The New Containment: Changing America's Approach to Middle East Security
3 Aug 2015
By Bilal Saab for Atlantic Council
This article is an executive summary of an external pageAtlantic Council report published 6 July 2015. The full report can be accessed from our Digital Library.
Securing the Middle East after an Iran nuclear deal is the next big challenge for both the region and the international community. The United States and its allies have engaged in tireless diplomacy with Iran over the past few years to produce an agreement that would limit Tehran’s nuclear program for the next decade and a half. However, the hard work does not stop here; in fact, it may have just begun. To protect the deal (assuming one is finalized) and take full advantage of its potential benefits, which include the drastic reduction of the risk of nuclear weapons proliferating in the region, the United States needs a comprehensive strategy for regional security in the Middle East. After all, the ultimate prize and broader objective is and has always been to secure and stabilize the region. A potential nuclear deal with Iran—as strategically significant as it is—is only one piece of the Middle East security puzzle.
In this report, the author makes the case for a more creative and cost-effective US containment approach to regional security in the Middle East that seeks, among other things, to ultimately involve regional stakeholders in a cooperative security system. The author starts with four key assumptions: First, there is no lasting security and stability in the Middle East without real political and economic development. Second, the United States neither can nor should be the agent pushing for change in the region; change should almost always come from within. Third, change cannot happen without first addressing immediate and severe security challenges. And fourth, the United States cannot address those security challenges alone.
The United States has three realistic, strategic options—counterterrorism, hands-on, and cooperative security—to choose from to arrest the collapse of order in the Middle East and improve security conditions. These options may have some commonalities, and some could be pursued in combination, but they are sufficiently distinct to merit a category of their own.
Option One: Counterterrorism
Many of this option’s advocates believe that what is currently happening in the region is reminiscent of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) in Europe. Instead of Catholics and Protestants fighting each other, today’s antagonists are Sunni and Shiite Muslims, whose competition for power similarly is fueled by ancient hatreds and competing faiths. In this holy war, there is very little the United States can do. In fact, the smartest strategy may be to step back and let radical elements within the Sunni and Shiite communities fight it out until the region is “purified.” In this scenario, the United States would continue to prioritize combatting terrorist groups that could target the US homeland. On other issues, however, it would essentially be on the margins, only willing to intervene militarily if Sunni-Shiite violence directly threatens Israel or the stability of global commerce. And even then, the use of force by Washington would be “surgical” and designed to fulfill a specific, short-term goal.
This counterterrorism-focused option is a fair characterization of the Obama administration’s foreign policy in the region (with the exception of NATO’s military intervention in Libya). However, it is evident that the strategy has not produced desirable outcomes. The Middle East’s security problems are hardly limited to terrorism. A minimalist and vastly noninterventionist US security approach risks both undermining US influence in the Middle East and losing traditional US regional partners, whose support is critical to addressing a myriad of other internal and external security threats facing the region—including failed states, civil wars, an intensifying Saudi-Iranian cold war, and Iran’s destabilizing influence—that affect US strategic interests, as well as regional and international security.
Option Two: Hands-On
A hands-on approach, which has roots in the George W. Bush administration’s philosophy toward the Middle East, merits careful discussion and honest evaluation. However, it is unclear if the failures of President Bush’s freedom agenda in the region were purely due to poor policy implementation. Indeed, securing the Middle East through heavy military intervention and promotion of free elections (with little regard for other equally if not more important elements of democracy, including rule of law, good governance, and institution-building) was a risky and flawed strategy. The disastrous US experience in Iraq since 2003 provides enough warning about the consequences of US-led nation-building in the Middle East. Regardless of its intentions, Washington does not have sufficient economic resources, local knowledge, or political commitment to the region to do it right.
But beyond Iraq, Washington’s push for free elections in Gaza brought Hamas—a group labeled as terrorist by the US government—to power. In Lebanon, Washington’s cluttered support for anti-Syrian Lebanese politicians backfired and consequently increased Hezbollah’s influence. Pressuring Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other regional partners to open up politically also was ineffective, partly due to internal resistance to what was understandably perceived as US meddling.
Option Three: Cooperative Security
A robust US containment approach to Middle East security ultimately would seek to help create a reasonably secure political space in the Middle East in which US regional partners can lead this period of transition with the least amount of violence and chaos. Such an approach that effectively:
- prevents Iran’s possession of nuclear arms and, more broadly, the spread of nuclear weapons in the region;
- deters large-scale military conflict and, if deterrence fails, intervenes militarily on the side of US partners;
- stops escalation in the event of another war between Israel and Hezbollah and/or Israel and Hamas;
- reduces the scope and severity of civil wars;
- degrades violent, extremist groups; and
- limits the destabilizing influence of Iran in the region
would significantly contribute to the development of a cooperative security system in the region. In such a system, formal or informal, security would be a shared goal, jointly attained through regional bargaining, coordination, cooperation, and even competition, but in ways that effectively prevent escalation and limit violence and conflict. It is hardnosed, realist arms control, but with broader applications than weapons cuts and limitations.
While cooperative security is a more sustainable and strategically sound security option for the United States and the region than the other two options, there should be no illusions about its inherent challenges. Indeed, it is unfortunate but not coincidental that this better option also happens to be the most complex and difficult to pursue. Nurturing a culture of arms control in the region will be an incredibly hard and lengthy process, especially in today’s increasingly volatile environment.
Because of the depth and scope of the political and security problems currently facing the Middle East, one would not be faulted for believing that no multilateral arms control initiative could ever be seriously entertained and practiced in that part of the world.external page[1] How could arms control succeed in a region that is deeply troubled, dangerously torn apart, and heavily militarized? Indeed, with Middle East order collapsing, the prospect of countries in the region cooperating with each other at a time when they feel most threatened and concerned about their relative security seems presently unthinkable. Thus, the unprecedented move of placing real, verifiable, and mutual limitations on these countries’ sovereignty, state secrets, and defense armaments for the collective goal of reducing regional insecurity seems even more far-fetched.
But it is precisely because of those reasons that arms control should be seriously pursued in the Middle East. Indeed, the Middle East, more so than at any other time, is in desperate need of a venue where countries in the region can discuss a host of security threats that pose a mutual danger and agree on a code of conduct for human and regional security.external page[2] For such a forum (and ideally a regime) to have any chance of materializing (the Middle East is the only region in the world not to have such a forum), it must not only be region-wide and inclusive but also conceived by and for the region. Though middle powers including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have risen over the past few years, the buy-in of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Egypt—the most pivotal states in the region—is most important.
Emphasis on local design and ownership of a regional security system notwithstanding, the United States and its extra-regional partners and allies can and should help facilitate the creation of such a system by serving as a critical node for cooperation, convening, facilitating, guiding, and providing technical and diplomatic assistance when needed.
This would not be the first time the United States tried to engineer Middle East security talks. It did so in 1991 following the multilateral peace discussions launched by the US-led Madrid Peace Conference. Made up of thirteen Arab states, Israel, a Palestinian delegation, and several other entities, an Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group was created to complement the bilateral tracks between Israel and the Palestinians on the one hand, and Israel and Syria on the other. ACRS focused on confidence-building and security-related issues but produced largely symbolic results. It ultimately collapsed in 1995, primarily due to failed attempts at bridging differences between Egypt and Israel on security priorities. Other important reasons for failure include the exclusion of key, confrontational states that carried a great deal of influence—Iran, Iraq, and Libya—and Syria’s and Lebanon’s boycotting of the talks. That Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria—all states suspected of having weapons of mass destruction-programs at the timeexternal page[3]—were not present all but guaranteed the failure of the talks.
There is no question that the regional context has shifted dramatically since ACRS. Syria is ravaged by civil war. Iraq is a torn nation. Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi is gone. Lebanon broke free from Syria (though it is still controlled by pro-Iran Hezbollah). Egypt’s regional weight has sharply decreased due to the upheavals of the past four years. Then, of course, there is Iran, whose nuclear program was not a major item of discussion two decades ago, but has now completely reshuffled the deck in terms of regional security and nonproliferation diplomacy. Furthermore, the status-affirmation and assertiveness of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar will force any potential regional security talks to take the views of these states into account; gone are the days when Egypt spoke for all Arabs. These emerging actors add an additional layer of complexity to any potential talks, which makes the task of understanding their interests and concerns even more important.
US leadership was crucial for the launch of ACRS. Secretary of State James A. Baker, in particular, played an instrumental role in pushing Israel and the Arab states to participate in the talks. Baker was highly respected by his Arab counterparts due to his toughness, straightforwardness, and impartiality. A new ACRS would require Washington to assign a veteran Middle East Special Envoy who could bring many of Baker’s qualities and diplomatic skills.
But beyond US diplomatic leadership, the United States would have to strengthen its security and political relations with its traditional partners in the region and ideally negotiate defense treaties with those that are most vulnerable and willing—the Arab Gulf states. Among other obvious benefits, a closer and better-functioning security relationship with Washington would provide these partners with a stronger incentive to participate in security talks with their archrival—Iran—without having to worry about bargaining from a position of relative weakness. Indeed, Saudi Arabia and other US partners would never agree (and rightly so) to a regional security architecture that sanctions Iran’s perceived dominance and increases their security vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Tehran. But on the other hand, and equally important, a regional security architecture that is specifically designed to weaken or “gang up on” Iran will also fail (Iran clearly would not participate in such a multilateral security arrangement). Therefore, the United States would need to engage in an artful balancing act to reassure its partners, while also being sensitive to Iran’s legitimate security interests.
Regardless of the nature of US strategies for Middle East security, regional security will remain lacking, and long-term stability in the Middle East will remain elusive if the Arab world fails to make a serious push for political and economic development. However, the process of historical change in most parts of the Arab world cannot fully materialize or even begin to achieve desirable outcomes without first addressing the immediate and severe security challenges currently plaguing the region.
The hope is that as regional insecurity decreases, the likelihood of reform increases; or, in other words, positive change would actually become possible. This proposition is worth debating, however briefly. The Arab uprisings were supposed to be a wake-up call for governments in the region. “Reform or die” was meant to be the Arab Awakening’s clearest message. With the exception of Tunisia, it seems that the lesson most Arab governments have drawn from the past five years is to double down on repression, instead of easing up. Indeed, the securitization of politics continues to be the preferred course of action for most governments in the region.
The United States can always try to come up with a more balanced and effective package of positive and negative incentives to push its partners and adversaries to institute good governance and reform their national economies. But if the history of US efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East is any guide, that approach faces serious limitations. The truth is that sustainable and peaceful change almost always comes from within. But will that type of change ever come? The concern is that, if the United States manages to effectively address many of the sources of internal and external insecurity, the motivation of many governments in the region to reform might actually decrease. A greater sense of internal safety and tranquility might encourage Arab governments to revert to the status quo ante and further delay change. Thus, the sense of urgency might drastically decrease.
It is tempting to argue that the United States should use the pressure generated by regional chaos as a tool or stark reminder to urge its partners to reform, or that it should make its efforts to help address regional insecurities conditional on their willingness to reform. While it sounds like a smart idea at first glance, it is a nonstarter. The United States should do whatever it can to help prevent the total collapse of order in the Middle East, simply because it is in its own interest to do so, regardless of what its partners choose to do internally.
“Whatever the course, however long the process took, and whatever its outcome,” President George H. W. Bush said on Soviet reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev, “I wanted to see stable, and above all peaceful, change.”external page[4] The Middle East is currently going through its own revolutionary changes, and it is critically important, as Bush National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft cautioned at a time when the Soviet empire was collapsing, to “mold and guide [these changes] into channels that would produce the right outcome.”external page[5]
external page[1] Bilal Y. Saab, “The Future of Arms Control in the Middle East,” The Middle East Journal, vol. 67, no. 3 (Summer 2013), pp. 426-436.
external page[2] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Towards a Regional Security Regime for the Middle East: Issues and Options, Report of the SIPRI Middle East Expert Group with a New Afterword by Peter Jones (Stockholm, October 2011), p. 43, http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRI2011Jones.pdf.
external page[3] Ibid. Summary of the 1998 report.
external page[4] Bartholomew Sparrow, The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security (New York: Public Affairs, 2015), p. 430.
external page[5] Ibid.