Raising a Female-centric Infantry Battalion: Do We Have the Nerve?

This article was external pageoriginally publishedcall_made in the external pageAustralian Army Journalcall_made (Volume XI, Number 1, Winter 2014). You can also follow the Australian Army's new blog external pageherecall_made.

"If nations rise because they have a better gender balance, if organizations prosper because of that, then Army must be a better Army if we make our women more prominent, give them greater opportunity and encourage their involvement across our organization. It makes perfect sense to this male."
-Lieutenant General David Morrison, AO, Chief of Army, 2012¹

"The culture and structure of military organizations, their policies of recruitment, training, education, materiel procurement, doctrine writing, and deployments, all need to be carefully studied and potentially reconsidered. This involves the traditional ‘truths’ about the nature of unit cohesion and the optimal capabilities of individual soldiers and officers. The issue of women in combat should not be approached through the lens of damage control, but rather with an emphasis on maximizing the effectiveness of military organizations in the contemporary context."
-Robert Egnell, 2013²

Introduction

With the removal of combat employment restrictions for female soldiers, the Australian Army stands at a watershed, its practices now changing to accord with contemporary expectations and requirements. The complexity inherent in this transition is obvious in both the lengthy domestic and international debate on the employment of women in combat roles, and by government confirmation that implementation of the Australian response will occur over a five-year period.³ Australia’s approach has been informed by a range of organizational imperatives including the development of operational capability, sustainable human resourcing, and the implementation of the 2012 Pathway to Change strategy.⁴ Thus, the Australian Army is currently proceeding with an implementation plan for progressively integrating women into its combat arms.

In the spirit of disruptive thinking, this article questions the nature of the Australian Army’s incremental approach to the integration of female combatants. The query concerns not the fact that women may be employed in infantry or the other combat arms, but rather whether Army should be expanding its consideration of how that might occur. The article makes the assumption that the raising of a female-centric Australian infantry battalion is sufficiently credible to warrant debate and is not so far-fetched or audacious as to be dismissed out of hand. It also does not eschew the potential validity of other combat arms units as alternative or better test beds. However, largely for the sake of brevity, that idea is left for others to develop.

This article argues that the Australian Army should consider raising a gender-integrated, but predominantly female infantry battalion as a means of delivering a more tangible and far-reaching capability than is likely under the current incremental model. The article has four components. First, it briefly examines modern historical examples of female combat experience that are broadly germane to the proposal. Second, it examines the context of Army’s current situation and the rationale for raising a predominantly female unit. Third, it considers possible employment options for such a unit and some of the opportunities that it could create. Finally, the article considers and comments on the vulnerabilities of the proposal.

Historical examples

There is no shortage of evidence of female participation in combat roles, both as individuals and as members of integrated or discretely female units. There is also a substantial body of literature opposing their employment.⁵ In 2001 one of the more strident opponents of women in combat roles, Martin Van Creveld, argued that historically, female combatants have been proportionately small in number and their contributions operationally insignificant.⁶ This view is generally accurate if raw proportion in the fight is the only consideration; however it is immaterial in relation to debate over their actual presence. It is also a view that is arguably becoming defunct in the context of more recent events and decisions. Whether in disguise as men, as members of warlike tribes, as partisans or insurgents, or conventionally in either integrated or discretely female units, women have long been apparent as combatants.

Nineteenth-century cases

As many as 400 women are rumoured to have disguised their gender and fought on both sides during the American Civil War, many enlisting and fighting alongside (or even against) their husbands.⁷ Confederate soldier Laura Williams personally raised and led a company in the 5th Texas Volunteers, participated in several actions, was wounded, captured and, while a prisoner, disavowed the attempts of her husband (a Union officer) to have her renounce the Confederacy.⁸ In the late nineteenth century, the French fought two campaigns against the West African kingdom of Dahomey which maintained a rigorously trained and disciplined regiment of female warriors, constituting approximately one-third of the kingdom’s army.⁹ These women ‘underwent intense physical training accompanied by education in their traditions, use of weapons, gymnastics, and all they needed to know to be outstanding warriors.’¹⁰ Nevertheless, Anthony King describes aspects of the Dahomey which may limit their efficacy as an example for contemporary purposes.¹¹ However, the members of this regiment were reputed to have been superior in skill and bravery to their male counterparts and were described by the French troops who ultimately defeated them as having fought with remarkable courage and ferocity.¹² Woodfork further emphasizes that, considering the outdated weapons with which they fought, Dahomian forces inflicted considerable casualties on a modern French army.¹³

The World Wars

During the First World War, Russian women initially fought in much the same (disguised) way as American women during the Civil War. Following the abdication of the Tsar, the Provisional Government raised a number of female infantry units, largely as an exercise designed to lift the flagging spirits of front-line male troops and to inspire (or shame) them into continuing the fight against the Germans.¹⁴ The 1st Russian Women’s ‘Battalion of Death’ fought creditably at Smorgon on 9 July 1917, although ultimately this and the other female units were disbanded.¹⁵

The Second World War marked something of a turning point, with much larger numbers of women becoming involved in combat. While not necessarily in extensive ‘close’ combat, many nonetheless fought, killed and died in the same way as their male counterparts. As early as 1938, investigations were initiated in the United Kingdom which, by September 1943, led to over 56,000 women serving in mixed gender anti-aircraft units in which women outnumbered men.¹⁶ At the time, these steps were viewed as ‘breath-taking and revolutionary’, and were also operationally significant in releasing corresponding numbers of men for overseas service.¹⁷ Similarly, by the end of the war, Germany had between 65,000 and 100,000 women serving in Luftwaffe anti-aircraft units.¹⁸ The US also raised mixed gender anti-aircraft units as an experimental activity which, before being shelved for politico-operational reasons, proved that these units were superior in performance to male-only units.¹⁹ The Russians trained women as infantry combat commanders and experimented with female units up to formation level.²⁰ From 1943, a Polish female infantry battalion saw action with the Red Army,²¹ and Soviet women were also active and effective as snipers,²² machine-gunners, aircrew in three dedicated female Red Air Force regiments, in anti-aircraft units and as partisans.²³ In the latter role, women in Italy, Yugoslavia, France and elsewhere also fought in large numbers.²⁴ The most widely known (and highly decorated) Australian female combatant of the war was Nancy Wake, initially a courier in the French Resistance and later a Special Operations Executive officer in occupied France.²⁵

Contemporary ‘reinforcement’ of recent history

Contemporary deployments have seen female Australian soldiers feature in a broader array of conventional roles than in the past. Notwithstanding the obvious differences of scale, this experience is compatible with US and other forces. Burrelli writes that, in approximately ten years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, over 238,000 female US military personnel have been ‘deployed’ at a cost of over 130 fatalities and more than 800 wounded. Many women have been decorated for heroism.²⁶ So it is that both recent historical and more contemporary examples demonstrate that female soldiers have and can fight, regardless of prevailing culture, circumstance or restrictions. Given the ‘changing character of war, women are already “in combat”’ and, in the past, where the ‘necessity’ arose, they have fought independently or alongside men.²⁷ British Second World War integrated anti-aircraft batteries were particularly effective. That they were initially regarded as ‘breathtaking and revolutionary’ by the decision-makers of their time is worthy of contemplation as the Australian Army considers the way forward.

Context leading to an individualized response

In 2011 and 2012 the Australian Defence Organisation conducted a series of cultural reviews as a result of the so-called ‘Skype Incident’ at the Australian Defence Force Academy.²⁸ These reviews were announced by the then Minister for Defence in a media release which also heralded ‘the opening up of all roles in the ADF to women, including combat roles, on the basis that determination for suitability for roles in the ADF is to be based on physical and intellectual ability, not gender.’²⁹ The reviews constituted an enormous body of work, delivered 130 recommendations and led to a consolidated response from Defence in the form of the Pathway to Change strategy (released on 7 March 2012) and the ‘Implementation Plan for the Removal of Gender Restrictions on Australian Defence Force Combat Role Employment Categories’ (released on 11 October 2012).³⁰

The corresponding Army implementation plan was released on 23 July 2012 and is underwritten by the introduction of new Physical Employment Standards based on common trade tasks performed by all soldiers and officers regardless of their age or gender.³¹ As a result, the plan focuses at the individual level and ultimately rests on a dictum of gender-neutral requirements which are designed to maintain standards, ensure safety and to prevent the degradation of combat readiness.³² This is a logical approach in the sense of Army’s need to achieve a directed outcome in a specified time-frame, but it is also potentially indicative of what Egnell infers when he cautions against female combat employment being viewed through a lens of ‘damage control’.³³ Cloutier argues for example, that the adoption of gender-neutral physical requirements will effectively keep women out of combat positions whereas entirely female platoons could be designed around women’s strengths.³⁴ The counter-argument to the standards approach is thus that there could plausibly be very little change to the status quo if the standards simply become the new barrier. Should this be the case, it seems reasonable to surmise that the effect or outcome of the planned Australian approach will probably approximate what the Canadian Army has implemented to date (noting that the Canadians have been ‘fully integrated in all occupations and roles for over 20 years’) — 2.4% of Canadian combat arms soldiers are female.³⁵ The Canadians are justifiably proud of the grit, professionalism and achievements of their servicewomen, including those occupying infantry command positions at platoon and company level in Afghanistan. While acknowledging laudable individual achievements, is it possible for the Australian Army to build on rather than mirror the Canadian lead?

Why consider a unit rather than an individual focus?

Sir Basil Liddell Hart once remarked that ‘the principles of war could, for brevity, be condensed into a single word: concentration.’³⁶ Ultimately, success in battle depends on achieving sufficient concentration of effort at a decisive point. It is somewhat telling that the Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force Phase 2 Report (the Broderick Review) identifies the need for a critical mass of women in mixed gender teams.³⁷ The accompanying Community Guide also points out that ‘ADF women strongly believe that when they are singled out, it makes it harder for them to fit in.’³⁸ Broderick is at pains to emphasize

the need for critical mass in the viable employment of women in combat roles, and recommends that policy planners ‘Focus on one combat unit/work section/ platoon/company in each Service where effective performance in mixed gender environments has been achieved.’³⁹ However the report does not consider whether this could be achieved (or assisted) by the establishment of a predominantly female Army unit (or units) rather than replicating and hopefully enhancing those areas of Army in which women are already professionally established. The absence of discussion about female-centric combat units in recent history and their potential viability is little short of extraordinary.

This is problematic because the feedback received in the course of the Review and an examination of ‘comparable’ militaries described as part of the report, envisage that few women are likely or expected to seek combat employment. The contradiction in accepting this as a fait accompli is that small-scale representation is arguably at odds with the nub of the entire reform initiative, which is increased capability. The approach adopted by Army might therefore be considered too dispersed, too small and at odds with the scale of the necessary outcome. It also risks perpetuating a key limitation which Broderick earnestly believes must be avoided — a reliance on ‘trailblazing’ individuals making their way (in what are anticipated to be small numbers) through a major cultural change.⁴⁰ The missing questions are: why would individual women continue to do this? Why would the organization continue to make it the only way for them to try? If Army’s ultimate goal is a combination of capability generation, operational excellence and equal opportunity for an exciting and equitable career, why would we not look closely at ways to potentially accelerate this and broaden the experience of those involved? There are some diverse contemporary examples and imperatives which should encourage us to consider doing so.

Israel’s Caracal Battalion

The first example is the Israeli Defence Force’s (IDF) predominantly female operational infantry battalion known as the Caracal Battalion — the existence of which appears to have escaped Defence despite the broad sweep of the recent cultural reviews.⁴¹ This unit was formed in 2000, has reportedly varied between 60 and 90% female and performs a light infantry function in a border region under the IDF Southern Command.⁴² Observing IDF integration of female combatants, Cawkill, Rogers, Knight and Spear describe a command-level acknowledgment that women ‘often exhibit superior skills in areas such as discipline and motivation, maintaining alertness, shooting abilities, managing tasks in an organized manner and displaying knowledge and professionalism in the use of weapons.’ Notably, at a broader level, they also mention continued (male) attitudinal issues, ‘negative messages from high ranking officers’ and a recognition (as is also strongly emphasized by Broderick) that the attitude of individual commanders is key to success.⁴³ Of further note, the period of service for IDF conscripts is three years for males and two for females but (demonstrative of a higher level of commitment in its members) the Caracal Battalion is an exception to this as its female members are also required to serve for three years.⁴⁴ Finally, while referring to a single incident, media reporting of the 2012 battlefield gallantry of a female Caracal Battalion NCO also offers insight into the competence of the battalion’s junior leadership⁴⁵ and the level of political acknowledgement resulting from ‘success’.⁴⁶

Limitations and their riposte

Like most comparable armies, the Australian Army is a volunteer force which does not draw from a conscript pool. Thus, an Australian equivalent of the Caracal Battalion could be perceived as vulnerable to personnel sustainability issues, both in generating and sustaining numbers. However Australia also has a much larger population and a much smaller army than Israel. This implies that, as a minimum, Army should research the Caracal Battalion and should also test whether prospective female infantry soldiers, their families, and the broader community would regard the opportunity for women to serve in integrated, but female-centric infantry unit(s) as more appealing than ‘trailblazing’ service in male-centric units.⁴⁷ Subject to the results of such research, Army should trial a number of models including a single year enlistment period for women in a female-centric combat unit in the Army.⁴⁸ A second option involves lessons from the former Ready Reserve Scheme of the 1990s in which infantry battalions progressively trained rifle companies in a single year and then transitioned them to the Army Reserve.⁴⁹ A third opportunity could utilize the extensive experience and expertise Army has acquired in training and mentoring Iraqi and Afghan units from a low capability base. There is no doubt that Army has the ability to focus effort on a primarily female combat unit and to train such a unit to perform well in a combat role.

How past ideas might fuel the future

Of these possibilities, Army’s experience with the Ready Reserve Scheme is potentially the most instructive. This scheme was introduced in 1992 and was designed to increase the depth of available trained units and personnel in an emergency and to improve ADF capability to respond to emergencies at short notice.⁵⁰ The scheme was highly attractive to women, a significant number of whom were reported to have been ‘of an exceptionally high standard’.⁵¹ Yet, because of the employment restrictions in place at the time, a ‘large number’ had to be turned away. The Ready Reserve Scheme delivered infantry (and other) soldiers to the Army in a very short time-frame. They were trained to a Regular Army standard and then transitioned to the Reserve, where they completed 50 days’ service over each of the following four years.⁵² The scheme was regarded as a cheap means of generating capability — a notion intrinsically attractive to Army and also to government in terms of current fiscal pressures.⁵³ Grey observed that the scheme ‘drew heavily on those intending to enter tertiary education [80% of those in the Army component], an educated pool of recruits not normally attracted to full-time military service.’⁵⁴ Moreover, in terms of capability, Grey identified that:

The focus within the Army component of the scheme upon infantry battalions provided precisely the capability that the Army has drawn on so heavily in East Timor and which the Ready Reserve Scheme could have supplemented with relatively little effort.⁵⁵

At an individual level, a former infantry battalion commander of Ready Reserve soldiers recently reflected that:

"… cohesion was not their only strength. They were remarkably motivated and resilient … with extraordinary levels of initiative. Especially at section level, they showed an ability to adapt and problem solve that I never saw in any other unit. The level of education must have played a part but I also suspect the upfront nature of their training and cohort system helped meld the most dynamic group of infantrymen I’ve ever seen. To my mind it was a model that should have been embedded in the Army a long time ago … [it was] an approach that was the most effective training system we have ever had and one adapted to the new social environment in which we live."⁵⁶

This narrative is not intended as an argument for the resurrection of the Ready Reserve, but rather as an indication that the Australian Army has previously been very creative when challenged to innovate with its infantry and to build a fresh capability which, in this case, also strengthened the Reserve. However, the relevance of the Ready Reserve to the case for female-centric units lies in emergent organizational recognition of a growing demand for increased workforce and operational flexibility. Indeed in 2013 the ADF launched Project Suakin, designed to enhance the employment elasticity of the entire force.⁵⁷ Earlier in 2013, the then Prime Minister and Minister for Defence also announced Plan Beersheba, a restructuring of the Australian Army in which the 1st, 3rd and 7th Brigades will have fundamentally common combined arms team structures and the 2nd Division will support these brigades, providing additional capacity from the Reserve.⁵⁸ Combined with the requirements of Pathway to Change, the ‘drawdown’ from Afghanistan and residual commitments, the Army operating environment remains both complex and extremely busy. Under such circumstances the urge to maintain a set course is compelling. But there are potential long-term benefits in reconsidering the principles and recommendations of the Broderick Review, carefully assessing the implications of Project Suakin and Plan Beersheba and potentially marrying them with other successes to provide Army more opportunities than offered by an incremental approach to the ingress of women into combat roles.⁵⁹ Army must examine alternatives as the delay and scale implicit in its current approach may eventually undermine rather than preserve the ‘strong combat culture’ referred to by the Chief of Army as vital to success.⁶⁰

Employment and opportunities

"The role of Infantry is to seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground and to repel attack, by day or night, regardless of season, weather or terrain."⁶¹

‘Conventional’ thoughts

In its mature state, a primarily female battalion could have many roles in addition to that traditionally considered core for the infantry. The key challenge lies in ascertaining its potential and testing ideas and the synchronization of their possible outcomes. Role definition may therefore be expected to evolve over time. Could such a unit be a permanent fixture on the order of battle, just an otherwise ‘standard’ battalion within one of the Plan Beersheba Multirole Combat Brigades which simply happened to have more women in it than men? Or on the other hand, once trained, could its sub-units be distributed between the brigades, giving each one a slice of an alternative capability comparable to the Female Engagement Teams used in Afghanistan, but with the innate capacity to fight beyond self-protection? Could it perform a designated opposing force function, in which differences of approach that may arise through gender might be valued and encouraged, to harden or diversify the test for those being assessed? Alternatively, might this be simply a time and function-limited unit, more strategically designed to assist the rapid generation of larger numbers of female combat soldiers who (ideally remaining in Army past their initial period of service) would then move out into other units (both Regular and Reserve) in formed drafts not unlike the Ready Reserve concept?⁶² This need not be restricted to infantry, as members of the battalion who have completed an ‘infantry year’ might take this experience to other corps, thereby broadening the footprint of female combat arms experience throughout Army. This would in turn more meaningfully operationalize the foremost of Army’s espoused nine core behaviors under the ‘I’m an Australian Soldier Initiative’ — that ‘Every Soldier (is) an Expert in Close Combat’.⁶³ Regardless, the chosen role(s) of the unit would be a major factor in its marketing to young women (and for that matter, men). This is a concept that would attract immediate attention and that, if successfully implemented, would provide Army long-term capability-based benefit.

Further opportunities

Alternatively, such a battalion could form the nucleus of a permanent Australian United Nations (UN) battalion which could be routinely committed to UN operations. If not an entirely Australian battalion, it could form part of a UN battalion populated by a collective of contributing nations. Given the presence of Norwegian female infantry in the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon from 1978–98⁶⁴ or the call by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as long ago as 1995 for a target of 50% women in UN field missions, this concept appears far from being as ‘breathtaking and revolutionary’ as the British WW2 antiaircraft batteries were once perceived.⁶⁵ According to the recently issued United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual:

"To enhance the role played by women in the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN Security Council has, to date, adopted four specific resolutions on women, peace and security: resolution 1325 (2000), resolution 1820 (2008), resolution 1888 (2009), resolution 1889 (2009) and resolution 1960. These mandates require that peacekeeping missions boost women’s participation in post-conflict decision-making processes, prevent sexual violence, protect individuals, including women and girls, increase the presence of female peacekeeping personnel, and systematically train all peacekeepers to address gender issues in their work."⁶⁶

While UN operations are not a determinant of Australian Army force structure, the new UN doctrine displays an applicable generic battalion structure. The manual also contains numerous references to the importance of female involvement in achieving mission success, both in terms of outreach and engagement with the local population and increased involvement of female military personnel. While the manual indicates that ‘Deployment of women as part of the battalion is particularly essential, for example, in areas affected by mass displacement, abductions, and conflict-related sexual violence’,⁶⁷ imagine the gravitas of Australia’s offering up, or contributing in part, to a predominantly female infantry unit. Not without its risks and limitations, this would nonetheless comprise a unique and powerful statement. It could provide intense focus for concept development, and as a concept it is not without potential strategic significance vis-à-vis Australia’s current membership of the UN Security Council.

A variation of this concept is the use of female-dominant combat teams (or smaller attachments) to augment male-centric infantry units in operational, cultural or environmental circumstances that mitigate against the use of a predominantly female unit. The principle remains the same: the more female combat soldiers we can generate in the shortest period of time, the greater our flexibility, the deeper our selection pool and, in turn, the more potent our capability in the future. The potential of a dedicated unit to create a cadre for increased female participation cannot be overemphasized. The same principle applies to longer term potential for ultimately growing Special Forces (SF) candidates as women are far more likely to join SF if there is a center of gravity from which they can start.

Other opportunities may also arise as a result of concentrating effort which may be less likely to emerge from a dispersed, smaller scale approach. Rather than focusing on barriers which essentially only permit the ingress of women, this mindset could be broadened to encourage them, with commensurate capability benefits for the whole force.⁶⁸ For example, this could create the impetus for technology responses to overcoming upper body limitations in female (and male) combat arms candidates.⁶⁹ Such technology would be equally beneficial for infantry soldiers regardless of their gender. Individual Load Carrying Equipment, for instance, could use lighter and tougher material, thus reducing the physical impact on and energy use by both male and female soldiers. If this principle were extended to weapons and other equipment, the effect could cascade to other corps. The overall result could be an increase in the pool of eligible personnel, improvement in performance and potentially a reduction in training injuries, leading to reduced costs, decreased personnel wastage and smaller overall recruiting liabilities. If we are only thinking of female infantry soldiers as women who can match infantrymen as they are now, we are limiting ourselves to the present when our capability design needs to include the future.

Vulnerabilities and mitigation

There will be no shortage of volunteers to identify vulnerabilities in a proposal such as this. This article will therefore briefly examine just three of these ‘issues’: that women will be unable to meet the physical demands of infantry service; that there is no operational ‘burning platform’; and that military culture will conspire to prevent the rise of female combat arms soldiers.

Physical demands

King identifies ‘female accession to the infantry’ (which he describes as ‘the most demanding military occupation’) as the most complex barrier confronting the successful integration of women into the combat arms.⁷⁰ He considers however, that past focus on masculinity has been diminished as a source of cohesion by the move away from mass citizen (conscript) armies to all-volunteer, professional forces in which collective performance relies more on training and professional competence than personal characteristics. On this basis, he believes that a very small minority of physically capable women could be incorporated into the infantry if they are judged on their performance not their gender. This essentially reflects the standards argument once again and, importantly, it signals the likely outcome for our Army (already mirrored in Canada) if no alternative vision is offered.

Observing a 1980s West Point physical fitness test in which only 23% of females passed, King also believes there is little evidence that physical disparities between average men and women have ‘changed significantly in the past three decades’.⁷¹ Haring, on the other hand, contends that a percentage of women are just as physically capable as men and describes more recent West Point data (from 2011) showing that 52% of females passed at the male standard.⁷² Wojack observes dramatic advances in female athletic achievements towards the end of the twentieth century which he believes show a ‘true picture of women’s athletic potential’. For example, in the 30 years that the men’s world record for the marathon went from 2:09 to 2:05 (a 3% improvement) the women’s record improved from 3:01 to 2:18 (an almost 24% improvement). The pole vault was closed to women until 1992 because ‘authorities considered women either to be too weak or the event too dangerous’; yet, between 1992 and 2002 the female record improved by 16% as opposed to .04% for the male record.⁷³ Egnell questions why physical standards are treated as ‘sacrosanct’ and suggests that:

"… it is, therefore, time to discuss not only what success means in contemporary operations, but also what successful units look like, how they are trained, what unit culture they possess, and what their cohesion is based on. At the individual level, it is also time to question traditional standards – cognitive or physical – and examine what soldiers and officers need to succeed on the “battlefield”, or what is probably better described as the complex field of deployment."⁷⁴

No ‘burning platform’?

Some may say there is no ‘burning platform’, no operational or social necessity (such as those faced by the Dahomey, the Soviets or currently by the Israelis) to warrant consideration of a female-centric battalion. Yet the Dahomey capability evolved over a lengthy period, the Soviet capability arose through crisis, and the Caracal Battalion probably had politico-legal rather than operational origins⁷⁵ but continues to evolve nonetheless.⁷⁶ The point is that the notion of a ‘burning platform’ is nuanced. If anything, such a view fails to recognize that we are already on the platform in the shape of the Pathway to Change strategy, the ADF Implementation Plan for the Removal of Gender Restrictions, Project Suakin and Plan Beersheba. The platform is the recognition that an all-volunteer force needs access to the largest possible talent pool in order to meet the vision of the Implementation Plan, which is ‘… ultimately about ADF capability (and) attracting capable people from a broader proportion of the Defence and Australian community.’⁷⁷ The only issue is whether concentration is a better way of achieving this than a method that seems destined to result in a trickle flow. Tucker observes that ‘… no insight into the nature of World War II can be complete without coming to terms with this fact: the victors of the war were those countries that most successfully mobilized their women.’⁷⁸ We should not need the ‘platform’ to combust beneath us as a precondition to improving our methods or extending our vision.

Culture as an obstacle

Cultural vulnerability is probably the most acute argument against the concept of a female-centric battalion, although this is more an issue of implementation. The Broderick Review argues that:

Driving cultural and structural reform of the scale intended by the Review’s recommendations carries inherent risks. Some people will embrace the changes and see merit in the arguments and strategies. Others will not. There will be strong resistance to some measures, such as targets, which could result in a backlash against women. Women’s place within the ADF may be called into doubt. They may be ‘accused’ of attracting special treatment. Their merit may be questioned. Their contribution may be undermined. Behaviors of exclusion or harassment may intensify and these behaviors may come from both men and women.⁷⁹

It remains instructive to reflect on the Soviet example as an insight into the power of culture. Cottam describes Soviet women as having a qualitative impact on morale which was out of all proportion to their numbers. They increasingly established themselves in non-traditional roles, they fought, and they assumed command. The result was that mixed-gender teams worked harmoniously and all-female groups developed team spirit previously only associated with comradeship among men. Yet after the war, the belief that women should only serve in time of crisis reasserted itself.⁸⁰ Similarly, while women in the IDF reportedly constitute over 50% of officers, there are indications that they are still under-represented at higher ranks and that (male) attitudinal issues and the example of high-ranking officers are a pervasive negative influence.⁸¹ The Australian Army is itself no stranger to gender prejudices although, in a now-famous YouTube address to the Australian Army, the Chief of Army has made his position on the importance of female soldiers and his expectations of their male colleagues unmistakably clear.⁸² This emphasizes the extent to which the cultural risk identified by Broderick applies and perhaps foreshadows just how distant our horizon actually needs to be. Once again, Egnell offers useful advice in this respect:

Integrating women with the aim of minimizing damage to the existing structure and culture of the organization provides a negative starting point for these processes. Instead, the introduction of women in combat units – or the implementation of a gendered perspective in military organizations – should be seen as an opportunity to revise the culture and structure of the armed forces for increased effectiveness in contemporary warfare.⁸³

Conclusion

The recommendations of the Broderick Review, the Pathway to Change strategy, organisational employment-offer imperatives under Project Suakin, and our envisaged post-Middle East operational stance under Plan Beersheba all combine to suggest that we face a compelling need to change. This article has argued that Army’s current plan may be too narrow and is unlikely to deliver a result on the scale required. It contends that the plan should seek to look beyond reflecting the Van Creveld view of operational insignificance. If this does not occur, the outcome will be incompatible with the stated goal of increased capability. The lack of debate over reversing the approach of sending small numbers of women into combat units is telling and the alternative — the formation of a predominantly female unit — appears to have been largely ignored. The fundamental imperative for this is to concentrate effort in order to build a critical mass and infuse it through the whole force in a manner which is more attuned to the ADF’s long-term interests and to Broderick’s goals. With an eye on Liddell Hart’s logic, concentration has an appealing allure.

Ironically, even if Army were unable to generate sufficient numbers of women to sustain a female-centric battalion (or another alternative combat arms unit), it will be arguably no worse off for trying because the current plan of ‘those who pass’ is premised on the hope of acquiring just those extraordinary few. That is not an increase in capability. The real vulnerability, the strategic loss, is to accept such a position as being inviolate without even testing it. The challenge before Army is therefore to risk that test, if necessary piloting it on a smaller scale, and even possibly in partnership with allies — but it must possess a vision larger than a handful of brave individuals. So can we be bolder, generative and cut to the chase? Do we have the courage, initiative, respect and teamwork to even talk about raising a primarily female infantry battalion? As long ago as 1928 Hughes observed:

We have handicapped ourselves by numerous man-made technical definitions of such things as Combat Zone. . . . Some of us conclude that women have no place in the Theater of Operations, others that women have no place in the combat zone. We fail to consider that the next war is never the last one. We forget, for example, that what was the Combat Zone during the World War may be something else during the next war. We use technical terms that are susceptible to individual interpretation, and that change with the art of war, to express the idea that women should not participate here, there, or yonder. We are further handicapped by man-made barriers of custom, prejudice and politics, and fail to appreciate how rapidly and thoroughly these barriers are being demolished.⁸⁴

And, to allow the Broderick Report the last word:

"Meaningful change is never easy – it takes courage to set aside the status quo. When that status quo, however, perpetuates marginalization and loss of personnel, when it threatens the future capacity of the organization, new and innovative ways of thinking must be embraced."⁸

See external pageoriginalcall_made for footnotes.