Rethinking Readiness

10 Sep 2014

How can the US military practice fiscal austerity while also remaining the world’s dominant fighting force? By rethinking what readiness means and how it should be measured and resourced, argues Todd Harrison.

This article is an excerpt of the external pageoriginal that was published in the Fall 2014 edition of external pageStrategic Studies Quarterly, by the external pageAir Force Research Institute.

In this era of austerity, the debate over the defense budget is, in many respects, a debate over readiness. Nearly every part of the defense budget is related to readiness in one form or another, whether through pay and benefits for military personnel, funding for training and maintenance, or the development and procurement of weapon systems. Over the next decade, the US military plans to spend more than $5 trillion dollars on readiness in all its forms.[1] To have an informed debate over the right level and allocation of defense spending, Congress and the nation first need a better understanding of what military readiness is and how bud-get decisions affect readiness.

The 2011 National Military Strategy defines readiness as “the ability to provide and integrate capabilities required by Combatant Commanders to execute their assigned missions.”[2] The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) readiness system describes three levels of war-fighting readiness: strategic, operational, and tactical. The common thread in how the military defines readiness at all three levels is the ability of forces to perform the missions and tasks assigned to them.[3]

While there is broad agreement on the importance of readiness, these definitions fail to answer some basic questions. What does it mean to be ready? What are the attributes of a ready force? And how much readiness is enough? Readiness can mean the level of training or staffing of units. It can also refer to how well equipment is maintained or to the availability of supplies. It can refer to unit-level readiness or joint force readiness. It can be low or high but is rarely too high. Perhaps Richard Betts offered the best description of readiness, writing almost 20 years ago: “Although we may not know what readiness is, we know it when we see it, or, more often, when we do not see it.”[4] Betts distilled the specific meaning of readiness into three fundamental questions:

Readiness for what?

The most basic element of understanding readiness is knowing what types of wars the military must be prepared to fight. This includes potential adversaries it could face, the capabilities these adversaries are likely to possess, the conditions under which conflict may occur, and how the military plans to fight or deter such wars.

Readiness for when?

Readiness also depends on the time interval in which the military must be prepared to respond. Near-term readiness depends in part on the peacetime force posture, such as the mix of forces in the active and reserve components and the stationing of forces at home or overseas. Some conflicts could begin with little or no warning, greatly compressing required response times. Long-term readiness depends more on the capabilities the military is investing in for the future and how these capabilities will address the future threat environment.

Readiness of what?

One must also know which parts of the force must be ready, and the answers to the first two questions may vary for different parts of the force. Some elements of the force may need to be prepared for certain threats but not others. Likewise, some parts of the force may need to be ready for today’s fight, some may need to prepare for tomorrow’s fight, and some may need to be ready for both.[5]

The answers to all three of Betts’ questions are fundamentally matters of strategy; what it means to be “ready” can only be understood in the context of one’s strategy. For example, military strategy could emphasize defense in depth, mobilization, preemption, or forward defense. For the military and its civilian leaders to know if it is sufficiently ready, it must have a strategy that adequately describes what it must be ready for, when.it must be ready, and what parts of the force must be ready. A strategy that does not define these attributes of readiness is, at best, incomplete.

For example, part of an overall defense strategy might be to use ground-based national missile defense forces to deter an adversary from launching ballistic missiles at the homeland. To achieve this objective, missile defense forces would need to be ready to detect, track, and launch interceptors. Since an adversary’s offensive missile forces could reach targets in the United States within minutes of being launched, interceptors must be ready to respond within minutes to make a successful intercept possible. This description of the role of ground-based missile defense forces as part of an overall defense strategy answers each of Betts’ questions:

•Readiness for what? Providing national missile defense for the homeland.

•Readiness for when? Within minutes of being notified.

•Readiness of what? Ground-based missile defense forces.

A defense strategy could also choose to take risks in near-term readiness, as the British did in the interwar period with the implementation of the “ten-year rule.” In hindsight, the ten-year rule is often remembered as foolish and shortsighted because it remained in effect through 1933, and war came only six years later. However, from 1919 to 1929 the rule worked as intended and allowed Britain to reduce defense spending by cutting near-term readiness.[6] Near-term readiness, by definition, has a short shelf life. If the military is not used during the period it is kept at a high state of readiness, near-term readiness yields little value beyond its deterrent effect. Investments in long-term readiness, such as new technologies and capabilities, have the potential to yield value years or decades into the future. Of course, one never knows when threats may emerge and how much warning will be afforded—a risk inherent with any time-based strategy. A 10-year rule that is automatically extended year after year will eventually prove to be misguided.

Why “How” Matters

This article does not attempt to offer an overall strategy for the military or make recommendations for how readiness should figure into that strategy. Instead, it focuses on what to do once the questions of “readiness for what,” “readiness for when,” and “readiness of what” have been settled. The trillion-dollar question for defense is: How can resources be allocated most effectively to achieve the readiness required by strategy? Unlike Betts’ three questions, the question of howto achieve readiness is fundamentally one of resource management rather than strategy and is of particular importance in an austere defense environment.

In the book Moneyball, Michael Lewis chronicles the story of how Billy Beane, the general manager of the Oakland Athletics, conducted a grand experiment to “rethink baseball.” Knowing his team would never have the resources of wealthier teams like the New York Yankees, Beane began a systematic and scientific look for inefficiencies in baseball. By using new metrics (known as “sabermetrics” in baseball) to gauge the value of players and by understanding how these metrics contribute to winning games, Beane was able to build a roster of players and a winning record that in many ways upended the game.[7]

In defense, as in baseball, the way money is spent often matters as much as the total amount of money available. History is replete with examples of wealthier nations being defeated by more modestly resourced adversaries.8 Understanding how best to resource readiness requires the same two things Billy Beane brought to the Oakland A’s—better metrics and a better understanding of the relationship between inputs (resources) and outputs (readiness). With such an understanding, the inputs can be fine-tuned to produce a more ready and capable force for a given level of resources. The first section of this article examines the differences between measuring readiness inputs and outputs and proposes a method for developing strategy-based metrics for readiness outputs. Next, it explores methods to identify causal relationships among readiness inputs and outputs so resources can be optimized to achieve the readiness required by one’s strategy. The article concludes by making specific recommendations to improve the way the US military measures and resources readiness.

Read the external pagefull article .

[1] If the Budget Control Act (BCA) caps currently in effect are extended through FY-2024, the DoD will receive roughly $5.5 trillion over the next decade, not including war-related supplemental funding.

[2] The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: DoD, 2011), 20.

[3] CJCS Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System (Washington: DoD, 15 November 2010), 1–2.

[4] Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), 5.

[5] Ibid., 33.

[6] Ibid., 53–58.

[7] Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 74–75.

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