(Part 2)

An initial round of European sanctions

The use of sanctions in the Yugoslav crisis began as part of a carrot-and-stick approach to get the parties to sign on to the EU-sponsored peace plan. On October 29, 1991, the foreign ministers of the EU countries met in Brussels and decided to impose economic sanctions against any republic that did not accept a European Union’s proposed peace plan put forth by former NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington of Great Britain. The EU plan called for sovereignty and independence for the republics, the protection of human rights and special status for certain groups and areas where other national or ethnic groups formed the majority (e.g., the Serbs in The Krajina). It also called for the restitution of the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

The plan was greeted positively by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia, but rejected by Milosevic. His rejection led the EU to initiate its own very limited economic sanctions on November 8, 1991. The measures included the elimination of all economic and technical assistance, a cutoff of textile and other commodity import quotas, and the elimination of trading preferences (most favored nation and the general system of preferences). U.S. officials followed suit with similar sanctions. Although feelings were already running high in the United States over Serbian brutality in Croatia and Bosnia and Serbian repression in Kosovo, Baker wanted to make sure that the United States did not get out ahead of the Europeans.

The emergence of American leadership in the Balkans

By the spring of 1992, American news media were regularly filing reports on atrocities being commit- ted by Bosnian Serb forces and their engagement in what could only be classified as ethnic cleansing. This outrageous conduct caught the attention of the American public, who began pressing for something to be done. The war also became an issue in the 1992 Democratic primary and the presidential election debates.

In May 1992, Baker traveled to Europe to attend a conference convened in Lisbon, Portugal for pledging assistance to the states newly emerging from the former Soviet Union. But, Bosnia was also high on his agenda. He had been pushing European leaders to no avail to impose more stringent measures against the Serbs in order to reign in the fighting. When the Europeans again failed to act, he became determined to take action on his own, and peremptorily announced a number of steps the United States would take against the Milosevic regime. He also directed the State Department to seek broad trade and other sanctions against the rump SFRY.

Standing before a press gaggle in Lisbon on May24, 1992, Baker announced the United States would immediately cut back the level of its diplomatic presence in Belgrade, cut off all contacts with the JNA, close Yugoslav consulates in the United States, and block Serbia-Montenegro from being recognized as the continuation state of Yugoslavia. He also announced that the United States had decided to seek Security Council chapter seven sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro and the Bosnian Serbs.

Baker had some sharp words for his hesitant European hosts: “Anyone who is looking for reasons not to act or arguing somehow that action in the face of this kind of a nightmare is not war- ranted at this time – I think that in the view of all of us in the civilized world at least – is on the wrong wavelength.” external page²call_madeWhen questioned by a reporter whether the United States would consider using force to intervene Baker responded:

There will be no unilateral use – no unilateral use – of U.S. force. As we have said before, we are not and we cannot be the world’s policeman. Before we consider force, it seems to me, we ought to exhaust all of the political, diplomatic and economic remedies that might be at hand … I would be even more encouraged if, coming out of the meeting on (next) Tuesday, there were a willing- ness on the part of our European colleagues to act. ( emphasis added) external page³call_made

Baker was adamant that the United States would no longer simply follow Europe’s lead. Rather, the United States would independently push for a more rigorous way of dealing with the crisis. And, this meant that the State Department and other U.S. foreign policy-related agencies would now begin to engage directly in the formulation and application of policies to deal with the Yugoslav crisis.

Designing U.N. sanctions on the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The task of drafting the Security Council resolution announced by Baker in Lisbon fell initially to the State Department’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs, with support from the European Bureau and the Office of East-West Trade in the Economic Business Bureau. I was the director of that office and had the lead line responsibility in the State Department for man- aging the international implementation of U.S. export control and sanctions measures. Under intense pressure to work quickly, we put together a draft resolution along the lines of that previously used for Iraq sanctions. Those sanctions involved the application of broad political, economic and trade sanctions that were meant to deter, isolate and punish the target state. There was no thought at that time of designing more limited or targeted sanctions. Rather, the administration wanted sanctions that would completely isolate Serbia and that would have a dramatic and immediate impact. There were, however, some serious complicating factors that had to be considered. The Danube River, a traditional link for trade traffic between western and eastern Europe, flowed through Serbia. Likewise, Greece’s rail and road connections with the rest of Europe also ran through Serbia. And, the heavily traveled Adriatic Sea was also very difficult to police without unduly disrupting maritime commerce.

On May 30, 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 757, with two countries, China and Zimbabwe, abstaining. The resolution directed all countries to completely cut off trade with Serbia and Montenegro (FRY), except for food and medical supplies; to impose a flight ban on FRY-owned (registered) aircraft; to ban their nationals from using FRY-flagged ships or aircraft; to prohibit all financial transfers (including cash transfers) to the FRY; and to freeze any economic asset in their territory belonging to FRY entities. Diplomatic representation was to be reduced to a minimum and scientific, technical, cultural and sports cooperation halted.

The sanctions resolution, however, also contained a major loophole which seriously undercut their effectiveness. Taking into account Serbia’s position as a regional transit hub, paragraph six of the resolution exempted from the controls all commodities and goods that were transshipped through the FRY. This provision was viewed as necessary to take into account the impact the sanctions measures might otherwise have on neighboring country trade, particularly that of Greece, Macedonia and Danube riparian states. The Yugoslav Sanctions Committee (which had previously been established to monitor the arms embargo) was directed to issue guidelines to regulate such transit traffic, but, in fact, was only able to produce some very general hortatory statements in this regard. Clearly lacking was any effective methodology, monitoring mechanism or system of accountability that could identify, segregate and control cargoes originating in or destined for Serbia and Montenegro as opposed to cargoes that were legitimately transiting the FRY. And, trade with Serbia and Montenegro actually increased over the next several months.

The failure of the U.N. sanctions to have the bite intended caused considerable angst in Washington. The United States even went so far as to raise the issue in the Security Council and to criticize publicly Italy, Greece and other European countries for failing to take the steps necessary to make the sanctions work. An indignant Italy responded by recalling its ambassador in Washington for “consultations.”

Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger made effective implementation and enforcement of the sanctions one of his core objectives for the August 26-27, 1992, London Conference on Yugoslavia. I was included as a member of his delegation to advise and assist on the sanctions issue, and was asked to put together a series of steps on sanctions implementation that Eagleburger might push for at the conference. Eagleburger’s statement reflected my recommendations. He made it clear that sanctions enforcement had to change dramatically:

… we must resolve no longer to tolerate continuing and flagrant violations of the sanctions regime. Several steps are necessary. One, the UN Sanctions Committee transshipment guidelines must be strengthened to include strict documentation and inspection procedures. Two, in agreement with the Government of Romania, we will move quickly to place multinational sanctions monitors in Romania. The United States is ready to contribute experts and equipment to this operation. Similar arrangements should also be established in other areas bordering Serbia- Montenegro, including Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and Macedonia. Three, we must implement new measures to eliminate violations occurring via the Danube River. ⁴

The idea of putting together an effective monitoring capability along the borders of Serbia and Montenegro came from brainstorming discussions within my office when it had become clear that confronting our allies simply would not work. To the fullest extent possible, it was important to de- politicize implementation and enforcement issues. The best way to do that was to hold companies rather than countries responsible for sanctions violations. Sanctions violations should be treated like smuggling and handled as a customs function, and that required bringing transparency to what was actually crossing Serbia’s borders. However, we recognized that considerable political clout might be necessary to assure that all countries participating in the effort manifested the necessary “political will” to succeed.

Left on their own, neighboring countries and their customs services would have been unable and unlikely to carry out such tasks given political, personnel and resource constraints. Government and customs officials and personnel in these countries, at that time, were largely under-motivated, under-trained and underpaid, and could too easily be corrupted. For this purpose the United States needed some strong political and economic incentives, and a core of experienced, committed and highly trained customs officers to oversee what was really happening. The trade-off for the local governments and customs services would be the benefits they gained from the infusion of resources, training, equipment, recognition and from the respect they gleaned from working in close cooperation with a corps of international customs officers. From the outset we championed the idea of both catering to, and co-opting the local government officials and customs services by treating them as full partners (including offering them increased perks, training and mission trips to other countries in Europe and the United States).

Negotiating such an arrangement at the London Conference proved to be much more difficult than anticipated. Support for the concept had to be earned and thought had to be given on how to institutionalize such an undertaking. From the outset U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros- Ghali insisted such an operation could only be conducted under U.N. auspices. But quickly establishing such a monitoring arrangement within the framework of the United Nations would have been extremely difficult, and, undoubtedly, would have politicized the monitoring function and/or denuded its effectiveness. Certainly, that has been the experience with U.N. sanctions committees and monitoring groups since then. Getting the U.N. secretary general to go along with the creation of a monitoring system outside of the United Nations was also going to prove quite difficult. His representative at the conference was instructed to squelch this approach as soon as Boutros-Ghali heard of it. Such sanctions monitoring, Boutros- Ghali maintained, would necessarily require prior Security Council approval and had to remain under Security Council (sanction committee) direction and control.

Eagleburger was just as adamant that the monitoring mechanism we proposed had to remain outside of U.N. control. He threatened to walk from the conference if Boutros-Ghali continued to object. I was authorized to convey this message directly to Boutros-Ghali’s representative. Under such pressure, the secretary general finally caved in, and agreed not to openly oppose such arrangement.

Rather, he would leave it to the Security Council to determine whether or not the Yugoslav Sanctions Committee would countenance and cooperate with such an arrangement. It finally did.

The neighboring states (other than Romania) were also very cautious about accepting these proposals but agreed to consider them. They all had a common interest in bringing Serbia to heel, but only Romania had agreed outright to our proposal.

After much discussion a compromise agreement was finally reached to establish a separate, informal sanctions liaison group that included the United States, the European community and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), working under the auspices of and reporting to both. Appropriate partner states would assure that the U.N. Security Council and its FRY sanctions committee were informed of the sanctions liaison group and SAM activities. Additionally, the European Community agreed to establish a Sanctions Coordination and Communication (SAMCOM) center in Brussels to support these efforts. A link would subsequently also be established between the sanctions assistance missions in the field through SAMCOM to the U.N. sanctions committee in New York.

The decisions taken to strengthen sanctions implementation at the London Conference constituted a special section of the conference’s final document. The final document reflected that “the relevant governments” had agreed to:

· “Implement an agreed action plan to ensure the rigorous application of sanctions.

· Enforce sanctions on the Danube, consistent with their view that riparian states have the authority and obligation to do so.

· Provide practical advice, manpower and equipment to help neighboring countries to enforce sanctions rigorously.

· Contribute experts to advise on the application of sanctions in all neighboring countries to take part in the monitoring missions which will be established in the neighboring countries to ensure full implementation of sanctions.

· Ask the Security Council to:

» Take necessary measures to tighten up the application of sanctions in the Adriatic.

» Prevent illegal transfer of financial assets to Serbia and Montenegro; and eliminate diver- sion of goods in transit.

Conference parties have asked the European Community and the CSCE to coordinate all necessary practical assistance to all neighboring countries.” ⁵

The sanctions improvements negotiated at the London Conference and in subsequent organizational meetings in Vienna represented the first steps in what would become, perhaps the most successful use of economic sanctions in modern history. For the first time stringent sanctions measures had been combined with a system for effective sanctions oversight and management. For the first time, methodology was in place to identify those violating the sanctions and to hold them accountable. In my view, this sanctions program gave the West its greatest lever over Milosevic and Serbia, and induced him, finally, to come to the negotiating table.

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