Initial Military Operations During the War in Georgia in August 2008

Author(s): Wolfgang Richter
Editor(s): Lili Di Puppo, Iris Kempe, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic
Series: Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD)
Issue: 10
Pages: 5-9
Publisher(s): Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich; Jefferson Institute, Washington D.C.; Heinrich Böll Foundation, Tbilisi; Research Centre for East European Studies, University of Bremen
Publication Year: 2009

Notwithstanding critical assessments of the historical, political, legal and humanitarian aspects of the August 2008 war in Georgia, key areas to be evaluated include the concept of the military operations and the sequence of the deployment of forces. The following analysis does not support the interpretation that the Georgian large-scale offensive operation against South Ossetia was necessary and suited to counter an alleged massive Russian invasion in progress. On the contrary, the first clashes with two smaller Russian combat units took place only two days after the deployment of the bulk of the Georgian forces against South Ossetia and Russian forces needed two more days to match Georgian units in numbers. The indiscriminate shelling of Tskhinvali, aimed at the destruction of the political power base of the break-away region, and the Georgian deployment to the frontline had clear escalatory potential.

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