Chechen rebels have the upper hand in Russia

If nothing else, the latest rebel raid in Russia's northern Caucasus republic of Ingushetia illustrates Moscow's curious lack of resolve to effectively deal with the conflict - a lack of resolve that could end with a nuclear catastrophe.

By Nabi Abdullaev for ISN Security Watch

The latest Chechen rebel raid in the neighboring Russian republic of Ingushetia demonstrated that, despite Kremlin rhetoric that the rebels’ power base in the Caucasus has dwindled, their operational capacities remain massive and Moscow has little muscle to counter their increasingly high-level strategic and tactical planning. If the Kremlin does not take urgent steps to change its anti-terrorist strategies in the Northern Caucasus, it should anticipate coordinated attacks on Russia’s most sensitive installations, possibly including its nuclear facilities. The Chechen rebels have proved to have no shortage of motivation, having made declarations of war against Russia with weapons of mass destruction, and ultimately displaying their ability to carry out large-scale multi-object attacks that Russian intelligence fails to predict or deter.

The Ingushetia raid

On 21 June, several hundred armed men attacked military and police bases in the Ingush capital, Nazran, and in two other towns, Karabulak and Sleptsovskaya, and virtually took control of the republic for several hours. Some 60 Ingush and Russian policemen were killed in the attacks or methodically executed by the assailants, and 38 Ingush civilians were killed in the crossfire. The attackers lost six men, an obscure rebel commander, who called himself “Asadullah” and claimed to have lead the raid, told the rebels’ website Kavkazcenter.com. He also said that 600 rebels, mostly Ingush, had taken part in the raid. Initially, Russian media reports said that the bodies of only two rebels had been found in the aftermath of the attack. But five days after the raid, Russian and Ingush officials announced that 35 rebels had been killed. No hard evidence was produced to substantiate that information, however. Russian officials have also said that the raid had been conducted by about 200 rebels, and that they had mostly been Chechens, with a handful of Arabs, Slavs, and Ingush.

Rebels raise their standards

Large-scale Chechen rebel attacks have not been rare. One might recall the suicide truck bombing of the government premises in the Chechen capital of Grozny in December 2002, which claimed 80 lives, or the hostage-taking raid on a Moscow theater in October 2002, in which 139 hostages and 41 terrorists were killed, or even the latest assassination of pro-Moscow Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov in May. What distinguished the latest raid in Ingushetia was the outstanding planning, thorough performance, and discipline of the gunmen - not to mention the sheer and unexpected size of the force. As the political process in Chechnya was unfolding and state institutions were setting up roots there, creating a sense of stabilization in the volatile republic, the Kremlin seemed to have lulled itself in the belief that the Chechen resistance had been reduced to a force of only several dozen hardcore terrorists. Moscow seemed to believe that that force was led by radical Islamist Shamil Basaev and bankrolled by foreign terrorist networks, with the former Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov serving as the political supremo and providing legitimacy for the separatist cause.

Another link in the chain?

The raid in Ingushetia, in which dozens of young Ingush males are believed to have participated on the side of the rebels, confirmed once again that the rebels maintain viable and extended networks outside of Chechnya. The presence of the anti-Russian Wahhabi underground in some other North Caucasus republics - Dagestan, Karachaevo-Cherkesia, Kalmykia - has been consistently illustrated by repeated acts of sabotage against Russian and local officials in these republics, or by active involvement of the natives of these republics in fighting against Russian troops in Chechnya. Traditionally pro-Russian Ingushetia, ruled by Muray Zyazikov, a retired Russian secret service (FSB) general, has unexpectedly turned up yet another powerful link in this chain. In statements published on the rebel website, the rebel warlords stressed that the raid had been carried out at the request of their “brothers, Ingush mudjahiddeens”, who provided most of the manpower for the attacks. Citing witnesses, the Russian press reported that many of the attackers had been speaking Ingush and had covered their faces under balaclavas, in an apparent effort to avoid being recognized by the Ingush civilians. Also, the stereotype that terrorism in Chechnya has been completely commercialized - a Kremlin-sponsored stereotype hoping to prove the link between Chechen terrorists and al-Qaida - was put to the test in Ingushetia. During the 21 June raid, the assailants made no attempts to break into banks or other valuable depositories, even as they exercised complete control of the towns. By the Kremlin’s logic, they would rather make away with two truckloads of cash than with Russian weapons. But it was with arms that they managed to flee. It was clear that maintaining the “purity” of the mission to punish Russian and Ingush law enforcers for alleged extra-judicial abductions and executions of Ingush civilians and Chechen refugees was more important that the material interests of the assailants. In fact, human rights groups have alleged that the Russian troops in Chechen villages are more concerned with material interests than with the “purity” of their cause, blatantly looting villages during so-called anti-terrorist operations.

A mystery for Moscow

Disturbingly, more than a week after the Ingushetia attack, Russian intelligence and law enforcement officials still have no coherent picture of what actually happened there. How and when the gunmen infiltrated Ingushetia from Chechnya - if in fact they did at all - is still a mystery. Official claims about the number and ethnic composition of the attackers contradict witness reports and independent expert evaluations. The latter say that some 300 to 400, not 200, were needed for such a large-scale operation. After all, the Ingushetia raid indicated a move from asymmetrical warfare to open warfare. Also, as for the Ingush allegedly involved, it is not clear whether they were random individuals or members of an underground organization. Another burning question is where the gunmen went after the raid. Chechen Interior Minister Alu Alkhanov has denied that they crossed the border back to Chechnya, as Ingush officials claim. Exchange of information between the Russian and Ingush services and civilian authorities has proved abysmal: the Ingush branch of the FSB claimed afterwards that it had had prior knowledge that the raid would take place. Ingush President Zyazikov, in the meantime, has publicly said that he had not been informed of the raid by the FSB in advance. Ingush police and other Russian agencies in Ingushetia have issued similar statements. Coordination and communication between the agencies has also been utterly inadequate. In the tiny republic flooded with Russian troops, intelligence, and police units, it took Russian and Ingush officials four hours to build a task force to rebuff the raiders. Russian President Vladimir Putin, during his lighting visit to Ingushetia the day after the raid, ordered another regiment of the Interior Ministry troops to be transferred to Ingushetia. However, it remains unclear what positive effect that will have on security in the region, given that no steps have so far been taken to improve intelligence gathering, information exchange, and coordination.

Cash and camaraderie

After the raid, speculations abounded about what could have pushed the insurgency into Ingushetia and what had prompted the young Ingush to associate themselves with Chechen rebels. The generally supported verdict was that the Kremlin’s violent policies of terrorizing the local population - via the federal security agencies and the local pro-Moscow law enforcers - had ultimately pushed the Ingush to join the rebel ranks. But there may have been other reasons, including camaraderie and cash. Moscow’s anti-terrorist strategy of bullying the local populations of Ingushetia and Chechnya - such as extra-judicial abductions, torture, and executions - has worked to deter large-scale public uprisings, but it has done little to win the hearts and minds of the locals. As such, violent rebel assaults against the Russian system are lent a certain legitimacy, regardless of the true motivations of the rebels. In forums on Ingush websites the voices in support of lashing out at pro-Kremlin Ingush police far outnumber those condemning rebel activities. Improving the conduct of officials in the anti-terrorist effort and making them accountable might help solve the problem. However, such changes are unlikely, at least in the near future, as they would require engaging the local population to cooperate with Russian security forces, the former fearing the latter, and the latter distrusting the former.

Ever-widening operations

Extrapolating patterns of Moscow’s behavior after major attacks by the Chechen rebels, it is apparent that hardly any effective steps are being taken to counter the spread of the insurgency or the honing of rebel operational capabilities. Even such an eye-opening event as the 2002 theater siege in Moscow failed to provide the impetus for the Russian security community to shift its intelligence strategy towards interdicting terrorist attacks. Creating an intelligence network within the Chechen resistance has not been on the cards - a failure that has allowed for a series of terrorist attacks that have claimed the lives of hundreds of people, including that of Moscow’s Chechen steward, Kadyrov. It is hard to believe that the Russian intelligence community, especially with former KGB agent Putin at the helm, is incapable of accomplishing the task at hand. As such, most observers assume there is a mysterious lack of political will at play here. It is impossible now to explain this deficiency of resolve. Some analysts say the war is helping the Russian security community to rise to power and remain on top in the Kremlin, while others believe that the war is a lucrative business that some would prefer to see continue. The immediate spoils of illegal businesses in war-torn Chechnya - kidnapping, oil, and arms - preclude Russian generals from taking decisive steps to end the insurgency. As for the rebels, their growing operational capacities will logically lead to more massive attacks. The rebels are consistently improving their planning - from the near-spontaneous hostage-taking operation in a maternity hospital in Budyonnovsk in 1995, to holding the entire Dagestani village of Pervomaiskoye hostage in 1996, to the sophisticated theater seizure in Moscow in 2002, followed by the latest impressive raid on Ingushetia.

Nuclear intentions?

Ultimately, the rebels could end up attacking Russia’s nuclear facilities in an attempt to obtain critical leverage in their conflict with Moscow. Acquiring nuclear weapons would give the rebels the strength of a state actor and create a strategic balance in their struggle with Moscow. There is a vast array of documented evidence that Chechen rebels are considering going nuclear. That evidence includes attempts to infiltrate the personnel of nuclear power plants and planning the hijacking of an atomic submarine. Shortly after the Moscow theater incident, Akhmed Zakaev, the envoy of rebel political leader Aslan Maskhadov, told a press conference in Denmark that the rebels’ next target might be a nuclear power plant in Russia. In one of his last statements posted by the Kavkazcenter.com earlier this year, the most prominent rebel warlord, Shamil Basaev, promised Russia a war with nuclear and chemical weapons. And given the stern position of Putin of not giving in to demands of terrorists threatening Russian civilians with conventional weapons, the rebels have little alternative but to escalate the threat to catastrophic terrorism. It looks like the grimmest scenario of all possible, but the events in Ingushetia have only added to its plausibility.

Nabi Abdullaev is a Dagestani journalist and research working with The Moscow Times daily. He holds a degree in public administration from Harvard University, where he studied terrorism and international security. Presently, he is a researcher at the Washington-based Transnational Crime and Corruption Center.

JavaScript has been disabled in your browser