Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threat to the United States
9 Jan 2015
By Jaganath Sankaran for The Air University
This article was external pageoriginally published in the Winter 2014 issue of external pageStrategic Studies Quarterly.
The argument that US armed forces are critically dependent on satellites and therefore extremely vulnerable to disruption from Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks is not rooted in evidence. It rests on untested assumptions—primarily, that China would find attacking US military satellites operationally feasible and desirable. This article rejects those assumptions by critically examining the challenges involved in executing an ASAT attack versus the limited potential benefits such action would yield for China. While some US satellites are vulnerable, the limited reach of China’s ballistic missiles and inadequate infrastructure make it infeasible for China to mount extensive ASAT operations necessary to substantially affect US capabilities. Even if China could execute a very complex, difficult ASAT operation, the benefits do not confer decisive military advantage. To dissuade China and demonstrate US resilience against ASAT attacks, the United States must employ technical innovations including space situational awareness, shielding, avoidance, and redundancies. Any coherent plan to dissuade and deter China from employing an ASAT attack must also include negotiations and arms control agreements. While it may not be politically possible to address all Chinese concerns, engaging and addressing some of them is the sensible way to build a stable and cooperative regime in space.
In May of 2013, the Pentagon revealed that China had launched a suborbital rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest Sichuan province that reached a high-altitude satellite orbit. According to Pentagon spokesperson Lt Col Monica Matoush, “the launch appeared to be on a ballistic trajectory nearly to geo-synchronous earth orbit.”[1] An unattributed US defense official said, “It was a ground-based missile that we believe would be their first test of an interceptor that would be designed to go after a satellite that’s actually on orbit.”[2] In fact, the anticipation of this launch had sparked reports in the United States that China would be testing an antisatellite (ASAT) missile that might be able to attack US global positioning system (GPS) navigation satellites orbiting at an altitude of 20,000 kilometers (km).[3] However, the Chinese claimed the launch carried a science payload (a canister of barium powder) to study Earth’s ionosphere. Reporting on the launch, China’s state-run Xinhua news service announced that “the experiment was designed to investigate energetic particles and magnetic fields in the ionized stratum and near-Earth space. The experiment has reached expected objectives by allowing scientists to obtain first-hand data regarding the space environment at different altitudes.”[4] Even though the barium payload release occurred at an altitude of 10,000 km, the Chinese did not clarify how high the missile actually went or what launch vehicle was used.[5]
The launch reignited the perceived threat of Chinese ASAT missile attacks on US military satellites. The growing US concern about Chinese ASAT capability goes back to 2007 when Beijing shot down one of its own satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). China has also conducted “missile defense” tests viewed as proxies for ASAT missions.[6] These Chinese activities are seen by many analysts as a threat to US space capabilities. The persistent refrain has been that the US military exploits space surveillance capabilities better than any other nation, resulting in an asymmetric advantage to its armed forces on a global scale.[7] Given this US advantage, analysts posit China will find it prudent to directly attack US satellites—executing a space “pearl harbor” that would cripple US military capabilities for years.[8] Without its eyes and ears in space to provide early warning and real-time intelligence, it is argued, the United States would be in a painfully awkward situation should China put direct military pressure on Taiwan.[9]
However, the argument that US armed forces are critically dependent on satellites and therefore extremely vulnerable to disruption from Chinese ASAT attacks is not rooted in evidence.[10] Instead, it rests on untested assumptions—primarily, that China would find attacking US military satellites operationally feasible and desirable.[11]
This article tests those assumptions by critically examining the challenges involved in executing an ASAT attack versus the limited potential benefits such action would yield for China. It first examines which US military satellites are most vulnerable to Chinese ASAT attack and then, by demonstrating the limited reach of China’s ballistic missiles and inadequate infrastructure capacity for launching multiple rockets, posits that it would be infeasible for China to mount extensive ASAT operations necessary to substantially affect US capabilities. The article next explores the limited benefits China would achieve from an ASAT attack, arguing that even if it manages to execute a very complex and difficult ASAT operation, the benefits do not confer decisive military advantage. Finally, it suggests policy actions—both unilateral US military-technical innovations and bilateral cooperative measures with China—to dissuade China and to demonstrate US resilience against ASAT attacks.
The Challenges of Antisatellite Attacks
Which US military satellites would China be able to destroy and how easily? The answer to this question gives a clear indicator of Chinese offensive space capabilities. Arraying the range of potential target satellites—US, allied, and private, operating across a spectrum of orbital space—against the capabilities of Chinese missiles and launch infrastructure clearly shows that China possesses very limited means to conduct an extensive ASAT operation against the United States. To make that case, one must first understand the various US military satellites, their operational parameters, and the services they provide. Based on military significance, US satellites can be primarily classed as (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, (2) GPS satellites, and (3) communications satellites. All three operate from different altitudes dictated by the functions they provide (see table 1).12 ISR satellites can be further divided into imagery or signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites. ISR imagery satellites operate in LEOs of around 1,000 km. A plethora of ISR imagery satellites, both government-owned and private, are used by US armed forces to construct a picture of adversary capability. Signals intelligence ISR satellites performing electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT) collection operate mostly from geosynchronous orbits (GEO) of 36,000 km and are used to develop data on adversary assets and functional capability, particularly during times of peace.
US GPS satellites operate from an altitude of around 20,000 km. They are an important component to the successful execution of any modern US military operation in addition to their extensive commercial applications. They provide deployed forces with precise positioning, navigational, and timing information that facilitates rapid maneuvering and precise targeting. US military communication satellites operate farthest from Earth in GEOs at an altitude of approximately 36,000 km. The US military employs a variety of military and commercial communications satellites for different activities.
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