The Russian Federation’s New Foreign Policy Concept and Threatening a Pivot towards Asia: A New Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation’s New Foreign Policy Concept

This article was external pageoriginally publishedcall_made by the external pagePolish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)call_made on 3 January 2017.

On 30 November 2016, President Vladimir Putin signed a new Russian Foreign Policy Concept. In the document, Russia states its aspirations to pursue an active policy in the field of international security (especially in the Middle East). One of its instruments will be seeking opportunities for cooperation with the administration of the new president of the United States. Relations with the EU will be reduced to economic cooperation, while more focus will be placed on developing political and economic relations with Asian countries.

The Russian Federation’s previous Foreign Policy Concept was published as recently as February 2013. The Russian authorities justify the relatively rapid revision of the document by the necessity to adjust the most important guidelines to reflect the changing international situation. In the past two years, Russia has made changes in almost all major policy documents, such as the doctrines of war, maritime and information security, relating indirectly to foreign and security policy.

Political and Economic Cooperation

Post-Soviet states such as Belarus (forming with Russia the Union State), Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are singled out in the new Foreign Policy Concept, as the most important partners for Russia. There is no declaration of a need to develop relations with Ukraine, but this does not mean that Russia will give up its active policy aimed at depriving Ukraine of prospects of close cooperation with Western partners and isolating it in the international arena.

The new Foreign Policy Concept places less political significance than the 2013 version on the integration of post-Soviet space in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This is probably due to the difficulties encountered by the EAEU, which brings together countries with inefficient and diverse economic models for which Russia, in spite of its dominant position, is unable to become a source of modernisation. It is also doubtful that countries with authoritarian political systems are able to create an efficient economic union.

Asia, especially China, Indonesia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia, has become a key area of Russia political activity. Russia also continues to attach importance to contacts in the BRICS framework, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Russia-India-China (RIC) platform. The new Foreign Policy Concept places great importance on the Middle East and regulation of the conflicts in this region (specifically, in Syria).

The role of cooperation with the European Union is limited in the new document to economic issues, although efforts to the abolish the visa regime will be continued.

The Role of Russia in International Security

The new Foreign Policy Concept stresses the need to create an international coalition to fight terrorism far more than in 2013. Moreover, the activities of terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State, were considered to be among the most pressing threats. Undoubtedly, the purpose of the document is to create the impression that Russia's involvement in Syria is a counter-terrorist operation and, at the same time, it signals readiness to cooperate in this regard with the United States. In practice, however, Russia’s intention is only to improve its own bargaining position and to oppose an internationally enforced change of leadership in Syria and other Middle Eastern countries. This means that Russia will continue to engage in the Middle East, especially in Syria.

As in previous documents of this type, Russia declares the necessity of cooperation with the United States, especially in the fields of arms control, nuclear potential and resolving conflicts around the world. However, the new Foreign Policy Concept makes no reference to the need for internationalisation of the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), which may mean that Russia will decide not to meet its provisions.

Relatively little attention was paid to cooperation with NATO. The document emphasises that it should be based only on partnership relations, but, according to Russia’s military doctrine, NATO is still seen as the main potential adversary.

In comparison to the document published in 2013, the importance of the Arctic in foreign policy was increased. This is compatible with the military and naval doctrines that stressed the necessity to increase Russia’s military presence there. The Arctic, because of its strategic importance and natural resources, could become an area of intense international competition.

Russia once more calls for the UN’s role in resolving international conflicts to be increased. Moreover, the new Foreign Policy Concept stresses that no currently existing military or political alliance is not able to resist the whole spectrum of challenges and threats. At the same time, Russia still sees the Collective Security Treaty Organisation as one of the most important elements of the security system in the post-Soviet space.

The “Russian World” Ideology and Information Space

The new Foreign Policy Concept places much greater significance on the “Russian World” (Russkiy mir) ideology, which should influence how Russia conducts its external policy. It openly states that the Russian Orthodox Church will support Russian government and diplomatic actions. It is also planned to increase the role of Russian media as a source of information to influence foreign public opinion (see the Russian Federation Doctrine of Information Security, of 5 December 2016). One of the main tasks of the media will be to change Russia’s negative image in the world. Despite the economic crisis, it can be expected that the level of funding for mass media will at least be maintained (the 2017 budget assumes that Russia Today will receive additional support to launch the channel in French), which will be one of the most important tools for Russian foreign policy.

Conclusions

One of the main aims of Russian foreign policy is to establish Moscow as one of the most important centres of international politics. That is why further strengthening Russian military capabilities and increasing engagement in existing regional conflicts should be expected. Simultaneously, Russia will seek the possibility of agreement, especially in security field, with the administration of the new president of the United States.

The Russian authorities will continue to use foreign policy as an important tool to create in Russian society the image of the state as an international power.

Maintaining its zone of influence (the Eurasian Economic Union), will be still crucial for Russian foreign policy. This means that Moscow will gradually withdraw from the system of “incentives” for the EAEU countries, such as the extended system of economic preferences, and will begin demanding that these countries meet their commitments, for example in relation to pro-Russian security policy. In the event of a change of foreign policy in any of these countries, Russia should be expected to react in the form of media campaigns or economic restrictions, and this may cause further conflicts in the post-Soviet area. Russia also wants to strengthen its influence of other post-Soviet states such as Moldova and Ukraine, which are not members of the EAEU and may seek to implement pro-EU domestic and foreign policies.

Due to the economic situation, Russia will continue to seek potential trade and investment partners. However, cooperation with Asian countries will not replace relations with European Union partners. Russia will try to find allies in the EU, in order to gain influence on policies such as the lifting of sanctions.

It cannot be excluded that Russia will propose United Nations reform in order to enhance the organisation’s efficiency. There is a possibility that Russia will propose the enlargement of the Security Council (while maintaining veto power only for its current permanent members), but only on the grounds of broad consensus. Increasing the United Nations’ role also means increasing Russia’s importance, as Moscow will have the possibility of vetoing the most important decisions concerning international security.

About the Author

Anna Maria Dyner is the Head of the Eastern Europe Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).

Threatening a Pivot towards Asia: A New Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation

This article was external pageoriginally publishedcall_made by the external pageCentre for Eastern Studies (OSW)call_made in December 2016.

On 30 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (the fifth in the history of post-Soviet Russia), which replaced the document issued in February 2013. This new concept, like the previous one, assumes the decline of the West and the end of American dominance in the system of international relations, which is becoming multi-polar. The main objective of the concept is to convince the West to make concessions to Russia, in order to  end  the conflict with it and  normalise mutual relations. The concept suggests that such normalisation is primarily needed by the West, while Russia could find alternative partners in  Asia, with which it has successfully been developing cooperation. To this end, the document exaggerates both the present results and the future prospects of Russian efforts to intensify its cooperation with Asian partners, while at the same time suggesting that only by normalising relations with Russia can the West prevent the conversion of Chinese-Russian relations into an anti-Western alliance. The Concept, on the one hand, highlights Russia’s exaggerated assumptions about the weakness of the West, while on the other it disregards Russia’s own domestic (especially economic) weaknesses and its continuing dependence on economic ties with the West, and also masks the difficulties and potential risks in Russia’s relations with its Asian partners.

Long-term trends and short-term objectives

On the one hand, the Concept is a reflection of how the Russian authorities perceive the fundamental processes in the international arena and how they define their long-term goals. On the other, it serves as an instrument of current Russian foreign policy, sending signals to both its (current) opponents and its (potential) partners.

The Concept repeats its diagnosis of the West from the 2013 document: the West’s weakening, the end of American hegemony, the rise of the new Asian powerhouses, and the formation of a new ‘multi-polar’ world order. Furthermore, Russia’s main policy objective remains unchanged: supporting the emergence of the new global order, and defending it against attempts by the United States and its allies to halt and reverse this process.

The document has been modified with regard to the tactical demands resulting from Russia’s open conflict with the West and the ongoing growth of China’s power. The purpose of these modifications is to demonstrate Russia’s self-confidence and the opportunities opened up to it by the rise of the Asian countries, which can supposedly provide an alternative to its economic ties with the West. These new emphases are intended to convince the West that continuing its current policy towards Russia will only involve additional costs and risks, in the form of escalating conflict, economic losses, and the loss of potential benefits, especially in the form of Russian assistance in the fight against international Islamic terrorism.

The ‘crisis’ in Russian-Western relations and its consequences

According to the Concept, Russia’s relations with the West are in ‘crisis’, the reason for which is the ‘geopolitical expansion’ of – it is worth emphasising – not only NATO, but the EU. The document blames the Western policy of containing Russia and exerting political, economic and informational pressure on it for both regional and global destabilisation.

The Concept signals a change in Russian priorities, towards developing relations with Asian countries and participating in integration processes in Asia. The phrases about ‘prioritising’ the development of relations with the Euro-Atlantic region and the ‘strategic community of aims’ between Russia and the West which were present in the 2013 Concept have been visibly absent from the current version, Similarly all references to the common civilisational identity of Russia and the West have been removed as well.. The EU is no longer Russia’s ‘main’ economic partner, only an ‘important’ one, and the Concept names as a potential partner for cooperation not the EU en bloc, but rather ‘EU member states’. There is no longer any reference to concluding a new basic agreement on strategic partnership, nor of the creation of mechanisms for cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, nor building a ‘shared space’ or a single market. Instead, there are references to harmonisation and joining both European and Eurasian integration processes.

There has also been a shift in the passages referring to the United States: in the previous version of the document, the emphasis (the ‘long-term priority’) had been placed on laying the economic foundations for dialogue. In the new version, Russia declares that it is interested in building a ‘mutually beneficial relationship’ with Washington on issues of strategy and international security, especially in the field of the fight against the threat of international Islamic terrorism. The Concept also warns about the possibility of a ‘serious reaction’ in the event of ‘hostile actions’ by the US, and openly describes the creation of a global anti-missile system as a ‘threat’ to the security of Russia, announcing that it will take ‘appropriate retaliatory measures’.

This part of the Concept dedicated to relations with the West is intended to make the impression that Russia’s revisionist policy in Europe is purely defensive, and that the Western policy of pressure on Russia is doomed to fail, as it is contrary to the change (supposedly purely objective in nature) in the balance of power in the international arena.

Russia’s ‘Asian alternative’

The part of the document concerning relations in the Asia-Pacific region has been given more weight: strengthening Russia’s position in the region and activating relations with the states there is referred to as ‘strategically important’. The document contains the idea of raising relations with the ASEAN countries to the level of a ‘strategic partnership’, and sets the objective of harmonising the integration processes within the Asia-Pacific region and in Eurasia, comprising ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union. Suggestions from the previous version that Russia’s relations with China and India are of equal value have disappeared from the document. China is listed in first place among Russia’s Asian partners, and India comes second. The description of Russia’s relationship with China remain almost the same as in 2013, while that of India has been reinforced with references to ‘historical friendship’ and ‘deep mutual trust’ (relations with China are described solely in terms of a convergence of interests).

It is also important to note the change in the description of Japan, where it is not economic cooperation that is discussed, but rather ‘ensuring stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region’, and from which references to territorial conflicts and the need to resolve them have been removed.

These descriptions reflect the growing importance of China as Russia’s most important partner in the international arena. Russia wants to demonstrate that the relationship-building process with its Asian partners (especially China) is continuing, and wishes to give the impression that these can override its relationships with the West.

At the same time, the descriptions relating to India, Japan and the ASEAN countries indicate that Russia is seeking to diversify its Asian policy and trying to rebalance its relationship with China. The wording used in the document suggests a lack of trust in Russia’s relations with Beijing, while trying to mask the problems in relations with Delhi (due to the intensification of relations between Delhi and Washington, and between Moscow and Beijing). The use of these phrases may be intended to show both the West and China and the other Asian partners that Russia is seeking to rebalance its relationship with Beijing. This is to encourage the West, particularly Washington, to change its policy towards Russia, in order to draw it away from further rapprochement with China.

Unrealistic underlying assumptions and concealing reality

The latest Concept is built on partially false and unrealistic premises, and serves more to conceal reality than to provide an objective and substantive analysis of the international situation. It is based on an exaggerated assessment of the weakness of the West and completely ignores the critical state of the Russian economy and Russia’s low attractiveness as a partner in international cooperation. It falsely presents Russian policy as a purely defensive reaction to the aggressive actions of the West. Moreover, it tries to hide the failure of the attempts of many years to diversify Russia’s economic ties in the direction of Asia, and the ongoing economic dependence of Russia on its economic relationship with the West. It also fails to mention the dangers posed by the growing asymmetry in its relations with Beijing.

About the Author

Witold Rodkiewicz is a senior fellow in the Russian Department at the Centre for Eastern Studies.

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