

# SPECIAL REPORT

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## Negotiations, Continued: Ensuring the Positive Performance of Power-Sharing Arrangements

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The disputed 2014 Afghan presidential election led to a power-sharing arrangement between President Ashraf Ghani (right) and rival Abdullah Abdullah. (Photo by Kacper Pempel/Reuters)

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### Summary

- Political power sharing is an effective and frequently used approach to end intra-state armed conflicts. Current cases of high-stakes negotiations that use this approach include those in Afghanistan and Yemen.
- However, power sharing can create challenges for maintaining peace in the medium to long term. Peace practitioners face a particular dilemma in their efforts to support power-sharing arrangements beyond the immediate transitional period after a peace agreement.
- To address this problem, practitioners will need to rethink mental models as well as practical approaches in peace processes. In particular, this will involve abandoning thinking of peace processes in terms of clearly defined phases, in which a negotiation phase is followed by an implementation phase with a peace agreement marking the transition between the two. Peace agreements are not in fact the end point, but often the beginning of protracted negotiated war-to-peace transitions.
- The prospects for a power-sharing arrangement's long-term success increases when conflict parties have forums for continued negotiation after a peace agreement has been concluded. Ongoing negotiations in these forums help to resolve newly contentious issues, address issues omitted or left ambiguous in the agreement, adapt a peace process to new power configurations, and pave the way for parties to entrench their commitment to peace in postconflict constitutions.
- International and domestic third parties can support postagreement negotiations in different ways, including by incentivizing compromise, mediating between the parties, and supporting dialogue mechanisms at the local and national levels.

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**MEDIATION,  
NEGOTIATION  
& DIALOGUE**

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## ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines the long-term performance of power sharing as an approach to ending intra-state armed conflicts. It argues that providing and fostering forums for continued negotiations after a peace agreement has been concluded is crucial to ensuring the long-term, positive performance of power-sharing arrangements. The report is based on a research project funded by USIP and run by swisspeace with the support of the Kroc Institute at Notre Dame.

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Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos (left) shakes hands with Rodrigo Londoño, the commander of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), after signing the 2016 peace agreement. (Photo by Fernando Vergara/AP)

## Introduction

Power sharing is one of the foremost instruments of conflict resolution in civil wars, and a central topic in current, high-stakes peace negotiations. For example, any intra-Afghan political settlement that may come out of the nascent negotiation process will have at its core a power-sharing agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Likewise, in Yemen, the negotiations mediated by United Nations Special Envoy Martin Griffiths are likely to revolve around a power-sharing formula that combines shared central power with territorial autonomy.

Power sharing is both a subject of negotiations and a prominent feature in peace agreements. Indeed, most negotiated settlements since the 1990s have included aspects of power sharing, whether in political, territorial, or military spheres.<sup>1</sup> Such settlements include the 2016 agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), which was designed to regulate the political participation of the FARC in different state institutions. In Iraq, power sharing was enshrined in the 2005 constitution and remains critical for stability, aiming to ensure cooperation between the country's three main groups—Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds.

What explains the popularity of power sharing? Its logic as a peacemaking instrument is sound: it reassures conflict parties that they will retain influence and participate in government after they sign a peace agreement. It therefore gives them confidence to conclude such an agreement. But not all is well. Some power-sharing arrangements freeze an unstable and unsustainable status quo, while others collapse and the conflict begins anew. South Sudan,

Power sharing can be an effective means to prompt parties to sign an agreement and cease hostilities in the short run, but it can create long-term obstacles for peace consolidation and reconciliation.

for instance, saw a return to violence in 2016 as the agreement signed the previous year disintegrated—and, most infamously, the 1994 Rwandan genocide followed the breakdown of that country’s power-sharing agreement. The resumption of violence is a consequence of the persistence of antagonistic interests

between the parties. But the dynamics of power-sharing arrangements may also bear some blame—by allowing unresolved issues to be swept under the carpet, only to reemerge later. Thus, as discussed below, power-sharing arrangements present a dilemma: they allow parties to conclude a settlement in the short term while creating obstacles to maintaining peace in the medium to long term.

This report focuses on political power sharing, which comprises different forms of representation of the conflict parties in state and governance institutions, such as by allocating ethnic or religious communities a specified percentage of seats in parliament, the cabinet, and the constitutional court.<sup>2</sup> Drawing on past cases, it investigates how to support and enhance the positive performance of power-sharing arrangements in the long term, and what role third parties can play in promoting this process. It illustrates the relevance of these findings to ongoing settlement negotiations in countries such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen.

## Power Sharing in Practice

Despite the prevalence of power sharing as a peacemaking instrument, its record in practice is mixed. In South Africa, for example, power sharing was key to ensuring a smooth transition to peace and democracy. However, in other cases it has led to dysfunctional political systems characterized by recurrent political deadlock. Leaving underlying issues unaddressed, power-sharing has entrenched fractured nation building and tensions between communities, as in Lebanon and Bosnia. In Rwanda and South Sudan, as noted above, the collapse of power-sharing agreements led to the resumption of war and mass atrocities.<sup>3</sup>

The pattern that emerges is that power sharing can be an effective means to prompt parties to sign an agreement and cease hostilities in the short run, but it can create long-term obstacles for peace consolidation and reconciliation. Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild have characterized this problem as the “dilemma of power-sharing.”<sup>4</sup> To explain this dilemma, scholars have focused on three aspects that produce inconsistencies between the short-term and long-term effects of power sharing.

**Identity and reconciliation.** In divided societies where armed conflict takes place between belligerents representing different communities, power sharing is essential to achieve a peace agreement. It provides guarantees against political exclusion and entrenches a group’s influence in the postagreement period.<sup>5</sup> However, in the long term, arrangements that divide power based on ethnicity or religion may deepen divisions and hinder reconciliation.<sup>6</sup>

**Credible commitment.** Parties fighting in civil wars mistrust each other, and they worry that if they sign a peace agreement their opponents will later renege on their commitments.<sup>7</sup> Power

sharing reassures the parties by providing protection against malicious behavior that would exclude them from power. However, credible commitment problems may reemerge in the long term because of lingering enmity and suspicion between the parties and because strong parties can easily abandon power-sharing arrangements that are not entrenched.<sup>8</sup> International pressure to implement an agreement may also dissipate.<sup>9</sup> In addition, power-sharing agreements often contain ambiguities or unresolved issues that lead to disagreements down the line. Not surprisingly, conflict parties in most settlement processes seek to entrench their commitments in a post-conflict constitution, which is more robust than a peace agreement because it has the status of supreme law and is therefore durable, justiciable, and enforceable.<sup>10</sup>

**Power configurations.** In civil wars, parties fight to defeat their opponents. When they realize that this is not possible, power sharing offers a way out. It allows the interests of different groups to be accommodated within political institutions.<sup>11</sup> However, sharing the proverbial pie among signatory groups sometimes appears to reward insurgent violence. As Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler have argued, power sharing incentivizes the emergence of new insurgent groups who use violence as a strategy to claim power.<sup>12</sup> Power-sharing agreements are therefore vulnerable to spoiling action from parties that did not sign the agreement. Over time, power-sharing agreements can also be challenged by reluctant signatories that did not get the share of power they wanted.<sup>13</sup>

## How to Overcome the Power-Sharing Dilemma?

Scholars have identified different strategies to overcome the power-sharing dilemma and ensure that power sharing leads to sustainable peace. Two sets of strategies dominate the literature. The first focuses on ways to design power-sharing institutions to tackle the identity and reconciliation dilemma. Scholars associated with the consociational school argue that lasting peace requires that institutions provide conflict parties with guarantees of political power, autonomy, and protection of group interests.<sup>14</sup> They thus prescribe measures such as ethnic quotas, electoral systems based on proportional representation, and devolution of power through federalism or decentralization. In contrast, scholars of the centripetalist school emphasize elite cooperation at the center as the key factor for durable peace. They therefore recommend institutions that incentivize the formation of coalitions across conflict lines, such as through vote pooling or preferential electoral systems.<sup>15</sup>

The second set of strategies focuses on the role of international third parties in addressing credible commitment and power configuration problems. Some scholars have shown that international actors can reassure mistrustful parties and increase the costs of defection by providing external guarantees for implementation, such as peacekeeping missions or robust monitoring mechanisms.<sup>16</sup> Others point to third parties creating incentives that reward agreement implementation and discourage defection.<sup>17</sup>

Nonetheless, these approaches do not fully explain the variations in the performance of power sharing, let alone conclusively identify strategies to overcome the power-sharing dilemma. For example, in Bosnia, the combination of strong third-party involvement and political institutions

inspired by consociationalism failed to bring about sustainable peace. According to Florian Bieber, this is partly because far-reaching international intervention undermined the local legitimacy of the power-sharing arrangement and allowed domestic actors to abdicate their responsibility for making it thrive.<sup>18</sup> This outcome points to the importance of understanding the interactions between domestic actors in the implementation of power-sharing arrangements. Third-party activities, such as relationship building and mediation, can help facilitate cooperation between former enemies in new power-sharing institutions. However, this type of “soft” third-party intervention has received little attention in the existing literature. This approach—the focus of this report—is the lens applied to four case studies below.

## Evidence from Northern Ireland, Nepal, Burundi, and Bosnia

This section provides summaries of four cases of armed conflict—in Northern Ireland, Nepal, Burundi, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In these cases, power sharing emerged as the main approach to conflict resolution, during which third-party support and the long-term performance of power sharing interacted in typical ways. The cases were selected because they have practiced power sharing for at least ten years, making it possible to analyze developments over time and allowing for an assessment of the long-term performance of power sharing in these contexts. The summaries provide an overview of the power-sharing arrangements, the main obstacles that arose in their implementation, and the strategies employed to address the obstacles.<sup>19</sup>

### NORTHERN IRELAND

The Good Friday Agreement of April 1998 enshrined autonomy for Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and created the Northern Ireland Assembly based on power sharing between “unionists” and “nationalists.” It took eighteen months to form the first executive, and the power-sharing institutions were subsequently suspended several times, leading to restoration of direct rule from London.

Two main obstacles thwarted cooperation between the signatories of the agreement. First, the Good Friday Agreement omitted several contentious issues, in particular the decommissioning of the Irish Republican Army’s weapons and the reform of the local police service. Second, elections strengthened hard-liners and weakened moderate representatives who were committed to power sharing.

Continuous negotiations, supported by external actors, were essential to prevent the return of full-scale violence, gradually address unresolved issues, and secure the support of hard-liners to the agreement. Between 1998 and 2006, the British and Irish governments undertook shuttle diplomacy and organized multiple rounds of proximity talks, and they used their leverage to pressure the parties to reestablish power sharing. Independent commissions also provided negotiation forums, allowing parties to reach agreement on contentious issues.<sup>20</sup>

In 2006, the St. Andrews Agreement paved the way for the restoration of power sharing, ushering in a phase of relative stability until 2015. However, unresolved issues regarding identity



Monica McWilliams (left), pictured at a 2018 ceremony marking the 20th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement, co-founded the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, which advocated for a role for women in the peace process. (Clodagh Kilcoyne/Reuters)

and symbols as well as changing power configurations weakened the power-sharing coalition, which collapsed following a political scandal in 2017. Negotiations to restore the coalition have so far been unsuccessful.

## NEPAL

Following the ouster of Nepal's King Gyanendra in 2005, Maoist insurgents and an alliance of the country's mainstream political parties negotiated the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2006. The CPA provided for the integration of the Maoists in transitional power-sharing institutions, the incorporation of Maoist armed forces into the Nepalese Army, and the formation of a Constituent Assembly (CA). The first CA election, held in 2008, was postponed twice. A second CA was elected in 2013, following the failure of the first one to complete its mandate.

Two main challenges affected the implementation of the agreement. First, the aftermath of the CPA saw the emergence of a number of splinter groups that staked their claims through protests, agitation, and blockades. Second, the CPA itself did not tackle substantive issues in detail, and so major disagreements emerged, most notably concerning the electoral system for the CA election and the reform of the security sector.



Nepal's newly appointed prime minister, Khadga Prasad Oli, faces the media at the Constituent Assembly in Kathmandu in October 2015, shortly after the country's new constitution took effect. (Photo by Niranjana Shrestha/AP)

To address these issues, the various political forces in Nepal engaged in a continuous process of negotiations supported by domestic and international third parties. Dozens of bilateral agreements concluded by the Nepalese government and splinter groups helped to ease tensions and bring these groups into the mainstream, even if the agreements often lacked coher-

ence and were rarely implemented. Informal mediation by international representatives was also helpful, especially in crisis moments, to reestablish channels of communication between the parties. Finally, a national dialogue structure, the Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative, helped to break the deadlock on contentious issues and paved the way for a series of agreements between the political parties. As a result, the constitution was finally adopted in 2015.

## BURUNDI

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement signed in 2000 was an ambitious attempt to end seven years of civil war fought across ethnic lines in Burundi. The agreement provided for power sharing between political parties and between Hutus and Tutsis. Implementation was delayed, and the parties ultimately needed a full year to form transitional institutions.

The challenges facing the Arusha Agreement at the time of its adoption were so daunting that its prospects for survival seemed small. Major Hutu rebel groups rejected the agreement altogether, and some Tutsi parties expressed reservations about key provisions, including the electoral system. Finally, important issues, such as the leadership of transitional institutions and the reform of the security sector, remained unresolved.

Postagreement negotiations promoted by external actors were essential to keep the peace process on track. The external actors who had facilitated the negotiation of the agreement remained active in the implementation phase. Key supporters included South African president Nelson Mandela and later deputy president Jacob Zuma; the Great Lakes Initiative for Peace in Burundi, which brought together countries in Central and East Africa; and, from 2004, the United Nations.

Hutu rebel groups were integrated into the Arusha institutions through a series of cease-fire agreements, culminating in the 2003 Global Ceasefire Agreement. In 2005, Burundi launched a referendum to adopt a new constitution and then held a series of elections, ending the transitional



period. However, international disengagement coupled with the difficulties of transforming rebel groups into political parties led to democratic backsliding, which culminated in a political crisis surrounding the elections in 2015 and the adoption of a controversial new constitution in 2018.

## **BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

In 1995, the presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement. The ceremony marked an end to the war in Bosnia, which had erupted after the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The agreement, which included Bosnia's future constitution as an annex, provided for devolution of power to two federal entities and power-sharing institutions at the central level.

Considering that the agreement had been adopted under heavy pressure from outside parties, including the United States, many in the countries of the former Yugoslavia perceived the Dayton Agreement as externally imposed. It benefited from neither elite support nor popular buy-in. Rather, political leaders were reluctant to cooperate in power-sharing institutions at the central level. They used boycotts of parliamentary sessions and community veto rights to delay decisions. Elections exacerbated the problem, as they reinforced nationalist parties that were opposed to reconciliation.

Given the lack of domestic support, implementation authority rested with international rather than domestic actors. A NATO-led Implementation Force enforced the military aspects of the agreement, while the Office of the High Representative, an entity granted far-reaching powers to oversee implementation of the agreement, handled civilian matters. Consequently, most decisions regarding implementation of the Dayton Agreement were imposed by successive High Representatives rather than negotiated among domestic actors.

The heavy-handed external involvement prevented conflict relapse in Bosnia, but it did not incentivize cooperation among political leaders. Consequently, the power-sharing institutions created by the Dayton Agreement have remained dysfunctional and dependent on continuous international oversight. More than twenty years after the peace agreement, there is little progress on the issues of reconciliation, democratic consolidation, and socioeconomic development.

# **Findings and Recommendations**

The case studies yield a number of findings about the performance of power-sharing arrangements. The findings do not have the quality of generalizable theory, but they point to dynamics observed across different cases, upon which future research can elaborate. In particular, five insights and corresponding recommendations are worth noting.

## **CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN CONFLICT PARTIES**

The most important finding is that the prospect for power sharing to consolidate long-term peace increases when conflict parties have access to suitably supported forums for continued negotiations. Such forums, whether permanent or ad hoc, allow the parties to negotiate and renegotiate issues and to assure each other of the credibility of their commitment. They can also help tackle issues that remained unresolved in a peace agreement, such as the decommissioning of

The prospect for power sharing to consolidate long-term peace increases when conflict parties have access to suitably supported forums, whether permanent or ad hoc, for continued negotiation.

the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. Negotiations also make it possible to adapt power-sharing arrangements to changing power configurations and to bring new actors into the process, such as Hutu rebel groups in the case of Burundi. When forums for renegotiations are lacking, as in Bosnia, power-sharing

structures lose traction with domestic political actors, and their survival depends on the ongoing engagement of the international community.

In this light, **practitioners and policymakers need to abandon mental models that categorize peace processes in distinct phases of negotiation, agreement, and implementation, with corresponding third-party roles.** Peace processes cannot be neatly distinguished into a discreet negotiation phase, which requires political support; an agreement phase in which all parties involved sign onto the settlement; and an implementation phase that calls for technical assistance. The entire construct of a peace process is highly political throughout and requires continuous negotiations between the parties. It also requires ongoing, sustained third-party assistance, even if the nature or form of that assistance may change.

## STAY INVOLVED IN THE POSTAGREEMENT PHASE

External actors can help ensure the positive performance of power-sharing arrangements by supporting the negotiations between the parties after they conclude a peace agreement.<sup>21</sup> External support can take different forms. One form pertains to diplomacy, staying actively engaged and using inducements and pressure to encourage agreement implementation and discourage defection. The United Kingdom and Ireland played this role in the peace process in Northern Ireland, and their active engagement was key for the positive outcome of the negotiations and the final settlement. A second role involves direct mediation regarding contentious issues that threaten to undermine the power-sharing arrangement. South Africa's role in mediating a cease-fire in Burundi is a case in point. In a third approach, international actors can support domestic structures that are engaged in resolving local conflicts and facilitating dialogue at the national level. These structures were critical in Nepal, preventing a collapse of the power-sharing arrangement and paving the way for the adoption of the new constitution.

All too often, the attention of the international community vanishes once a peace agreement is signed, due to shifting foreign policy priorities, coordination problems between international partners, or conflict parties' reluctance to accept continuous third-party involvement. However, **the struggle for peace is lost or won in the long term. It may require external support even after parties reach a peace agreement, especially when international intervention was critical in achieving the agreement.** The United Nations, bilateral partners, and other external actors are already deeply invested in postconflict peacebuilding; in this context, they should devote greater attention to the need to assist the parties in their ongoing negotiations.

More specifically, **external actors should support local and national dialogue capacities in conflict countries that build on existing peace agreements and power-sharing structures.** Such capacities help to defuse local conflicts that could otherwise spiral out of control and

threaten the peace process. They also help to grease the wheels of negotiations between the parties, allowing them to address contentious issues and recalibrate the power-sharing arrangement as necessary for its continued success.

## ENGAGE SPLINTER GROUPS

A common threat to power-sharing arrangements are splinter groups that defect from the main conflict parties as well as groups that did not sign the peace agreement, either because they did not have a seat at the table or because they rejected the agreement. The most promising approach to deal with these groups is to not marginalize them or label them as spoilers, but to engage them in negotiations with the aim of bringing them into a power-sharing arrangement. Back-channel diplomacy, mediated face-to-face meetings, or bilateral negotiations are all possible methods of engaging these groups. In Burundi, negotiations mediated by regional powers and South Africa brought Hutu rebel groups into the peace process. In Northern Ireland, where radical factions within the unionist and nationalist camps initially refused to sign the Good Friday Agreement, continuous political engagement likewise brought these actors into the power-sharing coalition.

**External actors should therefore support the negotiations of both existing and new conflict parties after a peace agreement has been concluded.** Depending on the situation, this support may consist of more robust interventions to influence the parties' incentives in favor of agreement implementation, or of more facilitative approaches to enable dialogue and relationship building.

## REFINE AND EXTEND PEACE AGREEMENTS

The cases analyzed here included a foundational peace agreement that set the parameters of the settlement process. The agreement defined a specific form of power sharing, built a coalition of actors willing to compromise, and attracted international recognition and material support. Yet it is important to note that even a perfect agreement is not sufficient to ensure that power sharing works. Any agreement requires sustained support for implementation as well as forums that allow for adaptation and renegotiation. In fact, in most of the cases examined here, additional agreements that focused on specific issues were necessary to establish effective power sharing. Examples of such follow-on and supplemental agreements include the St. Andrews Agreement in Northern Ireland and cease-fire agreements with armed groups in Burundi and Nepal. In that sense, peace agreements are not the endpoint but often the beginning of protracted war-to-peace transitions.

**Practitioners and policymakers therefore need to abandon the notion that effective power sharing requires those involved in the negotiations to design a single, “perfect” agreement.** The agreement is of course important, but effective power sharing also requires a constructive relationship between the parties. Peace practitioners should therefore help to create opportunities for trust building between the parties, and in the population as a whole, both before and after a peace agreement. The peace agreement itself can serve this purpose if it includes a realistic implementation plan and establishes forums for continuous negotiation and dispute resolution between the parties.

## INITIATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

After signing a peace agreement, it is common for conflict parties to try to deepen and entrench their commitment to peace through constitutional reform. All of the examples analyzed here are cases in point. Constitutional reform following a peace agreement can ensure the durability of power-sharing arrangements. It provides a space for the parties to continue to negotiate, allowing them to address unresolved or newly emerging issues. Because it is a more inclusive process that addresses a broader range of issues, constitutional reform also has more legitimacy than peace negotiations. Indeed, constitutional processes create opportunities to include a broad range of political forces, interest groups, and citizens, going beyond the belligerent parties and developing a more inclusive conception of national identity. Finally, since constitutions are formally enforceable, they represent a strong form of commitment, which contributes to the durability of power-sharing arrangements.<sup>22</sup>

**Therefore, practitioners and policymakers should support constitutional reform as a way to entrench the parties' commitment to peace and ensure long-term stability.** The design of constitutional reform can usefully draw on comparative experience, but the “best” design will always be one that entails a high level of involvement by political parties, civil society groups, and citizens.

## Applications to Current Negotiations

Peace practitioners and policymakers can put the foregoing recommendations to good use in ensuring the durability of power-sharing arrangements in specific, ongoing peace negotiations—including, but not limited to, those in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen.

**Afghanistan.** Beyond a possible agreement between the US government and the Taliban, the Afghan peace process requires an intra-Afghan political settlement. US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad has stressed this point repeatedly. Power sharing will be key in such a settlement, striking a balance between satisfying the interests of the main belligerents and drafting an inclusive agreement that the Afghan population will support. A settlement will only work if the Afghan parties are really willing to share power. At the same time, international powers—primarily the United States but also Pakistan, China, Russia, and Iran—need to have a common vision of the main contours of a negotiated settlement. They also need to bring their influence to bear on the parties during, and especially after, the settlement negotiations to ensure that any possible agreement maintains stability in the country.

**South Sudan.** The peace agreement of 2015 exemplifies the flaws of using strong leverage to force a power-sharing deal with limited ownership by the conflict parties. Once international attention faded, the parties reneged on their commitments and the agreement collapsed. Three years were devoted to reinvigorating the talks, which eventually resulted in a revitalized agreement signed in 2018. Implementation is lagging, however, as the formation of a unity government has been postponed. This is a setback, but it should not be a cause for despair. Rather, international actors should redouble their efforts and facilitate negotiations

South Sudanese president Salva Kiir (left) and opposition leader Riek Machar shake hands during peace talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in June 2018. (Photo by Mulugeta Ayene/AP)

between the parties until they find a workable formula that provides all of them with sufficient guarantees to move to the next stage in implementing the 2018 agreement.

**Sudan.** Following the ouster in April 2019 of long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir as a result of mass protests, the security forces that control the interim government and representatives of the protest movement have

engaged in negotiations about a power-sharing arrangement in Sudan. After a fitful start, the parties reached an agreement in August that aims to pave the way for civilian rule in Sudan. Implementation, however, remains a challenge, given the fragmentation of the security sector in Sudan and the strong influence of regional powers, in particular Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which have little interest in Sudan becoming a beacon of democracy. Western countries, in particular the United States, should stay involved to ensure that Sudan's security forces abide by the August 2019 agreement and to encourage continued negotiations with the opposition when necessary.

**Yemen.** The two main parties in the UN-led process are the Yemeni government under Mansour Hadi and the Houthis, each with their respective international supporters. To date, reaching a power-sharing agreement between these two belligerents has not been possible and would be a landmark achievement. It will be important that future agreements have realistic implementation plans. At the same time, power sharing in Yemen must go beyond the main belligerents and involve other entities, in particular the south, where many people favor independence. These issues can be addressed in follow-on negotiations—for example, through an inclusive constitutional process supported by international actors.



# Notes

1. For example, thirty out of the thirty-four comprehensive peace agreements that comprise the Kroc Institute's Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) include aspects of power sharing. Of these, twenty agreements include political power sharing, twenty territorial power sharing, and sixteen military power sharing (authors' analysis based on PAM data at <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/peace-accords>). The distinction between political, territorial, and military power-sharing arrangements is based on Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoodie, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (2003): 318–32.
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5. Ted Robert Gurr, "Attaining Peace in Divided Societies: Five Principles of Emerging Doctrine," *Journal on World Peace* 19, no. 2 (2002): 27–51.
6. On power sharing and ethnic identity change, see John Nagle, "Between Entrenchment, Reform and Transformation: Ethnicity and Lebanon's Consociational Democracy," *Democratization* 23, no. 7 (2016): 1144–61; and Alexandre Raffoul, "The Politics of Association: Power-Sharing and the Depoliticization of Ethnicity in Post-War Burundi," *Ethnopolitics* (September 20, 2018): 1–18.
7. On the credible commitment problem, the foundational text is Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 335–64. See also Hartzell and Hoodie, "Institutionalizing Peace."
8. Chandra Sriram and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, "The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond," *Africa Spectrum* 44, no. 3 (2009): 11–39.
9. The phenomenon of long-term international disengagement from settlement processes is described in Kyle Beardsley, *The Mediation Dilemma* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
10. See Laurie Nathan, *The Ties That Bind: Peace Negotiations, Credible Commitment and Constitutional Reform*, swisspeace Working Paper 1 (March 2019), [www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/downloads/Working-Papers/4493a8c50f/The-Ties-That-Bind-Working-Paper-19-v2.pdf](http://www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/downloads/Working-Papers/4493a8c50f/The-Ties-That-Bind-Working-Paper-19-v2.pdf).
11. See Scott Gates et al., "Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace," *Journal of Politics* 78, no. 2 (2016): 512–26.
12. Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, "The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa," *African Affairs* 104, no. 416 (2005): 375–98. See also Friedrich Plank, "When Peace Leads to Divorce: The Splintering of Rebel Groups in Powersharing Agreements," *Civil Wars* 19, no. 2 (2017): 176–97.
13. On power relationships in power-sharing systems, see Caroline A. Hartzell and Andreas Mehler, eds., *Power Sharing and Power Relations After Civil War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2019).
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17. Joanne McEvoy, *Power-Sharing Executives: Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
18. Florian Bieber, "The Balkans: The Promotion of Power Sharing by Outsiders," in *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places*, ed. Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O'Leary (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 312–26.
19. More comprehensive case studies can be found in chapter 3 in Alexandre Raffoul, *Tackling the Power-Sharing Dilemma? The Role of Mediation*, swisspeace, January 2019, [www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/downloads/Reports/7df2350452/Power-sharing-and-mediation.pdf](http://www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/downloads/Reports/7df2350452/Power-sharing-and-mediation.pdf). In addition to the cases summarized here, the report also examines power sharing in Rwanda and Lebanon.
20. Dawn Walsh, *Independent Commissions and Contentious Issues in Post-Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
21. This finding is consistent with a paper written by Katia Papagianni as background for the Oslo Forum in 2008: Katia Papagianni, "Power sharing, transitional governments and the role of mediation," Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008, [www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6DF9A83910278D55492576800020B9EC-Full\\_Report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6DF9A83910278D55492576800020B9EC-Full_Report.pdf).
22. Postconflict constitutions are elaborated on in Nathan, *The Ties That Bind*.

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