Method not Madness: Why Tehran Continues to Pursue its Nuclear Program

In the past year, tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions reached unprecedented levels, verging on war. With Israel assigning a “red line” for Iran’s proliferation efforts, the world nervously awaited for a likely Israeli air strike on suspected Iran’s nuclear sites—with all of its enormous political and economic consequences. Concurrent to this mounting crisis were the less discussed, though no less important, sanctions against Iran. Acting with much of the global community, the United States was able to convince a host of nations, including some of Iran’s closest trading partners, to cease major trade with Iran. As of now, the Islamic Republic is not only in a precarious security position, it is also as diplomatically and economically isolated as it has ever been.

The question that inevitably arises is why Iran is willing to go to such great pains to acquire nuclear weapons. What in the regime’s view can justify courting a military conflict and enduring crippling sanctions?

It is tempting to give a purely ideological explanation to this question. Taking the most inflammatory Iranian rhetoric at face value, it can easily be argued that Iran desires nuclear weapons for the purpose of using them against Israel. It could also be argued that, since the regime has sacrificed so much for the program, its legitimacy is, for better or worse, tied to it.

While there is no doubt that Tehran harbors true acrimony against Israel and has staked much of its legitimacy on the nuclear program, it is important to realize that several basic strategic reasons influence Iran’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons. Tehran’s acute awareness of the limitations of its conventional military capabilities combined with its vulnerable strategic position present very real benefits to acquiring nuclear arms. The recent events of the Arab Spring have made these benefits even more tangible for the regime, perhaps justifying sanctions and the risk of war required for them.

Stepping back, one finds that Iran occupies a position of relative weakness rather than strength in the Middle East. As a politically revolutionary, religiously Shia, and ethnically Persian regime, Iran is the natural foe of the traditionally Sunni, ethnically Arab autocrats that surround it. It has few allies and its two greatest rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel, enjoy regular installments of the latest military technology from the United States. Not to be forgotten is that Iran is bordered by Afghanistan, a country that retains American air bases and troops from the on-going war. Given all of this, it is not surprising that Tehran feels insecure about its geopolitical position. With so many powerful enemies surrounding it, Tehran is well aware that its conventional forces would be hopelessly outgunned if a war began.

The Arab Spring and its aftermath have accentuated Iran’s position of weakness. Though far from conclusive, the many uprisings that gripped the Arab world do not seem to have generated sympathy for Iran. Nations such as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt have demonstrated that they are wary of Iran’s involvement in their internal affairs, by tentatively rejecting a radical Islamic model. More importantly, Iran’s most important ally in the region, Syria, appears to be on the brink of collapse. With each passing month, the Assad regime slowly loses its grip on power. Now more than ever, Tehran is aware of its global isolation.

The Arab Spring has also introduced a perhaps even more dangerous element for the Iranian regime to contend with: the threat of internationally sanctioned external invention. For few regimes could the events in Libya have been more terrifying than for Iran. In Libya, European powers and the United States acted in coordination with a popular uprising against an internationally isolated dictator to create a military situation in which a successful revolution could be staged. Keeping in mind the recently suppressed Green Movement, which drove more than a million Iranians to take to the streets against the regime, it is easy to draw possible comparisons between what occurred in Libya and what could happen in Iran. It is important not to push this point too far, as the exact circumstances under which a Libya-style intervention would occur in Iran are unlikely, but it must be acknowledged that Iran at least might view this prospect as a threat.

By neutralizing the importance of conventional weapons, Tehran sees nuclear weapons as a way to head off the many threats that it faces. Nuclear weapons would make the idea of a normally devastating conventional attack against Iran unthinkable. With nuclear capabilities, Iran would no longer have to worry about their precarious security position and would be much less concerned with regional and global hostility. With an eye towards North Korea, Tehran can also see that nuclear weapons would make the already unlikely possibility of external intervention in Iran even less probable. Even if by some chance those popular uprisings begin to seriously challenge the regimes grip on power, the international community would never dare intervene in Iran for fear of nuclear reprisal.

It is impossible to step inside the mind of Ayatollah Khamenei to understand what are the largest considerations driving his decisions; however, if history is any guide, close attention should be paid to cold strategic consideration when predicting Iran’s actions. As the American hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq War proved, the regime is willing to take enormous calculated risks to consolidate and maintain its power. It is indeed possible that the current nuclear program is yet another one of these risks. While heavy sanctions may at times tip the balance of Tehran’s calculations, they are unlikely to alter the essential strategic logic that determines its decisions. Iran’s recent rejection of direct talks with the United States only underlines this feature of Tehran’s decision making.

Benjamin Mayer is currently an IDEX Fellow in Social Enterprise in Hyderabad, India, where he works as a market researcher at Gray Matters Capital. This article was external pageoriginallycall_made published by ISN partner, external pageDiplomatic Couriercall_made.

For additional reading on this topic please see:
Iran's Nuclear Programme: Closer to Compromise or War?
Risk and Violence in Iraq's New Sectarian Balance
The Gulf States: Between Iran and the West