The Islamic State Wilayats and Global Expansion

This article was originally published by the external pageS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)call_made in the external pageCounter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Volume 8, Issue 8call_made (August 2016).

Wilayats are territorial claims made by the so-called Islamic State (IS) to further its ambitions of establishing a global caliphate. They are located in weak areas of a country where the government lacks significant control and influence. As of June 2016, there are twelve internal wilayats located in Syria and eleven in Iraq, and external wilayats in nine countries. However, IS has plans to expand further, which means that countering the influence and spread of wilayats needs to be prioritised in order to curb IS’ global expansion.

Introduction

The overarching aim of the Islamic State (IS) is to build a global Islamic caliphate and to impose its own version of Islamic law from Spain to Africa (Maghreb, Sahel and sub-region), the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central, South and Southeast Asia and Xinjiang in China. To achieve this goal and live up to its slogan of “remaining and expanding,” IS strategy is to grow from its epicentre in Iraq and Syria into other regions, linking the caliphate with their provinces, thereby expanding its influence globally.

IS-associated threat groups, networks and individuals are influenced by several factors which include its sophisticated media campaign, declaration of the caliphate and control over territory. The group conducts violent attacks against transgressors and disbelievers to enforce Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s version of Islamic law, strengthening its appeal in the eyes of other extremist groups worldwide. Since 1 July 2016, IS has declared branches in Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Caucasus, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In addition, IS has declared plans to establish wilayats in Tunisia, Somalia, mainland Egypt, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines (Wilson Center 2016). With IS’ continuous efforts towards building cells and networks, there are emerging wilayats in the Balkans, Central Asia, India, and the Maldives. In parallel with current efforts to degrade and destroy IS central, the international community should develop a strategy to counter the entity’s global influence and expansion plans.

What are Wilayats?

Wilayats are provinces or governorates that reinforce IS’ vision to establish a global caliphate. IS has a total of thirty provinces, both internally and externally. The origins of the concept of the wilayat date back to the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923), when the Ottomans spread their influence across Europe and Asia (Kilcullen 2016) and perceived these territories as the House of Islam (Dar ul-Islam). Wilayats were provinces or “dependent principalities” located in external territories and functioned to replace the centrally -controlled administrations within the Ottoman Empire (Faroqhi 2006). Just as wilayats served as central administrations during the Ottoman Empire, IS seeks to create wilayats across the world in order to expand the structure of its global caliphate. During the Ottoman rule, wilayats were strategically located in places that were controlled by the Romans and Byzantines. Likewise, IS has sought to take control over such cities historically situated in the areas that were once held by the Romans and Byzantines.

IS has also justified its actions to establish such wilayats as a means to overcome perceived Western intrusion and liberate oppressed Muslims from the rule of non-believers and apostates.

IS’ Wilayats

Unlike in the case of the Ottoman Empire, wilayats are of secondary importance to IS’ strategy of establishing its global caliphate. IS has placed priority on the “ad-hoc [global] supporters and sympathisers that are approximated to cross thousands” (Kilcullen 2016). In this case, IS seeks to strengthen its broader governance structures by expanding its membership base through the various wilayats.

While IS continued to rely on wilayats to fulfill its global ambitions, there are certain requirements before a territory is considered as a wilayat. According to Dabiq, IS’ official magazine, a group situated in a particular geographical area must first publicly pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. In addition, the group must also have a detailed military or political strategy to counter the West and have a wali or leader (Dabiq 2015).

IS’ wilayats govern and conduct attacks in accordance with strategic guidelines set out by IS central. This includes, but is not limited to, targeting Christians, Americans and other groups that are seen to oppose Islamic beliefs (Dabiq 2015). Based on examples of already existing wilayats, there is no specific timeline for the transformation of an IS-linked group holding territory into a wilayat. However, the cases of Wilayats Khorasan, Gharb Iriqiyyah and Qawqaz have indicated that IS accepts the pledge of allegiance days after the declaration by the groups.

Since Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate in 2014, multiple terrorist groups worldwide have pledged allegiance to IS. This has effectively transformed their local area of control into a wilayat. The first priority of the newly-created wilayats has been to recruit and train a growing number of fighters. Each wilayat also appears to have certain specialised functions. For instance, Wilayat Khorasan’s objective is to promote IS training camps in Afghanistan through mirroring the sophisticated video propaganda of IS central. The wilayats in Libya are responsible for controlling the revenue from certain oil installations. Wilayat Sinai, in turn, focuses on chemical engineering for manufacturing weapons, whereas Wilayat Gharb Iriqiyyah supports cells across West Africa (Leigh et al. 2016).

IS’ Wilayats: Weakening Internal Wilayats, Strengthening External Wilayats

IS Losing Strongholds in Syria and Iraq

There are twelve wilayats located in Syria and eleven in Iraq. Within Syria, the largest and most prominent provinces include Raqqa and Aleppo. In Iraq, the significant satellites under IS control have included Mosul and Fallujah, until the latter was taken over by the Iraqi military in June 2016. Wilayat al-Raqqa has been the capital of IS since its capture in January 2014 (Remnick 2015), with IS claiming a total population of two million (Ansar al-Khilafah Media 2016). The loss of Fallujah and other towns and cities indicates that IS strongholds in Syria and Iraq are now receding and becoming weaker. Since July 2016, IS is also estimated to have lost 47 percent of its territorial holdings in Iraq and 20 percent in Syria (Schmitt 2016).

Expanding External Wilayats: Spread of IS’ Global Monopoly on Terror

The presence of external wilayats is integral for IS to retain and expand its global monopoly on terror. As of March 2016, the external wilayats exist in nine countries: Libya (Barqa, Fezzan and Tripoli), Egypt (Sinai), Nigeria (Gharb Iriqiyyah), Afghanistan and Pakistan (Khorasan), Russian Caucasus (Qawqaz), Yemen (Al-Yemen), Algeria (Al-Jazair) and Saudi Arabia (Najd, Hijaz and Bahrain). It is evident that IS wilayats are formed primarily in conflict zones, characterised by (a) political instability, (b) civil war (c) and the lack of governmental infrastructure. The volatile nature of these conflict zones allows IS to gain access and capture power easily (Masi 2015).

IS’ control or entry into parts of these unstable territories has also resulted in the subsequent escalation of attacks and violence. For instance, on 20 March 2015, coordinated suicide strikes on Zaydi Shi’ite mosques in Libya killed 130. On 10 October 2015, explosions at a peace rally in Ankara killed more than 100 people. On 25 March 2016, a suicide bombing attack took place in Baghdad, killing 41 people.

Similarities between IS’ Internal and External Wilayats

The administrative structures of the internal and external wilayats are mostly similar. Around 33,000 fighters operate in Syria and Iraq, while the external wilayats have a collective estimate of 24,800 fighters (Rahmani & Tanco 2016). External wilayats act as a safe haven for fighters and recruits who are unable to reach Syria or Iraq. One of the more prominent structures present in both internal and external wilayats is the branch which conducts Islamic outreach, exercises judicial oversight, policing, and manages tribal relations. A structure commonly referred to as the Department of Muslim Services focuses on conducting governance based on the principles of Islamic law, which includes the Hudud laws (the fixed punishments in Islam) and Da’wah (proselytising or preaching Islam) (Caris and Reynolds 2014).

Most external wilayats, such as Gharb Iriqiyyah in Nigeria have a decentralised hierarchical structure and compartmentalise their fighters to minimise communication between different departments. This strategy is particularly advantageous in keeping fighters’ knowledge and exposure limited to only those who operate within their cells (Counter Extremism Project 2016). This is to ensure that in the event a group of fighters is captured, the strategy and plans of other groups would not be compromised. The most prominent external wilayats are in Libya, Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria. Each of these wilayats have conducted attacks that have increased IS’ reign of terror. Such attacks include the Borno Massacre in Nigeria that killed more than 120 people in 2014, the beheading of 21 Coptic Christians kidnapped from the Libyan city of Sirte in February 2015 and the downing of the Russian jet plane on the Turkey-Syrian border, which killed all 224 people on board in November 2015.

The Libyan and Egyptian branches of IS have grown in significance following the ouster of Gaddafi and Mubarak in 2011. Other prominent external wilayats comprise the Khorasan, Qawqaz and Al-Yemen. The Khorasan group primarily occupies the Nangarhar province of Afghanistan. This wilayat aims to rival both the local insurgent group Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda. Wilayat Qawqaz (Caucasus) includes Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, areas which have been a hotbed for jihadist radicalisation since the 1990s due to political struggles for independence and the resulting wars in Chechnya. Al-Yemen is divided into eight smaller branches and operates independently of IS’ central command.

Lastly, the wilayats in Saudi Arabia and Algeria are smaller than others, with no discernible leader or professed administrative structure. Although these wilayats are likely to be in the incipient stage, on 5 July 2016, the IS wilayat in Saudi Arabia carried out a number of attacks in the country.

Likely Future Developments

Attacks that have been linked to IS in 2016, such as the Jakarta attacks on 14 January, the bombing at the Istanbul airport on 28 June and the slaughter in Dhaka on 1 July indicate that the IS sphere of influence has expanded. All three attacks correspond with the terrorist groups’ public pledge to Baghdadi, indicating that cells and supporters are already operational in these countries. More recently, pledges came from the Philippines, where four groups (Abu Sayyaf, Jund al Tawhid, Ansar al Sharia and Marakah al Ansar) came together.

On 24 June 2016, IS central released a video, where it accepted pledges of allegiances from a number of militant groups based in the Philippines (The Straits Times 2016). These militants are called ‘Soldiers of the Khilafah’. In April 2016, the IS weekly newsletter al-Naba announced the appointment of the IS representative in the Philippines.

However, Philippines is not the only country in Southeast Asia with Islamist extremists supporting IS. In fact, both Indonesian and Malaysian groups have also pledged allegiance. These include the Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and the Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT). As such, it is likely that more local groups will follow suit.

A means to predict the establishment of a wilayat could be through the cities conquered by the Ottomans during their own expansion. Cities such as Mosul, Fallujah and Damascus were all once territories of the Ottomans. It seems that IS is seeking to replicate the ‘glory days’ of the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, countries like Tunisia and Somalia are also central to IS global expansion claims as they have the highest number of fighters within the group, estimated to be at 5,500 (El Amrani 2016).

Countering the Expansion of IS Wilayats

IS will continue to expand its wilayats unless strong measures are taken to stem this development. Detailed policy plans are needed to counter the formation of wilayats in countries with fragile governments and ungoverned spaces. Foreign interventions to counter the expansion of wilayat remains a sensitive issue and will have to be handled delicately. However, governments that lack significant control in their respective conflict zones would benefit from a joint taskforce or financial support as it will better equip them to counter the threat. Controlling the sources of funding for active terrorist groups will also decrease their financial and operational strength, and prevent them from forming a wilayat. Minimally they should be prevented from having access to the country’s financial resources. Another possible means to counter expansion would be for governments to withdraw the citizenship of those who have joined IS. This would prevent fighters from re-entering their country legally and establishing a wilayat at home.

Reports have indicated that the number of IS fighters has declined from 55,000 in 2015 to approximately 33,000 at present (Martinez 2016). Still, it remains critical to come up with novel strategies to prevent the recruitment of more fighters by IS. Otherwise, IS will continue to replenish their manpower losses and sustain its terrorist attacks and expansion plans.

References:

Ansar Al-Khilafah Media. “external pageA Detailed Report incall_made external pageEnglish – Wilaayat Raqqa Thrives Under Thecall_made external pageIslamic Khilafahcall_made.” 2016. Accessed August 29, 2016.

Caris, Charles C. and Reynolds, Samuel. “external pageISIScall_made external pageGovernance In Syriacall_made.” Institute for the Study of War, July 2014. Accessed July 4, 2016.

Counter Extremism Project. 2016. “external pageBoko Haramcall_made.”

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El Amrani, Issandr. “external pageHow Much Of Libya Doescall_made external pagethe Islamic State Control?”call_madeForeign Policy, February 18, 2016. Accessed July 5, 2016.

Faroqhi, Suraiya. 2005. The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., p. 79.

Goffman, Daniel. 2002. The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, London: Cambridge University Press.

Islamic State. 2015. “external pageFrom Hypocrisy to Apostasycall_made.” Dabiq. Issue 7, p. 35.

Kilcullen, David. “external pageThe Deadly Efficiency of ISIS and How It Grew On Thecall_made external pageGlobal Stagecall_made.” The Guardian, March 11, 2016. Accessed June 11, 2016.

Leigh, Karen, French, Jason and Juan, Jovi. 2016. “external pageIslamic State and Itscall_made external pageAffiliatescall_made.” The Wall Street Journal, Accessed July 1, 2016.

Martinez, Luis. 2016. “external pageNumber of ISIS Fighters in Iraq and Syria Drops,call_made external pageIncreases in Libya, US Official Sayscall_made.” ABC News, Accessed August 10, 2016.

Masi, Alessandria. 2015. “external pageIslamic State Timeline Shows How ISIS Expandedcall_made external pageIn One Year From Two Countries To Tencall_made.” International Business Times, Accessed July 3, 2016.

Rahmani, Bardia and Tanco, Andrea. 2016. “external pageISIS’s Growing Caliphate:call_made external pageProfiles of Affiliatescall_made.” The Wilson Center, Accessed July 1, 2016.

Remnick, David. 2015. “external pageTelling the Truth About ISIS and Raqqacall_made.” The New Yorker, Accessed August 11, 2016.

Schmitt, Eric. 2016. “external pageAs ISIS Loses Land, It Gains Ground in Overseascall_made external pageTerrorcall_made.” The New York Times, Accessed July 10, 2016.

The Straits Times. 2016. “external pageISIS Officially Recognises Pledges of Allegiancecall_made external pageFrom Militant Groups In The Philippinescall_made.” Accessed July 20, 2016.

About the Authors

Rohan Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore. He is also the editor of the external pageHandbook of Terrorism incall_made external pagethe Asia-Pacific.call_madeNatasha Hornell-Scott is currently studying at the Royal Holloway University of London in the UK. She was a Research Analyst with ICPVTR at RSIS, Singapore.

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