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BESLAN – TWO YEARS AFTER

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Analysis

Looking Back at Beslan

Alexander Cherkasov, Moscow

Summary

Two years after the Beslan tragedy, the authorities have yet to publish a final report on what took place there. Most importantly, they have refused to examine the terrorist attack within the larger context of the Chechen war. They have also blamed all the deaths on the terrorists, preventing a thorough investigation examining the role of the Russian security forces and the responsibilities of the authorities. Such a study would make possible a more nuanced understanding of what happened at Beslan.

Hostage-taking tragedies: Moscow's questionable approach

During the course of the Chechen wars over the last 12 years, Beslan was the fourth large-scale terrorist act with the taking of hostages in Russia. It followed Shamil Basayev's June 1995 capture of more than 1,500 people in the hospital in Budennovsk (Stavropol Krai), the Salman Raduyev-led attack in January 1996 on the hospital in Kizlyar (Dagestan), and the October 2002 siege and hostage-taking of more than 1,000 people in Moscow's Dubrovka theater. Nevertheless, Beslan was exceptional. Never before had there been so many deaths (according to the preliminary Duma report, 331 hostages were killed), and, above all, the loss of so many children's lives (officially, 186 children were killed). Never before did the public pay so much attention to the investigation of a terrorist act.

The investigation of the 1995 assault in Budennovsk was stopped more than once. Only after many years did the authorities bring the terrorists to court, either individually or in small groups. Salman Raduev, the leader of the terrorist act in Kizlyar, was only brought to justice much later, sentenced to life in prison in December 2001. During the government's storm on the theater in Moscow, all the terrorists were killed and there simply was no trial. In the case of Beslan, the former hostages organized a public campaign to demand an investigation, but only in North Ossetia did these demands and protests become widespread.

Furthermore, one terrorist, Nurpashi Kulayev, from Beslan was captured alive and tried in court. Therefore it was possible to seek more information in a court of law going far beyond the criminal case against this one individual.

In fact, such investigations should have been possible in all of the terrorist acts listed here. Most importantly, it is necessary to investigate the conditions leading to the tragedy. In a narrow sense, the questions probing such conditions were "How did the

terrorists prepare and carry out their plans? Which administrative and law enforcement officials were responsible for this?" Those questions are suitable for prosecutors. In the wider sense, we need to address the questions: "What were the pre-conditions and context for the terrorist act? How was it possible to form the units of fighters and terrorist networks?" In other words, "Why did the Chechen war, at first described as an effort to 'disarm illegal groups' and then a 'counter-terrorist operation' lead to the opposite result - to the establishment of powerful illegal armed formations and a terrorist underground?" This topic is suitable for a parliamentary investigation and wide social discussion.

Need to investigate the authorities as well

The conditions surrounding the terrorist act itself, its course and outcome, are also a subject for the work of the investigative organs. As experience shows, the innocent people held hostage died not only at the hands of the terrorists, but during the "counter-terrorist operations." Such was the case in all terrorist acts, including Budennovsk and especially Dubrovka. The investigation should have determined how each hostage died, examining the actions not only of the terrorists, but also the special services, military, and the law enforcement agencies, if not to punish the guilty, then to extract lessons from these experiences.

Today, the "siloviki" have pre-approved carte blanche for any action and any "losses." Existing legislation allows them, in the course of "counter-terrorist operations," to inflict any damage, not only to property, but also to the health and life of citizens, and not bear any responsibility for doing so.

The Chechen war causes terrorism

The Russian mass media today is not prevented from discussing the topic of terrorism. Usually, public discussion focuses on questions such as: "How did this happen? Who allowed it? Could it have been

prevented?...” The question “Who concretely is responsible for the death of a specific person?” is usually answered thus “Wait, the investigation is still taking its course. In the meantime, we are talking about...” and the discussion returns to the general questions.

The answers of the investigation are well known: “the terrorists alone are responsible for the deaths of the hostages.” One can research the documents and find there such senseless and general formulations as: “Kulayev, working as part of a criminal group, murdered two or more individuals” instead of specific evidence describing the concrete crimes of each fighter. There are other factual absurdities presented to society for the purpose of burying clear and seemingly obvious things.

Undoubtedly, it is important to answer such questions as “How did the terrorists make their way to Beslan? How many were involved? Were arms hidden in the school before the attack? Was it possible to negotiate with them correctly? Why did the first explosion happen?” among others. Of course, it is necessary to seek answers, but as a result, by forgetting about the previous terrorist act, society deals only with the next one, ignoring a basic and obvious truth: before the Chechen war there were no conversations about such terrorism at all. In fact, the Chechen war itself caused this terrorism. Now, given the existence of terrorism, does the state have the ability to react adequately, not just dealing with each individual terrorist act, but countering the deeper causes of terrorism? And, moreover, in dealing with specific terrorist acts, can the state act while taking into account the larger context and deeper reasons for the attack?

The authorities’ general line: The terrorists alone are responsible

There is another, no less important flaw limiting the investigations, parliamentary examinations, and social discussions about Beslan. The questions are focused on the one official version of events. Even if you do not agree with it and seek to dispute it, the presence of the one official version limits discussion.

It is not simply that the investigation should have examined not only “the one true version,” but all possible explanations. Each of the different participants in the events has different descriptions of what happened. The events themselves are of such a large scale that at their core are at least two (those of the terrorists and the counter-terrorist forces) wills, visions, intentions, plans, and understandings of what happened, if not more.

The investigation is following the “general line” and what one would expect to happen has already happened. In the fall of 2005, Deputy Procurator General Kolesnikov confirmed that the investigation for the entire year was on the “only true path.” The procura-

tor tried to maintain the remnants of trust in the law enforcement agencies. But one can interpret “trust” in a variety of ways. One can be guided by the rules that “we want to establish the truth, we will check all facts, we will operate with maximal openness so that nobody will doubt our lack of bias” or one can support a “general line,” denouncing all other possibilities.

This predetermination was laid in the first minutes of the armed outcome of Beslan. Already then it was necessary to immediately divide the investigation into two parts. The first, focusing on the actions of the terrorists, such as how they prepared and conducted the attack on the school, undoubtedly should have been carried out by the Federal Security Service (FSB). But the FSB should have played absolutely no role in the second investigation, focusing on the storm of the school in which people died. While the FSB claimed that it wanted “to counter the possibility of falsification of material evidence in the case,” in fact the interests of the agency in painting the best picture of its own actions was too obvious.

But the investigation was not divided into two parts. In a situation of a clear “conflict of interests,” all facts and circumstances that did not agree with the general line could be excluded from examination, replaced with skillfully formed and “correct” questions to the witnesses and experts, if not directly falsified testimony. Every obstacle on the road favoring the general line was pushed aside and destroyed. How else can one explain the discovery at the dump of a large quantity of the personal effects and clothes of the dead hostages, which should have been evidence in the case?

After the investigators confirmed the “general line” in regard to the terrorists and the victims that “Basayev was responsible for everything,” there was no need to conduct further investigations, determine the conditions making the attack possible, or reconstruct events. Thus, they could write in the investigatory documents that the weapons and instructions were received “from unknown people at an unknown time in an unknown place,” that everything took place under the leadership of Basayev, who personally gave the terrorists almost every automatic weapon and bullet.

Of course, in this case, there was no place to examine the demands of the terrorists; the strategy and tactics of the negotiations (not political, but tactical - to free as many hostages as possible); and the ability and goals of using force, whether pin point or massive? Whether to save the lives of the hostages or, above all, to kill as many terrorists as possible?

The fact that one of the terrorists survived changed the situation to some extent because his court trial allowed for a larger discussion of what happened at Beslan. For example, what was the reason for the first explosion that ultimately led to the large loss of life?

Was it the result of the flamethrowers held by the law enforcement agencies? Did that cause the roof to catch fire? During the trial, the authorities at first denied that the law enforcement agencies had used flamethrowers and tanks, then they argued that the flamethrowers could not have set the roof on fire. However, this discussion could not replace a detailed investigation of the bodies of all those who died in the gymnasium. Such an investigation would make it possible to determine how each of the victims died, from the explosive devices set up by the terrorists or from the fire? Without such an investigation, it was possible for the authorities to declare that the terrorists, and only they, were exclusively guilty of the deaths of all the hostages.

The Torshin commission: A missed opportunity

The parliamentary commission established in the fall of 2004 under the leadership of Aleksandr Torshin could have corrected this defect. This committee was free from conflicts of interest and could have examined a variety of accounts of what happened. Unfortunately, that did not happen. The first statements by the head of the commission focused on *About the author:*

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For further reading:

- Draft document of the North Ossetian parliamentary commission for investigating the conditions around the terrorist act in Beslan. The draft was submitted for discussion in the North Ossetian parliament on 29 November 2005, <http://pravdabeslana.ru/dokl.htm>.
- Letter from the organization "Voice of Beslan" <http://pravdabeslana.ru/golos301105.htm>.
- The preliminary Duma report prepared by the committee under Aleksandr Torshin, 28 December 2005, <http://www.rg.ru/2005/12/28/tezis.html>.

Analysis

The North Caucasus: Taking stock two years after Beslan

Jeronim Perovic, Zurich

Summary

There have been no major combat operations in Chechnya for several years now. The resistance has dwindled to the point where only a few hundred rebels are carrying on. But despite signs of normalization, the situation remains tense not only in Chechnya, but in the entire predominantly Muslim North Caucasus. Chechnya is only one part of a larger crisis region that is increasingly succumbing to chaos and violence. Two years after Beslan, Moscow still has no recipe for regaining control over the situation.

The spread of war

The North Caucasus has continuously felt the effects of the war in Chechnya, which has been raging intermittently since 1994: it has been affected by Chechen refugees, by the repeated raids of armed Chechen units into neighboring territories, and especially by bloody terrorist attacks. The worst incident of

those who ordered the terrorist act and the possible participation of the republican elite among this group. Such statements made clear that he did not want to examine the Chechen war as the context or cause for the terrorism. The Torshin Commission refused to accept materials from Russian human rights defenders which could have helped in the investigation of this aspect of the tragedy. According to the account of State Duma member Yury Ivanov, who served on the commission, this investigation took place within the framework of the authorities' "general line." Two years after Beslan, the commission has still not published the final version of its report. Nevertheless, this commission has played one role, that of a lightning rod for the protests of the Beslan residents. Now such a commission could prove to be a blessing since the recently adopted law on parliamentary investigations essentially forbids investigations of significant issues.

In sum, the two years following the Beslan tragedy have exposed barriers in contemporary Russia that block the effective social monitoring of the military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies and therefore hinder a real battle with such evils as terrorism.

Translation from the Russian: Robert Ortung

this kind was the hostage-taking of over 1,100 people in a school in Beslan on 1 September 2004. More than 300 hostages, the majority of whom were children, lost their lives.

Since the hostage drama in Beslan, this form of terrorism, which was closely connected with the war in Chechnya and which involved mostly ethnic Chechen

perpetrators, has become less prominent. At the same time, however, there was an increase in the number of attacks and military operations in the North Caucasus region carried out by groups that consisted mainly of other North Caucasus ethnic nationalities, rather than of Chechens. The first of this type of larger-scale military operation was the attack in June 2004, by between 200 and 300 armed men, on various official buildings in Nazran, the largest city in the Republic of Ingushetia. The other large-scale military action occurred in October 2005 in Nalchik, the capital of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, and involved an attack by over two hundred armed rebels. These two events cost the lives of around two hundred people.

Similar developments have been observed recently in other parts of the North Caucasus. In the context of the North Caucasus crisis, Dagestan – home to over 30 ethnic groups – is by far the biggest hot spot in the region, with the media reporting killings, arrests, and military operations on virtually a daily basis. However, it is uncertain how many of these actions can be blamed on radical Islamist groups, as it is not always possible to determine whether an incident is a terrorist act by an Islamist group, or a dispute between criminal organizations or ethnic clans.

One thing that is certain is that there are now a number of *jamaats* (lit. communities) in Dagestan whose members follow the Islamic law of Shariah, which means that they live outside the official rule of

law. These *jamaats* often comprise the inhabitants of individual, isolated mountain villages, some of which have squads of armed men primarily to secure their own territory and who are therefore mainly engaged in defending local interests. Other *jamaats* have fewer local interests and resemble terrorist networks. The most notorious of these is the Jamaat “Shariat,” which features on Moscow’s list of terrorist organizations. According to official sources, this group is responsible for the deaths of approximately 50 members of the security forces (as of February 2006).

A single front?

The violence in the North Caucasus has local roots and is no longer emanating only from Chechnya. At the same time – and this has caused particular concern in Moscow – there are connections between the individual terrorist and resistance groups. For example, in May 2005, the “North Caucasian Front” was founded in order to improve coordination among the various rebel groups. Until his violent death on 10 July 2006, the military supreme commander of the Front had been Russia’s most wanted terrorist, Shamil Basaev.

Figures for the number of rebels on North Caucasus territory vary. Oleg Khottin, commander of the troops of the Russian Ministry of the Interior in Chechnya, estimated that there are currently less than 800 fighters operating in the region, organized in

The North Caucasus (physical map)



over a hundred small military formations. The figure is likely to be higher, however. President of Dagestan Mukha Aliev claimed in late March 2006 that, based on information claimed from the Dagestan security forces, there were an estimated 1,000 people in his republic who were members of a terrorist organization.

Figures for the number of Chechen fighters vary as well, but it is believed that there are now only between 200 and 300 armed fighters left hiding in the mountainous part of the republic. However, the number of Chechens sitting at home who would be ready to take part in a new chapter of the armed resistance struggle against the Russian army and the pro-Russian Chechen government may well be considerable in light of the fact that the present government, controlled by Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov and his clan, is unpopular with many Chechens. According to Chechnya's rebel president Dokku Umarov, the resistance does not lack volunteers but money and weapons in order to engage in large-scale war against federal and republican troops.

What remains to be seen is whether the death of Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev will have any significant impact on the military situation in Chechnya and the North Caucasus. With Basayev's death, a key symbol of resistance to Russian rule and an important link among the various local rebel groups of the North Caucasus has been eliminated. At the same time, however, the individual cells of armed resistance, which are able to operate autonomously, have not been eradicated and thus continue to possess the ability to conduct military operations alone or, perhaps, in coordination with each other.

Moscow's assessment

Moscow is fully aware of the dangers currently in the North Caucasus. In this context, two reports commissioned by Dmitry Kozak (the Presidential Envoy to the Southern Federal District) have caused something of a stir in Russia: one on the North Caucasus and the other specifically on the situation in Dagestan. In these secret reports drawn up for Vladimir Putin, from which extracts reached the Russian press in the summer of 2005 under mysterious circumstances, corruption, clan-based loyalties, a shadow economy, and the alienation of the population from the ruling elite are listed as the principal threats to social stability and a key factor for the continuing economic crisis. The increasing radicalism and Islamization of society are mentioned as manifestations of the situation, not as the causes for it. The situation in Dagestan, in particular, is seen as giving cause for concern. According to Kozak, 7 percent of Dagestan's 2.5 million population is (in theory) prepared to resort to armed struggle if the situation demands; one-third of the population would take part in illegal protest

actions.

Regardless of their general analytical depth, the reports have one great weakness: not a word is said about the disastrous role that Moscow has played in events up to now. Kozak's report does not mention that Moscow itself is part of the corrupt system he condemns. For a long time, Moscow was fully focused on Chechnya and the war against terrorism, being content just to maintain the status quo in the rest of the North Caucasus; in other words, it supported the corrupt political regimes there and helped the spread of maladministration and the entrenchment of clan structures. Among the biggest losers in this system were young people who, without jobs or hope for the future, posed easy prey for criminal organizations or militant Islamist groups. Rather than improving the situation, Moscow's policy actually helped radical Islamist forces to become established in the North Caucasus republics.

This central imbalance in Kozak's analysis raises questions about the political objective behind the reports. Russian newspapers have speculated in this context that the reports may not have been leaked accidentally, but rather made public on purpose, not simply in order to highlight irregularities, but also to legitimize a greater level of involvement by Russia in the region – even to the extent of direct rule. In fact, an overview of Russia's North Caucasus policy supports this view.

Control through cadre policy

Moscow is attempting to bring the situation under control by using strategies such as cadre policy, redesign of administrative and territorial structures, and intensive militarization. But it is doubtful whether these efforts will be enough to deal with the problems. Cadre policy is a case in point. The Beslan tragedy in September 2004 gave the Russian president an excuse to abolish the direct, popular elections of regional leaders and make appointments directly from Moscow. Putin then replaced the presidents of the republics of North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan. The others will also be appointed by the Kremlin once their terms have expired.

However, it is not clear how far this approach will manage to break up the old clan structures. In fact, intervention from the outside bears the danger of merely creating new constellations of conflict. Furthermore, interventions of this kind may lead to power shifts within the system, rather than changing the system itself. Dagestan provides a good illustration of this: although the then-departing president of Dagestan, Magomedali Magomedov, was unable to convince the Kremlin to appoint a candidate from his own family as his successor, continuity was preserved by appointing Mukha Aliev, a close ally of Magomedov, to the post

of president. Also, the influence of the Magomedov clan was secured by the fact that at the same time Magomedov left office in February 2006, his son was appointed president of the parliament – one of the most important positions in the republic.

Territorial restructuring and militarization

Moscow sees a further means of exercising control through territorial and administrative restructuring. Plans are being discussed to merge the small Republic of Adygeya with the ethnically Russian-dominated Krasnodar Krai. Chechnya would again have to unite with Ingushetia (as was the case up until 1992), later possibly also with Dagestan. However, such discussions may merely prove to be the first stage of a more comprehensive territorial restructuring of Russia. Mass demonstrations in April this year by ethnic Adygs in Maikop, the capital of Adygeya, served as an early indication of how sensitive such projects can be in the region, with its strong mix of ethnic groups and delicate balances. Reservations about an ethnic restructuring of the North Caucasus have now been expressed by the leaders of most of the other ethnic republics, and even in the Russian-dominated regions of the Southern Federal District.

The policy of militarization being followed by Russia represents a third element of its control. Despite the fact that Russia has now significantly reduced the number of its troops in Chechnya, it has dramatically

increased its military presence in the other republics. The estimated 300,000 federal troops in the North Caucasus were spread throughout the entire territory at the beginning of 2005, including the regions with a Russian majority (if we discount the concentration of between 80,000 and 100,000 soldiers in Chechnya at that time). Now, however, Moscow has consolidated its troops in much greater numbers in the national republics. More and more, the region resembles a huge training ground for the Russian military. In the 9-month period between September 2005 and June 2006, Russia conducted over half a dozen military exercises involving one or more North Caucasus republics.

By the end of 2006, the authorities plan to set up dozens of new frontier posts in an effort to tighten control over the internal borders between the republics and the international borders to the south. More and more, Moscow is replacing its regular army with special units from the Ministry of Interior and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Unlike previous efforts, Moscow aims to engage only contract soldiers for these units. In this context, the Russian Ministry of the Interior has started to build up two “mountain brigades,” which are to be stationed in Dagestan and in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and which are also officially designated to protect Russia’s southern borders; in practice, however, these mobile units may well be used in the fight against rebel groups on difficult ter-

The North Caucasus (administrative map)



rain in the North Caucasus interior.

The Consequences of “Chechenization”

Chechnya is a special case within Russia’s policy vis-a-vis the North Caucasus. Besides the 50,000 federal troops that remained in the republic by August 2006 (and which Moscow wants to reduce by one half in the coming two years), Moscow funds Chechen “battalions” and the Chechen Interior Ministry forces, with an overall manpower of up to 20,000 troops. On a political level, the main institutions in Chechnya have been re-established, formally at least: The republic now has a constitution, a president elected by the people (though some say the election was rigged by Moscow), a government, and an elected parliament.

In principle, the integration of former resistance fighters, some of them war criminals and common criminals, into political life, and the transformation of private armies into official armed forces, is not a bad thing since it represents a pragmatic solution to a difficult situation with no easy answers. However, the problem is that Moscow has, up until now, relied on a single faction in Chechnya – the clan of Ramzan Kadyrov, the Moscow-appointed prime minister, and his force of several thousand armed men.

According to the respected Russian human rights organization Memorial, the policy of Chechenization has merely authorized the official bodies to use unlawful force. Today, a frequent method of removing or wearing down an opponent is to kidnap the person concerned, or members of his family. Memorial says that such kidnappings are often carried out in the wake of mopping-up operations by the “Kadyrovtsy” (literally: “Kadyrov’s men”). Mopping-up operations, it says, are generally carried out in those regions of Chechnya that are home to supporters of an opposing clan.

In its last annual report on Chechnya, published in early August 2006, Memorial notes that the number of killings and disappearances have dropped over the past twelve months. If there were some 310 reported killings and 418 disappearances in the second half of 2005, the number dropped to 192 and 316 respectively in the six-month period from January–July 2006. However, the report notes that stability in Chechnya is based on a climate of fear and intimidation: many crimes committed by the Kadyrovtsy are never report-

ed or remain unsolved.

Dire perspectives

There are no obvious solutions for the problems of the North Caucasus. Moscow must eventually allow for greater self-rule. However, the problem remains that Chechnya, if left to itself, could rapidly slide into conflict among the different Chechen clans and rebel groups, but especially between supporters and opponents of Kadyrov. At the same time, centralization and militarization in Chechnya and the other ethnic republics of the North Caucasus risks upsetting the already complex ethnic, political, and social balance, and – as just one possible consequence – galvanizing radical and militant forces from the nebulous cluster of Islamist militant groups.

With its efforts to militarize the North Caucasus, Moscow is certainly proving that it is prepared to go to any effort or expense in the fight against terrorism in order to defeat this evil. At the same time, it is relying on inefficient local authorities and commissions to stabilize the socio-economic situation. These local actors are either unwilling or unable to control the funds promised for this purpose. But it is precisely in this area that greater Russian involvement is required. In order to eliminate corruption and clan-based regimes, the Kremlin needs to strengthen society from the bottom up; however, such a goal will not be achieved by inflating federal bureaucracy or the militarization of the region. What is needed is the encouragement of civil society, the creation of an independent judiciary, support for non-governmental organizations, the stimulation of a dynamic political party system, and the promotion of free and independent media.

Russia needs to present the North Caucasus and its peoples with a model for the future which would offer young people education opportunities and career prospects throughout all of Russia. Russia would also have to try to further relations in other areas, such as science, culture and sport. At the present time, however, there is little stimulus provided for integration in these areas. In fact, a process of alienation of the Muslim part of the North Caucasus from Russia is underway and manifests itself on the Russian side in the form of growing Islamophobia and hostility against Caucasus natives.

About the author:

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For further reading:

- Jeronim Perovic, The North Caucasus on the Brink, ISN Case Study No. 8 (Zurich, International Relations and Security Network, 2006), <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id=15316>.

Tables and Diagrams

The North Caucasus and the Southern Federal District: Statistics and Facts

Southern Federal District: Federation Subjects

Administrative unit		Area	Population (on 1 January 2000)	Population density	Capital
English designation	Russian designation	1.000 sq km	1.000	People per sq km	
Russian Federation	Rossiiskaia Federatsiia	17,075.4	145,559	8.52	Moscow
Republics		Respubliki			
Republic of Adygeya	Respublika Adygeia	7.6	448	58.95	Maikop
Republic of Dagestan	Respublika Dagestan	50.3	2.142	42.58	Makhachkala
Republic of Ingushetia	Respublika Ingushetiia	3.2	315	98.44	Magas
Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria	Kabardino-Balkarskaya Respublika	12.5	431	34.48	Nalchik
Republic of Kalmykia	Respublika Kalmykiia – Khalmg Tangch	76.1	315	4.14	Elista
Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessiya	Karachaevo-Cherkesskaia Respublika	14.1	670	47.52	Cherkessk
Republic of North Ossetia	Respublika Severnaia Osetiia – Alaniia	8.0	768	96.00	Vladikavkaz
Republic of Chechnya	Chechenskaia Respublika	16.1	786	48.82	Grosny
Territories		kraya			
Krasnodar Territory	Krasnodarskii krai	76.0	5.007	65.88	Krasnodar
Stavropol Territory	Stavropolskii krai	66.5	2.660	40.00	Stavropol
Regions		oblasti			
Astrakhan Region	Astrakhanskaia oblast	44.1	1.016	23.04	Astrakhan
Volgograd Region	Volgogradskaia oblast	113.9	2.677	23.50	Volgograd
Rostov Region	Rostovskaia oblast	100.8	4.341	43.07	Rostov

Sources: *Rossiia v tsifrakh. Moscow 2000, pp. 25. 34–43, complemented by: R. Götz / U. Halbach: Politisches Lexikon Rußland. München 1994, S. 131, 300.*

Note: The 13 Federation Subjects listed here constitute the Southern Federal District which is identical to the North-Caucasian Military District. Older statistics, which divide the country into 11 economic regions, the North-Caucasian Region comprises only 10 Federation Subjects, Kalmykiya. Astrakhan and Volgograd being excluded.

National republics and their presidents

Republic	President of the republic
Adygeya	Khazret M. Sovmen (elected 13 January 2002)
Karachayevo-Cherkessia	Mustafa A.-A. Batdyev (elected 31 August 2003)
Kabardino-Balkaria	Arsen B. Kanokov (appointed 28 September 2005)
North Ossetia	Taimuraz D. Mamsurov (appointed 7 June 2005)
Ingushetia	Murat M. Ziazikov (elected 28 April 2002)
Chechnya	Alu D. Alkhanov (elected 1 September 2004)
Dagestan	Mukha G. Aliev (appointed 20 February 2006)

Subsidies in 2005*

Republic	Share of federal budget transfer	Place in federal rating of subsidies**
Ingushetia	88.3%	2
Dagestan	81.3%	4
Chechnya	79.4%	6
Kabardino-Balkaria	73.4%	7
Karachayevo-Cherkessia	62.5%	11
North Ossetia	59.2%	14
Adygeya	58.1%	15

* From: *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 6 October 2005.

** Rank out of total 89 (today: 88) federal subjects

Unemployment in 2003–04

Russian Federation	8.0%
Southern Federal District	13.2%
National republics:	
Adygeya	16.7%
Karachayevo-Cherkessia	21.7%
Kabardino-Balkaria	28.7%
North Ossetia	10.9%
Ingushetia	49.1%
Chechnya	...
Dagestan	24.9%

Source: www.gks.ru/wages/tables%5Cbezrab.htm, accessed 19 June 2006

Ethnic composition in the national republics*

Republic	Population	Ethnic composition
Adygeya	447,109	Russians (64.5%), Adygs (24.2%), Armenians (3.4%)
Karachayevo-Cherkessia	439,470	Karachais (38.5%), Russians (33.6%), Cherkess (11.3%), Abasins (7.4%), Nogai (3.4%)
Kabardino-Balkaria	901,494	Kabardians (55.3%), Russians 25.1%), Balkars (11.6%), Ossetians (1.1%), Turks (1%)
North Ossetia	710,275	Ossetians (62.7%), Russians (23.2%), Ingush (3%), Armenians (2.4%), Georgians (1.5%)
Ingushetia	467,294	Ingush (77.3%), Chechens (20.4%), Russians (1.2%)
Chechnya	1,103,686**	Chechens (93.5%), Russians (3.7%)
Dagestan	2,576,531	Avars (29.5%), Dargins (16.5%), Kumyks (14.2%), Lesgins (13.1%), Laks (5.4%), Russians (4.7%), Tabasarans (4.3%), Azeris (4.3%), Chechens (3.4%), Nogai (1.5%)

* Figures are based on data from the 2002 Russian census (www.perepis2002.ru).

** In light of two costly wars and the emigration of many of its inhabitants, the real figure is likely to be considerably lower.

Regional per capita Gross Domestic Product 1998–2004

	Roubles								Ranking among 89 Federation Subjects							
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	
Russia (sum total of all 89 regions)	16,545.6	28,404.3	42,731.2	53,410.2	65,248.7	80,766.7	102,005.1									
Central Federal District	18,584.7	34,854.0	53,716.6	65,638.1	83,699.2	104,451.2	121,860.8									
North-Western Federal District	17,249.1	29,799.0	42,809.1	53,161.4	67,099.1	82,917.6	107,060.9									
Southern Federal District	9,082.9	15,098.8	21,813.4	28,199.7	33,897.5	41,026.9	50,014.7									
Republic of Adygeya	7,514.0	10,901.1	13,310.2	15,592.8	18,617.5	23,484.2	29,897.3	71	73	76	77	77	77	77	77	
Republic of Dagestan	3,595.3	5,478.2	8,577.8	12,760.9	16,461.5	22,547.6	29,129.3	79	79	79	78	78	78	78	78	
Republic of Ingushetia	3,625.4	6,447.6	14,827.8	10,890.1	8,016.4	10,275.9	12,582.9	78	78	74	79	79	79	79	79	
Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria	7,278.1	11,989.8	17,800.5	23,864.4	26,288.6	29,807.0	35,709.2	73	71	71	70	71	71	73	74	
Republic of Kalmykia	5,519.2	7,304.1	28,004.8	38,469.7	31,798.1	33,147.3	39,094.6	77	77	41	35	62	71	71	71	
Republic of Karachayvo-Cherkessia	6,457.0	10,257.4	13,006.4	17,341.2	23,974.1	27,303.9	33,218.3	74	75	77	75	75	75	75	75	
Republic of North Ossetia	6,045.1	11,079.1	14,393.2	20,701.4	24,997.0	29,082.1	35,885.4	75	72	75	73	73	74	74	73	
Republic of Chechnya	
Krasnodar Territory	10,696.3	20,661.2	28,647.9	37,099.8	44,928.1	52,192.0	63,843.8	53	37	38	36	41	43	43	42	
Stavropol Territory	10,709.6	14,877.1	20,969.1	26,234.5	31,461.3	39,678.0	48,792.5	52	62	62	64	63	63	63	63	
Astrakhan Region	11,017.7	17,770.1	31,729.4	36,174.0	44,962.5	54,529.8	62,584.2	47	46	30	37	39	38	38	45	
Volgograd Region	11,614.1	17,363.7	25,394.5	33,173.2	41,908.1	51,145.0	60,690.9	40	51	47	47	45	46	46	48	
Rostov Region	8,984.8	15,342.8	21,205.9	28,470.3	33,644.8	41,710.6	51,500.2	62	58	61	58	60	60	60	57	
Volga Federal District	14,638.3	24,311.5	35,568.2	44,412.2	51,404.2	63,423.0	78,391.1									
Urals Federal District	26,927.1	44,838.8	74,967.8	97,065.6	114,948.2	144,550.9	212,560.4									
Siberian Federal District	15,329.5	23,760.8	34,767.4	43,231.4	51,950.2	63,341.3	85,347.3									
Far Eastern Federal District	20,444.1	34,092.6	45,540.5	58,115.5	71,125.1	86,350.4	103,500.8									

Quelle: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01_19/issWWW.exe/Sig/d000/vrm02.htm, 15 June 2006.

Demographic trends in the Southern Federal District 2004

	Births (per 1,000 people)	Deaths	Natural increase (+), decrease (-)
Russian Federation	10.5	16.4	-5.9
Southern Federal District	11.7	13.5	-1.8
Republic of Adygeya	10.2	15.5	-5.3
Republic of Dagestan	14.9	6.5	8.4
Republic of Ingushetia	14.8	3.7	11.1
Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria	10.3	10.2	0.1
Republic of Kalmykia	13.1	11.0	2.1
Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia	12.2	12.4	-0.2
Republic of North Ossetia	11.1	12.6	-1.5
Republic of Chechnya	24.8	5.8	19.0
Krasnodar Territory	10.7	15.7	-5.0
Stavropol Territory	10.1	14.8	-4.7
Astrakhan Region	12.1	15.5	-3.4
Volgograd Region	9.6	16.0	-6.4
Rostov Region	9.6	16.4	-6.8

Source: <http://www.gks.ru/scripts/free/1c.exe?XXXX83F.1.1.1/010000R...010010R...010020R>. 17 September 2004

Official web sites of the regions of the Southern Federal District

Administrative unit	URL	
	Legislative assembly	Administration
Republics		
Adygeya	http://www.gshra.ru/	http://www.adygheya.ru
Dagestan	http://www.e-dag.ru/	
Ingushetia	http://www.ingushetia.ru/	http://www.ingushetia.ru/
Kabardino-Balkaria		http://www.nalnet.ru/
Kalmykia		http://kalm.ru/ru/
Karachayevo-Cherkessia		http://www.kchr.info/
North Ossetia	http://parliament.mno-a.ru/	http://president.osetia.ru/
Chechnya		http://www.chechnya.gov.ru/
Territories		
Krasnodar	http://www.kubzsk.ru/	http://admkrain.kuban.ru
Stavropol	http://www.dumask.ru/	http://gubernator.stavkrai.ru/
Regions		
Astrakhan	http://duma.astranet.ru/	http://www.adm.astranet.ru/
Volgograd	http://duma.volganet.ru/	http://www.volganet.ru/
Rostov	http://www.zsro.ru/	http://www.donland.ru/

As of 15 June 2006. In some instances, pages can take long to load.

Dead Chechen rebels*

Leaders

Dzhokhar Dudayev (1991–1996)	Ex-Soviet air force officer, killed by a missile homing in on his telephone
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev (1996–1997)	Radical poet and ex-Chechen president, killed by Russian agents in Qatar in 2004
Aslan Maskhadov (1997–2005)	Ex-Soviet artillery officer elected president in 1997, killed by Russian special forces
Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev (2005–2006)	Radical cleric, killed by Russian special forces

Key warlords

Salman Raduyev	Died of internal bleeding in 2002, in a Russian jail
Khattab	Killed by a poisoned letter, 2002
Ruslan Gelayev	Killed in 2004 by border guards in Dagestan
Shamil Basayev	Killed in Ingushetia in 2006, rebel vice-president at time of death


* Source: BBC NEWS, 12 July 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/europe/5168984.stm>

Opinion Survey


The North Caucasus in Russian Eyes

Source: Opinion poll conducted by the Levada Center in May 2006 <http://www.levada.ru./press/2006060504.html>

In your opinion, the situation in the North Caucasus today is ...



In the next year, the situation in the North Caucasus will ...



Chronology

Terror-related incidents in the North Caucasus (September 2004 – August 2006)

1 September 2004	At 9am, approximately 30 armed individuals, including two women, occupy Middle School No. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, and take 1,128 students, parents, and teachers hostage.
3 September 2004	Security forces raid Middle School No. 1 in Beslan. During the fighting between hostage-takers and security forces, 331 hostages (including 186 children) and 12 members of security forces are killed. 783 people are injured. Thirty-one hostage-takers are killed, one is arrested.
17 September 2004	In a statement published on the internet, Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev claims responsibility for the Beslan hostage crisis and threatens to carry out further terrorist attacks in Russia.
17 September 2004	A cargo train in the Naursk Rayon (Chechnya) is bombed, damaging railway tracks and rolling stock.
19 September 2004	In Dagestan, security forces attack a guerilla camp located near Talga village, 8 km from the capital city of Makhachkala. Three militia troops and three rebels are killed in the fighting.
19 September 2004	Under pressure from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Lithuanian government outlaws the website www.kavkazcenter.com , which has been distributing the Chechen guerillas' information.
27–28 September 2004	At the border triangle linking Nozhai-Yurt, Vedeno, and Kurtsaloi rayons in Chechnya, federal troops track down a major group of guerillas. A running battle ensues. Supposedly, Chechen President Maskhadov is also in the region.
3 October 2004	In Nizhnii Novgorod, the FSB secret police arrests 11 people accused of membership in an underground cell of the Muslim extremist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
6 October 2004	On the border of Vedeno and Noshai-Yurtovsk rayons in Chechnya, Russian Spetsnaz (special forces) troops clash with a guerilla group. Three Chechen fighters are killed, an unknown number of soldiers are injured.
10 October 2004	The website www.kavkazcenter.com , which disseminates Chechen rebel information, is shut down again four days after resuming operations. This time, it had been hosted on a Finnish server.

10 October 2004	In a suburb of Nazran (Ingushetia), police surround a house allegedly occupied by guerillas. In the ensuing firefight, two guerillas are killed and one is arrested. Two members of the security forces are injured, as are two women and six children who had been inside the house.
12 October 2004	Putin names Anatoly Safonov, who served as first assistant director to the FSB domestic intelligence agency from 1994–1997, as the president’s special envoy for international counter-terrorism cooperation.
21 October 2004	An assassination attempt is made on the life of Abakar Akayev, the mayor of Buynaksk (Dagestan). Two vehicles in his convoy are damaged, nobody is injured.
8 November 2004	Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov announces that his security forces have killed 22 guerilla fighters in an operation in Vedeno rayon, including Suleiman Chairullah, who is said to have organized the murder of Kadyrov’s father.
9–10 November 2004	In the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala, special forces botch an attempt to arrest a group of extremists. Following a shootout that kills one police officer and sets a house on fire, the militants manage to escape without being identified.
25 November 2004	Akhmed Sambiev, a.k.a. “the White Arab”, a close confidant of Chechen guerilla leader Basayev, is shot in a private home in Ingushetia while resisting police and security officers.
26 November 2004	Two guerillas are killed and two others arrested in clashes in Chechnya. A kidnapped member of the Russian interior ministry’s troops is freed.
2 December 2004	Akhmed Batanov, deputy mayor of Makhachkala, is shot by unknown assailants outside his house.
4 December 2004	Pro-Russian Chechen security forces, including Ramzan Kadyrov’s “presidential guard”, arrest a number of relatives of Aslan Maskhadov, the guerilla leader and last president of Chechnya.
6 December 2004	FBI Director Robert Mueller travels to Moscow to meet Attorney-General Vladimir Ustinov, Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev, and Nikolai Patrushev, the director of the domestic intelligence agency FSB. Among other topics, they discuss counter-terrorism.
14 December 2004	In Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria), an office of the Federal Drug Trade Control Agency is raided by members of the Muslim extremist group Yarmuk. The four officers present are murdered, 36 assault rifles and 136 pistols are stolen together with ammunition, and the building is torched.
19 December 2004	The Dagestani police arrests five members of the pro-Russian Chechen security services on suspicion of armed robbery and kidnapping.
8 January 2005	In Nazran (Ingushetia), security forces attack a house where two Chechen and two Ingush militants are hiding out. The four are killed in the shootout.
12–14 January 2005	A total of 18 members of the Russian and Chechen security forces are killed in a series of ambushes and clashes in various places in Chechnya. Furthermore, two large guerilla weapons caches are discovered.
14 January 2005	In Kaspiisk (Dagestan), police and special forces storm a building housing groups of guerilla fighters. Three police officers and one militant are killed. One guerilla is arrested, another manages to escape.
14–15 January 2005	In the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala, security forces assisted by tanks raid a house where guerillas are hiding. One member of the “Alfa” special forces is killed during the raid, another is injured. Five guerilla fighters also die in the fighting.
20 January 2005	Lawyer Makhmud Magomadov is kidnapped by Chechen-speaking gunmen in Grozny. It is assumed that they belong to Ramzan Kadyrov’s “presidential guard”. Magomadov had investigated cases of abduction and ransom extortion linked to Kadyrov’s associates.
25–27 January 2005	In Nalchik (the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria), between five and eight guerillas of the Muslim extremist group Yarmuk occupy a five-story residential building. After several hours of gunfire, the security forces storm the building. They find the remains of three males and four females.
31 January 2005	Russian news agencies report that the Russian military’s legal branch has brought charges against three commanders accused of abducting three siblings of Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov.
2 February 2005	The deputy interior minister of Dagestan, militia Major-General Magomed Omarov, is ambushed at an intersection in Makhachkala and is shot dead together with three bodyguards.
2 February 2005	A website announces a unilateral ceasefire in Chechnya, to last for several weeks, in the names of Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev, both of whom are commanders of Chechen rebel groups.
3 February 2005	British TV’s Channel 4 broadcasts an interview with Chechen guerilla leader Shamil Basayev. Russian authorities protest against the broadcast.

5 February 2005	An attempt to blow up the main gas pipeline through Dagestan fails because the bomb does not detonate.
5–6 February 2005	Security forces carry out a major search operation in the area surrounding the Dagestani capital, Makhachkala. One police officer is killed and another injured in exchanges of fire with guerilla groups.
11 February 2005	In Nazran (Ingushetia), security forces storm a house to arrest a guerilla fighter. The fugitive is killed after a firefight lasting one hour.
14 February 2005	Russian authorities announce that six guerillas have been killed while attacking military installations south of Grozny. Chechen guerilla sources deny the report.
15 February 2005	The newspaper “Kommersant” receives a caution from the Federal Media Agency for publishing an interview with Chechen president and guerilla leader Aslan Maskhadov announcing a unilateral ceasefire.
18 February 2005	The regional military command in Chechnya announces that the federal security services have killed guerilla leader Yunadi Turchayev in Chechnya, whom they describe as the “Emir of Grozny”.
18 February 2005	In the Kurchalovsk district of Chechnya, five people are killed when their car comes under fire from persons unknown. Two of them are security officers serving Chechen President Alkhanov.
19–20 February 2005	In Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, security forces surround a house where two members of the Yarmuk group are hiding out. The house is raided after they refuse to surrender. The two guerillas are killed.
24 February 2005	The European Court of Human Rights orders the Russian state to pay €135,710 in damages to six Chechens who had sued Russia for human rights violations. The court finds that Russia has committed grievous violations of human rights during its offensive in Chechnya, including the torture and killing of civilians.
24–26 February 2005	Chechen Interior Ministry troops encircle a group of 70–90 guerillas near Nozhai-Yurt (eastern Chechnya). The raid is supported by federal troops and the Dagestani police. Government forces carry out further offensive operations in the districts of Vedeno, Itum-Kale, and Kurchaloi.
28 February 2005	The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the US State Department publishes its Human Rights Report for 2004, criticizing Russia for human rights violations in Chechnya.
1 March 2005	One soldier is killed and 18 are injured in a guerilla raid on a police station in Sernovodskaya (35km west of Grozny). Five of the attackers are killed, seven are arrested.
6 March 2005	A firefight breaks out when a bus full of guerillas is stopped at a roadblock at the southern edge of the Dagestani capital Makhachkala. One police officer is killed. Two of the guerillas are injured, three more are arrested.
7 March 2005	Twelve guerillas are arrested as government troops carry out an operation in the Achkhoi-Martovskii and Sunzhenskii rayons.
8 March 2005	Aslan Maskhadov, guerilla leader and last freely elected president of Chechnya, is killed near the town of Tolstoi-Yurt during a clash with special forces of the Russian domestic intelligence agency FSB.
14 March 2005	The house where Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov was found is blown up by security forces.
15 March 2005	In Khasavyurt (Northern Dagestan), two guerillas besieged in a house by federal troops in armored vehicles manage to escape from the encirclement during the night.
21 March 2005	The Human Rights Watch organization publishes a report on massive human rights violations in Chechnya according to which 3,000 to 5,000 people have “disappeared” under the auspices of the Russian authorities. In this context, the organization accuses the EU of inaction.
23 March 2005	Rebel field commander Rizvan Chitigov, a.k.a. “the Marine”, “the Chemist”, or “the American”, is killed in his home town of Shali by Chechen security forces. Chitigov had been regarded as the third most important of the Chechen guerilla leaders after Shamil Basayev and Dokku Umarov.
24 March 2005	The owner of the house where Chechen President and guerilla leader Aslan Maskhadov was killed by Russian security forces is allegedly found dead. Russian officials issue a denial and claim he is being held in custody.
29 March 2005	A group of guerillas attacks a police station in Sernovodskaya, 35km west of Grozny. During the one-hour gun battle that ensues, one police officer is killed and 18 others are injured. According to Russian accounts, five of the attackers are killed and six are taken prisoner.

5 April 2005	In Khasavyurt (Northern Dagestan), a firefight breaks out when security forces try to arrest three guerillas. Two guerillas are killed and one is taken prisoner. One police officer is injured. During the indiscriminate exchange of gunfire, a three-year-old child is killed and its mother injured.
15 April 2005	Federal troops kill four guerillas near Grozny's airport and retrieve two portable air-defense "Strela" missiles. Federal and loyalist Chechen forces raid an apartment in Grozny and kill five guerillas. On the Russian side, five members of the "Vypel" special forces unit are killed.
18 April 2005	In Vedeno district (Chechnya), a 2,000-strong force composed of Russian special forces, Chechen militia, and Ramzan Kadyrov's security service and supported by heavy weapons carries out a sweep through the area surrounding the village of Dyzhne-Vedeno where guerilla leader Shamil Basayev was born. In the course of the fighting, seven guerillas are killed and a large number of weapons seized.
19 April 2005	In the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala, a man is killed by a car bomb, while another is injured. The police identifies the victim as a known contract killer.
20 April 2005	Units of Ramzan Kadyrov's security service are engaged in a firefight with locals in Dagestan after they cross the republic's borders to look for Chechen guerillas in a Dagestani village. The interior minister of Dagestan responds by shutting down the border with the neighboring republic.
21 April 2005	A truck explodes inside the base of the Chechen OMON special police in Grozny. The vehicle had been left behind by guerillas and been taken to the base by the police for inspection. The blast kills one OMON member and injures four others.
29 April 2005	In Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, several guerillas are caught up in a checkpoint of FSB officers and members of the regional interior ministry troops. In the subsequent firefight, four guerillas and one police officer are killed. Two guerillas are arrested.
5 May 2005	In Chechnya, federal security forces discover a KamAZ truck loaded with 1.2 tons of explosives.
9 May 2005	Chechen guerillas attack Zentoroi, the home town of Ramzan Kadyrov. According to reports, eight attackers and 15 defenders are killed in the three-hour firefight.
15 May 2005	Four Chechen guerillas are killed by security forces near Grozny. One of them is alleged to be guerilla leader and former vice president Vakha Arsanov. The identification is uncertain, however.
15 May 2005	Six guerillas, including two women, are killed by security forces in an apartment in Cherkessk, the capital of Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Plastic explosives, detonators, and microchips are found in the apartment.
17 May 2005	Federal security forces raid a house on the outskirts of Grozny and kill three guerillas, including rebel leader Alash Daudov.
18 May 2005	During a sweep by federal security forces in southern Chechnya, they engage in an extended gun battle with guerillas.
19 May 2005	Four members of the Russian special forces who killed six Chechen civilians at a roadblock in January 2002 are acquitted of murder charges on appeal in Rostov-on-Don, since they were acting on orders. This decision causes protests in Chechnya.
20 May 2005	Zagir Arukhov, the Dagestani minister for ethnic policies, information, and foreign relations, is killed by a bomb blast in Makhachkala.
20 May 2005	The attorney-general's office of Ingushetia charges members of the security forces with torturing a terrorism suspect.
25 May 2005	Amnesty International publishes its human rights report for 2005. Among other things, it criticizes the massive violations of human rights in Russia in the context of the Chechen conflict as well as the grievous deficiencies of the legal system. The security forces consistently employ torture with impunity, the group alleges.
2 June 2005	Seven out of eight relatives of Aslan Maskhadov, the guerilla leader and former Chechen president who was killed in March, return to their home town. They had disappeared the previous December and had been detained by persons unknown for six months.
4 June 2005	Chechen General Said-Selim Tsuyev, who is loyal to Moscow, narrowly misses a bomb blast. Four Russian soldiers are injured.
6 June 2005	Chechen President Alu Alkhanov announces that Russian troops are to blame for between 5–10 percent of all kidnappings in the republic. This is a noticeable decline over the previous year, according to Alkhanov.
8 June 2005	In Makhachkala (Dagestan), two local politicians are targeted for assassination attempts. Tamerlane Omayev, a deputy in the regional parliament, is shot and seriously injured by persons unknown. Daoud Magomedov, a high-ranking judicial officer and former city councilor, is killed in his apartment. Protests are held during his funeral.
9 June 2005	Thirty km southeast of Grozny, Chechen rebels fire on a small bus carrying police officers from Tver. ¹⁷ Seven police officers are killed, one is injured.

20 June 2005	In Nazran (Ingushetia), two Ingush students are shot dead as the police attempt to arrest a terrorism suspect.
1 July 2005	In Makhachkala (Dagestan), a military truck taking interior ministry troops to the steam bath is bombed. Ten soldiers are killed and 17 injured. Another 14 passers-by are injured.
6 July 2005	A firefight breaks out in the center of Makhachkala (Dagestan) when security forces try to search an apartment where several underground fighters have barricaded themselves. A passer-by who was co-opted as a witness to the search is shot and killed, and another is injured. In the ensuing shootout, two militia members are injured. Two guerillas are killed, and one is injured and taken into custody. Two more are able to escape. According to the security forces, one of those killed is Rasul Makasharipov, the leader of a Muslim extremist guerilla group.
19 July 2005	A group of militiamen is ambushed near Znamenskoe, about 60km northwest of Grozny. A booby trap explodes, killing ten militiamen, one member of the domestic intelligence agency FSB, and three passers-by. Six militiamen and 18 civilians are injured.
24 July 2005	A bomb explodes in a train between Khasavyurt and Makhachkala (Dagestan), killing one woman.
15 August 2005	The chairman of the Chechen state council, Taus Dzhabrailov, announces that so far, 160,000 people have been killed in the two Chechen conflicts, including 30–40,000 ethnic Chechens. He assesses the total number of Chechen guerillas at 1,000, including 100–150 foreign fighters.
15 August 2005	In Nazran (the capital of Ingushetia), the municipal police chief and his driver are injured by a bomb attack.
17–18 August 2005	In Akhoi-Martan in the west of Chechnya, Chechen security forces pin down two guerilla groups. Gun battles ensue.
23 August 2005	One person is killed and two police officers are injured by a bomb in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia.
25 August 2005	In an assassination attempt in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia, Prime Minister Ibrahim Malsagov is injured and one of his bodyguards is killed.
10 September 2005	Two police officers are injured in a bombing attack on the police station in Malgobek rayon (Ingushetia).
12 September 2005	Chechen rebel field commander Akhmad Avdorkhanov is killed in a gun battle with Russian troops.
20 September 2005	In Karabulak (Ingushetia), a police patrol is ambushed. Three police officers are killed, another is injured.
22 September 2005	In Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, special forces arrest Isa Edisultanov, the “emir” of Shali region (Chechnya). He is accused of having organized a series of attacks between 2002 and 2004.
9 October 2005	In Makhachkala, security forces engage a group of four insurgents hiding out in a two-floor building in the city center. All four are killed in the course of the shootout. Two police officers are killed, another two are injured.
10 October 2005	In Dagestan, a police patrol is ambushed. Two police officers are shot dead, another is injured.
13 October 2005	Several groups of guerillas raid police stations, a prison, the local office of the FSB, as well as the airport in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria. The city center is cordoned off. At least two buildings are set on fire. There are numerous civilian casualties.
14 October 2005	Federal troops clear out the last pockets of resistance in Nalchik. During the fighting, more than 80 guerillas are reportedly killed and 17 taken prisoner. According to official reports, 24 soldiers and police officers are killed on the government’s side. There are 12 civilian casualties and many injured.
16 October 2005	Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev claims responsibility for the raid on Nalchik. He claims that a total of 217 attackers took part in the raid and that 41 of them were killed together with 140 members of the security forces. According to government sources, 92 attackers and 33 members of the security services were killed.
18 October 2005	In Yandar (Ingushetia), between 30 and 60 people open fire with automatic weapons on the house of a member of the security forces. Nobody is injured.
19 October 2005	In the early morning hours, security forces surround five guerillas in a residential house in Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Two of the guerillas are killed, the other two are arrested. One police officer is killed in the raid and four others are injured.

24–25 October 2005	After a ten-hour siege, security forces storm a residential house in Makhachkala (Dagestan) and kill three guerillas inside. Two members of the security forces are injured.
2 November 2005	In Dagestan, a local guerilla leader, the “Emir of Khasavyurt”, is killed by security forces.
20 November 2005	Near Gudermes (Chechnya), a firefight breaks out between security forces and guerillas during a police operation. One militant and two members of the security forces are killed, another person is injured.
21 November 2005	One guerilla is shot and killed, and another injured and arrested, during a police operation in Buynaksk (Dagestan).
23 November 2005	The Chechen Interior Ministry announces that three guerilla “emirs” have been “destroyed” in Grozny.
23 November 2005	Khizir Khachukayev, a guerilla “brigadier general”, surrenders to federal troops.
29 November 2005	Masked men kill the mayor of the town of Avtury in Chechnya. In the gun battle that ensues, two police officers are injured.
1 December 2005	In Vedeno rayon (Chechnya), a firefight breaks out between rebels and security forces. Three guerillas are killed and six others are injured. Two soldiers are also injured.
8 December 2005	A freight train runs over a mine near Khasavyurt (Dagestan), and one carriage derails. There are no casualties.
10 December 2005	In Novmekhelta (Dagestan), a police officer is shot and injured by persons unknown. In Khasavyurt (Dagestan), two police officers are injured in altercations with five Chechens.
28 December 2005	The head of the parliamentary commission investigating the events in Beslan, Alexander Torshin, presents his report. He charges the local security forces with negligence and recklessness concerning the threats of terrorist attacks.
3 December 2006	Southwest of Buynaksk (Dagestan), security forces move against a group of guerillas as part of a comprehensive operation.
15 January 2006	A vehicle of the security forces is destroyed by a remote-controlled bomb in Chechnya. Four soldiers are killed.
18 January 2006	During a “special operation”, security forces kill Supian Abdulayev, a leading representative of Wahhabi Islam, in Shali region.
30 January 2006	In Khasavyurt (Dagestan), security forces storm a house and kill three guerillas, including one of the leaders of the guerillas in Northern Chechnya.
7 February 2006	Speaking to a meeting of members of the FSB, President Vladimir Putin praises the service’s work in combating terrorism and declares this to be its main task. He states that “the terrorists” must be tracked down “in their caves” and destroyed “like rats”.
7 February 2006	Two guerillas are killed and four arrested during a special forces operation in Kaspiisk (Dagestan).
7 February 2006	The barracks of the “Vostok” special forces battalion is completely destroyed by an explosion. Thirteen people are killed and more than 20 injured.
9–10 February 2006	In Tukui-Mekhteb (Stavropol region), security forces track down a group of Chechen guerillas. When the two houses where the guerillas are holed up are raided, seven police officers and eight militants are killed.
16 February 2006	Dagestani security forces engage two guerillas in the derelict schoolhouse of a village in Nogai district (Northern Dagestan). In the firefight that follows, they are both killed.
17 February 2006	The president creates a National Committee for Combating Terrorism by decree. FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev is named chairman of the committee.
26 February 2006	In the third and last reading, the Duma approves the anti-terror law with 423 to 6 votes.
3–4 March 2006	Eight soldiers and two police officers are killed in fighting in Chechnya. Ten soldiers are injured.
6 March 2006	President Putin signs the anti-terrorism law that allows the government, among other things, to shoot down hijacked airplanes.
8 March 2006	The US State Department publishes its annual report on the international human rights situation. The report criticizes human rights violations in Chechnya, but also notes improvements in the court system: < http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61671.htm >.

9 March 2006	In Nazran (Ingushetia), a guerilla blows himself up as he is about to be arrested. He allegedly participated in the kidnapping of Magomed Chakiev, the Ingush president's father-in-law.
12 March 2006	Magomed Magomedov, head of department in the Dagestani Ministry of the Interior, is killed by a bomb placed in his car.
22 March 2006	Ruslan Aliev, the administrative head of Botlikh region (Dagestan), is shot dead in Makhachkala by four unknown assailants on the way back from a government meeting to his home town.
10 April 2006	In Makhachkala (Dagestan), two police officers and one guerilla are killed in a shootout. Another guerilla is injured and taken prisoner, while a third manages to flee.
11 April 2006	In Nazran (Ingushetia), security forces surround a house where a group of guerillas have barricaded themselves. In the one-hour exchange of gunfire, one police officer and two guerillas are killed.
16 April 2006	A group of six rebel fighters attacks security forces sweeping a village near Buynaksk (Dagestan). Two police officers and three guerillas are killed.
1 May 2006	Magomed Chakhkiev, the father-in-law of Ingush President Murat Zyazikov and of the republic's attorney-general, Makhmoud-Ali Kalimbetov, who had been kidnapped on 27 February, is released. The details of his release are unknown.
6–7 May 2006	Four kilometers south of Buynaksk (Dagestan), a firefight breaks out between a group of about 20 guerilla fighters and security forces. One police officer is killed and four others are injured.
15–16 May 2006	In Kizilyurt, Dagestani security forces raid a residential building where a group of militants has barricaded itself. Two guerillas and one member of the security forces are killed. Six police officers are injured.
16 May 2006	Nur-Pasha Kulayev, one of the Beslan hostage-takers and supposedly the only militant to survive, is found guilty by the Supreme Court of North Ossetia of terrorism and participation in murder and kidnapping. The sentence is to be announced at a later date.
17 May 2006	Near the town of Nikichita (Chechnya), a military column is ambushed. Four soldiers are killed and another four injured.
17 May 2006	In the Kuban region of Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Justice Colonel Khazan Dzhanayev is killed in his car by unknown assailants.
17 May 2006	In Nazran, seven people including the First Deputy Interior Minister of Ingushetia, Dzhabrail Kostoev, are killed by a car bomb.
21 May 2006	In Khazavyurt (Dagestan), security forces raid a house where two guerillas are staying. During the operation, the two militants are killed, while three police officers are injured.
22 May 2006	Amnesty International publishes its human rights report for 2006 < http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/incex-eng >. Referring to Russia, AI criticizes attacks on human rights lawyers, the increase in racist violence, abuses in prisons, domestic violence, and especially the violations of human rights in Chechnya.
24 May 2006	In Grozny, a group of militia investigators is ambushed. One police officer is killed, another is injured.
26 May 2006	Nur-Pasha Kulayev, the surviving Beslan hostage-taker, is sentenced to life imprisonment by the Supreme Court of North Ossetia.
31 May 2006	In southwestern Chechnya, Chechen security forces track down a group of guerillas and pursue them into Ingushetia. Three guerillas and one police officer are killed in the skirmishes. A number of other police officers are injured.
1 June 2006	In Nazran, the Chechen health minister's car comes under fire by unknown assailants using automatic weapons. The minister and his driver escape unharmed.
4 June 2006	In Nazran, a car carrying members of the FSB is fired upon by unknown attackers. Two intelligence agents are killed.
8 June 2006	Russian human rights organization Memorial announces it has discovered evidence in a derelict police station in Grozny indicating a secret detention center.
9 June 2006	A high-ranking police officer in Ingushetia is shot dead by unknown attackers together with his three children, his brother, and his bodyguard.
14 June 2006	A special operation begins in Ingushetia to track down a group of guerillas supposed to be hiding near Nazran. During this operation, 20 attack helicopters are used.

23 June 2006	Dokku Umarov, who has advanced to become the leader of the guerilla movement after the death of Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, publishes a statement on the Chechen resistance website chechenpress.org announcing an offensive against "military targets" in Russia.
25 June 2006	Ramzan Kadyrov is awarded the academic degree of a Ph.D. in Economy by the Makhachkala Institute of Business, Management, and Law.
27 June 2006	Dokku Umarov, the new leader of the Chechen guerilla, names Shamil Basayev as his vice president.
29 June 2006	A firefight breaks out during a raid in Sogunta village in Chechnya. An NCO of the interior ministry forces is killed.
29 June 2006	A car bomb blows up in Grozny. A police officer is injured.
4 July 2006	Near the town of Avturi (Chechnya), a military convoy is ambushed. At least five soldiers are killed and 25 others injured.
10 July 2006	Guerilla leader Shamil Basayev, at one time the vice president of Chechnya and one of the driving forces of the guerilla movement, who was also responsible for the 2004 hostage crisis in Beslan, is killed in the detonation of a vehicle loaded with explosive. The FSB claims to have booby-trapped the vehicle.
12 July 2006	In Buynaksk (Dagestan), security forces raid a residential building and kill two guerillas hiding out there.
13 July 2006	The foreign minister of the Chechen underground government, Akhmed Zakayev, announces via the internet that the Chechen resistance is prepared to take up peace talks immediately and unconditionally.
13 July 2006	According to official reports, 13 guerillas are killed in clashes between Chechen security forces and guerilla fighters along the Chechen-Dagestani border.
15 July 2006	FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev calls on Chechen guerillas to disarm and to take up negotiations with the pro-Russian Chechen government.
17 July 2006	Two police officers are shot in the city center of Grozny in broad daylight by unknown perpetrators.
17 July 2006	A Muslim cleric and his brother are shot dead by unknown assailants in Grozny.
19 July 2006	Two police officers are shot and injured by persons unknown in the village of Maiskii (North Ossetia). One of them dies later in the hospital.
23 July 2006	The police track down three guerillas near Endirei (Khasavyurt region, Dagestan). In the gun battle that ensues, two police officers and one militant are killed.
2 August 2006	Unknown perpetrators ambush a vehicle carrying the pay for Russian peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia. Two Russian soldiers are killed, one is injured.
25 August 2006	During a meeting with Yuri Chaika, Prosecutor-General of the RF, Interior Minister of the RF Rashid Nurgaliyev, Dmitri Kosak, Presidential Envoy to the Southern Federal District, and the heads of the North Caucasus republics at Rostov-on-Don, Nikolai Patrushev, Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), states that 18 terrorist attacks have taken place this year in Ingushetia and 11 in North Ossetia, a 50 percent increase over 2005.
26 August 2006	Two policemen are seriously injured in Ekazhevo, near Nazran, Ingushetia.
26 August 2006	Two servicemen are injured in an explosion near Nesterovskaya in Sunzha raion, Ingushetia.
26 August 2006	Three police officers are killed in an ambush near Voznesenskaya, Malgobek raion in Ingushetia.
26 August 2006	Three suspected guerillas and former Dagestan Deputy Culture Minister Zubail Khiiasov, a theater director, are killed during a two-hour fire fight in Makhachkala. One of the guerillas is identified as Gadji Melikov, supposedly the successor of Rasul Makasharipov as "emir" of the Makhachkala jamaat.

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About the Russian Analytical Digest

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Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen

Founded in 1982 and led by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Eichwede, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to socialist and post-socialist cultural and societal developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Research Centre possesses a unique collection of alternative culture and independent writings from the former socialist countries in its archive. In addition to extensive individual research on dissidence and society in socialist societies, in January 2007, a group of international research institutes will be assembled for a collaborative project on the theme "The other Eastern Europe – the 1960s to the 1980s, dissidence in politics and society, alternatives in culture. Contributions to comparative contemporary history" which will be funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

In the area of post-socialist societies, extensive research projects have been conducted in recent years with emphasis on political decision-making processes, economic culture and identity formation. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular email service with more than 10,000 subscribers in politics, economics and the media.

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The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public.

The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center's research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS), offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students, and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

Any opinions expressed in Russian Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors.

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