Publication
Mar 2017
How can non-strategic nuclear weapons holders, particularly Russia and the US, ensure these arms are not used in a conflict in Europe? This text advocates 1) transferring these warheads to a small number of storage facilities, and 2) developing verification procedures that would confirm the absence of deployed warheads at nearby, nuclear-capable bases. The virtue of this approach is that the parties involved wouldn’t have to disclose the number of warheads they possess, which has been a serious stumbling block in previous deterrence efforts.
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English (PDF, 48 pages, 1.63 MB) |
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Author | Pavel Podvig, Javier Serrat |
Series | UNIDIR Books and Reports |
Publisher | United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) |
Copyright | © 2017 UNIDIR |