The Next Steps of North Africa´s Foreign Fighters

Since 2011, thousands of people have left their countries to fight in Syria, Iraq, and beyond, for the most part in the name of Islamic State (IS). The group’s successes attracted an estimated 40,000 foreign fighters – a figure far higher than that for other major jihadi mobilizations, including those associated with the 1979 – 89 Afghan war, the 1992 – 5 Bosnian war, the war in Afghanistan since 2001, and Iraq following the US-led invasion in 2003. North Africans have made up a significant contingent of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. However, the Levant has not been their only destination. They have also flocked to Libya following the creation of an IS enclave in the conflict-stricken country.

North African states are wrestling with how to deal with returning foreign fighters, as well women and children seeking to return from formerly IS-held territories. Other foreign fighters may redeploy, with Libya in particular likely to be a preferred destination for those fleeing Syria and Iraq, due to its weak governance and security structures and continued IS presence. North Africa is geographically close to Europe, and there are transnational links between jihadis in both regions, as became evident in the cases of the 2016 Berlin Christmas market and 2017 Manchester Arena attacks, which were both perpetrated by individuals with links to jihadist groups in Libya. Therefore, Europe can ill afford to ignore the challenges that the next steps of foreign fighters and returnees will pose to North Africa over the coming years.

Departing and Deploying

Jihadi foreign fighters may be loosely defined as individuals who travel to a state other than their own to participate in an insurgency within a conflict-afflicted state. While numbers are imprecise, due to delays in reporting and the absence of some official figures and subsequent reliance on estimates, they do help to give an idea of the scale of the problem. Over 3,000 Tunisians, some 1,600 Moroccans, and at least 600 Egyptians have travelled to Iraq and Syria. Although no official figures exist for Libyans, they were among the first to travel to Syria and Iraq, indicating that they too could have been present in fairly large numbers, some 600, according to estimates. Algerians have been present in markedly smaller numbers, 260 (as at December 2015).

North African foreign fighters have flocked not only to Syria and Iraq, but also to IS provinces within North Africa. Whereas Libya was once viewed as a transit and training hub for jihadis travelling to Syria and Iraq, it too became a destination state for foreign fighters from 2014 on. Ease of access to the country and the presence of an IS enclave in Libya made it an attractive destination, as well as a feasible alternative to the caliphate in the Levant as travel to Syria and Iraq became increasingly difficult. Some 1,350 to 3,400 foreign fighters are believed to have travelled to Libya since 2011. Tunisians have made up the bulk (1,000 – 1,500), joined by smaller numbers of citizens from other North African countries. North African foreign fighters have also joined the IS “Sinai Province” in Egypt, albeit in smaller numbers.

Recruitment appears to have been mainly carried out through people who are known to would-be foreign fighters, such as friends already in Syria or contacts within their local milieu, with online media playing only a secondary role. Established jihadi groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, and Gema’a al-Islamiyya in Egypt, have also proven to be effective recruitment and facilitating networks. The personal nature of recruitment may help to explain why hotbeds of recruitment exist in major departure states, such as cities in northwestern Morocco (Fnideq, Tangier, and Tetouan), as well as Casablanca and Fes, Ben Gardane, Remada, Bizerte, and Tunis in Tunisia, and Tripoli, Derna, and Benghazi in Libya (see map). Some of these areas (Ben Gardane and Derna) have a history of radicalization and foreign fighter mobilization.

The routes taken to Syria and Iraq are by now well known to authorities. Many North African foreign fighters would have crossed over land from Turkey to reach Syria and Iraq. Some would have flown to Turkey, sometimes via a third country. Others would have crossed by sea to Turkey from Libya. Libya itself has been reached predominantly over land, often through towns such as Ben Guardane near the Tunisian-Libyan border or Debdeb on the Algerian-Libyan border. Some Egyptians have also flown from Cairo to Khartoum and then crossed over land from Sudan into Libya.

Reasons for becoming a foreign fighter are many and varied, resulting in no single identifiable profile. However, a number of factors do appear common to individuals who have become foreign fighters. These include a perceived duty to assist fellow Sunni Muslims in Syria; religious and ideological motivations, often linked to the notion of Syria as the location of the final battle between Muslims and “non-believers”; and a sense of social and economic injustice instilled by socio-economic marginalization in their home countries. Such push factors seem to have combined in complex ways with the promise of worldly gains, including salaries and wives, in IS propaganda, as well as a sense of perspective that is often lacking in foreign fighters’ home countries.

In addition to young men, a number of women have also migrated to IS-held territory in Syria and Iraq, as part of a broader mobilization linked to building a caliphate. Seven hundred Tunisian and an estimated 275 Moroccan women (roughly equivalent to 23 and 17 per cent of the amount of foreign fighters from these countries) are thought to have emigrated to the caliphate in the Levant. Women have also migrated to Libya, with Tunisian women amongst the largest cohort, numbering some 300, according to some estimates (equivalent to 20–30 per cent the figure for foreign fighters). Moroccan women also travelled to Libya, though it is unclear how many. Furthermore, children have accompanied their parents or were born in the caliphate and the IS province in Libya, although their numbers are as yet unknown.

Returning and Redeploying

Some foreign fighters have already returned to their countries of origin or residence in North Africa. Amongst those known to have returned are some 800 Tunisians, 220 Moroccans, and at least 87 Algerians (roughly 25, 13, and 33 per cent of the total number who left for Syria and Iraq, respectively). Given the strategic importance of Libya for IS, it is likely that a number of Libyan foreign fighters would have made the journey back to their homeland, though no official figures are available. In addition to those apprehended, many foreign fighters will have returned clandestinely, since returning through official ports of entry is now likely to result in arrest.

Judging by the countries through which they have transited or where they are currently stuck, it seems that the return routes are fairly similar to the ones they may have taken to reach their destinations. Tunisians have returned clandestinely by crossing over land from Libya, for example. Egyptians too have returned via Libya or Sudan. A number of Tunisians and Moroccans are currently stuck in Turkey as they try to make their way back, perhaps using the smuggling routes they may have initially taken to get to Turkey.

Those who have returned disillusioned or are heavily monitored by the security services in their home countries are unlikely to represent a grave risk. The most acute risks will be posed by the remainder, who may possess sophisticated skills and extensive networks and, in some cases, may even have been sent back home to continue the fight there. The IS enclave in Libya itself was established by Libyan foreign fighters who returned from Syria in 2014. While something similar is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, some returnees could turn their attention to their home countries. Indeed, some Moroccan IS foreign fighters have already stated their intention to wage jihad against the monarchy.

Returning foreign fighters could not only have an impact on national jihadi networks, but also on regional ones. Regional jihadi networks could be reinforced by their return. Many North African returnees are likely to have been trained in Libya before travelling to Syria and Iraq. As a result, many may have jihadi contacts in Libya. Tunisians in particular have travelled in large numbers to Syria and Iraq and would most likely have trained and transited through Libya first, suggesting that the Tunisian-Libyan networks could be given a boost by their return.

Regional security may be further impacted by those who do not return home, but instead redeploy to the last remaining North African IS province – Sinai Province in Egypt – or to Libya, where IS is attempting to regroup. Indeed, numerous IS militants in Syria are believed to have already moved to Libya following military offensives against their movement’s heartland from 2015 on. The fall of IS strongholds in Syria and Iraq could increase that number. This would have implications not just for Libya, but also for its neighbors. Tunisia has already been heavily affected by the IS presence in Libya. The biggest 2015 terrorist attacks in Tunisia at the Bardo Museum in Tunis and the Sousse beach resort were carried out by individuals who had trained in Libya, and the attempted takeover of the border town of Ben Gardane in 2016 was planned by an IS cell based in the Libyan border town of Sabratha, for example.