China's Anti-Access Challenge and America's Air-Sea Battle Response

This article originally appeared in external pageVolume 5 / Issue 1 (January 2015) of Atlantic Voicescall_made published by the external pageAtlantic Treaty Associationcall_made.

The privileged position Washington has enjoyed in the Asia-Pacific since 1945 is under pressure. China’s rise, or return, depending on how you look at it historically, is challenging the hegemonic presence of the United States. The American position has been underpinned by the country’s superior military power, which has acted as the ultimate guarantor of Washington’s ability to influence regional developments. However, U.S. military power is dependent upon projecting power through bases as well as access to the theater of operations. This fact is currently being exploited by Beijing. For several years now, China has been expanding its missile capabilities, building a large and complex missile network capable of credibly threatening U.S. forces deployed in China’s maritime periphery. These capabilities form the foundation for what are popularly referred to as anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

Defeating such measures has been at the top of the agenda for Pentagon planners in recent years, particularly as the United States has begun its long-term strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The American response has been a military war-fighting concept known as the Air-Sea Battle concept, which proposes to break through the A2/AD systems by creating a networked, integrated force that has the ability to attack targets in-depth, even in a prohibitive anti-access environment.

This article will argue that China’s A2/AD capabilities will be a major factor in numerous security issues faced by the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific. It will start by defining the conflicting regional goals of Beijing and Washington by way of their grand strategies. Thereafter, it will describe China’s A2/AD capabilities and their implication for these strategies, as well as two worrying variables that could increase China’s propensity for bellicosity in the future. Finally, it will review the U.S. Air-Sea Battle concept, which has been presented as a way to counter A2/AD capabilities.

Competing Grand Strategies In The Asia-Pacific

A grand strategy can be defined, in the words of John Lewis Gaddis of Yale University, as “the calculated relationship of means to large ends”. Put differently, it is the answers to the questions: “where are you”, “where do you want to go”, and “how do you get there?” For China and the United States the answers to these queries will be at odds with one another in Asia-Pacific security affairs. This is because America’s interests are defined by being an established (and therefore status quo) power, while being a rising (and therefore likely revisionist) power marks China’s concerns.

The U.S. Grand Strategy

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the pre-eminent U.S. position in the Asia-Pacific became even more pronounced. Now acting as the sole superpower in a unipolar system, Washington developed in the 1990s a grand strategy for its international relations that can be characterized as “primacy.” This approach is built on the logic that a preponderance of U.S. power is the best way to assure stability and peace, in addition to buttressing U.S. political and economic interests. Washington therefore should strive to maintain its lead, particularly in military capabilities.

The developments in the power configuration of the world have changed the appropriateness and ability of Washington to follow a global grand strategy of primacy, but the basic approach of pursuing military dominance still remains. With this aspiration in mind, it is no surprise that Washington is concerned with China’s A2/AD challenge, as this threatens to neutralize America’s established military superiority and access to the maritime commons. The fear of the consequences of Chinese capabilities has been expressed in several official documents, such as the Pentagon’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the Joint Operational Access document.

The Chinese Grand Strategy

China’s grand strategy is harder to establish than the American one, as Beijing does not release official white documents describing its national security strategy. As such, much ink has been spilled trying to discern what China wants and how it will go about getting it, and, if in fact it will pursue its goals in a strategic way or go after its interest in a more ad hoc approach. Assuming China does indeed follow a grand strategic rationale of its own, the range of suggested strategies of Beijing runs a wide spectrum.

Beijing’s hardball approach to its territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, its unilateral establishment of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea, and its continued military build-up, particularly with the energetic pursuit of A2/AD capabilities, suggests a desire to carve out a sphere of influence for itself in its neighborhood. The intended end state seems to be a “zone of exceptionalism,” where the regional norms, as well as facts on the ground, would be bent towards China’s national interest.

China seems to be pursing this goal by advancing incrementally, i.e. by employing a gradualist model of expansion. This is displayed by its behavior in the South China Sea, where it slowly but surely advances its assertions by both challenging and openly defying the territorial claims of its neighbors. Beijing’s current grand strategy therefore appears to be geared toward creating a de facto sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific, casting doubt about Washington’s ability and will to intervene militarily during a hypothetical conflict, and thereby “winning without fighting.”

It is within this context of clashing grand strategies that the implications of China’s A2/AD capabilities become apparent.

China’s A2/AD Capabilities

The idea behind anti-access and area-denial, to prevent an enemy from accessing, as well as maneuvering within, a theater of operation is not a new one. This is, in fact, a timeless goal in military planning. Punji stick traps have, for example, been used by various militaries throughout history to slow down or prohibit the movement of enemy infantry units, such as during the Vietnam War when the Viet Cong used them to great effect against U.S. forces. Interestingly, A2/AD means are traditionally employed by a weaker party, in an attempt to offset the military superiority of an adversary. It thus usually relies on exploiting the cost-benefit ratio of a more powerful state by putting their more capital - intensive assets at risk through, ideally, relatively inexpensive means.

The novelty of today’s A2/AD measures, however, is in the power of technology, which has made missile capabilities much more potent and accessible. China now has the ability to target U.S. bases and forces beyond ranges of a thousand nautical miles. Its missile capabilities include advanced cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles, with greater precision and range than previously possible. When this capability is coupled with existing and expanding military power, such as modern submarines, fighter jets, and minelayers, it becomes a dangerous picture for any U.S. commander attempting to operate near or within China’s maritime periphery. The development has turned the offense-defense balance decidedly in the favor of the latter.

The reach and effectiveness of China’s missiles is significant, because much of the U.S. force projection in the region is reliant on bases and access to the maritime commons. When this is put at risk, decision-makers in Washington must make a much tougher call on whether to deploy U.S. forces in a given situation. The calculus is worsened further by the fact that U.S. forces are operating far from home, being reliant on a long logistical chain, while China would be operating in its own backyard. Beijing is thus exploiting a “home field advantage” as well as the cost-effectiveness of missile attacks against capital-intensive U.S. military assets.

What is at stake is America’s ability to deter China from using, or threatening to use, force against its neighbors in the region. A response to China’s A2/AD capabilities has therefore been deemed crucial in Washington. Additionally, by being able to cast doubt over the United States’ resolve and ability to intervene in a given situation, Beijing is strengthening its overall regional power. This allows China greater flexibility in pursuing favorable outcomes to its strategic interests, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, as well as changing the status of Taiwan. It could also lead decision-makers in Beijing into thinking that it had the upper hand in any conflict against the United States, and open up for adventurism in new areas of China’s neighborhood.

Factors That Could Increase The Likelihood Of Chinese Aggression

While it is not unreasonable to claim that China is not likely to pursue any type of aggressive military actions in its neighborhood, military planners need to be able to propose viable alternatives during worst-case scenarios, in order to deter the adversary. Regarding Chinese aggression, two factors that could increase the likelihood of bellicosity are worth mentioning. These add to the need for the United States to develop responses to potential belligerence from Beijing, such as the proposed Air-Sea Battle concept.

China’s First-Mover Advantage

The current unresolved maritime disputes in China’s neighborhood has led some to worry that conflict between the United States and China, for example over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, might break out due to a mistake or misunderstanding. However, others worry not about miscalculation, but deliberate calculation based on offensive military doctrines on the part of China. The latter could be one of the biggest threats to the stability of the Asia-Pacific today.

Such a doctrine could be based on China’s so-called “first-mover advantage.” Building on the logic of strategic offense combined with tactical defense, this would entail Beijing deciding to preempt its opponents by taking, for example, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and then daring other powers to reclaim it. If China’s seizure were successful, its antagonists would face impediments to taking the islands back, such as mounting a costly offensive, risking further instability, and being potentially seen as an aggressor. A comparison to Vladimir Putin’s hasty annexation of Crimea and the somewhat tepid, at least militarily, response from the West, seems apt to exemplify the power of the first-mover advantage. Such an incentive could combine with China’s potential short-term dilemma to provoke hostile actions from Beijing.

China’s Short-Term Dilemma

Analysts have in recent years begun to see a slowdown in the Chinese economy, and speculation has started over whether Beijing’s astounding growth model has reached its limits. This issue is compounded by other structural problems haunting China, such as environmental degradation, water and farmland management issues, an aging population, weak government, and rising food prices. Adding to this, these problems are piling up simultaneously, and have a dangerous potential of reinforcing each other. Thus, Beijing could in the near-future face difficult tradeoffs between focusing on its domestic economic security or continued expansion of its regional security influence. A population that continues to grow in age, nationalistic inclinations, and expectations for the future will exacerbate this predicament.

Decision-makers in Beijing may therefore be faced with a short-term dilemma of acting on foreign policy goals now while in a position of relative strength, or postponing any bold actions for the future, but then with a potentially weaker hand to play. This “window of opportunity” for China correspondingly represents a “window of vulnerability” for the United States. As such, the short-term period in U.S.-Sino relations could represent the most critical period where Washington needs to establish a firm deterrence against Chinese aggression.

America’s Air-Sea Battle Concept

The U.S. developed the current iteration of the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept as a response to the rising A2/AD capabilities of actors such as China. However, its conceptual antecedent was introduced much earlier. The name is inspired by the AirLand Battle concept, launched in 1981, which called for closer cooperation between U.S. Land and Air forces to counter the numerical advantage of the Soviet Union’s forces in Europe. In a similar fashion, the ASB, coined in the early 1990s, then refashioned and reintroduced in 2010 to fit newly forming A2/AD challenges, is at heart an enterprise to create a closer integrated and networked U.S. Sea and Air forces. This is then supposed to be used to counter challenges to access in the global commons, including air, sea, space, and cyberspace.

So how exactly does ASB envision defeating an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities? It aims at creating pockets and corridors under Washington’s control via a variety of means, including air and sea operations, but also, importantly, potential actions in space and cyberspace. These could be used sequentially or concurrently, depending on the intensity needed. ASB thus relies on a combination of current U.S. military assets, while also requiring new technological investments. The latter includes acquiring penetrating strike assets, such as long-range stealth bombers and the F - 35 Joint Strike Fighter.

An ASB-directed campaign would be aimed at affecting an adversary’s A2/AD systems, attempting to disrupt their abilities of command and control, as well defeating their weapons platforms and missile launchers. An operation against China would most likely initially rely heavily on U.S. cyber and space capabilities to incapacitate and confuse their computer networks. ASB also opens up for conventional strikes on China’s mainland to take out their systems through force, however this is an aspect of the concept that has received widespread interest and criticism.

The criticism leveled against ASB has partly been because of a lack of understanding of the concept. Such confusion is as good as inevitable when discussing a concept whose actual war plan remains classified. Nevertheless, the Pentagon did not do itself any favors when revealing ASB in 2010, and then waiting until 2013 to release an official unclassified document with more details on its content. In the meantime others were left to define ASB, sometimes badly.

One sticking point has been the proposed plan for striking China’s mainland. Some have presented this as the defining, and basically only, feature of ASB. This is not the case. ASB is certainly more than mainland strikes, and envisions giving U.S. decision-makers and military commanders the freedom to choose how to respond during a crisis. This can range, for example, from low-intensity shows of force, medium-intensity cyber attacks, or high-intensity combined operations of mainland strikes and attacks in other domains. In other words, a mainland strike would probably only be initiated in the most extreme of crisis situations.

Lastly, the question of timing is important to note. ASB assumes that an actor like China would be the one to move aggressively first, and thus it is only meant as a response, not as a tool for a first strike. ASB is therefore, ideally, only intended for its deterrent effect. It would create disincentives to aggressive behavior where China's A2/AD means, its first-mover advantage, and short-term dilemma could influence Beijing to act differently. Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 1 12.

If You Want Peace, Prepare For War

Thinking about conflict between the United States and China in the Asia - Pacific is indeed a grim exercise. It is nonetheless a useful one, for that old saying still holds true: if you want peace, prepare for war. From Washington’s perspective, strengthening deterrence by proposing plausible ways of counteracting aggressive behavior from China in an A2/AD environment is crucial. The question re mains, however, whether the ASB is the right approach for the task or if there are other, more credible and convincing ways, of countering China’s A2/AD challenge.

Bibliography

Colby Elbridge, “The War over War with China,” The National Interest , August 15, 2013, available at: external pagehttp://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/the-war-over-war-china-8896call_made .

Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia , (New York, Norton, 2012).

T. X. Hammes, “Why the China Military Strategy Debate Matters,” The National Interest , January 13, 2014, available at: external pagehttp://nationalinterest.org/commentary/debating-military-strategy-towards-china-9692call_made.

James Holmes, “Flashy Name, Old Idea: Anti - Access Strategy,” The Diplomat , October 28, 2012, available at: external pagehttp://thediplomat.com/2012/10/flashy-name-old-idea-anti-access-strategy/call_made.

Department of Defense, “Annual Report To Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” Department of Defense , March 2011, available at: external pagehttp://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdfcall_made

The Air-Sea Battle Office, “Air-Sea Battle: Services Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges,” The Air-Sea Battle Office , May 2013, available at: external pagehttp://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB - ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdfcall_made.

Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategies (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2010).

Thomas G. Mahnken, “China's Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective,” Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 34, No. 3. (2011), Department of Defense, ”Joint Operational Access Concept,” Depart- ment of Defense , January 17, 2012, available at: external pagehttp:// www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/joac_jan%202012_signed.pdfcall_made

Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-access Strategies and their Implications (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2007).

David Kearn, Jr., “Air-Sea Battle and China’s Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenge,” Orbis , Vol. 58, No. 1 (2014).

Thomas Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy towards East Asia” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006).

Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/1997).

The White House “National Security Strategy 2010,” The White House , May 2010, available at: external pagehttp://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdfcall_made.

Department of Defense, “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Department of Defense , January 2012, available at: external pagehttp://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdfcall_made

Avery Goldstein, Rising to the challenge: China's Grand Strategy and Inter- national Security (Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 2005) Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 2011).

Andrew Erickson, “Deterrence by Denial: How to Prevent China From Using Force,” The National Interest , December 16, 2013, available at: external pagehttp://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/war-china-two-can-play-the-area-denial-game-9564call_made.

Paul Krugman, “Hitting China’s Wall,” The New York Times , July 18, 2013, available at: external pagehttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/opinion/krugman-hitting-chinas-wall.htmlcall_made

Sulmaan Khan, “Suicide by Drought: How China is Destroying Its Own Water Supply,” Foreign Affairs , July 18, 2014, available at: external pagehttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141643/sulmaan-khan/suicide-by-droughtcall_made.

Andrew Erickson, “China’s S - shaped Threat,” The Diplomat, September 6, 2011, available at: external pagehttp://thediplomat.com/2011/09/chinas-s-shaped-threat/call_made .

Aaron Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing: An Alternative U.S. China Policy” Foreign Affairs , Vol. 91, No. 5 (2012).

Andrew Erickson, “China’s Near - Seas Challenges,” The National Interest , January 13, 2013, available at: external pagehttp://nationalinterest.org/article/chinas-near-seas-challenges-9645call_made .

James Holmes, “USS Cowpens and China’s First - Mover Advantage,” The Diplomat , December 14, 2013, available at: external pagehttp://thediplomat.com/2013/12/uss-cowpens-and-chinas-first-mover-advantage/call_made .

Greg Jaffe, “U.S. model for a future war fans tensions with China and inside Pentagon,” The Washington Post , August 1, 2012, available at: external pagehttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-model-for-a-future-war-fans-tensions-with-china-and-inside-pentagon/2012/08/01/gJQAC6F8PX_story.htmlcall_made .

Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Department of Defense, February 2010, available at: external pagehttp://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2026jan10%200700.pdfcall_made .

Jonathan W. Greenert and Norton A. Schwartz, “Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty,” The American Interest, February 20, 2012, available at: external pagehttp://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2012/02/20/air-sea-battle/call_made .

Harry Kazianis, “Air-Sea Battle Defined,” The National Interest, March 13, 2014, available at: external pagehttp://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/airsea-battle-defined-10045call_made .

Jonathan W. Greenert and Norton A. Schwartz, “Breaking the Kill Chain: How to Keep America in the Game When Our Enemies are Trying to Shut Us Out,” Foreign Policy Magazine, May 16, 2013, available at: external pagehttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/ breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battlecall_made.

Harry Kazianis, “Air-Sea Battle 2.0: A Global A2/AD Response,” The Diplomat, November 14, 2013, available at: external pagehttp://thediplomat.com/2013/11/air-sea-battle-2-0-a-global-a2ad-response/call_made .

Colby, Elbridge, “Don't Sweat AirSea Battle,” The National Interest, July 31, 2013, available at: external pagehttp://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804call_made .