The Proliferation, Diversity and Utility of Ground-based Robotic Technologies
8 Jan 2015
By Gary Martinic for Canadian Military Journal (CMJ)
This article was external pageoriginally published in Vol. 14, No. 4 (Autumn 2014) of the external pageCanadian Military Journal, which is published by the National Defense and Canadian Armed Forces.
Introduction
By contrast to weapons development, which has occurred progressively over thousands of years, the pace of development of information technology and electronics has been staggering. It has led to the ‘age of the machines,’ where robotic warfare and lethality via remote-control are no longer the preserve of science fiction novels.
These new ‘machines’ include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), robotic ground platforms (RGPs), unmanned surface vessels (USVs), and unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs), as well as unmanned weapons and surveillance systems (UWS), all of which have already been deployed in military operations.
With each passing year, the technologies involved have grown smaller, faster, and more sophisticated, mirroring developments in the ‘smart-phone’ industry, which essentially uses the same electronic components, namely optics, embedded micro-processors, sensors, and batteries. And while robotic technologies to date have featured most prominently in the air environment, state-of-the-art robotic ground vehicles and platforms are proliferating, and they are being incorporated militarily by an increasing number of nations.
In recent years, for example, the US Army and the US Marine Corps have reportedly deployed at least 6000 UGVs in Iraq and Afghanistan, primarily on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks, as well as for the detection of improvised explosive devices.[1] And while details are somewhat sketchy, South Korea has reportedly deployed stationary armed surveillance ‘robots’ in the demilitarised zone along its border with North Korea since 2010, and they are capable of detecting movement over a distance of three kilometres.[2]
This article will briefly describe the advances in ground-based unmanned weapons and surveillance platforms and systems, and outline their broad capabilities and military advantages. It will also address their potential use to the CAF, especially as this applies to currently available ‘off-the-shelf’ acquisitions. It purposely does not address UAVs, which have been reasonably covered in past issues of the Australian Defence Force Journal.[3]
The Development of Unmanned Systems
Germany was one of the earliest users of unmanned radio-controlled weaponry. Most people are familiar with the V-series rockets of the Second World War. However, as early as the First World War, Germany had deployed the FL-7, a wire-guided motorboat carrying 300 pounds of explosives, designed to be rammed into enemy ships.[4] It demonstrated its effectiveness when it struck and damaged HMS Erebus off the coast of German-occupied Belgium in October 1917. But early guided weapons were also developed for use on the ground. A rather crude example was the ‘land torpedo,’ an armoured tractor packed with about 400 kilograms of explosives, intended to be detonated after it reached enemy trenches.[5]
Today, unmanned ground vehicles are generally known as UGVs, although there is a sub-class of robotic ground platforms (RGPs), such as ‘quadrupeds’ and ‘bipeds,’ which use robotic limbs to achieve movement, rather than a wheeled-or-tracked chassis. Initially, most UGVs were designed specifically for particularly dangerous tasks, such as explosive ordnance disposal. They generally are fitted with on-board sensors to scan and monitor their environment, and they operate either via a human controller, or autonomously.
Remotely-operated UGVs (ro-UGVs)
The remotely-operated vehicles work on the same principle as a remote-controlled toy car in that their movement is controlled by a human operator, either via the use of sensors (such as digital video cameras), or by direct visual observation. Most have been developed to inspect and disable explosive devices, providing a safer alternative to human operators in high-risk situations. But increasingly, their use has been extended to include ground surveillance missions, urban ‘strike’ operations in law enforcement and military operations, military checkpoint monitoring, and even for some peacekeeping tasks. Currently, there are more than 20 types of ro-UGVs available ‘off-the-shelf.’
Other ro-UGVs include the ‘I-Robot 110,’ which is a lightweight, remotely-controlled UGV designed to provide a quick assessment of ‘situational awareness’ and persistent observation in confined spaces.[6] Weighing only 13 kilograms, and fitted with four cameras and night vision optics, it can be deployed into buildings in search of insurgents or snipers. Another is the ‘Mil-Sim A5 Robotic Weapon,’ an all-weather/all-terrain UGV weighing 90 kilograms, which can be operated remotely by day or night from up to half a kilometre away via wireless control.[7] It can be armed with lethal or non-lethal munitions, depending upon mission requirements. [Of note, the version illustrated is the ‘crowd control’ variant, capable of firing 1100 hardened rubber-ball rounds at up to 20 rounds per second, and this is possible while the UGV is moving].
Another is the Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System (MAARS) UGV.[8] It weighs around 100 kilograms, has a speed of 10km/hr, and can be equipped with an array of weaponry, including a machine gun and grenade launchers. It is operated remotely from a lightweight control unit, and its surveillance capabilities include day and night cameras, motion detectors, an acoustic microphone, and a hostile fire detection system. The MAARS UGV enables its operating force to project firepower while remaining under cover; the obvious weakness is its vulnerability to enemy direct fire.
Yet another ro-UGV, reportedly at an advanced stage of testing, is BAE Systems Black Night, which is similar in size and appearance to a traditional tank, complete with a turret-mounted 30 mm cannon.[9] While it is operated remotely, it reportedly has the capacity for a number of autonomous functions, including route planning and obstacle avoidance. A prototype has been under evaluation by the US Army since 2010.[10] The obvious advantage of a remotely-controlled tank—or indeed, any remotely-controlled fighting vehicle—is that it enables the engagement of targets and the projection of firepower without direct risk to human operators.
Autonomous UGVs (a-UGVs)
As their name implies, a-UGVs operate without direct human control. They have in-built sensors which scan and monitor their immediate environment, with sequential activities determined by the use of pre-assigned control algorithms. They typically have the capacity to traverse long distances and to operate for long mission hours without operator intervention, while some also have limited self-repair capabilities. There currently are more than 25 types of a-UGVs available ‘off-the-shelf.’
One of the most successful and well-known is the Mobile Detection Assessment and Response System (MDARS), a-UGV developed jointly by the US Army and US Navy for patrolling and guarding military warehouses, airfields, and port facilities.[11] It provides an automated intrusion detection capability, as well as an ongoing assessment of the status of inventoried items, through the use of transponder tags, as it patrols warehouses and storage sites in shifts of up to 12 hours without the need to refuel. It requires operator input only in assessing the severity of an intrusion. According to its developers, the MDARS a-UGV has been so successful that it has been the first ‘robot’ to be employed in guarding sensitive US nuclear sites. It reportedly is also saving the US Department of Defense millions of dollars annually in labour and security-related costs.[12]
Another innovative a-UGV is the US Army’s Big Dog, which is a robotic quadruped, designed to carry equipment for ground troops over difficult or rough terrain.[13] It is also known within the US Army as the ‘Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment’ robot, or ‘MULE,’ for short. Weighing 110 kilograms and standing 76 centimetres, it can carry 154 kilograms of explosives at an average speed of six km/hr, and climb hills at an incline of up to 35 degrees. Big Dog has the capability to jump over low obstructions, climb over low vertical obstacles, and to walk on ice. Importantly, ‘it never falls off its feet.’
Another important semi-autonomous RGP, which was designed to locate, lift, and rescue people out of harm’s way, is the ‘Battlefield Extraction Assist Robot,’ or BEAR.[14] Developed with funding from the US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, it has the capability to lift up to 200 kilograms, a top speed of 10 km/hr, and can negotiate difficult battlefield terrain. One can easily deduce that this prototype RGP would also have useful application in the civilian area of emergency medicine, such as the retrieval of victims from hazardous road accident environments, or from damaged buildings following an earthquake.
Current Limitations
While some of the autonomous functions of UGVs are well advanced, such as mobility, endurance, communications, and navigation, the development of behavioural functions relating to their adaptability and employment in complex tactical scenarios is still at an early stage. One particular issue is whether to limit UGVs (and other robotic technologies) to adaptive control solutions, or whether to incorporate artificial intelligence, ultimately seeking UGVs capable of complete and ‘responsible’ autonomous operation.[15]
Advantages of Ground-Based Robotic Technologies for the CAF
Undoubtedly, the most valuable advantages of UGVs are their ability to perform ISR tasks, to aid and complement the mobility of soldiers on the battlefield, and, when armed, to project firepower while protecting the operator from direct enemy action. These features have made them particularly attractive to armed forces and law-enforcement agencies worldwide, including in unconventional warfare and counter-terrorism operations.
UGVs are versatile, agile, and relatively rugged. Moreover, with the ability to perform repetitive tasks with speed and precision—and being devoid of human emotion—UGVs are tenacious, tireless, and fearless. This makes them extremely useful for a range of the more mundane, tedious, and dangerous tasks on the modern battlefield, especially ones that would otherwise expose combatants or human operators to higher-than-normal risk of injury or death.
Moreover, as the development and proliferation of UGVs continues, their acquisition cost will continue to decline, making them even more cost effective for militaries around the world, particularly where their employment can reduce overall manpower requirements, or minimize the risk of death or injury to service personnel. These attributes have been recognised by the US Congress, which mandated in 2000 that one in every three future US combat systems should be unmanned.[16]
For the CAF, the potential utility of these technologies—and ultimately, their effectiveness and reliability on the future battlefield—will need to be weighed against specific mission requirements and detailed cost benefit analyses. On one hand, it is relatively easy to justify the acquisition of a particular UGV to meet a specific, existing capability, particularly one involving highly-dangerous tasks, such as explosive ordnance disposal. The considerably more difficult exercise is to contemplate the required force structure for a future battlefield involving a combination of manned and unmanned platforms and systems, operating as an integrated battlefield network.
The other challenge, which has been addressed by a number of commentators—including in earlier issues of the Australia Defence Force Journal—is the complex question of the ethical, legal, and political implications of employing increasingly-autonomous robotic technologies in offensive operations.[17] While some might argue that this issue is overblown and the stuff of science fiction novels, it seems inevitable that future unmanned systems will progressively incorporate artificial intelligence systems, giving them increased if not eventual complete autonomy from a human operator.
Conclusion
The possibility of using robotics on the battlefield has long been envisaged by military planners. Just as UAVs have made a revolutionary impact in the air, it seems certain that UGVs and RGPs will continue to proliferate in ground operations, where they have the potential to greatly enhance combat effectiveness while reducing human casualties on the battlefield.
In the longer-term, it seems inevitable that the battlefield of the future will be dominated by increasingly-autonomous unmanned weapons platforms and systems, operating across the environments of air, sea, land, and space. How those platforms and systems are integrated into future force structures—including for the CAF—is a complex issue, requiring considerable analysis and planning, as will the associated ethical and legal questions surrounding their employment.
This article has attempted to provide some vision of what future ground warfare and surveillance using ‘weaponized’ UGVs, may look like. In some ways, these UGVs are perhaps the ‘perfect soldier’ in the sense that they are dangerous, mission-driven, highly-survivable, easily-repairable, and, if required, disposable. Their effectiveness will only be enhanced further when questions regarding the human-robot interface are solved, as will be their repertoire of military uses, as increasing levels of operating autonomy are achieved.
[1] Jeremy Lemer, ‘Unmanned ground vehicles: robots sidle into the limelight, in Financial Times, 8 September 2009, at external pagehttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b11c1ae-9b51-11de-a3a1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2bFHCafsQ, accessed 7 August 2013.
[2] See, for example, Jon Rabiroff, ‘Machine gun-toting robots deployed on DMZ,’ in Stars and Stripes, 12 July 2010, at external pagehttp://www.stripes.com/machine-gun-toting-robots-deployed-on-dmz-1.110809, accessed 7 August 2013.
[3] See, for example, D. Hooper, ‘The rise of the machines: discrimination and feasible precautions in the uninhabited battlefield,’ in Australian Defence Force Journal, Issue No. 179, 2009; and G. Martinic, ‘ ‘“Drones” or “Smart” Unmanned Aerial Vehicles? ’ in Australian Defence Force Journal, Issue No. 189, 2012.
[4] ‘A Brief History of Precision Guided Weapons,’ at external pagehttp://www.tfcbooks.com/special/missiles.htm, accessed 6 August 2013.
[5] P.W. Singer, ‘Drones don’t die – a history of military robotics,’ in Military History, May 2011, p. 2, at external pagehttp://www.historynet.com/drones-dont-die-a-history-of- military-robotics.htm, accessed 6 August 2013.
[6] external pagehttp://www.popsci.com/bown/2012/product/ irobot-110, accessed 7 August 2013.
[7] external pagehttp://www.coroflot.com/twilight/A5-Paintball-Gun-UGV, accessed 7 August 2013.
[8] external pagehttp://www.qinetiq-na.com/products/unmanned-systems/maars/, accessed 7 August 2013.
[9] external pagehttp://www.military-today.com/apc/black_knight.htm, accessed 7 August 2013.
[10] Joel Baglole, ‘Black Knight – Future Combat: Unmanned Ground Vehicle Is Similar to A Tank,’ at external pagehttp://usmilitary.about.com/od/weapons/a/blacknight.htm, accessed 6 August 2013.
[11] external pagehttp://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/Pacific/Robotics/Pages/MDARS.aspx, accessed 7 August 2013.
[12] Ibid.
[13] external pagehttp://www.bostondynamics.com/robot_bigdog.html, accessed 6 August 2013.
[14] external pagehttp://www.vecnarobotics.com/solutions/bear/index.shtml, accessed 7 August 2013.
[15] While the debate is unresolved, there have already been demonstrated successes with simple cooperative control strategies in UGV and RGP systems at a number of US universities and national laboratories. See, for example, the discussion in Technology development for Army unmanned ground vehicles, US Committee on Army Ground Vehicle Technology, (Washington: National Academies Press, 2002), pp. 1-2, and 5.
[16] As authorised by the National Defense Authorization Act, 2000, at <external pagehttp://www.dfrsolutions.com/uploads/newsletter%20links/2010-05/NDAA_Unmanned.pdf>, accessed 7 August 2013.
[17] See, for example, A. Krishnan, Killer robots: legality and ethicality of autonomous weapons, Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2009, particularly Chapter 4 (legal considerations) and Chapter 5 (ethical considerations) and P.W. Singer, ‘Military robotics and ethics: a world of killer apps’, Nature, Volume 477, Issue No. 7365, 2011, pp. 399-401 (and online at <external pagehttp://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v477/n7365/full/477399a.html> accessed 6 August 2013). Also Hooper, ‘The rise of the machines: discrimination and feasible precautions in the uninhabited battlefield’, pp. 49-53 and 55.