Calibrating Disorder

This article examines Iran's, and to a lesser extent Syria's, role in Iraq since the coalition intervention in March 2003 and the response by members of the coalition to Iranian activities in Iraq during the intervening period. The context of Iran's interference in Iraq is conditioned by both internal factionalism and the Iranian regime's perception of external security interests. The extent and substance of Iran's meddling in Iraq is both varied and contested. Iran's strategy of interference in Iraq is based on two tenets: to prove its importance to the post-war reconstruction effort by availing or denying its active or passive support, and by carefully calibrating the levels of violence to make itself an indispensable interlocutor in post-war Iraq, short of openly challenging coalition supremacy. This inquiry also seeks to posit and evaluate arguments for addressing external interference in Iraq by its neighbors. It closes by suggesting that in order for Iran to be given an opportunity to take the coalition, and by extension, Western demands for cession of its activities seriously, the coalition must create the conditions for a credible deterrent by demonstrating, where and when necessary, its willingness to confront Iran in Iraq.