Center for Security Studies

The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Armenia

The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Armenia

Author(s): Zareh Asatryan
Editor(s): Denis Dafflon, Lili Di Puppo, Iris Kempe, Natia Mestvirishvili, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines
Series: Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD)
Issue: 60
Pages: 2-5
Publisher(s): Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich; Research Centre for East European Studies, University of Bremen; Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University
Publication Year: 2014

In this short article, I discuss some of the political economy aspects of the ongoing pension reform in Armenia. The focus is on two opposing forces-taxpayers’ quite significant resistance to the reform vis-à-vis government’s imperative to reform due to fiscal constraints-that are likely to shape the outcome of the reform. The discussion is centered around a fiscal contract where the government is forced to make democratic concessions in return for the taxpayers’ commitment to comply with its new institutions. I argue that this conflict may push Armenia into a virtuous circle of development.

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