Prospect of Peace in Yemen: What We Know from Social Science Research

This article was external pageoriginally publishedcall_made by external pagePolitical Violence @ a Glancecall_made on 10 January 2019. external pageImagecall_made courtesy of Rod Waddington/Flickr. external page(CC BY-SA 2.0)call_made

Representatives of the Yemeni government and the external pageHouthi rebelscall_made met external pagein December in Swedencall_made to begin talks to end Yemen’s nearly four year long civil war. Yemen is divided between the Yemeni government and the rebels, who ousted the government from the capital, Sana’a, early in the war. Saudi Arabia led an intervention backing the government, using airstrikes and a blockade and triggering a widespread external pagehumanitarian crisiscall_made.

In Sweden, the government and rebels agreed to withdraw from the critical port of Hodeidah, to external pagerelease 5,000 prisonerscall_made, and to additional negotiations regarding the external pagecity of Ta’izcall_made. However, this agreement has not significantly altered the status quo in Yemen. Both sides have accused the other of external pageviolating the ceasefirecall_made and have their own interpretation of the stipulations concerning the handover of control of the port city. To reach a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), it is critical that both sides uphold their commitments to the ceasefire and to external pagefurther talkscall_made. This piecemeal approach to CPA negotiations is common; peace processes in external pageNorthern Irelandcall_made, Colombia, and the external pagePhilippinescall_made used this strategy, with varying degrees of success.

The disastrous situation on the ground may drive both sides to support long-term negotiations. One prominent negotiation theory claims that talks become more likely when fighting reaches a “external pagemutually hurting stalematecall_made.” When both sides think military victory is impossible, peaceful settlement becomes more attractive than suffering war. Despite the technological sophistication of the Saudi coalition, the conflict has become a external pagestalematecall_made with external pagehigh costscall_made for all sides, including international condemnation of external pageSaudi Arabiacall_made. Given this, the war may be “ripe” for settlement.

However, the negotiations face several hurdles. First is outside interference. external pageMilitary interventionscall_made, like the Saudi mission in Yemen, make wars last longer. In addition, if outside actors try to influence the negotiations, they can sink otherwise external pageviable settlementscall_made. Further, Iran is external pageallegedly supportingcall_made the Houthis as part of their external pageregional power strugglecall_made with Saudi Arabia.

Second, the Houthi rebel’s external pageproposed reformscall_made—a national dialogue, constitutional reform, and decentralization—could jeopardize the peace process. A external pagenational dialoguecall_made is a grassroots mechanism for identifying reforms to prevent or end war; however, these proposals may conflict with elite interests, preventing their implementation. Yemen’s 2013-2014 external pagenational dialoguecall_made did not prevent the current conflict.

Constitutional reform is extremely slow. For example, reforms following Nepal’s civil war lasted eight years. The parties need a transitional framework to fill the legal void during this process—one option, a national transitional government, was rejected external pageby the governmentcall_made.

Decentralization also poses multiple problems. First, disagreements over a federal government undermined the external pagelast national dialoguecall_made. Second, governments tend not to follow through on decentralization promises. In our data on external pageCPA implementationcall_made, only 43% of decentralization reforms were fully implemented within ten years.

Political scientists emphasize two roles for the international community in the peace process. The first is monitoring agreements to ensure both sides keep their promises. Third parties can external pageprovide informationcall_made on compliance or offer to external pageprotect disarmed rebelscall_made from future attacks. Outside guarantees help overcome both sides’ shared distrust to reach a settlement. The December agreement allowed external pagethe UN to monitorcall_made the ceasefire around Hodeidah, but the Yemeni government rejected UN peacekeeping. In our research, we find verification is the key to future external pageimplementationcall_made.

Second, third parties can mediate talks. The Swedish government is facilitating the current negotiations, but they might not be able to deliver peace. When mediators have leverage, they can unintentionally external pageimpose unworkable dealcall_mades. For example, the 2015 South Sudan peace agreement was shaped by mediation involving neighboring countries—as a result, South Sudanese representatives felt the deal was imposed on them and did not implement it.

Considering two future issues will help build a lasting peace. The first is forming a post-war government. Elections are one possibility, but research shows that elections external pageare destabilizingcall_made immediately following civil war. Although a transitional government was rejected by the government, external pagewe findcall_made power-sharing transitional governments can prevent external pagedestabilization from electionscall_made and achieve external pageimplementation successcall_made. The formation of a power-sharing government is a more promising path forward compared to the alternatives external pageproposed by the UN at the fifth day of the meetingcall_made as it brings both sides together to overcome the current impasse on a ceasefire and the control of the Hodeidah port.

Further, a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program, including the formation of a new armed forces, is critical. In the post-war period, former belligerents can disagree on where to assemble for disarmament, who monitors the process, or even the number of fighters to be disarmed. Settling the logistics of the DDR, and the nature of the new armed forces, can prevent delays that could threaten the peace in the future.

Don’t expect the parties to make significant progress when they meet this month and reach an agreement that will immediately end the war in Yemen. CPAs are the result of long and difficult negotiations. The current agreement will be successful if both sides can build trust by meeting their obligations under the agreement and committing to more talks as the most contentious negotiations are still to come.

About the Authors

Matthew Hauenstein is a postdoctoral research associate at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame.

Madhav Joshi is an associate research professor and associate director of the Peace Accords Matrix at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame.

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