Saving NATO with Airpower

Understanding airpower

In the wake of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) fledgling victory in Libya, airpower has again moved into the limelight. Not since the air war in Kosovo (1999) has airpower played such an instrumental role in achieving American—and NATO—objectives. Whether Western-style democracy comes to power in Libya remains to be seen, but airpower enthusiasts have already learned an important lesson: airpower can play a decisive role in warfare. Even more dramatically, an alliance, whose relevance is coming into question, was able to perform such a feat. Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR offered not only a victory but also an opportunity for NATO advocates to re-examine the relevance of airpower in the alliance as it tries to maintain significance in a world that, according to United States (US) Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, is pivoting toward Asia.[1]

When the United States Air Force (USAF) recently modified the definition of airpower to include air, space, and cyber power, many analysts viewed this change as a conflation of three distinct domains. However, in doing so, the Air Force emphasized that, unlike the other services, it considers space and cyber not as enablers of operations but as maneuver environments—that facilitate improved operations.

This broadened understanding of airpower has the potential to offer a new framework for employing it in ways not previously contemplated. For example, the defeat of integrated air defense systems by means of cyber power reflects the capability of this new conception of airpower.[2] It also gives airpower strategists the opportunity to consider new ways in which NATO air forces can employ cyber and space power to attain the global stability sought by the alliance.

Moreover, the USAF can now supply NATO with a new sine qua non that silences the chorus of NATO opponents who wish to further reduce America’s role in the alliance. To better clarify what we mean, let us offer a glimpse into the future as a way of explaining what a way ahead might look like.

Into the future

Technological advances are bridging the digital divide in the Third World.[3] Increasingly, people who enter the information society reshape both global and local politics.[4] As we have observed in recent protest movements—as in Athens (2008, 2011), Iran (2009), the Pittsburgh Summit (2009), Thailand (2010), London (2011), and the ongoing Occupy Wall Street movement— individuals use converged Intelligence and cellular technologies such as Twitter and Facebook to spontaneously organize themselves into groups that begin with nonviolent principles but in some cases turn into violent dissent.[5] Technological adoption is also transforming advanced air forces from those focused on air and space services—with limited space and cyber capabilities—into cyber, space, and air forces whose air assets no longer lead the way. USAF’s pilot-dominated leadership and culture will soon give way to cyber and space warriors who wield information and communications technology (ICT) as their principal weapon.

Given the rapid pace of technological and organizational change, airmen must prepare for a future in which conflicts among great powers may once again prove likely. However, these wars will occur largely in the cyber and space domains.[6] In light of the revised definition of airpower, air forces will play a leading role in future conflicts; nevertheless, NATO member nations cannot eliminate their conventional and nuclear forces. The success of these capabilities will drive adversaries to challenge the West in space and cyber—where its advantage is least perceptible.

Further, the dispersion of ICT and its enabling of new forms of innovation will pose significant challenges to sovereignty and security across NATO as well as globally. Non-state actors (empowered by ICT, networked organizational dynamics, and financial assets that may surpass those of the countries in which they operate) may begin to erode sovereignty in weak and fragile states— some of them in Europe or in close proximity.[7] As we have observed in Lebanon with the rise of Hezbollah, non-state actors may even take control of the state, creating hybrid “netwar” threats.[8] Airpower (air, space, and cyber) is best positioned to combat such adversaries as they try to influence or cause harm to NATO partners.

Weapons proliferation among state and non-state actors—coupled with rapidly developing ballistic missile technologies, directed energy, high-speed computing, and artificial intelligence—presents new security risks as well.[9] Airmen—whose profession emphasizes science, technology, engineering, and mathematics— can best deal with these emergent challenges in the 21st century. Should NATO airpower play a central role in defining this new strategic environment, air force leaders will exert substantial influence on their nations’ tactical, operational, and strategic options. Additionally, if airpower wishes to effectively defend global and regional stability, it must concentrate on deterrence; partnering; and the integration of air, space, and cyber capabilities to meet the dynamic hybrid issues involving conflict during this century.[10]

Admittedly, there are a variety of organizational constructs in NATO. Where, for example, the United States places much of its space capabilities with USAF, other NATO nations do not. These differences of approach will pose challenges to the vision we suggest, but as with most challenges, they can be overcome through a collaborative process.

Deterrence

Although many individuals wish otherwise, deterrence, in point of fact, remains critical to NATO, particularly in light of a resurgent Russia, China’s expanding nuclear force, a nuclear North Korea, and Iran’s nuclear program.[11] The nuclear umbrella, vital to European security for more than six decades, has not diminished in importance. Deterrence, however, entails more than just a nuclear capability. Broadly speaking, the effectiveness of deterrence depends upon policies focusing on thwarting adversaries across the spectrum of threats generated by peer competitors, rogue regimes, and non-state actors—operating across all domains.

A generation after the cold war’s end, nuclear-capable aircraft remain the single best means of deterring NATO’s (nuclear) adversaries—through visible escalation and de-escalation.[12] One should never consider preservation of this critical capability’s long-term viability as a simple task. It is not. Airmen must position themselves to develop effective policies that will both deter the most likely threats to allied interests and ensure the sustainability of extended deterrence.

Maintaining alliances, building partnerships, and forging coalitions

Transformation of the alliance. Historically, alliances have proven anything but static. In the case of NATO, changing political, economic, and security conditions in the post–cold war period led to its acceptance of former Warsaw Pact countries as members. [13] Even though NATO’s sovereignty no longer faces a threat, it continues to evolve. Recognizing these changes, the United States remains an essential member that is effectively balancing Europe “on the cheap.”

A central asset to the American effort in Afghanistan, NATO airpower provides ground forces with airlift, firepower, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Consequently, violent Islamic extremism has directed its attention to one of the least accessible and developed countries on the Earth—rather than Europe or the United States. Furthermore, recent operations in Libya illustrate an emerging trend where the United States serves as a willing and able partner, but does not take the lead.

The geostrategic reality of the Asia-Pacific region’s emergence as a hub of global finance, trade, and maritime flows is shifting the axis of power east. Over the past two decades, Asia has surpassed Europe as the United States’ principal trading partner.[14] As demands for social and other economic programs compete with defense investments in Europe and the United States, alliance nations will find themselves searching for ways to maintain a full range of air, space, and cyber capabilities to meet ill-defined but lethal threats half a world away. Although some aspects of US partnering have roots in current conflicts, old partnerships must persist and evolve. Preserving that continuity will demand a form of “airpower diplomacy” that leverages airpower as a tool for maintaining local, regional, and global stability by preventing conflict, providing aid and assistance, and transmitting constructive skills to those who want and deserve NATO assistance.[15]

This cost-effective approach limits the number of permanent US overseas bases and large troop deployments. Admittedly, some conflicts will necessitate rapid response and intervention. However, the deliberate application of airpower as part of a diplomatic campaign could leverage the alliance’s soft-power capabilities before members exercise hard power. In a future in which defense acquisition programs face considerable competition for limited resources, the ability of airmen to conduct both soft- and hard-power missions will give policy makers valuable options to cope with complex security issues.

Coalitions of democracies. Formal alliances simply cannot address every security concern. As Operation ENDURING FREEDOM indicated, coalitions of likeminded states must come together to reach common objectives when the structures or politics within alliances prevent their members from acting. Currently, USAF supports broader diplomacy by building partnerships and maintaining security cooperation.[16]

Airmen across NATO should prepare themselves and their services to offer greater contributions to produce a wider range of constructive effects that synchronize with policy and diplomacy. As operations in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly illustrate, by the time irregular conflicts evolve into major combat operations, the price to alliances and coalitions is too high. A better strategy lies in partnering with like-minded states and using airpower capabilities (when appropriate), precluding the need for NATO ground forces.

United States Africa Command’s (USAFRICOM) approach exemplifies the types of missions that combatant commanders may need to perform in the future. USAFRICOM’s efforts to prevent conflict by emphasizing partnerships, peace, and stability reflect its use of soft power.[17] Africa’s lack of transportation infrastructure lends itself to employing airpower to support diplomacy through a number of programs that may one day pay substantial dividends. Demand for such capabilities may intensify over the next two decades, as described in the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy.[18] Thus, the alliance’s airpower assets should be able to conduct a wide range of soft-power—airpower diplomacy—operations around the world as national leaders call on air forces to expand their diplomatic efforts.

Moving Forward

Integration and resourcing. As airmen move toward the future, the force structure—and, consequently, force-development programs—must change to emphasize the integration of manned and remotely piloted aircraft, space, and cyber-power projection capabilities. In other words, when formulating options to defend the nation’s interests, airmen should present proposals that fully integrate air, space, and cyber capabilities into the solution.

The military is no longer confined to organizing for linear warfare. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, militaries dealt with natural disasters, humanitarian relief operations, resource conflicts, terrorism, small-scale conventional conflicts, and insurgencies.[19] Flexible power projection is certain to prove critical to allied success in these conflicts. In a global security environment marked by the proliferation of advanced anti-access and area denial systems, alliance forces will find it increasingly difficult to establish secure bases within striking distance of great-power adversaries, a situation that demands options for long-range airpower projection.[20] Without a doubt, NATO air forces cannot offer their nations a more essential capability than successful power projection.

For air forces, power projection can take many forms, such as long-range strike, airlift, and aerial refueling, but the future will also call for something new. As the century unfolds, countries will expect their airmen who operate in joint, alliance, and coalition environments to eschew compartmentalized solutions in favor of comprehensive options that represent the capabilities of their services.

Future conflicts may resemble the recent Russo-Georgian clash, in which a cyber-offensive preceded Russia’s conventional attack.[21] Cyber weapons will more frequently target critical infrastructure, as did the Stuxnet computer worm.[22] Thus, conflicts will involve more specific targeting in terms of time and space, and the first salvos of a conflict may avoid detection until the second- and third-order effects of initial strikes manifest themselves— especially in any conflict that pits NATO against Russia, whose cyber capabilities are among the best in the world. Rather than rely solely on traditional integrated air defenses, adversaries will compete for control of the air, using integrated denial strategies informed by space- and cyber-based surveillance, reconnaissance, and attack coupled with high-performance missile systems designed to complicate deployment and operations for intervening air forces.[23] These scenarios will place additional stress on airpower leaders and their forces.

An irregular conflict against non-state actors may give rise to two potentially divergent missions for NATO air forces: fighting as members of joint or coalition forces or enabling partners to fight on their own. The former requires using traditional airpower assets; the latter, leveraging key tools such as training, education, and assistance. NATO air forces can conduct either mission. The leveraging of key tools, however, is proving particularly difficult. At present, USAF possesses limited capabilities, other than its Special Operations Command, to carry out such endeavors. However, this does not apply to some NATO members who have long focused on soft-power missions.

Fusing air, space, and cyberspace. NATO air forces must begin the process of fusing air, space, and cyber capabilities into existing and future platforms and systems. For example, aircraft currently rely on the global positioning system—a hybrid cyber and space asset—as well as a range of information technology systems, but much more is possible at the individual platform level and in support of command and control.[24] Integrating offensive and defensive capabilities across the three domains will prove a key enabler and force multiplier over the coming decades, suggesting the need for systems, operators, and organizations capable of producing effects in more than one domain. NATO members, therefore, should work together closely in developing interoperable systems.

Airpower organizations must continue to refine their unique, flexible means of power projection. For instance, in a conflict with a peer competitor that threatens national sovereignty and vital interests, the calculus for determining appropriate responses is relatively direct. However, in an irregular conflict involving limited interests, determining the appropriate course of action becomes more difficult.[25] Thus, scalable options are needed for airpower projection capabilities that often serve as the single best tool available—a challenge that has proven problematic in current warfare. Developing remotely piloted platforms enhanced by artificial intelligence—thereby enabling lethal, autonomous operations— will support conventional airpower projection missions.[26] Moreover, such systems may prove critical psychological tools in peer competition.[27] Near-peer adversaries may also view the employment of these aircraft as a reason to cooperate with NATO.

Undoubtedly, the alliance’s members will have to design such systems within new legal and ethical frameworks, working jointly in their development.[28] Extending the range and loiter time of existing and future platforms will have a similar effect. Improving the range of airbreathing platforms will also delay or prevent compromising one of airpower’s greatest advantages: the ability to operate from secure locations outside an adversary’s reach. The likely continuing drawdown in American overseas forces and the number of operating bases available globally must be offset not only through a closer relationship with US allies but also with long-range power-projection systems capable of holding targets at risk without access to nearby bases.

Offensive and defensive cyber capabilities must be fused into air and space platforms. In the near future, such capabilities may become the greatest power-projection tools in NATO’s arsenal, serving as both force multipliers and an Achilles’ heel. Several nations already have fielded impressive means of launching cyber-attacks and exploiting vulnerabilities within control systems for commercial and critical infrastructure.[29] Despite ongoing attempts to organize, train, and equip to meet cyber requirements, airmen across the alliance must recognize that the ability to conduct robust cyber operations is essential to both the current and future operation of non-cyber elements of the force.

Finally, airmen must take a more aggressive approach to developing cyber as a capability—understanding that flying, fighting, and winning depend on seamlessly integrating cyber with air and space power. Cyber superiority will ensure the reliability of data used for decision making in all domains. The global nature of cyberspace makes alliance cooperation even more important than in the other domains, given the global extent and near light speed with which cyber disruption occurs. Ad hoc support rescued Estonia from the disruption of digital services by malicious cyber actors. These attacks did not cross the threshold of cyber war, but they highlighted the fact that the alliance did not have a strategy or doctrine of response to specific acts against partners’ sovereign cyberspace. Although NATO’s establishment of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence “provides [the alliance] a wide range of products and services in the domain of cooperative cyber defence, it is not an operational centre, and does not fall within the NATO command structure.”[30] Its mission is to “enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO nations and partners in cyber defence by virtue of education, research and development, lessons learned and consultation.”[31]

Such a concerted effort will allow NATO to formalize strategy and maintain a doctrinal edge by fusing knowledge to develop a formidable cyber force. America’s recent sponsorship of the centre, after norm entrepreneurs articulated a need for the institution, will assure its success.[32] USAF figures prominently in this endeavor by bringing its robust body of cyber knowledge forward to assist alliance members as they forge a common framework, recognizing cyberspace operations as a critical specialty for airmen.

Conclusions

Reinvigorating strategic thought within NATO air forces calls for developing an understanding of the essential capabilities the alliance will need to meet future challenges. The geostrategic environment that NATO will encounter in the 21st century is certain to bring new threats and opportunities that diverge significantly from those it confronted in the 20th century. Specifically, responding to situations that require out-of-area operations will place greater emphasis on long-range power projection by alliance air forces. Defending allied interests in the Asia-Pacific region—considered by many individuals the 21st century’s center of commerce and power—will sometimes demand that NATO airmen fly long distances to reach primary operating areas either inaccessible or denied to sea or ground forces. Such challenges will necessitate innovative thinking, especially in the use of cyber power, if the alliance wishes to maintain global and regional influence during a time of constrained defense budgets. Continued success will likely come as cyber and space are integrated with traditional air capabilities—a particularly important capacity in an Asia-centered world.

The NATO alliance proved its value during the cold war and may do so in the future. Throughout its history, airpower has served as a cornerstone of that alliance and will continue as such well into the future. This status is certain to prove prophetic if Europe remains peaceful and subject to external threats. To prepare for any future scenario, airmen must adapt their understanding of airpower to conform to the needs of evolving technological trends and their influence on the international security environment. Doing so will ensure that the alliance and individual nations continue to enjoy the benefits of freedom and security.

[1] Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy 189 (November 2011): 56–63, external pagehttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_centurycall_made (accessed October 29, 2012).

[2] David A. Fulghum, “Cyber, Kinetic War Collide: Two-Seat Fighters Take on Multiple Missions as Bombing and Network-Attack Combine,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 167, no. 13 (1 October 2007): 27.

[3] John Feather, The Information Society: A Study of Continuity and Change, 4th ed. (London: Facet Publishing, 2004), 111–36.

[4] Graham Meikle, “Electronic Civil Disobedience and Symbolic Power,” in Cyber Conflict and Global Politics, ed. Athina Karatzogianni (London: Routledge, 2009), 177–87.

[5] Cyber capabilities did not prompt either the protests or the violence, but they certainly catalyzed the events and their effects.

[6] Richard A. Clarke and Robert Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (New York: HarperCollins, 2010); Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century (New York: Free Press, 2003), 179–95; and James Adams, The Next World War: Computers Are the Weapons and the Front Line Is Everywhere (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 233–44.

[7] Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Remapping Global Politics: History’s Revenge and Future Shock (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 273–311.

[8] Ian O.Lesser and others, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), Chapter 3: “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism.”

[9] See Barry R. Schneider and Jim A. Davis, ed., Avoiding the Abyss: Progress, Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the WMD Threat (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).

[10] John A. Shaud, Air Force Strategy Study, 2020–2030 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2011), 1, http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/AirForceStrategyStudy2010.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

[11] “Nuclear Weapons Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview,” Institute for Science and International Security, http://isis-online.org/nuclearweapons-programs/ (accessed October 29, 2012).

[12] Elbridge Colby and Thomas Moore, “Maintaining the Triad: U.S. Bomber Force Needs a New Nuclear Cruise Missile,” Armed Forces Journal 148, no.5 (December 2010): 28–29, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/12/4997542 (accessed October 29, 2012).

[13] Andrew T. Wolff, “Explaining NATO Expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, 1989–2004: An Analysis of Geopolitical Factors, Rationales, and Rhetoric”(PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2010).

[14] “U.S. Trade by Geographic Regions,” United States International Trade Commission, http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/Regions.asp (accessed October 29, 2012).

[15] Adam B.Lowther, “Why U.S. Needs Airpower Diplomacy,” Diplomat, 22 November 2011, external pagehttp://the-diplomat.com/2011/11/22/why-u-s-needs-airpowerdiplomacy/call_made (accessed October 29, 2012).

[16] Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne offer the following definition of diplomacy: “The peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, their principals and accredited agents.” The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration, 2^nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 1. Hedley Bull offers a similar definition, suggesting that diplomacy is “the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.” The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 156.

[17] Philip Seib and Carola Weil, “AFRICOM, the American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa,” Policy Briefing, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California, March 2008, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/pdfs/africom%20layout%20web.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

[18] David W. Hills and Neal A. Schier, “Air Force Security Cooperation Knowledgebase,” DISAM [Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management] Journal (Fall 2005), http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%2028_1/Schier.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

[19] Larry Minear and Hazel Smith, ed., Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007), 7–14. See also Stephen Browne, Aid and Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? (London: Earthscan, 2006); and Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

[20] Stephen J. Hagel, Adam B. Lowther, and Chad L. Dacus, The Future of Global US Air Force Basing, 2010–2040, AFRI Paper 2010-3 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Research Institute, September 2010), 60.

[21] Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg, “Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook,” Parameters 38, no. 4 (Winter 2008–09): 60–76, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/Articles/08winter/korns.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

[22] Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, and Eric Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Cupertino, CA: Symantec Corporation, 2011), http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/02/Symantec-Stuxnet-Update-Feb-2011.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

[23] Eleni Ekmektsioglou ,“Asymmetry in Asia-Pacific,” Diplomat, 14 June 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2011/06/14/asymmetryin-asia-pacific/ (accessed October 29, 2012).

[24] David J. Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

[25] John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 1–25.

[26] Peter W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21^st Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).

[27] United States Department of Defense, FY2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007),href="http://www.acq.osd.mil/psa/docs/UMSIntegratedRoadmap2009.pdf">http://www.acq.osd.mil/psa/docs/UMSIntegratedRoadmap2009.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

[28] Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009).

[29] Brian Grow, Keith Epstein, and Chi-Chu Tschang, “The New E-spionage Threat,” Business Week, 10 April 2008,http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm (accessed October 29, 2012); Ellen Nakashima and Steven Mufson, “Hackers Have Attacked Foreign Utilities, CIA Analyst Says,” Washington Post, 19 January 2008, A04, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/18/AR2008011803277.html (accessed October 29, 2012); and Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Views on Information Based Warfare,” Airpower Journal 10, SE (Special Edition 1996): 25–35,href="http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/">http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ apj96/spec96/thomas.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

[30] “Institutional Status,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2011, http://www.ccdcoe.org/38.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

[31] “Mission and Vision,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2011, http://www.ccdcoe.org/11.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

[32] For further discussion of the importance of American sponsorship of policy initiatives aiming to influence the behavior of states and the process through which it is most likely to succeed, see Simon Reich, Global Norms, American Sponsorship and the Emerging Patterns of World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). See also Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos, “Cyberspace: The New Frontier and the Same Old Multilateralism,” in Reich, Global Norms,147–177.