Bioweapons and Scientific Advances

The BWC and its Implementation

On the 25th of November 1969, then-US president Richard Nixon announced that his administration was forgoing its offensive bioweapons program. Although bio-weapons played no role in the Vietnam War, Nixon hoped that this unilateral move would help counteract growing domestic criticism over the use of defoliants such as Agent Orange during the conflict. The Soviet Union responded positively to the US initiative, since it was generally interested in détente. However, the Soviet Union was not prepared to allow for any on-site inspection regime. The BWC was signed on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.

The states parties to the BWC (currently 175 in total) undertake never to produce biological agents or toxins, except in ways and quantities that are warranted for prevention, protection, or other peaceful purposes. This intentionally vague “general purpose criterion” is designed to exclude all forms of biological warfare. Furthermore, the convention bans weapons, equipment, and other resources for the use of biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes or in an armed conflict. The states parties to the BWC may not transfer agents or equipment prohibited under the treaty to other states or non-state actors, and must enforce the bioweapons ban on their territory. In case of a suspected treaty violation, the member states may consult or call upon the UN Security Council for clarification. Finally, the signatory states are called upon to promote the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of bacteriological agents and toxins (Art. X).

Since the entry into force of the BWC, there have been repeated violations of its rules. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union massively expanded its existing offensive bio-weapons program. A research conglomerate of more than 30 institutions produced and weaponized large quantities of bio-agents, including smallpox and the Marburg virus. These were tested under real-world conditions on an island in the Aral Sea. After the demise of the Soviet Union, a trilateral process was initiated between the three BWC depositary powers – the US, the UK, and Russia – to investigate this matter. However, the enquiry was quietly terminated in the mid-1990s without tangible results, having ultimately failed to shed full light on the Soviet bioweapons program.

Another case was that of Iraq in the 1980s, when Saddam Hussein ordered the production of pathogens and toxins for military purposes. During South Africa’s Apartheid regime a bioweapons program was maintained, but the exact extent of the program remains unclear to this day. More recently, it has transpired that Syria produced the toxin ricin.

Terrorists, too, have been involved with biological agents. In the mid-1990s, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect experimented with anthrax and botulinum toxin, but failed to produce deployable weapons agents. In September and October 2001, letters containing finely milled anthrax spores were sent to two US senators and several US journalists. These letters resulted in 22 anthrax infections and five deaths, but the case was never officially solved. The terrorist organization al-Qaida developed an interest in ricin and anthrax, but failed in its efforts to recruit scientists from the former Soviet weapons program.

Efforts to Enhance the Treaty

Compliance with the ban on biological weapons is difficult to verify. Bacteria and viruses can be cultivated swiftly, and many occur naturally. In order to establish increased transparency, the parties to the BWC agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986 to introduce confidence-building measures (CBM), which were augmented at the Third Review Conference in 1991 and slightly modified at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011. These measures require, inter alia, annual reporting about activities at high biosafety level laboratories (BSL-3 and BSL-4), the exchange of information on biodefense programs, documentation on national legislation for the implementation of the BWC, and reporting of human vaccine production facilities. These CBM are politically, but not legally binding. More than half of the signatory states do not participate in them at all, and the quality of the submitted reports varies considerably.

A three-person BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) was established in Geneva in 2006. It serves as the secretariat of the states parties to the treaty. The ISU also collects the CBM reports and ensures the exchange of information.

In January 1995, the BWC signatory states began negotiations on a legally binding additional protocol designed to strengthen all aspects of the BWC, especially verification. In March 2001, a draft protocol was tabled requiring verification of compliance with the BWC based on annual national reports about biodefense programs, vaccine production facilities, BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, and installations with high production capabilities by way of voluntary visits, transparency visits, and clarification visits. Furthermore, there was to be the possibility of challenge inspections. An international BWC organization, which had yet to be created, was to ensure implementation.

The US opposed this draft. Washington claimed that the BWC was, in the final analysis, unverifiable, and that too much transparency would increase US soldiers’ vulnerability to biological attacks. Moreover, the US feared that visits could give rise to espionage against the pharmaceutical industry. Other countries such as Russia and China, too, were uncomfortable with the additional protocol’s efforts to establish transparency. In order to avoid a complete termination of the multilateral process to strengthen the BWC, European and other Western countries advocated a substitute program that would take into account the US interests. On the occasion of the Fifth Review Conference (aborted in 2001 due to the dispute over the additional protocol, but resumed in 2002), the states parties to the treaty agreed to hold annual expert and states parties meetings on the following topics: National measures to implement the BWC, including national legislation; national measures to enhance safety in handling pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; improvements to international response capabilities in case of intentional deployment of biological weapons and outbreaks of diseases; strengthening of national and international efforts to identify and combat infectious diseases; and codes of conduct for scientists.

Since 2003, these meetings have been held in the framework of the “Intersessional Process”. In the meantime the spectrum of topics has been slightly modified and expanded: now also including matters of bio-safety and biosecurity, assistance in case of an attack using bioweapons, implementation of Article X (use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes), and potential improvements of CBM. Furthermore, since 2011, there has been a stronger focus on matters related to scientific-technical advances. The meetings have enhanced transparency and fostered information exchange, especially since they were attended not only by international organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO), but also by representatives from industry and the NGO community. Even so, a number of observers believe that the discussion process has been exhausted, since many topics and contributions have been dealt with repeatedly. Attempts to better structure the discussions by introducing working groups have so far failed.

The Scientific Setting

Since the 1990s, technological advances in the life sciences have attracted a great deal of attention. They are mainly driven by the increasing convergence in the natural sciences, especially biology and chemistry. The notion of “convergence” refers to the increasing proximity, both at the level of theoretical knowledge and in terms of experimental technologies, between these disciplines, which previously were relatively distinct. This can be seen, for example, in the way certain chemicals or biological molecules can be produced and deployed. Using biocatalytic or biotechnological processes and methods in synthetic biology, synthetic pathways and production times can be decisively simplified, shortened, and designed for greater economic and ecological expediency.

For instance, these may result in fast and simplified manufacturing processes for bio-molecules (DNA, RNA, proteins), which are used in the CRISPR/Cas9 technology (CRISPR: Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats), for example. Based on the discovery of bacterial immune defense, CRISPR/Cas9 has become an established method for targeted genetic manipulation. Using this technology, it is now possible to generate changes in the genetic makeup of humans, animals, plants, and microorganisms in a quick and targeted manner. Modifications of the genome, which took months or years using conventional genetic engineering, can now be done within just a few weeks. It is expected that with the help of CRISPR/Cas9, huge breakthroughs will be achieved in the research and therapy of hereditary diseases in humans. The new technology can also help optimize agriculture. Crop yields can be boosted and the impacts of plant diseases minimized. Also, bacteria in their natural state can be modified for the production of therapeutic proteins, such as insulin, or for the elimination of environmental pollutants.

The convergence of biology and chemistry also facilitates advances in the production of toxins. These are biologically derived substances that, even in small doses, can inhibit essential cellular processes in organisms. Use of these substances is especially prevalent in medicine, agriculture, and the cosmetic industry. Traditional production techniques were based on enrichment and isolation methods. Now, there are procedures for manufacturing large quantities of toxins using synthetic biology and biotechnology.

One example is the synthesis of toxins by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum. These bacteria exist worldwide and, as spore-producing organisms, can survive even under the most restrictive environmental conditions. They are feared for their ability to cause fatal food poisoning. Among the neurotoxic proteins that they produce – the botulinum toxins – are some of the most potent naturally occurring poisons. Their effects are based on targeted paralysis of the muscle apparatus. For this reason, Botulinum toxin A has been employed since the 1980s as a therapeutic medicine. Since 1992, it has become well-known through its use in the cosmetic industry under the labels of “Botox” or BTX-A. Today, under the control of strict safety and security regulations, Botulinum toxin is obtained from bacterial cultures on an industrial scale.