Algeria: Stability against All Odds?

In a region beset by turmoil, Algeria has appeared to be a bedrock of stability. Having learnt from its earlier experience with unrest in October 1988, it was able to buck the trend sweeping across the region in 2011, largely through the use of hydrocarbon rents and the initiation of limited political reforms. The latter have, however, yet to bear fruit and the upcoming legislative elections in May 2017 are expected to do little to alter the country’s seemingly unchanging political landscape. Even President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s succession is unlikely to generate instability or significant change. Yet, it is precisely this political inertia, combined with reduced oil revenues that will place pressure on the regime in the coming years, though nothing of the scale of the 1986 oil price shock that sparked the popular uprising in 1988, which led to civil war during the 1990s.

From Liberation to Civil War

In 1962, Algeria won its independence from France, bringing to an end an eight- year war of national liberation. In the fledgling republic, devastated by war and the destruction caused by settlers returning to France, a single-party presidential regime was established. The Front de libération nationale (FLN), the principal nationalist movement during the war, became the sole party. Its armed wing, the Armée de libération nationale (ALN), in turn, mutated into a regular army, though its role in liberating the country meant that it never entirely ceded authority to politicians.

During the first two decades after inde- pendence, state-led socialism was pursued. One-party rule in Algeria was thus not only based on the revolutionary credentials of the FLN, but also on its image as a party committed to egalitarianism. By the 1970s, oil had become the mainstay of the regime and the principal means by which it was able to satisfy the socio-economic needs of most sections of society through the provision of subsidies and public sector employment.

However, low oil prices in the late 1980s diminished the government’s fiscal largesse. Drastic cuts were made in public spending, especially in the areas of health, education and housing. Subsidy cuts, in conjunction with inflation and curbs on imports, especially affected the lower and middle classes, damaging the FLN’s credibility as a party representing all Algerians.

In October 1988, people took to the streets to protest against economic hardships and the authorities’ seeming indifference to them. Demonstrations that were initially about socio-economic issues rapidly turned into calls for more radical reforms. Islamist militants, who had been gaining in prominence in the country against the backdrop of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the de- feat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, became a key mobilizing force. They were able to speak to the people’s frustration and to turn what had started as street protests led by youth and labour unions into a full-blown campaign against the FLN-ruled state.

In two weeks of clashes between protestors and security forces, over 500 demonstrators were killed and thousands wounded. In or- der to salvage the regime and to dilute sup- port for Islamists by bringing them into the electoral framework, one-party rule was ended and a multiparty system initiated. Some 60 new parties were created, amongst which the Front Islamique du Sa- lut (FIS) was one, formed in 1989 as an umbrella party for Islamist factions. In municipal elections in June 1990, the FIS won 54% of the seats, whereas the FLN garnered a mere 28%. Then, in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991, the FIS won 188 out of the 230 contested seats.

Alarmed by the prospect of an Islamist victory in the second round, the army effectively staged a coup under the pretext of preventing an Islamic revolution from occurring in Algeria. In January 1992, under pressure from the military, all political institutions were suspended and a state of emergency was declared. A Haut Comité d’Etat (HCE) was formed to govern the country, which subsequently voided the re- sults of the first round of legislative elections and banned the FIS.

The interruption of the institutional process and the crackdown on Islamists, plunged the country into a civil war be- tween the government and armed Islamist guerilla groups, principal among them the FIS’ armed wing, the Armée Islamique du salut (AIS). Violence only began to wane in 1997 as security forces gained the upper hand and a ceasefire with the AIS was reached. Yet, the war would only officially end in 2000, when the AIS laid down its arms, following the granting of amnesty in 1999 to Islamist militants, who had not committed a number of heinous offenses.

Again No Spring for Algeria

Although the end of the civil war restored relative stability to Algeria, the 2010/11 Arab uprisings raised again the specter of turmoil. The same conditions that fed popular grievances in neighboring countries existed in Algeria. While political institutions and a multiparty system had been re- instated from the mid-1990s through regular presidential, national and municipal elections, many people had lost faith in the electoral process as a mechanism for change. No credible opposition to the FLN and its ally, the Rassemblement national démocratique (RND), seemed to exist. Even the moderate Islamist opposition had been coopted. Restrictions on the media and the freedom of assembly also persisted even though the civil war had ended, corruption and nepotism were rife, economic conditions were deteriorating, housing was in short supply and youth unemployment was high.

In fact, protests did occur in Algeria in January 2011, triggered by the soaring prices of staples, such as cooking oil and sugar. Yet, these had more to do with socio-economic grievances than calls for political change. Nevertheless, a political movement did subsequently emerge – the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD) –, comprised of some opposition parties, civil society organizations and in- dependent trade unions. The CNCD had 3 key demands: the end of the state of emergency that was imposed in 1992 and still in place, the lifting of restrictions on the media and political participation and the re- lease of those arrested in the January protests.

In contrast to 1988, the government could respond to socio-economic grievances, due to high oil prices in the 2000s. Increases in public spending targeted specific groups, such as the poor, the large swath of public sector workers and retirees. High levels of youth unemployment and the potential of youth to protest meant that young people also received special attention. In order to facilitate young entrepreneurs, the government introduced preferential loans, tax exceptions and elimination of debt for young people.

The impact of almost a decade of civil war on civil society and the national psyche also worked against broad-based mobilization. The authorities’ shrewd granting of political concessions also helped to contain unrest – the 19-year old state of emergency was finally lifted and consultations on political reforms were begun. The latter culminated in constitutional amendments in February 2016, which, inter alia, limited the number of successive presidential terms to two, specified that the prime minister should be nominated from the majority party in parliament, guaranteed freedom of expression and association, and established an independent electoral commission to ensure fair and free elections.

Après Bouteflika, c’est le déluge?

Whether the 2016 reforms will encourage participation in elections and the broader political sphere or, indeed, lead to any genuine strengthening of parliament and the office of the prime minister has yet to be seen. They should, however, help to prevent one individual from monopolizing the office of the presidency for extensive periods of time, as Bouteflika has done since he was elected in 1999, now that successive presidential terms are now limited to two.

In principle, Bouteflika could seek a fifth and final term in 2019, although his failing health makes this improbable. His departure is unlikely to generate radical change or the instability that many observers predict. Succession, whether it happens in 2019 or before, will occur on the basis of a consensus between key figures linked to the two main constellations of power in the system at present – the presidency and the General Staff of the army. These core elite have an interest in maintaining stability. Bouteflika’s successor will, therefore, most likely be someone from his inner circle, who has the support of the General Staff.

The influence of the General Staff in an apparently political issue is indicative of an- other obstacle to democratic transition in Algeria – the incomplete civilianization of authority. The suspension of political institutions in the early 1990s and the election of a retired general, Li- amine Zeroual, in the first presidential elections following the 1992 coup meant that the military’s role in the shaping the political landscape was predominant when Bouteflika took office. Though Bouteflika’s his candidacy had the backing of the military, he has a civilian background and has done much to strengthen the presidency in relation to the army and, in particular, its ubiquitous Direction du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) – the military intelligence service that had become all-powerful.

Since the mid-2000s, Bouteflika has placed people loyal to him in key positions of the General Staff, notably the Chief of Staff, General Gaïd Salah, who plays a critical role in ensuring the loyalty of the army to the presidency. The President has also recently dissolved the DRS, which has been replaced with a new agency, the Département de Surveillance et de Sécurité (DSS). The latter is now to report directly to the Presidency. To be sure, these measures have increased the margin of maneuver of the presidency in relation to the military. Yet, the military continues to see itself as the guarantor of stability and unity in the country and it still plays a discrete role in political decision-making.