Dangerous Deadlock in Djibouti

Djibouti held national assembly elections on 22 February 2013. The election was unique in that it was based on a semi-proportional system. All previous elections were based on a majority system where ‘the winner takes all’, which guaranteed the ruling party People’s Rally for Progress (PRP) absolute domination. Throughout the independence period, the PRP and its small allied parties have thus ruled the county with an iron fist.

Another phenomenon that made the 2013 election unique was the degree of openness seen during the last weeks of campaigning. The opposition was given ample space in state media, TV, radio and newspapers to campaign. It was also permitted to hold several rallies. The rallies attracted thousands of people that perhaps came as a surprise and shocked the government.

For the last 36 years, since it got its independence from France in 1977, Djibouti has been ruled by two presidents. The president since 1999 is Ismail Omer Guelleh, who inherited the post from his uncle. He was able to run for a third six-year term in 2010 by changing the constitution. He has indicated that he will not run for fourth term when his current term ends in 2016. This induced some positioning for the office within the elite of the ruling party that was reflected in internal wrangling in the election.

Contested Outcome
Convinced by the strong turnout at its election rallies, the opposition United National Salvation (USN) was certain that it would win the election. So when the Independent National Election Commission announced the outcome and declared the ruling UMP as the winner, the USN screamed massive rigging and fraudulent election. The official result gave the UMP 80% and the USN 20% of the vote, translating into 43 and 22 parliamentary seats respectively.

The ruling party was quick to claim victory. It rejected the UNS’s accusations of fraud. The UMP lauded the election as free and fair and warned of inciting the public. International observers also declared it as free and fair. Nevertheless, many Djiboutians believe that the election was won by the opposition.

The Constitutional Council that is close to the president rejected the opposition’s claim of election rigging and endorsed the official results of the election. Some social groups, particularly women, still support the president. Under the presidency of Gueleh enfranchisement of women has improved. A fear that, if gaining power, the opposition supported by Islamist leaders would curtail women’s freedoms, might explain why women voted for the ruling party.

Strategic Ally
The government of Ismail Omar Guelleh is too important as a strategic ally for Western powers to criticize it. In spite of serious deficiencies with regard to basic universal values – pervasive violation of human rights and freedom of speech, recurrent and systematic repression, lack of democracy, and widespread corruption – Western criticism remains mute.

Its strategic location along the Red Sea-Gulf of Eden-Indian Ocean trade lane and the emergence of Global war on terror (GWT) and war against piracy off shores of Somalia has given tiny Djibouti disproportional regional as well as international leverage. The country is the main outlet to the sea of Ethiopia too.

Djibouti hosts several military forces (French, Germany, Spanish, NATO, AfriCom, Dutch, Operation Atalanta-EU, Japan, US Drones, etc.). The Camp Lemonnier military base hosts the largest fleet of US drones outside Afghanistan, deployed to strike targets in Somalia and Yemen. The military base has become a gold mine for the Djibouti government. The US pays $38 million annually for its use of the Camp Lemonnier; France also pays $39.5 million. This is beefed up by generous donor aid earmarked for friendly regimes.

Nonetheless, economic malaise, food insecurity, unemployment, huge inflation, abject poverty and corruption ravage the country. The revenue from the military bases and other aid sources is siphoned by the elite. Therefore the gap between a small elite and the masses is immense. This explains why the people are yearning for change.

Protests and Demonstrations
Following the official announcement of the outcome of the election, protests and demonstrations were organised. The USN rebuffed the outcome and resolved to express its objection through peaceful demonstrations in the capital city. The demonstration scheduled to begin at the Independence Plaza on 25 February was foiled by heavy police presence that sealed off the area, about 200 protesters remained stranded at the Bebel Bridge. Police used tear gases to keep protesters out of the Independence Plaza.

Following the demonstration 100 protesters and opposition leaders were arrested and at least six protesters were killed. Three opposition figures were convicted of inciting violence and creating chaos in the country and given 18 months jail sentences.

Three Islamist leaders of the Movement for Democracy and Freedom (MODEL), part of the USN coalition, were imprisoned. This assault on scholars of Islamist establishment has not only further complicated the situation, but also represents unprecedented escalation of the societal and religious division. So far there seems a consensus to exist along the political and social spectrum with regard to the preferability of secularism to political Islam. But this could change very quickly.

Social Division
Djibouti comprises two main ethnic groups. These are the majority Somali Issas that make up about 65 per cent of the population, the rest being the Afar;in terms of territory though, the Afar region constitutes the largest part of the country. Ever since independence the polity has been dominated by the Issas; all Presidents have been Issa men. The marginalisation and exclusion of the Afar has generated intermittent armed resistance since independence.

Many of the political parties are based on ethnic and clan affiliations that give the political cleavage ethnic and clan dimension. An additional phenomenon that characterised the 2013 legislative election is the division within the ruling majority of the Issa ethnic group. Indeed some observers claim that the contestation took place within the dominant Issa that was triggered by the succession struggle when the president steps downin 2016, if he ever steps down.

The division that manifested itself also has a class element. The poor saw the opportunity with the election to unseat the political elite that has amassed huge wealth at the expense of the majority. The level of poverty and the social cleavage between the few ‘haves’ and the overwhelming majority of ‘have nots’ is assuming dangerous dimensions. Unless promptly addressed the social cleavage could plunge the country into unrest.

Dangerous Deadlock
The opposition is yet to accept the election results; therefore a dangerous deadlock prevails. They have vowed to deny the government any popular legitimacy until the next election.

The government has labelled the opposition as spoilers and bent to turn the country into chaos and turmoil. Therefore the government is cracking down on the opposition. The opposition is feeling the heat, many opposition leaders are languishing in prison and the openness seen in the run-up to the election is virtually gone.

Following the month long repression popular opposition began to feel cowed. Popular disenfranchisement may however assume extra-judicial expression. If extra-judicial means of expression of political discontent is entrenched it could plunge the fledgling society into political turmoil.

In a region where political Islam has been on the rise, the arrest of Islamic scholars may also trigger a radicalisation of society.

For additional reading on this topic please see:
Conflict Trends (No 12): Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence, March 2013
Islamic Militancy in Africa
Elections, Politics and External Involvement in Djibouti