Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control

In April 2012 the emergence of the M23 rebel movement in North Kivu Province placed yet another obstacle on the road to disarmament and de­mobilization in the Democratic Repub­lic of the Congo (DRC). Kinshasa’s approach to neutralizing the myriad armed groups involved in the DRC’s wars has been one of demobilization paired with the integration of non­state armed groups into the DRC national army (Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC). M23 is a remnant of this approach and was formed by dissi­dent Tutsi FARDC soldiers who were formerly members of the rebel group, National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès national pour la défense du people, CNDP).

To better understand the issues that may arise in the future disarma­ment and demobilization of the M23 rebels, it is helpful to examine past experiences of disarmament, demo­bilization, and reintegration (DDR) in eastern DRC. To this end, this Issue Brief takes a retrospective look at the DDR process implemented between 2004 and 2011. In particular, it illus­trates how armed groups in North Kivu Province used mechanisms of organizational control to prevent the unauthorized demobilization of low­level troops. Here unauthorized demo­bilization refers to instances where combatants leave their armed groups without permission from their com­manders, either to return home or to enrol in a DDR programme. In this sense, unauthorized demobilization is synonymous with desertion.

The DRC’s national DDR pro­gramme ended in September 2011. Initiated in November 2004, the pro­gramme followed the signing of two peace accords—the Global and Inclu­sive Agreement on Transition in the DRC (2002) and the Dar es Salaam Accord (2003). A total of ten armed groups signed these two accords and were eligible to participate in the DDR programme. When the DRC govern­ment produced its National Plan for DDR in May 2004, it was estimated that 330,000 combatants, mainly from these ten groups, would be processed (DRC, 2004, para. 68). However, in early 2008 a further 22 armed groups signed peace agreements known as the Acts of Engagement. These armed groups were also incorporated under the DDR framework outlined in the govern­ment’s 2004 National Plan (HRW, 2008).

Despite the increased number of armed groups eligible for DDR, fewer combatants participated in govern­ment­led DDR programmes than anticipated. This is because the DRC government opted to directly integrate these 22 armed groups (or roughly 20,000 combatants) into the national army and police (World Bank, 2009, pp. 4–5). Between January and April 2009 approximately 12,000 former members of the CNDP and the Mai­Mai movement joined DRC army brigades in North Kivu through this ‘accelerated integration’ process. An additional 1,500 Mai­Mai combatants followed in July of the same year (Child Soldiers International, 2011, p. 5). Combatants directly integrated in this way did not go through a formal DDR process. This means that they were not screened, registered, or even given the opportunity to demo­bilize. In essence, even though 22 new armed groups became eligible for DDR after the Acts of Engagement, it was estimated that, because of accel­erated integration, only an additional 5,000 combatants would be processed through DDR (World Bank, 2009, p. 5).

This Issue Brief analyses disarma­ment and demobilization in the DRC by focusing on six armed groups. The Rally for Congolese Democracy­Goma (Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, RCD­Goma) signed the Global and Inclusive Agreement, and its combatants participated in the first round of government­led DDR begin­ning in November 2004. The five remaining groups are signatories to the more recent Acts of Engagement, including the CNDP, the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (Coali­tion des patriotes résistants congolais, PARECO), the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain, APCLS), Mai­Mai Simba, and Mai­Mai Kifuafua. The study examines members of these six groups who entered DDR and returned to ci­vilian life rather than those who were integrated into the DRC’s national army. Furthermore, it primarily covers the experiences of low­level combat­ants, including rank­and­file troops and junior commanders such as cap­tains, sergeants, and lieutenants.

Key findings include the following:

• The armed groups reviewed here mimicked the organizational struc­ture of a conventional national army. Low­level troops were closely monitored and the risks of being caught and punished for desertion were high. This meant that rank­and­file combatants were often wary of deserting in order to return home, or in order to try and reach an official DDR programme.

• The armed groups seem to have kept lists of their members and some groups also collected infor­mation on weapons stocks. These records could help DDR practi­tioners guard against situations in which commanders distort the number of troops and weapons under their control.

• It appears that increasing the amount of ‘one­size­fits­all’ economic incentives for DDR prompted at least some recalci­trant commanders to increase the severity of monitoring and punishment for deser­tion. When the organization of armed groups is similar to that of national armies, a more productive approach may be to grade DDR packages by rank in order to make them more attrac­tive to military commanders.

• DDR programmes arrived too late for combatants who deserted while conflict was ongoing. Better pro­tective measures for deserters, such as safe havens introduced prior to peace agreements, may have helped to prevent the re­recruit­ment of these individuals and may have also limited reprisal attacks against their family members.

Methodology

Evidence is drawn from in­depth interviews with 57 former combatants in the city of Goma, North Kivu Province. [2] These interviews took place during a three­month period in 2011 and a one­month follow­up trip in October 2012, and were conducted at the homes of ex­com­batants and at training centres and associations for the demobilized. [3] Some interviews were conducted individually, while others involved pairs of former combatants from the same armed group. These joint interviews allowed participants to directly dispute or corroborate the responses of their interview partners. In addition, individual interview responses were checked against other joint and individual interviews with other former members of the same group. Where possible, the interview data was also triangulated against the relevant literature.[4]

The interview sample included voluntary recruits and abductees, males and females, adult and child soldiers, those who participated in DDR programmes, and those who did not. It should be noted, however, that while the sample captures a diverse range of ex­combatant experiences, it should not be taken as representa­tive of all ex­combatant experiences in North Kivu, or even in Goma. The analysis that follows should therefore be treated as a first step in understanding the effect of armed group organization on disarmament and demobilization in the DRC.

A brief history of armed conflict in the DRC

The country now known as the DRC was ceded to Belgium on 15 November 1908. The fertile soils of the Kivu high­lands in eastern DRC soon attracted European settlers who were keen to profit from export­oriented plantation agriculture. To provide labour for the plantations, and beginning in 1926, Belgian administrators began to import workers from neighbouring Rwanda. Rwandophones (known as ‘Banyarwanda’) were present in east­ern Congo long before colonization; however, the arrival of this new wave of Bahutu and Batutsi immigrants sparked tensions with native inhabit­ants, who saw much of their custom­ary land taken and settled by the new arrivals.[5] Resentment was particularly high among the smaller local tribes, such as the Bahunde and Bayanga, who already felt marginalized by the majority Banande (Prunier, 2009, p.49). Tensions between natives and Rwando­phones over land rights, citizenship, and political representation became violent in late 1962 as the Banyar­wanda rose up to fight the Bahunde and Banande (Mararo, 1997, p. 521).

As this ‘Kanyarwanda war’ continued, an additional rebellion erupted in what is now South Kivu Province (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 13). This ‘eastern rebellion’ was fought by rebels known locally as the Simba (from simba, lions). The Simba believed in the power of witchcraft and utilized traditional medicine known as dawa during battle in the belief that the dawa would turn bullets into water and protect combatants from harm (Wild, 1998, p. 452; Jourdan, 2011, p. 93).[6] This tradition of war and witchcraft has continued in the DRC. In March and April 1993 groups known as ‘Mai­Mai’ (i.e. those using dawa or magic water) engaged in massacres of the Banyarwanda (Mararo, 1997, p.534; Lemarchand, 2009, p. 13; Jourdan, 2011, p. 94).[7] These groups were often ethnically based and were formed by local tribes—including the Banande, Bahunde, and Bayanga— who rejected the ‘foreign occupation’ of the DRC. Veterans of the Simba rebellion were among those fighting in these more recent Mai­Mai groups, including Mai­Mai Kasindien and Bangilima (Vlassenroot, 2001–02, cited in Jourdan, 2011, p. 94). The current incarnation of Mai­Mai Simba in North Kivu also traces its history to this earlier eastern rebellion.[8] Although technically part of a national movement, Mai­Mai groups have never been under centralized command and have often fought among themselves (Autesserre, 2006, p. 14). As illustration, in 1995 Bahunde, Bayanga, and Batembo combatants reportedly broke away from Mai­Mai Kasindien (composed primarily of Banande) to join Mai­Mai Kifuafua. These combatants complained that Mai­Mai Kasindien had discriminated against non­Banande combatants, using them as human shields (Mbinudle and Nzereka, 2007, p. 157).

The already tense situation between locals and Rwandophones was further upset when tens of thou­sands of Burundian Hutu refugees arrived in eastern DRC following the 1993 assassination of Burundian president Melchior Ndadaye. This precarious situation became explo­sive following the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, when roughly 1.2 million Rwandan Hutus crossed into North and South Kivu (Ndikumana and Emizet, 2003, p. 21). Among these refugees were Hutu genocidaires and former Rwandan soldiers who went into refugee camps in Uvira and Fizi in South Kivu Province, areas that have traditionally been home to the Congolese Tutsi Banyamulenge.[9] Vio­lence against the latter soon escalated as local ethnic groups colluded with the Hutu genocidaires in an attempt to drive out the Tutsi. Many young Banyamulenge had fought in the neighbouring civil war in Rwanda and were at this time part of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (Prunier, 1997, p. 4). Seeing that their former enemies had now assembled in South Kivu, they turned to the Rwandan government for help. In response, the Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian, and Angolan governments and South Sudanese rebel forces assisted in the formation of a new rebel group—the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo, AFDL). Led by Laurent Kabila, the AFDL was formed in late 1996 and brought together Banyamu­lenge and various anti­Mobutu ele­ments, including the Mai­Mai, with Rwandan forces.[10]

When the AFDL ousted President Mobutu in May 1997, Laurent Kabila proclaimed himself president of the newly renamed Democratic Repub­lic of the Congo. [11] When Kabila attempted to break free from the influence of his Rwandan sponsors, Kigali (with help from Uganda and Burundi) reacted by putting together a new rebel group to oust him. This group, the RCD, launched its armed rebellion in August 1998 and was supported by some, but by no means all, Banyamulenge.[12] The Con­golese Armed Forces (Forces armées congolaises, FAC) and the Mai­Mai fought against the RCD, which frac­tured less than a year later. From this point on the original RCD became known as RCD­Goma, while a new rebel group, the Ugandan­backed and Banande­based RCD­Kisangani­Liberation Movement (Rassemble­ment congolais pour la démocratie­Kisangani­Mouvement de Libération, RCD­K/ML), took root in Kisangani (HRW, 2001b, pp. 14–16). In December 2002 the Global and Inclusive Agree­ment committed all parties to the conflict to integrate their troops into a newly reformed national army, the FARDC (DRC, 2002). According to the DRC’s National Plan for DDR, these troops were to be given the choice of staying in the national army or demobilizing and returning to civil­ian life (DRC, 2004, para. 77).[13] The peace process was supported by the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC), which was renamed the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) on 1 July 2010 (UNSC, 2010b).

DDR in the DRC began in Novem­ber 2004 and a large majority of the armed group RCD­Goma was soon demobilized. However, two dissident RCD­Goma brigades refused army integration, forming a new armed group, the CNDP, in July 2006 (Stearns, 2008). Led by Laurent Nkunda, the CNDP was backed by Rwanda and claimed to be fighting to protect the Tutsi (ICG, 2007, p. 7). Local Mai­Mai groups soon re­emerged to counter what they saw as the foreign threat. These armed groups included PARECO, which was a coalition of Mai­Mai militias established on 3 March 2007.[14] Although technically under the overall command of General Lafontaine, PARECO combined dis­parate elements under the control of separate commanders. While Lafon­taine controlled PARECO’s Banande faction (henceforth referred to as PARECO­Lafontaine), PARECO’s Bahunde wing was led by General Janvier and its Bahutu faction by General Mugabo. Representatives from PARECO, the CNDP, Mai­Mai Simba, and Mai­Mai Kifuafua attended the Goma Peace Conference in early 2008 and signed the Acts of Engagement. However, General Janvier’s PARECO­Hunde faction refused to implement the agreement, arguing that the DRC authorities could not guarantee the security of land tenure for the Bahunde (UNSC, 2010a, para. 45). This faction formed the APCLS armed group in April 2008.

Implementation of the Acts of Engagement remained stalled until mid­December 2008, when Rwanda and the DRC reached a secret bilateral agreement to neutralize the CNDP’s military branch (ICG, 2009, p. 7).[15] As part of this deal, CNDP fighters would be quickly and directly integrated into the FARDC and deployed to fight the Rwandan Hutu group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, FDLR).[16] The vast majority of the CNDP did participate in this ‘accelerated integration’ process and went on to create parallel chains of command in the DRC’s national army (ICG, 2009). [17] Furthermore, because the option of accelerated integration was also extended to Mai­Mai groups, this meant that the overall number of combatants expected to join DDR programmes shrank from roughly 20,000 to 5,000 (World Bank, 2009, pp. 4–5). By September 2011, when DDR in the DRC officially ceased, the majority of combatants from the six armed groups analysed in this Issue Brief had either integrated into the FARDC or demobilized and returned to civilian life. However, roughly 300–400 APCLS combatants and 300–400 PARECO combatants remained active in North and South Kivu.[18] Scattered groups of Mai­Mai Kifuafua and Mai­Mai Simba combatants also remained at large. A short summary of these armed groups is provided in Table 1.

Table 1 Summary of reviewed armed groups

Size

Areas of operation

Aims

RCD/RCD-Goma

At its peak 17,000–20,000 fighters; now militarily defunct; the 81st and 83^rd brigades of RCD-Goma formed CNDP

Previously controlled North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and portions of Katanga, Kasai Oriental, and Orientale

Remove President Laurent Kabila; establish a democratic regime founded on popular legitimacy

CNDP

Vast majority now integrated into national army and police; CNDP had roughly 6,000 fighters in June 2010

Controlled the Masisi highlands between Ngungu and Mweso

Protect Tutsi community; protect the interests of local elites (land, cows, businesses)

PARECO

300–400 fighters

Loose groups operating from Kanyabyonga up to Beni

Protect indigenous communities from perceived Rwandophone/CNDP interests

APCLS

300–400 fighters

Masisi headquarters in Lukweti; also, Kilambo, Mutongo, Misao, Buboa, Butsindo, and Buhato

Protect Bahunde and Bayanga interests from perceived Rwandophone/CNDP interests

Mai-Mai Kifuafua

Scattered groups; mostly Batembo, Bahunde, and Bayanga

Southern Masisi territory

Protect indigenous interests against perceived Rwandophone interests; fought against RCDGoma and CNDP

Mai-Mai Simba

Scattered groups under various commanders living in Maiko National Park; mostly Bayanga and Bakubi

Walikale in Maiko National Park

Fights against ‘foreign invaders’, including Rwandan-backed rebel groups; traces its history back to the eastern rebellion in 1964

Sources: Internal MONUSCO document, September 2011; ICG (2000); HRW (2009); Stearns (2010)

DDR in the DRC

In December 2003 the DRC govern­ment established the National Com­mission for DDR (Commission nationale de désarmement, démobili­sation et réinsertion, CONADER) as the lead agency tasked with drafting and implementing the National Plan for DDR. The National Plan was adopted in May 2004 and was designed to deal with signatories to the Global and Inclusive Peace Agree­ment, including RCD­Goma.[19] Under the criteria set out in the National Plan, combatants were eligible to participate in a CONADER­led DDR programme if they were of DRC nationality, able to prove member­ship of an armed group recognized by the government, and either armed or in possession of a certificate of disarmament (DRC, 2004, para. 66). If combatants were not able to meet this latter ‘one weapon, one combat­ant’ criterion, then they were techni­cally unable to access the benefits on offer, including the choice of whether or not to integrate into the FARDC.[20]

The disarmament component of DDR typically consists of weapons collection, inspection, stockpile management, and destruction (UN DPKO, 2006, OG 4.10). Owing to the linkage between DDR and army reform in the DRC, working weapons collected during disarmament were passed on to the FARDC (Kasongo and Sebahara, 2006, p. 4). Defective weapons and non­transportable munitions were destroyed. After handing over a weapon, each com­batant received an official certificate of disarmament and was required to report to an Orientation Centre (Centre d’orientation, CO). Under the activities outlined in the National Plan, combatants were to have their military status suspended while at the CO (DRC, 2004, para. 96). They would then be given the choice of whether to demobilize and return to civilian life or enlist in the national army. Those choosing the former were to be issued with a formal card of demobilization, while those opting for the latter were to sign a document of commitment and be transported to a centre for military training and integration. At these centres individ­uals were expected to pass an aptitude test prior to joining a newly integrated FARDC brigade. If they failed the test, they were to be returned to the CO, formally demobilized, and returned to civilian life.

Citing an absence of funding, in June 2006, CONADER closed 18 COs and halted DDR (Kasongo and Seba­hara, 2006, p. 7). [21] Disarmament and demobilization remained stalled until a new administrative body—l’Unité d’Exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation, et Réinsertion (UEPN­DDR)—replaced CONADER on 14 July 2007. Following this administrative change, a second phase of DDR took place between July 2008 and December 2009, although ongoing conflict delayed the start of operations until June 2009 (DRC, 2010, pp. 11–12; Boshoff, 2010, p. 3). Activities related to disarmament and demobilization ceased in December 2009, by which point a total of 208,438 combatants had been processed since November 2004.[22] A total of 110,921 of these individuals opted for demobili­zation rather than army integration, and during this five­year period 118,548 weapons were collected (DRC, 2010, p. 11). After December 2009 com­batants still to be demobilized were to be dealt with under the DRC’s Programme de stabilisation et de recon­struction des zones sortant des con­flits armés, with support from the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy. Government­led reintegration activities continued, with a final phase running from July 2010 to September 2011.

The National Plan and army inte­gration continued to provide the basis for all subsequent caseloads of DRC combatants processed by the UEPN­DDR. Consequently, for mem­bers of the CNDP, PARECO, Mai­Mai Simba, and Mai­Mai Kifuafua, eligi­bility for a UEPN­DDR programme remained conditional on the ‘one weapon, one combatant’ criterion. In part, this weapons­driven approach was also utilized because of concerns that signatories to the Goma Agree­ment had vastly inflated the number of combatants under their command. Individuals unable to hand over a weapon were instead eligible for demobilization and community sup­port programmes run by the UN Development Programme (STAREC, 2009b, p. 2). Similarly, weapons pos­session also continued to influence integration into the FARDC. Combat­ants from the more recent UEPN­DDR caseload who had a weapon were eligible for accelerated integra­tion. Those unable to meet this requirement were instead eligible for a process known as ‘classic integration’. While this meant that these individu­als could still integrate into the national army, it was necessary for them to pass the aptitude test taken by earlier caseloads of combatants. In contrast, possession of a weapon meant that combatants bypassed any kind of formal demobilization and, by extension, any process of vetting and verification (World Bank, 2009, p. 4). In essence, arms possession became a fast track into the FARDC.

Disarmament: one weapon, one combatant

Adherence to the ‘one weapon, one combatant’ criterion has not been without controversy in the DRC. Following the Goma Conference in early 2008, DDR programmers feared that large numbers of combatants would be rendered ineligible for DDR under the National Plan (UNSC, 2008, para. 68; World Bank, 2009, p. 4). Interviews with ex­combatants indicate that this concern was not un­founded. Many groups, particularly those in the diverse Mai­Mai move­ment, did not possess the required ratio of weapons to combatants to ensure the eligibility of all their members. A former Mai­Mai Simba captain reported that a group of 30 combatants might have had only ten firearms between them.[23] Demobili­zation and army integration figures for South Kivu Province between April and July 2009 also indicate that of 2,500 declared Mai­Mai Simba combatants, 99 were registered for DDR under the National Plan (with arms), whereas 324 were registered for demobilization and community support (without arms). Similarly, 33 of these combatants were registered for accelerated integration (with arms) and 101 for classic integration (without arms) (STAREC, 2009a).

The situation was similar in other Mai­Mai groups. Former members of the APCLS reported that weapons were shared because there were not enough firearms to go around.[24] A former APCLS corporal added that those with a weapon would be given three magazines (90 cartridges) and would be expected to retrieve more during combat.[25] Weapons would be taken from prisoners of war and also from dead enemy fighters. Former members of Mai­Mai Kifuafua also reported that while they possessed many machetes, knives, and spears, it was not uncommon to find five soldiers with only one firearm be­tween them. Munitions in this group were also in short supply and training in the use of firearms and heavy weapons was sometimes inadequate or non­existent. A former Mai­Mai Kifuafua lieutenant explained that because individuals did not have suf­ficient training, some were killed attempting to use weapons they took from dead enemy combatants.[26] Con­sequently, this lieutenant took it upon himself to provide basic train­ing in weapons handling for his troops. A former Mai­Mai Simba captain similarly stated that a lack of military training was the reason why so many Simba combatants died during battle.[27]

Former combatants from the Lafontaine faction of PARECO also reported that there were not always enough weapons to ensure that every­one was armed. Firearms were in short supply, with combatants using machetes, spears, and even arrows. A former staff officer from this faction stated that the group did not have sufficient heavy weaponry to achieve its aim—defeating the CNDP.[28] A former PARECO­Lafontaine platoon commander also explained that in his group of roughly 15 people there were three firearms—one for himself and another two to be shared among the troops.[29] Reports regarding mili­tary training in this faction were mixed. A corporal and a second­lieu­tenant explained that ‘we took you [i.e. recruits], gave you a weapon, and sent you to the front the same day’.[30] However, other former PARECO­Lafontaine soldiers reported that they were taught how to use weapons. [31]

The situation regarding military training and arms distribution was very different in the CNDP and RCD­ Goma. Ex­combatants from both groups reported that firearms were readily available, although one former RCD­Goma captain indicated that there were problems with muni­tions shortages. [32] Each combatant fighting with either of these groups would be given a weapon before going into combat. A former CNDP first­lieutenant even explained how, prior to distributing weapons, a record would be kept. [33] The registra­tion number of the weapon would be written down next to the name of the combatant receiving it and the number of cartridges handed out to him would also be noted. When the combatant returned from his mission he would bring the weapon back to the depot. Off­duty combatants would deposit their weapons and only those on guard duty would keep their weapons in the camp. In RCD­Goma weapons were also distributed prior to combat and returned to the arms depot afterwards.

In terms of military training, former RCD­Goma combatants ex­plained that they learnt how to march, how to use a weapon, and how to dodge bullets. Ex­CNDP combatants also stated that they learnt the differ­ent parts of a weapon and participated in basic physical training consisting of army crawls and running. A former CNDP sergeant reported that he was taught not to leave bullets in the firing chamber of his rifle or to leave the chamber open, particularly when he was no longer engaged in combat.[34] The types of weapons that former members of RCD­Goma, the CNDP, and each of the Mai­Mai groups reported using in their armed groups are shown in Table 2.

Table 2 Types of weapons found in the armed groups reviewed

Group

Weapons reported by former combatants

RCD-Goma

Katyusha rocket launchers, armoured cars, machine guns, Uzis, rifles (including Kalashnikovs, R4s, and M16s), light artillery, revolvers, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)

CNDP

Machine guns and rifles (including sub-machine guns, MAGs, R4s, and Kalashnikovs), SPG-9 recoilless guns, RPG-7 rocket launchers, multiple rocket launchers

PARECO

Machine guns and rifles (including PK and Sterling machine guns, sub-machine guns, portable MAGs, and mini assault rifles), RPG-7 rocket launchers

APCLS

RPG rocket launchers, Kalashnikovs, grenades

Mai-Mai Simba

Machine guns and rifles (including Kalashnikovs and MAGs)

Mai-Mai Kifuafua

Machine guns, machetes, knives, spears, arrows, heavy weaponry acquired during combat

Source: Author interviews with former combatants

Demobilization and desertion

In a typical DDR framework disarma­ment is followed by demobilization. Demobilization occurs when combat­ants ‘delink’ themselves from a mili­tary command structure and return to civilian status (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007, p. 541). A demobilized individual should no longer respond to orders and no longer rely on a former commander to provide income, food, and other benefits through a military­style supply chain. Whereas mobili­zation is the process through which armed groups expand, demobilization is the process through which they downsize or completely disband.

Formal demobilization occurs when an individual participates in a DDR programme and is given official demobilization status, perhaps in the form of a demobilization card. The paths combatants take from their armed groups to DDR programmes can be very different. Combatants can sometimes report for DDR together with their commanding officer and other members of their military unit. Often, when commanders agree to enter DDR they will bring at least some of their troops to pre­arranged assembly areas, where the DDR process will begin. Alternatively, combatants may leave the group without authorization from a com­manding officer. This is similar to the idea of desertion used in many national armies and may occur long before DDR programmes are intro­duced. Combatants taking this route may simply go home and join a DDR programme when one becomes avail­able. Alternatively, they may opt not to join a formal programme and can be considered ‘self­demobilized’ (Uvin, 2007). It should be noted that these individuals may also skip the disarmament component of DDR and simply take their weapons home with them. In less common instances com­manders may authorize the release of troops while conflict is ongoing. [35] This may occur, for example, if a combatant is badly injured. These ‘early release’ individuals may also go home or, alternatively, report to DDR.

Between 2004 and 2007 combatants turning over a weapon to a government­run DDR programme in the DRC were entitled to an immediate ‘safety net’ payment of USD 110 for transportation and basic needs, a basic household items ‘kit’ valued at USD 30, and USD 300 in reintegration payments to be paid over one year. In 2007 this was changed slightly, with the ‘safety net’ payment increasing to reintegration payments increasing from USD 300 to USD 400. The extra USD 100 was given in kind, in the form of a bicycle (World Bank, 2012, pp. 5, 9, 47). In general the ex­combat­ant interviewees (both previously armed and unarmed) did not express animosity regarding the weapons­driven eligibility requirements for government­led DDR.[36] However, dissension was expressed by former child soldiers. A former child com­batant from RCD­Goma explained that:

Since we were demobilized we have received nothing. The ones who received something are those who handed in weapons. We are consid­ered as if we are not demobilized.[37]

This individual demobilized during the first round of DDR in 2005. Other child soldiers from PARECO, the APCLS, and the CNDP, who demobi­lized during the later UEPN­DDR­run process, also complained that they ‘received nothing’ or ‘only training’.[38] More generally, adult combatants from all six groups who were demo­bilized at different stages of the DDR process complained that their expec­tations had not been met. Many ex­plained how they had not received the money they were previously promised, while others stated that they were promised jobs, yet continued to be unemployed.

More specifically, the interviewees also highlighted that demobilized former members of RCD­Goma had been targeted by active members of the CNDP. An ex­combatant who quit RCD­Goma stated:

From CONADER I received USD 400 … the same day CNDP came to my place. They took the USD 400 and burned my eyes. Then they took me to Kitshanga, where I stayed for five months.[39]

Others had similar experiences, including a former captain in RCD­Goma, who explained: ‘we received money in the beginning, and then the rest of the money was stolen by the people from the CNDP.’ [40] Another former RCD­Goma soldier who demobilized with CONADER similarly recalled:

When I received the USD 100 it was at the same time that the CNDP became autonomous. They said that ‘we will arrest and kill the demobilized who are going out and abandoning us on the field of combat, because they are giving away our arms’. It was then that I was afraid to go back to Masisi. [41]

It is pertinent to note that not all the ex­combatant interviewees wanted to disarm and demobilize. Some, particularly former child soldiers who had served as personal staff to high­ranking officers, explained that their lives were easier as combatants than as civilians. As illustration, a former bodyguard to a CNDP major­general stated that he never tried to leave the group because his quality of life was very good. [42] Although he did not receive a salary, he was well provided for by the major­general. He ate well and did not have to sleep outside with the lower ranks. For similar reasons a former escort to Colonel Felly (APCLS) also reported that life in the group was easier than civilian life. Because this former escort was under 18 years of age, she complained that she was taken by DDR officers and ‘made to leave’ against her will.[43]

While some ex­combatants de­scribed the benefits of life in their armed group, many others described the difficulties, such as trying to live without pay or food. Several of the interviewees who complained of these hardships mentioned their desire to desert, but also their fear of punish­ment. [44] Most commonly, ex­combat­ants from RCD­Goma, the CNDP, and the Mai­Mai groups reported that the type of punishment meted out for desertion would depend on their commanding officers. A former Mai­Mai Kifuafua lieutenant also reported that the severity of punish­ment for desertion was stepped up after DDR programmes began.[45] This was presumably in order to deter desertion at a time when incentives were being offered to encourage it. Former combatants from PARECO­Lafontaine also reported that punish­ments for desertion were extreme, including public hanging or death by firing squad. Beating, whipping, and imprisonment were also common types of punishment reported by ex­members of the APCLS and Mai­Mai Kifuafua. A former APCLS corporal explained that deserters would be expected to serve a predetermined sentence in a makeshift prison, some­times a hole dug in the ground.[46] However, they would be released early if the enemy attacked and extra manpower was needed. A former CNDP first­lieutenant also stated that once deserters had been caught, they would be deployed to an area far away from where they were origi­nally based.[47] This was done in order to make it more difficult for them to attempt another escape.

In some cases it was possible for combatants to go on leave for a day or two if they received permission from their commanding officer. When this happened in the CNDP, precautions were taken to ensure that the combatant did not desert while having the opportunity to do so. [48] A former CNDP sergeant stated that he had the authority to issue a document stating that the combatant was officially on leave.[49] However, before the combatant was allowed to go, the registration number of his weapon would be recorded alongside the names of his mother, father, grand­father, and other family members. This was done to make it easier to trace the combatant if he failed to return. It was also to let the combatant know that failure to come back would endanger his family. A former RCD­Goma combatant reported that his parents were killed in this way when he had attempted to escape.[50] Mai­Mai Kifuafua and PARECO ex­combatants also stated that the relatives of escapees were likely to suffer reprisals.

Pursuit was also another common tactic used to force deserters to return to their armed group. A former Mai­Mai Simba captain reported that some­one who tried to escape would be caught, tortured, and re­enrolled.[51] A former CNDP sergeant also explained that combatants who were absent with­out authorization would be pursued until they were brought back to the base. Here they would be sanctioned. If necessary, the sergeant would travel to the missing combatant’s village and ask civilians to reveal where the deserter was hiding. One tactic was to approach children and offer them money in exchange for the informa­tion. A former RCD­Goma captain similarly explained how civilians would be approached to reveal the whereabouts of deserters.[52] This was because civilians could easily identify combatants from their military uni­forms. As pursuit was so dogged, a deserter formerly with the CNDP explained that ‘if MONUC had not helped me, it would have been neces­sary to join another armed group different to the CNDP’.[53]

Organization and surveillance

The ability to punish desertion is contingent on surveillance and detec­tion. A commander cannot punish a deserter if the escape goes unreported. In order to ensure that low­level combatants were monitored closely, the six armed groups were organized like a conventional national army. A typical national army organizes its personnel into smaller units—sections, platoons, companies, battalions, bri­gades, and so forth. Typically, each military unit will have an immediate commander in order to make moni­toring and surveillance of the entire army more manageable. In national armies, commanders of battalions, brigades, divisions, and corps typically delegate certain responsibilities to staff officers known as S or G officers (US Department of the Army, 1997). S officers help battalion and brigade commanders to manage information and make decisions, whereas G officers work at the corps and division levels. Typically there are five staff officers at each echelon, each of which is responsible for a broad field of interest. S1 (G1) officers are responsible for personnel, S2 (G2) officers for intelligence, S3 (G3) officers for operations and training, S4 (G4) officers for logistics, and S5 (G5) officers for civil–military operations. RCD­Goma, the CNDP, and the Mai­Mai groups also followed this system. Ex­RCD­Goma combatants reported that S1 officers were responsible for paying the soldiers, S2 officers were responsible for military intelligence and for guarding the military prison, and S3 officers were in charge of mili­tary planning. Members of the CNDP, RCD­Goma, PARECO­Lafontaine, and Mai­Mai Kifuafua also reported that S4 officers were responsible for managing the arms depot. Former Simba combatants similarly stated that the roles of S officers were the same as those in the FARDC, except that they were more often known by their functions rather than S1, S2, and so forth.[54] A former Mai­Mai Simba corporal also explained that although the organization of the group mimicked the design of the FARDC, the government did not recognize Simba ranks. [55] This was also true for members of other Mai­Mai groups who did not always have the level of military training appropriate to their rank.

S2 officers were particularly im­portant in detecting desertion because they were able to designate other combatants as ‘intelligence security’ (IS) agents. The role of an IS agent was to help the S2 monitor and detect potential desertion attempts among low­level troops. A former RCD­Goma member noted that a platoon of 12 people had its own intelligence agent responsible for monitoring the troops.[56] Former combatants from the Lafontaine and Mugabo factions of PARECO also stated that IS agents were present in sections and platoons. [57] These agents would report to the IS agent at the company level, who would then report to S2 officers at the brigade and battalion levels. Mai­Mai Kifuafua and APCLS combatants also reported similar organizational structures. [58] In addition to IS agents, troops could also report desertions to their imme­diate commanders. Denunciations were made because failure to do so could lead to accusations of complic­ity in a comrade’s escape. As a former corporal in RCD­Goma explained,

If they [the commanders] learned that you knew [about a desertion] and you did not denounce it within the prescribed period, and a third person saw you and denounced you, you would be punished and severely sanctioned.[59] These kinds of organizational structures meant that low­level troops could be kept under surveillance at all times.

The typical way for commanding officers to check for desertions among their troops was during military parades held each morning. A former PARECO­Lafontaine platoon com­mander stated that during PARECO military parades he was required to count everyone present and write a list of attendees in his morning report.[60] The report would then be passed on to his captain. In the report it was necessary to detail who was present, who was absent, and who was sick. If anyone was absent without cause, then the search for him would commence and a section of 24 combatants would be sent to locate the escapee and bring him back. Morning military parades also took place in RCD­Goma, the CNDP, Mai­Mai Simba, Mai­Mai Kifuafua, and the Mugabo faction of PARECO.

Conclusion

This Issue Brief has examined disarma­ment and demobilization in the DRC and underlined the means of punish­ment and surveillance employed to prevent combatants from deserting from their armed groups. The ex­combatant interviews show that RCD­Goma, the CNDP, and the Mai­Mai groups mimicked the organization of a conventional national army. This meant that low­level troops could be closely monitored, and also that the risks of being caught and punished for desertion were high.

While much writing on the DRC links participation in armed groups to profits from trade in natural resources, it is important to remember that not all members of non­state armed groups do well out of war and, in addition, not all want to fight (Enough Project, 2009; Spittaels and Hilgert, 2008; UNSC, 2010a). Abduct­ees, for example, may try to escape at every available opportunity. The analysis presented in this Issue Brief indicates that deserters were pursued by their former comrades. While safe havens, such as UN military bases, and accompanying sensitization campaigns are common during DDR, they arrive too late for those who prefer to leave their groups before these programmes are up and run­ning. Better protections for deserters may have helped to prevent re­recruit­ment in the DRC and may also have helped to curb reprisal attacks against the family members of deserters.

It is also important to note that the six armed groups analysed here were considerably more organized than is often realized. Indeed, while PARECO was a disparate collection of different factions under different commanders, some of these factions, notably the Lafontaine and Mugabo elements, seem to have had considerable organizational structure from the battalion level down. In the PARECO­Lafontaine faction and in the other five armed groups junior officers, including section, platoon, and company commanders, seem to have kept regular records of individ­uals in their units. Information on weapons stocks also seems to have been collected, typically by an S4 officer who was responsible for man­aging weapons and ammunition. If at all possible, getting hold of some of these records could help practi­tioners guard against situations in which commanders distort the number of troops and weapons under their control.

Furthermore, the analysis pre­sented has shown that brutal control mechanisms were used to deter de­sertion among low­level combatants. The presence of these mechanisms suggests that, in instances where armed groups are organized similarly to national armies, simply increasing the incentives for DDR may not encourage more combatants to dis­arm and demobilize. Slight increases in cash payments or vocational train­ing are not likely to have much of an effect when commanders pursue deserters until they return to the group. In contrast, increased incen­tives for DDR may actually prompt commanders to step up surveillance and punishment of desertion, thus encouraging troops to stay put. Increased incentives may also en­courage commanders to engage in further recruitment in order to siphon off a cut of the DDR benefits supposedly destined for their subor­dinates (UN DPKO, 2006, OG 5.30).

Practitioners have previously resisted grading DDR incentives to make them commensurate with low, middle, and high military ranks. [61] However, ranked incentive schemes may be necessary when commanders possess strong command and control over low­level troops. While the de­mobilization of an immediate com­manding officer does not guarantee that his troops will follow, it may at least provide low­level fighters with the opportunity to make a choice. Furthermore, if there is no obvious replacement for a commander, those left behind may worry that the next in line will treat them badly, prompting them to opt for the ‘safer option’ of DDR.

Box 1 The M23 Movement

The M23 movement was formed by veterans of recent armed conflicts in the DRC and neighbouring Rwanda, and in particular by members of the DRC’s close-knit Tutsi community in North Kivu Province. M23 refers to the peace agreement signed on 23 March 2009 between the Kinshasa government and the CNDP rebel group. This agreement stated that CNDP combatants would be integrated into the DRC national army and police force, that the CNDP would become a political party, and that the DRC government would work towards the repatriation of Congolese Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (DRC, 2009). By integrating the CNDP rebels into the national army, Kinshasa hoped to deploy former CNDP officers outside the eastern Kivu provinces and to ‘slowly wear down their chain of command’. [1] However, just as Kinshasa started to achieve this aim, former CNDP members began to organize army defections, first in January 2012, and then again in March and April (Stearns, 2012, pp. 42–44). On 6 May 2012 the army mutineers issued a statement announcing the creation of the M23 movement and denouncing the failed implementation of the March 2009 agreement. Former CNDP loyalist Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero acted as the group’s political coordinator, while former CNDP colonel Sultani Makenga led the group’s armed wing.

The M23 movement argues that former CNDP members did not receive the ranks, salaries, and government positions promised in the March 2009 agreement. The group also argues that the DRC government reneged on its commitments to repatriate refugees. While initially occupying territory in the former CNDP stronghold of Masisi (North Kivu Province), the mutineers headed to the border with Uganda and Rwanda in early May 2012. Two months later M23 took control of Rutshuru territory (also in North Kivu) and much later in the year descended on Goma, the provincial capital. The military occupation of Goma lasted 11 days (from 20 November to 1 December 2012) before M23 withdrew from the city to a buffer zone 20 km away. This military withdrawal was triggered by a peace accord negotiated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region that set the stage for direct negotiations between M23 and Kinshasa. These talks, held in Kampala, were in process in January 2013.

Box 2 Parades and codes of conduct

Military parades served a number of purposes for high-ranking officers in RCD-Goma, the CNDP, and the Mai-Mai groups. In addition to detectingdesertion and performing military marches and drills, officers used parades to transmit rules on how combatants should behave. At parades, high-ranking officers often read out written codes of conduct to lower-level combatants. These rules included prohibitions against desertion, but also dealt more generally with the theory and practice of being a soldier.

As illustration, a former APCLS corporal stated that at parades the troops would be taught how to use weapons and also how a true soldier should behave.[62] Regulations concerning conduct were transmitted verbally and included rules against stealing from civilians and wandering away from the camp. A former PARECO-Lafontaine platoon commander also remembered how parades were held each morning and could be held hourly if ordered by a higher-ranking officer. [63] He and a former captain from the same faction reported that a small book containing a written version of the military code was available only to individuals with ranks. The code was written in French and explained to officers in both Swahili and Lingala during classes. In turn, officers, including captains, lieutenants, under-lieutenants, platoon commanders, and company commanders, transmitted the rules to lower-level troops during morning parades.

A manual of military conduct also existed in RCD-Goma. A former captain in the group stated that there were close to 48 rules written in this manual.[64] Among these rules was one that stated that if you fire a bullet intentionally at your comrade without reason, you will be condemned. Stopping a civilian without cause was punishable by six months or more in prison, and rape was punishable by execution. This captain indicated that, above all else, combatants were supposed to protect civilians and their belongings. CNDP regulations against rape were similar. However, a former corporal explained that punishments for killing civilians were very lenient and would perhaps include whipping or a short stay in prison. [65] In contrast, killing another member of the CNDP would lead to execution. Members of Mai-Mai Kifuafua also stated that it was necessary to protect fellow members of the armed group more than civilians. As one former member reported,

we learned that instead of losing a comrade, it is better to lose between 101 and 720 [sic] civilians. An officer in the army is more important than civilians and more important than simple soldiers.[66]

Breaches of these codes of conduct, such as theft, attacks against civilians, and rapes did occur (HRW, 1998; 2004; 2008). As a former captain in Mai-Mai Simba put it:

we followed military regulations that we did not respect. We were told, for example, to protect civilians and their property, but because we had nothing to eat, we looted shops at night.[67]

The ex-combatant interviewees often justified their actions by stating that they were condoned in some way by the chain of command. One former RCD-Goma soldier stated that looting and rape were authorized by the commander. This interviewee argued that when arms were used abusively against civilians there was no punishment, because ‘all was done with the complicity of the commanders’. [68] Indeed, in all six groups the ex-combatant interviewees spoke of the importance given to obedience and hierarchy. As illustration, a former APCLS combatant recalled that during her time in the group, the following phrase was often repeated in Lingala: ‘discipline in armed groups means to obey all the commands given by your superior and to respect all forms of command.’[69] Two former RCDGoma corporals also reported that they followed only one rule: do what you are told by your superiors.[70] They said that regulations were for highranking officers and their (the corporals’) job was only to follow the orders given to them verbally at a particular moment. A former PARECO-Lafontaine corporal told a similar story: ‘if you had a bad commander, he would send you to steal.’ [71] If a rank-and-file combatant stole without authorization, this action would be severely punished. However, if a combatant refused to steal while under orders to do so, this was seen as insubordination and would be met with much harsher treatment. In this way, codes of conduct were broken while orders were obeyed.

Low-level RCD-Goma troops also described how commanders had much greater room for manoeuvre than they did. Two former corporals described how it was possible for commanders to write their weekly or daily reports in such a way as to cover up any indiscretions. [72] They gave the following example: if a commander killed one of his troops without motive, he would say that the soldier had been killed in action. A former RCD captain corroborated this when admitting that, if another captain broke the rules, it was possible for them to keep it between themselves.[73] A former Mai-Mai Kifuafua lieutenant gave a similar account.[74] If the lieutenant’s commanding officer wanted to rape a woman, he and his troops would secure the area until he had ‘finished his business’. Although rules prohibiting rape existed, the troops would not say anything because ‘a superior is a superior’and ‘is more important than civilians’.

Notes

[1] Confidential interview cited in Stearns (2012, p. 39).

[2] The breakdown of interviewees by group is as follows: RCD­Goma, 29 participants; CNDP, 7 participants; PARECO, 15 participants; Mai­Mai Kifuafua, 4 participants; Mai­Mai Simba, 5 participants; APCLS, 5 participants. It should be noted that some ex­combatants were members of more than one group.

[3] Interviewees were accessed by a simple snowball sampling method. See Cohen and Arieli (2011).

[4] Other ex­combatant interviews can be found in Jourdan (2004), Amnesty Inter­national (2003), and HRW (2001a).

[5] The name Banyarwanda literally means ‘those from Rwanda’ and is currently associated with Rwandophones from North Kivu. Some Banyarwanda were present in the Kivus long before coloni­zation, such as the Banyarwanda of Bwisha.

[6] Sometimes the dawa is referred to as mai.

[7] Mai­Mai literally means ‘water water’ (Wild, 1998, p. 452). Massacres of the Ban­yarwanda spread throughout Walikale, Masisi, and Rutshuru in North Kivu (Mararo, 1997, p. 534).

[8] Mbinudle and Nzereka (2007, p. 153) report that unlike the other Mai­Mai factions in North Kivu, the Simba use dawa, but not magic water (mai) to protect combatants.

[9] The Banyamulenge are Rwandophones from South Kivu Province. They were originally known as the Banyarwanda.

[10] See Reyntjens (2009), particularly Chap­ter 4. Uganda and Angola also supported the AFDL, which was officially founded on 18 October 1996.

[11] Congo was known as Zaire between 1971 and 1997.

[12] RCD­Goma announced its leadership on 16 August 1998. On Rwandan and Ugandan involvement, see ICG (2000).

[13] This process was known as the ‘tronc commun’ or common core.

[14] Unpublished internal MONUSCO docu­ment, September 2011; Mai­Mai Kifuafua also worked with PARECO.

[15] This deal was followed shortly afterwards by the 23 March 2009 agreement.

[16] The FDLR is a rebel group composed pri­marily of former Rwandan army members defeated in 1994 and Interahamwe militia. The group is based in eastern DRC and its stated aim is to take power in Rwanda.

[17] In September 2009 the World Bank (2009, p. 4) estimated the number of CNDP mem­bers in the FARDC to be around 6,000.

[18] Unpublished internal MONUSCO docu­ment, September 2011.

[19] Other signatory groups included: RCD­K/ML, Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie­national, Mouvement de libération du Congo, Mai­Mai, and the government army at the time, the FAC.

[20] The World Bank (2009, p. 4) also makes the point that this requirement was written into the statutes of the National Plan for DDR as one of its ‘key eligibility criteria’.

[21] CONADER had also been suspected of mismanagement and corruption. See Amnesty International (2006) and UNSC (2006).

[22] This aggregate number includes fighters from armed groups in the DRC’s troubled Ituri Province.

[23] Author interview with former Mai­Mai Simba captain, Goma, 20 July 2011.

[24] This was also corroborated by an internal MONUSCO document, September 2011.

[25] Author interview with former APCLS corporal/escort, Goma, 19 July 2011.

[26] Author interview with former Mai­Mai Kifuafua lieutenant, Goma, 8 August 2011.

[27] Author interview with former Mai­Mai Simba captain, Goma, 20 July 2011.

[28] Author interview with former S3 in PARECO­Lafontaine, Goma, 19 July 2011 (for an explanation of what an S3 is, see below).

[29] Author interview with former PARECO­Lafontaine platoon commander, Goma, 8 August 2011.

[30] Author joint interview with former PARECO­Lafontaine corporal and second­lieutenant, Goma, 15 August 2011.

[31] Author interviews with former PARECO­Lafontaine combatants, Goma, 16 July, 26 July 2011.

[32] Author interview with former RCD­Goma captain, Goma, 27 July 2011.

[33] Author interview with former CNDP first­lieutenant, Goma, 20 July 2011.

[34] Author interview with former CNDP sergeant, Goma, 19 July 2011.

[35] Uvin (2007) provides evidence of this in Burundi.

[36] This contrasts with the findings in Rouw and Willems (2010, p. 21).

[37] Author interview with former RCD­Goma combatant, Goma, 12 July 2011.

[38] Author interview with former APCLS corporal/escort, Goma, 19 July 2011; author interview with former PARECO­Lafontaine S3, Goma, 19 July 2011; author interview with former CNDP sergeant, Goma, 19 July 2011. This is consistent with the view that children are ‘released’ from armed groups and do not require ‘legal demobilization’.

[39] Author interview with former RCD­Goma and CNDP member, Goma, 2 August 2011.

[40] Author interview with former RCD­Goma captain, Goma, 3 August 2011.

[41] Author interview with former RCD­Goma member, Goma, 8 August 2011.

[42] Author interview with former CNDP sergeant, Goma, 19 July 2011.

[43] Author interview with former APCLS corporal/escort, Goma, 19 July 2011.

[44] Punishments for desertion are common in both irregular and conventional armies. See Minter (1989) on the Mozam­bican National Resistance and Amnesty International (2007) for a similar dynamic described by former members of armed groups in Ituri Province, DRC.

[45] Author joint interview with former Mai­Mai Kifuafua soldier and secretary/lieu­tenant, Goma, 22 August 2011.

[46] Author interview with former APCLS corporal, Goma, 19 July 2011.

[47] Author interview with former CNDP first­lieutenant, Goma, 20 July 2011.

[48] A study of the US Army shows that many desertions occur when combatants go on leave and do not come back (Rams­berger and Bell, 2002).

[49] Author interview with former CNDP sergeant, Goma, 19 July 2011.

[50] Author interview with former FDLR and RCD­Goma soldier, Goma, 4 August 2011.

[51] Author joint interview with former Mai­Mai Simba captain and corporal, Goma, 2 August 2011.

[52] Author interview with former RCD­Goma captain, Goma, 3 August 2011.

[53] Author interview with former RCD­Goma and CNDP member, Goma, 2 August 2011.

[54] Author joint interview with Mai­Mai Simba captain and corporal, Goma, 2 August 2011.

[55] Author joint interview with Mai­Mai Simba captain and corporal, Goma, 2 August 2011.

[56] Author interview with former RCD­Goma captain, Goma, 3 August 2011.

[57] Author interview with two former PARECO­Mugabo combatants, Goma, 18 October 2012; author joint interview with former PARECO­Lafontaine lieu­tenant­colonel and adjutant, Goma, 19 October 2012; author interview with former PARECO­Lafontaine battalion commander, Goma, 9 October 2012.

[58] Author interview with two former APCLS soldiers, Goma, 10 October 2012; author interview with former Mai­Mai Kifuafua sergeant, Goma, 19 October 2012.

[59] Author joint interview with former RCD­Goma corporal and sergeant, Goma, 15 August 2011.

[60] Author interview with former PARECO­Lafontaine platoon commander, Goma, 8 August 2011.

[61] Ranked incentive schemes are thought to reinforce the very chains of command they are trying to dismantle (author interview with DDR officer, Geneva, 10 February 2011).

[62] Author interview with former APCLS corporal, Goma, 19 July 2011.

[63] Author joint interview with former PARECO­Lafontaine platoon commander and captain, Goma, 8 August 2011.

[64] Author interview with former RCD­Goma captain, Goma, 3 August 2011.

[65] Author interview with former CNDP corporal, Goma, 2 August 2011.

[66] Author joint interview with former Mai­Mai Kifuafua soldier and secretary/ lieutenant, Goma, 22 August 2011. At this point in the interview military regu­lations were being discussed, so it could be that these very precise figures—101 and 720—were written down some­where, e.g. in a code of conduct.

[67] Author interview with former Mai­Mai Simba captain, Goma, 20 July 2011.

[68] Author interview with former RCD­Goma soldier, Goma, 4 August 2011.

[69] Author interview with former APCLS corporal/escort, Goma, 19 July 2011.

[70] Author joint interview with two former RCD­Goma corporals, Goma, 8 August 2011.

[71] Author interview with former PARECO­Lafontaine soldier, Goma, 11 July 2011.

[72] Author joint interview with two former RCD­Goma corporals, Goma, 8 August 2011.

[73] Author interview with former RCD­Goma captain, Goma, 3 August 2011.

[74] Author joint interview with former Mai­Mai Kifuafua soldier and secretary/ lieutenant, Goma, 22 August 2011.

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