Solving Long Division: The Geopolitical Implications of Korean Unification

The following synopsis is from “Solving Long Division: The Geopolitical Implications of Korean Unification,” a lengthy report which the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released in December 2015. For the full text go here.

Key Judgments

•• Unification of the Korean Peninsula would challenge the most fundamental prevailing assumptions about power, interstate relations, and nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. While there is no clear path to ending seven decades of division on the peninsula, there is nevertheless a resurgent debate over the shape and implications of unification. What some, such as South Korean President Park Geun-hye, have referred to as a potential “bonanza,” others would view as a potential calamity. At a minimum, Korean unification would raise significant strategic questions about Northeast Asian security, U.S. foreign and defense policy, the Korean armed forces, and the regional role of nuclear weapons and deterrence. Korean unification is likely to represent both an extraordinary opportunity as well as one of the most complex political and economic processes in modern history.

•• The peninsula stands at the geopolitical cross- roads of Northeast Asia and at the strategic intersection of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. While gaining the approval of the neighboring nations is not a precondition for unification, obtaining international and regional support will be vital for successfully building and sustaining a unified Korean state.

•• A key unknown is whether a unified Korea would turn inward to China and the Asian continent, continue to look outward as a maritime power aligned with the United States, or pursue a “Hermit Kingdom” strategy while focusing on integrating the peninsula. From the American perspective, the priority should be on encouraging a unified Korea’s continued alignment with the United States and its further emergence as a middle power that takes on an increasing share of global responsibilities.

•• Since unification is more likely to be a process than a single event, the prospect of reassessing U.S. relations with the peninsula will be a gradual one. Yet at some point during this process the alliance will face existential questions: In the absence of a North Korean threat, the alliance must either be repurposed and recalibrated, or simply wither and end. The United States will have an interest in a continued alliance for reasons that go beyond the threat posed by Pyongyang, and a U.S.–United Republic of Korea (UROK) alliance could serve as a key stabilizing force in Northeast Asia.

•• A staunchly shared commitment to regional stability, as well as to open markets, liberal democracy, and a rules-based order, would provide the foundation for a post-unification alliance. In the immediate aftermath of unification, questions will linger about stability on the peninsula, and the U.S. alliance can help dampen the prospects of conflict. In the longer term, the alliance – including American troops on the peninsula, their only presence on the Asian mainland – can help ensure that a broader balance of power in Northeast Asia endures.

•• Several structural implications would flow from the shift to a U.S.-UROK alliance. The Combined Forces Command (CFC) might be replaced by a U.S. Korea Command (USKORCOM), the means by which U.S. forces would support the UROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. A USKORCOM would serve both as a facilitator between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the UROK military leadership and as a tangible American commitment to peace and stability on the peninsula.

•• A newly unified Korean military would, in this scenario, reset around three revised strategic goals. First and most importantly, Korean forces would guard against the possibility of aggression or coercion by outside powers and so would need to focus on imposing unacceptable costs on foreign adversaries who threaten Korean sovereignty. Second, the Korean military would need to sustain mobility and power projection as far as the Indian Ocean in order to protect sea lines of communications. And third, Korean forces may be necessary to ensure internal security, especially in northern Korea in the immediate aftermath of unification.

•• Long-range precision-guided munitions and information warfare are the most likely major features of future conflict, especially among East Asian militaries. At the same time, substantial naval modernization is likely to continue across Asia while the maritime areas of the Indo-Pacific grow in importance to surrounding nations. These developments suggest that air and maritime forces should represent the priority in post-unification Korean military budgets.

•• Two major factors are likely to influence the geographic distribution of Korean forces on the peninsula in the medium term after unification– military basing infrastructure and U.S. military presence. In the northern half of Korea, surviving North Korean military infrastructure could serve as useful bases and facilities for Korean forces. At the same time, Korea would likely face Chinese resistance to U.S. forces deployed north of the 38th parallel.

•• Assuming that a unified Korea would maintain the ROK’s non-nuclear commitments, a key question will revolve around the means by which to physically secure and dispose of the nuclear weapons and materials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In a peaceful and stable reunification scenario, these issues could be dealt with in a deliberate and consultative fashion, likely involving intensive engagement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), other international bodies, as well as the United States and potentially other countries with particular interests in and/or expertise on the problem.

•• In a scenario in which conflict erupts between the two Koreas – especially one in which the DPRK threatens to employ its nuclear forces – the priority for the ROK, the United States and CFC would be to deter and defend against any attack involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to secure North Korean nuclear sites as quickly as possible after a potential northern collapse.

•• In either a peaceful or post-conflict unification scenario, a unified Korea (and the United States) would need to discuss Beijing’s concerns about the disposition of nuclear weapons and facilities on the peninsula. The allies would also need to assess the credibility of America’s extended deterrence over a unified Korea and the diplomatic implications of continuing it.

•• Unification is not yet on the horizon, but neither can it be said that the division of the peninsula is a permanent feature of East Asia. Because a unification process could be jump-started by sudden change inside North Korea, it is incumbent on the United States, the Republic of Korea, and other governments to think now and in more operational terms about the possibility of future unification and its manifold implications for the alliance, the region, and beyond.