UNIDIR

Annex 1

Application of Global Voluntary Standards and Guidelines
to Strengthen Weapon and Ammunition Management (WAM)
in Conflict-affected Settings:
2015 Expert Survey Results with 2016 Expert Inputs

Evaluation of Security Elements

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The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR's activities are funded by contributions from governments and foundations.

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Evaluation Criteria for Security Assessments
2015 Expert Survey Results

In 2015, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Conventional Arms Programme circulated a survey entitled, "International Small Arms and Ammunition Platform, A. Security Assessment Tool: Criteria Evaluation".

This survey sought to obtain expert technical inputs from relevant stakeholders—States assisting other States; the United Nations; and expert NGOs—to evaluate the safety and security assessment criteria for weapons and ammunition management as applied in conflict-affected settings.

Using the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) (5.20 Stockpile Management) and International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs), the survey was designed to gain unique insight into practitioners' interpretations—based on expertise, experience and knowledge—of the Importance, Priority and associated Risk Level for safety and security control measures when conducting a weapons and ammunition (WAM) storage assessment in conflict-affected settings.

There were 111 items, comprised of questions, statements and principles, for respondents to answer. For each item, respondents answered three assessment areas:

1. **Importance** (Minimal, Low, Moderate, High)
2. **Priority** (Low, Medium, High)
3. **Risk Level** (Negligible, Minor, Moderate, Severe, Critical)

The following provides an item-by-item review of these findings, including charts and graphs, which show the results in a digestible and informative manner.

Survey Response Instructions

Respondents were asked to complete the survey on the basis of the following assumptions:

1. You are providing security assessment assistance for a storage facility which belongs to security forces in a foreign host country;
2. The host country has recently emerged from conflict—the State has limited resources available, including limited financial and technical capacities;
3. Due to the conflict, the host country currently does not have relevant national security regulations in place for its storage facilities, and general physical security and stockpile management practices by the security forces are based on assumptions and/or experiences;
4. The general security threat level in the region you are responsible for is severe. There are reports of unrest, armed conflict and acts of terrorism;
5. Security assessment criteria are being designed to assist national security forces in conducting security assessments of their storage facilities. In this context, you are being asked to rate the Importance, Priority and Risk Levels of key physical security and stockpile management measures, based on your experience and knowledge of arms and ammunition management. Specifically, you are to determine the following: (1) how important is the specific security control measure? (Minimal; Low; Moderate; or High); (2) what is the priority of undertaking the security control measure? (Low; Medium; or High); and (3) what are the security risks of not undertaking the control measure? (Negligible, Minor, Moderate, Severe, Critical).
6. This is all the information that is available to you at this time to complete the survey.

*** * ***

NOTE:

- This document is not a security assessment checklist to carry out storage assessments. This document is designed to obtain expert technical inputs on the interpretation of Importance, Priority and Risk Levels of specific control measures when conducting security storage assessments in conflict/post-conflict settings.
- The questions in the survey are derived from the ISACS (5.20 Stockpile management) and IATGs, with direct references to specific control recommenations from these standards and guidelines. References and recommendation levels from the ISACS and the IATGs are intentionally excluded from this document.
- The information collected from survey responses will inform the development and finalization of security assessment criteria and a technical tool to facilitate its application in the field.

Chart legend: Percentiles of survey respondents per assessment area

0%	13%	17%	20%	25%	33%	40%	50%	60%	67%	80%	83%	88%	100%

For each item, a chart presents the survey results in coloured percentiles of the total number of responses received for the three assessment areas, i.e. Importance (Minimal, Low, Moderate, High), Priority (Low, Medium, High), and Risk Level (Negligible, Minor, Moderate, Severe, Critical). 100% (green) means that there is consensus among survey participants on the assessed area of the item. The higher the percentiles per assessment area, the higher the level of agreement among survey participants on the item's importance, priority and risk levels, respectively. The smaller the percentiles (> 0%), the lower the level of agreement among survey participants on the item's importance, priority and risk level, respectively.[1]

In the chart example, 88% of all the survey respondents agree that the Importance (I) of this item is High, whereas 13% see the Importance of this item as being Moderate. With regard to the Priority (P) of the item, there is a relatively high level of common understanding among survey participants, i.e. 75% of respondents agree that the Priority (P) of this item is High, whereas 25% see the Priority (P) of this item as being Medium. With regard to the Risk Level (R), there is consensus (100%) among survey respondents that the Risk Level (R) of this item is Severe.

Chart example

Importance (I)	Q.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	67%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	100%
Critical	Critical	0%

[1] Note that respondents only answered the items which were relevant to their experience and expertise. Therefore, some percentages throughout this document do not add up to 100%. Moreover, due to the software used to collate these findings, many percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number meaning that, at times, percentages add up to 101%.

Acronyms

ACTO	Attractive to Criminals and Terrorist Organizations
CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
IATGs	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
IDS	Intrusion detection system
ISACS	International Small Arms Control Standards
PIDS	Perimeter Intrusion detection system
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
WAM	Weapons and Ammunition Management

SURVEY FINDINGS, INCLUDING EXPERT INPUTS[2]

[2] All Expert Inputs are from the proceedings of a technical expert meeting entitled, 'Application of Global Voluntary Standards and Guidelines to Strengthen Weapon and Ammunition Management (WAM) in Conflict-affected Settings', organized by UNIDIR and GICHD. This meeting took place on 19 September 2016 in Geneva, Switzerland.

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1. Risk Assessment

In the Risk Assessment area, the survey included one item:

- Q.1 Are risk assessments being carried out for storage facilities? (this page)

There was general consensus on the Importance and Priority of risk assessments being carried out for storage facilities, with 88% of respondents rating both at the highest level. This item's associated Risk Level saw more variation, with 63% rating it Severe and 25% Critical; 13% of respondents believed that carrying out risk assessments had a Moderate associated Risk Level.

EXPERT INPUT

Experts deliberated the slight yet visible variation in the Risk Level category. Many believed this was due to differing understandings of Severe versus Critical. When the experts explored this, it became clear that Severe and Critical were sometimes used interchangeably, whereas others saw a clear distinction between the two ratings. By and large, however, it was evident from the experts and survey respondents that this question had a high associated Risk Level (Severe and Critical).

Importance (I)	Q.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	25%







2. Separation of Weapons and Ammunition

In the Separation of Weapons and Ammunition area, the survey included two items:

- Q.2 Are weapons and ammunition stored separately in different buildings? (this page)
    - Q.2.1.1 A secure room or cabinet is used to separate arms and ammunition when in the same building.

The need for weapons and ammunition to be stored in different buildings was seen as a matter of High Importance (88%) and High Priority (75%) with a unanimously Severe associated Risk Level (100%). When weapons and ammunition were stored in the same building, there was a generally High Importance (75%) and High Priority (88%) attributed to the use of a secure room or cabinet. Notably, 13% of respondents saw the use of a secure room or cabinet as a Low Priority item. The associated Risk Level of using a secure room or cabinet for arms and ammunition in the same building saw substantial variation (see Q.2.1.1).

Importance (I)	Q.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	100%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.2.1.1 A secure room or secure cabinet is used to separate arms and ammunition when stored in the same building.

Importance (I)	Q.2.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	13%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	13%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	0%







3. ACTO Items

In the Attractive to Criminals and Terrorist Organizations (ACTO) Items area, the survey included three items:

- Q.3 Are items that may be classified as being ACTO, such as MANPADS, detonators, bulk explosives, mortars, and hand grenades subject to more stringent security than other weapons and ammunition?
- Q.3.1 For weapons with explosive components (such as MANPADS), their delivery platform is separated from the explosive component.
    - Q.3.1.2 Delivery platforms and their explosive components are stored in different buildings.

As a general observation, most respondents believed it was of High Importance (88%) and High Priority (88%) that ACTO items be subject to more stringent security than other weapons and ammunition. When it came to the separate storage of their delivery platform and explosive component, there was 100% consensus that this was an item of High Importance and High Priority. When it came to exactly how these items should be separated, i.e. in different buildings or not, slight variation was observed, with 88% rating this an item of High Importance and High Priority and the remaining 13% as an item of Moderate Importance and Medium Priority.

Consistent variation was observed in this area's associated Risk Level across all three items. For example, respondents were generally undecided as to item Q.3's associated Risk Level, with 13% believing it was Moderate, 50% Severe and 38% Critical. However, a general trend towards a higher associated Risk Level can be observed when discussing the need to separate the delivery platforms of ACTO items from their explosive component (both Q.3.1 and Q.3.1.2).

Q.3 Are items that may be classified as being ACTO, such as MANPADS, Detonators, Bulk Explosives, Mortars, and Hand grenades subject to more stringent security than other weapons and ammunition?

Importance (I)	Q.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	38%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts highlighted the enhanced importance of ACTO items as they are ready "off-the-shelf" to be used against a local population and the State. This, to many of the experts, was an important distinction to bear in mind when analysing the Importance, Priority and Risk Levels of such items.







Q.3.1 For weapons with explosive components (such as MANPADS), their delivery platform is separated from the explosive component.

Importance (I)	Q.3.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	38%







Q.3.1.2 Delivery platforms and their explosive components are stored in different buildings.

Importance (I)	Q.3.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	88%
Critical	Critical	13%







4. Physical Security Infrastructure

4.1. Physical Security Infrastructure: General

In the Physical Security Infrastructure area, the survey included two items:

- Q.4 Is there a sufficiently robust storage building structure in place to prevent forced entry? (this page)
    - Q.4.1 The building structure complies with national security standards.

In this area, survey responses showed moderate variation. There was a general agreement that a sufficiently robust storage facility be in place to prevent a forced entry (Q.4). 75% of respondents believed this to be an item of High Importance and High Priority. However, only 63% saw this was an item of Severe associated Risk Level, and a further 25% saw it as an item of Moderate Risk Level.

When it came to the structure's compliance with national security standards (Q.4.1), there was marked variation in Importance, Priority and Risk Level ratings. 63% believed this to be an item of High Importance, 50% saw it as an item of High Priority and 63% as an item of Moderate associated Risk Level.

Importance (I)	Q.4	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.1 The building structure complies with national security standards.

Importance (I)	Q.4.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts focused on this item's even division between Medium and High Priority. They presumed that this variation boiled down to the survey respondents' diverse experience with national security standards. In some settings, national security standards were robust, in others they were outdated, unenforceable or too low. This question of national security standards was linked to that of national ownership of WAM activities by the host State. If the host State prioritizes WAM activities, then national security standards, and compliance with them, may be more relevant and useful. However, in the end, the Importance, Priority and Risk Level associated with compliance with national security standards was seen as heavily reliant on the personal experience of survey respondents in a variety of different settings.







4.2. Physical Security Infrastructure: Walls

In the Physical Security Infrastructure – Walls area, the survey included 10 items:

- Q.4.2.1 The walls of the storage facility are serviceable to prevent forced entry into the storage facility.
- Q.4.2.2 The walls of the storage facility meet one of the following specifications set by international standards:
    - Q.4.2.2.1 The walls are made of solid, reinforced concrete.
        - Q.4.2.2.1.1 Thickness of the wall (specify in meters).
    - Q.4.2.2.2 Solid, bonded brickwork or masonry.
        - Q.4.2.2.2.1 Thickness of the wall (specify in meters).
    - Q.4.2.2.3 Cavity walls of dense concrete block, brick or stone.
        - Q.4.2.2.3.1 Thickness of the wall (specify in meters).
- Q.4.2.3 Reinforcements exist in walls that do not meet the minimum thickness of national or international standards.
- Q.4.2.4 The walls are free of damage that provides direct access to weapons and/or ammunition.

Overall, within this area there was fair a variation among respondents. This variation increased as the items become more specific. It appeared as if many items in this area hovered around Medium Priority ratings, with some noticeable variation.

EXPERT INPUT

Experts remarked that, in some settings, the materials specified in this section were not available. Some experts had experience of using shipping containers, rock with reinforcement, or earth and wood as materials to build walls for a storage depot.

When asked if the 'Thickness of the wall' specifications in this category were relevant, there was unanimous agreement that it was. However, experts saw these specifications as part of a holistic approach to building a secure storage facility. Moreover, regardless of the materials used or their thickness, the important factor was the long-term quality management of the storage facility. This included where materials were sourced, for example all the way down to the sand used for concrete.

Q.4.2.1 The walls of the storage facility are serviceable to prevent forced entry into the storage facility.

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.2.2 The walls of the storage facility meet one of the following specifications set by international standards: (see following items).

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	38%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.2.2.1 The walls are made of solid, reinforced concrete.

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	25%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	25%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	13%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.2.2.1.1 Thickness of the wall (specify in meters).

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.2.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	38%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	25%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	25%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	25%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.2.2.2 Solid, bonded brickwork or masonry.

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.2.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	25%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	25%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.2.2.2.1 Thickness of the wall (specify in meters).

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.2.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	29%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	25%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.2.2.3 Cavity walls of dense concrete block, brick or stone.

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.2.3	
Minimal	Minimal	13%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	0%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	25%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	13%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.2.2.3.1 Thickness of the wall (specify in meters).

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.2.3.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	25%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	13%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	25%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	13%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.2.3 Reinforcements exist in walls that do not meet the minimum thickness of national or international standards.

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	25%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.2.4 The walls are free of damage that provides direct access to weapons and/or ammunition.

Importance (I)	Q.4.2.4	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	38%







4.3. Physical Security Infrastructure: Doors

In the Physical Security Infrastructure – Doors area, the survey included five items:

- Q.4.3.1 The doors are serviceable to prevent forced entry. (this page)
    - Q.4.3.1.1 Doors are made of solid hardwood with steel on the outside face.
    - Q.4.3.1.2 Door frames are rigidly anchored to prevent disengagement of the lock bolt by prying or jacking the door frame.
    - Q.4.3.1.3 Door and gate hinges are located on the inside.
- Q.4.3.2 Doors and gates are secured with high security padlocks.

Although responses regarding the material and necessary construction of the doors varied, there was overall consensus on the need to have serviceable doors to prevent forced entry (Q.4.3.1).

Importance (I)	Q.4.3.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	88%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.3.1.1 Doors are made of solid hardwood with steel on the outside face.

Importance (I)	Q.4.3.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	13%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	0%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts commented on the interesting combination of complete consensus regarding the Importance and Priority of doors in Q.4.3.1 and the variation in specifications of these doors seen in Q.4.3.1.1. Many experts were less concerned with the exact materials (i.e. wood or steel) used to make a storage facility's door, and more concerned with whether the door achieved the desired security. They highlighted the key difference between the two aforementioned items: the first requires that doors be serviceable to prevent forced entry (the goal) whereas the second specifies the materials used (the means). As long as the end goal of preventing forced entry was achieved by a door, then the means were relatively inconsequential to many of the experts.







Q.4.3.1.2 Door frames are rigidly anchored to prevent disengagement of the lock bolt by prying or jacking the door frame.

Importance (I)	Q.4.3.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.3.1.3 Door and gate hinges are located on the inside.

Importance (I)	Q.4.3.1.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	25%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
High	High	13%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	63%
High	High	25%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	13%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.3.2 Doors and gates are secured with high security padlocks.

Importance (I)	Q.4.3.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	0%







4.4. Physical Security Infrastructure: Windows

In the Physical Security Infrastructure – Windows area, the survey included four items:

- Q.4.4.1 The storage facility is free of windows.
- Q.4.4.2 If windows are present, they are fitted with guard bars/grills.
    - Q.4.4.2.1 Guard bars/grills are free of severe corrosion.
- Q.4.4.3 Windows are free of cracks or broken panes which could provide direct access to weapons and/or ammunition.

This area detailed the windows of a storage facility. Although responses regarding the material and necessary construction of the windows varied, there was overall consensus regarding the need to secure windows to prevent forced entry.

In cases where storage facilities have windows, there was variation in opinion regarding the windows' security infrastructure. Although there was general consensus regarding the High Priority of windows being fitted with bars (100%), there was wide variation regarding the actual state of the bars themselves. With respect to the Risk Level of window bars severely corroding, 13% rated this as a Minor Risk Level, a majority of respondents (50%) rated this a Moderate Risk Level, 25% a Severe Risk Level, and 13%, a Critical Risk Level. A majority (50%) of respondents rated this as a matter of High Importance whereas 38% rated it as a matter of Moderate Importance and 13%, Low Importance.

Q.4.4.1 The storage facility building is free of windows.

Importance (I)	Q.4.4.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	0%

EXPERT INPUT

The variation in Importance, Priority and associated Risk Level for this item came down to situational factors, according to the experts. If one is designing and constructing a new storage facility, then it is important that there be no windows. However, often there is no budget to build new facilities while actors are left to repurpose existing structures. In these cases, experts believed it was important to work with what they have and make windows as secure as possible.







Q.4.4.2 If windows are present, they are fitted with guard bars/grills.

Importance (I)	Q.4.4.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.4.4.2.1 Guard bars/grills are free of severe corrosion.

Importance (I)	Q.4.4.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.4.4.3 Windows are free of cracks or broken panes which could provide direct access to weapons and/or ammunition.

Importance (I)	Q.4.4.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	13%







4.5. Physical Security Infrastructure: Locks

In the Physical Security Infrastructure – Locks area, the survey included two items:

- Q.4.5.1 Locks are in working condition to delay forced entry. (this page)
- Q.4.5.2 Locks used are fitted with seven-digit coding system (category of use; durability; door mass; fire resistance; safety of use; corrosion resistance; security requirements; see EN 12320:2001).

The was near unanimous consensus regarding the need for locks to be in working condition to delay forced entry (88% rated this as an item of High Importance, 100% as an item of High Priority and 100% as an item with a Severe associated Risk Level). Variation was observed when determining the specifications of the lock being used (Q.4.5.2). Survey respondents showed varying opinions regarding the Importance, Priority and Risk Level of this item.

Importance (I)	Q.4.5.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	100%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.5.2 The locks used are fitted with seven-digit coding system (category of use; durability; door mass; fire resistance; safety in use; corrosion resistance; security requirements; see EN 12320: 2001)

EXPERT INPUT

When confronted with such a specific coding system for a lock, experts explained that this type of lock was not always made in-country, and that obtaining such locks was not possible in many settings. Some experts thought it was best to import the highest quality locks in order to improve security. Others thought it was more important to source locks domestically in an effort to enhance the long-term sustainability of storage facility maintenance. For example, if high quality locks were imported by an expert NGO constructing a storage facility, and 10 years later these locks needed to be replaced or serviced, national authorities may have difficulty locating these same locks or someone who knows how to service them.

Moving away from the coding system of locks, experts emphasized the desired effect of a lock as a way to enhance security. The desired effect of a lock is to, at the very least, delay forced entry into a storage facility. Many saw it as a way to buy time. As a baseline, a lock which cannot easily be cut or otherwise broken in a short period of time was most preferable.

Importance (I)	Q.4.5.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
High	High	25%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	63%
High	High	25%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	0%







4.6. Physical Security Infrastructure: Intrusion Detection System

In the Physical Security Infrastructure – IDS area, the survey included three items:

- Q.4.6.1 Storage facilities are fitted with IDSs.
    - Q.4.6.1.1 A central command and control station has the capacity to dispatch a response force in response to an alarm.
    - Q.4.6.1.2 Records are maintained for all alarm signals.

In this area, there was limited consensus among survey respondents on the value of an IDS to the security of a storage facility. Some respondents gauged an IDS to be a matter of Minimal (13%) or Low (38%) Importance and Low Priority (25%). Moreover, all respondents rated this item's associated Risk Level as either Minor (25%) or Moderate (75%).

Substantial variation in opinion continued throughout the other two items in this area, which detailed the ability of a central command and control station to dispatch forces in response to an intrusion detection alarm and to maintain records of all alarm signals. A majority saw the ability of a central command and control station to dispatch forces as a matter of High Importance (50%) and High Priority (63%) however the associated Risk Level rating saw greater variation: 38% Moderate, 25% Severe and 25% Critical. The item on recordkeeping (Q.4.6.1.2) was equally fraught with variation.

Q.4.6.1 Storage facilities are fitted with IDSs.

Importance (I)	Q.4.6.1	
Minimal	Minimal	13%
Low	Low	38%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	0%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	25%
Medium	Medium	75%
High	High	0%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
Severe	Severe	0%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.4.6.1.1 A central command and control station has the capacity to dispatch a response force in response to an alarm.

EXPERT INPUT

Experts highlighted two implicit assumptions in this area: a reliable 24-hour power supply to run an IDS (the assumption being that the IDS runs on electricity) and someone available at a central command and control station who can dispatch forces in response to an alarm. In the experience of many of the experts, these assumptions were not always applicable. In many settings, particularly conflict-affected settings, access to 24-hour power was rare and the necessary manpower to monitor and respond to an alarm was limited. These assumptions touch on the need for a clearer understanding of contextual elements such a power supplies and manpower.

For these reasons, many experts did not consider this area to be an essential element of a basic security assessment. They saw value in exploring an IDS as a possible security measure in each setting, but they did not feel it was essential.

Importance (I)	Q.4.6.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.4.6.1.2 Records are maintained for all alarm signals.

Importance (I)	Q.4.6.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	38%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	13%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	75%
High	High	13%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%







5. Physical Perimeter Security

In the Physical Perimeter Security area, the survey included one item:

- Q.5 Is there a serviceable perimeter security infrastructure in place to prevent unauthorized entry? (this page)

A majority of respondents believed a serviceable perimeter security infrastructure to be a matter of High Importance (63%) and High Priority (75%). However, a substantial portion of respondents rated this item one level lower on both Importance (Moderate Importance: 38%) and Priority (Medium Priority: 25%). There was similar variation in this item's associated Risk Level: 25% believed it to have a Moderate Risk Level, 50%, a Severe Risk Level and 25%, a Critical Risk Level.

EXPERT INPUT

Opinion on the value of perimeter security was divided among the experts. Some saw a secure storage facility, rather than a secure perimeter, as the true goal. The need for a perimeter fence also varied depending on the storage facility itself. If it was a single building, then the need for a secure perimeter would be less than if it was a 200-building depot. Moreover, experts were more concerned with the way in which the storage facility was managed as opposed to how the perimeter was secured. For example, if there is a high perimeter fence with no sentry on guard, then the strategic value of the fence itself decreases.

Importance (I)	Q.5	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	25%







5.1. Physical Perimeter Security: Fences and Gates

In the Physical Perimeter Security – Fences and Gates area, the survey included eight items:

- Q.5.1.1 Storage facilities are surrounded by a fence or a wall.
- Q.5.1.2 Security fences/walls are in serviceable condition to prevent and/or delay forced entry into storage site.
    - Q.5.1.2.1 A security fence/wall is at least 1.5m high to provide basic security.
    - Q.5.1.2.2 A security fence/wall is between 1.5m and 4m high and is reinforced by other perimeter security measures to deter and/or delay intrusion.
    - Q.5.1.2.3 A security fence/wall is greater than 4m high and is reinforced using PIDS, a visual surveillance system (such as CCTV) or an equivalent system.
- Q.5.1.3 Gates are sufficiently robust to delay forced entry into a storage area.
- Q.5.1.4 Security fences/walls are free from breaches that allow direct access to arms and/or ammunition.
- Q.5.1.5 Relevant warning signs are displayed to indicate a restricted area.

Regarding the existence and serviceability of fences and gates, experts were in fair agreement regarding their High Importance and High Priority. However, throughout this area, survey responses showed variation in associated Risk Levels. As the specificity of items increased, variation followed suit.

Q.5.1.1 Storage facilities are surrounded by a fence or a wall.

Importance (I)	Q.5.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.5.1.2 Security fences/walls are in serviceable condition to prevent and/or delay forced entry into storage site.

Importance (I)	Q.5.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.5.1.2.1 A security fence/wall is at least 1.5m high to provide basic security.

Importance (I)	Q.5.1.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.5.1.2.2 A security fence/wall is between 1.5m and 4m high and is reinforced by other perimeter security measures to deter and/or delay intrusion.

Importance (I)	Q.5.1.2.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	25%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	75%
High	High	13%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	0%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.5.1.2.3 A security fence/wall is greater than 4m high and is reinforced using PIDS, a visual surveillance system (such as CCTV) or an equivalent system.

Importance (I)	Q.5.1.2.3	
Minimal	Minimal	13%
Low	Low	38%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	0%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	25%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	25%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	25%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	0%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.5.1.3 Gates are sufficiently robust to delay forced entry into a storage area.

Importance (I)	Q.5.1.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	13%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts appeared divided on the need for sufficiently robust gates at the entrance to a storage area. Many experts believed that a threat assessment, once conducted, should provide greater clarity on the need for fences and gates.







Q.5.1.4 Security fences/walls are free from breaches that allow direct access to arms and/or ammunition.

Importance (I)	Q.5.1.4	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.5.1.5 Relevant warning signs are displayed to indicate a restricted area.

Importance (I)	Q.5.1.5	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
High	High	13%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	88%
High	High	13%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%

EXPERT INPUT

Conceptually, experts were unanimous regarding the importance of warning signs. However in practice, many emphasized that the specific setting in which one was operating may affect this importance. For example, if a storage facility is located in a region which continues to experience conflict, then it may not be advantageous to have visible signs which direct enemies towards a given storage facility.







5.2. Physical Perimeter Security: Lighting

In the Physical Perimeter Security – Lighting area, the survey included four items:

- Q.5.2.1 Perimeter illumination is present to allow for the detection of intruders. (this page)
- Q.5.2.2 Security lights are free of damages that make them inoperable.
- Q.5.2.3 Lighting switches are accessible to authorized personnel only.
- Q.5.2.4 High risk or high value storage facilities have a working backup generator.

Overall, there was variation in this area's responses. This variation increased as items became more specific regarding the condition and accessibility of lighting systems.

Importance (I)	Q.5.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.5.2.2 Security lights are free of damages that make them inoperable.

Importance (I)	Q.5.2.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.5.2.3 Lighting switches are accessible to authorized personnel only.

Importance (I)	Q.5.2.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.5.2.4 High risk or high value storage facilities have working a backup generator.

Importance (I)	Q.5.2.4	
Minimal	Minimal	13%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	13%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%

EXPERT INPUT

Many of the experts had come across generators, even in remote settings. However, these were frequently not used to power lighting around the perimeter of a storage facility but rather, for example, to power computers. Experts discussed other options for providing power to perimeter lighting, such as solar panels. However, this brought the discussion back to the question of long-term sustainability of international interventions. For example, if a solar panel breaks or malfunctions in a conflict-affected setting once expert NGOs and international actors have left, is there the expertise to fix it? In the experience of many of these experts, the answer was no. Overall, experts believed this was an important item to probe as part of a basic security assessment.







5.3. Physical Perimeter Security: Clear Zones

In the Physical Perimeter Security – Clear Zones area, the survey included three items:

- Q.5.3.1 Zones clear of vegetation are established both within and outside the security fence. (this page)
    - Q.5.3.1.1 Distance within security fence (specify in meters).
    - Q.5.3.1.2 Distance outside security fence (specify in meters).

Overall, there was greater consensus regarding the Importance and Priority of items related to the presence and specifics of clear zones, with consistent variation in the associated Risk Level ratings.

EXPERT INPUT

Experts explored this visible variation in associated Risk Level. One explained that if the storage facility were located in a fire-prone region, then a clear zone was extremely important. If a region receives a substantial amount of rainfall, then a clear zone was decidedly less relevant. The Risk Level also depended on whether the storage facility was designed for weapons or ammunition. Moreover, at a procedural level, experts shared stories about the difficulties of creating clear zones in urban centres; for example, cutting down trees or foliage could be a bureaucratic and cultural issue in some regions.

Importance (I)	Q.5.3.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.5.3.1.1 Distance within security fence (specify in meters).

Importance (I)	Q.5.3.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.5.3.1.2 Distance outside security fence (specify in meters).

Importance (I)	Q.5.3.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







5.4. Physical Perimeter Security: Drainage

In the Physical Perimeter Security – Drainage area, the survey included two items:

- Q.5.4.1 Storage site is free of drainage structures and/or water passages.
    - Q.5.4.1.1 Drainage structures and/or water passages in the site are secured by bars or grills at each end.

Survey respondents were divided on the Priority (50% Medium and 50% High) of having a storage site free of drainage structures and water passages. Moreover, a large majority (88%) rated this item's (Q.5.4.1) associated Risk Level as Moderate. However, when drainage structures and/or water passages were present on a storage site (Q.5.4.1.1), 75% of respondents saw bars and grills at each end of the structure as a matter of High Importance, 63% as a matter of High Priority, and 75% as a Severe associated Risk Level.

EXPERT INPUT
Generally, experts saw the value in ensuring sufficient drainage at a storage site. Many had anecdotes about flooding and other water-related issues, particularly in tropical settings. Therefore, they saw the relevance of this area to any basic security assessment.

Importance (I)	Q.5.4.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	88%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.5.4.1.1 Drainage structures and/or water passages in the site are secured by bars or grills at each end.

Importance (I)	Q.5.4.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	0%







5.5. Physical Perimeter Security: Guards

In the Physical Perimeter Security – Guards area, the survey included three items:

- Q.5.5.1 There is a guard on duty during non-working hours. (this page)
- Q.5.5.2 Records of patrol checks are maintained.
- Q.5.5.3 Dogs are used as complementary measures to guards.

There was noticeable consensus among respondents on items which dealt with the presence of guards at storage sites, specifically with regard to these items' Importance and Priority. Substantial variation was observed when the use of dogs as complementary measures to guards was mentioned.

Importance (I)	Q.5.5.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	63%







Q.5.5.2 Records of patrol checks are maintained.

Importance (I)	Q.5.5.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	25%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts believed that the Importance, Priority and Risk Level of maintaining records of patrol checks was contingent on how often a particular storage site experienced diversion. The more frequently a site experiences diversion, the more important record-keeping of patrol checks becomes.

Moreover, experts highlighted the general ambiguity about the type of "records" being kept. In their experience, there was wide variety in the quality and style of record-keeping. Some records are more useful than others. Moving forward, experts emphasized the importance of greater clarity on this point.







Q.5.5.3 Dogs are used as complementary measures to guards.

Importance (I)	Q.5.5.3	
Minimal	Minimal	13%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	25%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	25%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	25%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	13%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%







6. Access Control

6.1. Access Controls to Storage Area

In the Access Control to Storage Area, the survey included 10 items:

- Q.6 An administrative/procedural system is in place to control access to a storage facility.
- Q.6.1.1 Access to storage area is controlled at all times.
    - Q.6.1.1.1 Personnel and vehicle access control exists for all areas storing arms and ammunition.
    - Q.6.1.1.2 The number of pedestrians and vehicles is kept to a minimum, consistent with operational requirements.
- Q.6.1.2 Access to the storage facility is restricted to authorized persons only.
    - Q.6.1.2.1 An authority exists to grant authorization.
    - Q.6.1.2.2 Authorization is provided in writing for personnel that require access to storage facilities.
    - Q.6.1.2.3 Temporary personnel are accompanied at all times.
- Q.6.1.3 Records are retained for all personnel entering/exiting the storage facility.
    - Q.6.1.3.1 Records of each visit include, at minimum: name, title, reason for visit, date and time of entry and exit from storage facility.

Regarding access control, there was general consensus among respondents on the Importance and Priority of these items, with wide variation in associated Risk Levels. This was consistent throughout the area's items. To take one example, item Q.6.1.1 concerns controlling access to a storage facility at all times: 100% of respondents believed this to be an item of High Importance and 88% rated this an item of High Priority. However less consensus existed in this item's associated Risk Level: 13% rated it as Moderate, 63% Severe and 25% Critical.

Q.6 An administrative/procedural system is in place to control access to a storage facility?

Importance (I)	Q.6	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.6.1.1 Access to storage area is controlled at all times.

Importance (I)	Q.6.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.6.1.1.1 Personnel and vehicle access control exists for all areas storing arms and ammunition.

Importance (I)	Q.6.1.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.6.1.1.2 The number of pedestrians and vehicles is kept to a minimum, consistent with operational requirements.

Importance (I)	Q.6.1.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%

EXPERT INPUT

In some settings, areas where arms and ammunition are stored often include house soldiers and their dependents. Therefore for this item, experts believed greater clarification was needed in terms of which pedestrians and vehicles are to be controlled.







Q.6.1.2 Access to the storage facility is restricted to authorized persons only.

Importance (I)	Q.6.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	38%







Q.6.1.2.1 An authority exists to grant authorization.

Importance (I)	Q.6.1.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.6.1.2.2 Authorization is provided in writing for personnel that require access to storage facilities.

Importance (I)	Q.6.1.2.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	0%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts highlighted an implicit and problematic assumption in this item: that all actors involved are literate. Many experts have been issued an authorization slip only to provide it to a guard at a storage facility who was illiterate. In the future, ensuring that such assumptions are minimized and mitigated is an important consideration.







Q.6.1.2.3 Temporary personnel are accompanied at all times.

Importance (I)	Q.6.1.2.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	38%







Q.6.1.3 Records are retained for all personnel entering/exiting the storage facility.

Importance (I)	Q.6.1.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%

EXPERT INPUT

Once again, experts highlighted an implicit and problematic assumption in this item: the presence of pens, paper and other record-keeping supplies. While experts agreed that it was important to encourage record-keeping on this level, they emphasized that in many settings, particularly conflict-affected settings, record-keeping materials may be in short supply.







Q.6.1.3.1 Records of each visit include, at minimum: name, title, reason for visit, date and time of entry and exit from storage facility.

Importance (I)	Q.6.1.3.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	63%
High	High	38%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%







6.2. Controlling the Security of Keys

In the Controlling the Security of Keys area, the survey included six items:

- Q.6.2.1 An administrative/procedural system exists to control the issue of keys to storage facilities. (this page)
    - Q.6.2.1.1 Keys to storage facilities are stored separately from other keys.
    - Q.6.2.1.2 Keys to storage facilities are secured and held by authorized personnel at all times.
    - Q.6.2.1.3 Procedures are in place to limit the number of keys which provide access to a storage facility.
- Q.6.2.2 Access to storage facility keys are restricted to authorized personnel only.
- Q.6.2.3 Security keys are rotated.

Respondents were unanimous regarding the High Importance and High Priority of establishing an administrative/procedural system to control keys to storage facilities (Q.6.2.1). Variation came in this item's associated Risk Level. There was generally variation throughout this area; however, consensus returned as 100% of respondents believed it was a matter of High Importance and High Priority that access to storage facility keys be restricted to authorized personnel (Q.6.2.2). However, this item's associated Risk Level exhibited less common understanding.

Importance (I)	Q.6.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	50%







Q.6.2.1.1 Keys to storage facilities are stored separately from other keys.

Importance (I)	Q.6.2.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.6.2.1.2 Keys to storage facilities are secured and held by authorized personnel at all times.

Importance (I)	Q.6.2.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.6.2.1.3 Procedures are in place to limit the number of keys which provide access to a storage facility.

Importance (I)	Q.6.2.1.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	25%







Q.6.2.2 Access to storage facility keys are restricted to authorized personnel only.

Importance (I)	Q.6.2.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	50%







Q.6.2.3 Security keys are rotated.

Importance (I)	Q.6.2.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	38%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	0%







7. Staff Vetting

In the Staff Vetting area, the survey included four items:

- Q.7 Do authorized personnel undergo a vetting process?
    - Q.7.1.1 Staff working at a storage facility are subject to routine security vetting.
    - Q.7.1.2 Staff working at a storage facility do not possess a criminal record.
    - Q.7.1.3 Staff working at a storage facility are subject to regular training.

Survey responses displayed a lack of common understanding regarding the Importance, Priority and associated Risk Level of whether authorized personnel should undergo a vetting process. This lack of common understanding continued when respondents were asked whether staff working at a storage facility are subject to routine security vetting. There was, however, general consensus among respondents that staff be subject to regular training. For a large majority of respondents (88%), this item was of High Importance and High Priority.

Q.7 Do authorized personnel undergo a vetting process?

Importance (I)	Q.7	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	38%

EXPERT INPUT

As a general concept, the experts agreed that authorized personnel should undergo a vetting process. However, in many settings, particularly conflict-affected settings, the ability to vet someone through a database or verify their criminal record is limited. Therefore, it was important to many experts that clarity regarding what is required from a "vetting process" be sought.







Q.7.1.1 Staff working at a storage facility are subject to routine security vetting.

Importance (I)	Q.7.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.7.1.2 Staff working at a storage facility do not possess a criminal record.

Importance (I)	Q.7.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	13%

EXPERT INPUT

As a general concept, the experts agreed that staff working at a storage facility should not possess a criminal record. However, in some settings, particularly conflict-affected settings, the definition of a criminal was often blurred. This was particularly relevant for some post-conflict settings where DDR processes are underway. It may be valuable to employ members of formerly-armed groups as staff at a storage facility as they may be the only parties available with the relevant expertise.







Q.7.1.3 Staff working at a storage facility are subject to regular training.

Importance (I)	Q.7.1.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	25%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts were unclear as to which type of training is meant in this item. Many thought such a general question about training should be removed from the survey as it did not give any clear indications as to what type of training staff should undergo on a regular basis.







8. Local Accounting

In the Local Accounting area, the survey included one item:

- Q.8 Is there an effective accounting system of arms and ammunition at a storage facility to mitigate the risk of loss/theft/diversion? (this page)

All of the survey respondents believed it was a matter of High Importance and High Priority that there be effective accounting system of arms and ammunition at a storage facility. Moreover, 100% of respondents believed this item had either a Severe or Critical associated Risk Level.

Importance (I)	Q.8	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	88%
Critical	Critical	13%







8.1. Local Accounting: Ammunition

In the Local Accounting – Ammunition area, the survey included five items:

- Q.8.1.1 An ammunition accounting procedure exists for the storage facility. (this page)
- Q.8.1.2 Stack tally cards are used to account for ammunition.
    - Q.8.1.2.1 Ammunition is accounted for by type, quantity and location.
    - Q.8.1.2.2 Ammunition is accounted for by type, quantity, lot number, batch number and location.
    - Q.8.1.2.3 Ammunition is accounted for by type, quantity, lot number, batch number and technical condition.

Respondents exhibited substantial consensus regarding the need for an ammunition accounting procedure, rating this as an item of High Importance (88%), High Priority (100%) and Severe associated Risk Level (100%). There was mild consensus regarding the need to use stack tally cards to account for ammunition however this consensus diminished as the stack tally cards became more specific (Q.8.1.2.1–Q.8.1.2.3).

Importance (I)	Q.8.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	100%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.8.1.2 Stack tally cards are used to account for ammunition.

Importance (I)	Q.8.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.8.1.2.1 Ammunition is accounted for by type, quantity and location.

Importance (I)	Q.8.1.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	0%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts highlighted the fact that in many settings, particularly conflict-affected settings, accounting for ammunition is frequently conducted in two ways: low-detail accurate records and high-detail inaccurate records. All experts preferred the former over the latter. Some suggested that, as a baseline, ammunition should be accounted for by using only type, quantity and location.







Q.8.1.2.2 Ammunition is accounted for by type, quantity, lot number, batch number and location.

Importance (I)	Q.8.1.2.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	63%
High	High	38%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.8.1.2.3 Ammunition is accounted for by type, quantity, lot number, batch number and technical condition.

Importance (I)	Q.8.1.2.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







8.2. Local Accounting: Arms

In the Local Accounting – Arms area, the survey included three items:

- Q.8.2.1 An arms accounting procedure exists for the storage facility.
    - Q.8.2.1.1 At a minimum, arms are accounted for by make, model, calibre, serial number, location of storage facility, issue and receipt of weapons, and quantity.
    - Q.8.2.1.2 Country of manufacture or most recent import is accounted for in central storage facilities.

There was variation in the Importance, Priority and associated Risk Level of each item in this area. Generally, however, a strong majority of the respondents believed it was a matter of High Importance (88%) and High Priority (88%) that an arms accounting procedure exist for a given storage facility (Q.8.2.1). Substantial variation was observed in this item's associated Risk Level.

There was further variation in Importance, Priority and Risk Level for Q.8.2.1.1 and Q.8.2.1.2, which detail the specifics of an arms accounting procedure. There was little common understanding when it came to arms accounts and whether they should detail the country of manufacture, make, model, calibre, serial number, location of storage facility, issue and receipt of weapons, and quantity.

Q.8.2.1 An arms accounting procedure exists for the storage facility.

Importance (I)	Q.8.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.8.2.1.1 At a minimum, arms are accounted for by make, model, calibre, serial number, location of storage facility, issue and receipt of weapons, and quantity.

Importance (I)	Q.8.2.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.8.2.1.2 Country of manufacture or most recent import is accounted for in central storage facilities.

Importance (I)	Q.8.2.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	25%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
High	High	0%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	88%
High	High	0%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	25%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
Severe	Severe	0%
Critical	Critical	0%







8.3. Local Accounting: Back Up of Records

In the Local Accounting – Back Up area, the survey included two items:

- Q.8.3.1 Weapons and ammunition accounts are backed-up. (this page)
    - Q.8.3.1.1 The back-up account is stored separately from the original.

There was limited common understanding in this area. However, by and large, a majority of respondents felt it was a matter of High Importance (75%) and High Priority (75%) that weapons and ammunitions accounts be backed-up (Q.8.3.1). Despite these ratings, this was a matter of Moderate or Minor associated Risk, according to 100% of respondents. Even less common understanding existed regarding the item which specified that back-up accounts be stored separately from the original accounts (Q.8.3.1.1). Substantial variation was seen in this item's associated Risk Level.

Importance (I)	8.3.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
High	High	25%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	75%
High	High	25%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
Severe	Severe	0%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.8.3.1.1 The back-up account is stored separately from the original.

Importance (I)	Q.8.3.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	63%
High	High	25%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	63%
High	High	13%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	0%







8.4. Local Accounting: Stock Checks

In the Local Accounting – Stock Checks area, the survey included three items:

- Q.8.4.1 Stock checks for the storage facility are regularly carried out. (this page)
    - Q.8.4.1.1 The content of stocks are verified against existing accounts.
- Q.8.4.2 Stock checks are documented.

General consensus was observed in this area regarding the High Importance and High Priority of carrying out regular stock checks on a storage facility, verifying the contents of stocks against existing accounts and documenting these checks. Variation was observed in all three items' associated Risk Level.

Importance (I)	Q.8.4.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.8.4.1.1 The content of stocks are verified against existing accounts.

Importance (I)	Q.8.4.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.8.4.2 Stock checks are documented.

Importance (I)	Q.8.4.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	0%







8.5. Local Accounting: Issue & Receipt

In the Local Accounting – Issue & Receipt area, the survey included four items:

- Q.8.5.1 Only authorized officials have permission to remove arms and ammunition from a storage area.
    - Q.8.5.1.1 Procedures exist to authenticate persons authorized to remove arms and/or ammunition from a storage area.
    - Q.8.5.1.2 A register exists to record details of the issuance of arms/ammunition.
- Q.8.5.2 The issuance of arms and ammunition is covered in Standard Operating Procedures.

Generally, it was a matter of High Importance and High Priority that only authorized officials have permission to remove arms and ammunition from a storage area and that procedures exist to authorize these officials (Q.8.5.1–Q.8.5.1.1). However these items' associated Risk Levels fluctuated between Moderate, Severe and Critical.

Largely common understanding can be seen in the last two items this section. Respondents felt it was a matter of High Importance and High Priority for a register to exist detailing the issuance of arms and ammunition and for this issuance to be covered by Standard Operating Procedures.

Q.8.5.1 Only authorized officials have permission to remove arms and ammunition from a storage area.

Importance (I)	Q.8.5.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.8.5.1.1 Procedures exist to authenticate persons authorized to remove arms and/or ammunition from a storage area.

Importance (I)	Q.8.5.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.8.5.1.2 A register exists to record details of the issuance of arms/ammunition.

Importance (I)	Q.8.5.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	13%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts discussed the items in this area and explained that the context of each specific setting will dictate whether these items have higher or lower associated Risk Levels or Importance and Priority ratings. For example, in some settings, armed forces are not used to storing their weapons in storage facilities. Sometimes they bring their guns home with them. In these cases, it becomes decidedly less relevant to discuss this area in depth. Nonetheless, experts still believed it was an important set of items to include in any basic security assessment.







Q.8.5.2 The issuance of arms and ammunition is covered in Standard Operating Procedures.

Importance (I)	Q.8.5.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
Severe	Severe	13%
Critical	Critical	13%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts shared stories about working in settings where standard operating procedures exist yet were not adhered to. Moving forward, it was important to understand the context in which one is operating as this will dictate whether standard operating procedures offer added utility.







9. Security of Stocks

In the Security of Stocks area, the survey included three items:

- Q.9.1 Weapons are secured using weapons racks. (this page)
  - Q.9.1.1 Weapons are secured to weapons racks with chains or steel cables secured with padlocks.
  - Q.9.1.2 Weapons storage racks are bolted to the wall and/or floor with spot welding or an equivalent securing method.

In this area, a substantial amount of variation in responses can be observed. Generally, no common understanding existed on the use of weapons storage racks. However, in cases where weapons storage racks were used (Q.9.1.2), a large majority of respondents felt it was a matter of Moderate Importance (75%) and Medium Priority (75%) that these be bolted to the wall and/or floor with spot welding or an equivalent securing method.

Importance (I)	Q.9.1	
Minimal	Minimal	13%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.9.1.1 Weapons are secured to weapons racks with chains or steel cables secured with padlocks.

Importance (I)	Q.9.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	13%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	38%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.9.1.2 Weapons storage racks are bolted to the wall and/or floor with spot welding or an equivalent securing method.

Importance (I)	Q.9.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	75%
High	High	13%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	75%
High	High	13%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	0%







10. Actions on Loss and Theft

In the Actions on Loss and Theft area, the survey included four items:

- Q.10 Are actions taken to address loss/theft of arms and ammunition from storage facilities? (this page)
    - Q.10.1.1 Cases of suspected loss/theft are reported.
    - Q.10.1.2 Records are kept on the details of lost or stolen weapons.
    - Q.10.1.3 Investigations are carried out for lost arms and/or ammunition.

Generally, there was a common understanding regarding the High Importance and High Priority of all four items in this area. Respondents felt it was a matter of High Importance and High Priority that actions be taken to address the loss or theft of arms and ammunition from storage facilities, that cases of suspected loss/theft be reported, that records be kept and that investigations be carried out. However, variation was observed in each item's associated Risk Level.

Importance (I)	Q.10	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.10.1.1 Cases of suspected loss/theft are reported.

Importance (I)	Q.10.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	13%
High	High	88%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	13%

EXPERT INPUT

Experts had a great deal of questions about what "reporting" meant for this item. In their experience, there was wide variation in the quality of reporting. Generally, they agreed that this was an important area to probe when conducting a baseline security assessment, but that it would be valuable to specify, for example, the reporting mechanisms to be applied.







Q.10.1.2 Records are kept on the details of lost or stolen weapons.

Importance (I)	Q.10.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.10.1.3 Investigations are carried out for lost arms and/or ammunition.

Importance (I)	Q.10.1.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	88%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	50%
Critical	Critical	13%







11. Transport

11.1. General and Security Principles

In the Transport area, the survey included four items:

- Q.11 Are transports of weapons/ammunition conducted in a secure manner? (this page)
    - Q.11.1.1 Weapons and ammunition are transported separately during non-operational situations.
    - Q.11.1.2 A risk assessment is carried out prior to each transport operation.
        - Q.11.1.2.1 Mechanisms exist to ensure illicit transport personnel, companies, and/or routes are not used.

Survey respondents shared a common understanding regarding the High Importance (100%) and High Priority (100%) of conducting weapons and ammunition transports in a secure manner (Q.11). This lessened when it came to transporting weapons and ammunition separately during non-operational situations. As regards the need for a risk assessment to be carried out prior to each transport operation (Q.11.1.2), respondents largely agreed that this was a matter of High Importance (75%), High Priority (75%) and Severe associated Risk Level (75%). The associated Risk Levels for all other items displayed variation.

Importance (I)	Q.11	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
High	High	100%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	0%
High	High	100%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.11.1.1 Weapons and ammunition are transported separately during non-operational situations.

Importance (I)	Q.11.1.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.11.1.2 A risk assessment is carried out prior to each transport operation.

Importance (I)	Q.11.1.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	75%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	25%
High	High	75%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	25%
Moderate	Moderate	0%
Severe	Severe	75%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.11.1.2.1 Mechanisms exist to ensure illicit transport personnel, companies, and/or routes are not used.

Importance (I)	Q.11.1.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	0%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







11.2 Transport: Ammunition

In the Transport – Ammunition area, the survey included five items:

- Q.11.2.1 Ammunition is transported in sealed containers.
- Q.11.2.2 Qualified staff competent in handling ammunition are used to load/unload transports of ammunition.
- Q.11.2.3 Each transport movement of ammunition is accompanied by documentation.
- Q.11.2.4 A handover procedure requiring signatures confirming receipt is in place.
- Q.11.2.5 Transported ammunition is checked upon receipt to ensure that ammunition container seals are intact.

In this area, substantial variation was observed in the Importance, Priority and associated Risk Levels of nearly all items. Respondents were divided on issues related to transporting ammunition in sealed containers (Q.11.2.1), using qualified staff to load/unload ammunition transports (Q.11.2.2) and accompanying each transport movement of ammunition with documentation (Q.11.2.3).

However, greater common understanding was observed in this area's last two items on a handover procedure (Q.11.2.4) and verifying transported ammunition to ensure that container seals are intact (Q.11.2.5). A majority of respondents believed both of these items to be matters of High Importance (63%) and High Priority (63%).

Q.11.2.1 Ammunition is transported in sealed containers.

Importance (I)	Q.11.2.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	25%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	38%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	38%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.11.2.2 Qualified staff competent in handling ammunition are used to load/unload transports of ammunition.

Importance (I)	Q.11.2.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	25%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.11.2.3 Each transport movement of ammunition is accompanied by documentation.

Importance (I)	Q.11.2.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	50%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	13%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.11.2.4 A handover procedure requiring signatures confirming receipt is in place.

Importance (I)	Q.11.2.4	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.11.2.5 Transported ammunition is checked upon receipt to ensure that ammunition container seals are intact.

Importance (I)	Q.11.2.5	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







11.3. Transport: Arms

In the Transport – Arms area, the survey included four items:

- Q.11.3.1 Arms are transported in sealed containers. (this page)
- Q.11.3.2 Each transport movement of arms is accompanied by documentation.
- Q.11.3.3 Handover procedures requiring signatures confirming receipts are in place.
- Q.11.3.4 Transported arms are checked upon receipt to ensure that container seals are intact.

A majority of respondents viewed all items in this area as matters of High Importance and High Priority. However, these figures were not conclusive enough to suggest there was a shared understanding. Rather, there was moderate variation throughout this area in Importance, Priority and associated Risk Levels.

Importance (I)	Q.11.3.1	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	25%
Moderate	Moderate	13%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	13%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
Severe	Severe	63%
Critical	Critical	0%







Q.11.3.2 Each transport movement of arms is accompanied by documentation.

Importance (I)	Q.11.3.2	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	38%
High	High	50%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	13%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	50%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	13%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	25%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.11.3.3 Handover procedures requiring signatures confirming receipts are in place.

Importance (I)	Q.11.3.3	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%







Q.11.3.4 Transported arms are checked upon receipt to ensure that container seals are intact.

Importance (I)	Q.11.3.4	
Minimal	Minimal	0%
Low	Low	13%
Moderate	Moderate	25%
High	High	63%
Priority (P)		
Low	Low	0%
Medium	Medium	38%
High	High	63%
Risk Level (R)		
Negligible	Negligible	0%
Minor	Minor	0%
Moderate	Moderate	50%
Severe	Severe	38%
Critical	Critical	13%