Russia and the future of the INF

This article explains the history and significance of the INF and debunks the argument about the threat posed by the American system. It goes on to propose a few alternate reasons for this rhetoric and comments on the future of the INF.

The INF was signed on 8 December 1987, by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The result of negotiations which spanned the better part of the decade, the agreement was triggered by the 1977 deployment of the Soviet Union’s RSD-10 (SS-20 by NATO designation), an advanced intermediate-range missile which could target all of Western Europe. NATO responded with a “dual-track” strategy towards the end of 1979. The first track was a push for arms control negotiations to re-balance the number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) deployed by the superpowers at the lowest possible level. The second track was a plan to respond in kind by deploying almost 600 upgraded missiles in Western Europe beginning in the closing months of 1983.[1]

The INF banned the current deployment and future development of any missiles with a range of 500 to 5000 km and their related support equipment. The agreement covered both the territory of the two superpowers and that of their allies. The SS-20 and its NATO counterpart, the Pershing II, which had prompted the negotiations, were banned. However, the INF also outlawed a number of other types of missiles. In all, 846 NATO missiles and 1846 Soviet missiles were eliminated.[2] This was considered a significant contribution to the strategic balance between the superpowers because missiles of this type are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to defend against. This is the case because these missiles are smaller and more maneuverable than ICBMs, and can be launched at steep angles, which allows for an extremely high warhead velocity in the terminal phase of flight. Furthermore, their limited range implies a very short flight time, making it an ideal first-strike weapon. Additionally, some missiles of this type can be mounted and launched from vehicles. This mobility results in a massive increase in the intelligence and strategic planning assets needed to account for the movements of these platforms.

Today the missiles which the United States and USSR agreed to eliminate are divided into a number of subcategories: IRBMs (3000-5500 km range), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs, 1000-3000 km range), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, 70-1000 km range). The treaty did allow SRBMs with a range of less than 500 km, however. According to the Congressional Research Service, India, Iran, and possibly North Korea possess IRBMs. The nations which possess MRBMs are Israel, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran.[3] Recently, however, at least one more country appears interested in rejoining this list: Russia.

Recent statements by Russian officials have indicated that U.S. plans to establish ground-based midcourse missile defense (GMD) installations in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus have led them to consider withdrawing from the INF. On 15 February 2007, Army General Yury Baluyevsky, the chief of the Russian General Staff, stated, “It is possible for a party to abandon the [INF] treaty [unilaterally] if it provides convincing evidence that is necessary to do so. We currently have such evidence,” a reference to American GMD plans.[4] The head of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces went even further, saying that if Poland and the Czech Republic were to agree to host the GMD components in question, “the Strategic Missile Forces would be able to target these systems.”[5] While other officials quickly toned down the rhetoric- Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov a day later said that while withdrawal was an option, no decision had been made one way or another- the message was clear.[6] Russia, through a variety of sources, was voicing its objections to this development.

A look at the reality of the situation reveals that these statements should not be taken at face value. As US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice put it, “When it comes to missile defense, no one would suggest- anyone who knows anything about this would [not] suggest- that somehow ten interceptors deployed in Poland are going to threaten the thousands of warheads in the Russian deterrent.”[7] This is absolutely correct. As the GMD system has yet to demonstrate the capability to destroy even one modern missile under anything close to realistic operational circumstances, the planned interceptors pose absolutely no threat to Russia’s strategic missiles. Furthermore, several pieces of the planned system architecture won’t be ready for deployment for a number of years. Even if a mature system were to demonstrate the capability to intercept a modern ballistic missile, because any missiles launched at the United States from Russia would pass over the Arctic region, interceptors located in Poland would have to catch them from behind. This would be a big capability to ask of any system. Seeing as Russia has 503 deployed ICBMs, their Cold War-level arsenal could very easily overwhelm whatever the United States chooses to field.[8]

So, if the proposed US shield doesn’t threaten Russia’s actual arsenal, why are these high-ranking officials making such bellicose statements? One factor is certainly the cynical views of America’s long-term intentions held by senior Russian politicians. Some fear that fear that the GMD deployment presages the eventual basing of other types of weapons at these installations. Others argue that if Russia’s nuclear capabilities continue to degrade and the GMD’s spiral development process enhances its capabilities, the system could eventually pose a threat to Russia’s deterrent force, though the veracity of these claims remains dubious. One Russian commentator characterized the motivation for the GMD system as a desire to “expand US military and strategic capabilities and constrict those of other states that have nuclear missiles, Russia and China most of all.”[9] Regardless of which motivation is attributed to Washington, the rogue state rationale used by the latter to justify US missile defense plans clearly is not resonating in Moscow.

What is resonating is that the U.S. military may soon be operating in what Russia considers its backyard. The eastward of expansion of NATO has prompted calls from Russia to accommodate its concerns. However, after decades of oppression by Moscow-backed communist regimes, Eastern Europeans are not particularly inclined to give Russia veto power over their strategic future. Enter the INF withdrawal option: this heavy-handed approach to force Poles and Czechs to take Russia seriously will likely have the opposite effect. As Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg put it recently, Moscow’s bellicose statements provide “perfect arguments for an expansion of NATO.”[10]

Few can pin Russia’s threat of INF withdrawal as a response to any one particular factor. What is clear is that the so-called threat posed by the proposed US GMD system cannot be considered to be a serious candidate.

Another possibility is that emerging threats posed by 3rd party IRBM and MRBM acquisitions have prompted a reconsideration of the treaty. However, if Russia wanted to demonstrate its oft-stated preference for a multipolar world, it would seek to draw these nations into the INF rather than kill the treaty. Granted, the Bush administration’s pessimistic view of arms control treaties might make this difficult, but certainly the United States would have nothing to lose in trying to limit other nations’ strategic missile forces in the same ways it has voluntarily limited its own.

Increasing the breadth of the treaty would be very constructive, especially as it could ease the nuclear standoff with Iran. Russia, with its relatively good relations to the Islamic Republic, is particularly suited for this task. Expanding the treaty to include Iran would serve Russian interests. By further downgrading the threat Iran poses, Russia would remove the impetus to install GMD components in Eastern Europe. Russia claims that these deployments are a destabilizing step for European security. Paradoxically, its proposed response would further damage stability by ending one of the most comprehensive and successful arms control agreements in history.

[1] Federation of American Scientists, “Intermediate Range Forces [INF] Chronology,” Accessed 2 March, 2007. Available: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/inf-chron.htm.
[2] RIA Novosti, “Russia May Unilaterally Quit INF Treaty,” 16 February 2007.
[3] Congressional Research Service, “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries,” 26 July 2005. Available: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30427.pdf.
[4] RIA Novosti, “Russia Missile Forces Ready to Quit INF Treaty,” 19 February 2007.
[5] Ibid.
[6] RIA Novosti, “No Final Decision to Quit INF Treaty- FM Lavrov,” 16 February 2007.
[7] Viktor Litovkin, “Rice Cuts No Ice In Moscow,” United Press International, 2 March 2007.
[8] Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Project, “Strategic Rocket Forces,” 31 December 2006. Available: http://russianforces.org/missiles/.
[9] Mikhail Barabanov, “Weapons of Alliance,” Kommersant, 13 February 2007.
[10] Stefan Nicola, “US Missile Plans for Europe,” United Press International, 14 February 2007.