Reclaiming democracy in Central, Eastern Europe

Slovakia, September 1998: Parliamentary elections see the governing coalition of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, criticized domestically and internationally for his backsliding on democracy and his isolationist policies, challenged by an alliance of opposition parties stressing their democratic and European aspirations. In an energetic and polarized political campaign, civil society groups make a broad effort to provide voters with information about the elections, to encourage their participation and to monitor the electoral process. A neck-and-neck race ensues. Eventually, 84 percent of voters turned out, and in an electoral competition deemed fair by the international community, the populist-nationalist Meciar government is replaced by a democratic coalition government, under Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda.

Croatia, January 2000: Parliamentary elections take place, ousting the Croatian Democratic Union of the recently deceased President Franjo Tudman, whose nationalist and semi-authoritarian politics dominated the country since its independence in 1990. In a civic coalition for free and fair elections, NGOs rally voters for democratic change, provide election-related information and get out the vote. Seventy-five percent of voters turn out on the day. In parallel, long-divided democratic opposition parties form two coalitions that win the elections and take office under Prime Minister Ivica Racan.

Serbia, September 2000: Through early presidential elections, nationalist strongman Slobodan Milosevic attempts to prolong his rule, but is successfully challenged by Vojislav Kostunica, candidate of the newly united Democratic Opposition of Serbia. A broad civil society coalition provides voter information, calls on citizens to go to the polls and ensures election monitoring, while a youth resistance movement campaigns against Milosevic's quasi-dictatorship and demands democratic change. The ballot is clearly manipulated in Milosevic's favor. Hundreds of thousands take to the streets to protest, eventually forcing Milosevic to resign and bringing the democratic opposition to power under President Kostunica, a result confirmed by a landslide victory in parliamentary elections two months later.

Georgia, November 2003: The "For a New Georgia" bloc of President Eduard Shevardnadze, whose ten-year rule has increasingly led Georgia into political, social and economic crisis, is declared victorious in parliamentary elections. Suspicions of massive electoral fraud are substantiated by independent election monitors. In what comes to be known as the Rose Revolution, the political opposition, civil society and youth groups stage increasingly powerful street protests that reach their height when protesters peacefully interrupt the opening session of the new parliament. As a result, Shevardnadze resigns and new elections are held for both the parliament and the presidency. The democratic opposition under Mikheil Saakashvili wins overwhelming victories and Saakashvili is confirmed as president.

Ukraine, November 2004: Presidential elections are held to determine Leonid Kuchma's successor. Kuchma's presidency has led Ukraine increasingly away from democracy. His designated successor, Viktor Yanukovych, is challenged by Viktor Yushchenko, the joint candidate of the united democratic opposition. To ensure a democratic electoral process, civil society groups carry out various campaigns to provide information, encourage a high turnout and monitor the electoral process, while youth groups publicly demand political change. The official result of the run-off gives Yanukovych a clear lead, but is contested by election monitors, who provide evidence of massive manipulations of the ballot. In response, the democratic opposition and civil society groups mount month-long protests that bring hundreds of thousands into the streets of Kiev. Under the pressure of the Orange Revolution, the supreme court eventually orders repeat elections. Viktor Yushchenko becomes the new president.

Reclaiming democracy through elections

The sequence of events that has swept through Central and Eastern Europe in recent years is remarkable. What initially seemed to be individual incidents of democratic readjustment in Slovakia and Croatia have expanded into a series of spectacular political transformations in a pattern of "color revolutions" in countries as diverse as Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Some observers have even framed these developments as a "fourth wave of democracy."[1] While observers may differ in the terminology they employ and in their overall assessments of the events, they generally agree on a number of characteristics common to these recent democratic changes.

First and foremost, all these countries underwent initial democratic reform in the early 1990s. Once communism had collapsed, they established the basic institutions of democracy and held competitive elections. Constitutions were drafted that enshrined fundamental civil and political liberties, and first moves were made toward the development of the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Political parties emerged and reflected social pluralism and differing views, as did rapidly developing civil society structures and independent media. Market principles were introduced and privatization started to transform the economy. As these countries embarked on multiple political, economic and social transitions, hopes were high that Slovakia and Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, along with their other neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, would quickly come to resemble Western liberal democracies and integrate with European and international structures.

These expectations were soon frustrated, however. War broke out in the former Yugoslavia and shattered democratic hopes. Reforms stalled in Slovakia, Georgia and Ukraine, and within a few years many moves toward democracy were reversed. Although they were brought to office in free and fair elections, the governments of Meciar, Tudman, Milosevic, Shevardnadze and Kuchma began to disregard democratic principles and to manipulate fledgling institutions in order to consolidate their power. Over time, executive pressure was systematically broadened to affect any realm that could ensure democratic checks and balances, from political opponents, parties and institutions to the independent media and civil society organizations. All manner of state resources, from legal changes to administrative procedures to security apparatuses, were employed to silence dissent, while corrupt privatization practices served to solidify the economic status quo in favor of the ruling elites. Within a few years, democracy had become a facade for political regimes that were increasingly authoritarian in nature.

Although dubious in their democratic credentials, over the 1990s, leaders in the five countries still felt the need to justify and legitimize their actions before the public. One mechanism was strong nationalist rhetoric. The leaders argued that newly independent countries needed to consolidate and fend off domestic and foreign threats, for which a strong center of power, rather than dispersed democratic politics, was required. This reasoning resonated with many citizens as all these countries had only just emerged from the larger, multi-ethnic Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. It provided a considerable social foundation for non-democratic politics in the five countries, although one that would weaken over time, as statehood was less and less in question.

Elections have been held regularly since the early 1990s in order to draw legitimacy from within and international acceptance from without, and even regularly confirmed the support base within society for the "strong leadership" approach. But while Meciar and Milosevic, Tudman and Shevardnadze had originally come to office through free and fair elections, they grew increasingly uncertain of the support they could muster in society and started to manipulate subsequent ballots, using biased coverage in government-controlled media, changed election laws to sideline the political opposition and, ultimately, full-fledged electoral fraud.

But, despite their increasingly far-reaching and aggressive attempts to control power, political leaders in the five countries never managed to fully subdue their societies. Several realms remained outside the control of the state, embodying important "islands of democracy." These included a political opposition that, while often divided, remained present and visible in both national and local politics. Elements of independent, usually commercial, media existed that could, at least in part, counter the propaganda of state-controlled broadcasters and newspapers. Parts of the business community came to see rampant corruption and cronyism as liabilities and readied resources for political change. Civil society groups became increasingly vocal in addressing democratic deficits in their countries. Especially the younger, urban and educated segments of society grew more and more critical of the social situation in their countries, domestic politics and their international isolation.

The temptation of incumbent governments to grab for power and their need for legitimacy and the survival of democratic pockets within their societies were cross-pressures that resulted in societies that were both authoritarian and democratic[2]. However, authoritarianism and democracy are essentially irreconcilable, and the hybrid nature of these regimes eventually led to their downfall through elections, the most democratic of means.

A very similar sequence of events followed in all five countries. A semi-autocratic government prepared for elections in order to gain renewed legitimacy, yet was challenged by declining public support and a united opposition that portrayed the elections as a referendum on the status quo. Through independent media, and supported by civil society activities aimed at voter mobilization, this fundamental choice was addressed to the public at large, resulting in a strong turnout, especially among classical change voters, such as younger, urban and educated citizens. Defensive government attempts to manipulate the elections in its favor were either limited by the presence of independent election monitors, as in Slovakia and Croatia, or disclosed to the voting public, which came into the streets en masse to protest election fraud, as in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Democratic challengers ultimately prevailed and took office.

For this scenario to have succeeded in returning hybrid regimes to a more democratic path, a number of conditions had to be present. These included an unpopular incumbent leader and government, a united opposition, independent election monitoring, at least some independent media and sources of objective information and a potential for mass mobilization.[3]

Civil society

An important factor affecting the constellation for change was the involvement of civil society. The pre-election campaigns of NGOs, foundations, youth groups and many other civic initiatives made a notable contribution to reclaiming democracy that took place. In Slovakia, in response to the growing neo-authoritarianism of successive governments under Vladimir Meciar, and in parallel with coalition-building on the part of the democratic opposition, civil society joined forces and launched the non-partisan Civic Campaign OK '98 campaign in the run-up to the 1998 parliamentary elections. This project not only helped to return Slovakia to democracy, but it set an important example, soon to be followed by civic activists in other post-communist countries.

Among the first to draw on the Slovak experience were civil society groups in Croatia, with their GLAS 99 campaign. Political and social discontent with President Tudman had grown to such an extent that democratic change seemed possible in the parliamentary elections in January 2000. That such change did eventually materialize owed to civil society taking a stronger role in changing the public discourse and launching an election mobilization effort focusing on a few key target groups. In so doing, GLAS 99 helped to overcome the culture of fear that kept voices of dissent from speaking out against the political and social injustices of Croatia's semi-autocratic regime.

In Serbia, the IZLAZ 2000 (Exit 2000) campaign presented the September 2000 presidential elections as a potential exit from the domestic crisis and international isolation that country experienced under Milosevic. That regime was incomparably more determined to cling to power than the leadership in Slovakia and Croatia was, and it took additional, novel forms of civic action for change. Chief among these was the youth movement OTPOR (Resistance), whose more radical anti-Milosevic campaign was an important complement to the more moderate IZLAZ 2000. These and several other civic initiatives mobilized hundreds of thousands of Serbian citizens to protest election fraud, eventually forcing Milosevic to resign.

This more radical pattern of civic engagement was replicated by Georgian civil society, and especially the youth group KMARA (Enough!), which drew inspiration from Serbia's OTPOR. This relatively small youth movement, in cooperation with a few established NGOs, effectively challenged the Shevardnadze regime. At times bold, at times funny, but always strictly nonviolent, KMARA paved the way for the mass protests that took place in the aftermath of the rigged parliamentary elections in November 2003. With this Rose Revolution, successful civic action for electoral change also made its entry into the post-Soviet space.

One of the driving forces of Ukraine's spectacular Orange Revolution in 2004 was the Civic Campaign PORA (It's Time!), a voter mobilization program that involved numerous civic groups and volunteers across Ukraine. PORA combined the two forms of civic campaigning observed in the other countries. One of its wings, Yellow PORA, pursued a more moderate campaign aimed to ensure free and fair elections, as did OK '98, GLAS 99 and IZLAZ 2000. At the same time, a second wing, Black PORA, espoused more radical demands and openly advocated the ouster of President Kuchma, much like OTPOR had done in Serbia and KMARA in Georgia.

Distinctions

The force with which all these citizens defended their democratic rights often took those in power by complete surprise. While there are many parallels among these five cases, distinctions often remain hidden under labels such as "color revolutions." A central factor determining the outcome of electoral change was the nature of the semi-authoritarian regime in question. The degree of its consolidation of power and control over society, whether there was any competing leadership and the use of identity politics led to very different scenarios of electoral change, which took the form of transformative elections in Slovakia and Croatia but electoral revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. This regime factor is of particular relevance for the prospects of further electoral changes in post-communist Europe, which have rapidly decreased in recent years as remaining semi-authoritarian regimes have hardened and narrowed the space for any remaining agents that may potentially become carriers of democratic change in their countries.

A few overarching principles for civic campaigns pressing for electoral change do exist, including non-partisanship and non-violence, and have been at the core of an active transfer of experience among countries undergoing electoral breakthroughs. At the same time, no universal recipe exists for civil society efforts to assert democracy. Instead, strategies and resources need to be commensurate with the very specific circumstances of individual countries, thus demanding a high degree of flexibility and creativity among all pursuing and assisting democratic change.

One of the few constants across instances of electoral breakthrough has been the critical importance of young people. Youth movements figured prominently as both subjects and objects of recent electoral change from Slovakia to Ukraine, although differing in form and extent across the countries. First-time voters embodied an important reservoir of support, as did youth volunteering for NGOs and civic campaigns, and wherever protests occurred, young people were typically at the forefront. While in the short-run this upsurge in youth participation contributed much to achieving democratic breakthroughs, the longer-term effects are less certain, as many young people quickly retreated into their private lives and discontinued their public involvement.

Less obvious has been the influence of the economy on democratic change. Actual economic dynamics - growth and inflation, income and unemployment - make for very mixed effects, suggesting no clear causal links, although it is possible to find specific examples of economic influence. More subtly, perceptions and beliefs held by the broad public on socioeconomic issues, such as corruption, affected the legitimacy of semi-autocrats. More overtly, private business played a role in electoral breakthroughs, not least through commercial broadcasters' countering the propaganda of state-controlled media. These examples indicate that economic influences on democratization have been intertwined with a broader set of social and political factors.

Other factors leading to change included a competitive authoritarian state that allows space for a democratic opposition, "return to Europe" civic nationalism that assists in civil society mobilization, a preceding political crisis, a pro-democratic capital city, unpopular ruling elites, a charismatic candidate supported by a united opposition, youth politics, regionalism and foreign intervention. Of course, whether democracy was thereafter consolidated in a given country has depended on further conditions, including the new governments' ability to come to terms with immediate past, divisions among democrats, the return of political parties affiliated with the previous regime and manifest progress with democratic reforms.

The overall positive record of recent electoral breakthroughs in Central and Eastern Europe, however, provokes the question of continued democratic change in the region and further afield. Reinstating democracy through elections does not necessarily provide a model applicable to other post-communist countries. The hardening and sophistication of remaining authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, mounting backlashes against democracy assistance, the rising populist threat to liberalism and the weakening of the European Union's soft power place powerful obstacles in the way of continued democratic change.

Notes

1. See, among many others, Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," Journal of Democracy, July 2005; and "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Compromise and Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics, January 2002.
2. Analysts have described such regimes variously as "semi-autocratic" or "neo-authoritarian" and as "illiberal" or "phony" democracies. See e.g. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, November-December 1997; and Lucan A. Way, "The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, March 2004.
3. Other factors, such as splits within the security apparatus, the availability of local resources and foreign support, and pressures and incentives by the international community, were also observed. See Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions," Journal of Democracy, October 2006; Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," Journal of Democracy, July 2005.