Africa and the Global Market in Natural Uranium

Introduction

The actions of African countries will neither determine the number of nuclear weapons in the world, nor the identity of the countries that own them. But African countries have made a strong commitment to both preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting steps to their ultimate elimination.

While the primary responsibility for nuclear arms control and disarmament lie elsewhere—and first and foremost with the states that possess nuclear weapons— there are limited, but not negligible, proliferation risks associated with uranium extraction in Africa. Nevertheless, with a relatively modest investment, countries in the region, in cooperation with external partners, could reduce those risks— although they can never be entirely eliminated.

The changing nature of the market for uranium

Uranium is a unique commodity. It differs from, for example, coal, copper or iron because it is the raw material from which nuclear weapons can be made (see box 1.1). For decades the international market for uranium was highly predictable and was largely managed through stable, long-term bilateral agreements between sellers and buyers with long experience of working together. For the most part, the market was managed by a small number of countries with a shared commitment to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-armed states.

At the start of the 21st century, the price of uranium oxide on commodities markets was roughly $10 per pound ($22 per kilogram). Between 2005 and 2007, the price increased sharply—from roughly $20 per pound ($44 per kg) to almost $140 per pound ($311 per kg)—and at this price, uranium extraction became a much more attractive business.[1] Decisions taken at that time may mean that new sources of supply are likely to join the market in the coming years. In particular, many African countries have commissioned surveys and exploration to identify new uranium deposits that could be commercially viable if exploited. Based on the results, a number of states are currently reviewing whether or not investment in uranium extraction is justified.[2] New African suppliers of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) may enter the global market in the coming decade.

The rapid increase in demand for uranium in the 1970s was mainly to fuel civil nuclear power reactors in the Euro-Atlantic community. However, since 2005 many of the main markets for uranium have been in Asia, and so not only new suppliers, but also new centres of demand are appearing. The way in which the uranium market works has also been changing: it has become easier and more popular to sell uranium through the global commodities market.

Since 2007, the spot price for uranium has decreased again and is currently (as of November 2013) only $35 per pound ($78 per kg). [3] The volatile uranium market and low prices fit badly with the long-term operations and heavy investments required in the extractive industry. The market conditions have enhanced economic pressures on mining companies, which may translate into changes in ownership or corporate takeovers and also increase pressure on national authorities to create a business climate that attracts investors.

Box 1.1. Mining natural uranium and turning it into nuclear weapons

To constitute a nuclear proliferation threat, natural uranium needs to go through a challenging and time-consuming process of transformation as it moves through the nuclear fuel cycle.

Uranium extraction and milling

After natural uranium is extracted through mining it is usually processed into uranium ore concentrate (UOC), containing uranium oxide (most commonly U3O8, often called yellowcake, but also UO4). The uranium rock from an open pit mine will be milled—that is, crushed and ground into small particles—before being chemically leached to produce a liquid slurry in which uranium ore is concentrated. The residue is dried and packaged for shipment to a convertor.

Conversion

Uranium conversion is the process by which unirradiated nuclear material, or irradiated nuclear material that has been separated from fission products, undergoes changes to its chemical or physical form so as to facilitate further use or processing. At conversion facilities, UOC is transformed, using chemical processes, into either uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas that can be the feedstock for centrifuges at a uranium-enrichment plant, or into an intermediate product that is then further transformed into UF6. The conversion procedure will depend on the level of purity required in the UF6, something that will in turn be dictated by the specific needs of the enrichment facility.

Enrichment and reprocessing

Making nuclear weapons or nuclear fuel requires access to an isotope or a mixture of isotopes capable of nuclear fission; such fissionable material does not exist in nature. The isotope uranium-235 (235U, or U-235) is fissionable. The natural uranium extracted from the earth through mining and then concentrated into UOC contains minute quantities of the isotope U-234, about 0.7 per cent of U-235, and 99.3 per cent of U-238. For use in nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons, the percentage of U-235 in the UF6 has to be increased through enrichment. Low-enriched uranium (LEU) is uranium that has been enriched to less than 20 per cent U-235 (typically only 3–5 per cent). It is suitable for use in power reactors. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been enriched to contain at least 20 per cent U-235. While this is generally considered to be the lowest concentration that can be used in a nuclear weapon, weapon-grade uranium is usually enriched to over 90 per cent U-235.

Plutonium-239, which is produced through the atomic process that takes place inside the core of a nuclear reactor, is also fissionable. For use in weapons, the plutonium produced in a reactor must be separated from other reactor products and recovered by reprocessing the reactor fuel.

Sources: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Safeguards Glossary: 2001 Edition, International Nuclear Verification Series no. 3 (IAEA: Vienna, June 2002); and Glaser, A. and Mian, Z., ‘Global stocks and production of fissile materials, 2012’, SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013), p. 326.

The proliferation risks of uranium mining

States concerned about the potential implications of international transfers of proliferation-sensitive items have created mechanisms to help them regulate the spread of goods, materials and technologies that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons. The best-known effort is probably the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), in which participating states have coordinated national export controls on nuclear items since 1975 to reduce the risk that legitimate commercial trade will contribute to nuclear weapon programmes.

For a long time NSG participation was confined to a group of industrialized countries that accounted for almost all of the supply and demand for items especially designed and prepared for nuclear use. In the 1990s further consultation, among essentially the same group of states, led to agreement that international transfers of so-called dual-use items—not specially designed for nuclear use, but which could have nuclear applications—should also be screened against proliferation risk and approved for export by responsible authorities before leaving the jurisdiction of the exporting state. [4]

Over time, industrial development around the world has made both nuclear items and nuclear-related dual-use items more widely available. Even countries that are under close scrutiny because of international concerns over the way in which they are developing their nuclear programmes seem to be able to acquire sensitive items. Participation in arrangements like the NSG has expanded only gradually and still engages few developing countries.

A significant share—perhaps as much as one-third—of the UOC that is supplied to the global nuclear industry is provided by states that do not participate in the NSG.[5] South Africa is currently the only African country that participates in the NSG, and most of the significant UOC suppliers that are not members of the NSG are in Africa.

Although not all African countries participate in the NSG, they have all placed themselves under the global nuclear arms control legal acquis. However, there is convincing evidence that trade in controlled items also takes place between countries that are completely outside the international nuclear non-proliferation framework.[6] So far, the best efforts to create additional tools that could reduce or eliminate this trade—such as enhanced enforcement and interdiction efforts, the safeguards—do not seem to have had the desired impact. [7]

The main focus of efforts to reduce proliferation risk has been to further limit the spread of the industrial items and processes needed for the most sensitive stages of the fuel cycle—the enrichment or reprocessing that can turn uranium or plutonium into forms that could be used to make a nuclear weapon (see box 1.1).[8] However, despite the efforts by the countries that are most proficient in advanced nuclear industrial processes to construct ‘higher walls’ around the most proliferation- sensitive items, such items have become more widely available. This does not undermine the rationale for putting up barriers to proliferation. There is still a need for national export controls on nuclear items and nuclear-related dual-use items, and some have proved to be effective—for example, the acquisition of reprocessing technologies has been made difficult for proliferators. Efforts to further improve the effectiveness of export controls is justified, but experience suggests that a strategy based only on close monitoring of technology ‘choke points’ cannot, by itself, create a reliable barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

If measures to control transfers of particularly sensitive items are no longer effective barriers to proliferation, perhaps a more comprehensive regulation of the nuclear fuel cycle ‘from cradle to grave’ is needed. As countries of proliferation concern achieve proficiency in the most sensitive industrial processes, restricting easy access to uranium could be one part of a comprehensive and integrated approach to non-proliferation across the fuel cycle.

Equitable benefits from uranium extraction

The management of risks associated with uranium extraction in Africa takes place in a specific domestic and regional political and economic context. For many African countries, extractive industries represent a significant economic activity. However, the sector also presents a paradox that was summarized in 2010 as follows: ‘although the continent is strongly endowed with mineral resources, mining has not been the consistent engine of economic development that people in many countries have hoped for’.[9] There is a strong feeling in African countries that the benefits of extractive industry have not been shared in a fair way in the past, as well as a determination to bring about a more equitable distribution in the future.[10] The concern over fairness has recently been reflected in the work of bodies such as the Group of Eight (G8) advanced industrial states. The 2013 G8 Summit focused on promoting global fairness through trade, taxation and transparency, and prominent issues on the agenda included facilitating trade in Africa while promoting greater transparency regarding the revenues from extractive industries and forestry.[11]

This strategy has three elements that are relevant to all mineral extraction, including uranium.

First, African countries are seeking new partnerships to complement and balance long-standing cooperation arrangements. For example, the rapid increase in Chinese investment in Africa has been the focus of a lot of attention.[12] The Chinese engagement in Africa has extended to the uranium-extraction industry.

Second, African countries are rebalancing long-standing cooperation arrangements in ways that maximize the economic benefits from extraction industries— from which uranium extraction is not excluded. For example, in September 2013 the Nigerien Government initiated an audit of uranium mines operated by the French company Areva in preparation for negotiation of a new long-term agreement to govern uranium extraction. [13]

Third, over time African countries are trying to increase the capacity for local companies to take responsibility for extraction, rather than depending on foreign mining companies. Recent reports suggest that African countries will increasingly use legislation to require foreign companies to educate, train and employ local staff in key positions in their African operations. Legislation will also compel significant local shareholding (although the share varies from country to country) in African operations.[14]

The main drivers of change in the extractive industries are not related to uranium extraction, which is a relatively minor economic activity in comparison to the mining of other minerals. These changes may have potential consequences for nuclear non-proliferation if new owners and operators that become active in the sector have an incomplete understanding of proliferation risk. However, the people whose decisions will ultimately shape the future of the uranium extraction industry are, first and foremost, motivated by local factors linked to economic development, not international security.

The following chapters of this Policy Paper examine proliferation risks associated with the uranium-extraction industry more closely (chapter 2), provide an overview of uranium extraction in Africa (chapter 3), and describe and analyse the current legal framework for reducing proliferation risk in Africa (chapter 4). The final chapter draws conclusions about the adequacy of the current framework and suggests ways in which it could be improved.

2. Uranium extraction and proliferation risk

In conducting the field research for this Policy Paper in Africa, one question that was posed fairly frequently was why Africa should be in focus at all, given that the main nuclear proliferation risks are associated with parts of the nuclear fuel cycle that do not exist in Africa. African countries have made a strong commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons through their participation in key international agreements, both global and regional (see chapter 4).

African countries have also lent their support to recent initiatives to reinvigorate the process of nuclear arms reductions, leading eventually to complete nuclear disarmament. For example, 11 of the 21 members of the Group of 21 non-aligned states in the Conference on Disarmament (the only permanent multilateral negotiating body focused on disarmament) are African states. Having strongly disassociated themselves from nuclear weapons, African countries have a clear interest not to take any action that could contribute to the acquisition of these weapons by countries that do not have them, or to increase the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in countries that do.

The proliferation risks that African countries are most likely to be exposed to can be briefly summarized as follows.

First, there is a risk that uranium will be supplied to a nuclear programme of proliferation concern with the knowledge and consent of the supplier state. This could happen if the state exporting the UOC does not carry out a satisfactory proliferation risk assessment, or if the state receiving the UOC does not have adequate safeguards in place or if its safeguards are implemented and interpreted in ways that facilitate proliferation. It could also happen if the legal provisions in agreements granting mining concessions are inadequate.

Second, there is a risk that uranium will be supplied to a programme of nuclear proliferation concern without the knowledge or consent of a supplier state. This could happen if, for example, uranium is supplied as a by-product from another type of mining activity. Uranium is one of the most ubiquitous elements in the earth and can be recovered from many different sources. The most common approach is to seek out rocks where the uranium content is high enough (and the extraction costs low enough) to make recovery profitable. However, uranium can be obtained as a by-product from mining other minerals, notably gold, or from industrial processes associated with, for example, the fertilizer industry, the ceramics industry and the manufacture of modern electronic devices (see chapter 3). If authorities are unaware that uranium is being exported, they will not have systems in place to regulate it.

A third risk is that uranium could be diverted from legitimate purposes to the illicit market. This could happen if the security arrangements at sites where uranium is extracted are inadequate. The theft of uranium in relatively small quantities but over an extended period could create a stockpile outside the knowledge and control of regulators. Another potential risk could be the loss of a shipment of uranium during transport, either on land or at sea.

After describing in the following section what happens to uranium once it leave the mine, the subsequent three sections focus on the three risks outlined above.

The flow of uranium during commercial transactions

The commercial relationships within the uranium sector have tended to work through stable long-term agreements between the companies that extract uranium and produce uranium ore concentrate on the one hand and the companies that own and operate nuclear power plants on the other. [15] While the specific terms of long-term uranium supply agreements are commercially confidential, it is believed that the price is normally based on the average market price for uranium over a given period, combined with an agreed price inflator applied over the duration of the contract. As a result, seen from the perspective of uranium suppliers, the customer base has not changed much over several decades.

For the most part, the companies engaged in generating electricity using nuclear reactors prefer to buy each of the different services that are needed along the supply chain—conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication (see box 1.1)— separately in order to secure nuclear fuel. This approach allows the final customer to control costs and also maximizes security of fuel supply.

Customers have a strong interest in security of supply and want to be absolutely certain that they will get their fuel according to a firm schedule. In recent years the fluctuating price of uranium has awakened the interests of commodity traders and the spot market, which used to supply about 5 per cent of total global demand, has increased its share. However, it still only accounts for 10–20 per cent of uranium sales. [16] Because of the negative consequences of disruption in fuel supply, long-term contracts are likely to stay as the dominant model because of the stability they provide for the buyer and the seller.

With the full understanding of the supply chain that this approach ensures, a power company is able to tell the uranium-extracting companies how much UOC to deliver to which converter and when. Although the company operating a power plant is the customer, uranium-extraction companies have a close relationship with the converter, where the physical delivery of UOC takes place.

After a supplier delivers the agreed amount of UOC, the converter weighs the shipment and measures the concentration of uranium in it. Based on the results, the converter credits the account of the supplier with a given quantity of uranium.

The final customers of the uranium may have preferences for UOC from certain sources. For example, customers in Japan insist on uranium from Namibia because the purchase agreement is considered to be part of Japan’s development assistance to Africa. In contrast, the USA has put in place rules governing the origin of uranium in an attempt to protect US uranium mines from unfair competition.[17]

A uranium-supply contract is likely to commit a UOC supplier to make a goodfaith effort to supply uranium from a specific source. However, this is probably not a rigid condition because of the risk that an unexpected event (e.g. a mining accident, flooding at a mine or a transportation failure) could disrupt the fuel supply. Moreover, uranium becomes completely fungible during conversion. The contract between a converter and the final customer will obligate the converter to deliver a specified amount of feedstock (uranium hexafluoride, UF6) to the next point in the fuel cycle—an enrichment plant. In order to produce feedstock to the specifications required by the enrichment plant and to maximize the efficiency of the industrial process, the converter organizes the flow of material based on the chemical properties of the material that it has on site (possibly from a variety of sources mined by a variety of companies in a variety of countries). This makes it impossible for the uranium supplier to be confident that any commitment to supply the ultimate customer with uranium from a specific source is being implemented.

In addition, uranium suppliers also engage in various kinds of swap to meet their contractual obligations. Swapping uranium could be necessitated by a disruption in production that delays or prevents delivery from a specific source. In these cases a mining company may be forced to take material from inventory elsewhere in the company to make sure that it meets its contractual obligations. If necessary, the supplier might buy uranium, either on the open market or directly from another mining company, rather than miss a delivery to a converter. Swapping may also occur when it is convenient for suppliers to cooperate in order to reduce their costs. For example, if in a hypothetical case Converter A has a supply contract with Supplier X and Converter B has a contract with Supplier Y, it may be more convenient (due to e.g. location, transport costs, etc.) for Converter A to receive its uranium from Supplier Y and Supplier X to make a reciprocal shipment to Converter B.

Contractual guarantees on the origin of uranium are therefore met through a bookkeeping exercise based on material accountancy (tracking quantities and crediting or debiting uranium accounts accordingly), and not a physical exercise based on monitoring the movement of the actual material itself through the fuel cycle. Principles of equivalence and proportionality are applied so that equivalent quantities of material are designated to be of a particular origin for purposes of accountancy. These equivalent quantities, which would be of the same quality and concentration as the original material that entered the fuel cycle, would then be tracked through the different stages of processing. Thus, uranium designated as being of African origin may in fact have been swapped or mixed with uranium from, for example, Australia or Kazakhstan.

Uranium supply to a programme of proliferation concern

The first category of proliferation risk is that uranium will be supplied to a nuclear programme of proliferation concern with the knowledge and consent of the supplier state. Not all the states that have developed a complex nuclear fuel cycle have naturally abundant uranium. This has created a global market for uranium that is relatively free compared with the market for sensitive technologies. For example, as noted in the introduction, the proliferation risks associated with uranium extraction attract relatively little attention compared to processes further along the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium conversion and enrichment.

Making sure that shipments are delivered safely and securely to the converter is one of the principal responsibilities of the state from which UOC is exported and the UOC-exporting company. Assessing the non-proliferation credentials of the converter will be a key task of the exporter to ensure that proliferation risk is minimized. One factor that will weigh heavily in that assessment is the country in which the conversion facility is based, in particular the standing of that country in relation to international arms control and non-proliferation norms and agreements. Another important factor will be the level of confidence that the converter has procedures in place to ensure that its products are only supplied to enrichment facilities that enrich uranium for peaceful uses.

There are relatively few companies or facilities in the world that offer uranium-conversion services, and most of these facilities are located in countries that have nuclear weapons.[18] A number of countries that do not have nuclear weapons also provide conversion services or have conversion plants located on their territory. However, those include countries, such as Brazil, that have explored the feasibility of producing nuclear weapons in the past and that still use enriched uranium for military uses, as fuel for a future generation of nuclearpowered submarines.

Given that converters are often located in countries that have a military dimension to their nuclear programme, there will always be some risk that nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful use. In a number of countries that possess nuclear weapons the risk of diversion is currently low because nuclear arms reductions have released significant amounts of weapon-usable fissile material. These countries currently have no need for additional weapon-usable fissile material, because existing stockpiles are more than adequate for any anticipated military requirement. [19] However, this is not true in all nuclear-weapon possessing states and cannot be guaranteed to be the case in the future in any of them.

The way in which uranium moves through conversion means that it is a complicated exercise for an exporter to understand whether its uranium will be supplied to a country that possesses nuclear weapons. To the extent that the information needed to make that judgement exists, it is held further along the nuclear fuel cycle. Moreover, even if uranium were supplied to a country with nuclear weapons, it would be difficult for the original supplier to be certain that it went to a peaceful, as opposed to a military, purpose. In interviews with SIPRI researchers, the governments of Malawi and Namibia reported that they have no means of tracking uranium once it is in the conversion facility.[20] Since the uranium is blended with uranium from other places in the conversion facility, the view is that following uranium beyond the conversion facility is not possible. However, one Namibian senior official said Namibia would welcome assistance on this issue.[21]

Supplies to India

At present, the outcome of ongoing deliberations in several countries over whether or not uranium can be sold to customers in India is the factor that could have the most important implications for traditional uranium suppliers. Given India’s plans to increase the proportion of nuclear energy in its overall energy supply, most traditional uranium-extraction companies would want to be active in that market, provided that commercial activities do not compromise nonproliferation objectives.[22]

Several states have entered into bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with India, including Argentina, Canada, France, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mongolia, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA.[23] Negotiations are ongoing with Australia and Japan.[24] India’s agreements with Canada, France, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Russia reportedly include supply of uranium. The France–India agreement reportedly includes provisions for the supply of 300 tonnes of uranium to India, whereas the Russia–India agreement includes uninterrupted uranium supply.[25] Given these agreements, it is difficult for the African countries that deliver UOC to converters in Canada, France and Russia to be certain that India will not be the ultimate destination of their uranium. The degree of confidence would be highest in uranium-supplier countries that have a full picture of how uranium moves through the fuel cycle, rather than limiting the scope of their monitoring to delivery of UOC to the converter.

Three of the countries that have reached agreement on uranium supply to India—Argentina, Kazakhstan and Mongolia—are members of nuclear weaponfree zones. [26] The terms of the nuclear weapon-free zone treaties are rather consistent on the conditions of uranium supply. These three countries have decided that uranium supply to India is consistent with their nuclear weapon-free zone obligations. However, African countries have generally reached the opposite conclusion— that uranium supply to India would not be consistent with their obligations under the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba (see chapter 4).

India and Namibia signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 2009, although Namibia has yet to ratify it. [27] While the agreement reportedly includes uranium supply from Namibia to India, in an interview with the authors in March 2013 Namibian authorities denied that the agreement granted India any automatic right to purchase uranium.[28] Exports from Namibia to India would require separate authorization. [29]

In South Africa, primary legislation—the 1999 Nuclear Energy Act—imposes conditions on supply of uranium. [30]30 Source material (including UOC) is only to be supplied to a nuclear weapon state on the condition that the material and equipment concerned is to be used only for peaceful purposes.[31] Source material can only be supplied to a non-nuclear weapon state on the condition that the material and equipment concerned will be subject to comprehensive international safeguards at all times. Under the current interpretation of the Nuclear Energy Act by the responsible authorities in South Africa, uranium supply to India is precluded.

The reputation of a country like Canada—with a long engagement in nonproliferation risk management—may be damaged by the nature of its agreement with India, which allows supply of uranium. If Australia, with a similar profile, also decides that sales to India can be managed at acceptable levels of risk, it could send a strong signal to other suppliers, including those in Africa, that supplying uranium to India is acceptable. [32]

Supplies to Pakistan and China

Like India, Pakistan is both increasing the size of its nuclear weapons arsenal and making ambitious plans to increase the contribution that nuclear power makes to generating electricity. China is a third country that both has nuclear weapons and is expanding the role of nuclear energy in providing electricity. Approaches to uranium supply to Pakistan and China are sharply differentiated, and both cases contrast with the case of India described above.

It appears that no country is negotiating agreements for uranium supply to Pakistan. However, China—a long-standing partner in Pakistan’s civil nuclear energy programmes—claims that its supply of uranium to Pakistan in the form of fuel for nuclear reactors is consistent with its non-proliferation commitments.[33]

China itself is an important customer for many uranium suppliers because of the scale of its plans for generating electricity using nuclear power. It is a nuclear weapon state as defined by the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and therefore different obligations pertain to uranium supply to China from the perspective of uranium suppliers.[34] However, given the general commitment of uranium suppliers not to take any action that assists or encourages research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons, a supplier must consider how confident it can be that its uranium will not be used in China’s military nuclear programmes.

Supplies to other countries

At different times, the level of proliferation concern raised by certain countries has changed.[35] As noted above, proliferation concerns around Brazil used to be much higher than they are today, and the same applies to Argentina and South Africa. In contrast, concern over nuclear weapon proliferation in Iran used to be relatively low, but today it is the centre of a great deal of attention largely because of the way in which it has developed its nuclear fuel cycle.[36]

As the situation can change over time, a uranium-exporting country needs to have the necessary legal powers to modify UOC export arrangements if necessary. This would not only apply to the legal powers of national authorities, but also the powers available to mining companies if, for example, proliferation concerns related to a foreign shareholder grow to the point at which the risk of continuing UOC supply is considered too high.

The need to ensure that adequate legal powers exist to exclude foreign shareholders from a uranium project is becoming a mandatory requirement on states. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 of 2010 imposed new restrictive measures in response to the proliferation concerns arising from the Iranian nuclear programme.[37] One of the resolution’s provisions is that ‘Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology’.

[Table 2.1: see Image.177159]

At present a mining company may accept investment from any country other than Iran either into the parent company or, if it is operating internationally, into one or more affiliates in other countries. However, Resolution 1929 suggests that companies need to be aware of the current risk posed by investors and recognize that countries considered safe investors today may represent a proliferation risk in future. Therefore, mining companies need to develop internal rules, and mechanisms to enforce them, that minimize any proliferation risks that they identify. National laws need to protect companies from potential legal action by investors if the conditions of their investment change based on a new proliferation risk assessment.

In the final analysis, it will be for a uranium-exporting country to decide how much risk to accept. However, a systematic and sustained process for proliferation risk assessment is necessary.

Uranium supply outside the framework of current regulations

The second category of risk is that uranium supply may take place inadvertently, and outside the existing rules. Uranium extraction can be a side activity connected to, for example, gold mining or the extraction of phosphates (see chapter 3). Advances in technology are also making it commercially viable to recover residual quantities of uranium from what was previously regarded as waste material. At the extreme, uranium can be extracted from seawater, and while the cost of doing this has been a barrier to commercial exploitation, future developments may reduce those costs. [38] The governance system for uranium should therefore be under continuous review to ensure that all activities that could lead to uranium extraction are covered, not only those where uranium extraction is the main stated objective.

There are a number of unconventional resources from which uranium is only recoverable as a minor by-product. The total amount of uranium in unconventional resources is estimated to be about 22 million tonnes—three times the volume of identified conventional resources (defined as reasonably assured resources and inferred resources).[39] Unconventional sources have different uranium concentration levels (see table 2.1). The sources with the highest uranium concentrates are monazite and tantalum concentrates, which have many applications in ordinary commercial products, such as electronic devices, ceramics and tiles.

Significant amounts of uranium have been recovered from phosphate rocks in the past, and the world’s largest reserves of phosphate rocks are located in North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean (see chapter 3). Uranium has also been extracted from tantalum concentrates and mineral sands. Although unconventional resources are currently not a major source of uranium for civil nuclear purposes, they could be used increasingly in the future. Some projects are already in development to explore commercial uranium extraction from these sources.[40] It is important that all actors involved in activities that could lead to the recovery of uranium from unconventional sources are aware of the potential proliferation risks. As a first step, national authorities need to undertake a comprehensive survey of all activities taking place in their territory that could lead to uranium recovery. Once these activities are identified, they—along with all of the actors involved—need to be incorporated into the national proliferation risk assessment. The authorities then need to put mechanisms in place to mitigate any identified risks. Loss of custody and failures of physical protection A third category of risk is that uranium ore concentrate could be diverted, either from the site where it was processed or during transport, so the legitimate owners no longer have control over it or how it is used. There is therefore a need for physical protection of the ore concentrate at both mining and milling sites and during transport to reduce the risk of diversion.

UOC is usually produced at facilities close to mines—often at the mining site itself—to avoid the cost and inconvenience of transporting large quantities of heavy ore in raw form to a processing plant. The UOC is then usually packed into standard 205-litre steel drums, which, in turn, are put into standard 20-foot ISO freight containers (c. 6 metres long) for onward movement by road, rail or sea for further processing. [41]

The loss of custody of a full container during transport would be a serious proliferation risk in itself. There does not appear to be a fully standardized approach to the transport of drums of UOC.[42] The weight of each drum also appears to vary, from 372 to 400 kilograms.[43] The minimum proportion of uranium in the ore concentrate in the drum is 65 per cent, and in most cases will probably be much higher.[44]

In a scenario where one freight container carries 43 drums, each containing 400 kg of UOC with 85 per cent uranium content, the container will be carrying roughly 15 tonnes of natural uranium. Using these assumptions, which seem reasonable, each such freight container contains what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers to be enough uranium to produce, after conversion, enrichment and fabrication, one or possibly two nuclear explosive devices.[45] The IAEA considers a 25 kg quantity of 90 per cent highly enriched uranium (HEU) to represent the minimum amount of fissile material that, if diverted from peaceful purposes, could be used without further chemical separation or enrichment to manufacture a nuclear explosive device.[46]

From the brief discussion above, it can be concluded that the activities taking place in Africa do carry some proliferation risk, even though few African countries have an advanced nuclear fuel cycle as of today. The degree of risk should not be exaggerated. There is no evidence that African countries play any role in the programmes of countries that are armed with nuclear weapons. However, as more African countries become uranium suppliers, and if countries of nuclear proliferation concern diversify their sources of supply, there is a need for both vigilance and mitigation of proliferation risks.

[1] For a historical time series of uranium oxide prices see InvestmentMine, ‘Historical uranium prices and price chart’, .

[2] As many as 15 African countries have uranium resources considered to be of commercial importance— i.e. they either make a significant contribution to the economy now or are likely to do so in the future. The countries are Algeria, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Africa and Zambia. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘Natural resources’, The World Factbook (CIA: Washington, DC, 2013), .

[3] Ux Consultancy Company, ‘UxC nuclear fuel price indicators’, .

[4] On the history and development of the NSG see Anthony, I, Ahlström, C. and Fedchenko, V., Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, SIPRI Research Report no. 22 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007).

[5] See table 3.1 below.

[6] Squassoni, S. A., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress RL31900 (US Congress, CRS: Washington, DC, 11 Oct. 2006).

[7] E.g. despite the restrictive measures in place to reduce proliferation risks posed by the nuclear procurement activities of North Korea, it was able to acquire, install and operate centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Kile, S. N., ‘Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation’, SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010), p. 392.

[8] The most important suppliers of nuclear technology have recently agreed guidelines to restrict access to the most sensitive industrial items, in the framework of the NSG. Bauer, S., ‘Developments in the Nuclear Suppliers Group’, SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2012).

[9] Bardouille, P., Hamblin, A. and Pley, H., ‘Mining: unearthing Africa’s potential’, McKinsey & Company, June 2010, .

[10] E.g. Greve, G., ‘Equal sharing of resource revenues essential for African stability’, Mining Weekly, 13 July 2012.

[11] G8 Lough Erne Summit 2013, ‘Lough Erne declaration’, 18 June 2013, .

[12] According to one recent report, Chinese official statistics record a growth in Chinese investment in Africa from $75 million to $1.5 billion between 2003 and 2007. Zadek, S. et al., Responsible Business in Africa: Chinese Business Leaders’ Perspectives on Performance and Enhancement Opportunities, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper no. 54 (Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government: Cambridge, MA, Nov. 2009), p. 8.

[13] Flynn, D. and Massalatchi, A., ‘Niger audits Areva uranium mines, seeking better deal’, Reuters, 20 Sep. 2013.

[14] KPMG Africa, Mining in Africa: Towards 2020 (KPMG: Johannesburg, 2012).

[15] Generic models of uranium purchase arrangements are described in Mulholland, J. P., Hering, J. and Martin, S., An Analysis on Competitive Structure in the Uranium Supply Industry, Staff Report (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics: Washington, DC, Aug. 1979). Current information illustrating commercial purchase arrangements can be found in US Energy Information Administration, 2012 Uranium Marketing Annual Report (US Department of Energy: Washington, DC, May 2013).

[16] Information presented at ‘Governing Uranium: Country Reports’, Authors Workshop, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 23–24 Sep. 2013.

[17] Wilch, J. R., ‘GATT and the half-life of uranium industry protection’, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, vol. 10, no. 1 (spring 1989).

[18] IAEA, Country Nuclear Fuel Cycle Profiles, Technical Reports Series no. 425, 2nd edn (IAEA: Vienna, May 2005), pp. 6–8.

[19] International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step Toward Disarmament (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, Oct. 2013), p. 11.

[20] Official, Malawian Department of Mines, Interview with author, Lilongwe, 18 Mar. 2013; Official, Malawian Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment, Interview with author, Lilongwe, 18 Mar. 2013; and Official, Namibian Ministry of Mines and Energy, Interview with author, Windhoek, 12 Mar. 2013. 21 Official, Namibian Ministry of Mines and Energy (note 20).

[21] Official, Namibian Ministry of Mines and Energy (note 20).

[22] Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Task Force, Development of Nuclear Energy Sector in India (IDSA: New Delhi, Nov. 2010).

[23] ‘South Korea, India sign cooperation deal’, World Nuclear News, 26 July 2011, ; ‘India-Kazakhstan nuclear cooperation agreement signed’, World Nuclear News, 18 Apr. 2011, ; and ‘India, Mongolia sign civil nuclear deal’, United Press International, 15 Sep. 2009.

[24] Yamamura, T., ‘Status of nuclear cooperation with India’, Japan Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Letter no. 2, 28 Nov. 2012, .

[25] Mishra, S., ‘India’s civil nuclear network: a reality check’, Air Power, vol. 5, no. 4 (winter 2010), p. 117.

[26] Argentina is a party to the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); Kazakhstan is a party to the 2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk); and Mongolia declared itself to be a single-state nuclear weapon-free zone in 1992, with effect from 2000.

[27] Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Annual Report 2009–2010 (MEA: New Delhi, 2010), p. 61; and Indian High Commission to Namibia, ‘Indo-Namibian bilateral relations’, 1 Oct. 2013, , para. 17.

[28] ‘Namibia gives India access to “world’s best” uranium’, Economic Times (New Delhi), 1 Sep. 2009.

[29] Kerr, P. K., U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress RL33016 (US Congress, CRS: Washington, DC, 26 June 2012), p. 8.

[30] Nuclear Energy Act, Act no. 46 of 1999, assented to 20 Dec. 1999, commenced 24 Feb. 2000, Republic of South Africa Government Gazette, vol. 414, no. 20 759 (23 Dec. 1999), Article 35.

[31] According to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), only states that manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 Jan. 1967 are legally recognized as nuclear weapon states. By this definition, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are the nuclear weapon states. See also chapter 4 in this volume.

[32] Thakur, R., ‘Follow the yellowcake road: balancing Australia’s national interests against international anti-nuclear interests’, International Affairs, vol. 89, no. 4 (July 2013).

[33] China says Pakistan nuclear deal “peaceful” ’, BBC News, 17 June 2010; and Bukhari, S. S. H. and Attiqur- Rehman, ‘Pakistan–China nuclear deal & international fictions’, Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 1, no. 3 (Mar. 2011), p. 3.

[34] See note 31; and chapter 4 in this volume.

[35] See e.g. Hirdman, S., ‘The near nuclear countries and the Non-Proliferation Treaty’, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1972 (Almqvist and Wiksell: Stockholm, 1972).

[36] See e.g. Kile, S. N., ‘Iran and nuclear proliferation concerns’, SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013).

[37] UN Security Council Resolution 1929, 9 June 2010.

[38] Orcutt, M., ‘Novel material shows promise for extracting uranium from seawater’, MIT Technology Review, 16 May 2013.

[39] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Uranium 2011: Resources, Production and Demand, ‘The Red Book’ (OECD: Paris, 2012). The Red Book has been published biennially since the mid-1960s by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA.

[40] Sole, K. C., Feather, A. M. and Cole, P. M., ‘Solvent extraction in southern Africa: an update of some recent hydrometallurgical developments’, Hydrometallurgy, vol. 78, nos 1–2 (July 2005).

[41] Rouse, T., Cameco Corp., ‘Control of uranium ore concentrate’, Presentation at IAEA Regional Seminar on Good Practices in the Processing and Control of Uranium Ore Concentrate, Windhoek, 23–27 Apr. 2012, , p. 19.

[42] Cameco, a uranium-mining company, states that its usual packaging arrangement is ‘approximately 43’ barrels per container. Cameco Corp., ‘Milling: from ore to yellowcake’, Uranium 101, 2013, . However, in theory more barrels can fit in a standard 20-foot container (probably ignoring packaging regulations): one source estimates 72–80 barrels. All Star Link Logistics Co. Ltd, ‘ISO tank’, .

[43] Australian Uranium Council, Guide to Safe Transport of Uranium Oxide Concentrate (Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism: Canberra, 2012), p. 16.

[44] ASTM International, ‘Standard specification for uranium ore concentrate’, Active Standard ASTM C967-13, 2013, p. 1; and World Nuclear Association, ‘The nuclear fuel cycle’, Dec. 2012, .

[45] According to the IAEA physical model, c. 7 tonnes of UOC are required to produce 1 significant quantity of HEU (assuming 90% enrichment and tails of 0.25%). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Physical Model, vol. 1, Mining and Milling, STR-314 (IAEA: Vienna, 1999), p. 2.

[46] Cochran, T. B. and Paine, C. E., The Amount of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons (National Resources Defense Council: Washington, DC, 13 Apr. 1995).