Helsinki +40

What is the Helsinki +40 process?

In 2015, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) celebrates the 40^th anniversary of the external pageHelsinki Final Actcall_made. Signed by almost all European states, as well as the United States and Canada, the Act helped to facilitate East-West dialogue during the latter stages of the Cold War. It also kick-started a pan-European process that seeks to address security concerns in a comprehensive and innovative manner. Consequently, the Helsinki Final Act has been a point of reference for the OSCE ever since. However, despite the reaffirmation of a common European security community at summits in external pagePariscall_made (1990) and external pageAstanacall_made (2010), the OSCE is still far from implementing this vision. Standing in its way are East-West tensions that have waxed and waned since the end of the Cold War and with NATO’s eastward expansion.

Accordingly, it is time for the OSCE to revisit how it wants to contribute to security in Europe and how it intends to go about meeting its objectives. That’s the stated purpose of the “Helsinki +40” process (H+40). external pageLaunched in late 2012call_made, the H+40 seeks to determine how the OSCE should be adapted to meet the challenges of the modern security environment. A high-level working group of OSCE ambassadors is currently discussing barriers to reform. In addition, track II actors will provide their inputs through conferences and a recently established OSCE network of thinks tanks.

A strategic document outlining the future shape and trajectory of the OSCE is expected to be published in 2015. According to the incoming Swiss chairmanship and other OSCE actors, the H+40 shouldn’t exclusively focus on the elaboration of this document; concrete measures should strengthen the relevance of the organization.

What obstacles or barriers to reform stand in the way of the H+40 process?

Decisions at the OSCE are invariably taken by consensus, which means that disagreement often prevents genuine progress being made. This, in turn, reflects that the organization remains completely dependent on the will of its member-states. So any attempts to adapt and reform the organization will, of course, have to reflect the views of the entire membership. However, compromises are often difficult to achieve, especially when it involves external pageprotracted conflictscall_made among and between OSCE member-states. Western states will undoubtedly demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia before any new institutional decisions can be taken. In response, Russia is likely to demand concessions from Western counterparts in other areas before it is willing to remove its troops.

The current lack of agreement between Russia and the United States is, therefore, one of the main barriers to effective and meaningful reform of the OSCE. In this respect, the H+40 should aim to overcome the stalemate between these two actors by providing regular talks on fundamental issues. Russia's main concerns include a perceived imbalance between soft (human rights focused) and hard security issues. Moscow wants the OSCE to refocus on the latter, such as conventional arms control. It also perceives an overemphasis of OSCE activities in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and bemoans the external pagedouble standards of Western statescall_made over the recognition of Kosovo’s independence and thesimultaneous non-recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

To overcome this, Moscow has suggested a revised geographic and thematic focus for the organization. Russia also wants a legally binding charter for the OSCE, which would also create further opportunities to renegotiate the organization’s goals and objectives. The United States and its allies want to prevent this. They insist that all previous commitments must be implemented by OSCE member-states before talks on institutional reform can begin. In particular, they want Russia to fulfill its commitments in the areas of human rights and military deployment.

Is the idea behind H+40 at all new?

No, not at all. The OSCE has never been able to enforce the comprehensive implementation of the Helsinki Final Act’s commitments and principles. Frustration with this shortfall has grown significantly since the mid-2000s. In 2008, then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev launched an initiative to develop a legally binding external pageEuropean Security Treatycall_made that would create a new security architecture for the continent. From the outset, Russia expressed its discontent with the current European security arrangements, especially the OSCE. Indeed, if this treaty ever came into force it could make the OSCE an obsolete institution.

Partially inspired by this initiative, the Greek OSCE chairmanship launched the so-called external pageCorfu processcall_made in 2009, a dialogue that was also concerned with the organization’s contribution to security in Europe. This process culminated in 2010 with the OSCE’s Astana Summit and commemorative declaration. While earlier commitments to and the vision of a common European security community were confirmed by member-states, they were not able to agree on a concrete action plan for the future, with the United States, Georgia and Moldova blocking a decision on this matter. In 2011, the external page“V to V dialogues”call_made (Vancouver to Vladivostok via Vienna and Vilnius) basically consisted of informal talks on the role of the OSCE in conflict prevention and management. The H+40 takes up where these initiatives left off and wants to use the 40^th anniversary to achieve results that provide the organization with an effective and coherent strategic outlook.

As chairman of the OSCE in 2014, what role will Switzerland play in the H+40 process?

The H+40 process will be coordinated by the respective chairmanships of the OSCE. The current Ukrainian, the upcoming Swiss, and the Serbian chairmanship of 2015 are supposed to closely coordinate their guidance of the process, to ensure consistency and continuity. They will propose a meeting agenda, chair talks and ensure that discussions remain focused upon reform. Their efforts will be supported by the OSCE Secretary General.

The three consecutive chairmanships will try to build consensus for a summit declaration and take stock of the OSCE’s role in the current security environment. In addition, they will facilitate further discussions on several topics, especially where they believe that agreement is essential and realistic. Inter alia, this includes the modernization of the regime for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), the enhancement of the OSCE’s mediation capacities and the fight against transnational threats. Perspectives on how the OSCE should be reformed vary enormously among different member states and a breakthrough in the negotiations on difficult subjects seems unlikely. However, the success of H+40 remains dependent upon the willingness of the key actors, in particular Russia and the US, to make compromises.

As all the three chairs of H+40 are neutral or non-aligned states, they will try to act as impartial bridge-builders between the two camps. However, if they fail to achieve consensus, it is highly unlikely that future chairmen will be able to break the deadlock. What seems more likely is that the H+40 process will bring member-states together to discuss issues in an informal environment. Such small steps in the right direction may help to bolster the OSCE’s reputation as an important security actor.

For additional reading on this topic please see:
A New Helsinki for the OSCE?
The OSCE-Mediterranean Partnership and the Arab Uprisings
OSCE Conflict Management and the Kyrgyz Experience in 2010