Negotiating Peace with Your Enemy: The Problem of Costly Concessions

Author(s): Valerie Sticher
Journal Title: Journal of Global Security Studies
Publisher(s): Oxford Academic
Publication Year: 2021
Publication Place: Oxford, United Kingdom

Why do some parties fail to settle conflict, even after long periods of fighting? This journal article by Valerie Sticher proposes a new bargaining obstacle: costly concessions. A mutually acceptable agreement always contains concessions, yet when concessions are unpopular with key constituents, they are costly for leaders to make. This may result in a situation where leaders would prefer to settle but still decide to continue the war. This article argues that the problem of costly concessions renders the search for a mutually acceptable agreement a delicate balancing act, particularly if constituents are isolated from the costs of war and political competitors mobilize around unpopular concessions.

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