

SPECIAL REPORT

NO. 442 | MARCH 2019

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

Violent Extremism and Community Policing in Tanzania

By Lillian Dang



Police in Zanzibar enforce a cordon at the scene of an explosion of suspected improvised explosive devices in October 2015. (Photo by Tony Karumba/AFP/Getty Images)

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Summary

- Given Tanzania's proximity to Kenya and Somalia, where al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, and other terrorist organizations have expanded their presence, the spread of violent extremism in Tanzania is an issue of concern to regional security analysts.
- The Tanzanian government sees community policing as the focus of its response to prevent and counter violent extremism.
- While risks of violent extremism are acknowledged by community stakeholders, politically motivated violence, criminality, and conflicts over land use are viewed as more pressing security issues.
- Local communities are concerned about the securitized response to violent extremism and the involvement of police and security forces in extrajudicial disappearances and executions of violence extremism suspects.
- On the ground, the Tanzanian Police Force's community policing initiative continues to be stunted by a lack of resources, inconsistent application, and an overemphasis on intelligence gathering.
- The focus of the country's community policing program on intelligence provided by informants risks co-opting ordinary citizens into a securitized response to violent extremism.
- A lack of shared understanding between the community and police as to what constitutes violent extremism, along with a lack of trust in working together on a response, means that police efforts to prevent or counter violent extremism could aggravate rather than mitigate the problem.

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ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines whether community policing as practiced in Tanzania can contribute to the prevention of violent extremism. Based on a series of community security workshops and more than sixty in-depth interviews conducted in the Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar regions in July 2017, the report was supported by USIP's Middle East and Africa Center.

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

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Special Report No. 442. First published 2019.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-756-5



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INSTITUTE OF PEACE
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Students wait to be transported home after a deadly attack at Kenya's Garissa University College. Gunmen affiliated with al-Shabaab, including one Tanzanian, killed nearly 150 people in the attack. (Photo by Daniel Irungu/EPA/Shutterstock)

Introduction

Given Tanzania's proximity to countries where al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, and other terrorist organizations have expanded their presence, the need for measures to create a bulwark against radicalization has become a priority for regional security analysts. The fear is that the increasing presence of al-Shabaab in neighboring Kenya presents a serious spillover risk for radicalization and recruitment in Tanzania. Tanzanians are reported to have been among the foreigners fighting for al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia.¹ For example, in 2015, a Tanzanian was charged with involvement in the al-Shabaab attack on Garissa University College in Kenya, killing nearly 150 people, mostly students.²


As yet, however, Tanzania itself has not been the target of direct attacks by al-Shabaab. In part, this reflects the fact that Tanzania does not share a direct border with Somalia and has a small Somali population. A more important reason for al-Shabaab having yet to target Tanzania is that—unlike its neighbors Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda—Tanzania does not contribute troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has been supporting the Somali government in its counterterrorism efforts against al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has launched terrorist attacks against several AMISOM troop-contributing countries, including Uganda and Kenya.

According to the Global Terrorism Database, there were 43 terrorism incidents in Tanzania between 2008 and 2017, an extremely low number compared to Kenya, which experienced 574 incidents during that period (see figure 1). Notably, few of Tanzania's terrorism incidents have

FIGURE 1. TERRORISM EVENTS IN TANZANIA AND SELECT NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, 2008–17

Over the ten-year period, Tanzania experienced less than a tenth the number of terrorism events that occurred in Kenya, and about a third the number in Mozambique.

Total Number of Terror Events (2008–17)



Source: Global Terrorism Database, www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Map adapted from artwork by Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.

been committed by Tanzanians. However, there was a spike in terrorism events in Tanzania in 2014 and 2015 in which unidentified armed groups attacked government, police, and religious officials and institutions. In 2016, the US Department of State highlighted two incidents as terrorism related. One was an attack in the Mwanza Region in which fifteen assailants used improvised explosive devices, machetes, and axes to attack a mosque, killing three people. No group claimed responsibility, but assailants made comments criticizing police treatment of Muslims. In another incident, armed assailants attacked a police station in Dar es Salaam and stole weapons.³

In the following year, a series of suspected terrorist attacks took place in the coastal region of Pwani, killing more than thirty police and low-level ruling party officials.⁴ The assailants did not claim allegiance to a terrorist group, and police statements about the incidents in the media referred to the perpetrators as criminal bandits.⁵ Notwithstanding, a counterterrorism effort led by security forces in response to the attacks resulted in the arrest and detention of hundreds of suspects under the auspices of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.⁶

Since terrorism-related incidents have been underreported or characterized as criminal in nature by the Tanzanian government and security services, the actual number of terrorist attacks could be higher than what is publicly disclosed. The single most significant terrorism event in Tanzania remains the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam by Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda, which also attacked the US embassy in Nairobi at the same time.⁷ These attacks brought al-Qaeda widespread international attention. In the aftermath, Kenya and Tanzania viewed themselves as collateral victims of a terrorism campaign targeted at the United States.

The bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam prompted the Tanzanian government to introduce antiterrorism legislation and initiate its countering violent extremism (CVE) apparatus. In 2002 the Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed, setting out Tan-

zania's counterterrorism framework, and in 2005 Tanzania established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), an interagency unit that sits within the Ministry of Home Affairs.⁸ Initially comprised of members of the Tanzania Police Force (TPF) and Tanzania People's Defence Force (the army); the NCTC was subsequently expanded to include representatives from the intelligence community, immigration services, and prisons. The NCTC articulates its role as preventing rather than responding to terrorist attacks, and it is the focal point for the government's engagement with the international community on CVE efforts.⁹

Although Tanzania has yet to finalize a national strategy on CVE, the NCTC has made the existing community policing program of the TPF a focal point of its CVE approach.¹⁰ This report examines how effective the TPF's community policing program has been so far in addressing community safety and security issues and seeks to better understand whether community policing might be an effective approach to preventing violent extremism in the coming years.

Tanzania's low ratio of police to population means that local communities often rely on citizen-led efforts such as neighborhood watch groups for security.

Methodology

Because Tanzania is not currently experiencing civil or international conflict, the country's security dynamics can be best understood using an analytical framework focused on citizen security. Citizen security is an approach that expands the focus of security provision from a narrow preoccupation with protecting the interests of the state to one that is concerned with the safety and security of citizens and protecting the rights of citizens.¹¹ In Tanzania, citizen actors are responsible for the provision of security as much as the state. Tanzania's low ratio of police to population means that police have a limited presence outside of urban areas, and local communities often rely on citizen-led efforts such as neighborhood watch groups for security. As such, citizens are likely to understand emerging violent extremism risks. The approach further allows a comparison of community perceptions of violent extremism risks, vis-à-vis other local security concerns, to determine the gravity of the violent extremism threat. Recognizing that violent extremism is a highly sensitive topic for public discussion in Tanzania, applying a citizen security lens enables assessment teams to engage in discussions with local stakeholders about community security dynamics, including violent extremism risks, where present.

In July 2017, USIP's assessment team conducted a series of community security workshops in three of Tanzania's thirty-one regions: Zanzibar, Tanga, and Morogoro. The community security workshop is an assessment tool used by USIP's Justice and Security Dialogues program to conduct preliminary assessments of justice and security dynamics. The workshops in Tanzania facilitated dialogue between the community and police to examine local security dynamics and the level of community and police cooperation in identifying core security problems.



MOROGORO, TANGA, AND ZANZIBAR REGIONS OF TANZANIA

Adapted from artwork by Rainer Lesniewski/Shutterstock

Specifically, the dialogues examined the perspectives of stakeholders from local communities and local police representatives to determine the extent to which they shared a common understanding of the major sources of violence and insecurity. To the extent that local community representatives identified violent extremism as a security concern, the assessment sought to

situate the violent extremism risk within broader community security priorities.

The workshops were held in each region, with a total of 108 stakeholders from local communities, including fifty-eight youth representatives.¹² In addition, eleven police representatives participated in the workshops.¹³ To conduct the workshops, USIP partnered with three Tanzanian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): the Zanzibar Legal Service Center, which provides legal aid, conducts research, produces human rights documentation, and advocates for law reform; the Tree of Hope in Tanga, which works on issues of HIV/AIDs and gender sensitization; and an organization in Morogoro that wished to remain anonymous.

USIP's partners identified stakeholders from local communities with knowledge of conflict and security issues to participate in the workshops. The stakeholders included local government officials, religious leaders, representatives of local NGOs, journalists, members of the *boda boda* motorcycle taxi network, farmers, pastoralists, and members of trade organizations and trade associations. Police representatives were identified by regional police commands and included representatives from a variety of departments, including community policing, general duties, the gender desk, traffic patrol, criminal investigation, and field force units (riot police). In addition to workshop dialogues, the assessment team conducted sixty-six individual, in-depth interviews with participants who attended the workshops and with stakeholders who did not.¹⁴

Community Security Dynamics and Violent Extremism

Unlike in neighboring Kenya, where attacks by al-Shabaab have brought violent extremism to the forefront of public attention, violent extremism incidents remain under the radar in Tanzania. While radicalization, recruitment, and small-scale attacks related to violent extremism are present in Tanzania, they are largely hidden from the public. The Tanzanian government and security forces are hesitant to acknowledge that the rising number of attacks against domestic targets are motivated by violent extremism, preferring instead to portray attacks as perpetrated by criminal bandits. The Tanzanian government's position has been enabled by a degree of self-censorship by the local media and civil society, who have refrained from publicly discussing the topic for fear of a backlash from the government. Hence, there is little public awareness about the nature of violent extremism in Tanzania.

Across the three regions covered by this assessment, there was an absence of a shared understanding among participants of what violent extremism means. Community stakeholders and police, even when from the same region, lacked a common language for discussing violent extremism. Community stakeholders and police representatives frequently stated during workshop dialogues that they were reluctant to discuss violent extremism because the Tanzanian government has not acknowledged its existence or because they were not “authorized” to discuss it. Alternatively, workshop representatives viewed violent extremism to be a national security matter and not a local security issue to be discussed by citizens or even local police.

When asked to define violent extremism in Kiswahili, workshop participants offered different terminologies. In Zanzibar and Tanga, one commonly used term was *itakadi kali*, which translates into English as “ideology extreme” and is applied to religious or political ideologies. In Morogoro, participants used the phrase *kukithiri migogoro*, which translates into English as “extreme violence” and has been applied to land conflicts that have resulted in deadly violence. Given that there is no widely accepted definition of violent extremism among international policymakers and practitioners, the Tanzanian participants' lack of a common term reflects the broader definitional challenge within the violent extremism and counterterrorism policy discourse. For the purpose of this report, violent extremism was assessed by examining radicalization, recruitment, and attacks that are motivated by a violent political, social, economic, or religious agenda.

Another challenge for discussing violent extremism is the lack of public information concerning violent extremism-related incidents. Although Tanzanian police and security forces have detected radicalization and recruitment activities, so far no direct link has been made between those activities and domestic attacks. The motives for attacks against government officials and police remain unclear, and no group has publicly claimed responsibility. Since the Tanzanian government and the media have portrayed these attacks as criminal in nature or politically motivated, community stakeholders and even police representatives do not have a clear perspective on what is or is not a violent extremism event. Furthermore, because the number of casualties from violent extremism-related incidents has remained extremely low compared to deaths from other forms of criminal violence, most local communities have not viewed violent extremism as a major priority.

TABLE 1. PERCEPTIONS OF KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENCE AND INSECURITY

	Community Stakeholders	Police Representatives
ZANZIBAR	Political grievances Violence committed by a militia group referred to as “zombies” Youth unemployment, drug use, and participation in criminal activities Extremist religious and political messaging Clandestine martial arts classes	
TANGA	Criminality and illicit smuggling Drug addiction Family conflicts Land conflicts Clandestine military-style training of boys and young men Securitized response to violent extremism incidents	Terrorism Illegal migration Illicit drugs trafficking Land conflicts Family disputes
MOROGORO	Land conflict Conflict within the minerals sector Police harassment of female sex workers Police harassment of boda boda (motorcycle taxi drivers) Armed robberies by criminal bandits	Land conflict Conflict within the minerals sector Criminal banditry

Workshop participants acknowledged the occurrence of violent extremism in the Zanzibar, Tanga, and Morogoro regions, but they did not specify the precise nature and dimensions of the threat. Community stakeholders and police representatives did not identify violent extremism as a security concern unless prompted; then, stakeholders in all three regions pointed to covert martial arts training classes—conducted in mosques, madrassas, and forested areas—as suggesting the presence of a potential violent extremism threat. Stakeholders also described the presence of groups in the Tanga and Morogoro regions that local communities associate with violent extremism and refer to by the pejorative terms “Hizbu” (to describe individuals of Arab descent) or “al-Shabaab.”

For community stakeholders, the security response to violent extremism is a further indication of its presence. Police crackdowns, including raids on mosques, have targeted Salafist communities known in Tanzania as the Ansār Sunna (“Defenders of the Tradition”). Some community stakeholders suspect the police and security services of being involved in the extrajudicial killing of violent extremism suspects.¹⁵ Consequently, community members are hesitant to discuss violent extremism matters with the police for fear of being associated with violent extremism or being involved in the security response to it. With the exception of the Tanga workshops, police representatives did not discuss their perspectives on violent extremism with community stakeholders. Accordingly, while community and police perceptions of the key drivers of violence and insecurity varied across the three surveyed regions, politically motivated violence, criminality, and conflicts related to land were the most common themes (see table 1).

ZANZIBAR

A semi-autonomous region of Tanzania, Zanzibar is an archipelago that lies off the northern coast of the mainland. Community stakeholders in Zanzibar identified political grievances as the major driver of violence and insecurity. Although violent extremism risks were identified in the region, the overall security dynamics there suggest that the threat of violent extremism is low compared with politically motivated violence and violence perpetrated by vigilante groups.

The political competition between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and the Civic United Front (CUF) opposition party may be an unintended bulwark against violent extremism in Zanzibar. Unless an alliance is formed with either the CCM or the CUF, any new group would find it difficult to win supporters away from the two major parties. Just as the political landscape is crowded, so is the religious landscape in Zanzibar. The well-established Muslim groups and clerics that dominate the archipelago's communities help to regulate the entrance of Islamist militants.

The political contest between the CCM and the CUF has resulted in the polarization of political identity within the population. As such, Zanzibar is viewed as divided into two political camps, with any organized action interpreted as being done in support of one party or the other. Community stakeholders believe that when large-scale violence occurs, usually during election periods, it is often politically motivated and directed by political leaders.

Community stakeholders also see violence arising from the discrimination encountered by individuals and communities associated with the CUF party. This political discrimination is closely tied to socioeconomic marginalization, because CUF supporters tend to live in poorer neighborhoods with high rates of crime, unemployment, drug abuse, and family breakdown. Individuals who support the CUF face discrimination in many aspects of their daily life, from using government services to accessing higher education opportunities and gaining employment. Communities associated with the CUF party are also more likely to come under surveillance by law enforcement.

According to youth stakeholders, young Zanzibaris are frustrated with the slow pace of political change. This includes the unfulfilled promises of the constitutional review process that the country embarked on in 2012 and that Zanzibaris hoped would give the region more autonomy.¹⁶ Related to this is the ongoing detention of a number of leaders of the Uamsho, or The Awakening, a separatist movement that came to prominence in the early 2010s by advocating for Zanzibar's independence and voicing the grievances of young Zanzibaris. Uamsho has been linked to attacks against religious leaders and churches. The detained leaders, known as the "Uamsho sheiks," are held on terrorism-related charges by the Tanzanian government.¹⁷ Another frustration is the CUF's exclusion from government following the 2015 electoral crisis. The Zanzibar Electoral Commission, citing irregularities, annulled the result of the October 2015 election when it appeared that the CUF might have won. The government called a new election in March 2016, which was boycotted by the CUF, providing a landslide victory for the CCM.¹⁸ Against this backdrop of dissatisfaction, charismatic leaders can mobilize a frustrated youth population toward violence. Currently, the situation is tense but stable, thanks mostly to calls for restraint from the CUF leadership. The CUF remains a cohesive party, able to direct and influence its supporters to stay in the political process. However, a fracturing of the CUF leadership could pave the way for greater insecurity and violence.

Conversely, the CCM is perceived as acting aggressively to maintain its hold on power. Community stakeholders believe the CCM government in Zanzibar is associated with a militia group

Stakeholders identified high youth unemployment and drug use as sources of insecurity in Zanzibar. Unemployed young men are seen as a demographic group easily mobilized for violence by influential figures.

known as the “zombies,” a designation given because their members wear black masks to conceal their identity. The zombies are suspected of being responsible for attacks against CUF supporters at public rallies, torching the homes of CUF supporters following the 2015 election, dismantling street stalls operating during Ramadan, and assaulting individuals in their homes.¹⁹ Although the zombies are not perceived as related to violent extremism, they represent to local communities an excessive form of political violence.

Local stakeholders believe the zombies are directed by powerful individuals in the Zanzibar government who are trying to promote the CCM’s political agenda. There are also accusations that the zombies have been hired by wealthy individuals to attack their rivals and personal enemies. The identities of the zombies are unknown, but many community representatives believe that young men who are unemployed are vulnerable to recruitment into such violent groups.

Other community stakeholders believe that the zombies are members of the Zanzibar government’s Special Forces Department, specifically the Special Forces for Prevention of Smuggling Department, known by its Kiswahili acronym KMKM (Kikosi Maalum cha Kuzuia Magendo). Local police officers are said to be aware of the link between the zombies and the KMKM and allow them to carry out attacks with impunity. Community members contrasted police crackdowns on gangs in the past with police inaction against zombies and suggested that this disparity may reflect the endorsement of the zombies by political representatives. Some stakeholders and other interviewees alleged that local police officers have participated in zombie attacks, including sexual assaults on women. These allegations were reiterated during interviews with individuals who did not participate in the workshop.

In addition to political drivers, stakeholders identified high youth unemployment (31 percent, according to a World Bank estimate), drug use, and crimes such as theft and robbery as sources of insecurity.²⁰ In particular, unemployed young men are seen as a demographic group easily mobilized for violence by influential figures such as members of the Zanzibar government and opposition leaders. A series of attacks in 2012 and 2013 by unknown individuals directed at churches and mosques, religious leaders, and foreign tourists was blamed in the media on unemployed young men purported to be addicted to drugs. Whether the perception of easily influenced youth is accurate is hard to judge because many of these incidents have never been prosecuted and the perpetrators remain unidentified. For example, the secretary of the Mufti’s Office in Zanzibar, Sheikh Fadhil Suleiman Soraga, was the victim of an acid attack that was reported in the media to have been perpetrated by a young drug addict. The secretary, however, pointed out that the perpetrator of the attack—which he felt was politically motivated because of his statements against Uamsho—was a middle-aged man. This example highlights the difficulties of ascertaining precise motivations behind violent attacks in Zanzibar. Because political divisions color many issues in Zanzibar, participants frequently returned to political drivers of violence and insecurity or drew links between political grievances and other drivers such as ethnic identity, socioeconomic marginalization, and messaging by religious and political leaders.

According to community stakeholders, extremist religious and political ideologies are present in Zanzibar and do occasionally fuel violent attacks, but this has not given rise to widespread violence. However, religious and political messaging has the potential to be a driver of violent ex-

tremism. Political messaging has driven ethnic tensions by conflating political identity with ethnic identity. The CUF leadership is based on the island of Pemba, which has a high concentration of inhabitants of mixed African and Arab descent. According to youth stakeholders, political messaging by the CCM camp has highlighted the ethnic difference of CUF supporters in a way that has encouraged institutional and social discrimination against individuals of mixed African and Arab ethnicity. For its part, the CUF camp has highlighted the CCM's "Christian" identity, given the relatively higher percentage of Christians among the party's members and supporters on the mainland. (This is an opportunistic distinction: almost all CCM leaders and supporters are Muslim, as are 99 percent of Zanzibar's 1.3 million people.²¹) In conflating political identity with a religious identity, the CUF has been able to portray the ruling CCM party in Zanzibar as an extension of the regime on the Tanzanian mainland that has denied Zanzibar greater autonomy.

Messaging by religious leaders has driven interreligious tensions and is believed by local stakeholders to have helped inspire at least eight recorded attacks from 2012 to 2014 on Muslim and Christian leaders and on churches and mosques in Zanzibar. These incidents included the murder of a Catholic priest and the torching of a church in February 2013; an acid assault on two British tourists in Stone Town in August 2013; and an explosion at a mosque in June 2014.²² However, whether religious messaging is the primary driver of such attacks is difficult to ascertain. When asked about these incidents, community stakeholders cited a range of possible motivations, including not only provocative messaging by religious leaders but also personal retaliation and attempts by the CCM and CUF parties to discredit one another. In most cases, the perpetrators of these attacks were never caught, and their actual motives remain unknown.

In addition to messaging, community stakeholders identified clandestine martial arts classes held in madrassas as an indicator of a potential violent extremism risk. The concern for community members is not the teaching of martial arts itself but the secretive nature of the classes. According to one community representative, it is "strange to see [a] madrassa teach [an] exercise class like that. . . . If you do not have ill intention, then make it open."²³ Clandestine martial arts classes for boys and young men inside madrassas and mosques or within forested areas were a theme discussed by workshop participants in all three regions.

Though Zanzibaris are vulnerable to recruitment by Islamist violent extremist organizations (VEOs) outside the archipelago, given the high levels of migration from Zanzibar to Kenya and Gulf countries, the ability of Islamist VEOs to recruit, establish a base of operations, or carry out attacks in Zanzibar will likely remain limited in the near term. Zanzibar is a challenging environment for an Islamist VEO because of the comparatively high level of scrutiny by community members to outside actors, entrenched and highly competitive political parties, and well-established Muslim groups and clerics. For example, the Office of the Mufti in Zanzibar has been particularly concerned with the arrival of Salafist preachers since 2016 on the islands, and the propagation of what is viewed as an extremist—and potentially competitive—interpretation of Islam.²⁴ The Office of the Mufti is regulating madrassa teachers and curricula to prevent the spread of extremist religious teaching. Further, while political competition in Zanzibar (and Tanzania more generally) has resulted in violence, it continues to provide an agreed-upon means for individuals to gain and wield power. Within this environment, it would be difficult for an Islamist VEO to recruit from among the population, particularly for high-level operators, most of whom are likely already devoted to one of the political parties.

TANGA

Bordering Kenya to the north, with a vast eastern coastline, the Tanga Region is a transit point for transnational narcotic trafficking, illegal migration, and human trafficking.²⁵ According to community stakeholders, economic motivations related to poverty, family breakdown, homelessness, drug dependency, and unemployment push young men into illicit smuggling activities, including drug trafficking within the country. Heroin addiction among the youth population is a major driver of criminality. Family breakdown and conflicts related to land are the other major sources of insecurity.

Violent extremism was a more prominent theme in the Tanga workshops and interviews than in the Zanzibar meetings. A series of events in 2015 and 2016 that took place in and near Tanga's Amboni caves drew national attention to the presence of a shadowy armed group.²⁶ In February 2015, local TPF officers pursued criminal suspects to the cave complex, where the police encountered a heavily armed group that was hiding inside.²⁷ A gun fight broke out, and the Tanzania People's Defence Force was called in to assist the police, marking the first time in recent history the army had been deployed to deal with a domestic law enforcement matter. During the joint operation, one soldier was killed and five others injured, including one police officer. The army and the TPF eventually secured the caves but failed to apprehend any members of the armed group.²⁸ A year later, eight residents of Kibatini, a hamlet near the Amboni caves, were murdered in a single night.²⁹ Among those killed were the chairman and several members of the hamlet's executive committee.

Stakeholders from the local community in Tanga view the incidents at the Amboni caves as related to violent extremism. In one account given by a community stakeholder, the group inhabiting the caves was providing "militia" training to children, and the members of Kibatini hamlet were most likely killed for having alerted police to the group's presence inside the caves. Interviews with local stakeholders and police also shed light on incidents of boys and young men suspected of receiving military-style training inside some mosques and madrassas of the Ansār Sunna in the rural western districts of Tanga.³⁰

Other community stakeholders voiced an alternative view that there is an Islamist VEO distinct from—but operating under cover of—the Ansār Sunna community. These stakeholders referred to this amorphous group as Hizbu, a pejorative term used to describe individuals of Arab descent. According to stakeholders, members of the group subscribe to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and disagree with the practice of other Muslim sects. The group does not appear to be a unified organization, but is rather a number of individual cliques located in different areas across Tanga. And while members may live in local communities, they limit their interaction with other residents because they disapprove of the local culture. Unlike the Ansār Sunna, the group is allegedly motivated by opposing the government and carrying out revenge attacks.

The events at the Amboni caves induced community stakeholders and police representatives in Tanga to discuss violent extremism risks more openly than workshop participants in the other two regions. Yet, despite being ready to discuss violent extremism within the workshop, community stakeholders saw several reasons for limiting public discussion on the topic. One was to avoid publicizing the presence of violent extremism. Community stakeholders stated that they wanted to deal with violent extremism issues discreetly to avoid attracting more attention and possible recruits to their community. Another reason was the securitization of

the response to violent extremism. There is growing concern, particularly after the Amboni incidents, about violent extremism suspects being taken into custody by police or security forces and disappearing.

Among police representatives, opinions varied as to what constitutes a violent extremism risk. For some, the risk arises from the potential spillover of foreign terrorist groups into Tanzania. According to the Tanga Regional Police commander, “foreign ideas” exist in Tanzania, and the government recognizes that there are organizations coming from abroad with a “hidden agenda.” The view that violent extremism risks emanate from “foreign ideas” and “foreign organizations” is not unique to Tanga; it was also shared with the assessment team during meetings with police leaders in Zanzibar.

Conversely, some police representatives view the risk of violent extremism as politically driven by the contest between the CCM and opposition parties. For example, one police representative pointed to the recent murder of eight police officers in a roadside attack by an armed group in the Kibiti district of Pwani Region, which neighbors Tanga. As he commented, “Most of the issues of Kibiti may be an overflow of the youth running from Tanga. These killings are targeted and most of the attacks target representatives of CCM. Therefore, there is some form of politics that come into play.”

Furthermore, the presence of transnational criminal networks in Tanga’s coastal areas makes it harder for communities and police to ascertain whether violent incidents are criminal in nature or terrorism related, or a combination of the two. According to community stakeholders, the Amboni incidents could be related to al-Shabaab, to foreign terrorist organizations, or to transnational narcotic trafficking networks. Similarly, the disappearances of young men from the community could be explained by recruitment by al-Shabaab, or by foreign terrorist organizations, or by transnational drug trafficking groups, or due to apprehension by Tanzanian security forces.

Notwithstanding concerns about violent extremism, community stakeholders still ranked drug use, family breakdowns, and land conflicts above violent extremism as the major drivers of insecurity in Tanga. Police representatives, however, ranked terrorism as the top security risk, followed by illegal migration, illicit drugs, land conflicts, and family disputes. The assessment team identified several possible reasons for this difference in ranking. One is a misalignment of knowledge between community and police representatives, which may have led police representatives to overemphasize the violent extremism risk or community stakeholders to underestimate it. Another reason could be that community stakeholders view violent extremism as a national security matter and not a local security issue that can be usefully discussed by citizens. Notably, community stakeholders seem to lack confidence in discussing violent extremism in the presence of police representatives. Finally, violent extremism-related incidents occur infrequently, which may explain why community stakeholders do not see violent extremism as a major source of insecurity.

Despite the low priority assigned to violent extremism by community stakeholders, the assessment team found the presence of violent extremism risks to be more pronounced in Tanga than in Zanzibar or Morogoro. Specifically, there is a greater awareness among members of the

The view that violent extremism risks emanate from “foreign ideas” and “foreign organizations” was shared by police leaders in the Tanga and Zanzibar regions.

community and the police of incidents of violent extremism-related radicalization and recruitment. These incidents have occurred in places such as the *maskani*, public areas where people can gather and that are associated with unemployed or idle young men, and in forested areas, mosques, and madrassas associated with the Ansār Sunna.

In contrast to Zanzibar’s Muslim community, where the close monitoring of outside actors helps to identify and isolate Islamist VEOs before they take root, Tanga may be less resilient to this form of violent extremism. As a porous border region, Tanga is vulnerable to the undetected entrance of new actors and groups, including potential VEOs. With a mixed Christian and Muslim population, there is no overarching religious institution that is regulating the entrance and activities of religious-based organizations. The religious demographic of Tanzania is not officially recorded, because the national census does not capture information about citizens’ religion, but a 2010 survey by the Pew Research Center estimated that 61 percent of the population is Christian, 35 percent Muslim, and 4 percent belong to other religious groups.³¹ On the Tanzanian mainland, Muslim communities are concentrated in coastal areas, but Muslim minorities are also found in the inland areas. Although interfaith dialogues have helped ease interreligious tensions that have flared between Muslim and Christian communities in Tanga in recent years, mainstream Christian and Muslim leaders have limited influence among fundamentalist religious groups, some of whom have been associated with violence.³² Given these factors, Tanga is a region more vulnerable to Islamist VEOs than the neighboring islands of Zanzibar.

MOROGORO

In the inland Morogoro Region, stakeholders from local communities and police representatives agreed that land conflicts are the major driver of violence and insecurity. According to workshop participants, land-use conflicts between farmers and pastoralists, and within pastoralist communities, have stoked inter- and intracommunity tensions, provoked revenge attacks, and caused hundreds of casualties. Arable land scarcity, population growth, ethnic discrimination, corruption, poor land management policies, and weak dispute resolution mechanisms exacerbate ongoing conflicts.

Corrupt local government leaders contribute to land conflicts by taking bribes to favor one party over another in disputes and to facilitate land usurpation by wealthy and well-connected investors. A number of community stakeholders cited corruption in ward land tribunals as a driver of conflict. (A ward is the second-smallest local administrative unit, the smallest being a neighborhood.) One community representative shared an anecdote about a farmer who killed 150 cows belonging to a pastoralist community in revenge for a ruling against him in a ward land tribunal that the farmer believed had been influenced by corruption. Police have also been implicated in corruption related to land-use disputes and land usurpation.

In addition to land disputes, community stakeholders identified conflict within the minerals sector, police treatment of female sex workers, police harassment of boda boda taxi drivers, and armed robberies by bandits as other sources of insecurity and conflict.

Unless prompted, community stakeholders and police representatives did not raise violent extremism as a security concern during the workshop. When asked to define violent extremism, participants in the region suggested that land conflicts could represent a form of violent

Aerial view of a town in Morogoro.
(Photo by Moiz Husein/iStock)

extremism. This different usage of the term indicates a general lack of public awareness within the community of violent extremism or terrorism issues, as generally understood.

Interviews conducted outside of the workshop did identify violent extremism risks, however. These risks were associated with the training in weapons, explosives, and martial arts that boys and young men receive in mosques and madrassas. Religious leaders also discussed potential recruitment by un-

known VEOs inside some mosques of the Ansār Sunna. One Muslim community leader stated that a group he referred to pejoratively as “al-Shabaab” supports violent jihad and recruits from Ansār Sunna mosques.³³ However, according to another Muslim leader when discussing the group in the same interview, “They have select mosques that they go to. It depends on the leaders of the mosque. They don’t disclose their mission.” The use of the term “al-Shabaab” suggests that the local community sees the group as associated with violent extremism rather than a mainstream political agenda.

A police representative confirmed these views, stating that terrorism suspects have been detected in Morogoro, although such information is not disclosed to the public. The police representative believes Morogoro is an ideal hiding spot for shadowy actors or groups because of its vast forested areas as well as being a crossroads for transit around Tanzania. A recent report by the International Crisis Group identified Morogoro as a region where militants have reportedly planted sleeper cells.³⁴

It is difficult to determine the risk of violent extremism in Morogoro given the hesitancy of community stakeholders and police representatives to discuss matters pertaining to violent extremism and terrorism openly. Even so, community stakeholders seem not to be aware of violent extremism risks; their major security concerns are quite different, focusing on land conflicts, criminality, and gender-based violence.



Polisi Jamii

In 2006, the Tanzania Police Force, conscious that citizens had little trust in its forces, embarked on a reform strategy focused on three themes: modernization, professionalization, and community policing.³⁵ Launched the following year as a way of reversing the public's negative perception of the police, responding to the rising incidence of crime, and bolstering the number of police in uniform, the TPF's community policing model was structured around the appointment of a police officer at the ward level who would work with local government leaders to establish civilian security groups known as *polisi jamii*.³⁶

The *polisi jamii*—a Kiswahili term that translates into English as “community police”—consists of civilian volunteers from a village or neighborhood who provide local leaders and the TPF's ward-level police with information about safety and security issues. The term can be confusing to members of the public, as it suggests that volunteers are police officers or have powers beyond collecting and conveying information. In order to minimize confusion, the TPF's community policing unit in Morogoro changed the name of the units to *walinzi uma* or *uma jamii*, terms that mean “community security guards.”

In all three regions, the assessment found that most members of the *polisi jamii* are young men. Beyond that, the groups differ significantly, with wide variations in recruitment, training, roles, and responsibilities, even within the same region. For example, in some communities *polisi jamii* have received training from the TPF and carry identification cards, but in other communities they have received no such support and carry no identification. In Zanzibar, some *polisi jamii* are paid by the government to act as parking ticket inspectors, while others are paid by local businesses to patrol neighborhoods at night. According to community stakeholders, *polisi jamii* in Tanga and Morogoro do not perform active services like *polisi jamii* in Zanzibar, but play the more passive role of providing information to police and local leaders about crimes occurring within their communities.

Community perceptions of the *polisi jamii* program are mixed. Community representatives described their relationship with the *polisi jamii* to be “half good and half bad.” Members are often simultaneously viewed as a source of both resilience and insecurity: *polisi jamii* enhance security when they detect and report potential criminal activities to local leaders and the TPF, but community members also highlight the fact that *polisi jamii* sometimes abuse their position and use force against members of the community.

By establishing the *polisi jamii* as the eyes and ears of the TPF at the ward level, the TPF more frequently interacts with its informants than with ordinary members of the broader community. As a result, the TPF's community policing initiative has failed to pave the way for greater trust building between local communities and the police force.

Community Policing in Practice

The TPF's community policing approach displays both strengths and weaknesses. The strengths include the expansion of police presence in local communities, the establishment of regular communication channels between police and local government leaders, and official endorsement of the establishment of civilian security groups. Unfortunately, the community policing approach has been stunted by a lack of resources, inconsistent application, and an overemphasis on intelligence gathering.

Rather than use the TPF's community policing structure as a means of building trust between police and citizens and improving the delivery of policing services to local communities, community policing in practice focuses primarily on intelligence gathering from local communities. There appears to be a two-fold approach, with transparent and official information gathering taking place at the same time as less transparent and unofficial intelligence gathering. Typically, the local TPF community policing unit works closely with the TPF's criminal intelligence department to collect information from local communities and then relay it to the regional police commander. Police representatives see community policing as a means of building a closer relationship with local communities, thereby making it easier for community members to report information to the police. Community members have a similar understanding, viewing the *polisi jamii* as "informants"—that is, as a source of information about the community for the police.

Local communities have several channels they can use to share information with the police. The official channel is accessible when police representatives attend monthly ward meetings. In these meetings, police officers receive security briefings from the ward executive committee and the *polisi jamii*. A designated TPF community policing officer is usually the focal point for the police in these meetings. A representative from an intelligence department may also be present.³⁷ Outside of these meetings, local government leaders may report to the police directly about incidents. The *polisi jamii* may also report directly to the police or through local government leaders. According to police representatives who participated in the Tanga workshop, police officers cultivate relationships with members of the community who provide information anonymously and sometimes in return for payment. Undercover agents, although it is not clear from which agency, are used to gather intelligence in locations known for illicit activities, such as "clubhouses" (bars), the *maskani*, and, according to an intelligence operative interviewed in Tanga, areas frequented by members of *boda boda* taxi networks.

The TPF's reliance on citizen reporting has benefits and risks. Citizen reporting can serve as an early-warning system that allows the police to pinpoint emerging risks and allocate scarce resources. The flipside is that the reliability of the information collected is limited to what citizens can accurately ascertain about incidents and suspects and to what they are willing to disclose to the police. There is the added risk that citizens may provide biased or false information to target personal opponents rather than legitimate suspects.

However, the TPF's community policing efforts cannot be separated from broader policing practices. Local communities view the police ambivalently—as a provider of security but also as a driver of insecurity. A common theme across the three regions was a lack of trust in po-

In the absence of trust between communities and the police, community policing efforts to prevent violent extremism can easily become elaborate informant programs open to abuse.

lice among local communities due to police corruption, abuse of authority, and excessive use of force. Workshop participants identified slow and unresponsive policing, lack of police presence in local communities, and lack of professionalism as the major shortcomings.

Police surveillance of local communities to serve the political interests of the ruling party was also noted, particularly in Zanzibar.

At the same time, community stakeholders referenced positive relationships between police and civil society organizations (CSOs), especially in their joint work on issues such as gender-based violence, child abuse, and sex worker rights. CSO representatives appear to have more positive working relationships with the police than the general public because of their interest in solving the same problems. For example, CSOs and the police in Tanga have worked together to address gender-based violence. In Morogoro, CSOs and the police are collaborating to address gender-based violence and the protection of sex workers. In Zanzibar, CSOs and the police have developed a positive working relationship in their joint effort to address high rates of child abuse. In all three regions, the representative of the gender desk of the police was cited as the main entry point for CSO-police engagement, particularly in the case of efforts to protect the rights of women and children.

Ultimately, community stakeholders would like to see improvements in the relationship between the community and the police. Community stakeholders suggested that the process should start with more community-police dialogues, an increase in the professionalism of police officers, and responsive and timely policing services.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In Tanzania, local police are not only on the front lines of detecting and disrupting violent extremism activity, they are at risk of being targeted in violent extremism-related attacks. As a result, local police will continue to play a central role in mitigating—or aggravating—violent extremism in Tanzania.

Past USIP research has found that community policing programs designed to prevent violent extremism require the community and the police to have a shared understanding of what constitutes violent extremism and what is an effective response.³⁸ Additionally, significant levels of trust must be established between the community and the police. In the absence of this trust, community policing efforts to prevent violent extremism can easily become elaborate informant programs open to abuse but with limited benefits to local communities.

Given this analysis, it is premature to apply the TPF's community policing program as a preventive measure to violent extremism in Tanzania without further efforts to strengthen the community-police relationship. At present, there is no shared understanding between the community and the police as to what constitutes violent extremism, nor common agreement on a potential response. The lack of trust between the community and the police not only inhibits them from

discussing violent extremism, it prevents them from collaborating effectively on a joint response. Local communities are highly suspicious of police handling of violent extremism suspects, who they believe are being subjected to enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings by security forces. Similarly, police are fearful of future attacks against its force and suspect communities of allowing violent extremists to hide among the local population.

Moreover, the emphasis of the TPF's community policing program on information and intelligence gathering presents certain risks when it comes to preventing violent extremism. Given the lack of a common definition of what constitutes violent extremism between the community and the police, there is a major risk that information provided by citizens may misrepresent certain actors or incidents as being associated with violent extremism when in fact they are not. Citizens may also provide biased or false information to target personal opponents rather than legitimate violent extremism suspects. Relying on community reporting also risks co-opting citizens into a securitized response to violent extremism and turning ordinary citizens into police informants. There is the further risk that VEOs wanting to stay hidden may target citizens.

Furthermore, the securitized response to violent extremism makes it difficult for those close to at-risk individuals to report a friend or a family member to the police. Currently in Tanzania, parents, teachers, and peers who become aware of an individual becoming radicalized or recruited by a VEO have few options in terms of where to turn for assistance. A strategy to divert at-risk individuals to an alternative pathway is needed to enable a response to violent extremism that is preventive and nonpunitive. For diversionary strategies to be effective, a level of trust and confidence must exist between the community and the police. The community must have confidence that if they identify an individual at risk, he or she will receive diversionary assistance and will not be punished or exploited by the police. Ultimately, any intervention to prevent or counter violent extremism will require community and police cooperation. Given the positive working relationship between CSOs and police in jointly addressing problems, CSOs could be an entry point for future intervention efforts.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, policing interventions to disrupt violent extremism recruitment and radicalization have benefited from some level of cooperation from the community. In some cases, local police have been alerted to violent extremism activities through reporting from community members. However, the clandestine nature of the informant system and the lack of transparency around the arrest and detention of violent extremism suspects undermine trust among the broader community in police handling of violent extremism cases.

Future assistance to prevent violent extremism in Tanzania should focus on how to strengthen the capacity of local police to address violent extremism in collaboration with local communities. The TPF's community policing program could play a key role in promoting trust building if oriented toward improving the community-police relationship rather than the utilitarian purpose of information gathering from the community. Police leaders confirmed that they are taking preliminary steps in this direction, with efforts under way in Tanga, Zanzibar, and other regions to involve police in community meetings and sporting events and to increase the police presence in local communities.

To strengthen the community-police relationship, the TPF will not only have to expand its community policing approach but also address broader complaints of police corruption, abuse of power, lack of professionalism, and poor service delivery. To mitigate some of the risks of an

informant-based system, cooperation between the police and local communities should be as transparent as possible while also protecting the confidentiality of informants. By making information on violent extremism more transparent and collectively owned (for example, through the prosecution of suspects in court), communities can reduce the risk to individuals and bolster the reliability of the data collected.

Public confidence and trust in the police is also overwhelmingly dependent on regional police leadership responding seriously to community reports of police abuse, excessive use of force, and involvement in corruption. As long as police misconduct persists, any gains from community and police trust-building efforts are in danger of being reversed. In addition, the national government needs to address allegations of police involvement in extrajudicial killings and to punish and discipline police officers found responsible. The extrajudicial killing and disappearances of violent extremism suspects risk aggravating the violent extremism problem by creating further grievances, which could result in retaliatory attacks against police and government representatives and increase support for violent extremism.

The securitized approach to violent extremism needs to be moderated by expanding a development approach centered on communities and police working together through confidence-building measures, dialogue, and joint problem-solving initiatives. Without greater community trust in local police, strategies that include a law enforcement component to prevent or counter violent extremism may aggravate rather than mitigate violent extremism risks.

Notes

1. International Crisis Group, “Al-Shabaab Five Years After Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa,” Africa Report no. 265, September 21, 2018, 18, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/265-al-shabaab-five-years-after-westgate-still-menace-east-africa.
2. BBC News, “Kenya Attack: 147 Dead in Garissa University Assault,” April 3, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080.
3. US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016*, July 2017, 59–60, www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf.
4. US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017*, September 2018, 43–44, www.state.gov/documents/organization/283100.pdf.
5. For example, see Saumu Mwalimu, “Tough Queries as Police Mount Search for Killers,” *The Citizen*, April 15, 2017, www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Tough-queries-as-police-mount-search-for-killers/1840340-3890630-u2fbfez/index.html.
6. US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017*, 44.
7. For background on these attacks, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, July 2004, 68–69, www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
8. Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, *Laws of Tanzania 2002*, www.lrct.go.tz/laws-of-tanzania-2002.
9. US Department of State, “Country Reports: Africa Overview,” in *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*, April 2006, www.state.gov/jct/rls/crt/2005/64335.htm; US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016*, 60.
10. US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016*, 60.
11. Citizen security is an approach situated within the human development framework that has been advanced, largely through development assistance programs, to address endemic criminal violence in areas such as the Caribbean, El Salvador, and Honduras. For example, see UN Development Program, “Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America,” November 2013, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/citizen-security-human-face>.
12. Of the community representatives, twenty-seven were male and twenty-three were female. Of the youth, thirty-six were male and twenty-two were female.
13. Of the police representatives, six were male and five were female. Because of concerns expressed by the US embassy regarding the participation of a particular security group in Zanzibar, the assessment team opted for an individual interview method to consult with police actors there. If the assessment team had invited police and excluded the security group from attending the workshop, it might have undermined USIP’s reputation for neutrality and inclusivity and damaged its ability to convene future meetings.
14. Interviewees who did not attend the workshops were identified using a purposive and snowballing sampling method. The author asked local partners and workshop participants to refer individuals for interviews who had knowledge of particular aspects of the local security dynamics (such as violent extremism-related incidents) that USIP wanted to examine further.
15. In 2016, the US Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor cited media reports of ten cases of extrajudicial killings in Tanzania, nine of which involved police and individuals suspected of violent extremism. See US Department of State, “Tanzania 2016 Human Rights Report,” in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016*, 2, www.state.gov/documents/organization/265522.pdf.
16. In 2012, Tanzania embarked on a new round of constitutional review led by a thirty-member Constitutional Review Commission (CRC). The CRC held 1,773 meetings and consulted with over 1.4 million citizens and released its final report in December 2013 for consideration by a constituent assembly. In April 2015, the government scheduled a referendum on adopting the new constitutional draft. (See Nick Branson, “Party Rules: Consolidating Power through Constitutional Reform in Tanzania,” Briefing Note 1501, Africa Research Institute, March 2015, 3, www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ARI_Tanzania_Briefing_Notes_download.pdf.) However, the referendum was delayed due to difficulties in registering voters. (See “Tanzania Delays Referendum on Constitution,” *Voice of America*, April 2, 2015, www.voanews.com/a/tanzania-delays-constitution-referendum/2705034.html.)
17. Danja Bergmann, “Threatened Paradise: Growing Religious and Political Violence on Zanzibar,” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, October 25, 2013, www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_35865-1522-2-30.pdf.
18. David W. Throup, “The Political Crisis in Zanzibar,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 18, 2016, www.csis.org/analysis/political-crisis-zanzibar.
19. Based on examples given by participants during workshops and individual interviews.

20. According to the World Bank, in 2016 the “youth unemployment rate (15–35 years old) in Zanzibar was 31.3 percent and young people constitute the majority share of the underemployed and economically inactive.” See World Bank, “Project Information Document for the TZ-Zanzibar Improving Students Prospects Project,” April 27, 2016, 1, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/614411468336088639/pdf/PID-Appraisal-Print-P153277-04-27-2016-1461772071811.pdf>.
21. US Department of State, “Tanzania 2016 International Religious Freedom Report,” 2, www.state.gov/documents/organization/268948.pdf. There are no official national statistics because the Tanzanian census does not capture information about citizens’ religion.
22. Andre Le Sage, “The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, September 2014, 6, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-288.pdf>.
23. Community Security Workshop, July 4–5, 2017, Zanzibar.
24. Interview with the secretary of the Office of the Mufti, July 6, 2017, Zanzibar.
25. Interview with Tanga Regional Police commander, July 2017, Tanga.
26. *The Citizen*, “Questions Linger as Tanga Caves Cleared,” February 17, 2015, www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/Questions-linger-as-Tanga-caves-cleared/1840392-2626030-118gf7vz/index.html.
27. Police representatives stated that they were pursuing a criminal group following a series of armed robberies at supermarkets, fuel stations, and money exchanges in nearby villages. A community representative stated that police were pursuing an individual from a violent extremist organization who was recruiting children and young people into martial arts training. The media reported that police were pursuing suspects who had raided police stations for guns and ammunition. See Erick Kabendera, “Tanzania on Security Alert after Police Attacked,” *The East African*, February 21, 2015, www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Tanzania-on-security-alert-after-police-attacked/2558-2630984-93w78ez/index.html.
28. *The Citizen*, “Questions Linger.”
29. George Sembony and Paskal Mbunga, “Assailants Hacked Eight Tanga Residents to Death,” *The Citizen*, May 31, 2016, www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/1840340-3226612-kqpy4wz/index.html.
30. Søren Gilsaa, “Salafism(s) in Tanzania: Theological Roots and Political Subtext of the Ansār Sunna,” *Islamic Africa* 6, no. 1–2 (2015): 30–59. Every major city in Tanzania hosts organizations dedicated to propagating basic Salafist thought and purifying “local Islamic practices from ‘un-Islamic’ innovations.” All such organizations tend to be referred to locally as Ansār Sunna, despite sometimes having different individual names.
31. Pew Research Center, “Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project,” www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/tanzania.
32. Interviews with Muslim and Christian leaders, Tanga, July 17, 2017.
33. Interview with a community leader from Chamwino Ward and a community leader from Mazimbu Ward, Morogoro, July 22, 2017.
34. The report also identifies Kigoma, Kondo, and Tanga as regions where militants have reportedly planted sleeper cells. International Crisis Group, “Al-Shabaab Five Years After Westgate,” 19.
35. Joseph N. Musuguri, “Improving Police Professionalism Through Community Police Training in Tanzania,” Tanzania Police Force, Ministry of Home Affairs, December 2014, 8.
36. Daniel Scher, “Restoring Police Service with a Community Police Vision: Tanzania 2006–2009,” Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University, 2010, https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/Policy_Note_ID123.pdf.
37. Interview with an intelligence officer, Tanga, July 2017.
38. Georgia Holmer with Fulco van Deventer, “Inclusive Approaches to Community Policing and CVE,” Special Report no. 352 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, September 2014), www.usip.org/publications/2014/09/inclusive-approaches-community-policing-and-cve.

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