The Syrian Military: The Day After

Introduction

The Syrian armed forces have played – and still play – a prominent role in the onset and evolution of its country’s conflict. As the main military actor on the ground, it has been accused of having caused 90% of the civilian victims (more than 400,000 at the time of writing), using chemical weapons and other war crimes. The conflict has also taken a toll on the institution: 60,000 soldiers have lost their lives and several thousand have deserted, including high-ranking officers, not to mention the loss of equipment and damage to military infrastructure. The once 300,000-strong Syrian military probably now stands at a maximum of 150,000-175,000 troops (“About 430 Thousands Were Killed”, 2016; Davison, 2016).

But precisely because civil wars are to a significant extent a security issue (even though they begin as a political one), any type of post-conflict scenario will involve the armed forces in one way or another. No peace settlement, regardless of its outlines, will hold without security provisions in place. Almost absurdly, the very same institution that contributed to the war is also one of the key actors to rely on once the conflict is over – an irony that applies not only to Syria but to most post-civil war countries, and presents a notoriously difficult circle to square.

Unsurprisingly, different actors involved in the Syrian conflict have expressed different ideas and preferences regarding the military’s future once fighting ceases. It is perhaps worth noting that most international proposals mark the beginning of the conflict’s end as the retreat of the Syrian military from cities and residential areas and into its barracks – given that several military units are stationed in cities, it is not clear how this would work out in practice (League of Arab States, 2011; League of Arab States, 2012; “Kofi Annan’s Six- Point Plan”, 2012).

There are at this point broadly three sets of proposals regarding the Syrian armed forces in a post-conflict scenario. The opposition’s vision, laid out in several documents since 2011, includes the creation of an interim Joint Military Council that would supervise the immediate aftermath of the conflict’s end. The council, made up of militia fighters, defected military personnel as well as vetted army officers “whose hands have not been stained with Syrian blood” would coordinate security activities (including collecting arms, monitoring the ceasefire, managing and protecting borders, combating terrorism) and supervise the restructuring of a new military force that would, in the medium to long term, integrate former militia fighters (“Cairo Documents: Joint Political Vision”, 2012; High Negotiations Commission, 2016). The proposal remains otherwise silent on the details of the restructuring of the military, or indeed on the mechanisms for civil-military relations.

The second set of proposals, put forward by the United Nations (UN), is comparatively vague. Although in agreement with the opposition’s general ideas on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) as well as re-creation of a “strong and unified national army” in charge of border security, the fight against terrorism and the monopoly of violence, it spells out no details beyond these broad guidelines. Special Envoy De Mistura instead suggested the establishment of a thematic negotiations committee that would define the outlines of the post-conflict Syrian military in 2015, and later the “identification of standards for a unified, national, professional army as well as for the disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of armed groups” (UN, 2012; UN, 2015; UN, 2016a, UN, 2016b).

While the Syrian government has issued no statement concerning the armed forces’ role in a post-conflict situation, Russia’s proposals have been less concerned with change and more with status quo. A first Russian paper suggested that the functions of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and control of special services will be retained by the elected Syrian president, an element that was also included in a Russian proposal for a Syrian constitution. A Russian memorandum of intent issued a year later included a new provision only insofar as it recognised Kurdish paramilitary units as legitimate military forces in the Kurdish-held region – a proposition rejected by the Syrian government (“Text of Russia’s Draft Proposals”, 2015; Abboud, 2016).

Beyond these rather broad sketches, parties to the conflict have not put forward more comprehensive plans for the Syrian military’s reconstruction – in part, of course, because said reconstruction will depend very much on the conditions of the conflict’s end, the presence or absence of other troops (such as an international stabilisation force) and the security situation at this point in time. Nevertheless, concrete plans for Syrian post-conflict security are necessary to ensure smooth transition no matter the exact circumstances of peace.

This paper looks first at the particular challenges of post-conflict security and situates them in the Syrian conflict; it then assesses those features of the Syrian armed forces that will be relevant for the post-conflict context. From this, the study extrapolates three scenarios and uses them as frameworks for different plans for the Syrian military’s reconstruction.

Post-Conflict Security Challenges

Although human conflicts are at the heart of political contests, once they have evolved into war their security dimension takes precedence. The first sector to be at the forefront of a civil war is consequently the security sector and all its components, be they military, internal security or related civilian institutions.

Once the conflict is over, this sector is not only highly politicised and fragmented, it is also bloated, deregulated and usually lacks sound civilian supervision. Nevertheless, it is precisely this sector that the post-conflict peace hinges on: only where security prevails after a conflict can economic activity, reconstruction efforts and of course political normalisation occur. Hence, post-conflict security sectors face two principal challenges: re-organising a highly disjointed sector, while maintaining security in an equally highly volatile and violent environment. It is worth noting that there are very few cases where states succeeded in achieving both without any outside assistance. The reliance on security at a time when security is out of control is one of the main reasons why civil conflicts have the highest relapse rate of all conflicts at 50%. 90% of civil wars in the 21st century occurred in countries that had seen a civil war in the previous 30 years (Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom, 2008). Stabilising the security sector after an internal conflict is consequently one of the most important, but also the most challenging tasks.

The armed forces are usually at the centre of this task because they are not only normally better armed than their civilian colleagues and trained for much more elevated levels of violence but they retain a high degree of centralised decision-making, making them capable of moving in much more difficult circumstances than the police. This also explains why the military is more often involved in civil wars than the internal security forces.

Post-civil war security sectors share a number of challenging features regardless how the conflict comes to an end.

Firstly, civil wars – as the name suggests – lead to a militarisation of civil society, both directly and indirectly. This begins with the normalisation of violence as a means to solve conflict, extends to the prevalence of arms amongst the civilian population up to the existence of (comparatively harmless) armed self-defence entities and, of course, heavily armed militias with a political and/or economic agenda. In this context, the monopoly of violence is no longer controlled by the state – with tangible implications. Where the state no longer controls the means and regulation of violence, its core function as a provider of security and order is undermined, and with it its legitimacy writ large. Armed groups profit from this security vacuum for both political and economic purposes: while they pose as a credible alternative to the existing political order because they provide security, they also control resource extraction as well as taxation of imports and exports. As a result, the proliferation of weapons during a civil war undermines not only the state’s authority but also other traditional sources of authority, be it tribes, clans or religious groups (Ayoob, 1995, p. 172). Once the conflict has formally ended, reversing this militarisation requires time and resources – both elements that post-conflict states usually lack.

One of the first measures post-conflict states seek to implement in this context is disarmament. This achieves two effects: it removes the means with which the conflict was fought and thereby reduces the relapse likelihood, and it creates a stable security environment conducive to political stabilisation and dialogue between former combatants. However, in order for it to be successful, it requires trust in the peace agreement. Where civilians and former combatants have doubts about the sustainability of the agreement, they will retain their weapons. Sadly, mistrust is one of the main features of most post-conflict environments. Worse, where disarmament programmes are not properly implemented, they achieve exactly the opposite and increase mistrust. Disarmament programmes in Angola or Libya failed for two reasons: the necessary level of trust was not in place, and no adequate verification process had been established for their implementation.

Although the magnitude of weapons in civilian hands in Syria is not clear, disarmament will be an issue (De Groof, 2013). Opposition forces have captured weapons, including heavy ones, from government arsenals or received them from different sources; but the regime equally has armed militias in its support. There are two issues with the disarmament programmes put forward for Syria: they do not include a verification process, and they relegate the task to the armed actors (including the armed forces) under the supervision of the Joint Military Council. This is problematic mainly because it assumes an unlikely level of trust, and has no provisions in place to ensure trust in the disarmament process.

Generally, disarmament programmes are severely hampered in their efficiency if they are not flanked by a regional arms embargo. Given the porous nature of borders, especially in the Middle East, weapons can be easily replaced after they have been handed in. By the same token, peace settlements which allow for the continuous possession of weapons by armed groups are built on shaky ground and conflict can easily be retriggered under those circumstances. In addition, disarmament programmes need to take into account the prevalent “gun culture” in a country. This appears to be less of a problem in Syria which, somewhat in contrast to its neighbours Iraq and Lebanon, had a significantly lower private gun ownership rate of 3.91 per 100 citizens before the conflict (735,000 weapons for 22 million inhabitants). However, the longer a conflict lasts, the more this is likely to change. In general, disarmament programmes have a higher success rate if they focus on heavy weaponry such as tanks, surface-to-air-missiles and rocket launchers, and establish rules for the display and carrying of small arms in public.

Secondly – and more importantly – demobilisation of combatants is an important feature in the demilitarisation of society. While demobilisation is the formal disbandment of armed formations, the subsequent reintegration into society is the ultimate criterion of success for the process. Since membership in an armed group provides fighters with status, purpose and income, it is important to replace these elements; otherwise they can turn into spoilers. But where combatants are successfully reintegrated into society, their links to former fighting units are broken, and an alternative source of income is provided. Reintegration is particularly challenging in modern economies, where the gap between combatant skill and labour market demands is important; but even agricultural societies – such as Syria – face difficulties in the integration of former fighters although it should technically be easier. Agriculture does not provide the element of status fighters often yearn for, and their prolonged absence from home due to the conflict often hinders their access to land.

The number of fighters concerned by DDR programmes in Syria is difficult to estimate at this point; there are over 120 different groups in Syria fighting today, with 60,000- 70,000 said to be “moderate”; an additional 20,000 are in Ahrar al-Sham (al-Qaeda outlet Jabhat Fatah Al-Sham is excluded from the calculation as is the Islamic State as it is assumed that they will not benefit from reintegration measures) (MacAskill, 2011). The Syrian military, should it be disbanded (an option not put forward by any of the parties involved) has around 100,000 men at the time of writing, but DDR measures would be required for its deserted personnel of 60,000 as well. Perhaps most worryingly, no proposal put forward includes any references to demobilisation. Although integration into the armed forces is mentioned in the opposition’s framework, there are limits to how many former militiamen a military institution can absorb without running the risk of disintegration.

Crucially, neither disarmament nor demobilisation can take place without a minimum level of security: without it, combatants will not hand in their weapons and demobilise – but their continued existence as armed formations in itself presents a threat to security.

At the governmental end, post-civil war forces also share a certain number of features. Any armed force engaged in prolonged conflict will suffer from low morale, cohesion and lack of adequate resources; in addition, however, the institution’s oversight mechanisms – whether military or civilian ones – are likely to have been suspended, especially if the institution operates outside a democratic context. This in turn will have facilitated human rights abuses – if not encouraged by the regime – and hence burden the relationship the population will have with the armed forces. Most importantly, however, most military forces engaged in civil war will emerge as a party to the conflict and hence as a politicised actor rather than a neutral security provider. This is the case in Syria as well.

Lastly, security in post-conflict societies is further weakened by the side-effects of war: porous borders, criminal networks, terrorism and high crime rates all contribute to instability and jeopardise a usually fragile peace agreement further. All aspects of security – ranging from petty crime to large-scale physical destruction – are consequently severely challenged after a conflict – and will have to be managed urgently by an institution itself severely challenged, as the armed forces are usually in the lead in all of these matters right after a conflict.

The Syrian Military: Institutional Features

No matter the outline of the post-conflict context, the Syrian military’s institutional features will play a role in the aftermath of the war. It is on these that the armed forces will be rebuilt, and it is these that will shape its popular perception and indeed self-perception. Military institutions are by nature highly historical and self-referential, even if they have been disbanded and subsequently rebuilt, such as the Iraqi or the German ones. Institutional memory survives not only in the individuals that make up the force, but also in doctrine, training, and of course infrastructure and weaponry.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Syrian military for the post-conflict setting is its highly politicised nature. Of all military forces in the Arab world, Syria’s was by far the most involved in politics: between 1949 and 1982, it staged 17 coup attempts, 13 of which succeeded in toppling the government. Even the once very political Iraqi armed forces come a distant second with “only” 11 coup attempts of which more than half failed (Torrey, 1964, p. 121). Military intervention became not only the quickest but also easiest way to attain power in Syria – one of the reasons calls for a coup to remove Bashar al-Assad were pondered by the opposition (“Kamal al-Labwani: Al-Assad’s ouster”, 2013; “The Opposition Ponders Launching an Appeal”, 2013). Although very involved in politics in the first three decades of Syrian independence, the armed forces were however not a political actor in their own right. Whenever they did act politically, they did so in collusion with civilians seeking to take advantage of their military power. Since the arrival of his father, Hafez al-Assad, who came to power in 1970, the armed forces have, however, been intertwined with the regime’s power structure, most notably the Baath party. Although at least three coup attempts occurred during his time in power, the Syrian military morphed into a more professional, better equipped but tightly controlled agent of the regime.

To achieve both the protection of the military as an institution and his own regime, Hafez al-Assad relied on a combination of traditional coup-proofing techniques – but implemented in a constructive rather than destructive manner. These were mechanisms to gloss over the Syrian military’s increasingly ethnic factor, the creation of parallel forces, the appointments of loyal officers to strategic posts as well as the doling out of benefits to the officer corps. Taken together, these measures created the illusion of a united, cohesive and national force – in reality, however, the Syrian armed forces were the result of two intertwined militaries in one. What remained unchanged, however, was the traditional infusion and control of the Syrian military by the civilian politicians – which was brought to a test with the Syrian civil war.

The second aspect is the Syrian military’s handling of its plural nature. Since the coup of 1963, particularly the Alawite minority played an increasingly important role in the armed forces (of the five founding members of the military committee, three were Alawites and two were from the Ismaili sect). Until then, neither Syrian politics nor the military had been ruled by primarily ethnic or religious considerations. Yet several dynamics had unlocked the sectarian genie from the bottle: firstly, political inclinations somewhat overlapped with ethno-religious affiliation, which played to the advantage of the more cohesive Alawite community. Small (10-20% of the population), disenfranchised, rural, the Alawites very much sympathised with the socialist tone of Baathism, whereas Sunnis were, as a larger community, more diverse and consequently took to different political streams. Consequently, in the military, “Sunnis of one persuasion ended up purging Sunnis of another persuasion, or low or middle class Sunnis joined Alawites or Druzes in purging upper class Sunnis, or rural-oriented Sunnis joined with Alawites and Druzes in purging city-based Sunnis. In political terms, the Secessionists, the Huranists, the Nasserists, the group of the independent Ziyad Hariri, and the supporters of the Baathist Amin al-Hafez were successively purged between March 1963 and February 1966, and, with every purge, the Sunnis in the officer corps decreased in significance” (Batatu, 1981, p. 343). Before 1963, Alawites were not concentrated in the officer corps but in the non-commissioned officers as well as the rank and file, but they survived the purges better than their Sunni counterparts.

Secondly, the constant political bickering of the 1950s within the armed forces led to mistrust, a breakdown of military procedures and hence to a breakdown of professionalism. Command structures, promotions, recruitments and appointments all relied increasingly on shared identities. Rather than sectarianism leading to political turmoil it was the other way around (Drysdale, 1979). In addition, Alawites had incidentally ended up strategically in units relevant to striking a coup, such as the air squadrons, the armoured brigades around the capital as well as intelligence forces.

To the Baath regime, its overly Alawite nature was a disadvantage. It needed the support of all of Syria’s population to stay in power, and as such tone down the notion of sectarianism. This was even more so the case when it came to the military: not only was an all-Alawite force numerically simply not feasible and Sunni troops therefore necessary, the symbolism of the armed forces mattered to the regime and its legitimacy. It consequently pursued a policy of “glossing over” the Alawite factor in the armed forces. While the officer corps was purged of non-Baathist officers, which were quickly replaced with Baathist (and often Alawite) supporters, crucial and visible roles were given to Sunnis or other minorities. Of Syria’s ten defence ministers since the 1966 coup, six were Sunnis, one Greek Orthodox and three Alawites – more importantly, in the first three decades of the regime, the chief of staff was always a Sunni, flanked by Mustafa Tlas, who served for 28 years as minister of defence, also a Sunni. Sunni officer grievances nevertheless prevailed and were real – yet they were voiced in military professional not sectarian terms (Bou Nassif, 2015).

But while the regime was busy clouding its somewhat lopsided recruitment into the armed forces, it ensured that strategic positions in the armed forces were manned with loyal men, whether Alawite or Sunni. Although al-Assad recognised the detrimental impact of politics on the armed forces, this did not imply depoliticisation: instead, it meant Baathification. The corps, while revamped and refocused on meritocratic principles, was at the same time purged from political opposition (Perlmutter, 1969). While giving the officer corps at least the illusion of diversity mattered, 90% of general officers were, at the time of Hafez al-Assad’s death in 2000, trusted Alawites – often tied personally to the president (Pollack, 2002, pp. 479- 480).

It is important to note that the regime succeeded, in spite of an Alawite overhang in the officer corps, to largely shield its troops from sectarianism. This was facilitated by the creation of parallel forces. The “Defence Companies” under al-Assad’s brother Rifat’s command, later replaced by the Republican Guard Division and the Special Forces under Bashar al-Assad’s brother Maher, are not only predominantly staffed with Alawites, their goal is to protect the regime. This freed up the armed forces for their actual business of war, and allowed it to maintain a more diverse manpower as well as cohesiveness. The fact that sectarian aspects did not play into the desertions witnessed since 2011 is a testimony to this: low-ranking Sunni soldiers who had deserted stated very clearly that their motivation to leave was of humanitarian concern, and stressed that religion did not play a significant role in the armed forces. Similarly, desertions have also occurred from the Alawite community – the most notable one former chief of staff and defence minister Ali Habib Mahmud (Ohl, Albrecht & Koehler, 2015). The ongoing conflict is, however, likely to reverse this trend and lead to a re-sectarianisation of the Syrian military.

Thirdly, officers of the Syrian armed forces – who received notoriously low salaries of between $400 and $800 a month – were also members of the country’s economic upper class. Not only did they receive privileged housing and access to luxury cars, they were also allowed to use their positions for enrichment in a variety of ways. Syrians who dodged their military service bribed the officer of the unit in question; within their military sector, officers were allowed to rule as in a personal fiefdom. Corruption, nepotism and patronage networks became a tool to tie the officers directly to the regime – it is also what hollowed it out in terms of military professionalism, but not to the point where it broke cohesion (Khaddour, 2015; Khaddour, 2016). This expectation is likely to remain with any new officer corps, in the same way as Iraqi officers imported their corrupt practices from the 1990s in the post-Saddam military.

Interestingly, the transition from Hafez to Bashar al-Assad in 2000 brought no to little change in the relationship between regime and military although Bashar did not have the same military pedigree as his father (Zisser, 2001).

The Impact of the War

When the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, the armed forces and their cohesiveness and fighting power were put to the test. While numerous predictions foresaw immediate collapse, the military was still fighting at the time of writing, five years into the conflict (“Cracks in the Army”, 2011). It was consequently still very much intertwined with the regime rather than a potential independent actor capable of ousting it (“Syrian Opposition Ponders Appealing to Army”, 2013; “Syrian Dissident Urges Army to Overthrow al-Assad”, 2013). While this is in part the result of the prewar policies of both Bashar and Hafez al-Assad, the regime has handled the conflict in such a way as to protect the armed forces as its ultimate legitimacy-giver. Should the Syrian military collapse, so would the regime’s claim as the legitimate government. It has done so in several ways: it has bolstered its depleted ranks with militias and foreign forces, increased the salaries of the troops, hailed the army in virtually every speech, employed a nationalist narrative and relied on politicised tactics.

Desertion has certainly halved the Syrian military in the years since the war started – a fact even Bashar al-Assad openly recognised in summer 2015 when he mentioned a “lack of human resources” in the military (“Assad: Syrian Army Fatigued”, 2015; “The Regime’s Military Capabilities”, 2015). By the end of 2011, 3,000 Sunni officers were said to have deserted from all ranks. Crucially, however, these officers never defected with their whole units, and since they were not in critical positions, their departure did not affect the effectiveness of the military as a whole. The strategy of loyal appointments to critical posts thus paid off in this situation. Since 2014, desertions have come to a near halt.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the regime has employed several techniques to refill these empty posts: it has prolonged active service members (the so-called class of 102), granted amnesties to avoiders of military service and deserters that have not joined the ranks of the opposition and recalled retirees. Its most efficient way, however, was the creation of localised militias as well as the help of foreign forces such as Hezbollah, which are particularly of use in infantry operations. This leaves the Syrian military with mostly artillery and air power operations, potentially shielding it from further desertion.

At the same time, the regime repeatedly increased military salaries – with, however, little effect as inflation in Syria has been rampant since the war. In 2011, every civil servant received a one-time raise of 1,500 Syrian pounds (around $32 at the time), a 30% salary increase for every employee earning less than 10,000 Syrian pounds a month and a 20% increase for those earning more than 10,000. It increased salaries further in 2013 by 40% on the first 10,000 Syrian pounds earned and 20% on the second, and increased pensions for military personnel. In early 2015, it awarded a one-time payment of 4,000 Syrian pounds (around $15) to all salaries, and announced further increases in October 2015 (“Syria to Raise Army Salaries”, 2015).

The place Bashar al-Assad allocates to the armed forces in the numerous speeches he has given since the war erupted should not be underestimated. While his first speech in January 2012 devoted barely two sentences to the armed forces (“Standing hand in hand with the country’s institutions, assisting these institutions and the army, and morally supporting the army!”) this changed as the conflict evolved. A year later, he adopted a grander tone: “Greetings to those who deserve the biggest greetings: the men of the Syrian Arab Army. Greetings to our valiant officers, NCOs and soldiers (…) who are exerting sweat and blood for the sake of Syria, which they see dearer than themselves and all that they possess. Greetings to our Armed Forces as they wage the fiercest of wars, determined to restore peace and security (…). Our Armed Forces, which have recorded acts of heroism through their cohesion, steadfastness, and national unity, were a reflection of the people’s steadfastness and cohesiveness. (…) Glory to every soldier who fell in the battle while defending the national soil. Glory, all glory, to every soldier who carries his arms and blood to continue the mission of those who fell.” Al-Assad, along with defence minister Fahd Jassem al-Freij, seized opportunities such as army day on 1 August to hail the military as the saviour of the “cultural identity of the Arab nation and Syria”, carrying the “pan-Arab responsibility on its shoulders for decades” as the true embodiment of Syria and patriotism. The longest tribute to the forces came in al-Assad’s speech of 2015, when he not only recognised desertion as a problem but also called on the Syrian people to support it more. “If we want the army to offer its best, we must offer the most we have for it. If we want it to operate at its maximum power, we must provide for it all the energy it needs (…) Defeat does not exist in the lexicon of the Syrian Arab Army.” (“Syrian President Condemns West”, 2012; “We Will Engage in Dialogue”, 2013; “Syria’s Al-Assad Salutes Army”, 2013; “Syrian Leader Gives Speech”, 2015). In 2016, the Syrian military was allowed to vote for the first time in parliamentary elections – another measure to appease an embattled force.

Of course, in spite of these measures, morale is low in the Syrian forces today. Over 60,000 soldiers have fallen in the conflict; in 2014, the Islamic State executed several hundred captured Syrian soldiers in Raqqa and Hasaka province. On social media, recruits regularly complain about conditions, low salaries, outdated equipment and forced conscription (“Syria Army Conscription”, 2015). Within the forces, mistrust is rampant – some analysts estimate that only 65,000 to 75,000 of its troops are actually reliable for offensives whereas the remnants are posted in defensive positions (“The Regime’s Military Capabilities”, 2015). Nevertheless, as a force, the Syrian military is still standing – as CIA Director Brennan noted: “Syria has a real army (…) a large conventional military force with tremendous firepower” (Slavin, 2014).

In sum, Syria’s post-war military will consequently be less sectarian in collective identity than might be assumed, with an Alawite majority at the highest officer levels, important combat experience, a highly political yet nationalist outlook, corrupt practices and, of course, high levels of fatigue.  

The Syrian Military after the War: Three Scenarios

 The challenges of the Syrian armed forces and their reconstruction depend very much on the circumstances under which the conflict ends. The following scenarios sketch out the implications for the Syrian military in the absence of a foreign peacekeeping force, as for the moment there are no indications of such a presence.

Scenario 1: The Syrian regime crushes the uprising

Contrary to some beliefs, a military victory by the Syrian regime would still entail all the security issues raised above. The demobilisation and disarmament of more than 80,000 opposition fighters would be an issue the Syrian government would have to manage – but in a coercive manner in the absence of a peace treaty. This means that the Syrian military – in the rather deplorable state it will be in after combat operations have ceased – would have to conduct search missions and forceful seizures of arms in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. In the absence of political reform or change, this is very likely to be met with significant resistance and result in further casualties on both sides – especially given the depleted and fatigued state of the Syrian military, whose legitimacy is not recognised by the opposition’s forces. Studies show that for enforced disarmament to be successful, the military force conducting it must be able to project high levels of military capability – which the Syrian military is unlikely to project in its current state.

Where disarmament is not consensual, it is also highly likely to be incomplete – weapons would simply be hidden for further use. Cases of coercive disarmament conducted by United Nations peacekeeping forces, such as in Liberia, Somalia or Haiti, inevitably led to declined levels of acceptance (Tanner, 1996). In the case of Syria, this would mean that discontent with the regime would grow further, leading to renewed and, more importantly, protracted violence.

The difficulty in completely extinguishing an insurgency is showcased in Algeria. In numbers, Algeria’s Islamist insurgency was at the absolute maximum half of Syria’s uprising, while its population was nearly double that of Syria – still, it took the Algerian military more than a decade to reduce violence to near-acceptable levels. Nevertheless, Algeria still had high levels of terrorism for over a decade after the conflict came to an end, ranking 15th on the Global Terrorism Index. In 2011, it still counted 25 terrorist incidents. Given the smaller size of Syria, and the larger size of its insurgency, it is likely that Syria’s violence would be longer and more protracted than Algeria’s. In addition, the Syrian regime would have to manage the integration of its former enemy combatants; although victory rhetoric would suggest punishment, the opposition’s forces are simply too large to be either imprisoned or ignored as a potential security problem: former combatants who had not been reintegrated into society inevitably triggered renewed conflict in other cases.

The Syrian military, meanwhile, would face its own difficult reconstruction. Civil-military relations after a conflict are often strained, no matter the outcome of the war. In this “winner takes it all” scenario, the Syrian armed forces would feel emboldened and therefore would be even less likely to accept measures designed to recreate order, discipline and authority in a force largely free from oversight in the last years. Investigations into cases of disobedience, theft and corruption are likely to be met with resistance. In addition, the institution is likely to face budget cuts in the immediate aftermath of the conflict’s end as the regime would have to divert resources to reconstruction. This would further fuel resentment in the troops who would expect, in this scenario, preferential treatment after the conflict. Lastly, the post-war Syrian military might, or might not, choose to reintegrate deserters. The regime has repeatedly announced pardoning returnee deserters and draftdodgers over the past few years (“Assad Grants Pardons”, 2016; “Syrian President Grants Amnesty”, 2015; “Assad Offers Conditional Amnesty”, 2013). In addition to alleviating manpower shortages, this would send a message of reconciliation more generally. But for deserters to turn themselves in, they would have to trust the regime’s word. The regime could also opt for the Nigerian solution: in the 1970s, Nigeria’s military reintegrated only the officers, not the soldiers, who had joined the secessionists during the Biafra war with a penalty of delayed promotion and salary cuts.

Scenario 2: The opposition brings the regime to fall

A scenario in which the Syrian regime falls would probably be flanked – if not triggered – by the collapse of the Syrian military as well. This would echo the Libyan scenario after 2011 and entail similar consequences.

Stockpiles would be unguarded and pillaged by civilians; weapons would flow freely in the country and be sold into other conflict theatres unless the opposition’s forces take immediate provisions to guard them.

The over 100,000 self-demobilised soldiers and officers would, in the immediate aftermath, probably go into hiding for fear of reprisals and arrest. If collective punishment manifests itself – in the shape of lustration laws or other forms of political exclusion –, these troops are at high risk of organising violent opposition against the new political order and creating large-scale and protracted instability, as occurred in Iraq and Libya. This could be prevented with the promise of reintegration into a new Syrian force following a transparent and depoliticised vetting process, perhaps conducted by a neutral third party. So far, most proposals by the opposition have indicated a preference for institutional continuity, but some have suggested a complete disbandment of the present Syrian military and the reconstruction of a new one (“The Day After Project”, 2012; “Syria Transition Roadmap”, 2013; Çakmak & Ustaoğlu, 2015). In these proposals, security would be provided by unarmed citizens and the Syrian police until the armed forces are rebuilt – a force highly unlikely to be capable of dealing with the intricate security challenges of a post-conflict situation.

Although all proposals so far have called for a vetting process for current Syrian military personnel, the outlines of this process are not clear. It would be important for the new political order to vet individuals based on their behaviour rather than their group or party affiliation, for several reasons: large-scale purges reduce capacity, remove innocent individuals, create resentment against the new order in the process and are unlikely to achieve the goal of a reformed, sound institution (Office of the United Nations, 2006). But as vetting not only requires significant resources, it also takes a significant amount of time – which both post-conflict settings lack, having led in other comparable situations such as in Iraq and Libya to a preference for collective rather than individual lustration. Nevertheless, vetting is a less costly and speedier alternative to criminal prosecution, as is the exclusion from governmental jobs act as a punitive measure. In addition, the vetting process would have to spell out transparent criteria for exclusion as well as the procedures. In order to avoid the creation of peace spoilers, individuals must retain the impression that they are being excluded solely for their own wrongdoing rather than because of their affiliation with a political order. Perhaps crucially, a sense of certainty must be communicated to former service members. It is worth remembering that Libya’s opposition promised fair treatment to those defecting from the regime, only to introduce one of the most comprehensive lustration laws in a post-conflict setting two years later regardless of defection or indeed behaviour. Syrian military personnel are likely to remember this broken promise. It is also worth noting that not all of Syria’s military has been equally involved in the fighting. Vetting procedures could focus on those units most engaged in battle (e.g. the Defence Companies, the 4th Armoured Division, the Special Forces Regiments) (Holliday, 2013).

In this scenario, it would be important for the new political leadership to sequence the reform of the defence sector carefully. Overambitious reforms of military and adjacent institutions such as the defence ministry would have to be delayed to the benefit of assembly and vetting, as crisis contexts are very challenging for reform. Stability in the security sector would be more important than the hurried establishment of procedures and reformed defence postures. Crucially, the merger of opposition and regime forces would have to be undertaken in a stable political environment. Merging former opponents is a difficult endeavour not so much for reasons of political animosity but of institutional rivalry. Similar mergers elsewhere have failed when former militia fighters insisted on integration as whole units. Disagreements between former militiamen and military professionals also arose over questions of rank, training and discipline. The best manner to integrate therefore consists of a small-unit approach flanked by strong political support for the process and high levels of professional standards for all troops involved (Licklider, 2014).

Meanwhile, security would have to be provided by the opposition forces. Ambitions to transform the opposition’s forces into a standing military force, as voiced by some defected officers, are likely to be hampered by a number of issues ranging from lack of discipline to training and equipment. The transformation of such units into a regular force is of course feasible but requires a significant amount of time and, more importantly, stable security conditions unlikely to be in place in the aftermath of the conflict (“Syrian Opposition Member Interviewed”, 2014; “The Opposition Activates the Formation”, 2014).

As in Libya, these forces would have significant combat experience but none in matters of civilian security, ranging from counter-terrorism, border control, crime prevention and law enforcement. Security in this scenario would be likely to take a quick nosedive if these forces are not supervised and checked by a strong and legitimate civilian component. Revenge acts against supporters of the previous regime cannot be excluded in this scenario and would delegitimise the new political order.

Scenario 3: Opposition and regime come to a negotiated solution

In this scenario, the conflict would come to an end through a comprehensive peace treaty – it would, however, still come with a substantial set of challenges. Peace agreements do not automatically lead to trust, rendering their immediate aftermath highly fragile and prone to relapse into conflict. Most decisions pertaining to the security sector will have to be taken jointly, requiring compromise and concessions not readily available in a postconflict situation. While the agreement itself can build on provisions designed to prevent this, spoilers are still likely to attempt to destabilise the post-conflict context.

Both parties to the conflict could for instance agree on weapons limitation or demilitarised zones in order to prevent renewed fighting; they could agree on zones of separation of armed forces as well as mutually approved troop movements. Heavy weapons could be concentrated in a designated area, and both sides could agree to comply with a ban on arms and ammunition imports. Disarmament programmes in this context are at high risk of being suspended due to mistrust and the ensuing security dilemma. The opposition will find disarming difficult if it does not trust the regime, and hence delay the process. This in turn might give the regime the pretext for suspending all other cooperation.

Once security is stabilised, both parties would have to agree on the demobilisation of the opposition forces and their integration into the national military institution, or Syria would de facto maintain several armed forces (such as was the case in Bosnia- Herzegovina until 2005). Here, too, levels of trust are required, which are usually not yet high enough right after the conflict has come to an end. The division of the post-conflict phase into an initiation and a consolidation phase could help delineate the conditions under which the next steps in security cooperation will take place.

Should both parties agree on an integration of the former militiamen into the armed forces, it is important to comply with the agreed numbers: one of the reasons for Yemen’s civil war and indeed the renewal of Angola’s civil war was the perception that the levels of integration did not occur as promised. Vetting procedures would have to be applied to both sides, and follow criteria of integrity as well as capacity. As in scenario 2, vetting would have to occur based on individual behaviour rather than group affiliation – but as the principles will have to be agreed on jointly, this is likely to lead to a watered-down and drawn-out process.

Following the assembly, the Syrian military would benefit from a profound reform in order to achieve cohesion and join its troops together in one body. Civil oversight mechanisms in this scenario would benefit from a joint body in order to increase trust and promote cooperation.

The question of security management in this scenario remains one of the trickiest. In the absence of a foreign stabilisation force, it is unlikely that the forces – former opposition or regime – would be capable of undergoing the described process of assembly and reform while providing security. Spoilers in this scenario would have a higher chance of derailing the process through protracted instability and violence, which would delegitimise the process altogether, and potentially lead to renewed conflict. This would particularly be the case if reintegration programmes for excluded troops from either side of the conflict are not available.

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About the Author

Florence Gaub is a Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies.

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