldwide.[29] The Japanese government lacks a consensus regarding the reasons for Japan's contributions to peacebuilding in Africa in the face of high security risks. Not only has there been objection within the Japanese government, but the public also has criticized Japan's commitment and contributions to Africa during periods of recession. To both public and government, Africa may seem marginal to Japan's economic and political interests. Japan has no clear historical connection to or interest in the African region; therefore, it needs to clarify and emphasize its interests and overall strategy in the continent.

Policy Recommendations

Clearly articulate the focus and objectives of Japan's peacebuilding in Africa

Japan's wide-ranging sectors that are subject to peacebuilding support, the vague objective of its peacebuilding efforts, and Africa's marginal position in Japanese economic and political interests are major issues in advancing Japan's peacebuilding in Africa. Despite such problems, Japan has done remarkably well in taking the initiative to organize a series of important conferences with Africa, notwithstanding the budgetary constraints in Japan's ODA over the past decade. With such efforts as a foundation, Japan should clarify and promote its unique peacebuilding style and objective, emphasizing its comparative advantage over other donors. Its own experience of postwar recovery and reconstruction, which African countries could adapt according to their own objectives, is likely a significant component. Concurrently, Japan must consider coordinating its peacebuilding policy in Africa with the international community, especially given the increase in UNPKO missions in Africa over the past few years, and risks of recurring or emerging conflicts that many of the post conflict countries are facing.

Recently, purported Sino-Japanese competition in Africa has gained international attention.[30] Although Japan may be conscious of China's growing presence in Africa, there is no evidence that a sense of rivalry is the driver of Japan's current proactive policy toward Africa; rather, Japan's genuine interest in Africa is its motive. However, Japan is possibly aiming to emphasize "quality growth" principles as its comparative advantage.

Bolster collaboration among various stakeholders to improve coordination of efforts

The current debate among Japanese ministries regarding development cooperation involves increasing the quality and effectiveness and establishing a certain level of Japanese development presence. In particular, collaboration in post-conflict African countries, where individual actors' peacebuilding activities are either limited or too comprehensive, will

likely lead to better outcomes. However, as evident in South Sudan, cases of collaboration remain low and lack strong cooperation at the strategic or policy level of each actor in Tokyo. The current collaboration seems to be driven at the field level, and more frequent policy level cooperation is essential. Each peacebuilding actor, including the public sector and nongovernmental organizations, needs to overcome their differences in organizational cultures and interests.

Encourage the Japanese private sector to set up operations in Africa

The Japanese private sector's expansion in Africa could contribute to accelerating economic growth in the region. This will meet not only the interests of countries in Africa but also those of Japan; in recent years, Japan has realized Africa's importance to its economy, as Africa exports many of the raw materials and resources used for Japan's manufacturing industries. By deepening Japanese investment and encouraging joint corporate ventures, Tokyo hopes to secure the supply chains for these raw materials.[31] Prime Minister Abe's August 2016 trip marked his third visit to Africa since taking office in late 2012. He should continue his efforts to deepen relations with African nations, following his visits to various countries in the continent, while developing a policy to support the private sector in dealing with potential security risks and to assist in realizing sustainable businesses in Africa.

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Final Thoughts

Yuki Tatsumi

In 2016, Japan began its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The Japanese government identified "peacebuilding" as the policy area that it will prioritize during its tenure. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe reaffirmed his government's intention to sustain its commitment to peacebuilding, as he laid out in his speech in front of U.N. General Assembly in September 2015. Speaking at the U.N. Leaders' Summit on Refugees on September 20, 2016, Abe reemphasized Japan's commitment to support refugees in the context of human security and peacebuilding.[1]

Indeed, the policy briefs in this volume all point to an unambiguous reality that Japan engaged in peacebuilding long before the term was used. As Aizawa and Takezawa's chapters highlighted, its earlier efforts have leveraged official development assistance (ODA) and other forms of economic engagement such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. These efforts have been based on Japan's own reconstruction experience after World War 2 – without economic development and betterment of the quality of life of the general public, whatever peace has been achieved can be vulnerable. As such, Japan's efforts, first in Southeast Asia in earlier years and in Africa after the Cold War, have focused on assisting countries to achieve a level of economic well being that allows them to be less reliant on external aid.

However, in the post-Cold War era, the international community faces increasingly complex situations in various parts of the world. U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), for example, originally began as relatively simple and clear-cut missions, such as cease-fire monitoring in the Golan Heights and post-conflict power transition in Cambodia, but have evolved since then to take on far broader missions, sometimes under extremely changeable security circumstances on the ground.

Still, in the 1990s, Japan was able to play a meaningful role in peacebuilding, as Koga's chapter highlights. In Cambodia and East Timor, Japan's role was critical in facilitating reconciliation among the parties of the civil war, paving the way to the relatively peaceful political transition that culminated in democratic elections. Particularly in case of Southeast Asia, Japan's steady economic engagement in the region, as Aizawa's chapter illustrated, was critical in allowing Japan to play helpful diplomatic roles. Concurrently, Tokyo's efforts in articulating the conceptual framework to its approach in peacebuilding is reflected in its attempt to develop the concept of "human security" as the guiding principle in peacebuilding.

As the U.N. missions in conflict-torn areas continue to grow more complex, and some of its missions begin to include the protection of civilian victims of conflicts, Japan's restrictions from participating in increasingly complicated UNPKO missions became clear. In particular, as Fujishige and Koga both argue, due to the self-imposed stringent conditions under which the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) can be dispatched, Japan has not been able to dispatch the JSDF units to missions that are beyond infrastructure repair and other strictly non-combatant activities. This has led to the perception that Japan is not willing to share the risk and responsibilities with other members of international community in some of the higher-risk missions, resulting in under-appreciation of the efforts that Japan is making in other areas.

As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, Japan has had extensive experience in peacebuilding despite its limitation in certain areas. At the same time, however, these chapters also make clear that Japan's past approaches will not allow Japan to take part in today's international efforts for peacebuilding in places such as the Middle East. Even with the peace and security legislation that supposedly expands the scope of activities in which the JSDF can engage, and despite Prime Minister Abe's repeated promise that the JSDF will do more, a highly divisive debate over whether or not to allow the JSDF to perform "rush-to-rescue" (*kaketsuke-keigo*) missions as described in Fujishige's chapter is a stark reminder that Japan as a country is politically not ready to see its JSDF personnel get involved in situations that can lead to them using weapons for purposes other than national defense.

Moving forward, what should Japan do? The policy recommendations presented by all four authors have one element in common – Japan should keep doing what it has been doing, but do so more effectively. For instance, Takezawa discusses Japan's focus on "quality" vs. "quantity" in its aid policy toward Africa, given that Japan is now overwhelmed by China in the volume of its ODA. Fujishige recommends that Japan should leverage the JSDF troops' experience in infrastructure reconstruction as its specialization. Koga advocates a clearer articulation of "human security" to better differentiate it from other concepts in peacebuilding, such as the responsibility to protect. Aizawa argues for Japan's continued focus on economic development and nurturing of political stability that will allow gradual but steady transition to a more open society.

Although the policies that the authors suggest are incremental, they also still require improvement in intra-agency coordination. As Koga and Takezawa highlight, the cooperation between the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the JSDF on the ground in Iraq and South Sudan will serve as important precedents and lay the foundation for future coordination. As the National Security Secretariat continues to consolidate its leading role in shaping policy and initiating inter-agency coordination, the coordination process within the Japanese government will likely continue to improve. Better inter-agency coordination can indeed allow Japan to maximize its policy options.

That said, the "proactive" – as Prime Minister Abe describes the guiding principle of Japan's National Security Strategy – orientation of its policy is critical. As long as Japan continues to stay on the receiving end of requests and solicitation of participation from the U.N., it will not be able to play a meaningful role. Rather, what is required of Japan is to put forward what it can and is willing to do when the peacebuilding activities are still being shaped. That way, Japan can choose to play a role in the areas of its strength, rather than scrambling to figure out what it can do after other countries have made their own choices.

After all, such proactive foreign policy is what Prime Minister Abe has been promising to deliver since he first coined the term "proactive contribution to peace" in his government's National Security Strategy in December 2013.[2] Since then, Japan has made much progress in the area of defense diplomacy, reaching out to fellow U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. It has strengthened bilateral defense relations with the United States, as demonstrated by the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in April 2015.[3] It has taken measures to strengthen its capabilities to defend its homeland, as well as support U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific region by reinterpreting its Constitution to allow the government to exercise the right of collective self-defense when certain conditions are met. But when it comes to more active participation in broader international missions under U.N. auspices, Japan has actually contracted, leaving the mission in South Sudan

the only UNPKO mission in which Japan currently participates. In other words, despite Abe's repeated commitment to do more, Japan actually has not done much in broader international peacebuilding operations.

When the world looks at the United States under the Trump administration uneasily, given Washington's "America first" principle, more is required of all countries that believe in the existing international norms and that are committed to peace. Japan is no exception. In fact, now that Abe is one of the few world leaders who appear to have gained the confidence of President Donald Trump, Japan can play an important role in ensuring that the United States will continue to engage in multinational peacebuilding efforts. Proactively doing so in cooperation with other international partners will well-position Japan as the glue between the United States and the rest of the international community.

Endnotes

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Peacebuilding and
JAPAN

VIEWS FROM THE NEXT GENERATION

Japan has tried to actively engage in peacekeeping efforts with international partners despite its constitutional restrictions on the use of force by its Self-Defense Forces. Rather than reducing its contributions due to this unique limitation, however, Japan is forging new paths to peace by expanding its work in peacebuilding, opening doors for broader Japanese participation and impact. These policy briefs explore Japan's development of the concept of peacebuilding, as well as its practical contributions, and provide policy recommendations for issues of key importance for both Tokyo and Washington.

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