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Is Netanyahu Facing an Israeli Spring Moment?

Mitchell Belfer

With Middle East politics again ablaze, it is easy for pundits to miss the huge controversy brewing around Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he struggles to keep his composure under the weight of unfriendly allegations.

It is easy; but it is wrong. With Israel's Channel 2 reporting, back in early September, of an inquiry into claims that Netanyahu had solicited a bribe, something which he vehemently denies, this may be the trigger Israel needs to galvanize people against political mismanagement at the highest levels.

A recent piece by Ben Caspit, respected columnist for Al-Monitor's Israel Pulse, was headlined: "Will Bibi's love of luxury be his downfall?"

Add to this the likelihood that Hilary Clinton will win the US presidential election – as opposed to the Donald Trump that Netanyahu has posed with – all does not bode well for the Israeli PM's "Iron Dome" of political protection from Republicans he has enjoyed in the past.

According to Haaretz, Israel's oldest newspaper, the country's High Court has instructed the Attorney General, the heads of the State Prosecution and Israel Police to explain within 30 days why they have not opened an investigation into the suspicions against the PM. There have also been other claims that one of Netanyahu's advisers was funded by a US non-profit organisation.

According to Israeli media, the Attorney General Avichai Mendelblit blocked the investigation, despite senior police officers believing that fraud was involved. Reports claim that 20 witnesses have already testified in preliminary inquiries over corruption and fraud, although

unless solid evidence is produced, there will be no official police investigation and the inquiry will be stopped.

Allies of Netanyahu are being questioned.

*Editor's
Analysis*

Last week, French news agency AFP reported that Israeli police plan to question US billionaire and World Jewish Congress president Ronald Lauder as part of an inquiry into gifts for Netanyahu.

According to the French news agency, Lauder “refused to be questioned after arriving in the country for the funeral of ex-president and Nobel Peace Prize winner Shimon Peres, Channel 2 television reported.” The report stated that an agreement had been reached so that investigators will either travel to New York in the next few weeks or Lauder would return to Israel.

“I am coming from a commemoration for the Babi Yar massacre (the execution of more than 34,000 Jews by the Nazis in Ukraine), and I arrive for the funeral of a good friend ... and you arrest me?” he said, according to Channel 2.

AFP said that an Israeli police spokeswoman declined to comment on the reports.

The agency said that authorities “have been investigating spending and gifts related to Netanyahu, though Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit has stressed that a formal investigation has not been opened.

At the same time, “Israeli newspaper Haaretz claimed that police want to question Lauder over gifts he allegedly gave Netanyahu and alleged spending on trips for him. Lauder, whose family founded the Estee Lauder cosmetics firm, is known to be an avid supporter of Netanyahu though their relationship has cooled as more and more information surfaces in relation to allegations that Lauder financed Netanyahu’s travels in 2011, according to reports.

“Netanyahu and his aides have repeatedly denied any wrongdoing,” and certainly that is the narrative they will follow. But this story - while continuing to unfold - is more than just another case of political intrigue in one of the Middle East’s few examples of dynamic political life.

If the allegations prove to be accurate, then the case punches holes into the trust-based society that Israel was founded on. People are already at their wits end with what they see as systemic failures of gov-

ernance under Netanyahu's watch. That the story potentially includes Ronald Lauder, the President of the World Jewish Congress, is doubly problematic since it threatens to drag American and European Jewry into Israeli judicial and political life.

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A case of this magnitude may be exactly what is needed to deal out the old guard in Israel and among International Jewry; and deal in a more inclusive set of decision makers that have national interests in mind more than personal gain.

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Regime Theory as IR Theory

Reflection on Three Waves of 'Isms'

Nik Hynek

This article analyzes the significance of regime theory, or regimes theorization, for the field of International Relations. It tries to reflect on theoretical affinities between the two, with an intention to recast regime theory as IR theory. While this may not be surprising given that regime theory has been a standard occupier of IR theoretical space, not much has been systematically written on both evolutionary qualities of regime theory as such, and its changing yet strong pegging to IR theories and approaches. This is where the main contribution of this theoretically oriented article lies. The article proceeds as follows. First, it discusses existing IR theorization of regimes which has coalesced around three specific 'waves' of regimes theorization: the neo-neo-convergence regime theory; cognitivism; and radical constructivism/post-structuralism. Second, it assesses heuristic utility of the three waves of regime theorization in relation to possible domains of empirical application. Finally, more general trends in relation to heuristics are discerned and flagged in the conclusion.

Keywords: regime theory; regimes, theorization, neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, cognitivism, constructivism, post-structuralism, heuristics

Introduction

This article analyzes the significance of regime theory, or theory of regimes, for the field of International Relations. Specifically, it tries to reflect on theoretical affinities between the two, namely to recast re-

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gime theory as IR theory. While this may not be surprising given that regime theory has been a standard occupier of IR theoretical space, not much has been systematically written on both evolutionary qualities of regime theory as such, and its changing yet strong pegging to IR theories and approaches. This is where the main contribution of this theoretically oriented article lies. The article proceeds as follows. First, it discusses existing IR theorization of regimes which has coalesced around three specific ‘waves’ of regimes theorization: the neo-neo-convergence regime theory; cognitivism; and radical constructivism/post-structuralism. Second, it assesses heuristic utility of the three waves of regime theorization in relation to possible domains of empirical application. Finally, more general trends in relation to heuristics are discerned and flagged in the conclusion.

Theorization of Regimes in IR: Three ‘Waves’ of Scholarship

This part begins with a theoretically oriented discussion of regime analysis which can be identified within the discipline of IR. Indeed, such discussion needs to factor in the empirical domain in question, the scope, complexity and theme of regulation (Keohane and Victor 2010; Alter and Meunier 2009; Drezner 2009), as well as political dynamics and leadership related to their formation and effectiveness (Levy, Young and *Zürrn* 1995; Young 1991). This takes on importance when considering that majority of the existing scholarship on theories of regimes came to be articulated from within International Political Economy and Earth Science, rather than Security Studies (for notable exceptions, cf. Müller 1995; 1993; Krause 1990; Nye 1987; Jervis 1982). Geographically, complex interplay between regional and global attempts to regulate specific issue areas (Adler and Greve 2009; Bourne 2007; Duffield 1994). Legally, the range of regulative difficulties were discussed in existing studies (also, cf. Efrat 2010; Miron 2001; Krause and Latham 1998; Aceves 1997).

The discussion of the three “waves” of theorization of regimes is utilized towards an extraction of some of the criteria suitable for its application to cross-empirical domains. The specific attention is being paid to the category of security regimes (cf. Jervis 1982). To structure them further, thematics of those security regimes plays the key role (cf. Kratochwil 1993). Indeed, not all security issues experience that same

degree of regulation. For instance, Ethan Nadelmann (1990; for effectiveness, cf. Getz 2006) delimited global prohibition regimes as institutionalizations of explicit and implicit norms prohibiting certain activities of both state and non-state actors (through systemic diffusion in the international space, in international public law as well as domestic criminal law), and processes by which these norms are enforced. Thus, prohibition and regulatory regimes thus conceived are *substantive* (rather than merely procedural), and *global* in scale – or at least they contain a globalizing (or totalizing) ambition in order to eliminate possible ‘regime leakages’ and exploitation of loopholes (Müller and Wunderlich 2013; Garcia 2011: 40-41, 69; Alker and Greenberg 1977). On the other side of the regulatory spectrum, there are international non-regimes, i.e. functional and thematic instances of empirical absence concerning the formation of regulating rules and institutions, and of “transnational policy arenas characterized by the absence of multilateral agreements for policy coordination among states” (Dimitrov, Sprinz, DiGiusto, and Kelle 2007: 231).

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Consequentialist Regime Theories

The first generation of regime analysis can be linked to what has been known as the theoretical convergence between neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism (Andreatta and Koenig-Archibugi 2010; Baldwin 1993; Nye 1988; Keohane 1986; Ruggie 1983). It newly emerged as a research venue linked to the complex interdependency theory (Ruggie 1983, 1975; Keohane and Nye 1977; Young 1982), which attempted to balance the focus on state-centric framework and relative capabilities with importance of international institutions and absolute gains. While not entirely neo-neo synthesis (Waever 1996) as differences on the degree of possible cooperation, role of hegemony, and centrality of international institutions remained (Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn 2006; Keohane and Martin 1995; Grieco 1988), the convergence could be seen in the consequentialist reasoning, reduction of uncertainties, fears and transaction costs, as well as in the existence of future expectations driven by the conviction that cooperation among states is possible despite the structural logic of anarchy (Oye 1986; Rosenau 1986).

Existing definitions of regimes clearly demonstrate the theoretical link. Stephen Krasner (1982: 186) who depicted regimes as “sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making pro-

cedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Further down the denotative line, Haas (1983) argued that 'principles' featured beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude; 'norms' could be comprehended as standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations; 'rules' then being specific prescriptions and prohibitions concerning actors' behavior; and procedures encompassing dominant practices for making and implementation of collective choices. Another influential rationalist scholar, Robert Keohane (1989:4), specified regimes as "institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations", where institutions were understood as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations" (Ibid: 3). Moreover, Keohane also pointed to the importance of enforcement mechanisms by way of "injunctions" (Keohane 1984: 57). On the other hand, while sharing the rationalist convictions, Oran Young (1980: 331-332) attempted to go for a broader depiction of regimes that would circumscribe the problematic part concerning rules, norms, and principles: "regimes are social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities. As such, they are recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge."

General theoretical contours and two influential specimen in the form of Krasner and Keohane's definitions of regimes referred to above testify to the multiple limitations of this generation of scholarship. Theoretically, critics pointed out the paucity of linkages between "informal ordering devices of international regimes with the formal institutional mechanisms of international organization" (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 754). These authors also questioned the degree of conceptual precision (hierarchy and relations among components), instrumentalism, and predominantly positivist epistemological and methodological leanings. The consequences were said to be the lack of attention to actors' interpretations, meaning attachment and intersubjective understanding (Ibid: 763-770). Moreover, another identified shortcoming of the early generation of regime theorization was said to be its lack of focus on domestic politics (Haggard and Simmons 1987; for exceptions, cf. Ruggie 1982; Young 1980). Theoretical underdevelopment of affinities between domestic politics and its international corollaries has also been connected to reductionism in understanding various facets of sovereignty. While state-centrism has indeed been one of the edifices in analyzing regimes, state sovereignty has usual-

ly been depicted in a narrow sense. Krasner's (1999) understanding of sovereignty has become the IR standard: he decouples sovereignty through the specification of its four types – international legal (diplomatic recognition, prerogatives, formal position), Westphalian (noninterference into domestic matters), domestic (national authority structures and their efficiency), and interdependence (“states are losing their ability to control movements across their own borders”, Krasner 2003). Ironically, the last two – domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty, with their focus on state control rather than state authority, have been largely absent from IR focus generally and theorization of regimes specifically (Goldsmith 2000: 962).

The most interesting criticism of the first wave of regime analysis was offered by Strange (1982) and Keeley (1990) who both focused on what could be termed as the politics of regime theory. In her iconoclastic, and one could argue time-proven, criticism and refusal of the denotative dynamics supposedly leading to greater robustness of the concept and theory, Susan Strange (1982: 480, 487-488) maintained that they were articulated in a way which “tends to exclude hidden agendas and to leave unheard and unheeded complaints, whether they come from the underprivileged, the disenfranchised or the unborn, about the way the system works ... government, rulership, and authority are the essence of the word ‘regime’, not consensus, nor justice, nor efficiency in administration.” All of this with heavy focus on U.S. concerns, issues, and preferences. In a similar vein, Keeley (1990: 83-84) argued that consequentialist regime theory is implicitly skewed towards liberal analysis and the sense of a community among international actors. In an original and witty way, he took Krasner's work and - in his own words - “abused” it to study non-liberal regimes through which historical empires (the Mongols and Athenians) spread and maintained influence, thus putting “more distance between a theory of regimes ... and prescriptive analyses of or claims made for particular regimes, as prescriptions make it a language of apology or justification, a form of special pleading by and for the powerful and satisfied” (Ibid: 84).

Cognitivism and Theories of Regimes

By the beginning of the 1990s, a new strand of regime theorization came to the disciplinary prominence. The ascent made by cognitivist, or knowledge-based, theories of regimes rendered the previous assumption of consequentialism and fixed, rationally determined state

preferences flawed, and out of touch with empirical domain (Smith 1987). Additionally, it cautiously shifted the debate of regimes from state-centrism to neo-functionally (Haas 1982) and neo-institutionally (March and Olsen 1998, Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 5-8) inspired research on international organization, their bureaucracies, and involvement of epistemic communities, i.e. transnational networks of scientists which stepped frequently into the decision-making process under conditions of political uncertainty and issue complexity, altering previous decisional paths and understanding of problems (Haas 1992). As Peter M. Haas (1989: 377) noted on theoretical cross-fertilization of the scholarly work on epistemic communities and theorization of regimes, “in addition to providing a form of order in an anarchic international political system, regimes may also contribute to governmental learning and influence patterns of behavior by empowering new groups who are able to direct their governments towards new ends.” Last but not least, the rise of cognitivist research program on regimes could be seen as a specific response to the previously articulated – and at least partially justified, fierce criticism of the state-centrism, faddishness, and epiphenomenalism of regime theorization.

The development outlined above ought to be understood as a part of a more general IR debate, known as the Third Great Debate between positivism and post-positivism (Lapid 1989), and the gradual rise of theoretical eclecticism in IR (Lake 2013), with an emphasis on mid-level theorization. One of the effect could also be observed at the level of the label itself: ‘regime theory’ was largely replaced by ‘theories of regimes’ for this wave of theorization (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997; Haggard and Simmons 1987). And just ‘theorization of regimes’ for the third wave of scholarship, as it has drawn on theoretical approaches, many of the originating from the outside of IR, rather than substantive IR theories. It is here where the distinction between regime-theoretical ‘thinliners’ and ‘thickliners’ can be invoked (Stokke 2012: 5), with the moderation of his overly optimistic view of a “heathy conceptual and methodological debate” supposedly taking place between the two positions (Ibid: 5; cf. Hynek and Teti 2010). The ontological and epistemological opening for the second ‘wave’ of regime theorization was already made by Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: 774) who sparked off the discussion on a dialogical character of such analysis: “we proposed a more interpretive approach that would open up regime analysis to the communicative rather than merely the referential functions of norms

in social interactions ... The ontology of regimes consists of an inter-subjective basis.” Too, they highlighted the importance of epistemic politics (Ibid: 775). Methodologically, Puchala and Hopkins’ (1982) work on inductive analysis and qualitative research investigating participants’ perceptions, understanding and convictions paved the way for the cognitivist – and comparativist shift (Ruble 2009).

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The most systematically developed research program within this wave of scholarship has been represented by a European take on theories of regimes: the *Tübingen School* under the intellectual leadership of Volker Rittberger (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997). Not only did the authors provide IR field with rich understanding of cognitivism and its versions, but they, too, attempted to link it to the previous wave, and, at the same time, built up a path for the third wave of regime theorization. Specifically, the authors divided theories of regimes into three strands (power-, interest-, and knowledge-based). Power-based theories of regimes were said to be linked to security concerns driven by international anarchy and uneven power distribution, flagging the importance of relative gains (Ibid: 116-125). Theoretical inspiration was taken from hegemonic stability theory, realist theory of cooperation (defensive positionalism), and power-based research program based on non-Prisoner’s Dilemma game theory (Ibid: 86-135) Central variable was said to be power, with rationalist orientation and weak understanding of institutionalism (Ibid: 6). Interest-based theories of regimes were depicted as dealing with issues of overcoming collective action dilemmas (Ibid: 33-44), featured an analysis of institutional bargaining (Ibid: 68-82), and studied spillovers and their conditional circumstances (e.g. intra-institutional reuse of solutions due to cost efficiency, Ibid: 74-76; cf. Johnson and Urpelainen 2012). Cooperation was said to be the outcome of institutional bargaining and led to agreements and commitments (Ibid: 20, 33-70-72). Two specific approaches to cooperation were a broadened contractualism based on game theory (“situation-structuralism”, Ibid: 44-59) and “problem-structuralism” oriented on issue areas/themes (Ibid: 59-68). Interests served as the central variable, sense of institutionalism was stronger than with power-based theories but weaker compared to cognitivism, and absolute gains dominated a behavioral component (Ibid: 6).

The main contribution of the *Tübingen School* lies in its systematic incorporation of the cognitivist approach to regime analysis, linking it to broader theorization of IR. As has already been made clear, distinct

feature of the second wave of regime-theoretical scholarship is *cognitivism*. Unlike the other two types of theories, cognitivist theories of regimes have sociologically-derived meta-theoretical orientation (albeit of different degrees), with knowledge being the central variable. They display strong sense of institutionalism and their behavioral model is oriented at roles dynamics (Ibid: 6). Taking clues from the Constructivist Turn in IR, itself an effect of the Third Great Debate, cognitivists study ways and mechanisms through which knowledge, that is chiefly intersubjectively held ideas and beliefs, relates to actors' identities and actions. Codified and formalized sets of ideas, that is norms, are at the forefront of research. The authors distinguish between two types of cognitivism: "weak" and "strong" (Ibid: 136-139). While the former attempts to make sense of the actual behavior of an actor, the latter interrogates intersubjective structures, namely the relationship between the Self and Other (Ibid: 138). The weak cognitivism mirrors a more general strategy of the 'thin, complementizing' Constructivism in IR, which attempts to make rationalist accounts more robust by theorization of preference formation, i.e. what rationalists take axiomatically for granted (Ibid: 154-155; cf. Klotz 1995. It is here where the link to literature on epistemic communities and role of science in theorization of regimes exists (cf. Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002). Scientists are portrayed as powerful interlocutors and knowledge shapers (Ibid: 149-152). As for the strong cognitivism, itself based on the 'thick Constructivism' (Ibid: 156), Giddens' (1984, cf. Wendt 1987) structurationist approach to agency-structure debate is taken seriously, and four specific cooperation areas are highlighted. The power of legitimacy studying social fabrics of international political life and its norms and rules (Ibid: 169-176); the power of arguments inspired by Habermas' communicative rationality and ethics (Ibid: 176-185); the power of identity where Self/Other binary gets at the forefront (186-192); and the power of history, i.e. dialectical perspectives on historical creations of world orders and their structural features and maintenance mechanisms (Ibid: 192-208).

Radical Constructivist/Post-Structuralist Theorization of Regimes

This section tackles what can be termed the third wave of theorization of regimes, namely the incorporation of radical critical social and political theory to regime analysis. While the Tübingen School contained

discussion of strong cognitivism, and their outlined cooperation areas promised to open up new venues of research, it has stayed at the declaratory level and never produced specimens of such theorization. Ontologically and epistemologically, this wave goes *beyond* “strong cognitivism”. Rather than being linked to Wendt’s substantive-theoretical version of Constructivism inspired by mind-independent, scientific realist ontology, or it espouses a more radical, mind-dependent (i.e. anti-foundationalist) ontology and anti-essentialist epistemology (Hynek and Teti 2010: 174; cf. Sismondo 1996: 6-7, 79). As a consequence, correspondence theory of truth, and the possibility of ‘truth discovery’ as such, need to be flatly rejected (Sayyid and Zac 1998: 250-251). The previous wave managed to exclude radical constructivist and post-structural scholarship from considerations: ‘critical’ Constructivist research on regimes became limited to Kratochwil, Ruggie, Haas and their followers. With theorization of regimes and also more generally, this strategy produced a disciplinary effect in the form of delegitimization of ‘post-structural’ critiques as unscientific, and unfit for regime analysis. It presented the ‘loyal opposition’ of Kratochwil and others as the (only) critical alternative, providing at best a ‘thick’ description of norms inside regimes and their complexes, thus backing up (and cyclically re-legitimizing) ‘thinner’ versions. Rooted in the elision of ontological differences between Constructivism and Neo-utilitarianism, the demarcation between “thin cognitivism” and “thick cognitivism” policed the boundary of acceptable research on regime theorisation, contributing to the more general ‘immunization’ of the mainstream IR against radical-constructivist/post-structural critiques (Hynek and Teti 2010: 180-181; Keeley 1990: 83-85).

Not only have been radical approaches to regime analysis underpinned by strikingly different ontology, epistemology, and methods, by they, too, have drawn on markedly different intellectual inspirations. By taking clues from outside of the discipline, continental philosophy and linguistics has played an especially important role. The third wave does not begin with denotative exercises of the previous two waves: it flees them. Endless wrangles over what is the difference between rules and norms, and their subtypes, as far as degree of specificity, deontology, links to interests and alike, are being replaced by the arrival of connotation. Neither interested in (re)articulation of regime theory nor contribution to theories of regimes, this wave embraces the process of theorization as an end-goal. As Foucault maintains, process of the-

orization “is always local and related to a limited field *Theory* does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is *practice*” (Deleuze and Foucault 1977: 205). In the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze, theory gets a whole new meaning: rather than synbooking or totalizing phenomena, it is seen as a “box of tools” used in order to expose power where it is most unexpected. To understand theory as practice, one needs to ask: what kind of practice? As Deleuze (1987: 19) suggests, it lies “in developing a compass” and can be comprehended as “the art of conceptual and perceptual coloring” (Lorraine 2005: 207). As a result, theorization becomes conceptual practice, and is linked to a mode of experimentation. Experimentation is simultaneously theoretical and practical: it takes seriously interconnection between orders of assembled conditions and the resulting tendencies, thus investigating “what it does and what is done with it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 180). Experimentation is thinking anew, tackling “the new, remarkable, and interesting that replace the appearance of truth and are more demanding than it is” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). Similarly to Foucault’s (1977) genealogy based on further epistemological cultivation of Nietzsche, Deleuze also pits experimentation against history. While distancing it from historiography, experimentation requires history as it represents “the set of almost negative conditions that make possible the experimentation of something that escapes history” (Ibid: 111).

It is only within this wave where the four “cooperation areas” flagged by the Tübingen School (i.e. power of legitimacy, narrative structures, identity-related binary separations, and conditions of possibility for emergence and transformations of historical orders) are taken seriously, and theorized through the means of experimentation and conceptual practice. The best examples of regime analysis where these four areas can be found properly examined is the scholarship of Richard Price (1995, 1997) on the chemical weapons regime and Nina Tannenwald on the nuclear weapons regime (1999, 2007). Their scholarship can be understood as radical constructivist rather than post-structuralist, in spite of their meta-theoretical orientation and intellectual sources being identical (Price’s genealogy) or similar (Tannenwald’s social construction). As Price (1995: 88) put it, “genealogy injects a different dimension of power into the study of norms, an element that often seems neglected in the attempt to distance the role of norms and ideas from realism’s focus on material power.” Unlike post-structuralists, they both still subjected themselves to testing the null hypothesis (H_0),

articulating their theoretical and interpretive position vis-à-vis the mainstream IR and rejecting the “residual variance” of their accounts. This is despite the fact that their accounts still reflected notable differences between the two regimes, such as loci of their origins, presence/absence of hegemony during their formation, means of their spreading, robustness, and types of stigma, to mention but a few.

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Specifically, they showed how liberal and realist – but by extension also cognitivist – approaches are indeterminate, or outright mistaken, in their inability to explain the *de iure* existing non-use prohibition regime related to chemical weapons, and the *de facto* present non-use prohibition regime related to nuclear weapons. As the authors maintained, “with its ahistorical approach, rationalist regime theory has little to say about the origins and evolution of norms and practices that cannot be conceived as simply the rational calculation of the national interest. It is precisely because the taboos embody an ‘irrational’ attitude towards technology” (Price and Tannenwald 1996: 124). By the virtue of being interested in wider normative contexts, Price and Tannenwald successfully attempted to problematize rationalist explanation of the existence of those regimes, as well as the motivation of states for cooperative action and general observation of related norms. Their question is therefore “how certain weapons have been defined as deterrent weapons whereas other weapons have not?” (Price and Tannenwald 1996: 115). Simultaneously, even the “thick cognitivism” as outlined by the Tübingen School (cf. “*The critics of the critics*” in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997: 208-210) seem to avoid at best this type of analysis which relies on an investigation of historical contingencies probed through the means of Foucaultian genealogy. It marginalizes an analysis of moral discourses through which power hierarchies and political separations have been achieved and upheld; ideas, knowledge, and collective identities are being rejected to be more than variables.

Heuristic Utility of the Three Waves

The utility of the consequentialist regime theory mainly lies in highlighting structural (material) conditions and incentives for regime formation; regime evolution and maintenance; and regime compliance. With regard to regime formation, the following questions can be posed: Did the regime result from particular interests of hegemonic

powers, from a different “tier” of states, or another type of actors?; how precisely was the issue area specified and subsequently institutionalized?; what role did “norm entrepreneurship” play in a given regime formation?; was it pursued through coercive diplomacy; what kind of reasoning drove the other states when joining the regime (following rational interest, specification of cost/benefit, coercion, bandwagoning etc.)?. As for regime evolution, one’s attention is steered, *inter alia*, at these questions: did the regime evolve along the lines of great power interests, and if not, why?; how has the evolutionary dynamic changed after the initial stage of formation (from power/interest driven to path-dependency or even normative persistence; did the regime become more coherent due to the substantial economy of transaction costs/information sharing procedures? Last but not least, questions related to compliance relate to reasons why states complied with the regime – bargaining for profit, procedural calculations, rewards, coercion, compellence, and/or normative compliance?; were effective verification mechanisms formed within the regime, and why?; what were outcomes of non-compliant behavior, and impact on robustness of a regime?; did the motivations among the members to comply with a given regime change over time? More recent studies drawing on this type of scholarship have further contributed by examination of interplays of international regimes (Muzaka 2011; Stokke 2003), cross-scale interactions (Young 2000), regime complexity (Gómez-Mera 2015), and ontological pluralization, especially incorporation of other types of actors (Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Arts 2000).

To make a few remarks on the utility of the cognitivist wave of regime analysis, it can be divided into three areas: actors and identities involved in regimes; regime-related processes and outcomes; and ideas through which knowledge is produced and politically used. In regard of actors and their identities, it is to study primary and secondary agents and their identities, push-pull dynamics *vis-à-vis* IOs and their politico-scientific justification, transnational dynamics, as well as links between ideas and national interests. Too, role conceptions/playing are important objects of examination for regime analysis, not the least because they render foreign policy analysis relevant by virtue of bridging domestic and international environments. With respect to processes and outcomes, focus ought to be steered on cognitive and communicative mechanisms such as persuasion, coercion, forms of legitimation; network analysis related to workings of epistemic com-

munities (and other types of actors), and thematic analysis as well as research on formation and use of narrative structures more generally. Finally, relationships between ideas and norms needs to be scrutinized, their specific types (principled, causal, etc.) and codification (i.e. treaty regimes, cf. Sitaraman 2009), as well as an interplay between cognitive, regulatory, and behavioral components and how those contribute to identity formation and reproduction. How do actors' identities affect their stance on norm determinacy in formation and recreation of regimes? What is the role ideas play in the best possible achievement of a desired social and political purpose as far as regimes are concerned? How is cognitional (and political) success influenced by a degree of intersubjectively shared knowledge?

As for the third "wave", i.e. radical constructivist/post-structuralist theorization of regimes – the utility is manifold. Ontologically, it goes beyond the dichotomy, or juxtaposition, of state-centered and transnational analytical frameworks (for these, cf. Lipson 2005/6). It is capable of examining regime complexes, understood as a plural mix comprising actors, networks and artefacts: both material and ideational, and their coproductions and hybrids. Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987) and Foucault's (1991) analyses are vital for studying assemblages and ways in which they have been linked to state apparatuses and their rationalities, thereby creating governmentalized assemblages (Hynek 2012: 31-34; Joseph 2012; Krause 2011). This wave takes seriously ethics and culture, and examines them as socially-constructed, if contingent categories (Tannenwald 2013). Relevant scholarship recognizes the necessity of flexible analytical toolboxes comprehending structures as contingent, open, where seeds of resistance come from within: "Increasing interdependence among issues and issues-areas may thus produce increasing strains on regimes. In such circumstances, arguments that specific regimes order the entire system become problematic even if some issue-areas, regimes, or instruments are more significant than others. Theoretical approaches that rely on a grand unifying order become particularly suspect. 'The system' may be a fragmented, ill-coordinated thing; it may be broken-legged and limp along accordingly" (Keeley 1990: 95-96). Importantly, such an analysis also avoids siren songs of prescription and normativity, be it explicit or implicit kind (cf. Taylor 1985). Finally, collective identities are taken seriously and get scrutiny: on one hand, their conditions of emergence, on the other, their structural and productive effects (see the next session). Last but

not least, this wave attempts to expose forms (e.g. informal empires) and sources (e.g. use of knowledge) of international anarchy, hierarchy, and heterarchy (Wendt and Friedheim 1995; Crumley 1995).

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Conclusion

Theorization of regimes – and that includes international security regimes – is not dead, albeit Strange’s (1982) five criticisms, or “dragons”, have been swirling around theoretical grounds ever since she used them to critique what she believed were major deficiencies of the theory. Judged by the number of regime-analysis publications in academic journals and books, theorization of regimes has seen its peak, with more recent contributions having focused on refinements and new venues of limited ambition, such as regimes interplay, complexity, etc. Therefore, theorization of regimes has had many features of an explicit, progressive scientific research program – to invoke Lakatos’ (1970) understanding of scientific work – for much of its life. The move from neorealism and hegemonic stability theory to neoliberal institutionalist regime theory, and from there to theorization of cognitivism and stronger incorporation of the role of ideas and norms, can be understood as “progressive problem shifts”, both theoretically and empirically. That is, however, within an image of the IR field remaining intact when it comes to the nature of its general paradigm (Kuhn’s ‘normal science’) and ‘disciplinary’ standards. As was shown, the development in and around the field of IR experienced two trends which coincided with the existence and refinement of normal-scientific regimes theorization.

The trends – i.e. the opening the disciplinary boundaries (since the Third Great Debate) and the rise of theoretical and analytical eclecticism, which are still visible and even stronger today, have synergistically – and irreversibly – worked to change the IR landscape. For some, this has been to better, for others, the perception has not been so positive, as the special issue of *EJIR* on the end of IR theory showed (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013; Reus-Smit 2013; Lake 2013). Be as it may, it could be argued that the development of regime-theoretical research program has displayed signs of what Lakatos would have called “negative heuristics”, i.e. certain propositions of a research program that are non-revisable. Here, it was regime theorization based on “ism” of one sort or another, just with a more limited range, state-central-

ism, and marginalization of insights from radical constructivism and post-structuralism. For these reasons, this article sets the agenda for a theoretical preparation of an open-ended, eclectic position that puts into the center the discussion conceptualization of power, its exercises, multiplicities, as well as general outline of relevance for theorization of international security regimes. From Lakatosian “hard-core” research programmatic perspective, this looks as an example of epistemological pluralism, and theorization of regimes – and its multiple affinities with IR theory – would benefit from such a perspective immensely.

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Notes

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The Role of European Security Organisations in the Conflict in Ukraine

Zbyněk Dubský and Radka Havlová

The present conflict in Ukraine is considered one of the most significant crises in Europe since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Moreover, it is taking place in a very specific area with special interests of external actors. The conflict, which has escalated into a war, has been regulated and, in fact, frozen, due to the participation of international organisations. This study focuses on the role of three European security organisations—the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—in the de-escalation and resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. The qualitative case study examines the ability of the selected organisations to take a position and enter the conflict. The study proves that the ability of an organisation to enter the conflict is, to a certain extent, determined by its position towards the conflict (resulting particularly from its membership) and by the tools available to it.

Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, NATO, EU, OSCE, security organisations conflict

Introduction

Due to its location, Ukraine has historically been significantly influenced both by Russia and the West. In fact, the current conflict in the country was triggered by the decision of Ukraine's president, Viktor Yanukovich, not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in November 2013. Since this time, the conflict has had a

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strong international dimension with the involvement of Russia, the EU and the United States. By refusing to sign the Association Agreement, which would symbolically place Ukraine in the West and closer to the EU, Yanukovich chose an association with Russia by agreeing to accept the Russian offer of immediate loan to Ukraine. This led to demonstrations on Kiev's Independence Square (Maidan) with protesters demanding that the Association Agreement, which was understood to be a confirmation of the Western and pro-European orientation of Ukrainian foreign policy, be signed. In February 2014, the demonstrations escalated as protesters began demanding the resignation of Yanukovich as a reaction to an unsuccessful effort aimed at limiting the presidential powers through a return to full validity of the Constitution from 2004. The regime used force in an attempt to terminate the protests, resulting in fatal shootings of tens of demonstrators. Subsequently, the ousting of Yanukovich and growing separatism in the East led to the outbreak of war in Ukraine. The regions in the eastern part of Ukraine that traditionally have a deeper relation to the Russian Federation than to the EU did not approve of this 'EuroMaidan Revolution.' The situation in Ukraine further escalated after the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation in February 2014.

The conflict in Ukraine has been thoroughly dissected in academic articles¹ and therefore we do not focus on a general analysis of it. The conflict and its impacts were clearly strongly internationalised and external actors, particularly security organisations, were clearly interested in its de-escalation. The article therefore focuses on analysis of the role of European security organisations—namely NATO, the EU² and OSCE—in the conflict, as these organisations played an important role in de-escalation and finding ways to resolution of the conflict. We set out with the conviction that all the monitored organisations were able to legitimately and legally enter the conflict due to their relation to Ukraine, as Ukraine is either a participating state of the organisation (OSCE) or has established quite strong ties to the organisation (NATO and the EU). From the methodological point of view, we are producing a qualitative case study which analyses the involvement of these three organisations in the conflict based primarily on the study of official documents of these organisations.

First, we analyse the ability of the selected security organisations to adopt a position towards the conflict, and should such a position be adopted, we analyse how the organisation was able to declare its

position in its documents. Activities which stimulate and assist the conflicting parties in de-escalation and resolution are naturally of a more significant character with respect to the organisations' direct involvement in the conflict. These activities can be divided into those connected with the use of coercive diplomacy (military, diplomatic and economic)³ and the use of conflict resolution tools, which include a wide range of long-term and short-term field activities and the ability to act as a mediator in the conflict. We do not discuss the theoretical aspects of conflict resolution due to the limited scope of the article.⁴ Instead we focus on the tools which are of an operational character and are a direct reaction to the conflict, such as various diplomatic and civilian tools; the use of military force (e.g. peacekeeping) has been excluded due to the character of the conflict (involvement of significant external actors). It would be hypothetically possible with a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate, though Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, would certainly veto any UN motion to intervene militarily. The article discusses the involvement of the selected European security organisations until August 2016.

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Ukraine and its relation to European Organisations

The gradual escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, turning violent in 2014, did not occur in a vacuum. After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine became an integral part of the European security system. Ukraine became a participating state of the CSCE/OSCE after the disintegration of the USSR and adopted the treaties which were a part of the OSCE system (such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Treaty on Open Skies). The CSCE/OSCE significantly participated in the stabilisation of Ukraine, as various forms of CSCE/OSCE field activities have taken place in Ukraine since the 1990s. Ukrainian problems related to questions of nationality (especially in Crimea) have been also solved with the assistance of the OSCE, thanks in particular to the activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the OSCE Mission to Ukraine from 1994 to 1999.⁵ Ukraine has also established close relations with NATO and the EU. The relationships with these organisations have become more significant not only at the formal level, but also in the form of practical cooperation that has impacted both Ukraine's internal transformation and external relations. Ukraine may have viewed its closer cooperation with

these organisations as a certain factor of stabilisation in the European area. This was possible as both organisations opened themselves up to cooperation with external actors as part of their transformation. Potential future Ukrainian membership in these Western organisations, particularly NATO, has not been fully ruled out due to the open door policy of these organisations. Ukraine participated in the Partnership for Peace in 1994, within which NATO provided assistance with modernisation of the participating countries' armies and assisted them in compilation of their military budgets by assisting them in their reform and increase of effectivity of these budgets. Ukraine also participated in joint exercises with NATO. Ukraine could thus intensify and transform its relations with NATO with the objective of reaching a certain compatibility in military, security and political fields. Ukraine also took part in international missions organized by NATO and supported their implementation, in particular the KFOR mission in Kosovo and the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Ukraine also sent an entire contingent of 1,600 soldiers to Iraq in 2003 and participated in NATO's navy anti-piracy mission.⁶

The question of Ukraine's possible membership in NATO has been repeatedly discussed within NATO's open door policy. The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership was signed between NATO and Ukraine in June 1997 during the Madrid Summit. The charter explicitly states the areas of cooperation and mutual consultations. A special committee on NATO-Ukraine relations was established for this purpose. Ukraine was becoming a privileged partner of NATO, having a relationship similar to the relationship between NATO and Russia.⁷ The cooperation further intensified after adoption of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in November 2002, as this cooperation was clearly aimed at supporting Ukrainian efforts within Euro-Atlantic integration.⁸ The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan focused on complex deepening and enlargement of the relations between NATO and Ukraine. Specific plans further dealt with political and economic topics, issues of broad security, information and legal problems and defence and military forces.⁹ NATO was willing to move Ukraine from the 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan to a Membership Action Plan (MAP) leading to future membership. However, due to the current conflict, this question remains open.¹⁰

Discussion surrounding Ukraine's membership in NATO intensified during the second half of the last decade. NATO membership required fulfilment of various political and military criteria, such as a stable po-

litical democratic system based on the shared values of NATO—free and just elections, rule of law, a free market economy, and civil management of the military and its democratic control. Other criteria included popular support of NATO membership and Ukrainian willingness to defend the shared values of the organisation. The state must also dispose of a military capacity to contribute to the collective defence, cooperate within the alliance structures, and achieve interoperability with other NATO members. The last criterion includes resolution of territorial disputes of a separatist character and disputes with neighbouring countries, as well as assurance of the position of minorities living in the state territory in accordance with OSCE principles.¹¹ The criterion of unanimous political agreement of NATO member states to invite a state to accede to the treaty (based on Article 10 of the Washington Treaty) is of fundamental importance for any potential NATO candidate state. The basic assumption for NATO enlargement is derived from the consensus that the main objective of NATO enlargement is to support stability in Europe. Ukraine's potential membership in NATO was understood to be a furthering of this aim.

Ukraine decided to accede to the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in March 2008. This was understood as its first step on the road to NATO. This programme was approved at the NATO Summit in Washington and its main objective was to provide assistance to the candidate countries in their preparation for NATO membership. NATO understood the MAP as a tool to ensure that the candidate countries would enhance the alliance and not 'merely reap the advantages of membership.'¹² Ukraine understood NATO membership to be of strategic importance for the country, as it provided firm guarantees for the maintenance of Ukrainian sovereignty, national identity and territorial integrity. It was thus understood to be a significant alternative to the somewhat neutral position of Ukraine as a country located between the West and Russia.

The question of Ukraine's fast entry into NATO was nevertheless problematic for many NATO member states (in particular France and Germany) and it was reflected in the refusal to put Ukraine on the MAP.¹³ Russia viewed Ukrainian efforts to join NATO as a threat and exercised massive diplomatic pressure against the adoption of the MAP. At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO refused the MAP for Ukraine. Negotiations about Ukraine's NATO membership significantly slowed after the ascension of Yanukovich to the presidential

office in 2010; MAP adoption was postponed. Russia still feared the potential location of NATO military bases close to its borders, including in Ukraine, despite the fact that the question of Ukrainian integration in NATO had not been discussed significantly since 2008.¹⁴ The Russian position did not change after 2010 when Ukraine officially rejected efforts to become a NATO member by adopting a new Foreign Policy Doctrine placing Ukraine in the so-called 'non-bloc status.'¹⁵ The possibility of future Ukrainian membership in NATO thus became one of the main sources of dispute between NATO and the Russian Federation.¹⁶

The main reason for tensions between Russia and NATO issues from the strategic location of Ukraine and the dispute over Russian military bases in Crimea,¹⁷ as Ukrainian membership in NATO would most likely influence further negotiations about the presence of a Russian military base on Ukrainian territory. The question is whether a NATO member could host military bases of non-NATO members.¹⁸ John Kriendler in the report 'Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs and Challenges' states that 'although it would be difficult to imagine any requirement for the stationing of substantial non-allied military forces in any allied country, other than temporarily and related to NATO or NATO-led operation, there is no NATO prohibition for such stationing if the allied host country were in agreement.'¹⁹

The relationship between the EU and Ukraine has developed without any official guarantee or acknowledgement that Ukraine may one day become a full member of the EU. The partnership was first initiated in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which came into effect in 1998. After 2003, the EU stressed the development of relations with Ukraine within the European neighbourhood policy and, since 2009, within the Eastern Partnership. Relations between the EU and Ukraine have been characterised by a more ambitious driving force since the second half of the last decade, reflected in particular in closer political and economic cooperation resulting from the signing of a new agreement. The Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004 is considered a significant turning point in relations between the EU and Ukraine, as the EU tried to intensify its cooperation with Ukraine.²⁰ The Council of the EU expressed its support for the newly elected Ukrainian president Victor Yushchenko and the proposed reforms of the new government at the end of January 2005. The EU-Ukraine Action Plan was created as a basic tool of mutual cooperation which was expected to initiate new dynamics in relations. This was most clearly reflected at the EU-

Ukraine Summit of September 2008, which stressed the shared values and common history of the EU and Ukraine and declared close cooperation also in foreign and security policy. Eastern partnership (EaP) after 2009 could be considered as ground-breaking by stressing the effort of the EU to play a stronger role in this part of Europe.²¹

The complicated negotiations regarding the association agreement became the decisive factor in relations between the EU and Ukraine.²² The signature of the association agreement was meant to be confirmation of the clear geopolitical orientation of Ukraine, and in fact disabled the membership of Ukraine in the proposed Eurasian Union.²³ The EU expressed interest in deepening relations with Ukraine, but nevertheless stressed the fact that these relations have to be based on shared democratic standards and values. The agreement has not been signed or ratified although the negotiations were finalized by 2011 and ended in 2013.²⁴ Should the association agreement be signed, Russia would be defeated—because it viewed the geopolitical situation in Ukraine as a zero-sum game²⁵—as the association agreement would reflect significant change in the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine. EU officials, on the other hand, continuously stressed that association would be a win-win-win for EU, Ukraine and Russia.²⁶ This demonstrated that the integration of Ukraine to Western structures was understood as a breach of the strategic balance in Europe.²⁷

More active participation of European organisations in the conflict in Ukraine—even though their participation seemed to be a logical step—was significantly complicated by their previous relations to the nation. Any discussions about the direct entry of NATO or EU into the conflict were crushed by the fact that the previous behaviour of these organisations (and the rather close relationship between Ukraine and these organisations) was an integral part of the development in Ukraine. Neither NATO nor the EU could have acted in an unbiased manner in the conflict because they openly and clearly supported the policy of the government which was established after the EuroMaidan. It therefore seemed natural to activate the OSCE as an important organisation of cooperative security and part of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The OSCE developed as a regional security organisation in a forum for political dialogue focused on questions of security and stability in Europe according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.²⁸ However, after the end of the Cold War OSCE-participating states primarily preferred other forms of conflict resolution and organisations other

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than the OSCE. The OSCE was frequently asked to perform actions for tactical reasons but did not play a significant role in security management.

Ukraine, like most of OSCE-participating states, considered Russia to be an aggressor and explicitly declared this. It was evident that the conflict could be solved only through cooperation at the European level and with the participation of Russia. On the other hand, relations towards Russia — with respect to its behaviour in Ukraine (in supporting the separatist states in Donbas) and in particular regarding the annexation of Crimea (breach of international law and security order in Europe) — could have been at the same time characterised by the imposition of sanctions and limited cooperation with the nation. In addition to assistance to Ukraine, NATO and the EU significantly limited political cooperation with Russia and the EU also introduced several restrictions towards Russia. The OSCE could thus serve as a useful tool and a significant actor of stabilisation and de-escalation of the conflict; its active involvement not only stabilised the situation in Ukraine but also influenced the further development of this conflict. The OSCE therefore became the natural platform for dialogue about the conflict and representation of the international community in Ukraine.

The position of the EU, NATO and the OSCE on the conflict in Ukraine

The crisis in Ukraine has had a direct impact on the security system in Europe. Therefore, it is not surprising that the conflict has become part of the discussions of the EU, NATO and the OSCE. The contrasting positions of the EU and NATO on one side, and the OSCE on the other, resulted from their respective relations with Ukraine and Russia. From the beginning, NATO and the EU viewed the Russian approach towards the crisis as aggressive and perceived the separation of Crimea and its subsequent annexation by Russia as a clear and gross violation of international law. The differences between the EU and NATO were of a more rhetorical character, relating chiefly to the extent of their rejection of Russia's actions. These differences could clearly be seen between the US and its European allies.

The EU strongly condemned and refused to recognise the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation in the European Council Conclusions of 20 to 21 March 2014. The EU stated

that it did not recognize the illegal referendum in Crimea, which was clearly at odds with the Ukrainian constitution. The EU also declared that Russia's actions clearly contradicted the Helsinki process, which contributed to overcoming factors dividing Europe and building a unified continent living in peace.²⁹ All EU and NATO member states supported the United Nations General Assembly Resolution presented by Germany, Latvia and Poland on 27 April 2014 under the title 'The territorial integrity of Ukraine.'³⁰ The resolution refers to Article 2 of the UN Charter, which rejects the threat of the use of force in relations among nations and which calls for peaceful resolution of international disputes. The text was supported by 100 UN member states including all NATO and EU member states. The declaration undoubtedly tried to isolate Russia internationally after it annexed Crimea. EU member states further 'condemned the increasing inflows of fighters and weapons from the territory of the Russian Federation into Eastern Ukraine as well as the aggression by Russian armed forces on Ukrainian soil and called upon the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw all its military assets and forces from Ukraine'³¹ in the European Council Conclusions of 30 August 2014.

NATO also took a clear position towards the crisis after the annexation of Crimea. NATO issued a statement suggesting that 'Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace,' and affirmed that NATO nations 'condemn in the strongest terms Russia's escalating illegal military intervention in Ukraine'³² at its summit in Wales in September 2014. The resolution used strong language similar to the condemnation by the UNSC resolutions in the cases of Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990, referring to Russia's actions as a 'breach.'³³ This specific case stressed that the 'violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity is a serious breach of international law and a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security.'³⁴

The OSCE as an organisation did not take a position towards the conflict mainly because Russia is a participating state of the OSCE. However, dramatic discussions took place within the Permanent Council of the OSCE concerning the situation in Ukraine in relation to the Russian aggression and the need to implement the Minsk agreements (discussed below) as well as the question of the kidnapping and illegal imprisonment of Ukrainian citizens by the Russian Federation.³⁵ Russia nevertheless refused to comment on the situation in Ukraine

in relation to the aggression or to participate in the discussions in any way. Russia's participation in the discussion on this point would have been understood by the Russian representatives as an accusation that Russia was an aggressor. It soon became evident that specific political decisions which defined the position of the organisation on the conflict in Ukraine were being taken by other organisations (the EU, NATO and, to a smaller extent, the UN) and at individual national levels. The OSCE did not influence these decisions in any significant way.³⁶ The OSCE thus adopted an unclear position and actually remained neutral in the conflict.

The participation of the EU in the conflict in Ukraine

As a reaction to the conflict in Ukraine, the EU called, in particular, for the preservation of the internal unity of the EU. The EU as an international organisation was very active from the very beginning of the conflict, as the offer of the Association Agreement to Ukraine and its refusal became one of the initial causes of the protests at Maidan. On 21 February 2014, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany, France and Poland, along with the opposition and governmental forces of Ukraine, contributed to the signature of an agreement on the organisation of Ukrainian presidential elections by the end of 2014, punishment of those guilty of Maidan crimes and other measures. Further development in Ukraine resulting from the Maidan events had nevertheless been so fast that the agreement never came into effect. During the escalation of the crisis, the EU supported Ukraine by continually stressing maintaining continuity and deepening of relations with the EU, and by continuing to offer the signing and accelerated implementation of the Association Agreement. The EU also continued discussions on the cancellation of visa duties.

The EU also used sanction mechanism as a tool aimed at changing the behaviour of Russia, in particular trying to limit its active role in escalating the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The EU based its restrictive policy towards Russia on a three-tier strategy of sanctions. The first stage included an immediate freeze on the participation of Russia in selected international negotiations.³⁷ The second stage was initiated after the annexation of Crimea. New restrictive measures were calculated to target people responsible for misdeeds and/or close to President Vladimir Putin. As the EU does not recognise the policy of 'the il-

legal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol,' it has imposed substantial restrictions on economic exchanges with the territory.³⁸

EU policy changed fundamentally after the shooting-down of Malaysian Airlines passenger flight MH-17 on 17 July 2014. A third round of sanctions was initiated at the end of July 2014, which has been described as 'a shift from a focus on sanctioning individuals to sanctioning key sectors in the economy.'³⁹ This third stage of sanctions not only had a direct economic impact on Russia, but also on EU member states. As Francesco Giumelli explained in the EUISS Chaillot Paper, international sanctions can affect other actors by coercing, constraining or signalling them.⁴⁰ EU sanctions are meant to: 'signal to foreign target countries or domestic audiences dissatisfaction with certain policies, constrain the target countries or their leaders from undertaking future actions, or coerce a government into changing or reversing existing policies.'⁴¹ Imposing a wide range of sanctions that had an impact on economic cooperation also raised the question of whether the sanctions were in line with the normative understanding of Europe.⁴² Hrant Kostanyan and Stefan Meister are convinced that 'the sanctions have become an important element in the Kremlin's policy of testing the unity of the EU member states. At the same time, however, together with low energy prices, the global economic slowdown and bad economic policy, they affect the Russian economy.'⁴³

The EU also supported development in Ukraine by sending a mission within the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU launched a civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) to mentor and advise Ukrainian officials on civilian Security Sector Reform (SSR) on 1 December 2014. The mission aims to improve the accountability of Ukraine's security services and restore public confidence.⁴⁴

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The participation of NATO in the conflict in Ukraine

NATO participated rather reluctantly in the conflict in Ukraine due to geopolitical sensitivity. It only declared its positions towards the conflict without taking substantive action. At the time when the crisis on the Maidan escalated, NATO as an organisation first appreciated the fact that the Ukrainian army had not participated in the crisis; the organisation also recalled how it had decided at its summit in Bucharest in 2008 that Ukraine would become a NATO member state in the future. Nevertheless, this did not mean that NATO would participate in

the conflict, nor did it constitute a promise of more significant NATO assistance to Ukraine.⁴⁵

The events in Ukraine also presented a military challenge for NATO because the conflict was taking place within its borders. The objective was to keep each other informed about current developments in Ukraine as NATO first expected that the development in Ukraine was a political crisis which required a political solution. The aggressive behaviour of Russia, and its understood role in the fast escalation of the crisis into a war, led NATO not only to take a clear stand but also to use pressure on Russia. The aim was to create pressure on Russia while still leaving space for dialogue. NATO nevertheless interrupted all civilian and military cooperation with Russia after the annexation of Crimea, including the political dialogue at the level of ambassadors and in the NATO-Russia Council.⁴⁶ The Secretary General of NATO repeatedly talked about the presence of Russian soldiers in the eastern part of Ukraine during the conflict.⁴⁷ NATO criticised the fact that Russian military instructors were training the separatists, equipping them with Russian weapons and military material, and that Russia was sending its soldiers to territories controlled by the separatists. The approach towards Russia as a combination of deterrence and an attempt at dialogue continues to be characteristic for NATO at a time when, after an almost two-year gap, the NATO-Russia Council meeting was held on 20 April 2016 (but ended without any tangible breakthrough).⁴⁸ In his opening remarks, the General Secretary of NATO stated that member states of the NATO have no intentions to 'isolate' Russia.⁴⁹

In contrast, cooperation with Ukraine was supposed to be intensified. NATO focused in particular on assistance with defence reform and improvement of Ukrainian defence forces by providing consultations and assistance in army-building (new programmes with a focus on command, control and communications, logistics and standardisation, cyber defence, military career transition and strategic communications).⁵⁰ NATO, however, refused to supply arms to Ukraine as NATO did not want to allow Russia's action in Ukraine to jeopardise progress for aspiring NATO-member nations.⁵¹ It was clear that NATO members were not prepared to use force to defend Ukraine as a sovereign state. On the other hand, it was agreed that the alliance would remain open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained from mentioning Ukraine specifically. This was an important message to Russia

that it could not expect any authority, or even veto, over the future expansion of NATO.⁵²

NATO therefore used deterrence and strengthened the military presence of NATO in Eastern Europe (nevertheless it never reached the level of significant military forces). Increase of military presence was gradual and was in part to deter Russia and in part a reaction to the mass snap-exercises conducted by Russia just across border. At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO leaders agreed to deploy four 'battalion-sized battle groups' in Poland and Baltic states.⁵³ NATO considers the use of coercive diplomacy tools a defensive measure and a direct response to the actions undertaken by Russia. Sharyl Cross has noted that 'NATO allies have repositioned equipment and forces in the Baltics, East-Central Europe and the Black Sea region' and 'additional multinational exercises among NATO allies and plans for military training are underway for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to enhance capacity to work alongside NATO forces as well as to provide for their own defence'.⁵⁴

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The participation of the OSCE in the conflict in Ukraine

The OSCE has not been able to clearly declare its position towards the conflict in Ukraine due to both the consensual character of the organisation and the fact that Russia is an OSCE-participating state. Nevertheless, the OSCE was the only actor that was able to agree upon, and effectively use, conflict resolution tools as a distinctive platform for dialogue among the states directly involved in the crisis, and, to a certain extent, serve as a mediator in the conflict.

Ukraine was the presiding state of the OSCE in 2013. The annual December meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Kiev took place at the time of the protests on the Maidan. Regarding the developments in Ukraine, the differences of opinion between the Russian and Ukrainian governments on the one hand, and the EU and NATO member states on the other, were already clearly visible. The OSCE Secretary General offered the use of conflict resolution tools to Ukraine; however, the Ukrainian chairmanship (representing one of the parties involved in the conflict) refused OSCE's mediation.⁵⁵ The OSCE has nevertheless been active in the conflict thanks to the flexible bureaucracy of the OSCE in Vienna and due to the very important role of the Swiss chair-

manship of the OSCE⁵⁶ that even appointed a OSCE Personal Envoy for Ukraine, Tim Guldemann.⁵⁷

The involvement of the OSCE deepened in March 2014 when the conflict in eastern Ukraine intensified. Eighteen OSCE-participating states (all NATO members) decided unilaterally to send unarmed military representatives based on Chapter III of the 2011 Vienna document on confidence and security-building measures.⁵⁸ The short-term monitoring activity under the umbrella of the OSCE did not require the consensus of all participating states. The OSCE subsequently used the opportunity to implement its long-term tools, in particular its so-called field activities. These included the establishment of a special monitoring mission at the Russian-Ukrainian border. The project co-ordinator with a long-term mandate also participated in the stabilisation of the situation in Ukraine. Its main objective was to assist local authorities in improvement of the legislative system, including maintaining the rule of law and preventing human rights abuses. The co-ordinator also provided training for persons responsible for organisation of the 2014 parliamentary elections, including several informational campaigns. A similar information campaign asking people to participate in local elections was also implemented in 2015.⁵⁹ Additionally, the project co-ordinator had to react to the direct impacts of violence escalation and participated in activities which directly reacted to the impacts of violent conflict, including educational campaigns, publication of security rules for inhabitants regarding unexploded ammunition, and cooperation with the Ukrainian government in the field of police reforms and training new members of the OSCE police force.⁶⁰

The OSCE entered the conflict in Ukraine in a significant way by sending a special long-term monitoring mission based on an official request by Ukraine. The OSCE thus enabled involvement of international observers on Ukrainian territory and became the most visibly involved member of the international community in the conflict.⁶¹ OSCE-participating states agreed on the necessity of implementing a monitoring mission, despite the fact that the opinion of Ukraine (and all other OSCE-participating states) regarding the annexation of Crimea and Russian activities in the eastern part of Ukraine, differed significantly from the Russian interpretation. The OSCE obviated this difference of opinion in the form of interpretative statements attached to the decision on the mission mandate.⁶² OSCE-participating states, unlike Russia, consider Crimea an integral part of the Ukrainian territory

and the breach of the territorial integrity of Ukraine was considered a significant violation of the most significant norms of international law, the CSCE Final Act, and all bilateral and multilateral contracts which guarantee Ukraine's territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and non-intervention in the nation's internal affairs.⁶³ The objective of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is to maintain stability in the territory, reduce tensions, facilitate dialogue, especially among all parties involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine,⁶⁴ and support and control implementation of the so-called Minsk agreements. The mission's activities include monitoring of the conflict between the Ukrainian army and separatist forces, observance of cessation of hostilities, and control of weapon removal from the established security zone. The mission monitors and supports implementation of all principles and obligations of the OSCE and promotes cooperation among the OSCE executive structures, relevant actors in the international community and Ukrainian authorities.⁶⁵ The mission is comprised of several hundred unarmed observers. The first observers were on the spot 24 hours after their mandate was approved.⁶⁶ The maximum number of observers is limited to 1,000.⁶⁷ Most observers are located along the so-called 'line of contact' and in Donbas, particularly in the Luhansk and Donetsk areas.⁶⁸ By sending the mission, the OSCE demonstrated its ability to become involved in the conflict although it is not able to discuss the question of Crimea's annexation or find a solution regarding its status.⁶⁹ Though the mandate of the mission officially covers the entire territory of Ukraine, the mission's observers are, in fact, not allowed to act in Crimea. It is also difficult to keep the mission impartial and independent, as the mission must manoeuvre in a political and diplomatic 'minefield,' balancing between the necessity of securing the approval of Russia and the ability to act on the spot and prevent Russia from reducing its credibility and neutrality.⁷⁰

The OSCE Permanent Council decided to send another mission to Ukraine in the summer of 2014, as it was formally necessary to increase the transparency of the Ukrainian-Russian border. The Ukrainian government lost control over the entire length of the border during the conflict, it falling under control of the pro-Russian separatists. The Permanent Council Decision 1130—on the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border from July 2014—granted a mandate to the OSCE Observer Mission to the two Russian checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk.⁷¹ The

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decision recalled the Joint Declaration made in Berlin on 02 July 2014, which was adopted by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia and which called for a more transparent border. This mission is very small (approximately 20 observers) and one of its objectives is the monitoring of the two checkpoints at the Russian-Ukrainian border. Information about activities at the checkpoints are available to all OSCE-participating states. The mission contributes to a reduction of tensions and maintenance of stability when the Ukrainian security forces cannot objectively control the border; in fact, the mission substitutes the activities of Ukrainian security forces. Nevertheless, Russia has blocked the effort of some OSCE-participating states to enlarge the territorial scope of the mission to encompass a larger part of the Ukrainian-Russian border, including other checkpoints. The real contribution of the mission to the resolution of the conflict is thus rather limited; however, it cannot be neglected due to the fundamental importance of these two checkpoints for transit between Russia and Ukraine.⁷²

By becoming part of the so-called Trilateral Contact Group composed of the representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, the OSCE has played the role of mediator in the dialogue between Russia and Ukraine regarding the de-escalation of the conflict and stabilisation of the situation in eastern Ukraine.⁷³ This was made possible by the fact that Russia refused the more active participation of the EU in the so-called 'Geneva format,' which would include the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USA, Russia, Ukraine and the EU. The fundamental form for the search of an agreement was the so-called 'Normandy format' created by France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine. The OSCE was represented by its ambassador, Heidi Tagliavin, who was appointed by the Swiss chairmanship,⁷⁴ and the office was subsequently taken over by Martin Sajdik in June 2015.⁷⁵ Representatives of the self-declared separatist republics (Luhansk and Donetsk) also participated in these negotiations. This proved to be a fundamental format of dialogue, because it enabled the parties to reach agreement and sign the most important documents that led to de-escalation of the conflict, stabilisation of the territory and gradual facilitation of the conflict. The so-called 'Minsk protocol'—on ceasefire and initiation of a political process to conflict resolution—was signed in September 2014. An additional memorandum was signed in Minsk several days later, focusing on specific measures within the ceasefire. The Minsk protocols required an immediate

ceasefire, monitoring by the OSCE, and decentralisation of the power in Ukraine, with an emphasis on local administration in the Donetsk and Luhansk territories of Ukraine. The protocol granted new tasks to the Special Monitoring Mission of the OSCE, consisting in particular in monitoring of the ceasefire. The situation in eastern Ukraine nevertheless continued to escalate and the ceasefire was not maintained.

Against this backdrop, the leaders of the Normandy format met in the Belarusian capital of Minsk on 11 February 2015 to try to de-escalate the spiking conflict, once again agreeing to a ceasefire and working out a political solution to the conflict. The Trilateral Contact Group therefore adopted a 13-point package of measures for implementation of the Minsk agreements (Minsk 11) as comprehensive catalogue of undertakings, ranging from security to political, economic and constitutional changes.⁷⁶ The package repeatedly called for immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of contact, and adopted additional political and legal steps of conflict resolution.⁷⁷ A panel of eminent persons from the OSCE member states, including Russia, describes the fulfilment of the Minsk agreements as a 'starting point for the development of a sustainable political, military and economic settlement of the crisis in and around Ukraine.'⁷⁸ Six points from this agreement were partially implemented: withdrawal of all heavy weapons and establishment of a security zone; monitoring and verification of ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE; modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the law of Ukraine 'on interim local self-government'; exchange of prisoners; determination of the procedure for the full restoration of socioeconomic relations; and constitutional reform including decentralisation and special status for separatist held regions. Six points were not implemented: ceasefire; amnesty; humanitarian assistance; handover of control of the Russia-Ukraine border from the Ukrainian side to Kyiv; withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, military equipment and mercenaries; disarmament of all illegal groups; and holding elections in accordance with the OSCE standards and monitored by ODIHR. Only one point—the creation of trilateral working groups—was fully implemented, though with limited results.⁷⁹ The measures are of a consecutive character and can only be implemented upon successful implementation of the previous measures.⁸⁰ Such a huge catalogue of adopted measures is a clear evidence that they are considered to be a certain 'road map' for peace-making activities.

The situation indeed partly de-escalated in 2015, but, so far, it has not been possible to fully implement the agreements. In the year 2016, Minsk 11 is still far from being in effect. Violations occur on a virtual daily basis and the withdrawal of heavy weapons is hard to fully verify. Instead of conflict resolution, we may rather witness a tendency for the conflict to become frozen. Minsk 11 is a step on the way to stopping escalation, rather than a final act leading to resolution. For Russia, the Minsk 11 agreement is a convenient political and diplomatic tool for sustaining the current state of 'not an entirely frozen conflict' in the east of Ukraine.⁸¹ Hrant Kostanyan and Stefan Meister stated that 'the blame game between Ukraine and Russia for non-implementation of the Minsk agreements is ongoing.'⁸² On one hand we can talk about Russian reluctance and on the other about Ukraine's indisposition to fulfil Minsk 11.

This does not, however, negate the specific mediating role that the OSCE played between Russia and Ukraine and how the organisation became an important guarantor of the Minsk agreements. The role of 'honourable mediator' was accepted by Ukraine, the pro-Russian separatists, Russia and the West.⁸³ The OSCE has thus proven to be the only channel that has enabled an agreement to be reached between the actors directly involved in the conflict by consensus at a time when hostile and hateful rhetoric has increased between Russia and Ukraine, and other communication channels and discussions have been limited or completely interrupted. The OSCE has therefore enabled communications between Ukraine and Russia regardless of the fact that many consider Russia to be an unreliable partner.⁸⁴

Conclusion

The analysis above demonstrates that each of the three monitoring organisations showed a specific method of involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. All three organisations reacted very quickly to the escalation of the conflict, though their participation in conflict de-escalation and resolution efforts differed. The following table summarises the results of the analysis of participation of the EU, NATO and the OSCE in the conflict.

Whereas NATO and the EU clearly defined their position towards the conflict, supported the Ukrainian government, and defended the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the OSCE has not taken a clear position

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position towards the conflict</i>	<i>Use of declaratory tools</i>	<i>Use of coercive diplomacy (military, diplomatic and economic tools)</i>	<i>Use of conflict resolution tools</i>
<i>EU</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partially (Field activities - limited)
<i>NATO</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
<i>OSCE</i>	Yes	No	No	Yes (Field activities, mediation)

towards the conflict and its efforts have been aimed at de-escalation, freezing and possible resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. NATO and EU member states clearly defined their position towards Russian behaviour and tried to not only punish Russia with the use of coercive diplomacy tools, but also attempted to modify Russia's behaviour, in particular by stopping support of the separatists in the eastern part of Ukraine. The crisis in Ukraine has become a significant test, in particular for the EU, with respect to the abilities of its transformative power.⁸⁵ On the other hand, the OSCE enabled formulation of a minimum possible common position of Russia and EU and NATO member states and activated the organisation in conflict de-escalation by sending missions or appointing the organisation to the role of a mediator in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, as well as by guaranteeing the Minsk Accords.

The OSCE was the only organisation to become directly involved in the conflict. The simple fact that participating OSCE states have been able to agree on specific tools to be used in the conflict can be seen as a success. However, the viability of a peaceful resolution to the conflict and the actual implementation of the Minsk Agreements remain in question. We can similarly question the effectiveness of the tools used. The Russian Federation blocks the enlargement of the Special Monitoring Mission to the Russian-Ukrainian border and its activities in the long-term, and thus its added value is rather limited. It is rather paradoxical that thanks to the conflict in Ukraine, the OSCE has again become important as a Europe-wide forum and a security organisa-

Table 1, Participation of the EU, NATO and the OSCE in the conflict in Ukraine.

tion. This is happening at a time of further deterioration of relations between the West (the USA, the EU and other European countries) and Russia (plus Belarus and some Central Asian countries), which is clearly reflected in the Ukrainian conflict. This results from the relatively strongly shared political obligations which have their roots in the CSCE Final Act of 1975 and in the complex approach of the OSCE to security. OSCE has experience in operating even among non-allies and it can flexibly adapt to the situation. Its tools are therefore not connected with enforcement, but cover field activities including long-term and short-term missions. The OSCE has become a significant platform for conflict resolution for its participating states, particularly Russia.⁸⁶

The results of this study point out an interesting fact: the frequently criticised complexity and flexibility (read: lack of hierarchy) of the security arrangement in Europe—which includes a large number of security organisations with a varying understanding of security and membership—is not necessarily a disadvantage for Europe. This can clearly be seen in the deteriorating security situation and escalation of the violent conflict in Ukraine: Despite clearly different interests of the individual actors and the limited possibility of involvement in conflict resolution, it has been possible to de-escalate and freeze the conflict with the participation of European security organisations.



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Notes

1. See e.g. Sharyl Cross (2015), ‘NATO–Russia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond,’ *South-*

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 3. For the purpose of this study we understand coercive diplomacy as a diplomatic strategy with a degree of limited coercion. This includes diplomatic, economic and military measures and one of the important tools is represented also by sanctions. Coercive diplomacy may nevertheless also include the threat of use of force. Bruce Jentleson stated that: 'Carrots may be included, but, by definition, so too are sticks. The sticks can include economic sanctions as well as military force.' Bruce Jentleson (2006) *Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World*, Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, available at: <<http://stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/pabo6CoerDip.pdf?>> (accessed 20 July 2016).
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Overcoming of 'Dutch Disease'

Economic Modernisation of Gulf Monarchies in the 21st Century

Pavlo Ignatiev

The article deals with necessity of oil-rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to move away from commodities export in favor of more diversified economies in times of low prices on crude oil. Such issues as the rise of alternative branches of industry, the shift of agriculture to developing countries in Asia and Africa, investments in shares of profitable enterprises and property in the West, and the development of the service economy are examined.

Keywords: GCC countries, modernization, crude oil, aviation, aluminum, construction industry, tourism, investment, retail trade.

The monarchies of the Gulf represent a phenomenon of rapid transformation from mainly Bedouin nomad life and pearl-gathering activity of locals into modern post-industrial petroleum states, but they are highly dependent on one commodity – crude oil, thus creating pre-conditions for a 'Dutch disease'. Petrodollars allowed creating generous welfare states where ruling families do not tax population, which in turn does not require accountability from them. But this is about to change with the Arab Spring and record low oil price during the past few years. The aim of the article is to show the ways and means of how six regional monarchies are trying to diversify their various economies



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in order to lessen dependency on the export of energy resources. Main research steps include gathering statistical information, defining the reasons behind the rise of non-oil economy and analysis of principal sectors of economic activity which are intended to lessen the dependency on petrodollars. The sources of information, used in this article, are taken from regional mass-media outlets such as the Khaleej Times, Gulf News, Arab News, as well as IMF and World Bank reports.

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The monarchies of Arabian Peninsula are known as the Arabian Six. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain are members of this club, but the wealth between them is shared disproportionately according to their energy resources. The UAE and Qatar belong to the ranks of the richest countries in the world, whereas Bahrain and Oman are lagging behind all others. Saudi Arabia lies in the middle, since it has the biggest population and land area in the Gulf. The whole region is populated by 50 million people with 28 million of them living in a huge desert Kingdom. Combined regional GDP constituted 1.6 trillion dollars in 2013 and considerable positive balance of trade was registered for local countries – 558 billion due to high oil prices. Saudi Arabia possessed the largest economy with GDP around 711 billion dollars; the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait were behind with 385, 192 and 183 billion dollars respectively. Finally, there were the two poorest countries in the region – Oman with GDP of 64 billion and Bahrain with 30 billion dollars.¹

All those monarchies are different, depending on their natural resources. For example, Bahrain has become one of the oldest in the Gulf, where commercial production of oil first appeared in 1932, and now it imports black gold from the Saudi Arabian field Abu Safah via a pipeline and Oman's production is likely to finally run out in 2030. The same lack of oil resources is evident for the emirate Dubai – a small member of UAE confederation, which is the second most important economic player in this country after wealthy Abu Dhabi. Lacking huge oil resources of its bigger southern neighbor, Dubai rulers decided to develop a service economy, and build unusual buildings and shopping malls in the desert. Saudi Arabia, which possesses 16 percent of world oil reserves, is more reluctant to diversify, still considerably relying on black gold. Kuwait, destroyed during seven months of Iraqi occupation, when retreating Iraqi troops set ablaze more than 600 oil wells, now strives to rebuild and further develop itself purely using

oil as the main tool of economic development. In general, this region possesses 40 percent of oil resources and a quarter of natural gas fields in the world, therefore GCC countries previously had little or no incentives to diminish dependence on black gold.² Today only in Qatar, which is considered the biggest LNG exporter, oil is less important than abundant natural gas in the capacity of export commodity.

But there are several factors defining the necessity to diversify economy. One of the main preconditions of the region's development is stability of the political systems of the monarchies, bought by considerable social expenses. Many countries (except Kuwait and Bahrain) do not have parliaments, relying instead of councils with purely advisory powers known as *shura*. They consist of distinguished religious activists, technocrats and people with high moral standings in society. Rulers remain in alliance with religious leadership that justify and support their policies by issuing respective orders for their followers or, in the case of Saudi Arabia, *fatwas*. They also frequently grant gifts in form of land plots or provide money allowances during holidays, pardon criminals, meet citizens once in a year to hear their complaints and organize nationwide events. Stability is tightly connected to petrodollars, since they are used to pay exorbitant salaries to servants in the state sector, to keep prices for imported agricultural goods, local gasoline, electricity and potable water at an extremely low level, and to liberate native population from taxation in any form. For example, the top ten countries with the cheapest petrol in the world (after Venezuela) are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Iran and the UAE. A gallon of fuel costs only 1.77 dollars in Emirates, which is extremely cheap.³ The same also concerns water, since desert and arid countries are among top users of this scarce commodity. Many people in the region are obese because they possess several cars and have unlimited access to cheap local food outlets or American breakfast chains. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain are among countries with the highest number of overweight people in the world. Among them, citizens of Kuwait are the heaviest, as the average weight of adult in this country exceeds 77.5 kg.⁴ Moreover, a rent in apartment for three people constituted 268.5 dollars in the UAE, 160 dollars in Oman, 135 dollars in Bahrain and Qatar, 83 dollars in Kuwait and 55 dollars in Saudi Arabia.⁵ In accordance with World Bank data, fuel subsidies in the GCC countries exceed 160 billion dollars or ten percent of gross domestic product.⁶ The absence of income tax makes salaries here one of the highest in the state sector

anywhere in developing world, whereas the refusal of local elites to impose VAT contributes to low prices for imported consumer goods.

Kinninmont argues that government expenditures are used as a tool to lessen political contradictions with the populace, but not necessary in order to facilitate economic development. Many of those measures intended to buy the loyalty of locals were implemented in response to the Arab uprisings of 2011.⁷ At the same time, Abed and Davoodi from IMF believe that the large public sector represents a heavy burden for the Gulf economies due to poor quality of personnel and slow tempo of work. Additionally, they spend a lot on weapons and are unable to implement a radical tax reform indented to introduce at least value added tax (VAT). As a recommendation those countries should develop a strong private sector and create modern tax-generating infrastructure.⁸

After the nationalization of oil assets of multinationals in the 1970s, local countries decided to develop a related infrastructure in order to simplify the export of black gold. The first priority of modernization was to create local facilities to extract, transport and efficiently sell oil. For example, Saudi Arabia (now possesses world's fourth biggest number of tankers with 37 ships) and Kuwait (with 30 crude carriers) built huge tanker fleets from scratch. On the other hand, Qatar amassed, with the assistance of South Korean chaebols, the largest number of LNG vessels in the world – 65.⁹ Those countries also bought refineries in Europe, Asia and the USA along with a net of petroleum stations in order to supply crude oil to foreign markets and easily sell refining products. Petrodollars allowed construction of highways, condominiums and ports, the movement from a pearl and salt-extracting economy, dependent on caravan trade, towards modern infrastructure and settled life for tribal nomads. High world oil prices resulted from wars in the Middle East, constant instability in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, and the reluctance of users to switch to nuclear energy after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. India, China, Japan, South Korea, the EU and the USA are among top consumers of Gulf oil, with the two giant Asian countries gradually gaining importance due to population explosion and growth of GDP. As a result, the modernization of non-oil sectors remained moderate at best. Today the UAE boast the most diversified economy in the region while Saudi Arabia's is lagging behind all others except Kuwait. Oil-poor Bahrain with the freest economy in the Middle East is the second most in diversity after the UAE thanks to Islam-

ic banking, Arab tourism and aluminum industry, followed by Oman, Qatar and Kuwait.¹⁰ Kuwait, with a native population of 1.25 million people, enjoys currency reserves of 592 billion dollars, and extracts 2.8 billion barrels of oil daily with low production costs and sees no need to change the policy of overwhelming oil reliance.¹¹

Despite heavy investments in chain of extraction, production and distribution of energy resources, GCC countries are willing to diversify economy. Crude oil is burned to generate electricity, and to provide energy for desalinization plants and air-conditioning units. Taking into consideration that most families own two or three cars, fuel subsidies remain considerable and as a result, rampant consumption of oil takes place. For example, Saudi Arabia burns around three million barrels of it daily in order to satisfy domestic needs.¹² Another reason behind the drive towards diversification is a young and unemployed population, whose number is growing under the influence of generous state subsidies and house loans. The opportunities to create jobs for those people in the lucrative oil industry remain limited due to domination of white collar work force from Europe, India and the USA. The policy, when young and middle-aged citizens are employed in state institutions and are well-paid for actually doing nothing, cannot last forever because of population explosion. In the wake of Arab Spring, carried out by people of young and middle age, those segments of society represent a real danger for the ruling elite. Moreover, increased levels of North American oil production along with the discovery of shale gas reserves in Argentina, Algeria and China, together with the subsequent drop of world prices to the level of 30-40 dollars, could mean that even rich countries of the region have to diversify economy in order to achieve a balanced budget. China, as one of the biggest exporters of goods and consumers of oil, is facing gradual economic slowdown. The same is true for India, confronted by a number of domestic problems after prolonged populist rule of the Indian National Congress, whose leaders tried to influence voters before parliamentary elections with generous social spending covering two-thirds of the population. Also it's important to note that volumes of bilateral trade in the region of the Gulf remain relatively small and only diversification of local economies can bring results. Interchange between the GCC countries constituted only 146 billion dollars in 2014 due to heavy resemblance of their export commodities – oil, gas and petrochemicals, aluminum and palm dates.¹³

Local countries are endowed with substantial means to diversify economy since they possess sovereign wealth funds with 2.367 billion dollars or in other words, have at their disposal 32.6 percent of the global assets of such institutions. The money may be invested in local infrastructure, in foreign shares of profitable enterprises and in property in the famous European tourist countries – Switzerland, the United Kingdom and France.¹⁴ Egypt or Turkey are also considered as targets for investments because both countries have extensive recreational facilities and control important highways of international traffic – the Suez Canal and Black Sea Straits. Moreover, GCC governments have decent chances to borrow cheap money abroad for large-scale projects due to high credit ratings of their respective countries, which means a low risk of borrowing. For example, the Moody Agency assigned rankings Aa2 to Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Kuwait, and all others (except for Bahrain with Baa2) possessed a rating not less than A.¹⁵ It's important to add that until 2014 GCC countries enjoyed considerable budget surpluses and those funds can be used for diversification of economy in years of record oil sales. For instance, Saudi Arabia declared a surplus of about 55 billion dollars in 2013.¹⁶

In order to train the local workforce, the monarchies should invest in education. There are 24 million foreign workers in the Gulf, who send home tens of billions dollars. This amount can be earned by local population and remain in the region, thus boosting the spending power of people and encouraging their loyalty towards royal families. After Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Palestinian and Yemeni workers were deported at large scale and substituted with more peaceful Muslims from South Asian countries – India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, from eastern Sri-Lanka. The exception for people from other regions was made for Filipino maids, since they were considered very professional and trouble free. Today the impact of the Arab workforce is limited, with the majority of workers coming from Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. A cheap work force does not participate in strikes, makes a lot of services competitive and allows carrying out huge construction work in the Gulf for a fraction of real price. Moreover, locals have a lack of necessary skills for hi-tech or military jobs, or to the contrary – demonstrate a pride of family honor, which limits their selection of professions. Serhat Yalcin stresses that the status of the foreign labor force in the region is regulated via the system of kafala, which demands the invitation for worker be issued by a nation-

al sponsor or employer. Previously, foreigners could not change their jobs without explicit permission of aforementioned sponsor and only in the 2000s such countries as Bahrain, Oman and UAE relaxed this regulation.¹⁷ Today, the kafala system defines the high level of control of local employers over foreigners and limits their human rights.

As a result, unemployment rises and considerable levels of it can be seen among women, taking into consideration that conservative traditions forbid them to work outside the household. Females have a higher level of education than young men but unfortunately they cannot find jobs. The wages in the private sector are insufficient to attract nationals, who mainly work in public institutions, where they earn more during limited working hours and are protected from sacking by the law or family connections.¹⁸

This situation demands a change. In order to make the workforce competitive, GCC countries have implemented a policy of substitution of foreign labour whenever it is possible. Known as Saudization or Omanization, it is only viable in the retail industry, nursing services, or the military or police sphere, but all other jobs cannot be successful without a modern education, especially a technical one. Thus the development of educational facilities is quite natural, since the region possesses a very young population. Local girls do not travel abroad without their male relatives and rarely can attend Western universities on their own. Also, the rising number of affluent expatriates with children makes the issue of private schools and universities even more urgent. Therefore, local countries exert considerable efforts to develop education by building new and refurbishing old educational institutions. They open branches of famous universities and lure Western, Egyptian or Indian lecturers with high tax-free salaries and outstanding benefits, including free healthcare and several annual journeys to the region of family members. Today many non-oil Arab countries are experiencing the lack of professors, as they have left for the Gulf. The United Arab Emirates host 35 international branch campuses and is considered to be a regional leader in the field of private education. Qatar follows this path by heavily investing money in research funds and opening the unique Education City. Moreover, those countries have introduced a range of practical work-oriented courses and invited teachers from the United Kingdom to help with the English language. Saudi Arabia remains the most conservative in the region with the dominance of public schools, since its leadership is afraid of growing

foreign influence on young population. In 2014 GCC countries decided to spend more than 90 billion dollars on education. The total number of students during the same year has exceeded 11 million.¹⁹ Local rulers also traditionally send their children to English-speaking countries to help them to get a classical education. This concerns mainly the USA and United Kingdom, but a decade ago many students decided to study in Australia. Today 20 thousand young Arabs (mainly from Saudi Arabia) hone their skills there.²⁰

On the other hand, the high quality of education of locals represents a hidden hazard for all ruling regimes in the Gulf. Byman and Green claim that the monarchies successfully withstood the influence of Arabic nationalism, the export of Islamic revolution from Iran and instability in the Middle East in general. But today their young population can be considered as a factor of instability because of greater assertiveness. There are many educated nationals aged 30 and less who demand more accountability from the state and access to popular state jobs. The monarchies also are unable to keep up explosive population growth with social services and sustain high levels of GDP growth.²¹

Despite the fact that many countries like Turkey, South Korea, Great Britain and France contributed to the economic development of the region, the USA can be considered as a main foreign partner of the Gulf countries in the field of modernization. Mneimneh claims that local monarchies and world's sole superpower have a convergence of interests. Americans are interested in military presence in the area, in the sales of complex systems of weapons and investments of Gulf money in their economy. On the other hand, the Gulf rulers were freed from Iraqi threat due to wars of 1991 and 2003 against the regime of Saddam Hussain and also greeted the US containment of Iran via a set of sanctions. Thus, Washington provides the security umbrella for the region and allows the local rulers to spend more on infrastructure and on development of new branches of economy.²²

What are the ways to diversify the economies in the region in order to create jobs? First, it is necessary to develop the spheres of economy where cheap oil and gas can be useful, namely to invest funds in energy-intensive industries. For example, gas is extensively used to produce ammonia and urea fertilisers along with plastics. Taking into consideration that there is only Qatar that sells blue fuel abroad, other GCC members also have huge volumes of cheap gas at their disposal. Petrochemicals are destined to the overpopulated countries

of Asia with developed agriculture – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Thailand. This allows sustaining relations with the largest producers of food, which in turn provides the region of the Arabian Peninsula with basmati rice, wheat, fruits and vegetables. Moreover, local factories supply plastics to China, South Korea and Taiwan, which later is used to produce electronics, mobile phones, parts of cars and home appliances. In 2015 GCC export of petrochemicals constituted 70 million tones or 80 percent of the whole production.²³ Local industry provided employment to 148,900 people and indirectly created three times as many jobs. Despite huge mineral resources, the Middle East controls only ten percent of the global petrochemical capacity, what means that this field of economic activity does not have any correlation with substantial deposits of oil and gas.²⁴ The rise of population in China after the country dropped its one-child policy and traditionally ingrained high levels of birth in India will enhance the profits of the fertilizer industry of GCC countries in the long run.

Aluminum production came to the Gulf in the 1970s and today regional companies produce some 4.5 million tones of light metal with the UAE's share constituting 2.3 million tones.²⁵ The demand for aluminum, rolling products and aluminum castings on international markets is traditionally strong. Local producers import bauxites from Australia and Guinea, using own cheap gas during the process of production. This metal is light, corrosion and temperature-resistant, environmentally-friendly and can be produced in the required shape, therefore it is in great demand in the space, construction and car-manufacturing industries, and used in foil, cans for drinks, refrigerators and in production of modern furniture as well. The trend in fuel conservation can be seen behind the recent rise in popularity of aluminum alloys in car parts and passenger aircraft. Local countries even created the Gulf Aluminum Council to coordinate the policy and their private members account for 13 percent of world production of this metal. Despite the regional leadership of UAE in this respect, for oil-poor Bahrain, where the ALBA (Aluminum Bahrain) plant operates, this industry is the second most important after banking services.²⁶ GCC countries are situated relatively close to Europe and not too far away from the main consumers of this metal in China, South Korea and Japan, with their developed automotive industry. They also use some of the most efficient ports of the world that are free of natural disasters. On the other hand, aluminum recycling is not well developed here and the trade is

impeded by piracy near Somalia coast. Local gas is also widely used in metallurgy, since the Gulf area represents a fast growing market for commercial property and residential housing.

Construction industry remains one of the main drivers behind diversification of local economy. Social housing projects of the 1970s and the 1980s were connected to the need to attract tribal nomads to cities, guarantee their loyalty with own houses and create preconditions for demographic explosion necessary to lessen dependence on a foreign workforce. Another sector of economic activity consisted of building hotel towers for foreigners, barracks for South Asian workers and residential property for rich Arabs from other countries of the Greater Middle East. This was done together with the reclamation of land from the Gulf in order to increase the size of expensive land plots near the water. Emirate Dubai leads the region in this respect with a number of projects such as 'The Palm' and 'The World', whose properties are accessible by yacht or motorboat. Bahrain consists of 33 islands and also feels the need to reclaim the land, since it has been slowly sinking. The construction industry received a boost immediately after the Arab Spring, when rich Arabs emigrated for the sake of security from unstable Egypt, Syria, Libya and Tunisia and bought property in a relatively stable Gulf area. There is another area of activities of construction companies. For example, Saudi Arabia is extending facilities for Haj and Umrah pilgrims – Masjid al-Haram, and is constructing the world's biggest hotel towers in Mecca and international airport along with a ferry terminal in Jeddah for travelers from Egypt and Sudan. Simultaneously, this Kingdom is establishing economic cities in the desert in order to develop different regions. Regional countries also are building subways and railways. Underground systems of transportation are necessary to deal with road congestion, to develop tourism and to provide the growing population and the expat community with an efficient means of transport. It is expected that underground and railway projects will create 80,000 jobs for locals in the Gulf.²⁷

Moreover, the countries are actively erecting skyscrapers in order to attract more tourists and demonstrate their economic success and cutting edge technology to foreign investors. For example, emirate Dubai possesses the world's highest building – the 160-story Burj Khalifa – and Saudi Arabia is building Kingdom Tower – a one kilometer high structure in Jeddah, which is considered the main resort of the Red Sea. UAE and Qatar also have won the right to organize large events like

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Dubai-Expo 2020 and Soccer World Cup in 2022, which justified their heavy investments in infrastructure in the years to come.²⁸

Considerable attention is devoted to the development of ports. Currently 35 of them handle rising imports of consumer goods and agricultural commodities to desert countries and carry out re-export operations to Iran and the rest of the Arab world. The region receives huge cargoes of cars, telecommunications hardware and electronics. The locals and expats in GCC countries not only buy cars and spare parts, but also sell used motor vehicles each year to poor Arabian neighbors. The demand for them would only increase if the Saudi Arabian authorities allowed women to drive. Moreover, the areas around the ports are used as customs-free trading zones with huge storage facilities. Emirates' deep-water port of Jebel Ali, which is the ninth busiest port in the world and the biggest one in the Middle East, plays a crucial role of middleman for the shallow Iranian Bander Abbas and enjoys connectivity with 140 ports all over the world. Another famous port, Omani Salalah, is situated on the shore near the Arabian Sea and can be turned into the biggest object of infrastructure in the region, since it helps to avoid tanker-congested Persian Gulf. The work of ports may become even more dynamic in 2018, when a regional 2.177 km-long railway is scheduled to open for business. The network will run from Kuwait through Saudi Arabia to the UAE and Oman, simultaneously providing links to the rest of the monarchies.²⁹

One of the most recent phenomena is the rise of local airlines, which have become important worldwide players and have achieved a global reach. There are many reasons explaining this sudden occurrence. First of all, land in the desert land is barren, relatively cheap and usually belongs to royal families. Secondly, the Arabian Peninsula is strategically situated between Eastern Africa, where only Ethiopian Airlines has a big fleet, and Western Asia thus playing a role of an important transport hub for those regions. For citizens of the EU and Australia regional airports are also important as transit points. Thirdly, the foreign work force, engaged under short-term contracts, is cheap and their representatives available for work during Fridays and Muslim holidays. They also never strike under the threat of immediate deportation or even imprisonment. Some of the companies such as Air Arabia employ flight attendants from different regions of the world with knowledge of many languages in order to make them useful for all passengers. Next, oil wealth was used to buy the brand-new planes

and the local fleet remains among the newest in the world. Cheap local aviation fuel is also very helpful in competition with foreign carriers. Finally, there are many international customers. Local carriers provide their services to expatriate workers, travelling to and from their home countries. Moreover, GCC companies organize transportation of Muslim pilgrims that visit Mecca and Medina. Saudi Arabian Airlines allocates more planes on the domestic market and leaves vacant places for international destinations for Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways.³⁰

Iran (with a population of 80 million), which remained under international sanctions until recently, is in dire need of modern aircraft. Thus, Iranians continue to use carriers from the Gulf as intermediaries in their flights to far-away destinations. The same is true for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Afghanistan, devastated by long civil wars and lacking money to purchase planes. Moreover, GCC citizens are extremely wealthy and usually spend their vacation in tourist trips to Europe or the United States. They can be seen during frequent flights to London and Geneva – the most important European destinations for wealthy people from the Gulf. It is important to add that the interstate road and rail network here is underdeveloped and GCC nationals are increasingly relying on local airlines during regional trips, many of which last only one or two hours. Some of the airlines may also enjoy generous state subsidies but this information is classified.

Local airlines also are competitive with European companies like Air France or Lufthansa since they have brand new planes at their disposal and provide relatively moderate ticket prices, a huge selection of Arabian, Indian and European cuisine, as well as the latest movies for entertainment during the flight. They invest in long-haul airplanes like Boeing-777x (extended range) in order to gain access to any destination in the world with this fuel-efficient twin-engine jet. For example, in 2013 Emirates ordered 150 777X and Qatar Airways ordered 50 planes of the same model.³¹ Moreover, Emirates is the top operator of the Airbus A-380, which has 853 seats for passengers in one class. The UAE has the largest fleet of airplanes in the Gulf with Emirates, Etihad, Fly Dubai and Air Arabia companies. Emirates, which ranks as the best in the world, is considered the largest carrier in the Middle East with 219 passenger planes and the highest number of Boeing-777 and Airbus A-380 planes of any airline.³²

Gulf airlines are aggressively purchasing shares of foreign air companies. In recent years, Etihad has bought minority stakes of stocks

of Air Berlin, Air Lingus and Virgin Australia. Qatar Air became the owner of a 1.7 billion dollar stake in British Airways.³³ This provides enhanced access to European consumers in general and to some of the most important markets in Western Europe. They also sponsor sport teams and finance the construction or refurbishing of stadiums in the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain. Prestigious exhibitions take place here like the Dubai Air Show or Bahrain International Air show, where Boeing and Airbus present their latest models.

The monarchies also devoted substantial attention to the development of international tourism. Bahrain and Abu Dhabi are known for Formula One competitions. Apart from these, there are many other regional activities which are popular among foreign tourists such as camel races, desert safaris or falcon hunting. Unfortunately, only some of the GCC countries possess historic tourist attractions which can be interesting for demanding visitors. Saudi Arabia, known as a sacred place for 1.57 billion of the world's Muslims, also is famous for resorts on the Red Sea and the ancient Nabatean city of Madain Saleh. On the other hand, the desert Kingdom prohibits travelers who are non-Muslims to visit sacred Mecca and Medina and haram signs can be seen in the vicinity of both cities. Nonetheless, tourism, especially in connection with Hajj and Umrah, is a major source of revenue for dwellers of Jeddah and Mecca. The number of international pilgrims during the Hajj constituted over 2 million in 2013 and some 13-14 million religious tourists visited country during the previous year. In order to increase the number of visitors, Saudi Arabian workers are building 100 hotel super-towers with 24,480 rooms in Mecca.³⁴ The Kingdom is also striving to stimulate internal tourism by investing money in the renovation of old historic buildings. But potential development of this industry for the native population remains illusive, since many Saudi people travel abroad for entertainment or in order to spend their vacation in a more liberal environment – away from religious police and complete lack of social life. Today the leadership of the conservative Kingdom denies the possibility of Dubai-style international tourism within its own borders.

Oman attracts visitors with green scenery, since its southern part is under the influence of Kharif season, which brings rainy monsoon weather. It is also known as a land of Portuguese and Arab forts, spices from the bark of frankincense trees, and curved daggers, which are in great demand among Arab billionaires. Despite the fact that in 2015

only 2.4 million tourists visited the sultanate, this country has a good opportunity for tourism development, taking into consideration that its northwestern neighbor Dubai is the biggest hub for regional travelers and Oman has extensive areas suitable for green and historic tourism away from the noisy UAE.³⁵ Moreover, it is the only country in the Gulf with a long ocean coastline exceeding 2,092 kilometers and inexpensive tourism services, where mainly local Arabs work.

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The rest of the GCC countries have to rely on new-invented wonders in order to attract tourists. For example Bahrain, a small archipelago of 33 islands, positions itself as regional gate to the Saudi market due to its proximity to the biggest oil fields in the eastern part of the Kingdom. Many expats live here and work during the day in Saudi Arabia near Dammam. Saudi citizens travel to Bahrain via the 26-kilometer-long King Fadh causeway (known also as the Johnnie Walker Bridge because of frequent smuggling of whiskey and wine to the Kingdom) at the weekend to enjoy a more liberal life and entertainment here. Therefore the country has relatively many Arab visitors with the bulk of them represented by Saudi citizens. Bahrain, wary of possible consequences of Shia rebellion for the economy after the events of 2011, decided to introduce liberal visa requirements in order to prop up the tourist industry. Today nationals of 113 countries are entitled to receive Bahraini electronic visas.³⁶

The UAE is a very interesting example of tourist development in a desert terrain with few tourist attractions. Rulers of this emirate had a preference for unusual buildings and those architects who could build anything revolutionary found welcome and financial support. Moreover, the country boasts excellent air connectivity. Only Emirates airline operates flights to 120 destinations daily in six continents.³⁷ This allowed the international airport of Dubai to transform into the busiest in the world. The region is also oversaturated with Iranian goods, since many of local residents are of Persian origin and adhere to the Shia belief. Lately Arabs from other GCC countries frequented Dubai for entertainment and decided to buy commercial property in this city, which had a more vibrant and liberal life than their places of residence. Football teams prepare themselves for an incoming season in the Emirates during winter, more resembling an early summer in Europe. Major tennis and golf competitions also take place here. On the other hand, Doha and Dubai present itself as hubs of business conferences and exhibitions in the Middle East. Abu Dhabi, situated 126

kilometers to the west from Dubai, also attracts an increasing number of tourists. The capital of the UAE, which is investing billions of dollars in the hospitality sector and the most expensive religious structure of the world (Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque), also has constructed museums whose administration has the rights to exhibit artifacts from the Louvre and Solomon Guggenheim. As a result, the UAE has become one of the most attractive destinations in the whole Middle East.³⁸

Finally, Qatar is striving to become the leading sport destination in the region as well as the centre of the Middle Eastern diplomatic summits. The city of Doha plays a key role as a venue of conferences with the participation of the representatives of Arab countries, Palestinians and the members of Syrian opposition. This wealthy country is expensive but poor on attractions, nevertheless a building spree promises to create world-class infrastructure before the 2022 World Cup – exotic hotels, Hamad International Airport with 100 shops, brand-new stadiums, including a floating one. On the other hand, Qatar remains the poorest on man-made attractions, since it boasts only the Katara Cultural Village, several mosques and a modest museum of Islamic art.³⁹

The only monarchy in the region which is not striving to attract tourists of any kind is conservative Kuwait. First of all, the local currency (the dinar) is the most expensive in the world and its exchange rate is one to 3,5 US dollars. Second, this country is in position to show visitors only several man-made wonders – the three Kuwait Towers and the famous National Parliament building, designed by the architect Jorn Utzon, who also is considered the father of the Sydney Opera House. Local sources point out that citizens of Kuwait have spent five billion dollars on travel abroad, as staying in the country during vacation is extremely boring.⁴⁰ Kuwait can be considered as a gate to the ancient Iraqi sites, but unfortunately Iraq is very unstable and parts of it are occupied by Daesh.

One of the main local attractions is retail shopping. GCC countries became attractive venues for shopping in the 1970s when nomads settled in the cities and tasted the wonders of modern civilization. Growing urbanization also contributed to this trend. Since local markets are protected by a five percent external tariff, many malls sell Western and Japanese goods at significantly lower prices than in Europe or Japan. Arab women in the Gulf are free to spend their time on shopping, taking into consideration that Filipino and Sri Lankan maids do the bulk of the housework. Shopping malls substitute for the lack of entertain-

ment in all countries except the UAE. Moreover, the large population of expatriates creates a constant demand for fashion items, shoes and perfumes. Even the airports, which serve as intermediaries for the Middle Eastern passengers, have opened huge duty-free areas. For example, the company Dubai Duty Free operates the world's largest airport retail district with annual sales of 1.8 billion dollars.⁴¹

Locals also have an expensive taste for luxury goods. Many Arab women buy famous brands to put them on at home, because in the public eye they are forced to wear the black abaya. The high income of the average Gulf Arab allows the purchase of gold items, perfumes, yachts and luxury cars. As a result, the Middle East houses many of the main 'shopping cities', with Dubai occupying fourth place worldwide, Kuwait City ninth, and the Saudi Arabian capital twelfth.⁴² Huge discounts are present during the Dubai shopping festival or Dubai Summer Surprises and these events are accompanied by different shows for families with children. Indians and Russians are especially attracted by the opportunity to buy gold jewelry and this emirate accounts for a substantial share of the world gold trade. Dubai Summer Surprises was introduced in 1998 to attract visitors during the hot and humid season with great discounts in 6000 stores and became quite successful.⁴³ Several other regional countries are trying to emulate the success of this emirate in the field of retail shopping.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is considering the introduction of a unified visa for citizens of 35 countries, which will allow them to visit all monarchies of the union. Small members are interested in this initiative, since they lack attractions to lure foreign visitors on their own and can only serve as an intermediary stop for a couple of days, thus increasing occupancy rate in hotels.⁴⁴ For example, Qatar has one of the largest fleets of planes in the Middle East, but remains boring for foreigners because of its tiny size and lack of historic architecture. So this country can be considered as one of the bridges to the rest of the region owing to developed airlines with a global reach.

Local governments are also striving to develop medical tourism in order to compete with Malaysia, Turkey and South Korea. Previously, Arabs travelled abroad to receive medical treatment and it was difficult for women to do so without the obligatory escort of a male relative. The population explosion along with obesity epidemics has created the necessary requirements for the development of this industry since cardiovascular and diabetes-related illnesses have become wide-

spread. Today GCC countries buy state of the art medical equipment abroad and provide facilities in hospitals for rich patients from the unstable Middle East. They also attract the best doctors from Southern Asia with considerable salaries. The strategic location between East and West is important, since people with acute diseases cannot bear the long hours of flights. Taking this into consideration, Dubai rulers agreed to issue three-month renewable visas for medical tourists and their relatives. Local Health Authority points out that 135,000 patients visited the emirate in 2014 and their number is set to increase to 170,000 in 2016.⁴⁵

The Gulf region is also turning into a new destination for cruise tourism. The season for visitors commences in late October and goes on till the end of March. There are several reasons behind this new phenomenon. First, the strategic location of the Arabian Peninsula is not far from Egypt, Southern Europe and Africa. Second, the winter temperatures here are mild and the weather resembles late spring in Europe. GCC countries boast a decent selection of airlines to and from the Gulf along with brand-new hotels and shopping malls. Today mainly Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Oman are considered important players in this field, since Bahrain has already been excluded from many programs of cruise ships after the events of Arab Spring and repression against Shia opposition in 2011. Nonetheless, there is significant scope for expansion of the cruise industry if we consider that the region is flanked by exotic destinations such as Yemen, known as a desert land of first mud skyscrapers and Socotra Island with dragon trees, and Iran with the historic cities of Shiraz, Yazd and Esfahan. The introduction of the single tourist visa will make GCC countries very attractive for cruise passengers, who like to travel without paper formalities and visit several countries during a single trip.⁴⁶

The region is also gaining prominence as an alternative banking centre due to the easy access of local institutions to petrodollars. In 1975 many international banks left, destabilized by the Lebanese civil war, and settled in Bahrain and eventually other regional countries like the UAE. Banking (especially Islamic) remains one of the most important investment sectors in Bahrain and contributes 17 percent to the GDP. There are more than 400 banks and financial institutions in this tiny country.⁴⁷ The rise of financial services was connected with generous consumer loans for citizens, the necessity of South Asian and Filipino workers to remit money home, the need to exchange dollars

and Euro into local currencies by the rising number of tourists and expatriates. Sharia law prohibits economic and financial deals that are risky and based on gambling or on false data, which regional countries decided to use to their advantage. As a result, the Gulf region is considered a scam-free area by international banking institutions and safe for financial operations. Moreover, all principal donors of the underdeveloped Arab world periodically use banks of local countries for charity transactions. In general, GCC countries together with Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia probably have at their disposal 80 percent of world Islamic banking assets.⁴⁸

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Still, the monarchies are not only trying to diversify their economy in order to lessen dependency on oil, but also looking for the ways to protect their wealth from a possible rebellion of the local population. To this end, they make considerable investments in property abroad, shares of profitable Western companies (especially car-making factories) and luxury brands, debt obligations of national treasuries and so on. The USA, as a former main destination of those transactions, is gradually losing attraction. In response to the events of 9/11, when the main perpetrators of terrorist acts came from Saudi Arabia, the American government limited the movement of money, froze suspicious accounts and decided to put Arabs from the desert Kingdom under surveillance. Moreover, an unusually severe economic recession in the USA in 2008 also repelled Arab investors from this market. Europe (especially Great Britain, Switzerland and France) remains a top destination for GCC businessmen. For example, Qatar is considered one of the top investors in London property with such projects as the renovation of the Olympic village, construction of the Shard, the purchase of Harrods, under whose name sheikhs opened luxury hotels with shops in different parts of the world.⁴⁹ Sheikhs also are behind high-profile purchases of famous soccer clubs such as Manchester City, PSG and Malaga, as well as sponsorship of Real Madrid, AC Milan and Arsenal. These investments not only allowed them to put money into safe Western Europe, but also brought advertisement to GCC countries by raising their public profile. For example, the UAE and Qatar companies invested 160 million Euro into shirt sponsorship deals with European clubs in the past year alone.⁵⁰

For GCC states, the key concern is to ensure the security of food supply after the increase of world prices in 2008 and the subsequent refusal of India and China to sell rice abroad. The arid region of Arabian

Peninsula lacks constant rivers and lakes, simultaneously experiencing one of the highest temperatures in the world during summer months. During the 1970s Saudi Arabia undertook extensive water supply projects, intended to attain the necessary level of production of milk, meat and wheat. Its neighbors followed the kingdom's example. Unfortunately, this failed since the water was extremely expensive and had been taken from the Gulf for desalination. This is especially true in the case of Saudi Arabia, which consumes around two-thirds of region's food supply. Today countries rely on desalination facilities with Saudi Arabia considered the world's biggest producer of such water and the UAE the most generous consumer of it per capita. A viable alternative for this expensive technology is water reuse. For example, putting into use a cubic meter of wastewater can cost 20 cents in comparison to one cubic meter for sea water after treatment.⁵¹ The Gulf is becoming increasingly salty due to activity of these plants and as a result, local countries agreed to build several of them on the Omani coast within easy access to Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. The treated water will be transported to other users by long regional pipeline.⁵² In general, GCC countries have the largest capacity responsible for salt water treatment, since they control at least 35 percent of such plants.⁵³ Moreover, GCC members are investing funds in plots of land in Africa (Northern Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt, Tanzania, and Kenya), South Asia and Eastern Europe so as to not depend upon volatile agricultural prices. On the other hand, new investors in Africa have already met stiff resistance with an impoverished local population, socially-oriented decisions of countries to additionally tax the harvests from the Arab-leased land, regional conflicts, tropical diseases and local currency volatility.⁵⁴ They also have to endure competition from Indian, Chinese, Korean and Brazilian farmers willing to work here. The safer bet is Turkey, whose agribusiness companies are bought by GCC investors in order to supply food to the Gulf market.

Since oil is not a renewable resource and crude oil is extensively burned to generate electricity, GCC countries are still looking for ways to develop green energy projects. Direct sun radiation allows companies in the Arabian Peninsula to not only generate electricity during the whole year, but also sell it abroad. The emirate of Abu Dhabi is building Mazdar, the city of future, where 85 percent of demands are satisfied by sun and wind energy due to the work of solar panels. All water is recycled and wind-catchers in towers (like ancient structures

in Persia) cool the air inside of buildings. Simultaneously, neighboring Dubai decided to create a 3.2 billion dollar facility called Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park with a capacity of one gigawatt.⁵⁵ Many capital cities in the Gulf are increasingly adopting energy-efficient high-rise buildings, which use the power of sun rays. Moreover, Iran's nuclear program has caused a chain reaction in the region and today the UAE and Saudi Arabia are going to build several nuclear plants in response. For example, emirate of Abu Dhabi allocated some 20 billion dollars in order to construct four nuclear reactors by 2020 with South Korean assistance. By this time, the emirate intends to satisfy 25 percent of electricity needs with atomic energy and sell surplus oil abroad.⁵⁶

Regional integration can be considered a suitable step for further diversification of economy. The Gulf Cooperation Council was established in 1981 as a response to the Iran-Iraq war. Today Gulf nationals can travel to any of the GCC countries only with an identity card. The customs union in 2003 envisaged the introduction of a five percent protective tax for imported goods from other regions and no taxes in trade between GCC members. Since 2009, when electricity nets were interconnected, it helped to avert more than 1073 blackouts during hot summer months.⁵⁷ The countries want to increase the overland connectivity by building railway systems in order to intensify movement of goods, people and services. Moreover, it can be considered as a uniting factor for different nomad tribes.

Despite considerable oil wealth, every country in the region is developing its own model of economic diversification. Oil-poor Dubai and Bahrain lead the Gulf in this respect, but other countries are also actively engaged in this activity under the influence of the Arab Spring, the volatility of world oil prices in 2014-2016 and the shortage food supply from main agricultural markets. Today, the young and unemployed population of the GCC region is considered by economists not as a threat, but as an opportunity to escape from the rentier economy and limits of petroleum-dependent states. Sovereign wealth funds, oversaturated with petrodollars, are used as the main vehicles of growth of alternative industries and worldwide expansion of commercial interests of GCC countries. Saudi Arabia is betting on the development of religious tourism and creation of industrial cities in the desert, the UAE, Oman and Bahrain are improving banking, transportation and tourism services, Qatar is investing in Great Britain and is turning it-

self into the main educational and sport hub of the region and both the UAE and Qatar have created airlines with a global reach. There is a life and development without oil and gas in the Gulf and local countries are trying to prove it. Above all, ruling families should cut generous subsidies and introduce different taxes in order to overcome budget deficits in the event low oil prices are still in force.



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The Challenge from Merkel's Right

An Alternative for Germany and an Alliance for Progress and Renewal in Bavaria and Eastern Germany

Richard R. Moeller

In the past three years two new political parties have been established in Germany. Both parties approach recent economic, social and civil issues from the political Right. The Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) can indeed be viewed further to the right than the Alliance for Progress and Renewal (Allianz für Fortschritt und Aufbruch, ALFA), yet each notably exists in spite of Angela Merkel's (Chancellor of Germany) Christian Democratic Union party (CDU). Moreover, each has emerged under the direction of the same political figure. Current political discord within Germany today regarding the European Union as well as migration has empowered the two parties to advance a populist or even nationalist approach to gather strength in German national and state elections.

This article addresses the unique reasons for the overall division among the established Centre-Right parties in Bavaria and Eastern Germany. It also attempts to answer the question whether the Centre-Right will make accommodations to the new parties. Otherwise, there is a question as to whether the Alternative for Germany and Alliance for Progress and Renewal will fail since, for personal reasons, they lack any kind of relationship. Along the same line, this article ex-

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amines the similarities and differences of the two new parties as well as their ability to garner votes for 2017.

Keywords: Germany, European Union, Alternative for Germany, Alliance for Progress and Renewal, Eastern Germany, Bavaria

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A Political Shift of the Extremes

The year 2016 has seen political cleavages in Germany widen as never before. Unlike other states of Europe, Germany has, for all intents and purposes, been able to deliver a congenial and stable political system since May of 1949. In fact, the parliamentary 'German Model' has been borrowed by more than a few states following the end of the Cold War. In their 1967 seminal work, Lipset and Rokkan argued that parties in (then Western) European republics were 'frozen' or connected to the centre.¹ This was challenged a year later from the Left. Historically in Germany, according to Markovits and Gorski, extremes in the form of political parties and especially political movements had been from Leftist groups that some have referred to as 'Extra parliamentary opposition' (*Ausserparlamentarische Opposition*) and 'the K-groups', or *Kommunistische Gruppen*.² These earlier extremes have been moderated a great deal as a result of their political success (pragmatic *68ers* are now part of national, state and local governance), economic solidity has increased, energy responsibility has become a priority, and federal military trepidation in world conflicts is the norm. Today the opposite is true, the angst of German opposition is coming from the Right and they are becoming too substantial and broad to ignore. Along the same line, Centre-Right parties have now won at least ten per cent of the vote in five of Germany's 16 state parliaments. In the 2016 Eastern German Saxony-Anhalt state election, the Right, in the form of the AfD, won an astounding 24.2 per cent of the vote.³ How did Germany get here and why are the results more pronounced in Bavaria and in the Eastern (*Länder*) states?

2012 – 2015: Where did it Begin? Bavaria.

According to Professor Hans-Gerd Jaschke, politically disaffected Germans can be linked to Bavaria early on. Jaschke stresses that with small citizens' movements on the Right rising and falling throughout the

1990s, populist groups went looking for a stable substitute beginning in 2005.⁴ There are various theories regarding the dissolution of Bavarians with the traditional notions of social democracy and collective institutions of the state. The push to the Right in the last few years, however, has not been driven by debate. It is driven by vague concepts about 'nation' as well as various everyday policies that divide Germans and have, consequently, created modern populist movements on the Right. These differences are a strange mixture of cultural values (e.g. refugees) and tangible positions (e.g. Euro). Moreover, theoretical disputes of the 'old Right' like religion play a smaller role in modern Germany than before. With that, it can be argued that when the 'old Right' began to morph into the 'new Right', the Bavarians were front and centre.

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Despite the fact that German Basic Law does not grant any *Länder* a distinctive status in the way that Spanish or Italian ones do,⁵ Bavaria has a distinctive history that requires some sort of recognition. According to Bavarian historians and the official Bavarian state narrative, Bavaria constitutes 'one of the oldest European states.'⁶ Scholars have traced a long historical lineage, starting with the establishment of a Bavarian dukedom in 554, and later its transformation into a kingdom by Napoleon in 1806. After the Wars of German Unification of 1866–71, Bavaria became absorbed into a German Empire dominated by Bismarck, which created a strong sense of resentment of Prussia that persists to this day.⁷ This came to an end in November 1918 with the establishment of a Bavarian *Freistaat* by Kurt Eisner's Independent Socialist Party,⁸ which ended quickly and violently.⁹ This affair in Bavarian history cemented a distrust of socialism, with Bavarians soon going to the opposite extreme by supporting Hitler's anti-Communist position. After the capitulation of the German army in 1945, Bavaria came under the control of an American military government. The lack of a solid German political structure at this time gave Bavaria the opportunity to establish its autonomy by creating a Bavarian constitution that celebrated Bavaria's 'thousand-year' history, tradition of statehood and sense of identity.¹⁰

Steve Padgett and Tony Burkett noted that uniqueness is the driving force of the dominant Bavarian party – the Christian Social Union (CSU). At its inception in 1945, the aims of the CSU were clear: to protect Bavaria's special interests, unique identity and culture with as much political autonomy as possible while still supporting federalism. The

CSU saw then and still see today Bavaria as a cultural 'nation'. For example, the CSU uses the word *Heimat* for Bavaria and asserts that this uniqueness be recognised in Germany.¹¹ In the mid-20th Century, the religious component in Bavarian party politics as well as the territorial exclusivity was central to understanding the strength of the CSU. In fact, the main political traditions in Bavaria have been identified as 'Catholicism and separatism'.¹² This was further demonstrated by the micro-party Bavarian Party (*Bayernpartei*), an independence-seeking nationalist party that once took up to 30 per cent of the vote in the 1950s, but which has been reduced to less than five per cent since.¹³ Today, the zenith of religious influence with the party has passed.

As an example, a marginal split occurred in the late 1990s between the CDU and CSU when the German government, controlled by SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, promoted a law pushed by the Greens, (*Die Grünen*) in August 2001 to create registered partnerships giving same-sex couple protections similar to those of married couples. The law passed, with the CDU remaining relatively silent. Since the vast majority of Germans supported partnership equality, CSU leaders in Bavaria attempted to approach this issue not from an ideological or religious position, but rather the party questioned the implementation and speed of the law. This served as a way to pacify Bavarian Catholics and at the same time maintain the CSU relationship with the CDU. In 2011, the disagreement with the CDU and CSU came to focus on same sex privileges (policy), like insurance, inheritance, and taxation. It was seen by some that it was religion creeping back into the CSU. After all, it was a Christian Party in name, if not a Catholic one. Without a hiccup, the German High Court answered with expansion of gay rights angering many traditional CSU members. The CSU position was, without doubt, a product of religion; yet, at the same time, it also had much to do with Bavarian national self-importance.¹⁴ Nowadays, by all accounts, Right-leaning members of the CSU have new differences, front-burner issues with the CDU, or even Merkel herself, that now occupy the *Zeitgeist* of 2016. For some, the party is now torn between its official sister (the CDU) and the two new upstarts – the AfD and ALFA.¹⁵ These CSU members are represented through those such as Bavaria's Finance Minister Markus Söder who said in late August 2016 that many refugees should be sent back to their countries of origin.¹⁶ This will be addressed further below.

When did it Begin? 2012.

In 2012, the CSU became sceptical regarding the adoption of more Eastern European countries into the Schengen Area. At a European Union meeting in early March, Germany opposed a measure which would have allowed Bulgarian and Romanian citizens to travel passport-free across the Schengen Area. Even though Hans-Peter Friedrich, German Interior Minister and CSU party member, argued that the countries haven't done enough to curtail corruption and organised crime, the German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* accused the CSU of using the party's opposition as a way to fan the flames of anti-immigrant sentiment. The paper stated, 'Friedrich has framed the issue in a way that urges the public to link the Schengen Area with the problem of poverty migration'.¹⁷ Poverty migration was indeed a hot-button issue in Germany in 2012. It was then that Chancellor Merkel began to be pressured from the traditional and 'New' Right as well as the opposition Left.

Moreover, in 2012, Merkel was also still being pressured from the internal East-West differences of her country. An economic research report of *IWH Halle* stated that Germany was facing a dangerous demographic shift¹⁸; Eastern Germany's workforce was decreasing since more working-age people had moved west. This shift led to inequality and poverty.¹⁹ Merkel's government was criticised for adjusting a Dec. 2012 draft of the report by weakening the phrasing of statements about negative outcomes in order to 'mirror Germany's current well-being', as German Economic Minister and Vice Chancellor Philipp Rösler argued.²⁰ Critics called for studies like this to be conducted by an independent economic institute rather than a government committee.²¹ In a *Deutsche Welle* interview, Gerda Hasselfeldt (mentioned above) was asked about the financial goals of her party ahead of the September 2013 elections. Her answers were not in step with that of Chancellor Merkel and the public noticed. She stated that she was disappointed with Merkel's cooperation with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Greens regarding Euro stabilisation and hinted at opposition with the CDU in the years ahead.²²

In the East, during this time, the schism of alienation (along with the shortcomings mentioned above), would contribute to the start of a regressive movement in 2012. Shortly after, Merkel's SPD rival erroneously stated that she lacked a 'passion for Europe' because she grew up in Communist East Germany. Peer Steinbrück stated that it was a lia-

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bility at a time of crisis that the chancellor had not been steeped in the pro-Europe traditions of post-war West Germany. ‘The fact that she until 1989-1990 had a very different personal and political socialisation than those who experienced European integration since the early 1950s ... in my eyes plays a role.’²³ He insisted that he did not mean his remarks as an accusation against her, noting ‘she had no choice whether she grew up on the Eastern or Western side of Germany or Europe.’²⁴ Lothar Bisky, a European Parliament deputy and former head of the Left (*Linke*) party, which has roots in East Germany through the PDS, criticised Steinbrück’s comments. He told the daily *Tagesspiegel* that Steinbrück had managed to alienate millions of East German voters, ‘branding them for life.’²⁵

As early as 2012 and 2013, the failures of the EU were a substantial part of both the CSU platform in Bavaria as well as the CDU platform in the Eastern part of the country. Once investors started differentiating between individual Eurozone member states in terms of risk assessment, the peculiar nature of the European Central Bank as a federal bank that is not guaranteed by a sovereign state (and is prohibited from acting as a lender of last resort) meant that the crisis could not be addressed in the way that a “normal” federal state would have done by printing additional money. Instead, the ECB had stretched its mandate in an *ad hoc* way, seemingly favouring some countries over others and creating discontent all around. In spite of the displeasure of the Bavarians and Eastern Germans with Chancellor Merkel, no real traction had been achieved by the obvious alternative – the Social Democrats.²⁶ Bernd Lucke noticed the weak alternatives and imagined a potential party to the right of the CDU and Angela Merkel.

The AfD from Bernd Lucke to Frauke Petry.

Some scholars like Britta Schellenberg, have attributed the rise of the AfD to a movement inspired by a book that became popular in 2010.²⁷ The book was called *Germany Abolishes Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab)* by Thilo Sarazzin. Interest and even some support for the book came from the daily newspaper the *Bild* as well as the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel*. According to the book, a population problem existed in Germany. This problem related to the decline of the intelligent upper-classes in Germany coupled with the rise of the population among the lower classes in Germany, in large part with Muslim immigrants.

The book even hinted at programmes that may help to fix this trend. Some interpreted that these programmes as a call for eugenics - a deliberate attempt to populate Germany with more intelligent people. This of course, was troubling to many because of Germany's past. It is doubtful that Bernd Lucke was motivated by this book because he was, for all intents and purposes, an anti-European Stability Mechanism (ESM), fiscally focused professor who saw the bureaucracy in Brussels and the single currency as key problems.

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According to populist scholar Kai Arzheimer, Bernd Lucke formed the AfD in 2013 with an overarching theme of Euroscepticism.²⁸ Without doubt, the immigration and migration issues were there; however for Lucke, the main argument for forming a new political party to the right of Merkel was economic. Bernd Lucke was nicknamed as a 'sour (*sauer*) professor' for his anti-EU (more specifically anti-Euro) position. Lucke responded to this boorish nickname early on with 'Not so. It was disappointment'.²⁹ Bernd Lucke became involved in conservative politics at a young age and joined the youth group of the CDU at the age of fourteen. He admired Heiner Geißler³⁰ for his direction in the 1980s - moving many youth in the CDU to the right politically. By 2001, Geißler had joined the movement Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions to Assist the Citizen (ATTAC) which attempted to tax large corporations to support average citizens.³¹ ATTAC was an early anti-globalisation, pro-national sovereignty movement that would focus its ire on the EU as it became an increasingly political supranational endeavour. ATTAC leaders insisted that they favoured greater global integration, but in a quite different way promoted by the International Monetary Fund, WTO and most European governments.³² Lucke was disappointed with the CDU for a slow, but progressive movement in that direction under Merkel's early tenure. He believed that the party had veered too far away from his own views over his 33 years of CDU loyalty, particularly in the course of the global economic and Euro crises.³³

In a 2005 debate about increasing wages to stimulate the domestic economy, Lucke and his like-minded colleagues prearranged for 243 academics to sign a letter that ran in *Die Welt* newspaper, criticizing pledges of higher wages by the SPD and warning of a 'deep structural crisis that requires drastic and painful reforms'.³⁴ They highlighted the need for economic realism and attacked the use of class warfare rhetoric that might frighten investors away from Germany. When the

Eurozone moved to replace the temporary bailout fund with the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2011, Lucke founded the 'Plenum of Economists', a unit that was critical of SPD and CDU measures. Despite Lucke's ideas being well-received in academic circles, his words fell flat and had no impact with the public, and so his only choice, he felt, was to establish his own political party.

Many were surprised that a party politically to the right of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats could establish itself so quickly in 21st century Germany. This somehow seemed unique³⁵ because of the German war experience coupled with the failure of movements of the Right in Bavaria and arrangements of the Eastern states. Indeed, the AfD was and still is one of several parties using the idea of Euroscepticism to mobilise nationalist sentiment. UKIP of Britain's Nigel Farage, the *Vrijheid* of the Dutch's Geert Wilders and the National Front of Marine Le Pen in France were at this time harnessing even larger reactions of threats and loss in order to attract voters to their parties. In hindsight, the cultural issues revolving around what it was to be British, Dutch or French with the aforementioned parties was not close to the centre of Lucke's AfD. It would become so with Frauke Petry in 2015. Lucke would attempt to recover.

The ALFA Subsidiary.

According to author Michael Jankowski, ALFA has struggled as a go-between party with the CDU and the AfD.³⁶ Lucke has attempted to position his Eurosceptic party as another 'alternative' populist organisation maintaining a couple of rejections: no to the Euro currency and no to xenophobia. For example, as he left his first alternative, Lucke sent a letter to Reuters News Service calling out the AfD. His concern was that it was becoming 'Islamophobic and xenophobic'. He also highlighted anti-Western, pro-Russian leanings and growing public criticism of the United States by AfD members.³⁷ There seems to be little room for these vague positions as the AfD with a two-year head start (created by Lucke himself ironically) has stolen the limelight and the votes. Moreover, his focus has apparently been with the states in the north and west of Germany with CDU dominance of the Centre-Right there, rather than with Bavaria and the Eastern states. Despite the Brexit of June 2016 in the United Kingdom and denial of UKIP of being bigoted towards immigrants (and to a lesser degree than Germany

of migration from the Middle East), ALFA has failed to piggyback on the anti-EU illiberal Brussels momentum. Migration is not ignored, however, within the context of its policies. Yet unlike the AfD, ALFA approaches the issue with great caution and directs its connection to migration from an economic standpoint crouching it with weak economic state support from Germany stating in official language that the '[C]rises of unprecedented dimensions in Europe make Germany the destination of an endless stream of migrants and the willing paymaster of frail Eurozone countries. The German government has lost control or lost its mind, most likely both'.³⁸

It was in July of 2015 that Bernd Lucke founded ALFA after being ousted by his own AfD. As mentioned above, he quit the AfD arguing it was becoming increasingly xenophobic. Lucke, one of seven AfDers to be elected MEPs in 2014, said the new party would be called the Alliance for Progress and Renewal. Soon after, the AfD climbed to nearly ten per cent in German opinion polls.³⁹ Lucke, seen as too mediocre, was replaced by the more unconventional Frauke Petry after a power struggle over the party's direction. Lucke had tried and failed to stop the AfD from focusing on anti-immigration policies and stick to economic and democratic policy positions. Petry was known in the Eastern state of Saxony, where the anti-immigration and anti-Islamisation movement, PEGIDA, sprang up in 2014. Lucke was elected chairman of ALFA by 70 people at a founding conference in Kassel in central Germany. He assured others that more than 5,000 people had shown an interest in the new party using *Weckruf 2015* (Wake-up 2015) as his social media mantra. Lucke primarily founded the AfD to oppose Eurozone bailouts, yet his AfD colleagues were displeased that he wanted to focus exclusively on Euro-related issues. Adding to the current problems, Centre-Left SPD politician Ralf Stegner said his party would have nothing to do with the new party, dismissing ALFA as Right-wing populists.⁴⁰ The new party has not ingratiated itself with the CDU or SPD (and of course the AfD) by stating:

This is why on July 19, 2015 we formed the Alliance for Progress and Renewal (ALFA). We can no longer count on the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU), increasingly drifting leftward to the socialists (SPD). Neither is the answer the increasingly nationalistic Alternative for Deutschland Party (AfD), openly xenophobic, friendly with Russia's Putin and hostile towards the US and the idea of free trade and free markets. These are

policies which have failed in the past and they will fail again. We need policies for Germany's future.⁴¹

ALFA may never harmonise policies with the CSU and the AfD over the issue of Russia's position in a broad European context. Lucke's party states '[w]e seek close ties to the West, firmly withstanding irresponsible threats to Europe by Russian leaders seeking to rebuild their former empire'.⁴² Conversely, Frauke Petry has stated:

You see, we think this sort of a change in behaviour of the German Federal government is something that concerns us, as a new political party, very much, because we think that Germany's task, Germany's issue, not only with Russia but with the European community [*sic*], not just with the US, is to function as a balancing partner. We still think that Russia should be regarded and treated as a priority partner and it should be Germany moving that sort of relationship forward.⁴³

As ALFA tries to grow, the party, just two years its senior, continues to belittle it. Uwe Junge, a former CDU member and now a leading figure in AfD politics, quipped when asked if a rapprochement with the party ALFA or Bernd Lucke was possible: 'ALFA is nothing. It is very small and represents practically nothing. This party doesn't have any future. Bernd Lucke doesn't have the social capacity and cannot lead correctly. He is an autocrat'.⁴⁴

2016 and Beyond: The AfD in Bavaria

Franz-Josef Strauss argued that 'there was nothing to the right of the CSU except a wall' - a wall that couldn't be breached. But in 2016, things have indeed changed and the ideological and partisan wall has been formally breached. Many have argued that Angela Merkel is too 'social' democratic for those who have attempted to form these Centre-Right or Right-wing parties and with that comes hostility for her policies especially in Bavaria. In response, one of the ways in which Merkel's government has tried to frame the AfD (and thus, keep Right-leaning CSU members from joining the AfD or voting for AfD policies), is to portray the upstart party as obsessed with foreign invaders from conflict states and rife with wholesale racism that runs deep within the party.

Indeed, the Right flock to the AfD because they have no other practical alternative (not since 2011 when the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NDP) restructured) coupled with the rise of the AfD in

2013.⁴⁵ This is the reality that is unique to Germany, but not unique to Europe. Europe has been and is still filled with hard Right-wing parties. However, it is fair to admit that during the debate for Britain's exit from the EU, many Right-wing voices in the United Kingdom (England really) came out to add to the cacophony of voices calling for prejudiced policies to be implemented by government. An example of the typical and repeated answer that Petry has given regarding the allegation (from within and outside of Germany – in this case from Merkel herself) that the party is simply racist is this:

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You see, that's a rather simple conclusion of what's happening in Germany, but I can understand why Angela Merkel tries to simply put it down to the migration and the refugee crisis ... [N]aturally the people in Germany are waking up, realizing that our Chancellor has given up the sovereignty of the country, she has given up our borders, she has given up our rules and regulations by simply letting everybody in; so, that this makes people angry. This "fairy-tale of migrants" coming to Germany and being the enriching factor for the economy has been proven to be false and there are no concepts from our government on how to deal with the situation.⁴⁶

After the multiple terrorist attacks in Bavaria in July 2016, both sides and their positions are being put to the test especially after state elections in September where the AfD garnered a higher percentage than the CDU in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.⁴⁷ How these terrorist attacks will play out in elections is not too hard to predict. The AfD will gain strength. Germans like those in the oft violent *AntiFa* movements will do their best to shut down debate and perhaps elections for the better cause of keeping the past of Germany from becoming present and or future. Despite protests from the Left, there is a strange wind in the air as spring 2017 approaches regarding the migration issue. Even SPD Sigmar Gabriel, the leader of Merkel's coalition partner, stated in an interview with *ZDF* that the CDU had underestimated the challenge of integrating migrants. The CSU has broken away as well. As alluded to earlier, Bavarian Finance Minister Markus Söder, not wanting to encourage family reunions in Germany, argued that German officials should push for the "return of several hundreds of thousands of refugees in the next three years."⁴⁸ Despite polling showing the CSU as a strong political organisation in Bavaria, ideals like cultural importance and the independent social nature of Bavarians has some in the *Land*

attracted to ideas between the two new upstart parties and the CSU ahead of 2017. A 2016 *Spiegel* article entitled “The AfD Wedge: Bavarian Conservatives Weigh Split from Merkel’s CDU” begins with an ominous statement: “The rise of the right-wing populist AfD has driven a wedge between Merkel’s Christian Democrats and their Bavarian sister party. The CSU is now threatening to go it alone, with officials saying they may campaign against the chancellor in the 2017 election.”⁴⁹

In May of 2016, CSU leader Horst Seehofer presented a graphic showing the degree of migrant movement into Germany. Seehofer was appalled by the chancellor’s migration positions and excuses. He noted that after Sept. 5, 2015, when the chancellor opened German borders to those migrants stranded in Hungary, the numbers spiked. Seehofer then pointed out on the graph the day Macedonia closed its borders. The CSU leader noted that then, the numbers of refugees plunged. Seehofer’s presentation was an effort to show that his understanding of the migration of people was correct and that Merkel’s claim that her Hungary decision (and the “shameful selfies” she took with refugees) played no role in attracting migrants to Germany was, in fact, incorrect. He disputed her claim that they were on their way anyway. Yet Seehofer was also trying to get Merkel to change her entire approach. Senior CSU member and German Transportation Minister Alexander Dobrindt argued thereafter that the lesson of the rise of the AfD on issues like migration should focus German conservatives, essentially the CDU leadership, on more conservative CSU positions to keep the party faithful in the ‘sisterhood’ and not align with parties like the AfD.

The posturing of the CSU (Seehofer and his ilk) makes for interesting hypotheticals as 2017 begins. He made his point, albeit with some ambiguity: should the CDU not follow ‘our’ (CSU) lead, the CSU could run its own campaign for 2017. Seehofer himself would then become the party’s candidate in the federal election of 2017, which would be unprecedented. The CSU has always campaigned by the side of the CDU and the two parties have always collectively supported a single candidate for chancellor. In the past, there have been chancellor candidates from the CSU, but they have been supported by the CDU leadership. There has never been a situation where the CSU has its own candidate running against a CDU incumbent. There are many who would like to see such a challenge to the Right of Merkel on a national stage. The CSU acronym only appears on Bavarian ballots, yet a recent poll by *Infratest Dimap* found that 45 per cent of Germans would welcome a na-

tionwide expansion of the CSU with 40 per cent against an expansion. Practically, such a move would not be likely. Indeed, Seehofer campaigning as the CSU's national candidate next year would hurt both parties. There is talk that in the future, however, a CSU member on the national ballot would make it clear to Bavarian voters that they were supporting "CSU values," rather than a broad German position just a bit to the Right of the SPD. Some CSU supporters argue that it would clarify that the CSU would not play the traditional role as CDU advocate, but rather function as an assurance that Merkel/CDU would not be able to push policies that did not take into consideration Bavarian interests.⁵⁰

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There are, in fact, indications that Merkel is prepared to accommodate the CSU despite advisors that are convinced that the CDU would lose more voters in the Centre than it would gain on the Right if it was to adopt moderate CSU positions. As mentioned, Merkel views AfD supporters to be completely isolated. Also, advisors to Merkel note that the majority of AfD voters have not voted in previous elections, and in the election of 2013, Merkel was successful in pocketing votes from the Left. The CDU grabbed over 600,000 votes nationwide from the Green Party and from the SPD back then. However, Merkel has made conciliatory moves relating to the migrant crisis and has sought to close off routes to Europe with the help of Turkey.⁵¹ But she refuses to move her party on almost all other issues to the Right. CDU General Secretary Peter Tauber stated, 'The CDU sees itself confirmed in its choice to occupy the political centre.'

The AfD in Eastern Germany

Cornelia Hildebrandt in a journal article about the German Left Party notes that Eastern Germany has never been monolithic regarding policy or party. Notably, a strong ideological divide surrounds those who desire a new type of populism whether on the Left or Right.⁵² The AfD connection to the Eastern part of Germany is essentially articulated by the party through, what they see as, a fight for citizen democracy. In an interview, Uwe Junge, a former CDU member and now a leading figure in AfD politics in Rhineland-Palatinate connected the East and AfD dots by responding to a question from the Belgium based *Global Independent Analytics* that asked: 'Why is there such a huge difference between East and West in Germany for [national] patriots? Why are they strong in the East, where they had Communism before, and not

in the West?’ Junge answered, ‘In the East, the people did huge demonstrations in 1989. They have a culture of it. They are more sensitive to the fact that the system tries to silence the people. They are more socialised. In the West, we stay at home in front of the television.’⁵³

Scholars like Robert Grimm noted that the AfD sees patriotic promise in Germany.⁵⁴ This is especially true in East Germany. Contrarians, however, particularly within the SPD and in the West generally, would assert that AfD patriotism, represents jingoistic attitudes and are therefore dangerous to Germany. Uwe Junge argued however, ‘[f]or years, the German patriotic political field was a kind of a desert. In the Eastern part of the country, the patriotic family had to face, on one side, competition of the very radical nationalist NPD party and the less radical DVU. These two parties merged in January 2011. And on the other side the rivalry of the nationalist wing of the CDU as articulated by Erika Steinbach or Henry Nitzsche. The patriotic field of the German political landscape in the next years can only be occupied by two parties: the very soft patriotic ALFA and the AfD, which is becoming more and more patriotic.’⁵⁵

The Russian issue (highlighted above) that pits the AfD against ALFA has promoted greater success in Eastern Germany for the AfD. In a *Russia Today* interview, Frauke Petry warned about how the EU-guided sanctions endorsed by ALFA will only hurt Germans in the East. She stated:

We can calculate the degrees in economic growth in Germany. Economists reckon that with the sanctions against Russia we losing something like one per cent of our economic growth. This is a severe problem, especially in the East of Germany, but not only there. Whenever I go through the regions of Germany I find many people, many citizens, entrepreneurs, all sorts of small- and medium-sized companies who tell me that they suffer from these sanctions. So, I think, that slowly but gradually this message also gets to our government politicians - but, I think, it’s getting there far too slow.⁵⁶

The most notable growth of the AfD in the east of Germany comes from Germany’s disenfranchised youth. The statistics compiled by the *German Institute for Economic Research* and Humboldt University were surprising in themselves with nearly twenty per cent support; however, as one extrapolates towards the future, especially with young German men in the East, the upturn of support and even the long-term survival

of a new “radical” party on the Right seems indisputable. “The study, which drew on interviews with more than 40,000 people who have supported a political party over a long period of time, election results, opinion polls and political surveys, also found that AfD supporters tend to be mostly male, under 30, unemployed, poorly educated and living in the East of Germany.”⁵⁷

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Even Nigel Farage got into the personal motivations of the chancellor of Germany – insinuating that her upbringing in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) should make her more sympathetic to the Eastern half of Europe along with her pre-established allies found in the West. He blamed the problems that the entire European continent is having on her decision in 2015 to open the borders and allow the migration movement to move forward. His words were ‘when she said as many migrants that wanted to cross the Mediterranean and come to Europe ... you’re all welcome! And she was doing that not just on behalf of Germany but actually on behalf of the whole of the EU. I think it was the biggest policy failure we’ve seen in the Western world for many many decades.’⁵⁸

As 2017 arrives, revisiting the various polling organisations, through *Der Spiegel*, or other outlets in order to monitor the ‘strength’, ‘threat’, ‘patriotism’, or ‘hate’ as one may see it, the AfD is something to watch. Having never been seen in Germany before (at least with constitutional legitimacy), this phenomenon will occupy the minds of any student or scholar of German Politics until the election in 2017. The federal election result will fill some seats with these new opponents to the status quo. Like it or not, there are reasons that German citizens think there is a void to fill and this is, and will be, a challenge from Merkel’s right.

Conclusion

The populist movements on the Right are not just a fad in Europe or more specifically, in Germany today. In fact, as 2017 approaches, these two new parties (especially the AfD) will be able to position themselves on the margins leading up to the elections of the Federal Republic. Moreover, the AfD will be a formidable player. Whether the AfD can act as a coalition spoiler remains dubious. In most ways, the AfD’s chances to participate in government will be up to the success or failure of the CDU and Angela Merkel. If the CDU can generate a high

plurality of the votes next year, the AfD will remain on the fringes. After all, no major party will negotiate with the AfD as they have stated in the recent past. Yet it appears that the AfD will pass the percentage hurdle required by the *Grundgesetz* and pick up seats. What's more, historically, fringe parties have moderated themselves as they work in parliamentary systems. This generalised fact has some in Germany hopeful. Yet some fear that parties on the Left may adopt 'AfD light' positions as part of an à la carte political menu.

Specifically, the AfD is at a turning point in relation to its future. Furthermore, it seems that time is on the side of the Right in Germany as 2017 looms since the 'problems' that have propelled the party forward will not go away any time soon. As three journalists for *Der Spiegel*, Melanie Amann, Ralf Neukirch and René Pfister, wrote:

Merkel is hoping that AfD will destroy itself, either as a function of internal party differences or by moving too far to the right. Both are rather vague hopes. As an internal study undertaken by the CDU think tank *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* recently concluded: 'Following the split at the (summer 2015) party convention in Essen, AfD has stabilised.' At the membership meeting two weekends ago [April of 2016] in Stuttgart, the report concludes, 'party leadership successfully avoided an open outbreak of significant personal conflicts and the conflict between the base and the party elite.' AfD leadership was clever enough to block the most radical proposed additions to the party platform - such as the call for a minimum of 200,000 deportations per year and Germany's withdrawal from NATO. In the past, there have been several reasons why no right-wing party has become established in Germany. One of those was that admitting to voting for a party such as the NPD or the Republikaner was akin to civic death. With AfD, though, that has changed.⁵⁹

After all, the pre-eminence of the two major parties, linked with the *AntiFa* movement, has acted as a kind of social bulwark which has kept ALFA and the AfD on the fringes of political legitimacy or even recognition. Indeed, ALFA remains, for all intents and purposes, isolated as it attempts to find an angle to gain support. If, however, the AfD collects over ten per cent in 2017, Germany will have to handle the juxtaposition of a mainstream rebuke of the AfD coupled with its electoral accomplishments. For most Germans, it will be a bitter pill to swallow. It may even

divide the Western/Northern and Eastern/Southern parts of the nation further. In the end, Bavarian nonalignment paired with Eastern dissatisfaction may bring about a German parliamentary system with some new peripheral players where many thought there would never be – on the Right.

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*The Challenge
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The Role of Internet Based Social Networks in Russian Protest Movement Mobilization

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One of the unmistakable characteristics of Russia's 'White House' uprising that led to the regime change in August of 1991 was its broad popular support. The political upheaval that initially found a buttress in Muscovite urban middle classes soon transcended all social strata and geography ending dominance of the Communist Party in Russia. However, the mass protests in opposition to authoritarian rule that gained energy in 2011 has failed to generate the same momentum necessary to unite diverse social and political classes and topple the ruling regime. In both cases, social Networks of communication played an important role in the evolution of contentious politics because they connected actors across space, facilitated communication, exchanged information on tactics and strategies, and produced new knowledge. However, it is not clear exactly how such social networks interacted with other contextual factors to bring about a national protest movement of sufficient proportions to topple an authoritarian regime. Drawing on evidence from the popular protests in the Russian Federation between 2011 and 2014, surveys conducted among quiescent citizens, participants in popular protest and digital activists, this paper argues that social media (1) allowed a "digital activists" to form personal networks that initially circumvented the national media narrative by brokering information for outside mainstream media; (2) helped to



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overcome the “free rider” problem of collective action by catalyzing anger-frustration and reporting the magnitude of protest events; and (3) contributed in the formation of a collective identity supportive of protest activity that transcended geographical and socio-economic disparities by providing a shared, mobilizing element of emotional grievance; (4) the internet based social networks have failed to produce results exemplified by Twitter and Facebook revolutions of the Arab Spring, and effect regime change in the Russian Federation or make tangible impact on domestic policies.

Keywords: information, communication, social networks, mobilization, protest, civic-activism

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Introduction

Since the beginning of this century, the role of Internet-based Social Networks (hereafter referred to as ISN), as a conduit for information has sufficiently preoccupied researchers as well as practitioners applying this tool to a wide spectrum of civic and coercive functions. From entertainment and education, to political communication and participation, from application to patterns of protest diffusion to application in unconventional means of compelling populations do one’s will, Internet-based technologies have proven to be indispensable. Those aspects have resonated throughout the research conducted primarily in the context of consolidated Western democracies and has focused on system-supporting forms of political participation activities designed to influence the action of governments. With the evolution of Internet-based technologies, special emphasis in political science literature was placed on the interaction between digital content and the political process at the micro- and meso- levels of individual and group behavior.

There is a broad scholarly consensus that the ISN not only influence political engagement of the individual consumer of digital content, but also expanded the collective action by organized groups.^{1,2,3,4} Nevertheless, difficulties associated with the impact of the ISN on political participation reside in our ability to separate its impacts from standard predictors, such as social capital, education, and political interest.^{5,6}

The impact of the ISN on the formation of social capital as a predictor of political participation has been covered in political science literature that emerged in recent years.^{7,8,9} A number of researchers reflect on the role played by ISN in the rise of a model of often leaderless networked organizations based on decentralized coordination among diverse and globally expansive collective actors.^{10,11,12,13} Political science literature presents compelling evidence for the role of ISN ameliorating in the mobilization of a social movement. However, meta-analysis by Boulianne points to a very modest impact of the Internet on political participation.¹⁴

The literature draws a clear distinction between protests in a democratic state and those occurring under authoritarian rule. Mayer and Tarrow stipulate that the protest under conditions of democracy constitutes a central element of mainstream politics for the purpose of voicing dissent from the political status quo.¹⁵ On the opposite side of the spectrum, under authoritarian rule civil protest is severely constrained. From the resource view of mobilization under authoritarian rule, discontents, unlike elites, have no access to utilitarian or coercive resources while subjected to repression and information asymmetries by autocrats, thus limiting the ability of discontents to advance their interests through collective action. Hence the opportunity-threat balance is consistently skewed in favor of elites and the only strength of the ordinary citizens resides in numbers.

The broad spectrum of literature infers that public protest under authoritarianism will be rare, spontaneous, politically and geographically isolated, and will largely occur without coordination through organized social movements.^{16,17,18} The political economist Geddes explains the breakdown of authoritarian regimes by pointing out the role of elites and ruling coalitions.^{19,20} However, McFaul stresses the occurrence of massive acts of civil protests as a distinctive feature of contemporary collective action that contrasts elite-driven waves of democratic transition.²¹ To discern the role ISN play in mobilization of anti-authoritarian protest and political engagement in the Russian Federation we turn our attention to literature that provides a glimpse into interaction between collective action and application of the ISN in massive acts of civil protests that occurred in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

In MENA states, continued support for authoritarian rule from conservative, risk-averse middle classes, especially state employees and small-to-medium business entrepreneurs has been interpreted as related to high levels of regional conflict, a perceived potential for democracy to lead to increased civil strife deriving from sectarian or religious cleavages, as well as fears regarding the potential empowerment of Islamist parties seeking to reverse liberal economic reform.²² In this respect, the perception of the MENA region's middle classes is congruent to the Marxist conception of the "petite bourgeoisie" – i.e. essentially a class averse to social change considering a vested interest in protecting its financial assets and its standard of living.²³ Despite this constraining factor, the Arab Spring was brought forth by a broad coalition of social forces ranging from uprooted and atomized intellectual elites and urban middle classes to the impecunious strata of the population. This broad coalition of forces greatly benefited from the Internet based technologies conducive to creation of digital convergence spaces, mobilization and dissemination of information.

At the time of the Tahrir Square Revolution, also coined as the Twitter Revolution, according to a report by the Dubai School of Government, only a marginal number of Egyptians had access to the Internet and actively used a Facebook or Twitter account.²⁴ The year of "Tahrir Square Revolution", at least for a time, Facebook posts and tweets created digital convergence space, place where social capital was created. In essence, ISN platforms became some of the most important sources of news in Egypt, as well a tool for coordinating activism and protest.²⁵ This despite the fact that the Mubarak regime interfered with dissemination of information by shutting down the Internet.

Before Tahrir Square, in Tunisia, under similar conditions, a negligible number of active Twitter accounts, handled by youth political activists, may have played a significant role in catalyzing events that led to Jasmine Revolution.²⁶ However, Beamont insists — "despite the claims of Tunisia being a Twitter revolution – or inspired by WikiLeaks – neither played much of a part."²⁷ That said, the scientific community appears united in assessing that role as catalytic at the very least.

Similarly, over the past two decades, the Russian Federation went through its own patch of increased political opposition and protest activity. However, unlike the Arab Spring scenario, the implications of

ISN for strategies of political mobilization, protest diffusion across the vast terrain of the Russian Federation and the influence it has for individual political engagement at the time of political upheaval remained somewhat timorous.

Drawing on research conducted at the Levada Center - a Russian independent, non-governmental polling organization - this paper seeks to test the ability of existing theoretical frameworks to explain popular protest under authoritarianism in the Russian Federation. The methodology will be addressed in the notes pertaining to data presented thereafter. To advance our understanding of this complex dynamical process, the remainder of this article proceeds as follows:

Part 2 provides a brief overview of the major theoretical approaches to protest mobilization and discusses how the Internet based Social Networks fit in with them.

Part 3 defines the political system in the Russian Federation as a fusion of managed democracy and authoritarianism.

Part 4 provides a descriptive account of the activities of networks of protest movements of Russian opposition and pro-government activists.

Part 5 combines individual data on media and Internet based Social Network use and political protest behavior gathered in a number of nationwide surveys conducted primarily at Levada Non-Governmental Polling Center.

Part 6 shows that ISN contributed to popular protest mobilization against the Russian authoritarianism in three main ways: (1) by facilitating the formation of networks of digital activists who challenged the regime's control of the public sphere; (2) by disseminating censored information on human rights violations by the state on the one hand and the magnitude of anti-regime protests on the other. This information enabled Russians to mobilize collective action on the basis of shared grievances and to overcome the barrier of fear associated with protest under authoritarianism; and (3) by enabling the formation of a national collective identity that facilitated intergroup collaboration between socially and geographically distant segments of Russian society by providing elements of emotional mobilization. However, despite considerable contributions to mobilization and operationalization of the opposition protest movement in the Russian Federation, ISN have failed to generate the energy and the spillover effect needed to achieve regime change or affect foreign and domestic policies.

A Brief Discussion of Political Activism Models and the Role of Social Networks in Opposition and Protest Movement Mobilization

Grievance and Relative Deprivation Models

No single political activism model possesses sufficient descriptive and explanatory power into the dynamics of civil strife. Innate and learned human traits assign anger to situations where individuals experience unresolved relative or perceived negative discrepancy between expectations and capabilities with respect to any collectively sought value — economic, psychosocial, political — namely relative deprivation.²⁸ Here, the Grievance and Relative Deprivation models offer a strong starting point for discussion of the mechanics that transform unfulfilled ambitions and material expectations into anger, frustration and resentment which may manifest themselves in an individual propensity to protest. As Gurr infers, 'If anger implies the presence of frustration, there is compelling evidence that frustration is all but universally characteristic of participants in civil strife',²⁹ ISN acts as a conduit for information that contravenes self-serving governments' official narratives and defies information asymmetries set forth by coercive groups; they possess the innate capacity to induce in vast audiences a vicarious distress that stems from the struggles and suffering of the few. Specifically, ISN act as a cognitive amplifier to reactive emotions that cause individuals to take part in civil strife.³⁰

Rational Choice Approach

An attempt by a group to exert influence over a government to achieve favorable changes in policies that address real or perceived inequalities meets the definition of a group's pursuit for a collective good. The Rational Choice theorist Tullock points out that rebellious activities are large scale phenomena, viz., the typical individual contribution is insignificant, and the expected value of the collective good accordingly goes to zero. Once we disregard private benefits, all that are left are the costs.³¹ Hence, the rational choice model challenges a 'grievance approach' already on the premise that grievances appear essentially irrelevant to a self-serving, risk-assessing individual's decision to take part in civil strife. The stipulation implies a lack of incentive for an

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individual to engage in civil strife where benefits for participation are not present; such an individual is expected to maximize his gains by making a rational choice to free-ride on the risks that comrades in strife are exposed to.³² The described phenomena, coined as Tullock's Paradox of Revolution, predict excessive absenteeism and therefore appear at odds with reality. Despite this, the rational choice approach offers a valuable perspective to social networks' application to popular protest mobilization:

For instance, the threshold model for participation in collective action in networks posits that the individual threshold of each person for taking risks depends on the perceived participation of others.³³ Today, information revealing individual decisions to take part in protest activity is disseminated via social networks. Here, those inside the network make their choices and by virtue of doing so encourage others to follow suit. Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni infer that such a precedent has information value that increases with the degree of repressiveness of the regime in power, and a protest's information-revealing potential is maximized as the cost of collective action increases.³⁴ In such an environment, they expect a protest to transmit a strong informative signal that is likely to induce many more citizens to take to the streets and cascade into mass disobedience. In this context, the social networks can influence the individual's cost-benefit calculus regarding protest participation in two ways: First, online content that documents past protest events may trigger informational cascades that lead to mass civil uprisings. Second, the event management features offered by some social network sites (e.g. 'Twitter Hashtag Campaigns', 'Facebook group events') inform users about the prospective turnout in upcoming events.

Resource Mobilization and Social Capital

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) corrects some shortfalls of Resource Mobilization by addressing the irrationality of the individual choosing to engage in collective action. It questions the 'grievance' approach, which emphasizes deprivation and frustration as the primary drivers of popular protest. Instead, resource mobilization and social capital approaches stipulate that open and affluent societies foster contention, thus making protest more common.³⁵ Furthermore, contemporary research in RMT integrates structural and motivational var-

ables. Classical resource mobilization and political process theories, preoccupied with structural characteristics, are complemented with social-psychological and “cultural” insights which give weight to motivational factors.³⁶ The fusion of structural and motivational aspects transcends the role ISN plays in Resource Mobilization and Social Capital. Where the economic development of a nation state is inseparable from the increase in density of communication infrastructure, ISN begins to mirror psychological factors that drive people to engage in contentious politics. In such cases, Internet use is expected to coincide with participatory dynamics that are characterized less by formal relationships in civil society than by spatially dispersed, loosely-knit personal networks that are heavily mediated by electronic communication.³⁷

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From the view of resource mobilization, the main challenge consists of the fact that, unlike the authoritarian state’s coercive group, citizens in opposition to authoritarian government are excluded from control over the coercive powers of the state. In fact, the potential of the opposition resides primarily with the ability to exercise mobilization within large segments of society. However, autocrats use repression and agitprop in countering opposition efforts, hence, citizens are confronted with information asymmetries and receive distorted portrayals of their fellow citizens’ attitudes toward the regime and their disposition to revolt.

ISN provide an invaluable platform for mobilization and operationalization of willing participants in networks with shared interests that facilitate cooperation within and between organized groups. We may surmise that preceding and following the parliamentary election (Duma) held in the Russian Federation in February 2012, given the highly developed Internet communication infrastructure, ISN provided an alternative communication realm which bred an opportunity for protest movement activists to create networks despite heavy state control over the public sphere and the media.

Structural and Network Approach

Critics of rational choice approaches submit its failure to embed the individual in relationships and group affiliations that are crucial in influencing human decision-making. Structural and Network theorists seek to provide explanations of activism that locate its roots outside

the individual, and as being strongly influenced by structural proximity and network connectivity.³⁸ Klanermans and Oagama introduce four successive steps toward successful protest mobilization.³⁹ First, the individual must belong to a mobilization potential, viz., belonging to a pool of people with shared interest and appreciation for a collective action by a particular social movement. It is about the formation of collective identity and a social and political consciousness that allows people to ‘come ideologically closer to a given political issue.’⁴⁰ Second, the individual must be targeted by a mobilization attempt. The operationalization occurs as a result of interaction with a recruiting agent, such as an interested party acting on behalf of the social movement or a body of knowledge pertaining group’s interests and plans for action. Here, our prospect is targeted by a mobilization attempt and will take part in protest activity if and only if he/she is informed of the upcoming protest event. Van Laer operationalizes mobilization attempts in terms of awareness of the upcoming event, leaving the question of a direct, interpersonal link open.⁴¹ Third, the individual must be a willing participant — this cognitive variable touches on the individual propensity to actively engage with a particular social movement. Lastly, the individual must be able to participate. All obstacles that could be preventing the individual from taking an active part in group’s collective action — psychological as well as practical — have been removed.

Within a structural or network paradigm, the successful mobilization process leads to formation of CatNets, a term coined by Harrison White that attempts to describe a set of individuals as a group to the extent that it comprises both a category and a network.⁴² Here, categories are formed by sets of individuals sharing a collective identity and/or particular characteristic, such as race, level of education or affluence; network perhaps can best be defined by Manuel Castell as a set of interconnected nodes that facilitate communications and action.⁴³

As we have seen throughout this section, ‘networks play multiple roles in the process leading to participation, and that they intervene at different moments along this process.’⁴⁴ The likelihood of the individual to become mobilized increases with their degree of embeddedness in ISN. Overlapping network memberships allow information about upcoming protest events to travel beyond the boundaries of a network of hard-core activists and spill over to networks of less engaged citizens.⁴⁵ Within a matrix of ISN proliferate categories of followers that share

a collective identity supportive of political activism; this is achieved through interactions with friends, family and other network members. Collective identities function as selective incentives that motivate protest participation by providing the potential participant with a sense of membership, in-group solidarity, and an oppositional sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’,^{46,47}

As a medium for information dissemination, the Internet communication technologies have significant impact on the transaction cost of protest mobilization; the innate feature of the social network that allows information it transmits to evade government censorship or administrative pressures appears most conducive to its application in targeted online mobilization of protest activities. As individuals join a variety of online networks and begin forming multiple social cyber relations on those networks, the likelihood of their being targeted by an online mobilization movement for protest activity increases regardless of their pursuit of protest-related information circulated in those networks.

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In Conclusion

The social sciences continuously challenge established theories and scientific conjectures through targeted, in-depth studies of individual specific phenomena at the foundation of those theories and conjectures. Such studies enable the researcher to compartmentalize a complex system in which outcomes are determined by interaction of a number of variables, thus offering a plausible causal explanation.⁴⁸ In Russia, preceding and following the Duma and presidential elections of 2011 - 2012, the cost of collective action underwent considerable increase, yet mass protest’s information-revealing potential has failed to maximize, and protest movement never evolved into widespread mass disobedience. In fact, we shall attempt to demonstrate antithetical phenomena — discernible signs of demobilization in protest activity. In Russia, where the Internet based technologies and social networks underwent robust advances, civil strife has expanded neither geographically nor socially, as such, the country provides an interesting case for exploring the contribution of social online networks to the process of nationwide political mobilization across social and geographical boundaries.

Russian Federation, State of Polity

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At the United Russia party congress in Moscow in September of 2011, the President of Russia at that time, Dmitry Medvedev, accepted the offer to head the Edinaiya Rossiya party list in the State Duma December elections. Medvedev also proposed that the congress support the candidacy of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin for president of the Russian Federation.⁴⁹ The announcement sent ripples through the political landscape signaling a conclusion of the landmark consolidation of power by the leadership of the Edinaiya Rossiya party and the return of Vladimir Putin to the role of president of the Russian Federation.

As Ryabov reminds us, according to popular analysis, since the beginning of the new century the political system in Russia has remained monocentric, and the president is the principal political agent whose position largely determines the character and the thrust of political change.⁵⁰ Such a definition is largely supported by the observation that most systemic political movements and organized groups represented in Russia's political landscape in some form or another evolved from the organizational structure and mobilization capabilities of the institutional edifice that once was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the "Edinaiya Rossiya" party being the main beneficiary.⁵¹

Constitutional architecture allows the Russian government to control through legislation which parties have the right to exist and actively participate in public life, legally advance interests of constituencies, and which organized groups will not be afforded rights to legally pursue their interests in the form of a legitimate political party. Here, the polity, defined by Tilly as a collective action that consists of the members and the government, exercise a test for polity membership, for instance, their ability to mobilize or coerce significant number of people representing very specific segments of the society.⁵² Each entry into the polity redefines the criteria for membership designed to advance specific characteristics tied to the extent of common identity or organisational structure of the current set of members elected and represented in the Duma, establishing rules that advance the polity's tactical and strategic goals.⁵³

CatNets are essential to concepts of an organization or organized group; glaringly, the more extensive the common identity and internal networks, the more organized the group. Political parties that pass the test of Russia's modern constitutional architecture have been con-

structured from uniquely congruent CatNets whose leadership can afford to act collectively with the government as one coercive group. Perhaps the main benefit in the collective action of members and government aggregated into a coercive group lays in a group's routine low-cost access to mobilizable resources controlled by the government itself and consolidated control over concentrated means of coercion over relevant populations. Another crucial implication of such an arrangement is the extent of collective identity, multidimensional networking, and interpersonal bonds between actors comprising the coercive group. Here, horizontal linkages unite actors who increasingly share similar values, interests, or force (active participants in public life — members of the Duma); vertical laterals connect those actors to subject populations. As members of the coercive group, these actors coordinate their collective action with the government to advance what they deem to be in their common interest and for the benefit of the nation.

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In a feat of collective action designed to counteract challengers, the ruling political stratum expands control and influence through development and support for a rise to prominence of the unique category — professional, generational politicians — a massive segment within the society gradually metastasizing key democratic institutions. In this process, we recognize the rebirth of the genus *politica*, once amply represented by 'aparatchiki' — a powerful political stratum within Soviet society. Similarly, the ruling political elites use their low-cost access to state and local government resources, including international aid and credit, to expand their influence into the domestic economy, fostering conditions for a proliferation of economic elites with whom political elites have a symbiotic relationship. The product of this social engineering brought about the rebirth of the new bourgeoisie — the upper mildew of Russian society.

Etzioni postulates that all actors in a coercive group evolve committed to each other, but commitments of leaders and followers are asymmetric.⁵⁴ These asymmetries can and have been exploited by aspirants and challengers attempting to expand or achieve membership or prevail in exerting influence over the government. Contenders do not just receive an invitation to join a coercive group. It is the product of an amount of collective action by organized groups, the extent of organization, and opportunity to act, none of which is achievable without mobilization.⁵⁵ It can be inferred that all processes associated

with collective action by contenders and challengers in Russia must be viewed in conjunction with, but not limited to, the information and information services component of the utilitarian resources.

As described, the current state of polity in the Russian Federation is transitional authoritarianism or ‘a mixture of authoritarianism and managed democracy’.^{56,57} Judging by the aforementioned political science literature, we expect the ISN to play an increasingly prominent role in the mobilization of the antiauthoritarian protest movement.

Protest Activity in the Russian Federation

On October 12, 2011, a number of prominent public figures and opposition leaders called for a boycott of Russia’s parliamentary election in December, calling it ‘illegitimate and disgraceful’. Garry Kasparov, leader of the United Civil Front movement, appealed to the masses to ‘consciously ignore cooperation with the current authorities’.⁵⁸ Yet some in the opposition leadership suggested an alternative collective action — that voters participate in the election by ruining their ballot, or vote for any party except for the ruling United Russia group that Putin heads. The leader of the Left Front movement, Sergey Ulatszov stated: ‘Our goal is to invite people into the streets instead of the elections. We have no option left but to the streets’.⁵⁹

According to the Moscow Helsinki Group, in the first nine months of 2011, some 702 public actions were recorded with a number of participants reaching 97,043, of which 1,417 protesters were detained by authorities.⁶⁰

Organized groups exhibiting the most prolific protest actions at the time included ecologists, the Yabloko party, the United Democratic Movement Solidarity, the Left Front socialist movement, and the highly acclaimed non-systemic party Drugaya Rossiya. Names associated with the protest movement of the period included such prominent public figures as Alexey Navalnyi, Boris Akunin, and Vladimir Ryzhkov. The same set of organized groups and activists stood at the onset of the ‘Grazhdanskoe Deystvie’ movement created in January of 2012.⁶¹

All throughout 2012 the tendency for spontaneous unsanctioned rallies escalated. The increase in unsanctioned protest activity correlated with increasingly attenuated responses from law enforcement — a trend widely attributed to a highly unpopular MVD reform.⁶² Pro-

test activities escalated following the day of the Duma election.⁶³ Mass gatherings were becoming a staple in opposition collective action of the time.⁶⁴ Protests largely remained peaceful, though direct, violent confrontations with police did ensue when, for instance, on May 6, 2012 during a scheduled and authorized ‘Million Man March’ in Moscow, a group of activists attacked agents of the state.⁶⁵

May 9, 2012 marks a significant evolution in Russia’s protest movement. On that day, we observed the transformation of manifestation being organized in space to be about space itself. In this sense, the ‘Occupy Abay’ event became more significant than its derivative ‘Mobilnyi Lager’, or the more ephemeral protest movement ‘Narodnye Guliyaniya’, as it finally conveyed a message: ‘as of this moment, we, the opposition, possess this space; in this space, we are in control; we decide who is entitled to be present and perform what kinds of activities.’^{66,67} Here, on Chistoprudnyi Boulevard, the monument to Kazakh poet Abay Kunanbaiyev became a site of contested social and power relations, spatially facilitating an extensive political action. During its short existence, this convergence space experiment presented participants with an opportunity to attempt a different form of self-governance, the management of a space itself and, particularly while the physical occupation was overnight and continuous, of living together.⁶⁸ The convergence space provided for emergence of highly organized Cat-Nets — cohesion of diverse categories of participants, and facilitates development of social networks among previously atomized individuals and organized groups now sharing a common denominator — convergence space. Participants in the physical occupation of the terrain manifested a tendency to respond to external frustrations with greater hostility than randomly formed groups or protest marches.⁶⁹ Just as significant was the response by authorities countering occupier initiative, containing their actions.

Between 2011 and 2012, opposition and protest activity in Russia had reached its apogee. In that brief historic period, Russian organized political movement made substantial strides both in breadth and scope, boldly experimented with ways and means of mobilization, and proactively sought out an opportunity to act and advance collective interests while exhibiting tactically and strategically advantageous choices of locus, timing and message in an effort to influence political discourse in the country. Although in ensuing years opposition and

protest activity exhibited clear signs of demobilization, it revealed no remarkable novelty either in method or in the ability to expand the support base or opportunity.⁷⁰

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Countermovement

Authorities projected their engagement with popular discourse by seemingly encouraging collective actions by organized groups capable of mobilizing massive manifestations while inhibiting protest activities of smaller interest groups likely seeking to engage authorities in violent confrontations.⁷¹ It must be stated that on a number of occasions Vladimir Putin voiced determination to engage the opposition, as well as the active members of society, in direct dialogue. The most recent such statement he made at a meeting with representatives of ‘Silovye Structure’ on March 29, 2015. He reiterated his openness to constructive criticism that targets real or perceived ineptitudes on part of the government. He also stated ‘it doesn’t make sense to engage in discourse with those (in opposition) who act on a lead from outside (abroad) pursuing the interests of a foreign nation, not our own.’⁷² Since President Vladimir Putin’s re-election in 2012, a number of restrictive laws have been enacted in Russia. On July 20, 2012, Russia enacted the Federal Law Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-Commercial Organizations Performing the Function of Foreign Agents, which came into effect on November 21, 2012.⁷³ The law has severe repercussions, thwarting the ability of NGOs, both foreign and domestic, operating within national borders, to fulfill their intended educational and political missions.⁷⁴

A litany of data support allegations of polity exacting collective action to counter the breadth of protest activity and the threat it represented to the collective interests of the coercive group. On January 1st 2012, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) pointed to the illegality of the rejection to register the Republican Party of Vladimir Ryzhkov. Furthermore, ECHR alluded to coercive involvement by the government in the electoral process ‘on all levels’. ECHR notes that ‘the distinction between the state and the governing party was frequently blurred by taking advantage of an office or official position, contrary to Article 46(4) of the Law on State Duma Elections and paragraph 5.4 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document.’⁷⁵

Scores of charges permeated independent press detailing cases of the ruling coalition and government infringement on the opposition's freedom of assembly and right to free speech.^{76,77} The ruling political coalition routinely countered opponents by contrasting its ability to mobilize significant numbers of people in competing events.⁷⁸ Amnesty International reports that, between 2013 - 2014, all protest activities planned and scheduled to be conducted in highly populated areas of Moscow were not approved by authorities. Instead, distant city squares unpopular with Muscovites were offered as alternatives. In the interim, sanctioned, pro-government demonstrations were held in the same areas, where the right to demonstrate was denied to the opposition. Amnesty International points out that pro-government manifestation was often conducted unimpeded in parts of Moscow that are legally closed to public meetings or marches. Such actions by the local authorities constitute serious interference with the right to assembly and attempt to silence the proposed discourse.

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The countermovement to opposition protest activity underlines the government, defined by Tilly as a centralized and differentiated organization, as it possesses not only control over the chief concentrated means of coercion, but also the capacity to assert collective interest of populations it represents by exerting its monopoly on media, including ISN, to mobilize popular support among the population.⁷⁹

A Snapshot of Participation and Support Base for Opposition and Protest Movement in Russian Federation

According to *Novaya Gazeta*, some 102,000 gathered on Sakharov Avenue in Moscow on December 24, 2011 to take part in the event organized and sponsored by the 'For an Honest Election' group.⁸⁰ Statistical data on protest movement and participation were collected by the Levada Analytical Center. A sample of 791, or approximately 0.7%, participated in the Levada poll. The poll revealed that males dominated the scene with 60% participation. The overwhelming majority of protesters were of working age (25 to 55 years old), with some 25% under 25 and 22% over 55 years old. The overwhelming majority of protesters have a higher education (70%), while only 13% had no college degree. Upwards of 68% of those questioned reveal that they are "well to do" and have routine access to certain luxury goods, while 28% identified themselves as sufficiently opulent, able to afford such luxuries such as

an automobile. 32% of those questioned did not, or do not, discuss political issues online, while 37% did so regularly.⁸¹ The event targeted by pollsters appeared dominated by Moscow's opulent middle class.

Furthermore, the Levada Analytical Center research conducted in 45 regions of the Russian Federation at 130 locations and gauging 1603 participants revealed a rather fascinating weakness in normative support for the opposition movement in Russia. 43% of citizens confessed they have never heard the demands or seen the banners calling for the ouster of Vladimir Putin and the ruling coalition. 23.8% 'definitely' do not support the opposition's call to oust Vladimir Putin, and 32.1% 'somewhat' do not support the opposition. 40.6% expressed their belief that the country and its leadership are on the right track. Only 6% expressed their unwavering support for demands by the opposition to oust Vladimir Putin. Some 79.7% of participants will definitely not participate in opposition protests, while 9.4% would join the ranks of protesters given an opportunity. However, when asked if they approve of the State *Duma* — 60.5% say the State *Duma* is doing unsatisfactory or poor job. At the same time 64% approve of the job Vladimir Putin is doing.⁸²

An estimated one-third of protest participants have been active in ISN, shared digital content and information, and actively interacted in their community. However, these digital activists failed to increase the value of information pertaining to protest movements they shared in ISN, to generate broader support base, and to undermine the popularity of the regime. In essence, their level of utilization was insufficient to allow the ISN to reach their full potential for mobilization of the opposition protest movement. Perhaps the cause of this phenomenon rests with the makeup of the "For an Honest Election" — an aggregate of loosely organized groups with often conflicting collective interests dominated by the risk-averse category of urban elites.

Media and Internet Based Social Networks in Numbers

Despite wide access to Internet and Internet-based content, the role of this utilitarian resource vehicle in a protest movement mobilization remains precarious at best. Between 2010 and present day, Internet availability and usage have been expanding in line with the betterment of the welfare of the population. If in 2010, the number of regular or habitual Internet users was estimated at 34%, with nearly half using

the Internet daily (47%), then by 2014 this number reached 67%, with just over a half logging-on daily (52%).⁸³ A study conducted by the Levada Analytical Center largely supports this assessment.⁸⁴ In 2015, the segment of the population with access to the Internet jumped to 74%, or approximately 46 million people. In Moscow the number of users registered at 79%.⁸⁵

Some 47% of internet users surf for information (covering an unspecified range of data), while 34% logon to social network sites - of that number, 5.26% do so for entertainment, and 23% spend their time watching movies. Only 17% went online to view news or personal interest related information, or learn about the situation inside the country and abroad.⁸⁶ In May of 2015, a majority of responders said they consider television to be the main domestic information content provider (62%). This number has grown only slightly over the previous two years (by 2%). In sharp contrast, only 16% of poll participants considered the Internet to be their main information resource on domestic events, and only 6% of responders draw information on domestic events from ISN.⁸⁷ Alarming, 5% of habitual Internet users and formerly active participants in ISN-life completely lost their interest in the Internet on the premise that ISN take too much of their private time, or represents a complete waste of time, while nearly a quarter of ISN users expressed their concern with a lack of privacy while on ISN.⁸⁸

According to research conducted by Russia's Public Opinion Research Center, 55% of the population exclusively trusts the information content delivered by Russian television, 15% trust only Internet resources and 8% trust exclusively ISN. According to the Levada Center, access to web-based news resources accounts for 24% of all Internet traffic in Russia (up from 15% as of June 2009), whereas ISN makes up 15% of Internet traffic. Television, as a traditional mass media platform, maintains its undisputed leading role as Russia's most trusted provider of news and analysis. Over the past 5 years, the proportion of Russians heavily relying on TV as their main source of news remains consistently high (90%).⁸⁹

The television audiences exhibit a propensity to support an official government narrative on politically pivotal events: 82% of television audiences support the reunification of Crimea with Russia versus 78% among active internet users; 64% of television audiences support economic counter-sanctions against the U.S. and European Union; 43% of television audiences would like to see Russian volunteers actively

participate in armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine; 41% of active internet users support this idea; some 43% of television audiences voted for the creation of the Peoples Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, with 41% of internet “dwellers” voicing their support for the endeavor. Lastly, more than half (57%) of habitual internet users confirmed their support for President Vladimir Putin and approve of the work he has done as the leader of the Russian Federation (among TV-audiences this figure only 5% higher - 62%).⁹⁰

Readily available access to the Internet does not translate to active participation in ISN.⁹¹ 71% of habitual internet users have registered and actively use ISN; another 13% have registered yet rarely use ISN; 15% of habitual internet users choose to never use ISN.⁹² Approximately 5% of Internet regulars profess to being attracted by the opportunity the Internet provides for active participation in popular collective action; 2% (or nearly 1 million nationwide) of habitual internet users take part in organized political action. 9-12% of habitual internet users express their interest in the Internet as a vehicle for searching and communication with politically like-minded individuals.⁹³ For those who are already politically-minded, social networks enhance their interest. A third of respondents (33%) report discussing politics with friends and family ‘very often’, and they are more likely to use ISN for political purposes.

Despite the aforementioned inadequacies, the prevailing contention remains that protest activities of the period, in sharp distinction with previous years, were defined by broader application of Internet resources, particularly social networks and P2P (Facebook, Вконтакте, Мой Мир, Twitter, 1СQ, LiveJournal, YouTube, popular Internet forums, blogs). But the Ukrainian Maidan Revolution had a distinctly adverse effect on the mobilization of protest movements in Russia, including the role of ISN sites as utilitarian resource. Many in Russia became extremely concerned with the prospect of escalation from peaceful protest to political violence and even armed insurgency with its inescapable internecine effects, as seen in Donbas and Luhansk. Russia’s coercive group effectively used the events in Ukraine, as well as real or perceived aggressive gestures by the U.S. and its European partners, to drive up the cost of opposition collective action. Thus, the winter of 2014 was marked by extraordinarily harsh punitive measures against defendants in ‘The Case of May 6’, sending a message to the opposition that their actions will no longer be tolerated.⁹⁴

Consequently, whereas in 2012 46% of Russians had a positive view of opposition protest activity, by March 2014 that number dropped to 32%. Those who identified themselves as directly taking part in protest activities during 2012 accounted for 7%, by 2014 this number dropped to 4%. The number of citizens indifferent to protests rose from 33% to 49% during the same period. This last indicator exposed a cognitive divergence in dynamics likely triggered not only by externalities, such as events in Ukraine, but also by a countermovement that protest activity triggered inside Russia proper.⁹⁵

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Despite wide availability of the Internet communication technology, its role in content development and dissemination remained exiguous. The vast majority of audiences continued to rely on television and printed press as a main source of information and analysis. One organized group, namely the government, maintained primacy in mass media and effectively used it to advance political interests, mobilize support in public opinion and collective action. Cyberspace remained largely outside the government control while it was not perceived as a threat to polity and collective interests of populations it represented. However, changes in opportunity/threat equilibrium triggered a countermovement in cyberspace that included application of the ISN, and digital convergence spaces that would counter opposition mobilization efforts.

Countermovement and Cyberspace

Since its inception, the Russian government has made timely and significant strides in the development and application of the informational instrument of national power in the service of its national security; there is a clear understanding of its complexities and diffuse nature. In the contemporary environment in Russia, information readily available from a plethora of sources influences both domestic and foreign audiences via a variety of delivery systems. The statistical data presented shows the unequivocal superiority the government maintains in mass media, including periodicals both in print and online.⁹⁶ Yet the most precarious vehicle for information remains the Internet, since until now it has remained largely beyond the control of the government. Hence, Russia's coercive group gradually ratcheted up policies designed to institute and guard constraints on public access to Internet-based resources under the guise of national security and in-

dividual privacy reasons. The Russian government is taking steps to monitor attempts by Internet-based actors to deliberately inform or mislead foreign and domestic audiences. The latest sign that Russia's coercive group is consolidating its control over the Internet is seen in the Presidential Decree of May 22, 2015 — 'On Some Issues of Information Security of the Russian Federation'.⁹⁷ The document confirms the multidimensional approach taken by the Russian government with respect to Internet content management.

It can be further surmised that three main dimensions are being explored in the targeting of the opposition and protest movements in cyberspace.

The first dimension is the introduction of an e-governance paradigm. This digital democracy experiment was designed to provide citizens with direct access to local and central government officials, establishing continuous dialogue on a wide range of issues of social significance.

The second dimension is manifested in an attempt to engage all strata of the population in ongoing cyber dialogue, viz., proactively competing with foreign and domestic adversaries for minds via development and dissemination of conservative leaning content, as seen in the case of the Olgino project, where a pro-government group and, possibly, government minders collectively develop and disseminate Internet-based content and directly engage citizens via P2P communications in support of the official Kremlin narrative.⁹⁸ The government is working closely with online publications like "Izvestia", "Komsomolka", nacanune.ru, "Regnum" (among others) in the development and promulgation of content and analysis favorable in view of the political establishment and their close allies in Russia's vast economic sector.

Back in 2011, Vladimir Putin contended in an interview with Vesty Television Program: '... if the authorities or someone else doesn't like what is [happening] on the Internet, there is only one way to withstand: by offering, on the same platform, different approaches, different solutions and do so with a greater creativity, making it interesting, (and by doing so) to generate a greater number of supporters'.⁹⁹

The Third dimension can be defined as censorship. The Internet Users Association has registered 11,448 cases of administrative pressure on Internet users and providers, and 947 cases of website access restrictions. Administrative pressure was applied to Web content and

ISN providers with demands to block or completely remove groups engaged in activities supporting opposition and protest movements.¹⁰⁰

The success of the countermovement and consolidation of government monopoly in cyberspace is evident and well documented in studies conducted by Russia's Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM). In April of 2015, Dr. Valery Federov, the general manager of VCIOM, claimed 'The Kremlin has outfoxed the opposition-foxes' (paraphrasing the original 'The Kremlin has out-Interneted the opposition in Internet').¹⁰¹

*The Role
of Internet
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Networks in
Russian Protest
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Conclusions

Statistical data on Internet communication technology usage by organized groups and protest activists supports the thesis that ISN offered a significant contribution to the mobilization of civil strife that transcended geographical and socio-economic boundaries. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that, at least initially, ISN were responsible for helping to remove one of the central obstacles of collective action under the post-Soviet monocentric political system, namely, the deficit of social interaction and elevating political discourse with a nexus on democratization and honest elections. In support of the different theoretical views of protest mobilization, ISN exhibited the following three dimensions of utility:

The First Dimension — Information Transmission. During the tumultuous month preceding and following the December 14, 2011 elections, digital opposition elites routinely circumvented constraints imposed on the media by the government, most notably, the Internet-based television channel Dozhd (Rain.Tv). This enabled Russians both with and without Internet access to mobilize collective actions around the material and moral grievances symbolically represented by the re-election of Vladimir Putin as president of the Russian Federation. Nationwide availability of information pertaining to those events significantly contributed to the 'Za Chestnye Vybory' movement's geographical and social expansion. During the escalation phase of the 'Bolotnaya Square', information about the extent of the protests, disseminated through the Internet, countered attempts by the state-controlled media to mislead the public or even conceal the truth concerning the size, breadth, and message of the protest. Hence, the function

of ISN as an information hub supports most arguments in both relative deprivation theory and rational choice theory as they pertain to protest mobilization.

The Second Dimension — the “Free-Rider” problem. By feeding the public with information about the magnitude of protest events, past and present, and projecting the extent of upcoming events, ISN helped citizens to mitigate the barrier of fear associated with risks of repression identified with protest under the post-Soviet monocentric political system. ISN have played a critical role in triggering the information cascade by the dissemination of information pertaining upcoming protest events and expectation for turnout. By doing so, this encouraged masses of activists to re-evaluate the cost-benefit calculus and commit to participation. Thus, ISN helped to vanquish Tullock’s Paradox of Revolution that predicts excessive absenteeism.

The Third Dimension — Collective Identity Formation. There is sufficient evidence that the politicization of the popular masses by means of social networking succeeded in transcending all strata of Russian society. This supports the arguments brought forward by structural and networking accounts of collective action, according to which overlapping membership in numerous networks leads to a spillover of information from activist networks to networks of less engaged citizens. It also illustrates the important function of social networks in building a collective identity supportive of protest action. Both opposition and countermovement explicitly demonstrated that on the one hand, by depicting the suffering associated with the regime’s response to the protests, and on the other hand by exposing the worst atrocities committed against ethnic-Russian diaspora in Eastern Ukraine, social media led to the emotional mobilization of politically apathetic and acquiescent segments of Russian society. However, in the case of countermovement, it caused considerable demobilization of the protest movement and a shift of the protesters’ collective identity’s nexus from ‘For Democratization and Honest Elections’ to a nexus on ‘Ultra-Nationalistic Patriotism’. ISN thus helped to connect frustrated street protesters, socio-economically and culturally privileged and highly motivated digital activists, and the young, urban middle class in the large cycle of protest that to this day fuel collective action in Russian society.

In the Russian Federation, the Internet facilitated the formation of personal networks of digital activists who challenged the regime’s con-

trol of the public sphere and offered an alternative discourse to the official political narrative. In line with the arguments of Resource Mobilization Theory, the Internet thus provided access to donors of mobilizable resources, as well as the resource of a partially uncontrolled cyberspace that undermined the state's strategy of social isolation and fostered solidarity among Russians on the basis of shared grievances. While the most proactive actors of this digital network typically came from the socio-economic and cultural urban elites, the relatively high degree of Russia's Internet based social network development made their dissident discourse accessible to all strata of Russian society. Internet based social networks are but one variable of many that govern the dynamic leading to revolution and regime dislodgment. In fact, amidst the turbulence of political upheaval it is often hard to discern hidden externalities associated with nation-state and non-state actors applying ISN to project their influence over relevant populations. This opens a vista on the need to assimilate new evidence into existing historical frameworks as we continue in-depth research on the causalities of political activism and the role that Internet-based social networks play in its mobilization.

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61. Ольга Алленова (2012), Марш несогласных друг с другом, Огонек Journal No3, 23 January.
62. Observers believe that the weak response by security personnel to unsanctioned protest activities was the result of MVD reform that undermined confidence of *silovye structure* in the government they have sworn to serve. http://www.infox.ru/authority/state/2012/01/12/90__rossiyskih_silov.phtml
63. An example of such escalation is *Bolotnaya Square* event that stunned the world by mass participation. On December 10, 2011 *Izvestia*, citing sources inside *Silovye Structure*, reported that some 25 thousand protesters gathered on *Bolotnaya Square*. The *Novay Gazeta* Journal placed a number of protesters at 40 thousand to 120 thousand over some 4 hours over duration of the event. <http://izvestia.ru/news/509239> <http://www.novaygazeta.ru/photos/49997.html>
64. Denis Volkov (2012), Протестное движение в России в конце 2011 – 2012 гг, Левада-Центр 02 October, Russian Federation. Moscow. Available at <http://www.levada.ru/old/21-12-2012/protestnoe-dvizhenie-v-rossii-v>

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 66. Charles Tilly (2000), pp.135-159. *Spaces of Contention*, Mobilization Vol.5(2), Fall, NY.: New York Columbia University
 67. On May 7th, 2012 “Narodnye Guliyaniya” — a mass action was executed in various parts of Moscow to protest policing of the May 6th Million Man March. The action was met with crowd control measures, forced dispersals, and was accompanied by mass arrests. On May 17, following pre-planned legal action by concerned citizens, and under continuous pressure from law enforcement the “Occupy Abay” camp was relocated to Chistye Prudy, and later to Kudrinskaiya Square — a move that gave the camp name “Mobil Camp”. <http://lenta.ru/news/2012/05/10/appeal/>; <http://lenta.ru/news/2012/05/16/twenty/>; <http://lenta.ru/news/2012/05/19/onemoretime/>
 68. Peter Marcuse (2012), pp.15-16. *Keeping Space in its Place in the Occupy Movements*. Progressive Planning 191 (Spring 2012).
 69. Ted Gurr (1968), *Psychology Factors in Civil Violence*. (p. 273). World Politics, Vol.20, No.2, Baltimore, MD. John Hopkins University Press,
 70. In 2014, researchers at Levada pointed out divergence between a nation-wide sense of patriotism and opposition and protest activity. Published reports indicate the protest activity continued to plummet, reaching its lowest point since measurements were introduced. In 2015 pollsters cite consolidation of popular support for ruling political and economic elites triggered by events in neighboring Ukraine perceived as a threat to Russian National Security by the USA, fascists etc., as a dominant factor in low opposition and protest activity. Nationwide polls were conducted by researchers from Levada Analytical Center on 25-28 of April 2014, and 17- 20 April of 2015. A sample of 1600 individuals aged 18 and older were randomly selected from 130-134 towns and villages representing 45 regions of the Russian Federation (the expected margin of error stands at 3.4%). <http://www.levada.ru/old/11-11-2014/protestnaya-aktivnost>; <http://www.levada.ru/old/28-04-2015/protestnyi-potentsial>
 71. In this Op-ed. the newly appointed mayor of Moscow clarifies his position on protest activity. Sobyanin specifically points to the logistics of providing security and facilitating large demonstration, and comparatively articulates challenges in controlling small, often violent protests by “several dozens of rowdy activists”, as well as the destructive effect such belligerent activities bear on citizens engaged in everyday life activities. (Jun 6, 2011). Собянин объяснил, почему запрещает митинговать геям и несогласным. news.ru Retrieved from <http://newsru.com/russia/06jun2011/sobyanin.html>
 72. *Rossia-1* (2015), 26 марта президент Владимир Путин принял участие в ежегодном заседании расширенной коллегии ФСБ России. 26 March. Available at <https://russia.tv/video/show/brand_id/5206/episode_id/1185641/video_id/1154286/> (Accessed on 04 March 2016)
 73. ICNL (2016), *NGO Law Monitor: Russia*. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. Available at <<http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html>> (Accessed on 07 March 2016)

74. See also <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1981241>
75. OSCE/ODIHR (2012), *Russian Federation. Elections to the State Duma 04 December 2011. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report*. Warsaw. OSCE/ODIHR, 12 January, Available at <<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/86959?download=true>> (Accessed on 02 February 2016)
76. There are well defined procedures used by the coercive group through state security and designated non-state agents designed to terrorize, demoralize, and subvert the opponent. The government uses organized groups to conduct counter-protests, directly, at times violently, interfering with opponent's collective action. These organized groups resort to coercive means in their attempts to interfere with opponents' freedom of assembly and right to free speech. The state security apparatus engages opponents when all other means are unavailable or have been ineffective. See example as detailed in *Gazeta.ru* op-ed (Oct 16, 2011). Форум активистов в Краснодаре с участием Немцова и журналистки Романовой заблокировал ОМОН. http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/10/16/n_2054378.shtml
77. In a number of incidents, local government and the department of education acted in a concerted way to impede the ability of the student body to take a part in public opposition events. http://www.bbc.com/russian/mobile/russia/2012/01/120113_rally_moscow_school_test.shtml
78. Critique by *grani.ru* of the “*Edinaya Rossiya*” (United Russia) the event of December 13, 2011 must be viewed as exposing an aptitude of the ruling political entity for mass -mobilization of human and other resources; revealed lower mobilization and opportunity constraints on the ruling political entity; their higher potential to create and deliver highly specific collective product for consumption by target audiences. <http://grani.ru/Society/m.194012.html>
79. Charles Tilly (1984), p.170, *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime*. In P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, T Skocpol (eds.): *Bringing the State Back*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
80. The data was collected by the *Novaya Gazeta* staff, interns and volunteers. The video record of the event is available from <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/50259.html>
81. *Levada* Analytical Center (Dec 26, 2011), Опрос на проспекте Сахарова 24 декабря. Retrieved from <http://www.levada.ru/old/26-12-2011/opros-na-prospekte-sakharova-24-dekabrya>
82. *Levada* Analytical Center methodology. (Jan 17, 2014). Poll «За Россию с Путиным». <http://www.levada.ru/2014/01/17/za-rossiyu-s-putinym/>
83. This poll was conducted between March 21 and 22, 2015. The poll was based on a random sample of 1600 individuals. Internet — The New Era of Mobil Devices. Пресс-выпуск ВЦИОМа No2836. 2015. Retrieved from <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115255>
84. The data was collected by TNS within the framework of a Web Index project from a sample of 20,000 Internet users ages 12 to 64 located throughout Russian Federation. Data is pulled directly from selected websites equipped with the TNS tracking application. A sample of 2500 people was used to gather internet traffic from smartphones and tablets. Audio Matching System (AMS) was applied to collect television usage data from markets selected by the project. The sample size of 100,000 guarantees good representation and low error margins. TNS conduct some 60,000 fol-

- low up phone interviews. Data retrieved from <http://www.tns-global.ru/services/media/media-audience/internet/description/>
85. *ibid.*
86. *Levada Analytical Center* (Nov 20, 2014), Интернет: Возможности использования. Retrieved from <http://www.levada.ru/2014/11/20/internet-vozmozhnosti-ispolzovaniya/>
87. Most data were obtained by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center via “Omnibus”, based on a sample of 1600 responses and stored on “*Archivarius*”. The data can be accessed from http://wciom.ru/database/baza_rezultatov_oprosa_s_1992_goda/
88. The data were collected and analyzed by *Romir Research Holding*. A sample of 1000 responders, ages 18 to 50, was drawn from a pull of centers with population exceeding 100,000, and representing eight federal districts. As such, this data represents adult city dwellers. Retrieved from http://romir.ru/studies/670_143215600
89. Denis Volkov and Stepan Goncharov (2014), Российский медиа - ландшафт: телевидение, пресса, интернет, *Levada Analytical Center*. RF, Moscow. Available at <<http://www.levada.ru/old/books/stal-dostupen-otchet-rossiiskii-media-landshaft-televidenie-pressa-internet>> (Accessed on 04 March 2016)
90. Study conducted by the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Science, in October of 2015, titled «Динамика социальной трансформации современной России в социально-экономическом, политическом, социокультурном и этнорелигиозном контекстах». This study represents a sample of 4000 adults, ages 18 years and older.
91. In July of 2014, *Levada Center* released analytical report “Authorities beat opposition in their own game — Internet”. Here, based on data collected, researchers conclude: « ... наличие Интернета не делает из гражданина оппозиционера или хотя бы человека, скептически воспринимающего дискурс власти». (“The Internet availability does not transform citizens into oppositionists nor does it entice an individual to view discourse by authorities with skepticism”. Retrieved from http://www.ng.ru/editorial/2014-07-29/2_red.html
92. *ibid.*
93. Data collected from a nation-wide poll, conducted in March of 2014, and based on a sample of 1600 individuals 18 years of age and older. Expected margin of error was estimated at 3.8%. The poll, «Гражданский активизм: новые субъекты общественно-политического действия» was conducted by a group of researchers affiliated with the Center for Integrated Sociological Research, and commissioned by the Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research. Retrieved from <http://politanalitika.ru/upload/iblock/01b/01b21729d6e2cf25aofc50887b5d3e5a.pdf>
94. Case records indicate that on May 6, 2016, during an opposition -sponsored mass protest event on *Bolotnaiya Square*, a number of activists engaged agents of the state in a violent attack. A number of security personnel, responsible for keeping an order during manifestation, sustained injuries of varying severity. Individuals, responsible for an attack on agents of the state were detained and persecuted to the full force of the law. «Болотное дело» после 6 мая. *Gazeta.ru* Retrieved from <http://www.gazeta.ru/news/seealso/2411445.shtml>
95. *ibid.*

96. The Russian Government maintains its firm censorship grip on most, if not all, high profile periodicals currently in circulation. Some examples of controlled pro-elite base in the press can be found in digests with internet mirror-sites, such as “*Izvestiya*”, “*Komsomolskaya Pravda*”, nakanune.ru, “*Regnum*”, “*Vzglyad*”, “*lenta.ru*”.
97. Vladimir Putin (2015), О некоторых вопросах информационной безопасности РФ. R.F. Presidential Decree. Moscow, Kremlin, 22 May Available at <<http://pravo.gov.ru/>>
98. “*Olgino* system” was erected specifically to advance a narrative that favors and promotes the interests of the coercive group. It employs researchers, IT specialists, political scientists, and content developers able and willing to comply with requirements set forth by the management. Access to the facility itself is restricted as well as access to employees or content. Retrieved from <http://bolshoyforum.com/forum/index.php?page=768>
99. Vladimir Putin (2011), Разговор с Владимиром Путиным, vesti.ru, Available at <<http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=661853&tid=94874>> (Accessed on 11 February 2016)
100. As an example of censorship and administrative pressure we may cite a collective action against Cable Internet TV providers resulting in the removal of the pro-opposition TV channel “*Dozhd*” (tvrain.ru). Administrative pressure was applied against groups involved in discussion of judicial sentencing of opposition and protest movement leaders — *Navalny Brothers*. «Свобода интернета 2014: Власти не оставляют интернету выбора». 2015. Retrieved from <http://www.slideshare.net/temyuchk/2014-44249413>
101. Ura. Ru (2015), Легитимных путей прийти во власть у оппозиции сегодня нет. Russian Information Agency ura.ru, 22 April, Available at <<http://ura.ru/articles/1036264628>> (Accessed on 07 March 2016)

Vladimir
Remmer

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Caron E. Gentry and Amy E. Eckert, The University of Georgia Press:
Athens and London, 2014, ISBN 978-0-8203-4560-4.

The Future of Just War

New Critical Essays,

*Reviewed by Amitabh Vikram (Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University,
Katra, India)*

Edited by Caron E. Gentry and Amy E. Eckert, *The Future of Just War*, is a part of the series *Studies in Security and International Affairs*. Twelve authors and specialists educated in International Relations, including political science, international security, and peace and conflict studies contributed to this text. The book is divided into three parts: *Jus ad Bellum*, *Jus in Bello*, and *Jus post Bellum*, with the sections having four, five and one chapters respectively. Essays in the text are supported with tables, notes, bullet points, extensive citations and internal sub-headings. The book seeks to 'reorient the tradition around its core concerns of preventing the unjust use of force by states' and limiting the harm inflicted on populations, including prisoners of war and civilian noncombatants (pp. 5-6).

In chapter one, the author deals with varied and complex issues, such as the historical development of procedural authority, and the tradition to possess moral or ethical legitimacy. Gentry argues that the conflation of moral and political authority results in 'epistemic injustice' (p. 17). Critiquing the Westphalian framework, the author states that 'terrorist is a pejorative, loaded and ultimately problematic' term as it reflects the State's fear and anxiety against substate groups that choose to use political violence (p. 25). Chapter two, co-authored by Hudson and Henk, explores the conceptual shifts behind the changes in 'roles and missions of security sector actors' (p. 30). The authors provide an answer to the question of how society can use its military

establishments best. In the next chapter, Glanville takes up his main argument from Cicero's *On Duties*, and argues up to what extent that humanitarian intervention to protect populations, *i.e.* foreigners and strangers, is morally obligatory. Eckert, in chapter four, assesses the chance of winning war with the increasing reliance of states on private force.

The first chapter in section two investigates the theoretical challenges that the advent of 'risk-free' American warfare poses to both the ethics of the use of force and the laws of war (p. 79). The author deals with a moral justification where he argues when it is justifiable for a soldier to kill another soldier and for the same to kill a civilian. In *From Smart to Autonomous Weapons*, Steel and Heinze argue that advances in military technology are reducing the costs and suffering associated with waging war. Royden, in chapter seven, argues that the emergence of new technologies continues to complicate the principles of discrimination and proportionality as weapons under the Conventional Global Strike Program (CGSP) 'have become more deadly and more accurate' (p. 116). Gould, in the next chapter, starts his argument with a hypothetical situation where 'destroying the enemy facility will contribute significantly to ending the war,' but it will do so only at the costs of noncombatants' lives (p. 130). On the whole, this chapter deals with rethinking intention and double effect of the Just war theory. The second-to-last chapter explores a scenario by revising Just war theory without civilians, putting aside the gendered combatant/civilian dichotomy.

There is only one chapter in the final section: *Jus post Bellum*. The author claims that from Aristotle to Hart, all philosophers have provided only one objective of war, *i.e.* 'peace is the proper objective of a just war' (p. 172). This concluding chapter serves as a conclusion to this project, suggesting that *jus post bellum* is best understood as a set of principles that facilitates the transition from a belligerent rights regime to a more expansive human rights regime as war gives way to peace. Overall, this book is a wonderful read and the essays cover wide-ranging issues with common themes of sovereignty and mutuality.

Analysing Political Discourse

Theory and Practice

Reviewed by Alireza Salehi Nejad (Department of British Studies, University of Tehran)

In this novel work, Paul Chilton expends a considerable amount of effort examining relations between the use of language and political discourse (p. xi). Many realist linguists in the past century claimed that language should be evaluated as the innate part of a human mind. The scholarly interest in the public use of language is followed by critical theory and the Frankfurt School of social theory and philosophy, which considered language rather as a social phenomenon than a mental phenomenon and intended to validate the crucial relationship between language, politics and culture.

Analysing Political Discourse with a comprehensive introduction takes a fresh linguistic-oriented approach towards political interaction, discourse, and language, which can attract the interest of scholars from different disciplines in cognitive and social sciences such as linguistics, political science, psychology, and religious studies. Paul Chilton not only analyses the integration of language and politics, but also offers concrete analyses of actual specimens of political text with regards to semantics, pragmatics, evolution and discourse processing.

The book is divided into four sections and eleven chapters; comprising a theoretical foundation in the first four chapters, followed by illustration and analysis of political text in a domestic (UK) context in part two and a global context in part three. The final chapter, after a concise contextualization, synthesizes the analytical notions examined throughout the book and offers some concluding thoughts for

formulating a theory of language and politics by integrating human interaction and mental representations of the world.

The first part of the book entitled 'Political animals as articulate mammals', on the basis of Aristotle's premise that humans use language to pursue their own benefits and are political creatures with a unique aptitude for speech (4), covers four chapters on human cognitive linguistic ability, including thoughts on its evolution and relation to social order, and what might be broadly labeled as politics.

Chapters 1 and 2, entitled 'Politics and Language' and 'Language and Politics', discuss the nature and evolution of language, linguistic ability, and its ties with politics as a means of cooperation and social interaction. Chilton believes that both language and political comportment are constructed from cognitive endowments rather than social practices, while both being closely interrelated. (29) By the same token, Chilton intends to challenge the Chomskyan position on the social intelligence language module of generative creativity, with the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis on Linguistic Relativity in Chapter 3 and 4 entitled 'Interaction' and 'Representation', by evaluating the linguistic, discursive, and communicative dimensions of politics in the first two chapters. He sketches the philosophy of language and cognitive linguistics to explore the ways in which we think and behave politically, concluding with overviewing and comparing Paul Grice's cooperative principle with Jurgen Habermas's validity claims and communicative rationality.

The three chapters covering 'political interviews', 'parliamentary language' and 'foreigners' in the second part of the book, entitled "The domestic arena", offer models for the analysis of political discourse in the given national and cultural settings. This part of the book provides examples from the United Kingdom to illustrate including Labour MP Margaret Beckett's interview with BBC 4 before the 2001 General Election, explicitly agreed institutional rules of parliamentary language, and Enoch Powell's (the Former Financial Secretary to the Treasury) 1968 Rivers of Blood speech.

Similarly, Part III entitled 'The Global Arena', examines political discourse beyond national borders, mostly focusing on war, terrorism, and military intervention. Bill Clinton's speech on the Kosovo War in 1999, George W. Bush's speeches following the 9/11 attacks, the English translation of Osama bin Laden's speech aired by Al Jazeera, and

George W. Bush's speech entitled 'Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance' given at the National Cathedral in 2001 are used to illustrate. In both Part II and III, the political discourse analysis is significantly colored by cognitive linguistics and the philosophy of language, and Chilton implies the prominence of language in the representation.

Part IV entitled "Toward a Theory of Language and Politics" is a single chapter that offers concluding views regarding the necessity for a theory of language and politics on the basis of human interaction and mental representations of the world. Whereas the author seeks the means of communication in contemporary language, societies, political trends, and culture by focusing on critical theory and cognitive linguistics, he claims that political discourse uses binary conceptualizations and exploits spatial cognition and metaphorical reasoning.

To conclude, the book's merit of two dedicated parts for practicing theory by sketching out concrete examples of political discourse analyses is considerable. However, the multi-dimensional framework for analysing great volumes of political text or diverse genres of political discourse could be flawed since Chilton never clarified his methodology for compiling a corpus of political text. Even though the integration of methodologies may benefit political discourse analysis beyond a particular sample of text or genre, neither the conceptual nor the empirical components of the book are adequately cogent. Moreover, the review of literature is not elaborate, and the text is not appropriate for those who have absolutely no knowledge of speech act theory, rhetoric and generative linguistics, social theory, and cognitive science. Chilton mentions that he does not know whether discourse analysis may have any serious impact on the 'genocides, oppressions and exploitations we are still witnessing' (x), and he leaves the discussions open to debate. Generally speaking, the author provides an inventive contribution towards understanding political discourse, especially by touching upon detailed micro-analyses of samples, hence I recommend "*Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice*" to students who are interested in theoretical approaches of studying language and politics.

Terrorism

A History

Reviewed by Basem Aly

Being an issue of interest for many scholars across disciplines, there is no doubt that terrorism serves as one of the most controversial concepts, especially in regards to conceptualising its nature and understanding its historical development. One of the most prominent research questions in academic texts tackling terrorism-related topics involves the time of its emergence in modern history. In a book entitled *Terrorism: A History*, Randall D. Law exerts a considerable effort to challenge the rationale behind posing such a question in particular. Law, through presenting numerous case studies that involved reliance on terrorist acts, argues that terrorism has been in place for centuries, and is not a phenomenon that is associated only with contemporary time spans.

Law, a historian, offers a conceptual framework that encompasses three key themes on which the case studies of the book were analysed. On the one hand, Law says that the 'weapons, methods and goals of terrorists constantly change, but core features have remained since the earliest times'. He describes the techniques, methods and behaviors of terrorists as their 'toolbox' that are traditionally in place in any instance of terrorism. It is worth mentioning that Law does not leave terrorism undefined, for he states that it is a 'communicative act intended to influence the behavior of one or more audiences'. On the other hand, he believes that terrorists are acting consciously and rationally in light of well-structured strategies to achieve their respective objectives, putting into consideration the surrounding political, cul-

tural and social environments. Terrorism, as a result, is not a type of 'madness', an argument that was previously put forth in literature by some studies of terrorism.

The author also refers to the relationship between 'vilifying enemies'—mostly related in security studies to the so-called diversionary theory of war or scapegoating—as motives for some actors to give the terrorist label to a certain group. The aim is to produce psychological influences on a certain population, accordingly giving room to adopt some measures that would be essentially impossible to implement in normal conditions. Law refers to the example of the PATRIOT Act in the United States. Although it was originally created to facilitate the process of blocking the attempts of terrorists to execute new attacks—which was successfully accomplished to some extent—the Bush administration had unconstitutionally detained both US citizens and foreigners at US military units that are located outside the borders of the United States.

One, in fact, can hardly challenge the manner through which Law had structured his book, specifically with regards to his analytical framework or case selection. As is the case with all academic texts, Law gives solid evidence that terrorist acts—such as bombings or assassinations of social, religious or political figures—have existed throughout the history of mankind. He even claims that gathering such a massive amount of case studies embodies his contribution to the literature on terrorism as no other scholar had made a similar effort in the past. Law should also be credited for differentiating between a terrorist act and an insurgency, for the line between both concepts is not always obvious. Insurgents use force against government forces to eventually replace the latter as the legitimate governors of a certain territory. Terrorism, therefore, is only one tactic out of many others that insurgents can use in their war.

Nevertheless, perhaps due to his background as a scholar of history, Law suggests dozens of factors that can be understood as the political objectives for depending on terrorist acts. After reading the book, one can conclude that depending on terrorism might be a result of a political clash over political power, financial resources or even a territorial dispute. But at no stage of this book does Law directly mention which of these factors specifically results in resorting to terrorism. In other words, Law does not provide readers of this text—mainly, if not

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all, students or scholars of history—with a crystal-clear generalisation that can serve as a contribution to the academic literature on terrorism. It would have been a value added to the book if Law had strictly confined his analysis to certain dependent and independent variables and chose case studies that come in consistency with the former. It is quite understood that the work of a historian should not necessarily be helpful in terms of responding to the inquiring of, as an example, political scientists or sociologists. But for such types of social scientists there is little need to read an academic text in order to acknowledge the fact that terrorists have political objectives: this is a matter that scholars almost take for granted. Determining the nature, dynamics and factors shaping these objectives is essential for taking the research a step further.

Imperial Gamble

Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War

Reviewed by Dr. Oliver Stuenkel, (Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in Sao Paulo/Brazil)

In 2004, at a public debate about the future of the European Union at the Harvard Kennedy School, optimism was in the air. The EU had just completed the largest expansion in its history earlier in the year, adding Poland, the Baltics and Hungary, among others, to the club. Discussions about Turkey's accession were gathering steam. 'At some point', a scholar said, 'we'll have to talk about an expansion far bigger. One day we'll have to talk about inviting Russia to join the EU'.

No policy maker at the time seriously thought about integrating Russia into the EU, of course. But the mere fact that such an idea was stated publicly (even though explicitly framed as a long-term goal) showed how confident many observers were not only about the European project, but about integrating Russia in Western structures.

Even in 2014, when the West's ties to Russia were no longer what they used to be after the end of the Cold War, the vast majority of policy makers and international affairs scholars still believed that things like territorial conquest were a thing of the past. To them, the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russian forces was a stunning event which put many of the previously held beliefs in doubt. Putin, they argued, was on the wrong side of history, and ideally he should pull out of Ukraine to allow the country to decide its own fate.

As Marvin Kalb argues in *Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War*, this is wishful thinking:

Putin will not return Crimea to Ukraine, because Russians believe it never really belonged to Ukraine. They feel it always has been theirs. Nor will

Putin abandon the rebels in southeastern Ukraine, because they have become his wards and because their realm gives him undeniable leverage over the future of all Ukraine. If there is a Putin doctrine, hidden somewhere in his rhetoric, it would be that people who consider themselves Russian, no matter where they live, cannot and will not be abandoned by Moscow. (p. xviii)

Imperial Gamble provides sound historical background to explain such statements, which still often generate confusion among Western policy makers. Kiev is not only seen as the origin of Russian civilization and nationhood, but also was its center (and Russia's first capital) for a long time. Ukraine's importance for Russian politics continued all the way until the collapse of the Soviet Union: Khrushchev was brought up in Ukraine and was married to a Ukrainian woman. When as a young man, Brezhnev applied for membership in the Communist Party and was asked his nationality, he answered 'Ukrainian'.

Kalb shows how the Mongol occupation of Rus had a profound impact on Russian culture, stalling development at a time when the rest of Europe began to emerge from the Middle Ages. It also led to the emergence of an alternative hub, Moscow, and the first tsar, a product of complex negotiations with the Mongol Khan. It was only in 1480 that Ivan III severed all ties with the Mongol Empire.

The book excels at explaining the ambiguity of Ukraine's status over the centuries, and how the emergence of Ukrainian nationalism generated profound anxiety among policy-making elites in Moscow. At the end of the 19th century, Russia decided to ban all books in Ukrainian, which led literacy rates there to plummet. In 1897, barely 13 percent of people living in Ukraine could read and write. In addition to uncertainty about whether Ukraine should be an independent nation or not, another constant division emerged: one part of the country tilted towards the West, the other, in the east, towards Russia.

During Stalin's early years in power, the Donbas region and the Dnieper Valley were transformed into industrial hubs, suggesting that Moscow did not consider Ukrainian independence a serious possibility. That changed when World War II began, when over a million Ukrainians were deported from western Ukraine to Siberia, the Arctic Circle, and Soviet central Asia to reduce groups critical of Moscow. Paradoxically, it was in the name of Ukraine, and not of Russia, that Stalin successfully claimed vast territories west of the then pre-1939 frontier, thus extending the USSR into central Europe and the Danubian valley.

Indeed, Ukrainian independence in 1991 would have been impossible without 1939–1945, when Stalin inadvertently helped spark a sense of Ukrainian nationhood by creating a unified land, though under Soviet control, called Ukraine.

Khrushchev’s decision to hand Crimea to Ukraine a decade later — a mere administrative technicality at the time — showed that policy makers in Moscow did not believe Ukraine would ever be separated from the Soviet Union. At the end of the Cold War, Ukraine’s referendum to leave the Soviet Union was critical in explaining its demise. Kalb also shows that, upon becoming an independent country, Ukraine’s relationship to Russia remained one of the unresolved issues — after all, as he puts it, ‘Ukraine means “borderland,” the Ukrainian looking from the border of Russia, through a hazy window, into Russia’s heart and soul’. (p.212)

The book’s title suggests that Russia’s annexation of Ukraine is the beginning of a ‘new Cold War’. At first glance, this seems to make sense; after all, ties have not been this tense since the late 1980s. And yet, there is something misguided about this comparison. The Cold War was not only about geographically restricted tensions between Russia and the West. Rather, it was a globe-spanning ideological contest, which shaped the lives of millions of citizens. Tensions with Russia are arguably important, but they do not define global dynamics.

Still, *Imperial Gamble* is a carefully researched analysis of Ukrainian history, and highly recommended for all those who seek to gain a deeper understanding of the geopolitical crisis that emerged in the aftermath of the 2014 Maidan protests and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Two years after the first clashes, there seems to be no solution in sight.

Book Reviews