Eastern DR Congo (DRC): Security Provision in the Context of Continuous Conflict and Militarisation

This is a chapter of DIIS report 2015:01 external page“Insights from Eastern Africa and Sahel: Protection and (In)Security Beyond the State”call_made (edited by Kasper Hoffmann and Louise Wiuff Moe), published by the external pageDanish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)call_made in March 2015.

This case study looks into the provision of security by armed groups in eastern DR Congo and more specifically in the Bunyakiri area situated in the northern part of South Kivu province. It argues that a combination of the long-term erosion of the state’s capacity to provide basic public services to its citizens and continuous multi scalar conflict has paved the way for a multitude of competing actors to emerge as contending security providers. This has produced a self-reinforcing spiral where more and more people seek security services from armed groups and army units. This rising demand for security services has strengthened the authority of armed groups leading to a general militarisation of social relations. So far neither the Congolese government nor the considerable peacebuilding efforts of the international community have been able to reverse this cycle of conflict and militarisation.

Since the early 1990s eastern Congo has gone through a highly complex, multi-scalar series of conflicts, including two regional wars (1996-1997; 1998-2003) that involved the armies of up to seven African countries and numerous foreign and domestic armed groups, with catastrophic human consequences. Officially  the regional wars in the Congo ended in 2002 with the signing of a power-sharing agreement brokered by the international community. But many of the fundamental sources of the conflicts, such as access to land, inter- and intra-ethnic tensions, the explosive issue of the citizenship status of the so-called Rwandophone populations, [1] rising poverty levels, the mismanagement of resources, and parasitic state services, have not been adequately addressed and continue to fuel conflicts and the social logics of militarisation.

The end of the wars was followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2006, which were won by Joseph Kabila and his coalition. But the new political order did not put an end to the conflicts or reverse the social logic of militarisation as various Congolese and foreign armed groups continued their struggles in eastern Congo, often in ever-changing alliances with either the Congolese government or foreign governments, especially the Rwandan and Ugandan governments (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus & Vlassenroot 2008). In effect by focusing so strongly on brokering power-sharing deals among national and regional politico-military elites, and reinforcing the authority of the Congolese state while overlooking many of the underlying causes of the war, the international community has contributed to the perpetuation of a compromised clientilistic political order, and a deeply divided political polity (Autesserre 2010).

To make matters worse, badly designed strategies to tackle non-state armed groups have fed into the dynamics of the conflicts and arguably entrenched the logic of militarisation. One of the important points of the 2002 Sun City peace agreement was the creation of a new unified national army, the Forces Armées de la République du Congo (FARDC), which was supposed to integrate the various fighting forces. However, rather than create a unified army, former adversaries maintained their command structures and continued their struggles. This process ushered in a vicious cycle of army integration and disintegration, which in itself has become a major factor in entrenching community violence and militarisation (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen 2013).

However, in spite of the collapse of state institutions and ongoing conflict, people have continued to seek and find practical solutions to their daily security problems. For instance, in Beni-Lubero (North Kivu) on the Congo–Ugandan border a protection agreement was reached between the rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération and cross-border regional traders, which included the regulation of border trade, the provision of social services (such as roads, hospitals and schools) and the governance of security (Raeymaekers 2010).

Indeed, military protection arrangements are so widespread that they have become part and parcel of the working of the entire sociopolitical order in North and South  Kivu, creating a self-reinforcing spiral, as those who do not enjoy military protection believe that they are at a comparative disadvantage (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen 2014). Even at the micro-level this dynamics of protection is at work. In the town of Misisi, a gold mining site in Fizi territory, the FARDC, enables and protects market stalls in the residential areas, which allows vendors to evade the official market taxes of the chiefdom. All over eastern Congo these self-reinforcing dynamics have made armed actors attractive business partners (Verweijen 2013, pp. 75–6)

Armed groups and the provision of security in Bunyakiri

The Bunyakiri area is a prime example of how state collapse and continuous conflict affect the provision of security. Since the early 1990s Bunyakiri has witnessed a proliferation of armed groups. Historically these were local self-defence militias, which were strongly connected to local customary authorities and mobilised to defend against rival ethnic militias. During the Congolese wars, however, the phenomenon diversified.

Today, armed groups come in many different forms. They can be simple groups of bandits, local self-defence militias, or large-scale rebel groups exercising authority over significant territories. They are often in conflict with each other over the benefits derived from ruling over territory and populations, and tend to claim to defend the interests of their ethnic group, or sub-group, against other ethnic groups, or sub-groups, or predatory state institutions. In many parts of Bunyakiri people feel abandoned by the government and they are accusing it of failing to live up to its responsibilities to protect the population. As a leading figure from Bunyakiri explained:

You get the sense that there is an absence of, or perhaps an abdication by the state in Bunyakiri. In several sub-chiefdoms you do not feel the state! It is absent. And this absence of the state means that the populations live like orphans. And when you are an orphan no holds are barred in the struggle to survive; that is why you see the emergence of armed groups. [2]

Some even accuse it of being in collusion with foreigners – typically labelled “Rwandophones” – which they see evidenced by their presence in the national army:

The way we see the political game there is a slippery slope, and you can see it in our army, those who are the commanders, it is the Rwandophones. For the population this will not work, that is why you have these militias here and there .[3]

Armed groups feed off people’s perceptions and fears, and justify their right to rule with the argument that since the Congolese state is not able or willing to secure the Congolese citizens from the elements threatening them, they are obliged to do it. In other words they claim to assume the neglected responsibilities of the state.

In Bunyakiri today armed groups are crucial players in the daily governance of security. The most important among them is the Raia Mutomboki (translating to “the population is angry”), which is active in the zones of Kalonge, Kalima, Mubugu and Buloho, the Mai-Mai Kifuafua and the Mai-Mai Kirikicho, which are active in Ziralo. These three groups are mainly recruited among the majority ethnic group in the area, the Batembo: a political community which has been marginalised since colonisation. Batembo leaders have used their historical marginalisation to justify the creation of such self-defence militias. In addition there is a mainly Hutu group called the Nyatura, which is also active in the Ziralo zone. The ability of these armed groups to exercise authority varies strongly from case-to-case; the most powerful have ties to larger political-economic networks and are deeply involved with the governance of daily life across a large spectrum of domains at the heart of statehood, including security, justice and taxation. Such groups present an attractive option to businessmen, politicians, foreign armies, under-resourced army units, traditional authorities, and state officials looking for protection or means of enforcement.

In fact the proliferation of armed groups in Bunyakiri is directly linked to the army reintegration process. Many of the leaders of today’s armed groups in Bunyakiri are ex-members of one of the biggest armed groups in South Kivu during the second Congolese war; the Mai-Mai group of general Padiri Bulenda, which was dominated by the Batembo.

Army reintegration was intended to break down old wartime loyalties and replace them with a unified chain of command. But in many cases different factions remained in control of their former units and competed over the distribution of lucrative posts and deployment in resourceful areas. Lacking support, Padiri’s officers were not accorded lucrative positions in the army. Further, many of them were only given ranks, but no troops to command. Combatants were demobilised without any support for their reintegration and found themselves in a marginalised position. Thus, the failed army integration produced a large number of jobless and disaffected former combatants, which could be drawn upon for renewed mobilisation in Bunyakiri. Furthermore, when Padiri’s group left the area the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) (a Rwandan Hutu rebel group created in exile in the Congo by remnants of the Rwandan regime, which was responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994) moved into the void created by their departure. After decades of geopolitical conflict, the Congolese and Rwandan governments signed an agreement in 2009 which revolved around rooting out the FDLR. Under pressure from Rwandan and Congolese forces many FDLR units regrouped in the dense equatorial forest of Bunyakiri. The forces became increasingly abusive against the local populations, which not only reinforced strong anti-foreigner attitudes among the local populations, but also delegitimised the government, and the UN peacekeeping mission (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO), the largest of its kind in the world, which had bases in the area due to their inability to protect the civilian population.

Another aspect, which facilitates the spread of security provision by armed groups, is that the Congolese army and other state security actors, such as the intelligence services and the police, are irregularly and derisorily paid. This not only pushes them into competition with each other and with the armed groups, but also pushes them to demand unofficial fees and taxes for their security services. As a result they too become part of the logic of privatised and partisan security provision, which further decreases the legitimacy of the state.

The security governance of the Raia Mutomboki in Bunyakiri

The Raia Mutomboki rebel movement is an interesting illustration of the dynamics of security provision and militarisation. It represents a grassroots response to a generalised context of insecurity. In areas where this armed group operates, it increasingly rejects the legitimacy of the state and claims political authority. The current Raia Mutomboki started operating in 2011 in a neighbouring territory of Bunyakiri (Shabunda territory) as a response to a series of attacks perpetuated by the FDLR. Initial success against the FDLR endowed the group with considerable popularity and led to massive mobilisation (Hoffmann & Vlassenroot 2014, Vogel 2014). The movement arrived in Bunyakiri at the end of 2011, where a similar development took place. Bolstered by its success in Shabunda, the group pushed the FDLR out, which made it highly popular among many local citizens who had suffered through FDLR domination and extortion schemes. Oce the group had settled in Bunyakiri, its local branch was increasingly taken over by local Batembo ex-Mayi-Mayi commanders associated with Padiri’s group, and increasingly started challenging local state authorities, both military and civilian. It began interfering in the governance of both security and justice.

Individuals or groups began soliciting the help of the Raia Mutomboki as a way to have disputes settled to their advantage (e.g. land conflicts, inheritance disputes, debts, and disputes related to marriages) or simply to settle scores. Many preferred the justice of the armed groups, which were viewed as more accessible, effective, and cheap, yet which in most cases was administered without due process. This development inturn increasingly pushes families to send youths to the Raia Mutomboki, or other armed groups for self-protection. Soldiers of the Congolese army also offer their “services” in this way. Armed actors’ methods may entail intimidation, the harming of its clients’ opponents or the use of force to appropriate goods or land plots. This dynamics is increasingly leading to violent clashes at various levels. The militarisation of the sociopolitical order, therefore, cannot simply be attributed to the activities of armed groups.

Instead militarisation and the production of violence are much more ambiguous processes involving both civilians and military actors. This corroborates the findings of researchers like Verweijen (2013, p. 74) and Kalyvas (2006, p. 14), which show that civilians instrumentalise political and military actors as a means to settle their own private disputes, and thereby are part of the reproduction of violence and militarisation.

Various local leaders also became involved with the Raia Mutomboki. A member of the national parliament, elected in Kalehe territory, reached out to the group to increase his leverage locally and nationally. At gatherings in his home region he praised the actions of the group and encouraged them to fight against foreign rebel groups. Customary chiefs were in constant and direct contact with its commanders and acted as the Raia Mutomboki leadership’s main liaison with local communities. As such they played a crucial role in mobilisation efforts and in increasing the movement’s legitimacy. For some chiefs the new rebel movement presented an attractive instrument to strengthen their claims to customary authority, and their power in border conflicts. The Raia Mutomboki claim that since the Congolese army is not able to protect the population, it is them that should be recognised as the legitimate security force. This leads them to demand an “effort de guerre” (war contribution) from each family.

Thus Raia Mutomboki members pass by each household to claim taxes on a weekly basis. But, even though the movement is marred by internal infighting and loosely structured, and even if its provision of security and justice is highly partisan and erratic, it currently stands as a lesser evil to many local citizens than other security actors (Hoffmann & Vlassenroot 2014), showing that the line between the provision of security and a protection racket is sometimes razor thin.

Key Insights

• The eastern Congo case shows that the long-term inability of the state to provide basic public services to its citizens and continuous multi-scalar conflict have made room for a multitude of actors to emerge as contending security providers. This dynamics has aggravated intra- and inter-ethnic conflict, strengthened armed groups, and led to a general militarisation of social relations.
• Badly designed strategies to tackle non-state armed groups have fed into the dynamics of conflicts and arguably entrenched the logic of militarisation.
• The UN’s association with the Congolese regime delegitimises it in Bunyakiri.
• The Raia Mutomboki displays a similar behaviour to previous security actors: collecting unofficial taxes and fees and interfering in justice provision, whereby they contribute to the militarisation of social relations.
• Insecurity is jointly produced by civilian and security actors, as the former instrumentalise the latter to settle private conflicts.
• Security arrangements often cross the boundary between public and private, highlighting the difficulty of determining the boundary between them.

This is a chapter of DIIS report 2015:01 external page“Insights from Eastern Africa and Sahel: Protection and (In)Security Beyond the State”call_made (edited by Kasper Hoffmann and Louise Wiuff Moe), published by the external pageDanish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)call_made in March 2015.