Network-Centric Warfare in Asia

The USA pioneered network-centric warfare (NCW) doctrine, or network-centric operations, in the 1990s. But first we must define NCW, as it can be a nebulous thing. Indeed, it is a theory of war rather than a collection of hardware. A US Department of Defense release in 2005, entitled ‘The Implementation of Network- Centric Warfare’, defined NCW as “the combination of emerging tactics, techniques and procedures that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive war-fighting advantage.” The document highlighted three characteristics:

• NCW is first of all about human behaviour as opposed to information technology. The focus is on the verb ‘to network’ rather than on the noun ‘network’, which is just an enabler;

• NCW is a concept that, at the highest level, constitutes the military’s response to the information age;

• NCW is an emerging theory of war because it identifies new sources of power (information sharing, information access, speed), how those sources relate to each other, how they are brought to bear to achieve the desired outcome, and how they link to political objectives.

The term ‘network-centric warfare’ first appeared in the US Department of Navy publication ‘Copernicus: C4ISR for the 21st Century’ in 1997. NCW is essentially ‘team warfare’, where all military services integrate and synchronise to achieve joint warfare. It has four major tenets:

1 A robustly networked force improves information sharing.

2 Information sharing provides a common tactical picture and enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness.

3 Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronisation, and enhances sustainability and speed of command.

4 These, in turn, dramatically increase overall mission effectiveness.

The USA is the world’s undisputed proponent of NCW, turning its vast information-gathering apparatus into a competitive advantage through robust networking of interconnected forces across the globe. This article offers a quick précis of NCW developments in the Asia-Pacific region. NCW involves three domains: (1) Physical domain where events occur and reality is perceived by sensors and individuals; (2) Information domain where collected data is transmitted; and (3) Cognitive domain that receives information so it can be assessed and acted upon. Because NCW encompasses many intangibles that are difficult to gauge, much of the following content focuses on new hardware being employed. In theory, such acquisitions should reflect more deep-seated NCW changes occurring within militaries.

Singapore has made the most progress regionally as it transforms into a ‘Third-Generation Force’ thanks to high levels of investment and an advanced technological base. The Singapore Army’s newest vehicles such as the Terrex carry a battlefield management system (BMS) from ST Electronics. Vehicles possess two BMS terminals, while the Command, Control and Information System (CCIS) synchronises dismounted infantrymen fitted with the Advanced Combat Man System (ACM) to higher headquarters. The CCIS interacts with other ground-based systems and aerial platforms too. Another element aboard the Terrex is a Blue Force Tracking and Red Force Marking (BFT/RFM) system.

Singapore’s network-enabled force is the region’s most advanced user of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) like the Heron 1 and Hermes 450. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has four Gulfstream G550 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft fitted with an Elta EL/W-2085 Phalcon radar, and data from such platforms feed into Singapore’s tactical picture.

In Malaysia, Sapura has commenced Phase 1A of the nation’s Network-Centric Operations (NCO) contract. The two-year programme is due for completion in early 2014 and aims to integrate existing command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) systems and to study future capabilities. Phase 1B will be more comprehensive, probably adding capabilities like a BMS and integrating the Soldier Advanced Kombat Technology Integrated (SAKTI) programme. Thales, based on existing cooperation with Sapura, seems a likely foreign partner. Thales is also involved in fitting the Open Information Communication System (OICS) onto the AV8 armoured vehicle to allow internal/external information exchange and serve as a BMS platform.

In 2010, Northrop Grumman UK won a contract to create a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) in Brunei. Its heart is the company’s International-Joint Operational Command and Control System. The contract provides both a static headquarters and deployable JOC. Common core software allows interoperability with regional partners. Phase 2 is believed to be under way, and it should implement tactical components such as a BMS. The network encompasses Harris Corporation Falcon II radios, but wideband networking radios and high-capacity line-of-sight (HCLOS) radios are an obvious future purchase.

In Thailand the Directorate of Signals is in charge of NCW technical aspects. Thailand employs commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions alongside military-specific C4I systems as this proves more economical. In recent times the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) has made significant gains owing to a package of Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighters and Saab S100B Argus AEW&C aircraft. An integral part of the Swedish deal was installation of the StriC network, whose data-links connect Gripen and AEW&C aircraft into a complete air defence system. StriC, which greatly enhances the RTAF’s networkcentricity was delivered in March 2011. Saab was subsequently requested to expand Thailand’s air defence C2 system with a contract running from 2011-13.

Since 2001, Taiwan has invested heavily in its Lockheed Martin-derived Po Sheng (‘Broad Victory’) C4ISR system. The high-level Po Sheng system can quickly plug into the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) of the USA’s Pacific Command (PACOM). In the worst case of Chinese espionage in 50 years, authorities conceded Taiwan’s C4ISR platform may have been compromised by Major General Lo Hsien-che before his arrest in 2011. The military has been hardening its communication system that is primarily based on a fibre-optic cable backbone connecting bases. There is now a need to extend it into an agile tactical network, and to add ISR capabilities. Furthermore, work is required to integrate Taiwan’s Surveillance Radar Programme (SRP), a mountain-top missile early-warning radar, with Patriot PAC-3 and Po Sheng networks. Cyber-warfare is a threat to NCW, with Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) revealing that, in the first half of 2012, hackers launched more than one million attacks on the NSB.

Over the years the author has observed increasing digitisation in China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), primarily through equipment being fielded in the elite Hong Kong Garrison. New assets include the Z-9ZH helicopter, a C2 platform with forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system and cabin command console. In addition, the garrison received the Type 07 6x6 Armoured Command Vehicle accommodating the latest radio equipment that can transmit/receive real-time data. These platforms illustrate PLA advances in its drive towards NCW. ‘Informationisation’ is a fundamental goal, and in one sense, because the PLA was a late starter, it can take advantage of leapfrog technologies. C4ISR is crucial to China’s blue-water naval presence, anti-access/area denial and missile capability. China has procured both KJ-2000 and KJ-200 AEW&C aircraft. China still has much to learn about gaining maximum benefit from them, plus their practicality is stymied by the fact that older fighters do not have digital data-links.

South Korea is rolling out its Tactical Information Communication Network (TICN) to replace its SPIDER communications system. The USD3.8 billion TICN deal involving Samsung Thales, Huneed and LIG Nex1 has five subsystems such as High-Capacity Trunk Radio, Tactical Multiband and Multirole Radio, and Network Management System. Other important C4ISR projects include: (1) Korea Joint Command and Control System (KJCCS) to connect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to each service; (2) Military Information Management System (MIMS) to enable tactical-level cross-service interoperability; and (3) Joint Tactical Data Link System (JTDLS) to allow dissemination of digitised tactical information between all services.

South Korea knows it needs to improve C4ISR capabilities before it takes over wartime operational control (OPCON) of military forces on the peninsula in December 2015. Four Boeing 737 “Peace Eye” AEW&C aircraft have been inducted, plus it is contemplating RQ-4 Global Hawk UAVs, despite blanching at the USD1.2 billion price last year. The government has delayed any decision by at least a year, and is investigating cheaper alternatives. Since 2006, South Korea has been developing its Korea Air and Missile Defence (KAMD) system due for completion in 2015. Key components include Aegis-equipped KDX-III destroyers, EL/M-2080 Super Green Pine early-warning radars and Patriot missiles.

Japan is greatly concerned at North Korea’s missile arsenal, as well as maritime territorial disputes with China. The Japan Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF) operates four Boeing E-767 AEW&C aircraft with JTIDS and 13 E-2C Hawkeyes. Missile defence incorporates four FPS-5 and seven FPS-4 radar installations, six Aegis-equipped destroyers, plus a series of communications and imagery satellites. Money is being invested in a new X-band satellite network. Initiated in 2009, the USD935 million Japan Aerospace Defence Ground Environment (JADGE) system, centralised at Yokota, brings a wider upgrade to conventional air defence and ballistic-missile defence systems. JADGE is closely interlinked to US systems. A JSDF C4 Systems Command was established in 2008, while a far-reaching mobile communication network is promoting information sharing. However, the 2011 tsunami revealed communication capability gaps, leading to funding for the Next-Generation Field Communication System. The government stated the system “will enable the rapid creation of high-speed and wide-area communication networks and also be useful for disaster response.”

Moving to a different continent, two years ago the author witnessed Elbit Systems’ Battle Group and Below Command, Control and Communications (BGC3) system being trialled by Australia’s 7th Brigade. This forms part of the $300 million LAND 75/125 programme awarded in 2010, with full operational capacity scheduled for late 2013. The Israeli system has two core software components: TORC2H and Tactical Intranet Geographic Dissemination in Real-time (TIGER). BGC3 was first installed on Bushmaster vehicles and used a layer of Harris radios. Australia has performed a lot of engineering to make it work with non-Israeli applications such as Raytheon’s Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and Northrop Grumman’s Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system aboard Abrams tanks.

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has six Boeing E-7A “Wedgetail” aircraft, and initial operational capability was declared last November. The RAAF instituted the Project Vigilare Network- Centric Command and Control System (NC3S) under AIR 5333, with new installations at RAAF Bases Tindal and Williamtown. Boeing helped develop NC3S along with an Air Defence System communications network integrating data from 45 different land, sea, air and space interfaces. It commenced operations on 2 September 2010.

Across the Tasman Sea, New Zealand is acquiring a Defence Command and Control System (DC2S) to support high-level decision-making as well as joint operations. Delivery is expected in 2015-16. The Network Enabled Army programme will deliver most of the tactical C4I capability from 2013-33, though it needs a new communications network and strategic links via the Strategic Bearer Network Project.

India has high hopes for its Tactical Communications Systems (TCS) though, as usual, movement has bogged down. Two local companies – Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), and an L&T, Tata Power and HCL Infosys consortium – were shortlisted. An important step is a BMS for the Indian Army, but its delivery to a combat group is unlikely before 2015. Phase 2 should offer wider fielding of BMS from 2017-21, and the third phase would see upgrades in 2022-26. Total cost will be at least INR2.3 billion. It will also align with the Futuristic Infantry Soldier As a System (F-INSAS) programme.

The Combined Information & Decision Support System (CIDSS) has been stymied by the failed appearance of TCS as its key bearer. Last May the military ordered an investigation into the substandard CIDSS programme, though BEL is still working on it. CIDSS is one element of the army’s Tac C3I system, with other elements being the Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS), Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS), and Air Defence Control and Reporting System (ADC&RS). India is essentially pursuing a bottom-up approach because of a lack of tri-service cooperation.

Cisco Systems helped the Indian Air Force inaugurate its fibre optic-based Air Force Network (AFNet) in September 2010. Riding on its backbone is the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) that provides connectivity and real-time transfer of voice, data and images between aircraft, satellites, UAVs, aerostats and ground bases. It also offers a ballistic-missile defence capacity. The Israel-launched RISAT-2 satellite is crucial to India’s NCW capabilities, and the first element of the seven-satellite Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS) was launched in July.

Conclusion

Independent business analyst Vision gain calculated that the international C4ISR market amounted to some US $70.3 billion in 2011, or 5% of global defence spending. NCW is still undergoing growing pains around Asia-Pacific, with service interoperability one of the greatest challenges. This is complicated by the spectre of combined operations with allied nations that will require harmonisation of international technical standards. Architectural difficulties exist because various communication systems must be integrated into a unified whole, which is especially difficult where new equipment must be tightly integrated with legacy platforms. Regional nations are taking steps in the NCW direction, though few could be described as making great strides.

For additional reading on this topic please see:
Task Force Stryker Network-Centric Operations in Afghanistan
The Future of Milsatcom
Cyber Warfare