Karzai's Paranoia Threatens Afghan Security

19 Mar 2014

Hamid Karzai’s failure to sign a post-2014 bilateral security agreement with the United States has put him at odds with Washington and a large number of his own people. Worse still, warns Patrick Balbierz, his stonewalling is threatening his country’s modest security gains and further emboldening the Taliban.

This article was external pageoriginally published on the external pageWorld Policy Blog on 7 March 2014.

With President Obama calling for a plan to withdraw completely from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the question remains if this is the right course of action. President Hamid Karzai has refused to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), which would ease the rate of withdrawal, despite popular support for the deal among Afghani citizens. However, should Karzai fail to sign the BSA, he could plunge his fledgling nation into civil war.

The BSA external pageoutlines the steps Americans and Afghanis would take to ensure a smooth transition of military presence. One particularly contentious point in the deal is granting free legal reign to U.S. troops. Karzai has been opposed to granting such freedom, which further guarantees that if an American is arrested by Afghan security forces, he “shall be immediately handed over to U.S. forces authorities.” U.S. officials believe this is important in protecting American troops, while Karzai believes it gives them unlimited power without fear of the judicial system.

Of course, this is only one of many sticking points between the two delegations.Karzai has also said he external pagewon’t sign the agreement unless Pakistan and the U.S. discuss peace settlements with the Taliban. In short, Karzai seems to be playing hard ball in his final term, despite years of accepting American financial and military support with open arms.

In addition, his suggestion of negotiating peace with the Taliban seems to be a safety net for his administration if they leave office without the backing of “Big Brother." The shift indicates Karzai's fear of history repeating itself. When the Taliban came to power in Kabul in 1996, they executed former president Mohammad Najibullah (shortly after Russian aid that supported his office was withdrawn.)

While President Obama's threat of total withdrawal may just be a means of persuading Karzai to accept the BSA, following through with such a threat is the last thing the Afghan people need. Failing to solidify the fragile structures the U.S. has built in Afghanistan could counteract a decade of efforts by the U.S. armed forces and global investors, estimated at approximately $640 billion. The effects of this aid is evident, as Mustafa Kazemi, an independent war correspondent in Kabul notes, "in nearly all fields the U.S. has tried to invest in, there is a great change compared to 13 years ago."

Despite dramatic improvements to Afghan life, the general population still lives under deplorable conditions. While the GDP today is almost four times what it was in 2002, the external pageWorld Food Program notes that half of children under five are malnourished. Furthermore, civilian deaths in Afghanistan have dramatically external pageincreased as of late.

Studies indicate that a full American withdrawal would enhance the power and audacity of Taliban operations. In 2009, following a massive offensive by Taliban forces, the response of a U.S. troop surge forced the Taliban to retreat back into Pakistan. The subsequent troop reduction after the successful surge, however, saw a return of violence by Taliban forces. This back and forth between Taliban forces and U.S. troops has left no real winner. The U.S. has spent substantial time and resources to train a new Afghan army. However, a full withdrawal could trigger an all out offensive on its green army forces.

Karzai has suggested that he is withholding his decision on the BSA because of the upcoming April 5 elections. Yet he held a loya jurga, or council of elders, to seek their opinion and they overwhelmingly agreed to approve the security plan. This development, which Kazemi says Karzai thought the tribal elders would vote against, caused a doubling back to alternative reasons not to sign the BSA. Karzai has continued to external pagedrag his feet and make demands of the U.S. in order to gain concessions. The U.S. has been holding a “take it or leave it” approach, as domestic voices are calling for full withdrawal. In short, Karzai's window is closing, and fast.

Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton has taken a more aggressive stance saying, “if we want to be safe against terrorism, we have to be where the terrorists are.” The U.S. is pursuing a stance of retrenchment, transitioning from a Bush led era of aggressive military tactics to one in which calculated and narrowly focused agendas are implemented. The external pagenew budget plan for defense spending is 10 percent less than in 2008. Withdrawals from Iraq and eventually Afghanistan account for substantial reductions, along with reducing troop levels to that of pre-World War II.

It seems the expansion of U.S. forces in two major conflicts has left a lasting impression on its decision makers. However, Kazemi remains hopeful, "The best case scenario is the U.S. troops staying in, the international aid flowing to the government of Afghanistan, and the support remain stable as it is now." Yet the failures and setbacks that have occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan are at least being taken into account going forward. This shift in ideology is something Karzai should be paying closer attention to, because the time to accept American protection on the terms of the BSA may be running out.

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